

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION: A SKEPTICAL CONTRIBUTION

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1. Introduction

The problems of security and cooperation in Europe can profitably be discussed under the same headings as these made use of under the name of "baskets" in Geneva: "security" in general; "cooperation", and particularly in an economic sense; and the "free flow of persons and ideas". The precise wording should not be our concern here, for our purpose is to try to go into this matter with a view to the future, not so much with a view to the past.

For one thing is now certain: the situation in Europe has changed dramatically from what it was five years, ten years, twenty years ago - which is a truism. What is not a truism is that with the changed situation came also a change in the problématique: what seemed important many years ago dwindles in significance, what did not even exist on the political agenda suddenly takes on great proportions as a problem (1). For politics it makes little sense to claim that we have been able to solve the problems of yesterday when we do it at the expense of more problems for tomorrow, not to mention when we do it today in a way that is remarkably oblivious of the problems already on the horizon created by the progress made.

For progress there was: there is no longer fear of atomic war in Europe (2). Some years ago most politically conscious people seemed to be of the opinion that the likelihood of a major nuclear war on the European continent within their lifetime was considerably above 50%. Something happened to that likelihood, both to the subjective estimate and to the more objective probability, and that has somehow to be understood. To phrase it very simply: the East-West conflict withered away. How did that happen, and what, if anything, came in its place?

1) For some discussion of this, see the author's "Europe: Bipolar, Bi-centric or Cooperative?", Journal of Peace Research, 1972, and various articles on the issue in the Bulletin of Peace Research, 1970 and 1971.

2) Or more correctly: there is no fear of a major nuclear war. That skirmishes might involve the use of mini-nukes is another issue.

To answer this question, one has to have some kind of view as to what the conflict was about. The view taken here is very simple: the conflict was essentially about the type of regime that should prevail in Eastern European countries. The "hust" had slowly, and certainly not without fighting for their privileges, grown accustomed to the Soviet Union as a "communist" state; after the second World War they were faced with the perspective of the sphere of "communism" expanding considerably, and even westwards. It belongs to the picture that Eastern Europe, like Russia before the 1917 revolution, indeed belonged to the sphere of western penetration, both economically, politically, militarily, culturally - and socially in a broad sense, in the sense of defining the social structure that should prevail (3). To change Eastern Europe was not only to curtail western privileges of an imperialistic nature, it was also a challenge to the western powers themselves, a challenge to the validity of the social organization prevailing in these countries. A socialist regime in Rumania constituted no such threat; a socialist regime in Eastern Europe countries sufficiently similar to Western Europe, would be a tremendous challenge provided they were successful in the sense of giving a better life to the majority of the citizens than West itself was able to provide.

There was one complicating factor in the picture: the agreements arrived at during and after the war (Yalta, Potsdam) to a considerable extent taking Eastern Europe out of the western sphere of influence. There was one important reason behind this: Eastern Europe had above all been under German influence, this was epitomized in the Nazi aggression which in Eastern Europe took on the form of a colonial war starkly reminiscent of what western countries had done before in Africa, in the western hemisphere and in Asia(4). Nazi Germany was beaten, for many reasons the Soviet Union stood out as a logical successor overlord. More or less revolutionary processes came about in Eastern European countries, to a large extent with the help or support of the Red Army, and the net result was a fundamental change of system in highly illegitimized regimes that not only had been economically feudal or precapitalist, and politically more or less fascist, but also had been on the wrong side during the war(5).

In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union withdrew from Iran and Finland, and later on from Austria, and limited her direct influence to the sphere defined by the agreements mentioned, the forward expansion of "communism" was used as a pretext in the West for large-scale alliance formation and reformation, under the umbrella of NATO. However, in spite of much searching for that type of evidence, the West has never been able to prove that the Soviet Union or any of her allies in the new regimes had any serious intention of expanding beyond what was stipulated by these agreements(6). Western propaganda has tried to make much out of

3) For an analysis of the Rumanian case, see articles by Tord Håvik and by Amalendu Guha in Journal of Peace Research no. 4, 1974 (forthcoming)

4) We are thinking particularly of the genocidal and culturocidal aspects in either case.

