

# ON THE FUTURE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN \*

## Some notes from an outsider

by

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### 1. Introduction

Does a Norwegian, working in Geneva, have any right to pronounce himself on the Mediterranean region? I would say yes, not only<sub>a</sub> because we are all citizens of the same world and have not only/right but also a duty to be concerned with each other, but also because I feel a profound attachment to the region. The attachment dates from early explorations in the region as a teenager making autostop; it has lasted ever since. It has some basic components: climate is no doubt one, beauty and culture another, but above all it is the human warmth more than the outside temperature that dominates the picture.<sup>1)</sup> To use a metaphor: I often feel that we northerners are like the moon, incapable of radiating much by our own inner energy, but capable of reflecting the strong radiation emanating from the Mediterranean sun once we are there. In other words, it is what the region does to us as human beings that perhaps is the major source of attachment; a point to be elaborated later. All I want to say at this point is that if there were such a thing as a Mediterranean nation I would like to be in it.

Some years ago most images of the future of the Mediterranean would probably be cast in the developmental paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s: technological development and economic growth, and as its precondition a change of attitudinal and behavioral structures from traditional to modern. Having myself written a book largely located in that conceptual framework,<sup>2)</sup> I know something about how it was taken for granted that the North was to be the model of the South and that factors impeding the transformation of South into North would have to be worked upon so as not to stand in the way. Increasing doubts about the developmental paradigm set by the North have characterized developmental thinking of the 1970s and will also continue to play a considerable role in the changing images of the Mediterranean.

There is no doubt that there is backwardness and misery to be eradicated, but there are doubts about the penetration of the North into the South as the means for obtaining this. It is interesting in this connection to look at the changing images of Albert Schweitzer<sup>3)</sup> and Mohandas Gandhi:<sup>4)</sup> both of them have been through three phases so far. First there is the image of the hero who sacrifices a safe western-type existence and career in order to work for the underprivileged, sharing their conditions. Second, there is the idea that in sharing their conditions both Schweitzer and Gandhi in fact served as effective bulwarks against modernization, uplifting them to a certain point, but not further because of their paternalistic protectionism against the penetration of modern patterns, ideas and techniques. Third: the present phase where both Gandhi and Schweitzer have a resurrection, a revival based on the increasing relevance of their ideas about how to organize things, since it so obviously is related to recent slogans of "small is beautiful", "soft technology", "human-size development" and so on. And the prediction is that something of the same will happen to the Mediterranean: Mediterranean values and Mediterranean structures will increasingly be seen not as something to be left behind, neither as something to be preserved like cultural artefacts are preserved in a museum, but as something solid to build on and to develop further, resisting the penetration from the North.

## 2. A macro-historical overview.

To explore this more in detail a very brief glimpse of history might be useful. For this purpose one might divide the relevant part of the world, roughly speaking Europe and the coastal states of Northern Africa, into four parts, by drawing two lines. One of the lines coincides with the Alps and their continuation in the Carpathians; it might also be continued towards the West, cutting through France, perhaps ending with the Pyrenees. The other line runs from north to south, following the linguistic border between the Slavonic and Germanic speaking people, but including in the east, in the eastern part, the Hungarians and the Rumanians, the Albanians and the Greeks and the Turks. It is not, however, so important to define the lines in very precise terms since the conceptual tools to be used are only rough ideas

about a distinction between northern and southern Europe on the one hand, corresponding to the old distinction between cis-alpina and trans-alpina, and anybody's intuitive notion of distinctions between western and eastern Europe. What is important, however, is that this conception of southern Europe, together with the northern African coastal states, serves to define the Mediterranean region when we include the remaining Arab states bordering on the Mediterranean and Palestine/Israel. Maybe this leads to something like 25 countries,<sup>5)</sup> it is not so important to know. In extension it is not too different from the Roman empire at its heyday except for its northern outposts; enclosing the mare nostrum, the Mediterranean sea itself.

The problem to be discussed can now be phrased using the concept of power-gradient: given the two axes, where are the highs and lows of power in various phases of history? We shall then distinguish between three types of power: political/military power ultimately defined as "who invades whom"; economic power ultimately defined as "who exploits whom" (whether it is through simple robbery or the more intricate practices of investment in capital goods and transfer of surplus characterizing industrial capitalism, or corresponding practices in mercantile capitalism); and cultural power roughly defined as "who forms (shapes) whom". Needless to say, these forms of power are related and have all kinds of spill-over effects from one into the other.

