Johan Galtung

Theories of conflict

Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations

Columbia University, 1958
University of Oslo, 1969-1971
Universität Zürich, 1972
University of Hawai'i 1973

Contents

Preface

Theories of Conflict is based on lectures given when the author was professor of sociology at Columbia University 1958-60, of conflict and peace studies at the University of Oslo 1969-1977, and visiting professor at Universität Zürich spring 1972 and University of Hawai'i spring 1973. The book was mainly written in Zürich and Honolulu, gently facilitated by the late Professor Peter Heinz in Zürich and Professor George Kent in Honolulu. To both my most sincere gratitude.

The predecessor, A Framework for the Analysis of Social Conflict, New York, NY: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1958, is reproduced here in the original version as an Appendix. But neither that one, nor this book, nor another book, Theories of Peace, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1967 was published. Why?

Answer: because the books had not lived through enough confrontations with real life conflicts, as opposed to meetings with other books in libraries, and with their authors at conferences. My model for a peace science from the beginning back in 1951 was medical science, and its theory-practice interface. The lectures, and this book, clarify concepts and theories. Artists and sculptors would have called them sketches. They are working books. I wanted as fresh a start as possible, based on intuitions and brushes with reality, not readings and academic discussions only, however indispensable.

Not building primarily on others there are no references. They come in A Theory of Conflict, A Theory of Development, A Theory of Civilization, A Theory of Peace, TRANSCEND University Press, 2009.

The concepts were tried out, like in "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding", "Anti-Semitism in the Making", "Towards a Theory of Race Relations", "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm", "Conflict as a Way of Life", "The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict"; in Essays in Peace Research, Volumes II, III and V, Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1976-79-80.

In Part Four (commissioned by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1974)

reality comes closer. But there are many theory and practice steps from there, via Peace By Peaceful Means, London: SAGE, 1998, to 50 Years: 100 Peace & Conflict Perspectives, TRANSCEND University Press 2008 (see www.transcend.org/tup).

The reader will find in this book such ideas as dissociative vs associative relations, actor vs structural conflicts based on values vs interests, symmetric vs asymmetric conflict, conflict transformation, empirical vs potential reality, conflict transcendence as opposed to compromise, conflict resolution vs conflict repression, conflict resolution through transformation of potential into empirical reality, goals vs pursuit by means of resources, the focus on equity and the rejection of the conflict-manager who steals somebody else's conflict and deprives them of that chance of growth. Needless to say, they have all been developed further, but basically they are all here.

Chapters 1-2 have been published as the entry "Conflict Theory" in Lester Kurtz, ed. Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, Amsterdam etc.: Elsevier, Second edition, 2008, pp. 391-400; otherwise nothing has been published elsewhere.

And nothing has been changed apart from some language editing, like making sentences and paragraphs shorter. I am most grateful to S.P. Udayakumar, then (1992) my assistant at the University of Hawai'i, for making the digital version, and to my assistants Summer 2009, Naakow Grant-Hayford and Karoline Weber, for their help with the final manuscript; all three also wonderful dialogue partners.

There are things I would have said differently today but I can identify with the 1973 version, and found it interesting to revisit myself 36 years later, even 51 years later (for the Appendix).

It was also interesting to revisit the chapter commissioned by the Norwegian foreign minister at the time, Knut Frydenlund. Written in 1973-74 the Cold War was certainly on, but as is evident from Part Four I did not believe in the East-West conflict becoming hot in the "Atlantic Theater", "only" in the Third World. NATO and the WTO were seen in the chapter not so much as pitted against each other as ways of consolidating the gains from World War II with both of them enforcing their systems and deploying military force for that purpose.

Thus, I saw world dynamics more in terms of "Center vs periphery formations" than in terms of "Center vs Center formations". There were two of them, capitalist imperialism and socialist imperialism, and upheavals were predicted in both, with US and Soviet interventions. More concretely, the Soviet empire was seen as an early victim of upheavals in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet system itself would collapse because of its anti-human character. The US imperial control was also seen as crumbling in the longer run.

Nor did I believe in any general "North-South" conflict, the conflicts being inside the two imperial formations. The focus was also on superpower cooperation in the sense of respecting the other's "sphere of interest", protesting interventions but not too much, using repression cooperation, passive or negative, as a way of building cooperative ties, very apprehensive of a nuclear war between them.

Basically both the US and the Soviet Union would try to keep their periphery elites in power and strike a deal on that basis. This actually culminated in the Gorbachev cooperation with Reagan and Bush, with hands off the other side intervening in Panama and in Caucasus-Balticum. In the terminology used in Part One the prognosis was in terms of asymmetric center-periphery conflict, with nonviolence and guerilla strategies, not in terms of any big symmetric encounter. Afghanistan was not predicted, however, neither the Communist take-over, nor the Soviet "protection", nor the US intervention.

Another prediction was in terms of an emerging European vs Asian conflict, now in full bloom, militarily-politically with West Asia and economically-culturally with East Asia. The prognosis of China-Japan cooperation seemed far-fetched, but with the power and paradigm shift in Japan from LDP to DPJ it now looks more probable.

I only hope the reader will also derive something useful from the book.

Jondal and Alfaz, August 2009
Johan Galtung

Chapter 1

DEFINITIONS OF CONFLICT

1.1 Contradiction and Incompatibility: A First Approach

Once upon a time, during the Han dynasty, there was (perhaps) a man who was a dealer in weapons, somewhere in China. In his store were the means of attack as well as the means of defense, and among them a halberd and a shield. The man, the dealer in arms, had anticipated not only modern patterns of advertising, but also the modern arms race with its ballistic missiles, its anti-ballistic missiles and anti-anti-ballistic missiles, and had two posters.

One advertised his halberd: This halberd is so sharp that it can pierce any shield! The other advertised his shield: This shield is so strong that no halberd can pierce it!

And thus it was that the Chinese characters for halberd and shield, juxtaposed in that order, became the character for contradiction:

$$矛盾$$

in Chinese pronounced: mau tun

in Japanese pronounced: mu jun

But are these two statements really contradictory? And what does it mean that they are contradictory, if we agree that they are?

To explore this point, fundamental for any theory of conflict, let us look at these two statements:

P1 Point X is on one side of a strip of paper;
   Point Y is on the other side of the same strip.

P2 The curve X-Y connects the two points without ever crossing the edge of the strip
   of paper.

Even a beginner in mathematics will yawn at this hackneyed example, and we apologize to them. Others might like to tear out a narrow rectangular strip of paper, mark X on one side and Y on the other and try a solution: twist the strip, join the two narrow edges together, and the curve X-Y can be drawn with no difficulty.

The example serves to illustrate one point: there is more to reality than what meets the naked eye. What appears impossible may become possible once the concept of reality, in casu a strip of paper, is extended, or at least transformed. The Möbius strip is only one simple example: mathematics is, indeed, full of them. For ex mathematicians have it in their power to expand their reality so as to make possible what was impossible in the reality to which they were formerly constrained. Take the example of what happened to numbers:

Starting with	they had to add	so as to permit	and they got
natural numbers	fractions	unlimited division	positive numbers
positive numbers	irrational numbers	unlimited roots	positive real numbers
positive real numbers	negative numbers	unlimited subtraction	real numbers
real numbers	imaginary numbers	unlimited "roots"	complex numbers
complex numbers	etc.		

In the original "reality" of natural numbers the two statements:

P1 N is a natural number

P2 N is the difference between a and b, b>a

constitute a contradiction, for there is no such natural number.

Back to the Chinese merchant: is there a reality in which his two statements would not form a contradiction, without stretching the definitions of halberd and shield? There probably is. His statements concern the relative impact two weapons, both presumably made of metal – or at least of some mineral, the Aztecs used swords of obsidian – have

on each other. These impacts are well studied in geology (mineralogy) under the general heading of "hardness", and the scale of hardness, from the lowest, talc, to 10, diamond, is problematic. Shape plays considerable role, but so do external circumstances. It is not inconceivable that one material may outdo another at one temperature, but has to capitulate at another.

To this the answer might be that sword and shield differ in form, not in substance, and that they are used under exactly the same circumstances; in the heat of the battle, to be precise. The merchant might still retort if a suit were brought against him, that his particular halberd would only pierce "a little", because it would be blunted, again "a little". In other words, to beat that merchant sharper definitions would be needed to bring out a contradiction. The legend adds, however, that when confronted with the contradiction in his two statements the merchant was at a loss.

In the following "contradiction" will be given a specific meaning. The point of departure is a set of theses or sentences that say something about reality, whether they are data-sentences dividing the world into observed and unobserved, theory-sentences (hypotheses) dividing the world into foreseen and unforeseen, or value-sentences dividing the world into desired and rejected. The difference between "is" and "ought" does not concern us here. Either kind is ultimately descriptive of reality, they all refer to states of the world. Nor are we concerned with operationalization, testability or such matters. An intuitive understanding of what the thesis says about reality is sufficient. The important point are the dichotomies.

Imagine, then, that we have a set of theses, $\underline{T}$. To say that $\underline{T}$ is a contradiction is another way of saying that some states of the world the theses express are mutually incompatible. This, in turn, is another way of saying that the realization of one thesis will impede the realization of at least one other thesis. By realization, then, we mean that something is, or becomes, part of empirical reality, which means that the thesis is, or becomes, a data-sentence. It is or becomes "confirmed", "true", "tenable", while at the same time also being a theory-sentence or a value-sentence.

If the thesis is all three at the same time the meaning is that the state of the world that is observed, is also foreseen and pursued, which might be said to be a definition of the best of all worlds.

In defining contradiction as a property of a set of theses, in other words as a meta-thesis, it is assumed that no single thesis is formulated in such a way that it is a contradiction. If it were, it should be split into at least two theses.

Further, contradiction is taken in its literary sense, <u>contra dicere</u>, "to speak against",

between theses. But this does not mean that a contradiction is seen as merely verbal, for each thesis is seen as indicative of a state of the world, e.g. "equitable international relations", and "capitalist international economic system".

The contradiction, hence, is not seen as a "struggle between words", but as something with reference to empirical reality. All it says is that "the combination of these empirical states of the empirical world is impossible". "The theses cannot all be tenable", the "theses are mutually incompatible", "T is a contradiction", are, consequently, synonymous statements.

To issue a contradiction-certificate, then, is to say something about empirical reality. More particularly, something very dramatic, viz., that something is empirically impossible; the world cannot accommodate all those empirical realities.

Thus, a contradiction statement is itself a thesis, which may also be contradictory to another thesis, the latter being a contradiction thesis or not.

We are brought into a hierarchy of contradictions of second order, third order etc. Of these the contradictions of second order - non-contradictory theses contradicting each other - seem most important, or at least more tractable at an intuitive level.

To explore this further the following distinction is useful:

I: "What is impossible, and is not"
P: "What is possible, but is not"
E: "What is possible, and is"

Innermost is that tiny little thing known as empirical reality, E, the fetish of empiricism. It is, and, consequently, is possible. But from that it does not follow that "what is not is

impossible"; only that "what is impossible, is not" the counterpositive statement. The latter is descriptive of what is here called irreality, I, the outermost sphere.

Between the two is potential reality, P; that which is possible but is not (yet). But if it is not, how, then, can we know that it is possible? We cannot know by referring to data about that which is observed, nor about what is pursued. We can only know by bringing that reality into being, through practice, in other words. Where that will bring humankind is unknown and unknowable; for that reason the borderline between potential reality and irreality cannot be fixed. But the borderline between that which is, and that which might be is assumed, in this connection, to be unproblematic, although there will be decision problems in practice. There will be grey zones, e.g. disagreements among competent observers.

We have assumed that any contradiction thesis refers to empirical reality; in other words, that it is a statement pronouncing something as impossible in empirical reality. Each single thesis in T may or may not refer to empirical reality.

But if contradictory, each one of them can only refer to empirical reality, be realized in other words, under the condition that the negation of the other theses, singly or combined, is realized. This statement may, obviously, also be true or false, since it is an empirical statement. If it is false then it has to be shown where in empirical reality the theses in T are compatible. If it is true in empirical reality, then there is still the problem of whether it would remain true in a potential reality. And the more interesting problem: whether a process can be identified whereby that potential reality can be brought into empirical existence.

In line with ordinary usage we shall now say that to transcend a contradiction ("einen Widerspruch aufheben") is to make empirical a potential reality so that T is no longer a contradiction, in other words create a reality where the theses are no longer mutually incompatible, but can all be empirically realized.

The Möbius strip may be seen as an example of a transcendence of that kind by transforming reality. But is the Möbius strip part of empirical reality before the reader, you, all readers, everybody, did that little experiment? Yes, and that serves to underline the difference between objective and subjective transcendence. A contradiction is objectively transcended if this empirical reality is possible. To what extent it is also subjectively transcended depends on the degree and extension of consciousness about this possibility.

For this reason any contradiction-certificate may itself contradict a thesis about partly discovered, contested empirical reality, and this is a crucial type of the second order contradiction referred to above. When somebody says "but that is incompatible", and

somebody else exclaims "to the contrary, it is possible, I have seen it in ..." a second order contradiction has been identified.

What makes the whole idea of contradiction so basic is not the concept of incompatibility, or exclusion, which would also be found in empiricism, but the idea of transcendence. Underlying it is the assumption that known empirical reality is only a fraction of potential reality, and that other realities can be brought into being. What is incompatible today may become compatible, not sub speciae aeternitatis, but tomorrow, even now, here.

