

KOREA NORTH AND SOUTH: NEVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET? *
Is Peaceful Cooperation Between Different Systems Possible?

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1. Introduction.

Imagine two countries, N and S, one a capitalist, the other a socialist country. We want to discuss the problems of interaction between them, and not only in the form of exchange but also cooperation, meaning, roughly, that they do something together beyond the mere exchange of persons, goods, and ideas. ⁽¹⁾ To do this we shall start with the most basic properties of the two systems, and then gradually fill in more details to make the picture somewhat more realistic.

What are the most basic properties? Liberalism and marxism are broad, encompassing ideological systems, but coming out of late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe the shared focus is on economic aspects ⁽²⁾ - so dynamic at that time - and their social manifestations. Capitalism and socialism are above all economic formations, profoundly affecting production patterns, but also to some extent the patterns of consumption. In both systems production factors - land (ground, raw materials), labor (unskilled, skilled) and capital (money, capital goods) - are brought together and there is processing into products, mainly taking place in factories, in the cities. Neither system is against industrialism. But then there are some important differences:

Table 1. Capitalism and socialism as economic formations.

	<u>Capitalism:</u>	<u>Socialism:</u>
Ownership of means of production	<u>private</u>	<u>collective</u> (state,communal)
Production for	<u>demand, market</u>	<u>needs, basic need of most needy</u>
Mobility of factors and products	<u>unlimited, expansionist,trade</u>	<u>limited, national or local self-reliance, not autarchy</u>
Production methods	<u>high productivity capital and research intensive</u>	<u>lower productivity more labor intensive full employment,participation</u>

Thus, the differences are fundamental enough but they are not located in the often mentioned distinction between private and collective ownership of the means of production - for there is ample experience showing that the state as the owner of the means of production may practice entirely capitalist goals and methods.⁽³⁾ The difference can be spelt out as follows. Under capitalism the ultimate measure of the success of an economic process is the accumulation of capital, leading to production for those who want and can pay for the products, to a "global reach"⁽⁴⁾ when it comes to where to fetch factors and where to market products, investing capital into research so as to produce in ever more efficient manners. Under socialism - essentially a family of related efforts to negate capitalism⁷⁰ - the production is, at least in the first phase, for the satisfaction of the basic needs for those most in need - meaning of food, clothes, shelter, health and education. There is much emphasis on using own factors and much less on trade (again particularly in the first phase); and on securing full employment. The latter is a measure of meaningful participation of everybody.

It may be objected that this distinction is by and also ideological - but that is exactly the purpose. These, it is claimed, are fundamental features of the "systems", and in much of the debate about the relative co-existence between them, the attention is so much on the political moves of the day that the basic underlying characteristics of the systems are easily forgotten. That they undergo modifications is obvious enough - nevertheless these features play a basic role politically in shaping the process of highly uneasy relationship between them. They are simply, in their pure versions that are always somehow underlying the infinitely more complex empirical reality, different things, and partly contradictory things.

This also shows up in the measures, the indicators, of economic activity: the capitalist system would talk about economic growth and measure it in terms of processing and marketing, expressed in gross national product (per capita) where the socialist system would be more concerned with the level of basic needs satisfaction; the capitalist system would talk about the foreign trade and see increase in export as a major goal

where the socialist system would be much more concerned with how one can do without trade, in other words with self-reliance; the capitalist system would be concerned with how many units of the product one can get per capital unit and worker-hour where the socialist system would be more concerned with how many units one can get per unit of land or raw materials (which would also be of interest to the capitalist system, of course). In general, the capitalist system would be concerned with the decrease in workers' role through higher labor productivity where the socialist system would increase the role of workers through higher worker participation.

Let us now review these differences sector by sector to see what impact they will have on efforts to achieve patterns of cooperation between the systems, and start with the economic sector itself.