There is no doubt that the Roman empire put the center of power in the south. They invaded the north, they exploited the north and they shaped the north - the latter so much so that even in this century the concept of being a person with culture, with Bildung, is related to internalization of southern culture, for instance knowledge of Latin and Greek, in other words southern languages, today not even spoken in the region. Moreover, the power center was in the west rather than in the east by the mere fact that Rome was located in that part. But that part collapsed in the fifth century, and the Middle Ages can perhaps be seen as a period in which the power distribution between the four parts of the region we are discussing, became more symmetric, with the exception of the clear cultural power emanating from Rome, this time in the form of the Catholic Church. It was only with the

advent of Protestantism that a certain symmetry in cultural power was obtained, with strong islands of Protenstantism established in the Catholic sea, with a remarkable stability for the last three hundred years or so.<sup>6)</sup> The economic counter part was the Hanseatic League.

It may perhaps be said that Protestantism gave a more clear expression to some basic items of western social cosmology inherited from Greek antiquity: a strong accent on individualism and competition and expansion in space and a highly dramatic conception of time.<sup>7)</sup> Life was safer, more protected, more collective under Catholicism than it became under Protestantism,<sup>8)</sup> although the difference should not be exaggerated. At the same time mercantile capitalism was so successful in the North that large-scale capital accumulation started taking place, ultimately leading to the industrial revolution in the north-western corner of the region, probably based on a combination of capital accumulation that could be used for investment in capital goods, not only for buying merchandise, and the clear expression of western cosmology found in various types of Protestant thinking.<sup>9)</sup> Alone neither of these factors would have made it, together they probably account to a large extent for the rise of modern capitalism in that corner.

In short: the power-center shifted towards the North and it shifted towards the West - later on to proceed to the Far West, the United States. And thus it became a highly lopsided region with political/military, economic and cultural gradients running from west to east and from north to south. It was the Swedes, the French and the Germans that invaded the Slavs, not the other way round. It was they who had command over the trade between west and east, not the other way round. And it was they who, particularly since the times of Peter the Great, started shaping the East, not the other way round. And similarly for the north/south gradient: the trade pattern quickly became industrial goods from the north against food-stuffs etc. from the south, after the Hanseatic League had created a balance relative to southern traditional trading superiority that corresponded to the Protestant religious counterbalance to Catholicism,<sup>10)</sup> responsible for much of the capital accumulation. Of course, the north also invaded the south, an early example being northern France relative to southern France,<sup>11)</sup> later the establishment of

colonies, mainly by the French and the British, on the southern (and eastern) Mediterranean seaboard. The Ottoman empire does not enter in this picture so much although it lasted five hundred years; it was restricted to the south-eastern corner. But after its breakdown its function became more clear: as a bulwark against north-western penetration which immediately took place, politically/militarily, economically, culturally. In this light one should also see the rise of the Soviet Union and its hegemonial position relative to most of eastern Europe: north-western economic and cultural penetration would probably have been even more pronounced if it had not been for the political/military balance created after the Second World War.<sup>12)</sup> And finally: Hitler invaded the south, not vice versa.

In this article we are, however, not so concerned with the east-west axis as with the north-south axis as it is rather mandatory that changing realities in Europe after détente and the Final Act of Helsinki lead to changing images. It is now important to start thinking not only in terms of contradictions and conflicts along the west-east gradient, but also along the north-south gradient, pitting northern Europe not only against southern Europe, but against more of the south, the Mediterranean region as such. Thinking should not lag too much behind reality.

Concretely the power-gradient has forms that are well known to any observer of current world affairs. Thus the military political headquarters of the world are in the north: Washington and Moscow to mention the superpowers, NATO (in Brussels) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) to mention the alliances. It is they who use the Mediterranean for the deployment of their ships, not the south that uses the northern waters for the deployment of theirs. The block system is sewn together in a network of conferences in the north with the superpowers and alliances meeting each other; there is very little contact of politically/militarily meaningful kind between their more peripheral members in the south. Economically the headquarters are all in the north: New York for the American Economy, Brussels for the European Community, Moscow for the CMEA system. This is where decisions are taken regarding the south, not vice versa. The economies of the south are shaped by the demands from the north, not vice versa.