It should be pointed out that we have systematically avoided referring to two theses. That figure of speech reduces T to a set of two theses only, and is not general enough. It tends to arrest thinking and confine it to the thought-prison of the dichotomy, so ubiquitous and so difficult a prison to break out of. This is particularly important in conflict theory where conflicts much too often are conceived of in dichotomous terms: North-South conflict, capital-labor, democracy-dictatorship, etc. This is not to deny the usefulness of dichotomies under some circumstances, but those circumstances should be spelt out and demonstrated empirically. The dichotomy should not be built into the thought form, the discourse, from the very beginning. From the circumstance that there cannot be less than 2 theses in T to constitute a contradiction it does not follow that 2 is also the maximum number.

Another word to be used with care is synthesis. It does not merely refer to a simple mixture, an eclectic combination, an in-between compromise, but to a "higher unity". What is intended by "transcendence", however, is something more modest: a transformation of empirical reality so that what once was a contradiction no longer is.

The incompatible has become compatible. Whether this new reality is "higher" or not is another matter, and to assume that history somehow proceeds towards ever higher realities is obscene for anybody who has lived through the twentieth century. The term "transcendence" will be used for anything from the smallest micro-changes to the real watersheds in history, and for subjective and objective transcendence.

A third word to be used with care is "antithesis". There is an image of antagonism evoked by the term "anti", as if each thesis stands for a force trying to fight its way against the other force, the "thesis". Again, this is an image that is very useful under circumstances to be spelt out, but artificial under other circumstances, like in the Möbius strip example. We prefer not to build it into the contradiction concept from the very beginning, but to develop it as a special case. Moreover, there is also an element of anthropomorphism, and even an over-accentuation of consciousness implicit in the image, however unintended this may be. The world becomes animated in a way hardly conducive

to further exploration. We aim at a broader discourse than this dichotomous speech, wrongly attributed to Hegel, with thesis vs antithesis producing synthesis.

1.2 Contradiction and Incompatibility: A More Formal Approach

Let us now formalize this somewhat, and in a way which <u>may</u> imply a limitation of the perspective; although we are not convinced that this is necessarily so.

We shall assume that any thesis in $\underline{T}$ is a proposition, in the sense of attributing properties to something. In another context we have defined a proposition as any statement

$$P_s\ (X_1,\ X_2,.....X_n)\ \text{or}\ P_s\ (\underline{X})$$

where S is a set of m units, X is a set of n variables and P is a distribution, probabilistic or deterministic, of S on $\underline{X}$. For m=n=1 we get simple propositions like "God is good", "I have a car"; for m=200 and n=2 we may get propositions like "the higher a country is on the international division of labor, the higher its GNP per capita".

For our purpose, however, we shall usually assume that the propositions in T are about <u>one</u> variable only (n=1). A proposition involving two variables will then show up as a contradiction between two propositions involving one variable each, e.g. "C is low on the international division of labor in year Y" and "C is high on GNP per capita in year Y+". The contradiction is in what the proposition excludes. In so doing we have also, implicitly, said that the incompatibility may be probabilistic rather than deterministic, and also that the two statements do not necessarily refer to the same point in time. This restriction to n=1 is, however, only a convention to facilitate and standardize presentation.

A contradiction can be defined involving theses of any order of complexity, for any number of variables. Thus, a contradiction between a thesis with one variable and one involving two other variables would be tantamount to a proposition with three variables, and so on.

Thus, the general paradigm for a contradiction would be based on m units and n variables, and t theses, $\underline{T}$, specifying the distribution of m units on n variables. Here are two cases, both with t=2.

In the first case m=1 and n=2, there is one unit, the "body", and two variables. The two theses locate the unit on either variable:

T1 "The body has fallen freely 5 seconds"

T2 "The body has fallen freely 5m"

But if the body is subject to the laws of free fall, then elapsed time t and distance s relate to each other like s $= 1/2gt^2$, so 5 meters is (about) what it would have fallen after 1, not after 5 seconds, when the distance covered would be (about) 125 meters, under the conditions of free fall with $g = 9.8$. So T is a contradiction, but not for $g = 0.4$.

Figure 1.1.

In the second case $m = 2$ and $n = 1$: there are two units and one variable. The two theses also locate the units on the variable.

T1 for the unit "I": "I have Milano"

T2 for the unit "my brother": "my brother has Milano"

However, the variable is only in a formal sense one and the same, that of possessing Milano. In a more real sense there are two variables: "I having Milano" and "My brother having Milano". As diagram:

Figure 1.2.

Of the four possible combinations one is excluded; hence, T̲ is a contradiction. But there are certainly ways of transcending this contradiction, to be discussed later.

In general, then, when there are m units and n variables we shall need (mxn) axes to explore the contradiction. This defines an (mxn) dimensional space, $\underline{S}$, like the two-dimensional spaces in the two examples. Each thesis in $\underline{T}$ defines a sub-space where the unit is (or the units are) located, according to that thesis. These subspaces intersect and form a region we shall call INT, for intersection. Each point in this region stands for the realization of all t theses in $\underline{T}$. It should be noticed that t is not necessarily equal to mxn, nor is INT necessarily a proper set. It may be empty because there is no intersection or equal to the total space defined by the mxn axes. But in general we assume that INT is a proper set different from either.

Each point in $\underline{S}$ represents a reality. We now divide $\underline{S}$ into two parts, the compatibility region, COMP, and the incompatibility region, INC. This division is not done on the basis of the theses in $\underline{T}$, but on the basis of the empirical distribution of m units on the n variables. Thus, we assume that there exists some basis for saying whether a point is realizable, i.e. belongs to empirical reality, or not. In the former case it belongs to the compatibility region, in the latter case to the incompatibility region. In the first example above the basis for this distinction was the law of motion, COMP being a parabola, in the second case the meaning of possessing Milano.

We can now give a more formal definition of contradiction: A contradiction obtains when the intersection is located in the incompatibility region, or simply

Contradiction: $INT \subset INC$

Nothing new has been said in formulating it this way, but this formulation makes the transition to a theory of conflict very easy since INT has a special meaning in that theory, and INC has exactly the meaning already given to it.

We then proceed on the basis of the idea of incompatibility to work out a definition of conflict. To do this the idea of incompatibility is retained in the form given at the end of the preceding section, as a contradiction, leaving open whether or not the contradiction can be transcended by changing empirical reality.

Conflict, then, is a special case of incompatibility, but what kind of special case? What are the differentiae specificae that make a conflict out of an incompatibility? We assume them to be two in number, and a first formulation might be as follows:

[1] the variables referred to in the theses are goal-dimensions;

[2] the units referred to in the theses are live actors.

What one thesis does is to indicate the location of a set of actors on one goal-dimension, and a set of such theses will serve to indicate their location in a space of goal-dimensions.

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Here it should, at once, be said that "goal" is taken in a very general sense. It has no necessary connotation of "end" or "value". All it says is that the variables with which conflict theory deals are not "flat"; they are equipped with a goal-gradient. Concrete ways of conceiving of goals will be spelt out in the next section.

It should also be emphasized that the units, i.e. the "sets of actors", may range all the way from the single individual to highly structured sets of sets of sets and so on of individuals; like groups, countries, regions, worlds.

Moreover, we assume generally that these individuals are human beings, from individuals to collectivities; not denying that it may be fruitful to talk about "conflict" in the animal world. But we are not convinced that the referent is the same; it looks as if in that case we should rather talk about "hostile" or "antagonistic" behavior as something short of any transcendence.

1.3   The Goal Dimension: Drives vs Consumption

Basic in this connection, hence, is the concept of the goal-dimension. Life is manifold and human life perhaps even more so. We take it as axiomatic that life, and not only human, is the pursuit of goals, not necessarily deliberate, whether it takes the form of approaching positive, or avoiding negative, goals. What is positively and negatively evaluated varies from culture to culture, whether the culture is collective or individual, and from species to species.

Each individual has explicit and implicit cultural elements, standards, of his-her own; also changing and rarely completely clearly structured. But goals nevertheless serve as positive or negative sign-posts, perceived or not perceived, along the life-line of any individual or set of individuals (collectivity), sometimes creating drives to arrive at, or to avoid, these sign-posts. The sign-posts are approached and they are avoided, and approach and avoidance are both processes that fill the better part of the lives of individuals and collectivities. They should be distinguished from the goal-states which are the sign-posts themselves, where the positive value is approached and-or the negative value completely avoided. In the consumed goal-state there is no approach or avoidance. The drive is extinguished until it reappears, or attention is given to other goals. Thus, a goal-state has a temporary stability: the author with the completed book, the hunter with the game, the couple in intercourse, the person enjoying his meal, the politician elected to his office, the conqueror at the moment of conquest, the people that have obtained nationhood, the

nations that have obtained statehood, the leaders that have managed to integrate the revolution that has liberated the people, the party that has managed to "privatize" the public sector, the other party that has managed to "nationalize" the private sector.

Thus, there is a basic asymmetry in life between pursuit and consumption: what one has not, or is not, may make itself more clearly felt than what one has, or is. The person deprived of air, whether because of drowning or suffocating for some other reason, appreciates air fully, and probably even enjoys hours of gratitude if air is made available for consumption again. But very few have the capacity to appreciate the air around us every minute of the day, nor do we feel that we no longer are hungry for food or sex right after consumption of the goal-state.

The entrepreneurial type can be defined as one who is always looking for new things to create. He is not merely enjoying the institution he has built, resting on his laurels. The military conqueror is known to look for more conquests to be made, the politician for more changes to be made in the social structure, "and thus man chases woman until the woman in the end catches him" (G.B. Shaw), and so on. To live is to strive; where there is no drive, no strife, there is no life.

It may be objected that this may be a way of characterizing a specific collective or individual culture more than a general statement about goals. Modern man, to the extent he resembles Sorokin's sensate man, is process and change oriented. He is looking for ways of changing the external world, engaged in the struggle for control, if necessary through conquest. But how about Sorokin's ideational man, striving for changes in the internal world, perhaps summarized as a struggle for salvation? Do they experience lack of salvation, or salvation, as such? Biographical and other evidence seem to point in the first direction: it is the uncertainty, the struggle with forces inside and outside oneself that seem to dominate that person's mind.

Salvation is described as a bliss relative to sinful life before conversion, but it has to be re-conquered all the time. If it has been obtained for oneself, then an ideational "entrepreneur" may want to extend it to others and become a missionary, or to deepen the scope of his own salvation becoming a monk, a hermit. In other words, the striving is still there, only along other dimensions.

Thus, the distinction is probably not only between process and goal, between the awareness of hunger and the lack of awareness of its satisfaction, but also between individuals and collectivities with various degree of appetite and ability to struggle for more of the goals and to invent new goals. That drives are extinguished upon consumption, and that there is an asymmetry between the drive state and the consumption state, are

both true by definition.

The libertine losing interest in the woman after the first intercourse proves nothing new about the structure of goal-pursuit in general, only that his goal-state–even though he may not have known this himself–was precisely the first and only intercourse. The non-libertine may be interested in follow-ups, not to mention to broaden and deepen the scope of interaction seeing that same person as the source of mutual satisfaction of multiple goals. It is customary to refer to the accompanying sentiment as love if the scope is relatively broad, saying nothing about the time-perspective and whether there is an effort to broaden it further. When there are no more efforts, no new drives, only consumption, love may become routinized, even dead.

We can think in terms of a wave pattern: the drives are transformed into energy and released into some kind of activity in an undulating pattern. Frequencies and amplitudes may vary, but it is difficult to imagine a life where the wave is reduced to a completely level line. Except, by death, like the brain waves in encephalograms.

Let us put this in more formal terms crucial for understanding conflict. In the diagram the line is the life-line of an actor, an individual or a collectivity as, moving through time and space:

Figure The life-line of any actor

At G, at time t, there is consumption of a goal, gratification. At t_0, when the actor is at A, he is at a distance from G: the value may be consumed gradually over time, like gradually achieving mastery of a new language. Or, it may be in terms of spatial distance, as when the invasion army is approaching the capital; or in terms of time distance, the libertine again, calculating time needed till surrender. The difference matters: the first interpretation may mean a gradual extinction of the drive and the others a wetting of appetites.

If G is the consumption of an apple, the zero point stands for zero bites; then the first bite and so on till the apple is consumed.

For the goal of democracy one may count the number of participatory sectors of society, for the goal of socialism the number of equitable sectors; representing gradual realization of the goal.

How about ownership: either the actor owns the means of production, communication, destruction, or not? Depends on how many he has to consult with; ownership may also be represented in a graded fashion.

This gives us four different meanings when we talk about "goal", and they should be kept apart.

Table 1.1 Four Aspects of "goal"

	goal as dimension	goal as end point
goal as standard of evaluation	a variable	"goal"
goal as consumption	degree of goal-consumption	goal-state: goal-consumption completed

When "peace" is mentioned as a goal it is usually in the upper right hand corner sense, and "peace" is usually clarified when spelt out as a variable because positive peace is then contrasted with negative peace. Shades and grades of peace can then be specified.

All this should be distinguished from locating an actor on a goal-dimension, and particularly from locating him at the end of the dimension where the goal is consumed: the actor is in or at the goal-state. One thing is goal and goal-dimensions as abstract entities belonging to the culture, or to the analytical apparatus; another is goal or degree of goal-attainment as a concrete state of the actor.