2. Economic relations.

A basic assumption of the capitalist system is that other countries shall be willing to play for the world game, i.e. the game of trade, will want to sell in excess and buy what it does not have - which means that it will be able to. But a pure socialist system is not willing to play the world game for many reasons: it wants to use its own land and natural resources, to use its capital and labor, it would be sceptical if not totally against the import of raw materials and even skilled technicians because it could not use the local economic structure, and equally sceptical of the import of manufactured goods, except, perhaps, capital goods that may enable them better to pursue a policy of self-reliance. Hence, the point of departure is already far from positive when it comes to exchange, leaving alone cooperation. What to the capitalist system is a natural thing, the normal way of operation, becomes to the socialist system economic aggression and something to protect oneself against. Experience proves the latter right to a large extent: exploitation as a part of a general imperialist formation is a major characteristic of world trade, for which reason one would predict that socialism above all is adopted by countries in need

of economic (and political/military) defense against economic (and political/military) invasion - Russia in 1917, Eastern European states after the Second World War, the Asian socialist countries and Cuba - and all the others that have adopted similar patterns, such as Algeria. (6)

There are three kinds of answers to this problem: no interaction at all, interaction in non-economic fields or efforts to find some kind of economic interaction nonetheless. Leaving out the first and the second because it will be explored later, and also because it is often even more problematic given the ideological differences, the question here is: is there some type of economic exchange that would be acceptable from both a capitalist and a socialist point of view?

We have mentioned one: capital goods, usually in exchange for raw materials. This could take the form of technology, machine tool, factories, labor-saving devices (particularly in agriculture, transport, and in the oil and chemical industries). In general this will be demanded by the more advanced capitalist countries, and it is what is demanded, also because they can afford to pay money on initial deals, hoping for others to follow. Generally there will be capital export going along with capital goods export, solidifying the control. But what about all the other types of commodities? Here is an effort to deal with the problem systematically:

Table 2. Exchange of commodities between capitalist and socialist forms.

Capitalist	Land	Raw materials	Unskilled labor	Skilled labor	Capital	Capital goods	Products
Land							
Raw materials		E		E	E	D,E	E
Unskilled labor				E	E	E	E
Skilled labor		B	P				
Capital		P	P				
Capital goods		A,B	B				
Products		E	B				F

In the Table we have put the various types of commodities (in the broadest sense of the term) that the capitalist and the socialist country may export, so each of the 49 cells of the Table gives one type of exchange. The typical case already mentioned, capital goods for raw materials, is marked with an A in the Table.

In general, we would assume that capitalist countries, unless they are very big and very rich in natural resources, would be loathe to export raw materials, and the same would apply to land and unskilled labor - unless there are dependent capitalist countries in the periphery of the system.⁽⁷⁾ If they are, however, they would export these products to their own center countries, and it is what these countries will demand from them that counts for consumer goods and capital goods. Correspondingly, we would imagine that the peripheral countries would be loathe to export unskilled labor and raw materials, the famous postal bank of the East, and would be ready for complete capitulation. If they are not, they are at least engaged in it, the argument is that they are not really socialist. Socialist countries might like to export excess skilled labor,⁽⁸⁾ consumer goods and manufactured goods, however, and when they do not do so in the industrial setting in the East (or as a result of lack of demand in the West) because they do not want to, it becomes clear that there is such a demand and/or that the socialist countries are not interested in the international exchange of goods and services of countries, treating them much like the peripheral and neo-colonial peripheries.

Thus, in general, it is obvious that most of the exchange possibilities are located in the lower, left corner of Table 2. And this is also where that ingenious face-saving formula, the joint venture, is located: instead of exchanging across borders, sending the factors to the West and letting the processing take place there, what is done is to move the factories to the factors, established as "joint venture" inside the socialist countries. In practice this means that the capitalist countries export skilled labor (technicians), capital, capital goods and ultimately

also products (e.g. cars, only that they do not cross borders) and that the socialist countries contribute raw materials and unskilled labor - and, not showing in the Table: markets.

(B in Table 2). It is hard to see that this "joint venture" differs from conventional vertical trade: the research, spin-offs are still with the capitalist countries, and they still retain the control of the dynamism of product development, and probably to a large extent be able to control the enterprise, or at least lower its output quality, or to a considerable extent, the withdrawal of expertise, technical and technology and know-how. Hence we shall see this as co-operation (the kind of co-operation which is not co-operation), but not as a mixture, and we shall see at that.