The international division of labor is less pronounced than between the First World and the Third World, but of the same kind. Moreover, there is fragmentation in the sense that the north has a tendency to deal with one country at the time in the south - for instance making them queue up singly, not combined for European Community membership. And there is marginalization in the sense that south is excluded from many important meetings held in the north. Thus, the structure is imperialistic although of a weaker form; to change it is a problem of politics, and has to be discussed as such.

### 3. The politics of Mediterranean self-assertion.

It might be useful to distinguish between five phases in the political process, not to be seen in a linear fashion as something to be completed before one proceeds to the next step, but as five components with an overall shift in the process from the former towards the latter stages.<sup>13)</sup>

First, there is consciousness formation: awareness of one's own needs and the forces conditioning their realization. Second, mobilization, or organization in order to shape the things to come. Third, an element of confrontation: a clear demarcation of conflict issues. Fourth: the struggle itself, and fifth some type of transcendence, some type of new order.

It might be useful to start from the end: what kind of image could one have for the future of the Mediterranean region? This is so eminently for the Mediterranean peoples to decide, but others might be permitted at least to project an image, and my image would not be that of a federation of Mediterranean states in the classical sense. Rather, it would be a very tightly spun web of associative relations,<sup>14)</sup> linking together peoples on all the coasts and the islands. Many of these networks will be functionally specific in a technical sense, concerned with food production,<sup>15)</sup> with health and education, energy and the environment, culture - but they will also be Mediterranean regional assemblies for political articulation, perhaps also for some limited decision-making. The basic point is a sense of self-reliance, meaning a

Mediterranean self-respect, a certain amount of self-sufficiency particularly when it comes to food-stuffs and energy, and fearlessness relative to those that militarily are stronger. In short, what matters is a region that cannot be manipulated and is a center in its own right, not the precise political architectonics that emerges out of the process of this kind.16)

To get a clearer perspective on this let us look at the other four components, starting with consciousness formation.

No doubt there has to be a stronger Mediterranean consciousness for anything like this to happen. In that consciousness there has to be an element of pride, a sense of having something specific which does not have to be better than what others have, but it is at least not inferior, and it is ours. If an outsider should point to one such factor, it would not be the climate or natural beauty because they are not the products of man. Nor would it be cultural artefacts, partly because this often leads to an overaccentuation of elite cultural production, partly because it so easily leads to an orientation towards the past, to the masters in the arts, music, literature; in order to preserve and hand over to the next generation rather than to create. The factor that much more than this, or in addition to these factors could serve as a nucleus of crystallization for an increased transnational, all-Mediterranean consciousness would rather be the style of life. By this is not necessarily meant a less hectic pace; given better opportunities to express themselves through work many people in the region no doubt choose to work more, not less. The famous dolce far niente could be seen as a product of a cruel social structure rather than as a cultural trait. There are other elements that are much more important, such as a much higher capacity to enjoy many pleasures of life - food and wine, the good company of others, conversation, to laugh and make others laugh, beauty and love. The amount of time given to such pursuits, the priority given to them in the daily and annual cycles sets the Mediterranean life-style apart from the northern European one. The siesta is a very good and concrete expression of a time-slot in the middle of the day, in the best working period from a northern point of view, set aside for food and conversation, beauty and love - in principle.17)

I know perfectly well that this is partly destroyed in modern city life in the region, and also that there is a class aspect: many, perhaps the majority are deprived of many of the pleasant aspects of this style of life. The style of life is eroded by misery at the bottom, and by northern penetration at the top, perhaps leaving a middle layer in which it is still the dominant life-style.