Thus far we have talked about goals and drives and it might be tempting to relate the two. This has been done fairly often at the level of individual: one has tried to measure the drive as a function of the physical distance from the goal, and of the degree of realization of the goal. The relation between drive and distance is often referred to as the gradient, and they may look as follows:

Figure 1.3. The Relation Between Goal and Drive

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
In the first case, consumption <u>starts</u> at G and the drive becomes more intense the closer one is; in the second case the consumption <u>ends</u> at G and the drive is extinguished. Combined into one diagram yields an A-shaped curve known to many actors for many goals.

1.4 Conflict: Actors in Pursuit of Incompatible Goals

Let us now add another actor to create a social system.

<u>If life, action, is the pursuit of goals, then social life, interaction, is the exchange of value</u>. Actors enter into exchange relations, for many reasons, one of them being that they think they gain utility (subjective value); another because they are used to do so; still another because they are forced to. The farmer and the city-dweller exchanging food with manufactured goods are useful as examples of a limited type of exchange. The prison inmate and his guard also exchange values–the inmate is usually forced into his position and the guard is usually paid to be there–but the values exchanged are predominantly negative, like not being a troublemaker against relaxing the rules. We refer to the interaction relation as <u>dissociative</u> if the values exchanged are mainly negative or neutral, and as <u>associative</u> if the values exchanged are predominantly positive.

Both examples above have a certain superficial equivalence or reciprocity about them: the farmer gets his due in terms of manufactured goods, the guard gets back from the inmate as trouble whatever he, the guard, may have added to the punishment in terms of strict reinforcement of regulations, etc. But reciprocity, or <u>equity</u>, is not a generally valid social rule. In the relationship between slave-owner and slave, or between nineteenth century capitalist and worker, it makes no sense to talk about equity in the exchange.

In the following sections the difference between <u>equality among actors</u> and <u>equity in the exchange between actors</u> will be explored. Cases of gross inequity in exchange will be referred to as <u>exploitation</u>, which may even go so far as to involve an exchange between positive and negative value, as when the slave contributes to profit and receives all kinds of deprivation in return.

<u>How is exchange on unequal terms possible?</u> Simply because the two-person free-will market model has very limited applicability. It portrays the individual as master, seeking optimal value exchanges, and not as an element in a more comprehensive and complex social structure where repression plays a major role.

The social structure may prescribe for the individual his patterns of exchange and fix the exchange price for his labor (wages), his love (that love should be reciprocated), etc. Not all actors are able to change the prices since they are often not geared to one isolated individual but to positions, to statuses and roles, as a worker, a lover, an enterprise, a big power, etc., not easily changed. But not all spheres of life are thus regulated and circumscribed, and the spheres that are only regulated up to a certain level leave lots of possibilities for the change-oriented individual, group or nation.

Thus, individuals as well as collectivities are both free and bound, both able to fix the terms of exchange as they want and to withdraw from unrewarding bargains, and unable to do so. With a less complex image of social reality no analysis will carry us very far.

To summarize: life is the pursuit of goals, social life is the exchange of value - and that which pursues values, and exchanges values, is referred to as an actor.

In the pursuit he acts, and in the exchange he interacts; actors move along their life-lines, dotted with goal-consumption, culminating in goal-states.

Occasionally the life-lines intersect: the actors come together in space and time, become relevant to each other and may engage in value-exchange or interaction; positive, neutral, negative.

And this is, of course, where conflict enters, although it can also be defined for one actor.

We can now define conflict, building on the notions of contradiction and incompatibility developed in the general goal-notions explored here. According to these notions there are goals to be realized; the realization sometimes referred to as goal-consumption. Thus, with the units being sets of individuals and the variables being goal-dimensions, INT becomes the region of acceptable goal-realization, here called ACC, or the acceptability region. A conflict, then, is a contradiction where the acceptability region is located inside the incompatibility region:

$$ACC \subset INC$$

This will serve as a point of departure. A conflict simply involves incompatible goals. But there is more to it: those goals are pursued, leading to Conflict=Actors in Pursuit of Incompatible Goals.

1.5 Two Types of Conflict: Structure-Conflict and Actor-Conflict

We now proceed to the basic distinction in conflict theory, with an effort to outline the major features of two fundamental types of conflict, here referred to as structural and actor conflict respectively. They both conform to the definition given in the preceding section and fit into the basic conflict paradigm:

Figure 1.4.

Thus, in either case there are two sets of actors, S_1 and S_2, and two goals, G_1 and G_2, and B, the point of bliss with both achieved, located inside the incompatibility region. But from this point on dissimilarities rather than similarities will dominate.

The basic difference lies in the interaction relation between S_1 and S_2 in the two cases; the two fundamental types are based on vertical and horizontal interaction, respectively.

To start with, the extreme version of vertical interaction will be spelt out; the horizontal interaction is then the negation of all three criteria.

The vertical interaction relation can be defined by three criteria that complement and reinforce each other:

1. Exploitation, or vertical division of labor: the interaction relation is set up in such a way that the total value effects are much more beneficial to S_1than to S_2.

2. Penetration: S_1 penetrates into S_2 shaping S_2's consciousness

3. Fragmentation: the interaction relation is set up in such a way that whereas S_1 is kept together in associative relations, S_2 is kept apart in dissociative relations.

This definition is abstract and has to be concretized. To do so let us consider two different cases: S_1 and S_2 are collectivities, and S_1 and S_2 are individuals.

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In the first case, like a relation between countries, the vertical relation just defined is identical with what can be referred to as an imperialistic relation. Diagrammatically it looks like this:

Figure 1.5.

Center S_1

Periphery S_2

S_1 is the center countries, S_2 the periphery countries. S_1 is connected with horizontal ties, and to S_2 with vertical ties; the arrows indicating the direction of the exploitation.

The two other criteria can then be regarded as structural devises to protect this exploitation: S_1 penetrates into the top of S_2 (curved arrows); which concretely means that the elite in S_2 thinks and acts in accordance with the desires of S_1, and particularly of the elites in S_1, and the countries in S_2 are kept apart from each other by well-known divide et impera strategies, playing on mutual isolation and-or mutual hostility.

Much more could be said about this archetypical structure, and one contemporary example would be the relation between the European Community and the associated African, Caribbean and Asian-Pacific states.

The diagram above can also be used for the second case, the relations between individuals since it is, essentially, the organogram of very many, perhaps most, organizations. The top is integrated by association, the bottom disintegrated by dissociation. The division of labor gives the interesting, the challenging, the personality-expanding tasks to the top, and the routine tasks to the bottom. The economic concomitants in terms of unequal salary etc. are tangible. At the same time there is penetration: the social outlooks of the two layers are "harmonized", the bottom values what the top not only values but also enjoys, and consequently supports the structure.

How does this work in a third case, with two individuals only, S_1 being the topdog and S_2 the underdog? The archetypical example might be patriarchal husband-wife relations, where the verticality of the division of labor is obvious. But there is also penetration, with the wife's consciousness being formed by the husband. And there is fragmentation, only that in this case it is not immediately and physically observable. The disintegration takes place inside the underdog, the integration inside the topdog and expresses itself in differential degrees of coordination and harmony in their personality.

The topdog will be well composed, goals coordinated and resources mobilized whereas the underdog will be at a loss and tend to follow the topdog. The underdog will also incline in other directions, but the topdog in a sense penetrates into them all. The integration <u>of</u> the underdog is based on an integration <u>in</u> the topdog: just like an empire is integrated in the center of the Center country, and a company is integrated in its board of directors, trustees etc.

The structure in the diagram implies a double dislocation of the center of gravity away from the periphery, the underdogs, not only in terms of division of labor, but also in terms of level of association or integration. The periphery, the underdog, is integrated in the center, the topdog. Thus, the relation is doubly vertical: it is exploitative, and that exploitation is protected by the whole organizational structure.

What, then, would a <u>horizontal</u> interaction relation look like? By negating the three criteria we get the following:

1. Equity: Horizontal division of labor, which splits into two:

    (a) the interaction is set up in such a way that the total value effects are about equally beneficial to S_1 and S_2.

    (b) there is no interaction, hence no exploitation.

2. Equal consciousness-formation which also splits into two

    (a) there is mutual inter-penetration, S_2 forms the consciousness of S_1 as much as S_1 forms the consciousness of S_2 (dialogue).

    (b) there is no interaction, hence no penetration.

3. Equal organization-building the level of association in S_1 and S_2 is about the same.

In other words, the relation would look more like this:
Figure 1.6.

What one observes are two actors, S_1 and S_2, both of them capable of doing what makes them actors by our definition: <u>autonomous goal-formulation</u>–which presupposes that they

have control over their own consciousness-formation and are not subject to too much manipulation– and mobilization of resources to pursue those goals, which presupposes that they have control over their own internal organization. Neither condition is satisfied for the underdog Periphery in the vertical case, and that is what makes it vertical.

The difference between the two types of conflict can now be made sharper in the effort to define the conflicts, not only the two relations. So, what are the two types of conflicts about?

The way it is conceived of here there is always conflict in the vertical relation because conflict is already built into the structure whereas conflict may come and go in the horizontal relation.

The vertical structure has much more permanence, the horizontal structure is more eventful. For that reason they are best captured, analytically, in what somewhere also has been termed the structure-oriented and actor-oriented perspectives, discourses, intellectual frameworks, respectively.

According to the former, society is seen as a structure and the essential characteristics are the nature of the interaction relation and the interaction structure, not the nature of the individuals and sets of individuals. To refer to them as "actors" presupposes that they can act, i.e. that they have sufficient Spielraum, action-space, that they have alternatives and hence can set goals and pursue them. This opportunity is to a large extent denied the underdog periphery in the vertical relation; and for that reason analysis in terms of consciously formed goals and organized pursuit of them easily becomes false and misleading.

But it is not misleading in the second, horizontal, type of relation. Here there are actors by definition capable of formulating and pursuing goals. Hence the structural network can be permitted to recede into the background in an analysis, and the focus can be on the actors themselves, on their goals and strategies. Just as much as marxist types of analysis are less warranted in the latter, strategic analysis of individuals whose consciousness has been deformed by being at the bottom of a vertical division of labor, penetrated, fragmented, can only lead to illusions of harmony when the bottom does not express any goal different from that of their masters, nor takes any step in that direction. Similarly, marxist analysis of a horizontal situation leads to strained efforts to cast the relationship in terms of exploitative interaction. This, of course, is not to deny that vertical type analysis of internal relation inside S_1 and S_2 may be very fruitful in efforts to understand S_1-S_2 relations even when the latter look horizontal.

In the following, however, marxist and liberal analytical schemes will not necessarily be

used; the analysis will move forward on its own conflict theory terms, obviously borrowing from either.

And the terms are sufficient to define the two types of conflict, i.e. the typical conflicts in the two social situations. Since the sets of individuals have already been clarified in the two cases, conflict obviously has to be explicated by turning to the goal aspect.

In a vertical relation the conflict is defined in terms of interests, and according to the following axiom:

It is in everybody's interest not to be exploited

The entire analysis of vertical conflict derives from this assumption, and we shall later show that there is a similar assumption behind the much better known analysis of horizontal conflict.

The basic point is, of course, that there is no reference to consciously formulated goals, only to "interests". These interests are objectively defined, and tied to an analysis of the interaction relation itself. If exploitative, then somebody is exploited and somebody is an exploiter. What the axiom says is that however interest is defined, it is in everybody's interest not to be exploited, even when he begs for subjugation.

Is it in somebody's interest to exploit? It is definitely, very often, somebody's subjective goal to exploit, but is it also in somebody's objective interest? A Gandhi might say no: the exploiter may think that it is in his interest, but it actually is not; not merely because the exploiter will sooner or later have an uprising topple his privileged position, but also because he becomes a slave of his own efforts to exploit and to maintain the exploitation. To destroy the exploitative structure, therefore, is also to liberate the exploiter from his exploitation, and set him free.

But the opposite view is indeed also possible. There is such an overwhelming multitude of situations where people, consciously or not, seem to accept positions of privilege, and to react against any effort to reduce the exploitation.

An analytical concept is needed to explain this as well as to explain the situation of the exploited.

The exploiter may not be conscious of his exploitation, so why does he persist in it? One answer may be: because it is in his interest to do so.

On the other hand, the exploited is in a situation not in his interest, so why does he nevertheless sometimes accept it consciously and openly? One often found answer may be: because he has false consciousness or none at all.

Thus, interest is seen as something that may or may not be expressed as a value. If the expressed goal does not coincide with the interest, which we assume for everybody is

not to be exploited, one may talk about false consciousness. Obviously, this can only be done with a criterion to decide whether there is exploitation or not.

We can now define the conflict between exploiter and exploited, here referred to as topdog and underdog, or center and periphery:

Figure 1.7.

It is assumed that either party has a positive interest in exploiting and a negative one in not being exploited, although it is only the latter that is expressed in the axiom above. But to the extent that exploitation is asymmetric (which it is not, S_1 may exploit S_2 in one context and S_2 may exploit S_1 in another) six of the nine combinations above are excluded by definition. They form the incompatibility region. The question is what is acceptable to the two parties. One could imagine some cases, compatible with the axioms:

Figure 1.8.