It is our basic conviction that this kind of arrangement is contrary to the interests of socialist countries. It is basically speaking "the situation" imply that the socialist countries have been cheated again. It is more clear that the capitalist countries will establish a certain binding function, and a conflict-oriented function, as postulated by Marx. The result will serve to make the socialist economy a dependent one, which does not mean a poor one or technologically sophisticated one, but an economy incapable of setting its own goals and of experimenting with new means of production the moment the current technology of the type of consumers' goods produced by the capitalist countries, coveted and enjoyed by the new bourgeoisie in the socialist country - and not only by the

But this should not be seen as resulting from capitalist strength only; it is the result of an important socialist weakness so far only, effectively counteracted (at least for the time being) by the People's Republic of China. The weakness consists in the frequent inability to have a good answer to the question: "after the satisfaction of basic needs, what?". For that reason there may be some kind of phase movement at work here: a first, "puritan" phase where co-operation may maximally be of the A type, followed by a second phase where

basic needs have been satisfied and, some kind of "new class" has emerged, even vast masses of them - "middle classes" - and one proceeds to co-operation of type R. Of course, preceding all that is a phase zero of rupture, perhaps of economic boycotts brought upon the emerging socialist state by capitalist countries sufficiently unenlightened not to understand that for socialism to be built this kind of rupture is welcome, even essential (and so materialistic in their smugness that they underestimate the power of ideas are faith). (9)

What would be the socialist counter-measure to avoid this kind of penetration? It is clearly one or more out of three: to close the country completely, to see to it that a new class emerges capable of satisfying such more and more basic and frivolous demands for income for many, and to see to it that in this phase of rupture leading to leading to a rupture of the path of a new type of society, the socialist partner to build a new type of society is not technologically and technologically in command. (10) It is clear that now both the US and the Soviet Union are filled with people who expect this to break down, because they still believe in some kind of linear theory of history; history is a process they think they have been through and are now the rest of the world will say that that is only a phase of rupture, a phase of rupture; wait till the capitalist partner has a strong economy; wait till the Soviet Union they would be in a position to build a socialist phase of sacrificing conditions, a phase of economic infrastructure; wait till the Brezhnev phase comes - - -. They may both be right, but then they may also be wrong: history is not unilinear, the tracks are no longer necessarily laid by societies in the West - China may be paving the road for some new type of society that is less materialistic. (11)

Is there no other way in which trade ties may expand? Yes, if we get away from the assumption underlying the preceding analysis: that the capitalist partner is technologically advanced and has a strong economy, and that the socialist partner is the opposite of this. First, there are weak capitalist countries, in fact, most of them are - that is what the Third World consists of. Second, there could be socialist countries that have very

advanced technology and with strong economies - either because they have been socialist for a long period of primitive (and not so primitive) accumulation - evidently the case with the Soviet Union - or because they were quite advanced capitalist countries and turned socialist. Of the latter there are so far no cases, except, perhaps, GDR, but they will come - e.g. among the small countries in North-Western Europe - because of the other types of dissatisfaction with capitalism (not that it fails to satisfy basic needs of those in the periphery of the Periphery of the system, but that it does not offer all kinds of non-material needs, creativity, together with the freedom of more or less unimpeded self-realization etc.).

And that is a new set of possibilities.

Table 3. Exchange between capitalist and socialist economies.

		Exchange	
		with socialist economies	with capitalist countries
		1st phase	2nd phase
		A	B
Capitalist country	Technologically advanced	1st phase: A	2nd phase: B
	Technologically backward	1st phase: A	2nd phase: C
		F	

(the letters are defined in Table 2)

Thus, everything that is produced in the world (and are roughly speaking at the same level of technological sophistication, and can exchange raw material with each other, or semi-manufactured, or manufactured goods (as defined in the Tables)). This situation may now gradually occur in several parts of the world. Thus, the Soviet Union and the eastern European socialist countries may be inferior to the most advanced capitalist economies but not to the capitalist countries in the Southern part of Europe or around the Mediterranean in general (this would actually have been even more obvious had Occitania been independent of Paris and Mezzogiorno of Rome). Hence, in that area considerable growth in this type of exchange, at roughly speaking the same level of sophistication, can be expected. Since the ex-

change is much less problematic than the A,B,D and E possibilities we would expect them to be accompanied by considerably higher levels of political leverage, not in the sense of one party dominating the other, but in the sense of a harmonious relation that would benefit both parties and world peace. (13)

The same applies to the role of socialist countries that used to belong to the Third World (we use that as a political/economic category, not as a geographical concept): they might trade with the capitalist Center, but not in an intra-sector rather than inter-sectoral manner. In the case of Cuba, the blockade against Cuba is a political act, not an economic one. If Cuba build a socialist economy, it will be able to deal with the mass influx of goods from the capitalist Center, its economic/political relations with the Center will be different from the one might expect. The same applies to the other countries, more than the present situation. The same principles certainly apply to the Korea case. The condition will have to be that no country tries to take the other country, economically dependent, or lets itself be made into a dependent.