Of course, there is already some kind of negative pride connected with this: very often an open, sometimes very outspoken, rejection of northern life-styles can be heard. There is a characterization of northerners as "cold", individualistic in the sense of being isolationist, staying away from each other, incapable of enjoying each others company, not to mention love. The picture is of course overdrawn when Sicilians seem to believe that passion is some kind of Sicilian monopoly<sup>18)</sup> but there is a solid element of truth in it, solid enough to be one of the (usually unconscious) motivations for the enormous influx of northern tourists into the south, and the (equally unconscious) tendency for the south not to go to the north during vacation, but to stay in the south. Why? simply because the southern style of life is much closer to anybody's image of the style of life people would like to have when free to choose, not constrained by the northern pattern and ethic of work.<sup>19)</sup>

There is something interesting here in connection with the cultural aspect of the power gradient. It stands to reason that North will preserve its superiority where political, military and economic power are concerned still for some time, probably even for generations. But it may be that the relative importance of that factor becomes lower; it may also be that the relative significance of the life-style becomes higher. In that case the total equation would change and the Mediterranean would stand forth as a region which perhaps is somewhat poorer in material terms but very much richer in non-material terms. As the point of gravity of human concerns shift towards the latter, this is what will loom large. There are examples of such things in history: Hitler was very proud of his military machinery and no doubt exercised power; somehow he did not understand that military power was no longer the only one that counted in the minds of men - such a soft factor as how democratic a society was counted even

more. For that reason among other things his victories did not last long - they did not convert into power over the minds of peoples.

To move on to the factor of mobilization: no doubt the Mediterranean region could be better organized. Here one might think in terms of two levels of organization, or perhaps three: the Mediterranean region as an association of states (maybe around 25 in number); <sup>the</sup> Mediterranean region as an association of lower level units (municipalities, provincias, province, départements etc.) closer to the sea, although not necessarily as an absolute criterion, and the Mediterranean region as an association of groups of people and individuals. Obviously the state concept would bring the region far into the north of Europe and deep into the desert of Africa; by far transcending the traditional definition of the Mediterranean region in terms of the range of the olive tree. On the other hand our world is a world of states, and it is indispensable to have them participate in some kind of Mediterranean organization; only that it could be supplemented by concepts of Mediterranean towns and cities, and other municipalities, and also perhaps the intermediate layer of administrative units - and by associations of groups and individuals, organized around common values or around common occupations/professions.

The first type would be inter-governmental, the latter would be transnational. One important aspect of the latter is that it defines an open concept of the region, not one defined once and for all by geo-politics. This would permit a high level of flexibility, starting, for instance, with some type of association of Mediterranean towns and/or regions, on the coast, expanding into the hinterland as interest grows. As hinted at above the idea would be a dense network with a high number of such associations, many of them organized around very specific functional tasks, coming together at the top in an organizational framework that might have some of the features of both the United Nations and the European Community today. In other words, it would be neither a federation, nor a confederation (neither a Bundesstaat nor a Staatesbund), but something somewhat lower in level of organization. Each component would itself decide to what extent its resolutions are binding on the members, for instance.<sup>20)</sup>

If things like these really took shape it would feed back into consciousness-formation because the Mediterranean region would be something more concrete. Thus, it might even have some impact on such consciousness-forming devices as geography textbooks in elementary schools which still, by and large, have a tendency to divide the world into Europe, Africa, Asia and so on - not giving any prominence to the Mediterranean region.<sup>21)</sup> One sees only one important west-east dividing line, and it runs in the middle of the Mediterranean, creating the illusion of a harmony of interest along the north-south axis of the two Europes.<sup>22)</sup> Of course, nobody would dispute that there is a certain dividing line between the two old continents, but it is today probably mystifying rather than clarifying to think in terms of that one alone.

This becomes particularly clear in connection with the third stage: that of confrontation. Clearly, the confrontation would have to do with political/military and economic penetration into the region. There is no scarcity of examples, but let us only mention three.

The superpowers are penetrating militarily into the region with their navies. One very important step, which also might have some positive implication for world peace, would be - and it is a painstaking and difficult process - to close the Mediterranean for superpower navies. This would run against current tendencies at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea;<sup>23)</sup> nevertheless it would sooner or later have to be done (it is a question of closing two straits and one canal). Actions of such significance experience indicates, can only be carried out at the opportune political moment. That moment will, no doubt come sooner or later, the important point of departure / would be / to raise the consciousness about these matters, and have plans and options available if time should come. Needless to say, this perspective could also be expanded to exclude all treaty allies of the superpowers from having bases in the area, thus preventing arms races by substitution of smaller powers for the biggest ones. The Mediterranean should become mare nostrum, not in the imperial Roman sense, but in an egalitarian sense, and as a regional in-land lake.