		S_2	S_2
		only "exploits" acceptable	"exploits" and "equity" acceptable
S_1	only "exploits" acceptable	conflict	conflict
S_1	"exploits" and "equity" acceptable	conflict	no conflict

The result is obvious enough: under the axiom, if either party only accepts "exploits", then there is conflict of interest. Only when both parties accepts "equity" is there no conflict because there is an overlap between the acceptability and compatibility regions,

the equity solution, E. One conflict history would be for a system to start in A with S_1 as the exploiter, then move to C with a revolution with S_2 as the exploiter, and then end up in E with equity.

And that ends our story so far. It all hinges on the concept of equity, not only on the negative concept of exploitation. In equity S_1 and S_2 can meet, but for that to happen much consciousness formation is needed. In both.

Meeting in equity there can still be incompatibility, but the conflict is horizontal, and according to the following axiom:

It is in everybody's interest to maximize value.

Obviously this may bring us from a marxist to an economist paradigm. But there is no assumption that values are egoistic. Cultures will define them and play the role for horizontal conflict structures play for vertical conflict. Their cultures may be altruistic, with no axiom to the effect that the sum of a zillion egoisms is one altruism.

So far conflict has been defined, like many authors do, in terms of incompatibility of goals, and two major subtypes of goals have been indicated, interests and values, giving rise to two major subtypes of conflict: conflict of interest (structural conflict) and conflict of values (actor conflict). The distinction is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive; many, maybe most, conflicts are mixes of the two.

This does not mean that we split the theory of conflict into two conflicts of interest and conflicts of values. On the contrary, we shall assume that there are two basic parts of the theory of conflict, but defined differently.

One is a conflict transformation theory of how conflicts of interest are transformed into conflicts of manifest values. And the other is manifest conflict theory.

In other words, it is assumed that conflict in latent form, as conflict of interest, does not have an independent life, remaining the same, but will be heading for transformation into manifest form, as conflict of values. Indeed, latent conflicts–exploitation, penetration, fragmentation– are persistent facts in social life, but that persistence is for each specific conflict in an unstable equilibrium. Consciousness-formation and organization, individual and collective, are also facts of life.

But can it not be imagined that a latent conflict is resolved without necessarily being transformed into a manifest conflict? From the axiomatic statement just given no, but this is certainly not evident.

For instance, could it not be that somebody comes from the outside, digs into the structural conditions of the conflict of interest, changes-manages the whole situation and produces a more equitable society? Yes, this can certainly be imagined, but there would

still be a conflict of interest in the division of labor between the outside conflict-managers and the conflict-managed. The conflict-managers would use the conflict of others as the raw material that they themselves would process and turn into a processed product, a conflict solution.

With the old Herr (topdog) gone, the Knecht (underdog) will wake up to find himself under a new Herr – the conflict-manager. The rule may be different, but the opportunity of self-growth, of becoming truly autonomous through one's own conflict transformation or conflict manifestation, has been lost.

1.6 Frustration and Conflict

So far we have assumed that goals are not only set but also obtained, that goal-states are reached and goals consumed. However, it is a rather trivial fact of life that it often takes time and other resources to reach goal-states, and even if the actor tries as hard as possible, the goal-state may nevertheless never be arrived at.

It is customary to refer to this as frustration, which means that the access to the goal-state has been blocked. It is also customary to talk about sources of frustration, which are the factors that must be removed to permit the access to the goal-state when the actor is said to be frustrated.

There are many difficulties with these definitions, however. To take an example: a person wants an academic degree, but has to mobilize time, money and other resources. He is frustrated because of this, but in the end gets his degree. In that case one might perhaps say that his frustration is relative to the goal-state of getting his degree easily, and that differs from the frustration of a person who fails the examination for the third and last time.

One major class of sources of frustration can be referred to as scarcity of resources. Not to afford something produces a clear case of frustration; to afford it and discover that it is out of stock another; to afford it, locate it and then discover that somebody one cares for and about dislikes the object, still another. But there may also be goal-states that are blocked because no resources can ever be mobilized to reach them. He who has glued the goal perpetuum mobile on his mind is in a different kind of difficulty from he who merely wants to invent a more effective steam engine than anyone else before him. The same applies to the person some time ago who wanted to go to the moon: today that goal is more realistic.

In other cases we do not know: mathematicians often set themselves goals in terms of theorems they want to prove where they may be unable both to prove and to disprove. Politicians certainly do the same: he who works for the world government cannot say whether his goal is realistic and may become a part of empirical reality. But given the actor, his goal and the resources available we have a basis for operationalizing the degree of frustration as the amount of additional resources needed to reach the goal-state, ie, to remove the sources of frustration. As indicated, it may vary from zero in the case of no frustration to infinity in the case of unrealistic goals.

Let us now complicate the picture again, this time by introducing not only one value-dimension, but two, so that there are two different goal-states, G_1 and G_2 to refer to; for the same actor or for different actors is of no significance. We have mentioned scarcity of resources as one important source of frustration and this now brings us to the next: the situation where two goal-states exclude each other because they are incompatible. This is not the case of having insufficient resources to obtain one's goal, but of realizing that one goal stands in the way of realizing another goal. A person may find it difficult to be both rich and happy, or to be both honest and considerate; a nation may have difficulties being loyal to an international community of nations and at the same time safe-guarding its own more immediate interests. Or: two persons may find that they are in love with the same, third, person who is as monogamous as they are; two countries may find that the desire for autonomy for one conflicts with the desire for markets for the other, and so on.

It is customary to refer to this as conflict, which means that the access to one goal-state is blocked by efforts to reach an other goal-state; the goal-states are incompatible, exclude each other.

In principle this is not very different from frustration. In frustration there is one goal-state and insufficient resources to reach it; in conflict there are at least two goal-states and insufficient resources to realize them all. Thus, conflict is for two actors what frustration is for one actor, for which reason one sometimes treats conflict as a special case of frustration. We shall prefer to do it the other way, however, as will be elaborated below. At any rate, the distinction between the two is important since conflict (except when G_1 and G_2 are pursued by the same actor, the two actors are inside one) is to the social system (and to sociology) what frustration is to the personal system (and to psychology). But it is important to tie them together in a general theoretical framework to be developed in the following two parts of this book.

Life in general, and social life in particular, would now look highly different if goals were always adjusted to the possibilities of satisfying them. It is important to imagine

this state of affairs since this book is dealing with the particular conditions under which goals are <u>not</u> satisfied, whether this is best analyzed in terms of too high ambitions or too limited resources. Under this condition, which is hard to imagine, frustration and conflict would both be unknown since they are both special cases of limited resources. Life would consist in A-shaped wave patterns with limited amplitudes: goals are satisfied, then goals build up again, drives become intense, they are satisfied, and so on and so forth.

It is customary to associate this type of existence closely with stability, and that is probably correct: there would be few ripples on the waves that could serve as foci for the emergence of new social patterns. There would be no motivation for a pattern of change and growth.

But appetites might be growing as conditions of satisfying them develop, challenging even a stable and collectivistic social structure protected by a culture of a buddhist variety. It does not account for the circumstance that the world's richest societies also seem to be the societies that change fastest, or the possibility of having change itself as a value, even a dominant one. Such a world, with sufficient resources for all goal-states to be enjoyed, would probably rather be characterized by non-buddhist patterns of behavior and attitudes.

On the other hand there is the world with a maximum of frustration and conflict. Any grown-up person today will immediately think of the nazi concentration camp as a model, with its seemingly unlimited potential for inflicting frustration and conflict. The results in terms of behavior of the inmates are well-known; they range from animal brutishness to extreme apathy to incredible acts of compassion.

We mention this to place the study of frustration and conflict in its proper perspective, as dealing with human essentials, with matters of life and death. For somewhere on this range from zero to infinity in terms of degree of frustration and conflict every personal and social system on earth is located. The quality of the existence of the actors is a function of this condition. And, as so often is the case in human affairs: the best prescription for most individual and collective actors is <u>in media res</u>. Too much frustration and conflict may have a highly destructive effect, and too little may provide the actor with too low levels of stimulation, challenge, to function adequately.

Conflicts are frustrating but not all frustrations can be put on the standard conflict form with actors, goals, incompatibility and pursuit. To deal with the latter we need more conceptual tools.

1.7   The Elements of Conflict

We have defined conflict as a social system of actors with incompatibility between their goal-states. We shall show that surprisingly much can be said about conflict as such, with no reference to special types of conflicts. It is a property of social systems; then conceived of as a more or less interdependent systems of actors striving to achieve their goal-states. In the process it happens that they stand in each other's way, or so they may believe, and this is where the system becomes a conflict system. We are concerned with the general theory of such systems.

However, to make it less abstract, and to have tools of analysis, some dimensions of conflict systems will have to be introduced. The science of conflicts, conflictology, needs elements of analysis as much as any other science to arrive at hypotheses that can be tested and serve as a basis for the establishment or empirically confirmed propositions, which in turn can serve as building-bricks for theories (or vice versa). Twelve such dimensions will be presented in the next part of this book, in this chapter we shall focus on a more precise version of the definition.

For a start these are the elements in the conceptualization of conflict:

1. The actors, m of them, who may be of any kind. We assume that they are, for good or for bad, relevant to each other so that they form a system of actors.

2. The goals, n of them, also of any kind, that the actors try to achieve, forming a system of goals.

   We do not assume that all m actors try to achieve all n goals, but we need information on where they stand on all of them. The system of goals combined with the system of actors form the action-system.

   The movements of this system can be traced in the many-dimensional goal-space, R, where each actor can be located on each goal-dimension.

3. The acceptability-region, A, which is defined as the set of positions in the many-dimensional goal space acceptable to all actors. This point of bliss is the point where all m actors enjoying the goal-states on all n dimensions, obviously a part of A. However, often some actors may accept less, thus extending the acceptability region.

4. The incompatibility-region, I, which is defined as the set of points that cannot be realized because one or more goal-states, points on the goal-dimensions, are

incompatible with one or more others. The points not of incompatibility are points of compatibility and also form a set, the compatibility-region, $\underline{C}$. Clearly, $\underline{I} + \underline{C} = \underline{R}$ if we presuppose that we have sufficient information to decide for each point in $\underline{R}$ whether it is a point of compatibility or incompatibility.

5. The conflict, which is defined as a property of the action-system which obtains when there is no overlap between acceptability-region and compatibility-region. Or, differently expressed: the acceptability-region is a subset of the incompatibility-region. Still differently expressed: when all acceptable combinations of degree of goal-consumption exclude each other, are incompatible with each other.

With the action-system and the definition of conflict, we can now define the conflict-system as the minimum set of actors and goals that does not change the conflict. If we start out with m actors and n goals it is not always the case that all of them are needed, for instance to define the East-West conflict. Thus, the conflict-system is the hard nucleus of the action-system where the conflict is located; if we reduce it further then we lose actors and-or goals that are indispensable for the understanding of the nature of the conflict.

To analyze a conflict, however, we often have to add to the conflict-system some more actors and goals, as when the East-West conflict is analyzed in its global context, adding the Pacific to the Atlantic theater, then referred to as the reference-system. Thus, conflict-system and reference-system are the minimum and maximum, respectively, needed to analyze the conflict.

We then add to the scheme so far developed:

6. Conflict attitude, which we identify with mental states of the actors, and

7. Conflict behavior, which we identify with somatic states of the actors in the action-system.

Thus attitude and behavior are used to describe completely the states of the actors in the system; using the age-old body-soul division between the somatic and the mental states.

This means that the conflict-system is looked at from two different angles: an abstract angle where goal-states are analyzed for their compatibility or incompatibility, and a concrete angle where actors are analyzed in terms of attitude and behavior. We then use "behavior" in such a way as to include verbal as well as non-verbal

behavior, not to mention behavior that consists in keeping constant the state of one's body; inactivity. And we use "attitude" so as to include cognitions as well as evaluations and emptiness; inactivity.

These are very broad concepts, but the line between them is relatively clear, which is not the same as saying that we do not believe in empirical correlations between somatic and mental states of the actors. It should perhaps be added that if the actor is a collectivity, then "behavior" refers to the behavior of its members, and "attitude" to the attitudes of the members. However coordinated and harmonized, even "masses" ultimately boil down to individuals.

We mention this because there might be an alternative definition, reserving "behavior" for collective representative behavior–which may not be representative–and attitude for collective representative attitude–which may not be representative. We reject that approach as being too reminiscent of the old "group-soul" idea, and because of difficulties in drawing the border line.

At the concrete level of behavior and attitude actors act and feel the conflict, they are the conflict. We are used to identifying this as destruction, both in behavior and attitude, an identification which is not necessary even if empirically tenable. But had it not been for the destruction, violence, that may accompany conflict the field would not have attracted so much attention as it does.

8. Conflict negation is now easily defined: it is a process that includes the disappearance of the conflict. In other words; it is a succession of states of the conflict system where the end state has one definitely characteristic: an overlap between acceptability and compatibility has been found. Conflict negation is a process where the final state may be referred to as conflict termination.

Nothing is implied about the quality of the negation: it need not be just, good or lasting; the negation just is in the sense that the conflict is not: acceptability- and compatibility-regions overlap. Thus, a negation may involve killing one actor or suppressing one goal, just as well as it may involve the fusion of two actors into a integrated whole or the dissolution of the incompatibility through the mobilization of reservoirs of time, energy, money etc. All elements we have listed to arrive at the definition of conflict become keys to conflict negation in as much as they are elements in the conflict situation, and constitute in themselves approaches, both in theory and in practice, to the negation and termination of any conflict.

