CONFLICT, WAR AND PEACE: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW

(And what mainstream journalists/politicians make of it)

By Johan Galtung, dr hc mult, Professor of Peace Studies Director, TRANSCEND: A Peace and Development Network E-mail: <galtung@transcend.org> Site: <www.transcend.org>

1. The bird'seye view

There is a standard natural history, with many variations and sub-types, leading to violence and war=organized group violence, indicative of how violence can be avoided or at least reduced. That prototype includes two stages preceding the violence.

The first is a conflict (parties with contradictory goals); a ubiquitous phenomenon in human and social reality, a major force motrice. Or, more correctly: unresolved conflict, leading to frustration because of blocked goals, and a potential for aggression against parties perceived as standing in the way.

The second is polarization, reduction to two groups, Self and Other, with positive interaction within and negative between the groups. Under extreme polarization Other is dehumanized and Self exalted as carrier of supreme, sacred or secular, values.

This prototype is as much a part of human reality as high exposure(pathogens)+low resistance(immunity) leading to disease. Like disease violence is caused by the preceding stages in the prototype; like disease violence can be prevented by removing the causes. Conflict is removed as a cause by transformation so that the conflict can be handled by the parties nonviolently, creatively, empathically. Polarization is removed as a cause through depolarization, (re)linking positively and flattening the gradient from Self to Other. As violence is polarizing violence should be minimal. By transforming the conflict the bellogen frustration+aggression are removed; depolarization adds to this a paxogen corresponding to the immune system.

In UN jargon these two activities are known generically as peacemaking and peacebuilding. In medical jargon they are similar to primary and secondary prophylaxis, removing pathogens and strengthening the self-healing capacity of the body.

Then there is peacekeeping, aiming at controlling the violence, reducing it, possibly even removing it to the point called ceasefire. In medical jargon that would be curative therapy, removing the symptoms of disease, as distinct from the two types of preventive therapy mentioned above. In peace as in health the total therapy is in the package, not in one part.

The flow chart would look like this:

╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗

║ CONFLICT____ POLARIZATION____ VIOLENCE/WAR ║

║ incompatible dehumanization hurt/harm body, ║ ║ goals Self-Other gradient mind or spirit ║ ╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

contradiction attitude behavior

deep structure/culture basic needs

We have added some explanatory categories: conflict has to do with contradictions among incompatible goals, polarization has to do with attitudes which may be translated into behavior like a prejudice, but can also start as behavior like discrimination. Violence is a form of avoidable behavior--physical, verbal or both (body language)--which hurts/harms. Direct violence can be mapped on a sentence with subject (the perpetrator), verb (the action) and object (the hurt/harmed victim). With no subject we would talk about indirect or structural violence.

Underneath are the deeper levels of explanation: the deep, more long-lasting structures and cultures defining long-lasting contradictions and attitudes and the basic human needs defining more permanent behavior (in medical theory deep = gener/tic).

Let us now have a second glance, reviewing the prototype.

Basic question: are these antecedents, if that is what they are, necessary causes, sufficient causes, both or neither? Do they really explain violence? Let us start with "necessary".

Is there always an unresolved conflict underlying violence? The imperial powers were extremely violent in their overseas conquest but they had no prior conflict with those peoples, they did not even know them, they "discovered" them. True, but the conflict was over the unlimited submission required of them (by the papal bull Inter Caetera), as subjects, economically as forced labor, culturally as converts. If they submitted they could be admitted as slaves, today as second class citizens; if not military power, violence, war was used. Suggestion: if violence is the smoke conflict is the fire. Search, you'll find.

Is polarization always underlying violence? Polarization means social distance, horizontal (like countries separated by borders); vertically (like classes separated by unequal power), or both. Social distance means human distance. Even the most violent bully probably has somebody he (usually a he) would not harm/hurt. He recognizes a common identity = identification. The bully has a buddy even if the family is not exempt from his violence. Somebody is untouchable, protected by identification. For Gandhi identification includes all humanity; for buddhism all sentient life (capable of experiencing a dukkha-sukha gradient, from suffering to well-being. Romans spoke of homo res sacra hominibus. Needless to say, the less polarized will employ the more polarized for the dirty job of violence, the riff-raff of any society, and on top of that train them to kill. Scratch the surface and you will find elements of polarization.

The "sufficiency" part is much more problematic.