Economically the major factor operating in the region would probably be the European Community. Characteristically there is probably more thinking carried out about the region and its future from Brussels than in the region itself. The European Community has plans for the Mediterranean region, not vice versa - and this is the situation that has to be changed. The very least that should be done would be for the four Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey) possibly<sup>24)</sup> in the process of becoming members, to join together elaborating joint proposals rather than to enter the process competitively, trying to get advantages at the expense of the other candidates. Mediterranean countries should not be less able to meet the European Community combined, not singly, than were the ACP (African, Carribean, Pacific) countries (and there were 46 of them together!) negotiating the Lomé Treaty with the European Community some years ago. That treaty may be criticized,<sup>25)</sup> but the process leading to it was important in forging greater unity in the Third World. Similar processes should be instituted in the Mediterranean region, and not only for the candidates for full membership, but also for the other countries with lower levels of integration into the Community.

More positively: it is obvious that trade and other forms of exchange between and among Mediterranean countries should increase, thereby making the Warenhandelsquote higher.<sup>26)</sup> For this to happen the Mediterranean would have to regain some of its status as a major medium of transportation. The network of shipping lines of all kinds would have to be made much denser, and less expensive - perhaps by lowering the standards of luxury that have been introduced in recent years.<sup>27)</sup> Those who want to travel that way will probably continue to do so, more important is the availability of cheap if less comfortable transport for less privileged people, among them also youth and students who would like to know other parts of their region. If anything like associations of peoples /<sup>or</sup> municipalities should come about, such means of transportation would be indispensable the rises in airfares pricing the air as a medium of transportation out of reach from most people, as is also the case for too many of the ferries.

In the field of energy: the International Energy Agency (IEA) is a typical example of penetration from the north in an effort to preserve North-Atlantic superiority over the south; an institution that favors Atlanticism over an above mediterraneanism.<sup>28)</sup> Clearly, the prospects for an economic development in the Mediterranean, to some extent based on the complementarity between the energy-producing, oil-rich southern part and the more industrialized northern part - both of them equipped with a high potential for self-sufficiency in food-stuffs - would seem to be excellent. Rational political thinking would lead to the conclusion of the south cooperating with itself, rather than joining the north in its efforts to maintain oil-prices high enough to make nuclear energy competitive, thereby permitting a switch in the point of gravity for the energy corporations (yesterday's oil corporations). France somehow seems to have been thinking more in this direction; the others joined IEA. But such decisions are reversible, and oil (with very short transportation distance) is by no means the only source of energy to the region. To the extent that solar energy can be used, the South has more sunshine than the North; this is a comparative advantage that should not be upset by efforts by the North to monopolize the means of energy production, the solar "cells". To the contrary, the Mediterranean region should go ahead with full strength, and on a cooperative basis, developing this form of energy as far as possible, thinking in terms of energy cells both on a micro-basis (for the individual household) and on a macro-basis. And there are probably also other possibilities, such as utilization of tidal energy.<sup>29)</sup>

Some initiatives of this kind would set the South on a collision course relative to the North. It is important to have institutional settings where this type of conflict can be not only articulated but also permitted to evolve in a non-violent manner, in a process of well regulated struggle. Institutions are not too well made for this purpose: the European Community excludes too many countries in the region and give to others lower level status; OECD takes in only the most industrialized ones; the UN and its agencies have a natural bias towards more global problems, and all the European organizations - also those in the UN family - have by and large a tendency to be exactly that.

What would be needed would be some type of machinery where Mediterranean countries could have a dialogue with the countries to the north, possibly even in a UN setting - thereby mirroring organizationally the nature of the issues, and permitting the issues to be handled comprehensively, not one by one, parcelled out to specific agencies, and with a change of partners depending on the issue. Clearly, the goal of such a process would not be for the South to regenerate the Roman empire with a power center located somewhere in the Mediterranean, but for the South to obtain a balance with the North, a mutually satisfactory exchange preserving its lifestyle and cultural values.