There is only one distinction which should be made here: just as we distinguished between conflict in the sense of contradiction on the one hand and conflict attitude-behavior on the other, we may distinguish between conflict resolution on the one hand and conflict repression as defined above on the other. Conflict repression, then, is the negation of any aspect of conflict, particularly patterns of behavior and attitudes arising from the conflict, that makes the conflict disappear as factual phenomenon. Usually, one will conceive of conflict repression as the cessation of hostilities, a "back to normal" where destructive attitude-behavior is built down, and the conflict as incompatibility may be frozen and enter a stage of latency. This distinction is important for political and ethical debates, since conflict repression is a more modest goal than conflict resolution and these two levels are often confused.

1.8   The Phases of Conflict

We can now conclude this part of the book with a brief note on the phases of conflict. It seems useful, in general, to distinguish between these phases:

Figure 1.9. The Phases of Conflict

```
Concrete level    conflict ─────────→ conflict ─────────→ conflict
                  origins             dynamics            resolution
                      ↕↑                                      ↕
Abstract level    conflict                                conflict
                  articulation                            solution
```

The conflict originates somewhere and becomes articulated. Then it develops until a resolution phase can be said to emerge and the conflict dissolves as the system finally reaches the solution state where there no longer is any conflict. The resolution phase is certainly part of the dynamics (and vice versa), and the solution part of the resolution, just as much as the origin is part of the dynamics. Nevertheless the diagram is fruitful as a paradigm since the life history of so many conflicts seems to be that the conflict almost imperceptibly evolves, then there is a process of often destructive behavior and-or attitude until some regulatory forces are called into operation from within or without to start the phase of resolution which then finally leads to some kind of solution. These phases seem to be so relatively easily discernible in the life-history of conflicts that we have used this simple paradigm as organizing axis.

Paradoxically it seems more easy to arrive at a theory for the resolution than for the origin or genesis of conflicts. Much can also be said about the dynamics of conflicts, but it looks as if knowledge of the dynamics and resolution phases of conflicts sheds more light on the phase of origin than vice versa. A conflict system is a succession of states; the more similar these states the more static the system, the more dissimilar the more dynamic, by definition.

Knowledge of the nature of the conflict itself at all points in the history of the system is indispensable, particularly since the conflict will change and generally aggravate by an admixture stemming from the escalation in the dynamics phase. But given the way conflict has been defined most of the relevant properties of the system are already included in the definition of the conflict: the description of the actors, the description of the goals, sufficient knowledge about either to establish acceptability and incompatibility regions and their relation to each other. It is claimed that with this knowledge it should be possible to proceed on the basis of general conflict theory, and that the shadows thrown by the prehistory are of minor significance relative to the impact of the factors already included in the definition of the successive conflicts in which the system is found. History is already absorbed in actors and goals.

1.9 Conflict Theory and Game Theory

We have now presented the building-blocs for a conflict theory: actors, their goals (values, interests) imputed to them by analysis of their interests and studies of their behavior to uncover what they seem to pursue, and on interview methods to get verbal declarations about value-orientations and other attitudes. Acceptability- and incompatibility-regions are defined and compared. The more detailed knowledge about all these factors or aspects of a conflict, the more can be said about the conflict dynamics and possible resolution.

In game theory the same elements appear, but in a somewhat different order so that the emphasis becomes different. There are actors, but usually only two. There are goals but they are usually projected onto a generalized utility-dimension so that for all practical purposes the theory is handling only one goal. This means that game theory in its simple, very common, case is studying (2,1)-conflicts, known as two-person games, but more general formulations of the theory are certainly available.

For some mathematical theorems to apply there is the condition that the goal-dimension (utility-dimension) is additive, even limited to the structure of an interval scale. There is

of course no such assumption in general conflict theory, and the game theory paradigm can be developed without this assumption as long as ordinal scale for the goal-dimensions can be assumed.

The two paradigms can be presented as follows:

Figure 1.10. Two Paradigms Compared

In both paradigms each party, referred to by the euphemism "player" in game theory–an unfortunate term disguising that these are often paradigms for matters of life and death–has one axis. In the conflict theory paradigm the axis stand for the goal-dimension of the party, in the game theory paradigm for a dimension of action-choices. In the conflict theory paradigm the action choices are implicit, they come out as points in the goal-space indicating where the actors are located in the compatibility-region. Similarly, in the game theory paradigm the goals come out as utilities accruing to the actors according to which action-choices they make.

However, since the same elements are used in the two paradigms they should be convertible to each other. Below are two examples of converted game matrices, pay-off matrices, one zero-sum and one non zero-sum, taken from Diagram 1.8:

Figure 1.11. Pay-off Matrices on Conflict Paradigm Form

Similarities and dissimilarities can now be made more clear.

In the first case, the zero-sum game, the combinations of action-choices given in the pay-off matrix yield utility-pairs on a straight line, reminiscent of the straight

incompatibility-line in Diagram 1. In the second case the situation is more complex, the utility-pairs are more scattered. Two of them are located on the zero-sum line, two of them on the line of equal utility. If these lines are identified as the lines of "pure conflict" and "pure cooperation" respectively, then games can be seen as composed of these basic elements, depending on how the parties or actors are coupled together in the system they are components of.

This can be well expressed by means of correlation, or better, agreement, coefficients: if the coefficient is negative, then the conflict element is predominant, if it is positive then the cooperation element is predominant, and if the correlation is zero then there is a mixture of equal magnitudes present in the system.

In the game theory paradigm the points represent possible outcomes: given a certain combination of action-choices certain combinations of utilities emerge. Hence, these are possibilities or compatible combinations, and they span a space that can be filled with compatible combinations if mixed strategies are made use of.

In the conflict theory paradigm the two regions of compatibility and incompatibility usually come out as contiguous regions. But this is no built-in necessity. The sets of points of compatibility can have any structure, and the distinctions in terms of correlation can be equally well made for the conflict theory paradigm. Usually the compatibility curve is much more interesting than the region, for it stands to reason that the parties will at least try to obtain positions on the curve and not be content with an inferior position inside the region from where both can move without harming the other.

In conflict theory the emphasis is on position on the goal dimension; in game theory on action-choice. Thus game theory appears as more concrete, relating directly to concrete actions, whereas conflict theory is more general, not asking how the party arrived at a certain point in the diagram, it only maps their joint position. The advantage is that trajectories can be traced and regions defined with great accuracy, in game theory they come out as points only.

But the two are essentially translatable to each other and should both be used depending on the type of information that is available: positions on goal-dimensions, or action-choices.

Chapter 2

DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT

Introduction

This book is written in a spiral; things are touched upon, left behind, approached again when some other themes have been explored a little bit, fade out then to be approached again later on. Thus, after the preparatory work done in Part One an effort will now be made to approach a major theme: the dimensions, necessary and sufficient, to conceive of conflict in all its phases, origin or genesis, process or dynamics, resolution or negation. In short, its ongoing, never ending transformation.

Let us start by making a distinction between typologies of conflict and dimensions of conflict. A typology classifies conflicts into types. A dimension is a variable that apply to all conflicts, regardless of type. Moreover, they can be conceived of dynamically: a conflict can move along these dimensions; that is what makes them different from a taxonomic, static scheme. Actually, there is only one typology that we would not include among the dimensions, the simple typology derived from the type of actors participating in the conflict: conflicts involving persons, involving groups, or involving societies. This is a typology and not a dimension because we would not generally assume it to be dynamic. An interperson conflict would remain an interperson conflict, although its history might reveal ramifications from and to all the other types.

When it comes to dimensions each author in the field will have his own bundle to present, and this book is no exception. The present bundle has been arrived at with two principles in mind.

First, as already mentioned: it should be possible to say what we want to say about conflict relying on these dimensions, and whatever can be derived from them by purely logical operations, alone.

Second, the dimensions should be as few as possible, for economy of thought use conceptual puritanism. Why? Why submit oneself voluntarily to Occam's razor? Are not the richness and variety of society in general, and conflict in particular, so overwhelming that it can only be captured by a language that with the same richness and does that not argue in favor of the variety in natural languages?

If there were a choice between the puritan rigor just advocated and the richness of natural language we would certainly opt for the latter. But there is also virtue to the former, often referred to as "scientific discipline". The virtue is to some extent combinatorial: the researcher says, to himself and to others, here are my terms of reference, let me now try to get as much out of them as possible. If they are very many one cannot possibly explore all the combinations. But if they are very few I can do that, and this may lead me into dark corners where the fruitfulness of the dimensions chosen is measured exactly by their ability to lighten up those corners. Thus, the puritanism of conceptual economy serves as a heuristic, as an aid not only to formulate what I already know, but also to ask questions about the unknown. The fruitfulness of the scheme should be judged on the basis of the latter rather than the former.

To arrive at the dimensions we use the definition of conflict: <u>actors in pursuit of incompatible goals</u>, remembering that as limiting case actors may be parties, goals may be interests, incompatibilities may never be brought into the open, and the pursuit may be steered by the structure. This "limiting case" must be given much prominence.

It has been found useful to group the dimensions under the four headings of <u>actors</u>, <u>goals</u>, <u>incompatibility</u> and <u>pursuit</u>. With three dimensions for each heading this gives a total of 12, but the scheme is not quite that economical since there are subdimensions:

Table 2.1 Dimensions of Conflict

ACTORS	GOALS	INCOMPATIBILITY	PURSUIT
(1) Domain 0 – party 1 – intra-conflict 2 – bilateral, polar . m – multilateral, polar	(4) Scope 0 – interest 1 – 2 – . n –	(7) Analyticity low – empirical (synthetic) medium high – logical (analytic)	(10) Attitude negative neutral positive hatred detached love
(2) Structure of actors Unstructured conflict Vertical Conflict (interaction-defined) weak order strong order linear order specific diffuse Horizintal conflict (interaction-defined) specific interaction diffuse interaction fusion weak strong	(5) Structure of goals Unstructured goals Vertical Goal Infrastructure (priority-defined) weak order strong order linear order Horizontal Goal structure (similarity-defined) specific similarity diffuse similarity fusion	(8) Substitutability low – actor conflict medium high – structural conflict	(11) Behavior negative neutral positive destructive neutral constructive
(3) Consciousness objective/subjective false/true	(6) Acceptability Bounded-nonbounded (fundamental) Continuous-discontinuous (step, dechotomous) Boundary-form (indep. vs. dependent) Derivative at boundary (steep vs. flat)	(9) Incompatibility Bounded-nonbounded (impossible) Continuous-discontinuous (step, dichotomous) Boundary-form (harmony and disharmony) Derivative at boundary (steep vs. flat)	(12) Ressource Types: ideological renumerative punitive Distribution (balance): asymmetric: TU conflict symmetric: TT " UU "

The Table may look impossible at first glance, but is actually very simple. Thus, the two first two columns simply start with the number of actors and number of goals; then proceed to the structure of the sets of actors and the structure of the sets of goals, obviously defining some kind of "space"; and then continue with two important functions of that space: the type of consciousness the actors have of it, and the extent to which various positions in that goal space are acceptable or not.

In the third column, then, the incompatibility function does the same for what is empirically possible, attainable, realizable or not, preceded by two important distinctions in the theory of incompatibility, analyticity and substitutability.

And finally, there is the fourth column which starts out with such obvious manifestations of conflict as attitude and behavior, and then brings in a basic variable in any theory of conflict: how the resources are distributed, which is a euphemistic way of bringing in power, but then power of different types.

The basic distinction is between ideological or normative, remunerative and punitive forms of power, to be explored in some detail. But underlying that is power or resources as something an actor has, and power as something built into the structure as part of the position of an actor. Obviously this relates to the key distinction in Part One between actor-conflict and structure-conflict, and the two types of power can be referred to as resource power and position-power respectively. We just mention this point to assure the reader that the key distinction from Part One has not been lost sight of but comes up in dimension (12) below.

Let us then dig into this systematically, and in the order indicated in Table 2.1.

ACTORS

2.1   Domain

This is a deceptively simple dimension: simply counting the number of actors. However, there is the basic idea that the counting starts at zero, with the non−actor, the "party" to a conflict. Then, the single actor conflict, the actor at odds with himself, is of course included; defining the category of the intra−actor conflict, whether of the intrapersonal, intra−group or intra−societal variety. Correspondingly, when the domain exceeds 1 we obviously have to do with inter−actor conflicts, starting with the bilateral or bipolar variety, ending with the multilateral, multipolar type where m actors are involved.

How then would we distinguish between, say, an intragroup and an inter−person conflict? Does not the group consist of persons, like a society consists of groups, and does not that mean that an intra−group conflict is simply a conflict between persons, just as an intra−societal conflict would be a conflict between groups? No, although this may be the consequence of an intra−actor conflict, it seems a waste of terms to identify them with each other a priori. On the contrary, we can conceive of an intra−group conflict as a condition where the same intra−person conflict is found throughout the group, in the smallest sub−section; and similarly we can conceive of an intra−societal conflict as a conflict where the same intra−group conflict is found throughout the society. In either case the collectivity is ridden with or by a fundamental doubt, for instance as to what is worse, "to be red" or "to be dead"; or what is preferable, a socialist government headed by Jews or the country occupied, by anti-Jewish Germans (a Cold War, post−World War II dilemma, and a pre−World War II dilemma in France, respectively).