Will an unresolved conflict with the frustration of goals unattained for one or all parties always lead to aggression, violence? In a basic conflict, with basic needs among the goals, aggression is more likely. But even so there may also be suffering in silence, seeing the predicament as an unavoidable part of the human condition, dwelling in human nature.

This holds particularly for structural conflicts, built into the social structure between those high up who want to remain on top, and those lower down who do or do not reconcile themselves to their fate: the dangerous classes, "dangerous" because they may one day wake up and see reality. But in actor conflicts, where there is a very concrete actor on the other side (and real conflicts are mixes of the two) the subject standing in the way is easily identified, and "what can we do about It" becomes "what can we do about Him".

Will polarization always lead to violence? Of course not, it can go on for ages like between countries with no ties. And between classes the polarization is already structural violence if those lower down are really hurt/harmed, meaning that their basic needs are molested/left unsatisfied by the structure. Will direct violence be added? Yes, if basic needs are deeply insulted. But states and nations have kept apart for ages with no violence, so have class structures, between peoples, between countries. Moreover, can we be close to everybody?

What has to be added for unresolved conflict + polarization to lead to violence? One answer (and that is enough, we are dealing with sufficiency here) would be a culture of violence, making violence seems natural/normal, lowering the threshold.

One such culture of violence is provided by the hard reading of the Book, the kitab of the abrahamitic religions, the Old Testament (but actually also the Christian New Testament, although the focus is more on faith and the Kingdom of God in heaven and/or inside us than on acts and the Zion for the Jews.

Conflict is seen as dual, between two parties, like God and Satan, one good, one evil, fighting over one issue. It can only end one way, in a massive, violent encounter, possibly with Evil triumphing over Good on Earth but Good continuing in Heaven.

We refer to it as the DMA-syndrome for Dualism-Manicheism-Armageddon. If a conflict is constructed as a contradiction between two parties, one worthy of survival and the other not, predestined to meet in a major battle, then this natural law of violence, its DMA inevitability, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, like in marxism; embedded in the deep culture.

The dangerous sufficiency mix, the nitrate-carbon-sulphur mix, would include a violent culture turning an actor frustrated by an unresolved conflict into a bad actor, a bully; a violent structure already pre-polarizing the society; and some kind of precipitating event, the hammer blow on the dangerous mix. Bad actor+bad culture(violent)+bad structure (polarized) = violence.

That now gives us four components in a preventive therapy:

First, identify the bad actors (eg., by past behavior) and arraign them into court, in detention, incapacitate them.

Second, change a violent culture into a peace culture.

Third, change a violent structure into a peace structure.

Fourth, be on guard against precipitating events.

But violence-prone actors and precipitating events there will always be. Better build on peace cultures and structures.

2. The first narrative: The just violence/war.

This is a mainstream narrative, following the arrows.

In the beginning is not the word, but an issue between two or more goals held by one or more parties. A goal can be put in words, but they may not convey the intense emotions of hopes and fears fueling the pursuit of the goal, be it positive, something to attain, or negative, something to avoid. And the more so the more goals are related to the sine qua non of human existence: the basic needs, survival, well-being, freedom, identity.

Polarization enters because other parties are seen as standing in the way of goal-attainment. A social/human distance is created to such parties. At the root may be the problem of legitimacy. My goal-attainment is legitimate; his is not, even if he says so. Projecting on him hidden, evil goals makes his proclaimed goals a cloak, and I have won the first round by constructing not only his goals but him as evil/illegitimate.

Evil should be incapacitated, depriving Other of the capability to enact his evil motivations. But the problem with violence is that it molests the most basic of basic human needs, survival itself. There will be a reactio to a violent actio.

One possibility is that violence makes Other see himself as at least partly evil, amends his ways and gives up the goal. This is the rationale for the legal use of punishment=violence.

A second possibility is escape; Other becomes unavailable.

A third possibility is for Other to suffer violence with no resistance, common when violence is institutionalized, direct or structural; possibly with extermination at the end of the road.

A fourth approach is violent resistance by Other.

And a fifth approach is nonviolent resistance by Other.

Violence introduces a conflict after the root conflict, a meta-conflict between molest and remain unmolested, which then leads to a meta-polarization and feeds into the root conflict in the well-known vicious circle of violence breeding violence. In the first three cases Self gets what he wants; and so he does if he wins, overcoming violent or nonviolent resistance. This is called a "military solution", i.e. a lull before next round.