#### 4. Conclusion.

Much has been said about the fragmentation of the Mediterranean region: three continents, two major military blocks, several regional and sub-regional economic organizations, a plethora of cultures and sub-cultures including languages, religions, idioms in general. And yet there is something unmistakably common in the Mediterranean region: a heritage, a village-structure, a way of organizing life from the individual level through the family and the villages to macro-politics - not all of it equally desirable in the longer run.<sup>30)</sup> There is a certain common denominator in the style of life; there is a similarity in nature and habitat. In short, there is a mixture of homogeneity and heterogeneity that both makes a process of evolving regionalism possible, and challenging and fruitful in its diversity.

But it will not come about by itself. If present processes continue, the Mediterranean region is likely very soon to become even more of a periphery of the North, even more incorporated into northern military and political blocks and power-structures, into northern economic structures, and to lose its lifestyle to the North. The tourists who enter the region in millions every year stay each one of them, only a short period, enjoying the Mediterranean context as a vacation; those who live in the region have tourists around them, admittedly with peaks and troughs, most of the year. In all likelihood, influence through net lifestyle transfer is from the north to the south rather than from south to north. Like in the Third World the processes of

acculturation of the south by the north has come furthest in the city-based elites, but is very rapidly spreading. In one generation what is Mediterranean about the Mediterranean region will probably only be found in the deeper recesses of the hinterlands.

There cannot be anything but one conclusion: the time for more concerted, more deliberate action is now. This is the time, not only for one journal of Mediterranean Studies, but for many, not only for one center to collect information (and perhaps much more importantly: collect imaginative proposals), but for many - not only for one course on Mediterranean Studies at one place in the region, but as many as possible - - all of this to mention the type of things that intellectuals would be likely to do; thereby serving as catalysts as to how deep the process is.

NOTES

The present paper was presented at a discussion meeting in Madrid, December 1976, invited by Joaquin Antuña, chaired by Professor Jose Vidal Beneyto, and under the auspices of the World Education Studies Federation, Rome. The paper was also presented at the course Latinamerican Studies at the Inter-University Centre in Plymouth, April 1977, a course directed by John Grech and Professor Ferrer Ruf. I am grateful to discussors all present, and more my numerous friends in the region will forgive an outsider who saddles into their affairs. But in a sense we from Northern Europe have not only a right to be concerned with the rest of Europe, or the rest of the world for that matter, but also a duty to shout a warning, clear and loud: do not be trapped by us when we seek to "integrate" you. It may be more in our interest than in yours, and will almost definitely serve to correct our problems, even our social and individual pathologies.

1. The cold, coldness is almost ironic at this: the Northerner is seen as essentially "cold". He does not like to hear it, but there is probably something to it. Just as I don't know what it means, in more precise terms, however. I don't think it should be confused with the production of a high pitched level of noise, usually the verbal noise - not silence or distance with coldness. Compassion for others can find forms that are distant and silent, not only forms that are direct and visible/audible. But that the Northerner often envies in the Southerner is the art of direct, the ability to express emotion directly and thus articulate emotion in others, increasing the temperature - also of the - in all relations. A comparison between an evening party or a luncheon in Spain and one in Norway will serve as an illustration: the latter needs alcohol to warm up and even then is likely to become unpleasant rather than warm. But if ours is interpreted as coldness rather than coldness a more positive image may emerge.
2. Links of the Two Worlds: A Development Study of Three Villages in Eastern Sicily, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1977
3. After the Elich critique the Schweitzer medical approach becomes more meaningful.
4. After the critique of modern technology the Gandhi approach gains in acceptability - a point which may play a role with the post-Indira Gandhi group.