Thus, the intra−collectivity conflict is a collectively shared dilemma, "dilemma" being a term often made use of in connection with intra−personal conflict; here generalized.

Perhaps the difference between intra−actor and inter−actor conflict can be made more clear in terms of some possible, although extreme, outcomes, as indicated in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2. <u>Conflict−Types and Possible Outcomes</u>

		<u>type</u>		
		person	group	society
<u>domain</u>	intra	suicide	apathy	anomie
	inter	homicide	internal war	external war

Typically, the extreme outcome of the intra−actor conflict would be some kind of self−destruction and the extreme outcome of inter−actor conflict some type of other-destruction. But this means that it might be very advantageous for a possible target of that other destruction to manipulate the perception of a conflict so that it is seen as an intra-actor conflict, leading to gradual erosion, inactivity and self−destruction of a potential aggressor.

We do not have to go so far as to the collective suicide found in some cultures for a group or a society to become inactive. Total collective apathy, or one corresponding term at the social level, anomie, would render a potential aggressor innocuous.

For the time being there is not much more to get out of this dimension. It only defines the number of actors in the set of actors, not the structure of that set. To that we now turn.

2.2 Structure of Actors

To define a structure one needs a set of elements, and a set of relations between them. To the social scientist there is no doubt what the latter is: the key relation of interaction, analyzed in terms of ex−change, what passes between the parties, and in−change, what goes on inside the parties as a consequence of the interaction. But what does this interaction relate or connect? We cannot say "actors" because we may have situations without actors, only with parties. But in the latter case it would usually make sense to say "positions", that in which the party is put to perform according to the interaction rules. We let that do for the time being, and turn to the major distinction: whether the conflict is unstructured or structured, and in the latter case whether it is vertical or horizontal. Needless to say, these distinctions are analytical and hence too blunt. There are all kinds of shades in between, such as the semi−structured conflict, the diagonal conflict, and so on. But, as somebody has said: the existence of hermaphrodites and other intermediate types does not make the dimension of gender invalid as an analytical or practical tool.

First, there is the unstructured conflict which in a sense is a conflict that takes place in a vacuum, a vacuous conflict. There is no prior interaction whatsoever, like the colonial powers suddenly descending on an African society. Analytically speaking this case is often relatively simple to handle since analysis of the resources the two actors bring into the conflict will often carry us a considerable distance in understanding what is happening. This dimension will be explored below, in Section 2.12, under (12). Suffice it here only to say that in this case we could clearly speak about symmetric versus asymmetric conflicts, depending on the distribution of the resources the actors have at their disposal for the conflict.

However, in general we shall assume that conflict is structured, and in that case the major focus would be on the nature of the interaction. More particularly, the focus will be on the results of the ex−change and in−change; on whether the net benefits that accrue from the interaction are unevenly or evenly distributed. In the first case the conflict is vertical, in the second case it is horizontal.

This is the basic, fundamental distinction, because it is so closely related to the distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of goals. The conflicts of interest are structurally defined, they do not necessarily leave any traces whatsoever in terms of consciousness, attitude or behavior in the parties. And the basic, but by no means the only one, conflict of interest would be in connection with verticality. However, as

pointed out in the preceding part of the book there can also be structural conflicts that are horizontal − only that they are probably not so important. Further, in a vertical conflict parties may certainly become actors through organizations and interests become goals through consciousness formation, so there is no contradiction in saying that an actor's goal is his interest. The point is merely that there can be interests that are not goals.

In horizontal conflict, a conflict between parties in an equitable relationship, we would not talk about conflicts of interest since that term has been tied to some kind of asymmetry in the interaction structure, in the form of exploitation, penetration, fragmentation or marginalization. Thus, the horizontal conflict would typically be a conflict over goals.

At this point it is important not to confuse the vertical−horizontal distinction with the asymmetric−symmetric distinction.

The former has to do with a position in the structure, the latter with the resources they bring into the conflict. The two are strongly related empirically, however analytically distinct they may be.

Thus, exploitation is usually predicated on the assumption that he who is on top of the structure, in its center, will also command the resources. In other words, it is predicated on the assumption that structural power is highly correlated with resource power; relational power with difference power to express the same in terms with a slightly different connotation. But that is not necessarily the case.

Correspondingly, the theory of revolution, the opposite of the theory of repression, assumes that those at the bottom of a vertical structure have latent resources. The function of consciousness formation and organization is to mobilize these resources. When this is done a vertical conflict may turn into a symmetric conflict, or even an asymmetric conflict in favor of the underdog.

Having said this let us introduce some additional distinctions in connection with interaction, highly useful in conflict theory.

First, an interaction relation connects actors. However, it may not necessarily connect all of them, in which case the connection is <u>weak</u>; if it does connect all of them it is <u>strong</u>. If the interaction is vertical this gives us weak order and strong order respectively, and in the latter case one may even have linear order. There is some way of ordering actors so that the differences between them become measurable. An example would be the ordering of civil servants on a salary scale, where they can be compared in terms of the number of "steps" that separates them. In Figure 2.1 some examples are given, for both the vertical and the horizontal cases. It should be noted that in either case "strong"

interaction relations mean that all actors are related, not only, for instance, neighbors.

It might also be pointed out that linear horizontal interaction is the case where interaction is equitable, and some type of distance, for instance geographical distance, is the same between all actors.

Figure 2.1. <u>Weak, Strong and Linear Order</u>

Let us make use of these distinctions to develop some basic social models that seems to be useful in social analysis. They are developed simply by making use of the vertical/horizontal distinction and the strong/weak distinction, combining them into four social models as indicated in figure 2.2.:

Figure 2.2. <u>Four Social Models</u>

The horizontal types are the simplest ones. In Model III, Communal Society, all interaction is horizontal and the connection is strong, not like in Model IV, Pluralistic Society, where groups relate to each other horizontally, but very weakly or not at all.

In the vertical case "strong" has been interpreted weakly: the point is that no element is isolated from the rest, all are connected, but at the bottom of society there may be fragmentation. It is quite clear who is above and who is below, but those at the bottom are only relate to each other by having the same actor on top of them. This is Model I, Conservative or perhaps better Feudal Society.

Correspondingly, in Model II, Liberal Society, the predominant mode is still vertical but it has been modified by introducing horizontal interaction between equals. The "weakness" in this case, is not exactly of the type indicated in the definition above; that definition would point more in the direction of detachment between vertical units. But in spite of these impurities in the definitions the scheme is so related to what has been presented here for conflict analysis, and also brings us towards more concrete societies.

Thus, conservative society has its obvious manifestations today in archetypical Japan, liberal society in the various types of class societies from the United States to the Soviet Union, communal society in the people's communes in China, and pluralist society appears as some kind of future utopia, more or less articulated in the minds and actions of some people.

Our point in this connection, however, is not to engage in of futuristic analysis but to indicate something about the concrete setting in which conflicts may take place.

Thus, in Model I and Model II societies the conflicts would predominantly be vertical and in Model III and Model IV societies predominantly horizontal. The latter two would, by definition, have overcome–transcended–vertical interaction. They would be non-exploitative, equitable societies.

The point is that conflict genesis, as well as conflict dynamics and conflict resolution, will take on very different forms in these four societies, and that is a theme which will be developed later.

More particularly, we would be interested in studying what kind of conflict resolution mechanisms would develop in these four social forms; clearly more related to structure-conflicts in Models I and II, and to actor-conflicts in Models III and IV.

Let us then turn to the next aspect of interaction, particularly well known through the works of Sorokin, Parsons and many social anthropologists. The focus is not on inequity-equity, but on the scope of interaction, from the narrow band referred to as specific interaction via the broad band of diffuse interaction to an interaction so encompassing

that one can talk about <u>fusion</u> between the actors.

This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, for both vertical and horizontal cases:

Figure 2.3. <u>Specific and Diffuse Interaction, and Fusion</u>

Obviously, this typology can now be combined with the types in Figure 2.1, or in Figure 2.2 for that matter, and lead to relatively complex configurations. We shall show later that such combinations are quite meaningful for the analysis of conflict in all its phases.

Since what is here called "structure of actors" essentially would be an opening to the whole theory of social structure, it is more than obvious that much more can be said.

Thus, we have only focussed on interaction relations and not on interaction patterns or networks. However, they have already been introduced in connection with the analysis of conflicts of interests in the preceding part: the focus was not only on inequity, but also on penetration, fragmentation and marginalization.

But we do not have to take in all of this analytical machinery for all purposes; they are four different ways of looking at essential asymmetries in social structures, and hence at conflicts of interest, and they already carry us quite far.

The basic point about what we have said under this heading is rather how complicated the actor side of a conflict is.

Thus, one may perhaps say, as is often done, that there are "two" actors. But it makes a lot of difference whether they are unstructured or structured, and in the latter case whether they are vertically and-or horizontally related.

Moreover, there is also a "Chinese boxes" principle involved here: when one opens up one actor one finds, very often, "subactors" inside, and the question then is: how are they structured? Thus, how many participants are there in the classical cold war conflict

formation: 2–two blocs–or $15 + 7 = 22$, the number of participant countries in the two alliances?

How do we take into account the NN, neutral-nonaligned, countries playing an increasingly important role?

And, what difference does it make that the NATO system possibly is more organized like a Model II society with the superpower on top, some middle powers–UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany–in the middle and small powers at the bottom whereas the Warsaw Treaty system is more organized like a Model I society, obviously with the superpower on the top?

And then, what has been done once can be done twice: one can open up the single country actor and ask what it looks like on the inside, what is its structure?

And so on, and so forth. What has been given here are only some major tools for that type of exploration.

2.3 Consciousness

We now come to the question to what extent the parties we have been talking about are capable of seeing the forces operating upon them. To the extent they do we shall say that they have consciousness, consciousness being defined exactly as the insight in one's own situation, or more specifically precisely in the forces conditioning oneself, meaning one's self, including inner forces.

The major significance of this dimension lies in the distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of values. Thus, in the pure conflict of interests we assume no consciousness, no insight in the situation in which the party finds itself.

That does not mean that the conflict does not exist; only that it is objective (independent of, <u>ante</u> consciousness), not subjective (<u>in</u> consciousness). Another term often used for the subjective conflict is one that is "perceived".

This gives rise to a simple but important combination of the two categories "objective" vs "subjective" conflict, indicated in Table 2.3:

Table 2.3 "Objective" vs "Subjective" Conflicts

		Actor-oriented	
		not subjective	subjective
Structure-oriented	not objective	no conflict	conflict of goals
	objective	conflict of interest False consciousness	interests = goals True consciousness

As mentioned repeatedly above there are two ways of finding out whether there is a conflict anywhere: one is actor−oriented and leads to the exploration of values somewhere in the actor's consciousness or subconsciousness, revealed in attitudes and/or behavior.

The other is structure−oriented and leads to the exploration of any kind of asymmetry built into the structure. The asymmetry defines interests of two types: the interest in maintaining advantage, and the interest in getting out of disadvantage. Obviously, this leads to four different cases, as indicated in the Table.

The case of "no conflict" is in need of no further comment. But the other three cases can stand some elaboration, although it is rather obvious what is intended.

Thus, there is the important category of the conflict of interest that is not perceived, not subjective. In this case there is a pure conflict of interest, and since we do not assume that parties have no consciousness (they are alive), whatever consciousness they have is false since they do not see their own situation.

This immediately leads to the question of how this false consciousness has come about: what are the structures upholding it? In our analysis this is explored by using the ubiquitous twin of exploitation-penetration.

It is exactly through the penetration of the consciousness of the underdog, through the mystification of the structure for him, that he is led not to see the obvious.

This can take place at the level of the person, of the group, and the society. The precise mechanisms will vary, but they have one thing in common: the topdog somehow gets under the skin of the underdog.

The parents penetrate the consciousness of the children they dominate, the teachers the students; the managers the workers; the Center nations penetrate also physically the Periphery nations by making their elites into pliable bridgeheads for themselves, and so on. Thus, Ibsen's A Doll's House is precisely about what happens when a Nora throws away the false consciousness built into her.

And the reaction: All was quiet till Ibsen wrote that play.

Diametrically opposed to this is the pure category of the conflict of values that are subjective, as it would have to be in order for a value to be defined, but structure−oriented analysis does not lead to the issue of any kind of asymmetry certificate. In other words, it is the type of conflict one would have in situation of zero or horizontal interaction, with compatible goals. Thus, a definite stand is taken here: we do <u>not</u> assume that all conflicts have a class character. There are subjective conflicts, and they are vacuous or horizontal − which does not mean that all vacuous or horizontal conflicts necessarily have led to consciousness formation. For this a certain crystallization is needed, maybe through some conflict manifestation in one form or another. But that would not be a case of false consciousness, or at least not of the serious kind mentioned in the category above. It might be a case of unconsciousness, which is something different.

Finally, there is the obvious combination of the two categories: the conflict which is at the same time objective and subjective. In this case there is consciousness, interests are seen as goals, which means that there is <u>true</u> consciousness. For whom? For the underdog, or for the top-dog, or for both. For there is no assumption that the top-dog necessarily has more insight in the conflict of interest than the underdog; that would introduce the palpably untrue hypothesis that all exploitation is somehow premeditated.