5) For a further analysis of this, see Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Supremacy in the Making (London, Allen & Unwin, 1973), chapter I. Of course, Poland constitutes an exception to this, which is also the reason why the Polish resistance was sacrificed by the Soviet Union in August 1944.

6) They, particularly Stalin, may have asked for more, and hoped to get more.

so-called "inlandization", but the measure exercised by the Soviet Union on this country is so small¹¹⁾/comparative¹²⁾ measure exercised by the major western powers on their neo-colonies, that it has been hard to make such political currency out of it. Thus NATO rests on a colonial error, a blunder of historical proportions (7); which is not to deny that subjectively speaking the politicians who went to that step after the "coup" in Czechoslovakia in 1948 probably were genuinely frightened. The Soviet Union was in a large extent acting out war-time agreements in addition to certainly participating in social processes in Eastern Europe that would have to come about in one form or the other anyhow, but NATO was a post-war phenomenon (although the structural basis had already been laid during the war through allied cooperation), and the Warsaw Treaty Organization was a logical response to NATO six years delayed.

However future historians may sort out the circumstances that led to changes of regime in Eastern Europe, there can be little doubt that they constituted the hard nucleus of the so-called East-West conflict. Hence something had to happen to that nucleus in order for the conflict to wither away - if withered away it has. And it may now be objected that nothing has changed, the regimes are by and large the same, although they may have wobbled, and some of their economic practices may look different today. Hence on what would we rest the thesis of basic change?

On two simple circumstances: even if the regimes in Eastern Europe have not changed, people in the West may have grown accustomed to them; and even if the internal regimes have not changed, West may have discovered that this is not nearly so important as they once believed it to be.

As to the first factor: Conflicts may simply dissolve, not because the objective circumstances change much, but because the attitude to them undergoes even dramatic changes. This is most clearly seen in the case of Western Germany where it took 25 years for a new generation to become sufficiently powerful and numerically strong to impose a new perspective(8). If we agree that most of

(6) continued.- Furthermore, if there had come into power, in France and/or Italy, communist regimes, a further Soviet expansion is not inconceivable. But this is not what the NATO scenario given to the populations of the member countries (i.e. an unprovoked attack on Western European countries) has been about.

(7) Again, relative to its rationale. The thesis is not that the Soviet Union may not be expensive, but that it is not expensive under any and all conditions (as one might have argued in connection with Nazi Germany). Thus, the expansion into Eastern Europe is taken for granted, but seen as a result of very special conditions in the aftermath of a major war - not as proof of inherent aggressiveness. Further, that the Soviet Union will help, subversively, certain forces around the world, including in Western Europe, is also taken for granted - but the adequate response to that is located inside these countries, not in a Cold War context. It is in this sense that the Cold War should be regarded as hoax - a hypothesis to our mind partly verified by the two factors associated in the article with the "withering away of the Cold War" (the time factor, and the reopening of the East for capitalist penetration).

(8) This is very clearly reflected in the public opinion data in Germany, e.g. from the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach.

those who were between zero and fifteen years old - not to mention those who were not yet born - in 1945 did not feel the defeat of Nazi Germany as any kind of threat to their personal identity, we get the idea that a sizeable fraction of those aged below forty would feel no particular remorse when the final German capitulation came in 1970 - tentatively dated at the day when Chancellor Brandt made his famous genuflection at the Ghetto Memorial in Warsaw. The Second World War was over, and as to the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe: they had always been there, and constituted no basic threat to oneself, and showed no signs of going away that might upset the existing military, political and psychological balance either.

As to the second factor: it is not at all obvious that ^{the} West was really concerned about the nature of the regimes in ^{the} East except for one thing, the possibility of making advantageous economic deals with them. (9) Since West all the time since the Industrial Revolution has understood very well that "advantageous" is to be measured essentially in terms of the use of foreign countries as a source of raw materials and a market for excess capital and goods, the signs one would be looking for would be the willingness to serve in this underdog role within a capitalistic (or better, imperialistic) setting. Towards the end of the 1960s it was absolutely clear that Eastern Europe, and indeed including the Soviet Union, were willing to play this role, although they would consistently deny that in doing so they were becoming economic colonies. In this they were partially correct: they entered into this arrangement of their own free will and they can abrogate the agreements considerably more easily than a colonial country would ever have been able to do. But there are other reasons to say that their freedom is rather circumscribed, to be developed later.