5. Not too much time should be wasted on this kind of exercise, but one way of thinking might be as follows. Starting in the West there are the Latin countries in the North (Portugal, Spain, France and Italy - Portugal clearly belonging to the region even if not a coastal state); and the Maghreb countries in the South (Morocco, Algeria, Tunis). Then there are the Balkan countries in the North (Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, but also including Rumania and Bulgaria for the same reason as Portugal); and the Arab countries in the South (Libya, Egypt, Jordan, - Palestine, Lebanon, Syria). In a class all by itself is Turkey, and so is Israel. Then there are the three islands of Gibraltar (the road link to La Linea not making it less of an island), Malta and Cyprus; and the four mini-states (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Città di Vaticano). This yields a total of 26 - others may come to other numbers. (For a similar exercise see Anthony Macelli, "Co-operation in Mediterranean Systems Research", p. 48). Of course, the sub-division used above in Latin-Maghreb-Balkan-Arab countries (leaving out for a moment Turkey, Israel, the islands and the mini-states) is far from neat: one Balkan country is Latin (Rumania), the Maghreb countries are at least partly Arab, etc. If we include Libya in the Maghreb group then such statements as "The Latin group colonized the Maghreb group" and "Turkey colonized the Balkan and the Arab groups" become almost true. They are important in pointing to the power gradients of the past - after the Roman empire and the Arab influence over most of the region. The links are numerous and in sufficient time perspective not that asymmetric.
6. For cis-alpina and trans-alpina to be in some kind of equilibrium there had to be a counterpoint to the Church of Rome. If Luther had not done it, somebody else would - and the history of Christianity in that period testifies to a number of mutually relatively independent approaches to this problem in that period.
7. For one elaboration of this, see Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad and Erik Audeng, "On the Last 2500 Years of Western History, and Some Remarks on the Coming 500", The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 13, ch. 13 - forthcoming (1978).
8. This point is repeatedly stressed by Troels-Lund in his monumental Daglig Liv i Norden (Daily Life in the Nordic Countries), with an excellent analysis of the impact of the Reformation on life in general.
9. This is, of course, one of the basic points in Weber's analysis.
10. It should be added that the Hanseatic League and other forms of mercantile capitalism in the North did more to destroy the Mediterranean city-states than Protestantism has been able to do to destroy Catholicism. Because the total number of Christians in the world expanded more rapidly than total world trade, making the former an expanding-sum and the latter a constant-sum game?

11. Paris will increasingly have to pay back on the debts incurred in this manner: Occitanie! It is interesting to note that today it is Spain rather than France that seems able to undo some of the monolithism of the early nation-states possibly because post-Franco Spain has gone through a discontinuity that makes it politically possible.
12. The "Cold War" can be seen in this perspective: beginning in 1917, but much more so after the Second world war, a Europe had emerged that did not obey so clearly the rules of north-western dominance. The Soviet colossus stood in the way. A "normal" Europe, from this point of view, would have been a Europe where most of Eastern Europe, from Estonia, via Ukraina to Rumania and Albania would have been queuing up in Brussels for some kind of status with the EC. This point is elaborated further in Johan Galtung, "East-West Co-operation and Security: A Sceptical Contribution", Journal of Peace Research, 1975, or in Essays in Peace Research, Vol.5 (forthcoming).
13. For a further elaboration of this, see Johan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective, New York, 1977 - chapter 4.4
14. For a theory of associative relationships, see Part I in Galtung, Lodgaard eds., Co-operation in Europe, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1970. The basic components in this kind of thinking would be to promote networks of relations that are
  - symbiotic - all parties depend on them
  - equitable - they depend on them about equally much
  - broad in scope - many items to cooperate on
  - broad, but not too broad, in domain - several partners
  - homologous - based on partners who are not different structurally
  - entropic - based on cooperation in all directions, tightly spun
  - transcending - with the creation of some new actors/institutions.

The Mediterranean region consists of so many parties of different shape and size, and with numerous opportunities for sub-regional formations that such principles can be enacted. The region does not have the built-in cooperation problem of the big power with the very small country: when an elephant cooperates with a mosquito the relation is unlikely to be equitable, and two parties alone does not yield enough flexibility for conflict resolution.

15. For an excellent analysis of possibilities, see Peter Serracino-Inglott, "Mediterranean Regional Policy", Paper prepared for the Special Meeting of the Club of Rome, Alger 25-28 October, 1976. The paper naturally focusses on sea and sea-bed related institutions, pointing to the advantage of "ocean-centred regionalism": "- - even the most cursory examination of Mediterranean history shows very clearly that the periods of sea-centredness coincide precisely with the periods of prosperity, and vice-versa".(p.5).