It should be emphasized that consciousness is not the same as "attitude". The way it is conceived of here consciousness is cognitive and attitudes cathectic (which is not the same as "evaluative"). Since it is cognitive, the whole notion points to one major function of social science: <u>to contribute to true consciousness.</u>
This is exactly what the social scientist should be equipped for.

On the one hand he should have the tools to develop insights into structures, on the other hand he should also understand actors, and he should be able to combine the two.

However, when this is not necessarily what social scientists engage in, then it may be fruitful to ask what holds him back? And the answer to that question would probably have to be divided into two, at least.

The obvious answer is that the social scientist might himself have considerable vested interest in putting some limits on the extent to which he wants to explore false consciousness, demystify social structures. He may himself be highly privileged, or at least belong to the privileged class. And even if the vested interest is not so strong, he may be ideologically opposed to its clarification. He clearly sees society from one vantage point only, that of his class, or perhaps more importantly, sees the world from one vantage point only, that of this region, however analytically schooled, and this may distort and

contract his perspective.

More importantly, however, would be the idea that analysis might not be enough. We have argued strongly above in favor of the idea that societies can only be understood when they are in a state of excitation, not only in the "normal" state. There is an obvious parallel here to the physicist-engineer encountering some new compound, exposing it to a context different from the "normal" 15°C and one atmosphere pressure to see how it reacts. And this leads to a confrontation, a special type of experience, as a deeper tool for social insight and normal state analysis. He might detest that phenomenon being more law-and-order oriented, and disinclined to engage in or benefit from such experiences.

GOALS

2.4   Scope

Actors and goals are here to some extent treated symmetrically which means that the dimensions of goals will be similar to the dimensions of actors.

Thus, we start, simplistically, with the scope of the conflict: the number of goals at stake. Let it immediately be said that this is not a well defined entity. Actors have a certain separateness, a certain capacity for "boundary maintenance"; goals do not. How many goals we see in a conflict, and to some extent also how many actors we see also depends on how we want to analyze it. The criterion does not lie so much in counting as in the conclusions we can arrive at, particularly the extent to which we are able to develop a practice-indicative theory.

Thus, it is more than obvious that a goal can be subdivided so that instead of a conflict with one goal we suddenly have one with 20. But it is equally obvious that how fruitful this is depends on the extent to which the subgoals really enter in a different manner. A typical example would be the splitting of the conflict goal under the conflict resolution technique known as "trading" into a number of subgoals that can then be traded off against each other. In this case the subgoals do enter differently, and that would be the criterion.

Just as for the domain of a conflict the limiting case of scope is zero: there are no goals in the sense of values at all because we are dealing with a conflict of interest. It is only when that interest is perceived and converted into an internalized value as a goal that the scope jumps from zero to one, to put it that way. And then it continues, to n goals, but not in the sense that there is a conflict over all n goals.

By the "scope" of the conflict we mean all the goals that come into play for the actors included in the analysis; some of them competitive, some of them cooperative, a distinction to be explored below in 2.9, as (9).

Let us now combine domain and scope in an obvious way and introduce what we could call the character of a conflict, the pair (m,n) with the first figure standing for the number of actors and the second figure for the number of goals, as in Table 2.4:

Table 2.4 <u>Character and Complexity of a Conflict</u>

		Scope			
	1	2	3	. . .	n
1	(1,1) 0	(1,2) 1	(1,3) 2	. . .	(1,n)
2	(2,1) 1	(2,2) 2			(2,n)
3	(3,1) 2			. . .	
⋮					
m	(m,1)	(m,2)	(m,3)	. . .	(m,n)

(Domain is labelled vertically along the left side of the rows.)

The complexity, c, of a conflict is defined as $c = m + n - 2$. Obviously, this introduces a "diagonal" way of looking at Table 2.4 lumping together conflicts with different character because they have the same complexity as defined.

In the upper left corner is the conflict with complexity 0, the improper conflict. It is not really a conflict for there is only one actor and one goal. He cannot reach the goal, it is unattainable, but not because it is incompatible with some other goal pursuit − in that case there would have been a proper conflict − but because it is "blocked", a term which explains nothing but describes everything. In other words, a conflict of complexity O is a frustration.

The significance of frustration as a limiting case of conflict lies in its use in conflict repression strategy.
Obviously, if, particularly in a vertical conflict, one party can make the other believe that when he does not reach his goal it is not because something or somebody else stands in the way, but because of his own inadequacy, or because of some absolute, even physical block, then the whole situation changes character.

It is a major technique of manipulation, of mystification, as when people at the bottom of vertical societies (Model I or Model II varieties) are told that the only reason why they are down there is because they were born into that position and will remain there, either because the society is based on the "like father, like son" principle, or because the society is based on the "like talent, like position" principle. In either case higher positions are inaccessible, and the person will be much more happy if he understands that this is the nature of things. He will in fact be more free if he develops this insight in necessity instead of letting his frustrations erode him from the inside.

At complexity level 1 we encounter what could be called the two paradigmatic conflicts, with character (l,2) and (2,1) respectively. Relative to the rest these conflicts are over-

analyzed, but there are good reasons why.

Conflicts of the type (1,2) are also referred to as dilemmas: this is the case where there is one actor and two goals. And conflicts of the type (2,1) are often referred to as two−party conflicts, over one goal, like the two princes in conflict over the ownership of Milano.

In German and Norwegian that goal is often referred to as Streitapfel/stridens eple (the apple of strife, the English bone of contention), in a sense indicating the oneness of the goal. Horse-trading indicates the same and more so given their indivisibility.

The notion of complexity has led us to lump these two types together, and we have even referred to them as paradigmatic. For one problem can now be formulated: to what extent can any conflict be dissolved into these two components so that it can be written as a resultant of x(1,2) conflicts and y(2,1) conflict? It might readily be conceded that intra- and inter−actor conflicts are fundamentally different, and that any given conflict may have components of either. But can all other conflicts be reduced to these forms? Here we only pose the question, possible answer are for later.

Let it only be said that if the answer should be positive (which it is not) the theory of conflict would be extremely much more simple than it is: it would essentially consist of the exploration of the two paradigmatic conflict types. Once you know about their genesis, dynamics and termination you know it all. And this, in turn, would mean that the work in conflict theory has been well directed, for psychologists have invested enormous energy in studying the former; and so much theory in sociology, political science, international relations, economics and game theory has gone into studying the latter.

We could then move on to higher levels of complexity, but need more analytical machinery in order to do it so that substantive insight can be added. Let it only be said that one conclusion which we shall arrive at is that the theory and also the practice of conflict does not show any simple, linear relationship with complexity. It is not the case that conflicts with low complexity are better understood and better handled, and from there it becomes worse and worse. To the contrary; there are good reasons to say that the medium range of complexity, from 2 and onwards a couple of steps, is least understood, and most problematic in practice.

Only at higher levels of complexity does the light of theory shine more clearly through the mist, and the problems of practice become less obstreperous. And to this there is an interesting parallel in mechanics: it is well known that the three−body problem (to calculate what happens when 3 bodies are brought into space with initial positions and velocities given) has not yet been solved. But the one−body problem has been solved

(Newton's first law of mechanics), the two−body problem also (the law of gravity); and the m−body problem (for very high m) is solved in statistical thermodynamics, kinetic gas theory etc.

The problem is whether this says anything about society and nature, or only something about our ways of conceiving of society and nature. Thus, the two paradigmatic conflicts both share in their character the magic number 2, the two-ness, the duality so often encountered, not only in analysis, but also in nature. The human body has many bilateral symmetries including those in the brain, and it may very well be that if we had been trilaterally constructed we would have come to grips with trilateral concepts like the three−body problem more easily. For the time being, however, let us leave the problem at that and return to it later in connection with conflict dynamics and conflict resolution theory in Part Three.

After this exploration into complexity of conflict let us combine domain and scope in another and equally obvious way. Clearly, m actors and n goals define an mxn behavioral space where for each actor there are n axes, one for each goal, indicating how far he has come in the realization of that goal. We have presented a number of such behavioral spaces in the preceding Part One of the book, although only for the two paradigmatic conflict types. But this is a useful figure of speech, although not much more.

It permits us to give a static picture of the situation by means of one point which tells us where all m actors are on all n goal dimensions, and a dynamic picture of the situation which would give us the trajectory of that point as it moves through time, a curve with time as a parameter.

That dynamic or diachronic representation is particularly useful in connection with (1,2) conflicts. Thus, imagine that a country wants to realize two goals, that of economic growth and that of educational growth. In the short run there may be a conflict, a dilemma here, in the sense that there may be a choice between investing in highly research intensive education, educating very few people far into tertiary levels of education, and investing in capital intensive and research intensive production on the one hand, and, on the other hand, investing in broad education for the people, primary level education for all, that in the first run could only lead to labor intensive production. And there might be all kinds of mixtures of these two extremes. In the long run, however, it may very well be that the two goals are not competitive but cooperative.

However, it will still make a lot of difference through which history the actor in question, that particular country, arrived at its point of "bliss": was it through trajectory numbers 1, 2 or 3?

Figure 2.4. <u>Bivariate Diachronic Analysis (BDA) of Conflict</u>

Thus, BDA can be used for dynamic conflict analysis, focusing on strategies and trajectories, not only on compatibility or not.

2.5   Structure of Goals

We have found it fruitful to deal with the structure of goals in almost pedantic parallel to the way in which the structure of actors was handled. This means that we need relations, vertical and horizontal, to structure the set of goals. And we also need the basic distinction between unstructured and structured goals, the former meaning that the goals have no relation whatsoever to each other, the latter meaning that there is a relation defined in the setNeue Ebene. Unlike the case of interaction between actors it is more easy to define the relations between goals and then define the unstructured goal-set as the absence of any such relation than vice versa.

The basic vertical relation between goals is obviously a relation ordering goals in terms of rank-priority, like vertical interaction does not only order actors in terms of ranks but <u>creates</u> this ranking. Goals are not actors, however, so the ordering relation is imputed to the set of goals. And like any other ordering relation it may induce a weak order, a strong order or a linear order, the weak order also often referred to as partial order. This is actually the most interesting case for it means that there are goals that cannot be ranked relative to each other so that in case of conflict there is no ranking order for resolution. The actor imputing priority relations in a set of goals is indifferent where such goals are concerned which makes the conflict more, not less problematic.

If we now conceive of goals in a less absolutist way in terms of either/or, and more

relativistically in terms of gradual realization of goals, then we are led to the important concept of the indifference curve. From the point of view of that actor the indifference curve (or indifference set) is a set of points that he cannot order or rank, because they are equally good or bad. Other criteria are needed.

A person may allocate resources, for instance time and-or money, to travel and-or build a house, but he is indifferent whether he does one or the other. The only thing he is not indifferent to is the total amount of resources available for the project, whether for pure travel, pure house—building or for any combination. Thus, he has indifference curves that reflect the amount of resources at his disposal, but he is not indifferent to the ordering of indifference curves, as expressed in Figure 2.5:

Figure 2.5. Relations on and Between Indifference Curves

When a strong order can be imputed then it might be fruitful to refer to the goals that are strongly ordered as actually being goals on one value dimension. In order to do so, however, one would usually also have to assume that they are somehow of the "same kind", that there is a fundamentum divisionis. In other words, it would usually be assumed that the goals differ from each other only in terms of being more or less of the same kind, not in terms of having more or less value of different kind. In the first case the order may become linear, not only strong by bringing in some extrinsic measurement, for instance the number of square kilometers of Milano, or the number of grams or bites of an apple. And in the latter case, where only values are to be compared, linearity may (perhaps) be imputed by means of the countless procedures by which psychologists, economists and others try to measure the utility (for instance in utiles).

This leads us to the second relation between goals, the horizontal relation of similarity or equivalence. Goals can be more or less interchangeable, not only in the sense that they

are on the same indifference curve because they represent the same amount of "value", but simply because they are sufficiently similar. The dilemma a person is in when he is deciding whether to buy a book or a bottle of liquor, is different from the problem he has in discriminating between two books, by the same author and more or less on the same subject. When he says "it really does not matter" this means something more in the latter case than in the former. More precisely, it means that when he chooses one over the other he can forget about the other precisely because they are interchangeable, whereas in the other case he may forget about the other for some time, but not when he has sufficient resources to devote his attention to the rejected goal once more. Similarity relations induce equivalence classes among goals, just as indifference relations do, but in the former in the positive sense that one element can be taken to represent all the others, whereas in the latter it is only in the negative sense that no element stands out as more preferable, having a higher priority than the other.

Let us now compare what has been said here about structure of goals with what was said under (2) above about structure of actors. In either case we have on the one end the completely unstructured case: actors unrelated by interaction, horizontal or vertical; goals unrelated by preference and similarity relations. And on the other end the completely structured case: actors linearly ordered in a hierarchy, or horizontally fused through interaction with increasing scope and goals linearly ordered in priority, or horizontally fused through similarity.

That gives us four strongly structured cases, and it is customary to refer to all of them as integration: there is no nonsense, no play. There is solid structure, order, not just a heap of actors and goals.

Obviously, there is a difference between vertical integration and horizontal integration. In the former some type of unity is obtained because one actor, or one goal, is so obviously dominant. Ranking privileges actors, and prioritizes goals. And in the latter case the unity is obtained on an egalitarian basis, through fusion, coalescence, unity in diversity, whatever term we might prefer.

But, leaving that distinction aside we could simplify all of this by talking in terms of unity (horizontal or vertical integration) vs diversity (the weakly structured or unstructured situation) for actors as well as goals.