Again the key element is probably legitimacy. The beaten Other may draw the conclusion that he was wrong, illegitimate; and that provides the happy ending for Narrative 1 for Self.

But Other may also draw the conclusion that his goal in the root conflict was legitimate and demand a revanche, a new deal.

And/or, Other may draw the conclusion that his goal in the meta-conflict, survival, was legitimate and demand retribution.

This is where the narrative makes a loop via deep culture for legitimacy feedback, and the next round gets a fresh start.

The narrative now becomes drawn out if the capacities to incapacitate are relatively equal, the "equal playing field"; more likely to serve, like in sports, the goal of fairness in identifying the winner than deterrence, abstaining from playing. The archetype is the duel/battle for individual/collective decision-making in conflict according to "the winner takes all". There is an underlying meta-narrative identifying being victory with being legitimate. Watching that violence/war unfold is watching justice at work, according to this narrative.

Violence, war is a morality drama. God is on the side of the winner. If not God, Evolution is on the side of the winner. Or, in globalization, Market is on the side of the winner. He who loses deserves to do so. Justice has been done.

The more equal the playing field, the higher the suffering.

What, then, makes a fully fledged war with conflict and meta-conflict, polarization and meta-polarization and meta-meta come to an end? Remembering that a war presupposes capability, motivation and targets of incapacitation, why end the game?

The first scenario is incapacitation of one side; both being incapacitated is unlikely. The winner dictates the terms.

The second scenario is capitulation by one side short of incapacitation; simultaneous capitulation being unlikely. But he may be suspected of saving capabilities for revenge/revanche, hence better make the capitulation unconditional.

The third scenario is ceasefire by mutual agreement because of too high costs and incapacitation/capitulation not in sight. The question is who demands it from strength, who from weakness.

The fourth scenario is choking the violence/war by running out of targets (or making them unavailable), by running out of capabilities (arms, ammunition, money, food), by running out of motivation. Simultaneous choking is unlikely, but the choking point does not have to be the same for the parties.

The fifth scenario is in occidental deep narrative: a war is mono-climactic, the end comes after the climax; male orgasm as metaphor. With both parties driven by this narrative a climax ushers in one of the scenarios above and a victor is declared.

The narrative attributes justice to violence/war. The war is not only mutual carnage; it has a function. If God sides with the winner, then the war makes God reveal His will. If Evolution by definition sides with the winner/the fittest, then war makes Evolution reveal its arrow. If some float to the top, buoyed by the Market, and some sink - then so be it, it is deserved.

3. The second narrative: Intervention on the side of justice

But imagine there is no end in sight; the war is protracted. Or worse: the party on the side of God (read: our side), or higher on Evolution (read: election democracy), or more embodying the Market (read: access, privatization) is not winning. Time has come to open for a second narrative: intervention by outside, by so-called third parties. To mingle in the strife they have by definition to be big powers lest they get badly hurt. Even so they may limit intervention by doctrines of "force protection".

Being now parties to the conflict the question is what goals they have and whether the goals are legitimate. Being big they may be suspected of having big, even ulterior goals. "Humanitarianism" provides formulas for legitimacy, but hardly sufficient to allay suspicions of ulterior goals. A conflict, and particularly a violent conflict shakes any system, there may be loose bits and ends floating around, morsels for outside parties to pick up. Big powers may be suspected of doing that: reconstruction, even reparation contracts, trade privileges, political clientelism, cultural cloning, military bases/allies.

We are now entering the narrative of the conflict between the intervenor and the intervened. The narrative will probably be that they enter on the side of justice to equalize the playing field, helping the righteous side to a righteous victory over the unworthy, and in addition reducing innocent suffering. Basically they have to embody the three principles of legitimacy around which these morality tales are spun: the three selectors, God, Evolution and Market. They have to enter so that God can pick His choice, Evolution can run its course by rewarding the most evolved, the most ready to embody Market principles.

For what follows, see above. It all hinges on the ability of the intervenor to be seen as legitimate and not just as one more party with a "what is in it for me" motivation. For that reason it is essential to enter late enough to give the parties a chance, also to exhaust each other so that the military risk to the intervenor is less, yet before the evil side is winning. If the good side is winning, no problem. If not, and with good timing the scenarios may combine into victory for the intervenor who dictates the terms of ceasefire, of how to depolarize and the terms of conflict resolution (in favor of the Good party).