In short, the conflict withered away for one subjective and one objective reason that are dialectically intertwined. It is easier to forget about the conflict concerning "human rights", "political liberties" (10) etc. when one can make highly advantageous economic deals, which would lead us to the simple hypothesis that the concern with such rights in Eastern Europe would vary inversely with the gains made in the economic spheres. Since these concerns have been on the increase recently, although objectively speaking, the situation has hardly changed very much, there might be some reasons to believe that these gains have recently been less than anticipated (11).

In this perspective, then, let us look at the three aspects of European affairs today, starting with the infrastructure, the "cooperation" currently emerging.

(9) This is not to say that there is not a genuine concern in ^{the} West about freedom and civil liberties, particularly in certain peak periods (as in connection with the Soljenitsyn drama) - but a general survey of Western (particularly US) support of regimes around the world does not lead to the conclusion that concern with human rights is the overriding factor.

(10) For this reason, the excellent journal *IBEX*, published in England, is a good reminder.

(11) The thesis would be, for instance, that, had they been higher, than the Soljenitsyn issue would not have been given so much prominence in western mass media.

2. Cooperation in Europe

We often hear that cooperation has to be mutually beneficial, and it would indeed be stupid to enter into any other type of cooperation. The question remaining, however, what kind of benefit? And how mutual is it both in the short run and in the long run?

The benefit from the point of view of the capitalist countries is clear and has already been pointed out: an exchange process whereby the spin-off effects from production, not to mention the direct profit to be made from it, remain in the West. In fact, when it comes to trade among groups of producers, one might even talk in terms of a relatively consistent gradient running West-East with its high point in the United States, slightly lower in Western Europe, lower still in Eastern Europe and its lowest point in the Soviet Union - very roughly speaking. By and in large, but with extremely important exceptions both as to country, year and commodity, the further one comes to the East, the higher is the tendency to export raw materials and import manufactured goods (12). It has been like this for a long period already in this century, after the Industrial Revolution was combined with managerial and corporate structures bringing about "Americanization" of the United States, and it probably will remain that way for some time to come (13). No doubt, the socialist revolution in the wake of the first and the second World Wars meant much to change this in the sense that a much higher level of industrial self-sufficiency had been brought about in the East, - but at the same time the socialist West has also "developed" further, controlling raw materials and research intensive industries, preserving or even increasing the gap with the East. This is seen most clearly if one imagines the contrast: the West as a consistent exporter of raw materials to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the East as a consistent exporter of highly sophisticated technology to the West (14).

However, East-West cooperation is not only helpful to the West in terms of trade composition, but also in facilitating that trade. Formulated simply and brutally: there is something in the Eastern regimes today that makes them almost ideal from the point of view of us here in capitalism. One might even say that Eastern European socialism has provided Western European capitalism with the law and order conditions which it has longed for. Not only are economic agreements adhered to and payments made regularly; in addition to that there is no trade union problem to speak of, by and large depoliticized workers not concerned with privatized consumption (at the individual and family levels) and with individual mobility rather than structural changes, i.e. with politics (15). Nor are there

(12) For some data on this, see the Journal of Peace Research article quoted in footnote (1).

(13) The only alternative seems to be a very low level of trade, combined with a solid ideology of "self-reliance and hard work" - as the Chinese put it - and for reasons to be explained in the article this is not a likely development in Eastern Europe in the short run.

(14) Such counter-factual thought experiments are highly useful in politics, and the quality of a Western politician might be measured, partly, by his ability fully to grasp and defend this contradiction.