And the latter conclusion is not surprising. The thinking is so intuitive that it is not surprising that we have seen joint ventures, however small, between socialist and capitalist countries. We also know that the same thing is typically of the D and E varieties. The same thing is going on with China and the Soviet Union. The rupture between them became China had a socialist identity, it saw the danger signals of dependency. (14) All India and most other poor Third World countries in the capitalist Periphery are not equipped with the economic mechanisms - if they were, they would not have remained in the capitalist Periphery but done something about it. The alternative is not necessarily socialism, but could also be complete isolation a la Burma, or efforts to get into the capitalist Center by exploiting others as the OPEC countries may try to be doing (and as India perhaps tries to do in her orbit). So the Soviet Union naturally turned to India after having "lost" China, causing obvious resentment in China. From India's point of view what happens

is concealed by the thin veil of non-alignment ideology, trading with the capitalist powers and with the socialist power, balancing one against the other - fails to see that they are exploited by both of them. As a capitalist country India still believes in the doctrine of comparative advantages, and being geographically on the periphery of the two transition to being also the periphery of the other may not be that difficult. Needless to say, we do not believe the situation to be stable, for the same reasons as in connection with trade of types A and B. It should be noted that the trade of types A and B is not necessarily beneficial to the countries which export spare parts and tools. It is not clear that the countries usually that depend on the technology of the leading countries make use of the capital and know-how produced here and there.

Hence, our conclusion is that trade of types A and B - and considerable, symmetric trade of types C and D - is not beneficial, if the purpose is to achieve a balance of trade. If the purpose is to achieve a balance of payments, however, it may be beneficial, if some kind of harmonious relations can be established.

3. Political relations

Let us now turn to the question of denature for some reflections on the relations between the two systems; interpreting political relations in a broad sense. In international politics one would like to see as much possibility for cooperation in general terms as possible. The image of the world ought to look like a rather different. The same is as long as one uses the terms "capitalist" and "socialist" without any qualification. The picture changes immediately if one looks at capitalism and socialism at present as hegemonial, even imperialist systems. These countries have positions:

interest is becoming more autonomous of the superpowers. When the objective interest is not reflected in concrete co-operation (except to some extent in the European context) it is because the hierarchical systems are still intact and the superpowers see that their success rates are not low, and because the pattern of superpower hegemony has not yet crystallized sufficiently for this type of center-periphery contradiction to mature. We could imagine such a change in the years to come, which would have the potential for political co-operation across the globe, if the political leaders able to grasp the opportunity. It is also possible that this may also be a result of a considerably more advanced type of economic development that would turn a lot of them into a dependent status.

However, political change is not a simple affair in the global context. It is a more or less continuous evolution, and this, in turn, is a result of the changing economic configuration inside the world system. In the 1970s, many countries today regard the international system as a set of rules, particularly the rules of the superpowers, in the vast capitalist Periphery. The first country to do this in June 1975 was India - and then followed the United Arab Emirates, to abolish a relatively traditional system of monarchy, in parliamentary or presidential form, if almost on a round in the capitalist center. The new classes have taken the spoils from centralization of power, and the working class has taken the spoils from the bourgeoisie. The new measure of political power that is not an end economic reality through various types of well-known measures (the social democrats are particularly good at this). But in the world at large the authoritarian regime is still the military directly (about 50 countries right now or indirectly (particularly in the socialist countries) is the rule.

The reasons why socialist and periphery capitalist countries become authoritarian differ, however. The socialist countries constitute efforts to withdraw from some of the world capitalist system; that system tries to reintegrate them with

because so much of the rhetoric is in that direction. That strengthens the authoritarian tendencies even further, and will tend to aggravate rather than solve the problems of the displaced states in socialist countries, and of the exploited masses and the oppressed peoples. (19)

However, the fact that certainly does not follow that such regimes cannot co-operate provided they are strong enough under their authoritarianism so that neither finds it easy to topple the other. In the contrary, they have even come to co-operate quite well because of historical reasons and certain basic similarities. The two examples are Spain and Yugoslavia in the 1960's, and Cuba and North Vietnam. "Cuba and North Vietnam" were based on the same ideological system, after a civil war forced to be fought by the army, and then run by a single party, the Workers' Party of Cuba in the first, and the Workers' Party of North Vietnam in the other. If they were closer to the border and had no border problem (like Trieste), they would have developed a considerable range of co-operation policies. But the reason for this is located in the common sense that they are both authoritarian, ruled by a single party, and have the same ideological system with military and party discipline. They are also both socialist countries, and have a common ideological system, and a common political system with the other.