The third possibility is almost too horrible to contemplate but it does happen: the evil side wins not only over the just side, but even over the intervenor in the name of justice. The narrative dissolves in a nightmare. At stake is not only the justice of Good overcoming Evil. Good, being too weak, could not win alone. But if Good, reinforced by super-Good cannot win either, then what is the morale? That we live in the worst of all worlds and the End is near? Possibly, and that would be compatible with the Armageddon metaphor.

But there are at least three other interpretations.

First, bad, could it be that the intervention was self-choked, with insufficient capability, or motivation, or that they ran out of targets? There was lack of nerve, lack of will?

Second, worse, could it be that the credentials of the intervenor, as catalyst in this justice-revealing activity, were not good enough? Worse still, could it even be that they were negative, that the intervenor actually was on the side of Evil?

Third, worst, could it be that the use of war to serve justice, to obtain political-cultural goals, is basically flawed?

4. The third scenario: Transformation-depolarization-peace

The first narrative (Clausewitzian) was about the quick or slow but successful, pursuit of a political goal, the conflict goal, by military means. For that purpose instant polarization may be used, trusting that violence itself is polarizing and will overcome bonds of economic ties, neighborhood, friendship even kinship. The process will bypass deep polarization, go straight from unresolved conflict--unresolved because the other party refused to submit--to violence and war and then pass through some loops of meta-conflict and meta-polarization to victory. The second narrative is about the quick or slow but successful intervention into protracted warfare. It better be by "overwhelming force" lest the three queries at the end of the preceding section should surface.

Is there a third narrative hidden somewhere in this prototype? Certainly, and like the first narrative it starts in the conflict end of the story, unlike the second narrative it does not start with violence. It may be called the peace by peaceful means narrative, and has less backing in our deep culture, being more recent. But it is not entirely without archetypal backing. Jewish prophets, the words of Christ and of the Prophet are rich in proposals for conflict resolution. But there is a tendency for such proposals to be of the "or else" variety, ultimately backed up by the wrath of the Almighty.

The narrative does not exclude a peacekeeping prologue to reduce the violence, if possible down to zero, but not "peace enforcement" to help one party win. But peacekeeping is not necessarily done by military force. "Overwhelming nonviolent force" may also be a formula, leaving no space for violence.

The first chapter in the narrative is an image of an outcome for the conflict so compelling that the parties say, "hey, that is much better than what the first and second narratives have to offer, specially given the suffering and the revenge/revanche factor that may follow in the their wake?"

The second chapter is the story of peacebuilding, in other words depolarization, sewing broken tissue, substituting some new tissue. This is much broader than "confidence-building measures" which may also be cosmetic if not internalized in the minds and hearts and institutionalized in the structures. Truth for the minds and reconciliation for the hearts!

The third chapter is peacekeeping by nonviolent or very soft violent means like police forces, similar to the prologue mentioned above. But there is also another scenario for the third factor, the violence. The solution to the conflict makes it look irrelevant, misplaced, out of tune. Weapons become distargeted, "decommissioned", they start "withering away".

We say "chapter", but they are to be read simultaneously. And the "reading" has to be aloud, indeed, and massively so, based on solid knowledge of the texts.

Has this narrative ever had an empirical counterpart? Oh yes, but the two preceding narratives read so loudly in the media that they tend to overwhelm public consciousness. The collective subconscious, the belligerent deep culture has war reporting as a major conveyor belt. Empirically the third narrative is so frequent that it is not even told but taken for granted. This is the normal way things are settled: an image of a viable, meaning acceptable and sustainable, emerges; people move from imaging to fantasizing to living it. And that's it.

5. The peace narrative: Four cases.

The White-Black conflict over desegregation in the US South did not lead to a major war (although there was violence), with intervention (although there were elements of that) and a diktat (although there were and are elements of that in the schools). There was and is an image of a one person-one vote democracy, a colorblind society. The image gains in acceptability as can be seen in the countless desegregated facilities in the South, like eateries, toilets, recreation areas. There was and is increasing depolarization of blacks and whites simply practicing a future of togetherness, highly provocative for segregationists but in the longer run irresistible. Crucial peacekeeping was nonviolent until the process became to a large extent self-sustaining. And it all happened over a surprisingly short period of time. No doubt it matters who propagated the conflict outcome image: the US Supreme Court, on May 17, 1954. The image negated the old "separate but equal" image in favor of "desegregated and equal".