(15) This is developed further in text, entitled by the present author, "How milk only is 'socialism'?", published in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, 1964, pp. 10-15, in Journal of Peace Research, Stockholm, as a part of a research project on Eastern Europe.

any urban guerrillas roaming around, abducting local plant managers of "joint enterprises" (16). At the same time there is the sizeable middle class where buying power is concerned, brought about through painstaking work and puritan postponement of gratification through the last 20 years or so. Capitalism would never have been able to bring about such good conditions in Eastern Europe if it had continued as it did; socialism has.

Is it also beneficial to the East? Of course it is, but in a very special way. A remarkable factor in Eastern European socialism is that they have still not been able to satisfy quite reasonable consumer demands, above the satisfaction of fundamental needs (food, clothing, shelter, health, education) at a basic level (17). There are several reasons for this which we shall not go into, suffice it only to say that two of them seem to be basic and also to be inexplicably linked with some versions of Marxist thinking.

First, there is the idea of the automatic effect, the idea that very much will follow when the basic contradiction between work and capital has been transcended. The concrete means made use of to establish this transcendence were collectivization of the means of production (usually meaning state ownership), and planning. Whether it is because these means are insufficient or it is because the theory is fundamentally wrong, can be discussed. What remains is the feeling that not so much followed as one might have hoped. Neither production nor productivity went that much up, nor was creativity released on a mass scale, nor did the state wither away, and most particularly: nor did dominance relations in general, in family, school, at work wither away because the mode of production was changed. This is of course always the danger with any theory that promises very much on the basis of what is essentially very little: when prophecy fails repression may set in. There will be claims that the theory was nevertheless right, that the results are very good and always getting better; that whatever failed was due to the machinations of saboteurs and other enemies, in addition to natural calamities; and/or that the effects will show up relatively soon, after a gestation period.

Secondly, there was the theory that industrial workers and particularly their most conscious part organized in a party, would constitute the vanguard of the revolution and the new society. The difficulty with that type of theory is that an elite is appointed a priori, based on such objective factors as profession and/or family background, and such subjective factors as a declaration of faith. Neither basis is good for leadership, and may very easily lead to a self-sustaining, self-satisfied elite that stands in the way of creativity, bent on protecting

(16) I am indebted to Horacio Godoy for this point, and to his paper "Los Acuerdos entre los Estados Unidos y la Union de Republicas Sovieticas: Nueva Era de la Politica Mundial para el Desarrollo", Bogota, 1973.

(17) On the other hand, nobody would or should deny that this was a tremendous and literally speaking basic achievement. The point is merely that a society conceived on the launch of such achievement, for the need-structure changes and new issues appear on the political horizon of the masses - interesting work, not only work; active participation, not only passive consumerism, etc.

its own theory by claiming its validity immediately, and protecting itself against competing theories by such standard means of repression as censorship, limited freedom of expression and so on (19).

Most important in this connection is the highly detrimental effect repression has on creativity. Again, to make a very long story short and to focalize the point clearly: it looks as if the Eastern European countries had had three options: a development in the Chinese direction; a development now in the Western European direction with highly vertical, individualistic societies; and a continuation of their own system. The latter was an impossibility because it was both repressive and incapable of satisfying consumer needs of large groups in the society - a society may be one of these, but not both for a long time unless repression is almost total (which it is not). But the former was also impossible for the Chinese have restricted both of the two alternatives; they insist that a change in the mode of production is insufficient in general conditions, certainly not a sufficient condition for free social change of all over society (hence the need for the "permanent revolution" which actually means an endless series of revolutions); and they also insist in total disregard, that neither "correct hierarchy" nor declarations of faith are sufficient to bring a person into an elite position (20). Hence, to change the Chinese road would be to undermine the position both of dogma and of the new class. And from this follows the very obvious conclusion that there is nothing the elite in Eastern Europe countries will fear so much as the Chinese challenge, also in the form it takes when it is expressed by Western European neo-marxist intellectuals(21).