He goes on, stating that "Sea-centred political functionalism would, indeed, be much more in accordance with Mediterranean tradition than a European-African centred polarization". The author, incidentally, sees the present North-South split in the area as recent, as "mutual cultural and political aloofness /created/ by the coincidence of the Ottoman decline and the European colonial interventions" (p.6, like the preceding quote).

16. For interesting exercises in that architectonic, see the paper by A. Macelli quoted in 5 above, and by that same author "Creative Development in the Mediterranean", Mediterranean Studies, University of Malta, 1977.
17. The "siesta strike" in Athens recently, with the government trying to reduce the siesta break considerably towards more northern rhythms is a good example.
18. Sicilians do not draw the line with the Alps, however: passion, in their image, suffers a steep decline already at the Straits of Messina.
19. Thus, it is much to be doubted whether equal economic opportunity would make southerners in Europe have as much vacation in the North as northerners today seek in the South.
20. This would not be a neat formula, but why should it? As Serracino-Inglott points out: "The model/of continent-centred regionalism, such as that towards which European Federalism tends / still retains the modern Western idea of centralized and monolithic sovereignty at its basis - an idea related to, and perhaps rooted in, the idea of absolute private ownership as developed in the tradition of Roman law" (op.cit., p.3).
21. In fact, all the dividing lines we are used to draw split the Mediterranean region: the three continents, the "capitalist"/"socialist" divide, the "developed"/"developing" distinction, civilizations, cultures, religions. It is only under a Mediterranean perspective, geographically/historically informed, that these lines become more blurred and the region emerges, for that reason less weak and fragmented, less easily enrolled in camps that usually have their headquarters outside the region.
22. In fact, the gradient that runs from North-Western Europe through Southern Europe and further to Northern Africa and then on towards poorer parts of the Third World offers a number of opportunities for the rich capitalist West to expand through the mechanism of uneven development, by creating chains of economic cycles with more refined processes in the North and the cruder ones in the South. This would correspond to a system of graded membership in the European Community, and also be encouraged by the US to the extent that sectors of the US economy can be on top of the entire process..
23. UNCLoS has been marked with a general subservience to the super-powers under the guise of calling it "realistic". The stand by Malta, highly anti-superpower, at some moment almost led to

exclusion of Malta's foreign policy, see Malta News, April 9, 1976, with a very clear presentation of Premier Dom Mintof's foreign policy.

24. Turkey's position being more unclear, not presently a candidate of full membership.
25. Most of that criticism, however, would be the same as criticism that can be levelled against many of the measures included in the New International Economic Order.
26. What is getting higher is the tendency to export to the EC countries: percentage of the export from Greece, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia to the EC countries increased from 28-40, 17-37, 35-39 and 15-29 in the period 1959-1970/71 respectively. It should be noted that type of regime, or whether the country is an associated member or not, does not appear to be important. See M. Nikolinakos, "Die Arbeitsteilung zwischen EG und Mittelmeer" Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Informationsseminar, May 1977.
27. A typical example is the Danish ferry Genova-Alicante-Tunis. A 31 hours trip Genova-Alicante for a family with a car costs about four times what a sixteen hours trip with the same company between Oslo and Copenhagen would cost.
28. France was the country in Latin Europe that seems to have seen this clearly enough to draw the conclusion of not becoming a full member of the IEA. In so doing France may have seen also the clear advantage in the longer run of building Mediterranean ties exactly in the field of energy, and it is a measure of both US power and European subservience in a certain period that not more countries drew the same conclusion as France. But then there is clearly also much more than energy at stake. The integration of Southern Europe into the system dominated by the North-West in the form of the European Community becomes more urgent when it is remembered that what is often called "Eurocommunism" in fact is Mediterranean Communism, or more precisely Latin Communism (with the exception of Portugal, so far). Southern Europe has a different tradition of working class movements: less tied to social democratic parties, reformist and parliamentarian in their orientation, more inclined to heavier forms of class struggle. To bring them under the influence of their colleagues in the North would be an important part of the program of "integration" of Southern Europe.
29. Biogas, incidentally, also fits better for Southern Europe as the outside temperature should not be too low.
30. Of course - there is no need to romanticize. Every system has its shadowy sides: in this case corruption and despotism - not to mention the fact that most fascisms in Europe were in the South.