The question of whether there is any possibility of co-operation in authoritarian regimes is a question of a different type of regime, and the answer may be a simple "yes". A democracy can count on so much initiative and creativity from its citizens that the country can derive some dynamism from the people, and not only from the elites - and the same applies to the other great or comparative states of system in the world today: the Chinese. An authoritarian regime does not have this possibility, by definition, and has to substitute something for it. One possibility is planning, relying on experts and their formulas rather than people; another possibility is some kind of entrepreneurism - letting loose a number of industrialists, constructors, land-owners etc. A third possibility would be to do both - and that is what both Spain and Yugoslavia seem to be doing, creating remarkably similar countries within different ideological framework. It should be added,

though, that if the countries were totalitarian this would not work - then they are shaped in all details according to some master plan emanating from a very almighty center.

There is nothing in the mind of anywhere - interests may coincide sufficiently for political co-operation, or emerge on top of economic co-operation over a wide range of sectors - but it should be added that the price is considerable to the purists: neither capitalists, nor socialists. This is actually the old convergence theme and what we would like to add here are two elements: we do not think that a convergence is inevitable - it will be a process in the long run, but not by itself, it will need other forces placed and possible mechanism is through the kind of authoritarianism, particularly military regimes (the USSR, the military all about the same all over the world - except PRC to some extent), and tend to run counter to it. Also they will be a mixture of planning and enterprise, the outcome may be relatively similar.

What form will be the co-operation between activities? Above all exchange of technology, know-how, patents, declarations and research. The latter is the reason for the latter is the active popular participation, to arrive at deeper level of co-operation, so plan remain remain paper projects, unless the refusal of the parties to let the activities participate and the co-operation for the strictly establishment. The latter of these projects is dominated by the probability that what will happen to most of the economic co-operation between East and West in the future will be due to the rise in authoritarianism of the Soviet Union - at the same time as West will continue to exploit East economically (according to formula B in the preceding section). The sceptics will find this considerably short of the ideal; the enthusiasts will point out that it is preferable to cold war, not to mention to hot war. They are, of course, both right.

But what would that more ideal form look like?

We have in mind a situation that does not obtain in the world today but might obtain in the future: two participatory countries, one capitalist with parliamentary democracy, the other socialist with a participatory system like that which is emerging in China and in Cuba. The countries would have to be technologically about the same level, or at least close but to use the discrepancy as a tool of domination. None of them would have to permit considerable mobility of their citizens, and hence which would not be possible if their social levels are not too different, and hence if there are no large groups in one country or the other that are able to dominate the other.

Under the conditions of such co-operation, should a power struggle arise, citizens of one country could even request, consented to by the criminal government of life that stems from the other, by living some time in one, some time in the other, of course, rather distant from the blood struggle of the two regimes mentioned above. If it had been the other way around, in a large sense, against the power of the capitalist, the same could be said of co-operation, even now, for a dozen years, in the case of Cuba. And all this is a possibility that is not only possible, but bordering on what is actually occurring, in the case of the to the same end, the world is not only divided, between classes, but also divided, within individuals --

5. Conclusion.

In short, I say, it remains only to add the obvious: these conditions do not obtain today. But one day they may, and it may be useful even in the darkest periods to maintain a vision of a more desirable future - for one thing we know with certainty: that no situation in the world lasts forever, including the unfortunate situation in which the Korean people finds itself. The aspect of that situation, incidentally, is Western ideologies. They are alien - hence they are alienated, in different ways, not only divided. Could that once have a

unifying power like a shared bitterness at being a pawn in an East-West conflict and a superpower conflict not of their choice.

In an earlier article, prompted by the famous 4 July 1972 communique, I tried to describe in some detail²² how and why such has actually happened since that time; the situation had proved to be relatively stable. Korea is now divided by that line drawn during the night of 24-25 July 1948, then Colonel Dean Rusk was told by the minutes of a meeting²³ that the Americans were opposed to the Russian proposal. The promise from Washington in 1948 that Korea would be free and independent²⁴ has not yet been fully and certainly not fully realized; there are two Koreas.

Nevertheless, there are perhaps some pointers in a more positive direction.