If now, a movement in the direction of Western European societies was the only possibility. By this is not meant "convergence" as customarily thought of, with a return to not only decentralization but also privatization of the means of production and distribution. These two factors are important but by no means as significant as marxist dogma has made them (22). Rather, we are thinking of such characteristics as clearly vertical societies, individualized mobility patterns, cosuperism, fragmentation, depolitization and technocratic planning of society at large. This can only function if the mobility channels are not too

(19) It is particularly discouraging that even Yugoslavia, freed from the social imperialism exercised by the Soviet Union, engages in such practices, e.g. against the Praxis Group in Zagreb and the social philosophers at the University of Belgrade.

(20) For a further analysis of this, see Johan Galtung and Fumiko Nishimura, Learning from the Chinese, 1974 (forthcoming)

(21) That the fear of radical Western students comes very clearly to the surface during such events as international conferences, e.g. the World Congress of the International Sociological Association in Varna, Bulgaria, September 1970.

(22) It is not to state how marxist thinking in this regard has distorted the perception and discussion of the whole convergence issue by focussing on the one dimension considered essential (ownership of the means of production, in a broad sense) and the response of a host of their incoherent dilemmas.

clogged and the privileges of the top are sufficient - conditions brought about by means of special shops, dollars, even hospital, etc. for the ruling elite (22). But there is also the second condition: mass, individualized consumption. Nowhere is this illustrated so well as in the transitions from bus excursions organized by the local trade union groups on Sundays to individualized, privatized car transport - a transition the capitalist West has been more than willing to contribute to (23).

We shall not elaborate the obvious: the current pattern of East-West cooperation is in the interest of both elites, it benefits them both. It also benefits the masses on both sides: by retaining, even expanding the industrial capacity in the West (particularly in a period when developing countries are either unstable or expected to offer increasing resistance against colonial trade patterns), and the masses in the socialist East, because it gives them both the bread (the US-Soviet wheat deal) and the circuses (particularly the car deals) that their own economies have been incapable of producing. Hence, it keeps the elites in power and keeps the masses happy - what more can one expect from any pattern of cooperation!?

This is where "mutual" in the idea of "mutual benefit" enters: simply by posing the question: who will benefit *most* in the long run? The East helps Western capitalism in what might be a crisis by offering new sources and new markets; the West helps Eastern elites because a channel through which goods can pass to their populations. If this cooperation increases significantly in volume then it will create a certain dependence in both camps, even to the point where its disruption might cause wars and drought in one and mass discontent in the other. So far the situation is relatively symmetric.

But it is far from symmetric when it comes to the spin-off effects derived from the highly asymmetric position the two parties have in the production process. Of course, the East can always take technology acquired from the West and convert it into production processes for internal consumption, but they cannot at the same time have big export markets available to them in the developed part of the capitalist world. Chances are also that they will not be competitive in the underdeveloped part of the capitalist world since they are essentially belaboring technology that are lagging by one or two product generations behind what the capitalist West is able to persuade countries of their own penetration to acquire. The solution might be an underdeveloped socialist world, which exists (Cuba, China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam), but this part of the world

(22) Sometimes the privileges of the elites do not consist in getting other things than what is available for the masses, but in getting them more quickly, without queuing, waiting time, etc.

(23) The political meaning of a car should be taken very seriously: there is hardly any doubt that it favors fragmentation and familism simply by its size and closure - and hence reproduces and reinforces some social structures more than others. The Chinese reaction to cars should also be seen in this perspective, not only as an expression of being "underdeveloped".

is based on self-reliance so that no lasting solution is given by this option.

But in addition to the asymmetric benefit, the influence as such is also asymmetric. The East is penetrated by the West: even though the West selects the technologies to be acquired, these are nevertheless technologies developed by the West, for instance inducing highly stratified and individualized consumption patterns. In doing this, the East derives herself of the possibility of developing social structures to the challenge of our times and creates societies built around material structures imported from capitalism (24).

This is a contradiction and it will show up sooner or later in the form of some kind of revolt against being manipulated from the outside. It could happen if and when marxist analysis is again taken fundamentally seriously in Eastern European countries; that is, not in analyzing capitalist societies developed or undeveloped, but in analyzing including Europe itself (25). It is very hard to see that this would not have a fundamentally concealing effect, for asymmetries and inequalities can only be abolished through some kind of liberation, isolation, in short through discontinuity. Thus, it is also difficult to see that what is happening now is not simply laying the ground for some future conflict, in other words even for a new version of the Cold War. That this, in turn, would be hailed welcome by certain circles, both in the West and in the East, is in need of no further explanation. Hence it is strongly felt that the present detente is bought at the expense of a partial return to the old contradiction between the two parts of Europe.