The White-Black conflict in South Africa did not lead to a major war either, only exchanges of violence between terrorism and state terrorism, nor to a major intervention to put an end to the violence and settle the conflict. People increasingly bought into the compelling image of one-person, one-vote democracy with human rights. There was a major depolarization at the top: the Mandela-de Klerk very cooperative relationship. No doubt it was helpful that US desegregation had preceded the abolition of apartheid with no major backlashes of any kind. One thing is to live in a virtual image; quite another to have a case sufficiently similar to make that image even more compelling. No doubt Rhodesia-Zimbabwe was also useful.

But the end of the Cold War was even more impressive as a case for the third narrative, the peace narrative. True, we have pointed out that the antecedents to violence/war are not sufficient causes, not even when unresolved conflict and heavy polarization combine with an arms race = a cold war. And the underlying conflict was massive: over interests, who is the Master in Eastern Europe, and over values, what is the good society--multi-party/capitalist or single party/socialist. Enacting the first narrative would be catastrophic as evidenced by the places it was partly enacted, Korea and Viêt Nam. And: on a world scale, there would be no powerful inventor available.

Fortunately, what happened followed the third narrative.

There were the images of outcomes projected by the two parties: all that is needed is that you become like me. This is not known as an acceptable solution but as imposition, victory. Then the idea of convergence started taking roots, with social democracy or democratic socialism (the first ideology of Solidarnosc) as obvious meeting ground. This was not to be, however, because of internal processes in the USA (consistently moving to the right politically relative to, say, New Deal) and the Soviet Union (consistently moving toward demoralization and implosion because of inability to overcome many contradictions).

But there was another compelling image coming out of the peace movement and the dissident movement: no more danger of nuclear war/human rights and democracy for all. The movements practiced the future by depolarizing different and complementary segments of a heavily polarized East-West system. The resistance against nuclearism and post-stalinism was done nonviolently and successfully so. The Berlin wall fell. We all knew it was over.

The fourth case has a different flavor because of the time span between the first and second narratives, and the third. The civil war 1936-39 in Spain between the Loyalists (to the democratically elected Popular Front government of republicans, socialists, communists, anarchists, and nationalists in Cataluña and the Basque country) and the Insurgents (under Franco, supporting and supported by los poderes fácticos, the real powers, land-owners, military, clergy) was also based on a massive conflict between two very different images of the good society. Put simply: communist (but with strong anarchist elements) versus fascist, the falange. Narrative 1 was enacted through many loops in a cruel war with massive polarization and one million dead. Narrative 2 came with much military aid to the Insurgents from Germany and Italy, and an International Brigade, and a trickle of aid from the Soviet Union, for the Loyalists.

Who won? In the short run Franco, of course, enacting his image in an unstable, deeply traumatized society. But who won in the longer run? Neither one, nor the other. A very compelling image was in the air from the Second world war, often twisted, thwarted: multi-party democracy, human rights, selfdetermination for minorities. Both sides gradually bought into this image, traveled abroad, lived it, got testimony from visitors. But time, say, one generation, was needed to overcome the most acute phase of the traumas. And that coincided roughly with the life of Franco. When he died November 1975, lamented by few, no night of long knives was in sight. And the successors to the Loyalists and the Insurgents met in a multi-party endeavor to construct, successfully so far, non-fascist/non-stalinist Spain, with only one small backlash: the Tejero incident of 23 February 1981.

So, right now--July 2001--why does this not work in the Basque country, in Ulster, in the Middle East/Israel-Palestine? Why is there no peace process, except as a propaganda term, with no solid peace in sight--only some breaks Narrative 1 violence? And enactment of Narrative 2 by Spanish and English police and military in the first two cases, and a denial of Narrative 2 by Israel in the third lest they make the playing field equal?

First answer: for lack of a compelling image of the future. General autonomy for the Basque country in Spain is less than what is wanted, moreover, it does not include French Basques. The Good Friday agreement does not provide for symmetry in arms. IRA is against the British Army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (with 93% Protestants), and the equally para-military Ulster Defense Forces. And there is no serious image of how two states, Israel and Palestine, could live side by side, remembering that any image has to be symmetric in such basics as the right to have a state (and a capital and a Right of Return).

Second, a negative answer: the ritualistic demand for a ceasefire, even disarmament, only then depolarization around the table, only then conflict solution. Why should they do that when there is no light at the end of the tunnel, not even an image as an anchor for trying out of that outcome, virtually? Even if they are not planning any major violence, arms have a nuisance value, why should they give up that card?