- (1) Much time and energy have been spent in the past in an experience that has not been particularly successful. There may be so much more to be done.
- (2) At the very top, the quality of leadership in the South - when there also is a change in the North that might improve the situation. Obviously Kim Il Sung is the man who has carried the process of deconstruction (a better term than "unification") to its present stage forward.
- (3) Both Koreas, though they are still well within the framework set - or at least they may lead to a productive self-confidence - are not yet willing to see each other as anything positive.
- (4) The world system may regard not only the Korea as one additional power keg. On the other hand, with increasing tension in the world along traditional East-West lines, increased tension in Korea is also to be expected.

One factor that may be to the good or to the bad would be the general neglect of the Korea question in a world that has

so much else to bother about. When people in the Atlantic area talk about the East-West conflict, they tend to think it is all in that area. This is related to a certain general tendency to hold Koreans in low regard, and to neglect the issue.²³⁾ In short, we shall still have to wait for some time for the federal republic of Koryō - or something like Nordic relations among the parts of Korea.

N O T E S

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The basic points in the paper were also presented at the European University Seminar on the Korean Question, Oslo, Norway, September 13-14, 1980; the content is in from that presentation. I would also like to express my gratitude to the organizers of the important seminars on the Korean question in Oslo, June 1975 and June 1978. The responsibility for the mistakes drawn rests with the author.

1. For some of the central theory of this paper see introductory chapter of Johan Galtung and Einar Myrdal (eds.), Cooperation and Conflict, Oslo, 1978 and Johan Galtung, "European Farm. Social Cooperation: A Sceptical Contribution", Peace Problems and Peace Studies, Essays in Peace Research, Vol. V, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1980, ch. 1.
2. For an exploration of these ideologies see Johan Galtung, "Two ways of being Western: Social Structure between Marxism and Liberalism", Paper for the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, 1979.
3. For more on this see Johan Galtung, "On the Eastern European Social Formation", Paper for the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
4. Probably the best book on transnational corporations, Barnett and Muller, Global Reach, Simon & Schuster, N.Y. 1974.
5. The Economic and Social Council under the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project has been concerned, for some time, with the general idea of exploring different types of negations of capitalism.
6. For a survey of some of these, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Revolutions", Peace and Social Structure, Essays in Peace Research Vol. III, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1978, ch. 8.

7. Which, of course, is what imperialist capitalism is about - eg. as explored in Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Peace and World Structure, Essays in Peace Research Vol. IV, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1979, p.13 - of course processes of raw materials may also be on the spot, free zones, etc.
8. Rumor, and the fact that the Soviet technical assistance programs; the Soviet Union demands of its UN experts a payment format whereby they receive only what corresponds to their salary at home.
9. Some of it is also explored in Johan Galtung "Cuba: Anti-Imperialism and Social Order", Peace Problems: Some Case Studies, Essays in Peace Research vol.IV, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1979, p.11.
10. See Leorning, Johan, "The Cuban Revolution and the Third World", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1974, Denmark, Sweden, mimeo.
11. See Johan Galtung, "The Cuban Revolution and the Third World", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1974, Chair in Conflict Resolution Research, University of Oslo.
12. This type of movement, the new styles of life movement enters the picture in Johan Galtung, "Alternative Life Styles in Rich Countries", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1974, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
13. Whether this option is a good one is another matter.
14. The Cuban revolution is also seen in other perspectives, for example, as discussed skilfully by the Cubans at the UN.
15. They needed about 1970 of imperialism, though, as the Soviet economic imperialism probably was not that important. See Johan Galtung, "Social Imperialism and Sub-imperialism" Papers No. 22, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
16. See the analysis of the foreign policy in the book referred to in footnote 1 above.
17. See the paper referred to in footnote 9 above.
18. See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Peace and Social Structure, Essays in Peace Research Vol.III, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1976, ch. 4.

19. Of course, it is also in the interest of the hegemonial powers in both systems that all these countries are authoritarian since that makes it possible to rule either part of the world through the elites.
20. Whether it is as participatory in the early 1980s as in the early 1970s is another question.
21. See "European Security and Cooperation: A Sceptical Contribution", Foreign Affairs, Poland's indebtedness to the West is a good example, because of - among other reasons - deteriorating terms of trade.
22. See Johan Hartung, "Divided Nations and a Divided State, Two States and In-between. The Case of Korea", Some Current Issues in Peace Research, Vol. V, Ejlert, Copenhagen, 1977, 147-168.
23. See the excellent article by Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Korea as a World Order Issue, Institute for World Order, New York, 1981.