3. The Security Aspect

Security is here relatively narrowly conceived of: it is simply the probability of not being exposed to war or the threat of war, within the geographical space comprised by the aligned and non-aligned powers, and the non-aligned powers in between. This will now be discussed under four headings: the nature of detente, external proliferation, internal proliferation and possible re-emergence of the threat of war.

When it comes to detente: The contention generally shared is that the chance of war one way or the other about in the 1950's and 1960's has decreased to the point of vanishing. We share this idea, but would like to add that we feel by and large that there never was a credible threat (26). In short, we

(24) The most important example being precisely the cars, but also the Taylorism taken over uncritically in the Soviet and other Eastern European factories.

(25) It belongs to the total picture that East in Europe is remarkably poor in self-analysis - and increasingly uses social science tools imported from the West with insufficient analysis of their distorting impact.

(26) Berlin does not constitute an exception to this: its status was and still is ambiguous. The Soviet blockade in 1948 does not constitute valid proof of aggressive intentions elsewhere.

feel that the zones of influence defined during and right after the Second World War were taken very seriously by the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union was taken very seriously by the western powers who in their traditional imperialism only have been picking on smaller and smaller nations later. After the fundamental defeat of western traditional imperialism in 1956, the level has dropped to the level of the islands of Antigua and will eventually come to that level even for the United States. This is paraphrasing so when western capitalism is obtaining its goals through various types of neo-colonialism rather than gunboat diplomacy.

In short, our argument would be: (1) there was never any really serious threat of war, (2) the conflict that existed evaporated more or less through the ten mechanisms discussed in the introduction, (3) in spite of (1) and (2) there had nevertheless been the most gigantic arms race the world has ever seen with corresponding accumulation of military hardware and software. And that raises the question: could it be that this accumulation has taken place for some other reason, and what kind of reasons could that be - apart from the military-industrial and -bureaucratic complexes?(27)

The obvious hypothesis is that the East-West conflict has for a long time been used as a pretext in which military capacity can accumulate within a framework of political argumentation to which people have become accustomed, but with purposes completely different from those expressed in 25 year old rhetoric. Thus; the US military capacity has predominantly been used in Indochina, and the Soviet military capacity increasingly in connection with the Sino-Soviet conflicts. And this is where the Third World, the developing countries certainly enters: it is not likely that the arms race has served to siphon off enormous production capacities (some of which might have been in their favour): it is also that the weapons may one day be used against them. But even if the arms race should not boil over into an even more large scale, external proliferation of direct violence than has so far been the case, it has already certainly served as a mechanism of structural violence. Thus, military hardware is today highly capital research intensive, vastly in need of strategic raw materials obtained in developing countries, thereby contributing to freezing the economic structure that serves as a straightjacket for the developing countries. That raw materials are strategic is certainly not the only reason to try to keep developing countries as underdogs in the capitalistic system, but it is an important one and particularly one that might trigger military intervention and the engineering of coups d'Etat.

We assure that in the West as well as in the East it is much easier to get elite and mass consensus for further armament (and the arms race certainly goes on) when East-West rhetoric is made use of, or any other context. To argue in favour of armament, a credible threat has to be demonstrated, moreover the threat has to be from a credible enemy - and "imperialism" and "communism" have been ideal from this point of view for East and West respectively. So, one might even go so far as to say that if East and West

(27) For some views on the latter, see article by David Halberstam in Journal of Peace Research no. 4 1974 (forthcoming)

have power elites that think they need military hardware from the south, then it will be in their joint interest to keep a certain pressure level so as to be guaranteed a constant input of goods for continued development. What we are saying is that a Soviet submarine in the Baltic waters might be exchanged for a US reconnaissance flight intrusion over Soviet territory, by mutual, confidential agreement. "I provoke you under the condition that you provoke me", and for that will exist not only because of real or hypothetical antagonists in the South, but also to suit their military-political elites, with a feeling that the heyday may be behind them, in power.