Rather much more can be said, but let this do. The basic conclusion is this: The first narrative leads but to demands for revanche and revenge, the second narrative puts the cart before the horse by demanding that people do in the beginning what they will only do at the end. The peace narrative is more promising.

Which does not mean that it is infallible. Moreover, like natural medicine it cures without doing harm but needs more time than violent antibiotika. People have to engage in virtual tests of a concrete peace proposal. Much psychological mobility is needed; hence words above like "compelling" and "irresistible". The proposal has to be so good that the time factor can be considerably shortened. It defies reason to believe that such proposals can emerge from a "table" accommodating people who have been in a tunnel killing each other according to narratives 1 and 2 suddenly to see the light by switching to narrative 3.

Ancient and not-so-ancient history speak to us through narratives 1 and 2. We sense primitive society using rituals of violence to settle conflicts. We sense traditional society adding God's finger and His chosen instruments, the Kings. We sense modern society with the State as successor to the Kings for the execution of these atavistic rituals, adding the social darwinist idea of Evolution, right now with democracy cum Market as the crowning achievement, The End of Evolution/History.

There is more than the power of the most powerful State(s) at stake. There is a whole syndrome of interconnected beliefs down there in the collective subconscious with "bringing to Justice", in the battlefield and ultimately in the court room, as connecting elements. And we sense how subversive the idea of peace is, the third narrative, cutting out the atavism of violence, going straight to the solution, then solidifying it through depolarization and as much nonviolent control of violence as possible. Peace becomes left wing not because left wing people are more pacifist, but because they believe less in the rest of the syndrome. May it spread and be shared by all.

6. And what do mainstream journalists/politicians make of this?

[1] They leave out the unresolved conflict and polarization, focus only on violence which then looks irrational, autistic.

Example: "Terrorism", read Chalmers Johnson's Blowback

[2] They confuse conflict arena-where the violence/"action" is-with conflict formation the parties with a stake in the outcome.

Example: focus in Ulster only on violent parties, not on 85%.

[3] DUALISM, reducing the number of conflict parties to 2 and the number of issues to 1 as dominant discourse. not looking for hidden parties presenting themselves as mediators and issues.

Example: missing Germany as major conflict party in Yugoslavia, with her own goals, read Matthias Küntzel Der Weg in den Krieg; missing class and gender as major issues in Yugoslavia.

[4] MANICHEISM, presenting one party as evil and the other as good, (re)enforcing polarization, denying the "evil" a voice.

Example: standard image of Serbia, Indonesia, Saddam Hussein; taking sides, usually same as their nation-state government.

[5] ARMAGEDDON, presenting the violence as something inevitable omitting alternatives, blaming evil party autism.

Example: the NATO war against Yugoslavia (Serbia), omitting the many alternative causes of action, denying their existence.

IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT DUALISM/MANICHEISM/ARMAGEDDON ARE BASIC ELEMENTS IN OCCIDENTAL, JUDEO-CHRISTIAN-ISLAMIC, DEEP CULTURE

[6] They omit structural conflict/polarization and violence, like ghettos, refugee camps, reporting only the direct violence.

Example: 100,000+ dying of no food and medical service daily.

[7] They omit the bereaved, easily 10 per victim and their sentiments of revenge and revanche, fueling spirals of violence.

Example: almost any conflict, except "our" prominent bereaved.

[8] They fail to explore causes of protraction and escalation, and particularly the role of the media in keeping violence going

Example: arms supply to the parties, e.g., in Sri Lanka.

[9] They fail to explore the goals of interventors, how big powers tend to move in when the system is shaken loose by conflict and violence, picking up morsels, getting footholds.

Example: the "international community" in Yugoslavia, missing the Camp Bondsteel story, the German protectorate policy.

[10] They fail to explore peace proposals and compelling images

Example: missing the Pérez de Cuéllar proposal December 1991 for the Yugoslavia conflict; always downplaying citizens groups.

[11] They confuse ceasefire and meeting at the table with peace with exaggerated expectations when "warlords" meet for peace, following standard government agenda ceasefire-negotiation-peace

Example: Afghanistan, with no regard for peace images.

[12] They leave out reconciliation, basic for depolarization.

Example: any conflict, e.g., Ethiopia-Eritrea.