And that last idea may serve as a bridge to the theme of internal pacification of military power. If the present detente with its pattern of cooperation is advantageous to the elites on both sides, then one might also expect that they would be willing to invest some power in the maintenance of the pattern. Concretely, this would mean seeing to it that the regime do not change. A socialist regime in Western Europe or a capitalist regime in Eastern Europe might share the analysis given in the preceding section of that the cooperation pattern is about the socialist regime because it does not want to engage in long-term exploitation of Eastern Europe, the capitalist regime because it wants to retain all spoils off the face, comprising for itself, possibly combining it with export of arms and technology. It might be in the interest of both power elites, particularly of the superpower elites, to see to it that such changes do not occur, and this can be done according to the pattern "I take care of you provided you take care of yours". And this, in turn, will point to a parallel military balance: the military machineries would increasingly be directed inwards, against internal enemies inside the bloc, and inside the country, instead of against each other - but in a balanced manner. This means that "the more you take care of yours, the more or less will I take care of mine". Quite concretely, that means that the higher the tendency towards a military intervention in cold countries, the less likely increased national autonomy for countries in the Soviet sphere of influence - not only because of the escalated threat involved, but because of the underlying, tacit alliance.

This leads us to the fourth aspect: the possibility of a re-emergence of a conflict. We have already indicated in the preceding section that we regard that as within the realm of the possible because the present cooperation pattern is sufficiently loaded with conflict potential. We can now add the factors of external and internal proliferation: both of them have the high likelihood of fundamental instabilities in their wake, and these instabilities might add to increased resentment among the masses in the Eastern European countries when they in, say five, say ten years, say such less, discover what the whole deal is about. By that time the designers of the present detente and cooperation will be biologically, socially and/or politically dead; the responsibility will not be theirs to take. But it might weigh heavily on the shoulders of future generations, not to mention their followers who might have good reason to accuse contemporary politicians of two very simple things:

- (1) Last-but-not-least cooperation in establishing some system of capitalistic neo-imperialism over Eastern Europe,

(2) The failure of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe to keep the revolution creative and developing, socialist solutions.

Thus the blame, if that is the word, is not equally distributed. One may of course blame capitalist countries for practicing capitalism, which would make for perfect equality, but not much more. When they are invited by the East to do what they want to do, it is hard to say "no, this is dangerous for you in the long run, you should rely more on yourselves".

Rather the problem remains whether the East should have been playing up to the West that way. Was it really necessary in order to obtain the "status quo" in Europe? Could the demands for a better trade composition not have been stiffer?

To all this should be added the need in the world for social models that constitute good alternatives in the capitalist societies of the West. The societies of Eastern Europe were in a unique position to become such models; precisely because they very recently were in a state of socio-economic development very similar to what today prevails in the Third World (28). The present pattern of all-European cooperation seems to make them less, not more relevant as models, combining repressive features with capitalistic ones - although not in the classical economic sense of that word. Of course, it may be objected that the task of the leaders in Eastern Europe is above all to satisfy the demands of their own populations, not to serve as models for the Third World, or as experimental grounds for theories of the western New Left. All this may be very true, and it may also be true that this non-dependency is but a passing phase. But we have no doubts, because of the proliferating effect of technological dependency.

4. The free flow of persons and ideas

That there is an eastern resistence against this idea is quite understandable, for at least three very simple reasons.

First, it will to some extent upset a very precarious internal balance. Most important in this connection, however, is perhaps not so much new ideas and consumption patterns as old reward patterns. If the idea is to make people look to their own country as a source of satisfaction, and to geographical mobility above all social mobility within their own country or region, as the basic form of career, then increased "flow of persons and ideas" would be antithetical to the pattern. The annual, biannual etc. travel abroad has long been an important item in the reward system of the eastern European countries, and particularly available in the elites, except in some of the countries, particularly Hungary. Systems of graded passports exist, the obstacles to travel are generally considerable (29). This is carefully worked out and any change in the system would, as mentioned, upset the balance.

(28) This is the basic theme of the article by Leonid Iudin referred to in Footnote 3 above.

(29) See some of the information published by IUC-86.

Secondly, from the western point of view this demand could look relatively unfair. From the eastern point of view, the political (Zouren, local) status quo is hardly a concession given by the West, but what the East considers a right already negotiated successfully during and right after the war. What has taken place recently in China is not a concession. Thus it comes to the agreement on cooperation. The East is hardly unaware of how advanced it is in the field, although it has advantages to the East. In addition, then, the West has demands the existence of a pattern that is impossible without some fundamental structural changes in the East, as the East has repeatedly pointed out under the heading of "interference in internal affairs". At least, the East might ask: what would be the western quid for this eastern quid? For the West this is a meaningless question.

Third, exactly what would the exchange imply? Let us imagine that it means the exchange of 50,000 politically conscious persons in either direction each year - a sort of gigantic youth festival spread thin. To whom would this constitute any type of threat?

It should be remembered that western societies have a very high absorption capacity. Even 50,000 leaders of communist youth organizations from all over Eastern Europe, adequately fragmented and dispersed all over Western Europe, would hardly cause much stir. Their conventional 'model' look stale relative to what western bourgeoisie is accustomed to actually, and in all probability they would be disoriented by signs of the decadence of western affluence hanging in front of their faces. It was western students, not eastern ones, who in 1968 were burning the symbol of industrial society: the car; it was eastern students, not western ones, who were checked upon hearing this (3).

At the same time western youth, very much of it more or less neo-Marxist, swarming into Eastern Europe would everywhere compare political structure with their own political thinking and not often show a turn the thumbs down. They would be looking for, and find, hierarchical, vertical structures and a high level of depoliticization, in addition to describing in which they are less accustomed from their own societies: permissive intolerance rather than merely progressive tolerance. They would usually be affected by the remnants of the past, by beautifully painted churches and icons, by unpolluted air and genuine, non-chemical food, and so on. But everywhere they come they will start discussing and questioning rather than admiring in an unquestioning manner, and the type of thinking they will engage in would be not too remote from the two points attributed above to the Chinese.

From this it might follow that we feel the challenge would essentially be in the East, and that the East could not expect to have this swarm of political radicals over its land, as they fertilize it. That is so, but in addition to this, there is also another perspective; it might not be in the interest of the West to send to the East youth with a highly skeptical view of the present pattern of relations and cooperation. Not conclusion:

(3) I was inhibited to follow back for this point.

we would surmise that such a position would mean to it that this exchange is kept at a very low level, and within a safe framework, bilateral or multilateral, something not too different from the already existing patterns of youth festivals and delegations.

5. Conclusion

Much more can be said about European security and cooperation, both positive and negative - we have chosen to focus on the points elaborated above. There is one very simple political consequence that follows from what has been said: Generalized internationalization of cooperation, confidence, unbridled! Either the East has to turn its attention internally in a socialist direction before capital has a chance to penetrate further, and/or the West has to be willing to let the East penetrate much more deeply into the West by changing the trade-composition, and exchange-composition in general, fundamentally. To what extent the East is willing/able to do so at present remains debatable. The contention of the present paper is that if the present trend continues unabated, then the result will inevitably be to buy detente at present at the expense of considerable conflict in the future, even in the near future.

Nevertheless, we have come a long way and one sign that we really have come some steps further ahead is precisely the circumstance that we can now discuss the type of problems mentioned in this paper, such as we were able to and willing to do before. In fact, the progress to which we are able to discuss such problems is an important test of how far detente has come: if we cannot ask questions about the political processes in Europe at present but regard them as dogmatically and one-sidedly as the Cold War was regarded in its heyday, then we have only once more fallen into the abyss of dogmatism. And for that there is only one cure: a dialogue, even a passionate one, but always with the overriding goal of a peaceful coexistence between East and West that is at the same time meaningful and productive for the developing countries.