And that permits us to ask one seminal question: how do these two dimensions of integration relate to each other? Table 2.5 gives us the possibilities:

Table 2.5 <u>Actor vs Goal Integration</u>

		Goals	
		unity	diversity
Actors	unity		
	diversity	impossible	

The basic point is just one: when the actors are unstructured we cannot possibly assume that they can arrive at unity, in the vertical or horizontal sense, of goals. Some unity on the actor side is needed in order to obtain some unity of goals, whether that actor unity is vertically imposed from the top, or horizontally arrived at through some level of fusion of actors. In very simple terms: in order to structure a set of goals priority in similarity relations have to be defined.

But who shall define them, unambiguously? It can only be done by something that at least for this particular purpose can be referred to as "one" actor, in other words, it can only be done in an intra−actor conflict. The inside of that actor may be some vertical order, linear, strong or even weak, provided it is connected. Or some horizontally fused set where individual subactors may still be vaguely distinguishable; but some unity there is, some kind of oneness.

Of course, this is not in any way implying that with unity on the actor side there has to be unity of the goal side; in that case dilemmas would be non-existent, which is obviously untrue. Which is another way of saying that all other three combinations are possible.

Needless to say, this plays some role in connection with conflict negation theory, for one type of conflict negation would simply be to give priority to the highest actor, and/or to the highest goal.

But the latter is only possible in an intra−actor conflict with a coordinated view of the total situation, unknown to the bicephalous or multicephalous character of the inter−actor conflict. Thus, in general we would need more conflict work in bilateral or generally multilateral conflicts since there are both diverse actors and, by definition, conflicting goals to take into consideration. A major reason for actor integration, be that as couples or as communities.

2.6 Acceptability

Another term very often used for this particular conflict dimension is <u>utility</u>. However, we have avoided this term for two reasons. One of them is the wish not to be associated with the debate on utility measurement. And another is the more human, active connotation of such terms as "acceptability", "accept" as well as their negative counterparts, "rejectability", "reject", which we see as considerably less bland than the expression "negative utility".

Using the term "acceptability" makes it possible for us to talk about "extension of acceptability area", not that easily expressed in utility terms, and so on.

Acceptability is seen here as a function, defined for each actor at each point in the action space. For simplicity, however, let us start by discussing acceptability as a function of the actor's own dimensions. What acceptability then tells us is, simply, how each point on that goal dimension is valued.

The first distinction to be made is in terms of positive, zero, negative − meaning accept, indifferent, reject respectively. These are three regions on the goal dimension, and since we have been using the term "dimension" we assume that they are ordered from left to right, from decreasingly negative through zero regions to increasingly positive. This assumption is both conventional and convenient, but certainly not indispensable for the reasoning.

The division into positive, zero, and negative regions immediately begs the question "what if one, two or all three for that matter of these regions should be empty"?

The question gives rise to eight different possibilities, through simple combinatorics, but they are all quite meaningful as can be seen from Table 2.6:

Table 2.6

Accept	Indifferent	Reject	No.	Goal dimension type
x	x	x	1	full-fledged goal dimension
x	x	Empty	2	nothing indifferent, polarized
x	Empty	x	3	nothing rejected, positive goal
Empty	x	x	4	nothing accepted - negative goal
x	Empty	Empty	5	everything positive
Empty	x	Empty	6	everything indifferent
Empty	Empty	x	7	everything negative
Empty	Empty	Empty	8	no goal−dimension

The first type is the fully fledged goal dimension with positive, zero and negative regions. When we then eliminate one of these regions we first arrive at the typical positive goal dimension: something is defined as positive, to be pursued, and what is not positive is indifferent relative to that particular positive goal.

Corresponding to this there is the negative goal dimension where something is defined as negative, to be rejected, and the rest is indifferent.

In the history of conflict theory these two types of goal dimensions have played a certain role in defining approach−conflicts (between two positive goals), avoidance−avoidance conflicts (between two negative goals), and the approach−avoidance conflict, between one positive and one negative goal.

They are actually much more similar than the highly divergent terms should indicate, for in each case there is a clearly defined acceptability region in the upper right hand corner of the conflict space. The only idea is that "acceptable" in the avoidance cases does not stand for anything positive, but for the avoidance of something negative. And that only brings out the obvious point: acceptance is a relative term, it connotes a gradient, a differential along a goal dimension, rather than anything absolute. Things are more or less acceptable, not necessarily acceptable per se.

Then, there is the third type with no indifferent point or region at all: things are either acceptable or rejectable. Needless to say, this is a highly polarized conflict dimension. For or against only.

The second half of the table gives us four strange conflict dimensions, possibly more important theoretically than in practice. Thus, if everything is positive (type 5) or everything is negative (type 7), where is the material out of which a conflict can be made? Answer: in the differential, it may be more or less positive, more or less negative. The message is simply that the actor is in an intrinsically positive or intrinsically negative

situation, like engaging in his or her favorite culinary or sexual activity, or enduring some kind of torture. Gradations in terms of more or less will still make quite a lot of sense.

In type 6 gradations are taken out: the goal dimension is simply flat, defining total indifference. We need this as a limiting case since this improper goal dimension is the material out of which proper goal dimensions are made through consciousness formation. And that does not only consist in perceiving, understanding the dimensions of the situation, but also in equipping these dimensions with gradients, internalized as values, positive or negative.

In type 7 the dimension is perceived but not equipped with a differential; in type 8 it is not even perceived. It is simply non−existent, the total negation of the full−fledged goal dimension of type 1.

In practice there is no need to make use of all these eight types. It all amounts to the difference between no consciousness at all, which would be type 8 above; then the indifferent goal dimension of type 7 awaiting some structuring, and then all the others which have one thing in common: an acceptability differential.

Whether that differential is inside the positive region alone, inside the negative region alone or spans both of them, and in that case, whether there is an indifference region defined or not, is less consequential.

In this connection, however, it should be noted that the differential in evaluation might precede any clear cognition of a conflict. At the lower levels of consciousness formation the general notions of something rejectable and something acceptable may certainly precede the type of intellectual cognitive structuring in goal dimensions that the researcher might engage in. This would, then, in a sense be a fourth type added to the three just mentioned - and even more basic raw material for consciousness formation.

If the differential, the gradient, is what merits most attention, then the next sub−dimension here would bring in a new aspect of that differential: whether it is bounded or non−bounded. The latter is a figure of speech: unbounded would somehow mean infinite acceptability or rejectability, which makes mathematical sense. Whether it also makes sense in a theory of human conflict is another matter. However, there is one simple interpretation in terms of <u>fundamental</u> goals, positive or negative.

Goals of unlimited acceptability or rejectability are not subject to any compromise or trading. They are non-negotiable and cannot be exchanged for anything else, except, perhaps, another unbounded goal.

The next aspect of the acceptability−function is equally conventional: what does the function look like? We assume that the function is monotone, brought about through

ordering.

But is it continuous or discontinuous? There is a simple definition of the former: the acceptability−function is continuous if for any two points on the goal dimension the actor can imagine a third point with acceptability between the other two.

Thus, whether a function is continuous or not is a subjective characteristic of the actor, depending on the actor's ability to "imagine". But the actor may not conceive of the dimension that way, in which case the acceptability−function is a step function. Clearly, a step−function with only two steps is a dichotomous acceptability-function: there are only two accept-ability levels, low and high.

If in addition the low level is negative and unlimited, and the high level is high and unlimited we are clearly dealing with the most intractable goal dimension possible.

This leads straight to the next sub-dimension: the "derivative at the boundary". By this is simply meant how the acceptability function crosses the rather important boundary between positive and negative acceptability, between "accept" and "reject".

The two extremes, "steep" versus "flat" are indicated in

Figure 2.6. The Derivative at Acceptability Boundary

Steep
Derivative

Flat
Derivative 0

In the first case, the steep case, the boundary is a precipice, a quantum jump from acceptability to rejectability. In the second case, the flat case, there is also a boundary, but much less well defined since the derivative of the acceptability function is zero at that point. Needless to say, these two conditions can also obtain anywhere else on the acceptability function, but they are particularly significant at the point A=O, which by definition is the boundary.

Finally, let us look more closely at that boundary. So far we have only made the distinction between the boundary point and the boundary region, but if we introduce

more goal dimensions the important distinction between independent and dependent boundaries can be made.

Figure 2.7. The Form of the Acceptability Boundary

independent   dependent

In the first case, the independent case, the joint acceptability function is simply the product of the two acceptability functions for G1 and G2. In the second case, the dependent case, the joint function is not that simple. What the actor accepts along one goal dimension is not independent of, but depends on, how much he has achieved on the other goal dimension. The two goals are coupled in acceptability so that he may lower his demands on one of them provided increasing satisfaction on the other. Thus, for a good meal I might like to have both beer and wine, but what constitutes quantum satis of one certainly depends on how much I get of the other.

INCOMPATIBILITY

2.7 Analyticity

As indicated above we cannot discuss "incompatibility" without making a distinction between empirical and potential reality. Other terms that are frequently used in this connection would be "impossibility", "infeasibility", "unattainability". But we prefer incompatibility which is more relational, less absolute, and points to a relation between goals and actors. Something stands in something else's way, that is the point, whether it is a (1,2)−conflict or a (2,1)−conflict, or any other type with the exception of the improper (1,1)-"conflict", the case of frustration. What incompatibility means is simply that this combination is not realizable in present empirical reality. Something has to be done with that reality; realizing a potential reality, if the incompatible is to be made compatible, or the contradiction to be transcended.

As mentioned above incompatibility is tantamount to a contradiction certificate. There are at least two theses that cannot both be true. More particularly, in conflict theory we are concerned with theses that relate actors to goals in one way or the other. Thus, the two theses:

T1: I have a cake

T2: I have eaten the cake

cannot both be true at the same time, that would run counter to the adage that "you cannot have your cake and eat it too". Compare that to the following two theses:

T3: I have a cake

T4: I have an apple

There is no corresponding adage to the effect that "You cannot have a cake and an apple too". Why?

Because we can, through simple inspection of the linguistic formulations, conclude that there is a contradiction in the first case but we cannot arrive at that conclusion in the latter case. The first case gives us visions of a cake disappearing into the mouth of somebody with subsequent disintegration and subjection to a digestion process that seems dismally irreversible: the cake is simply not retrievable. Either you have it or you eat it, you cannot do both. No experiment is needed to ascertain this. The very concept of "eating" is antithetical to "having".

In the latter case, however, we entertain no such visions at all. We need additional information, for instance about the price of cakes and apples, and the amount of money

that can be expended on either. On this empirical basis we may arrive at a conclusion in terms of incompatibility or not; but in either case we need more information than what is contained in the verbal theses alone.

One might now simply conclude that when the contradiction lies in the linguistic form alone, then the conflict is <u>logical</u> (more precisely, negatively analytical, which is a special type of contradiction); and when this is not the case then it is <u>empirical</u> (or synthetic). But we would like to see this as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy, and refer to this particular dimension as <u>analyticity</u>.

Thus, in the first case the analyticity is certainly high, but not absolute. Is it so obvious that "eating" really is antithetical to "having"? What if a person were able to eat the whole cake in one gulp, and that his stomach was made in such a way that it could store the cake a long time before various acids, enzymes and so on start their devastating activity? In that case he would have eaten the cake and also have it, even quite well protected–much in the same way as fish eat fish even to the point where they are retrievable.

But this means that there are lots of empirical assumptions in connection with "eating" that may have been taken for granted. And yet, we would still say that this is different from the cake and apple example. But it is not that different, as can be seen from these two alternative formulations:

T5: I have a cake worth 75% of my money

T6: I have an apple worth 60% of my money

In this case resources are brought into the picture, but the formulations are still not sufficient to conclude that there is a contradiction on the basis of the formulations alone. To mention just one point: the assumption that the grocer extended no credit, which is an empirical assumption.

Obviously, analyticity has something to do with the number of assumptions we have to make in order to arrive at the conclusion that the theses entail a contradiction. If we make no assumptions at all then the contradiction can only be contained in the formulations themselves, completely irrespective of the state of affairs in the empirical world. In that cage analyticity may be said to be high, and correspondingly it may be said to be low the more assumptions we have to introduce in order to arrive at the incompatibility conclusion.

But this means that analyticity has something to do with flexibility versus rigidity in the definition of the empirical world: a logical incompatibility holds even in a highly flexible world; an empirical incompatibility presupposes a more rigid world. And in these

formulations ways out of the two types of conflict are also indicated: in the empirical conflict it may be by relaxing somewhat those rigidities, whereas in the logical conflict, by definition, no change in the empirical world will bring about any negation of the conflict.

What, then, would bring about that negation? Evidently what is left in defining the conflict: the theses themselves, through reinterpretation.

One of the most important cases of a logical or analytical conflict is what could be referred to as relative conflicts, where the actors are not aiming at an absolute amount along some goal dimension, but at getting most, even all.

Thus, imagine the case of two siblings orphaned by the premature death of their parents in an accident, with no testament left behind, and in a legal vacuum with no automatic rule.

Here are their theses:

Sibling S1: Everything to me because I am the eldest

Sibling S2: Everything to me because they loved me most

In short, they both want 100% of the inheritance, H, and they both back up their demands with well−known arguments.

The real test of whether this is a relative, logical conflict or an absolute, empirical conflict can be made by changing the empirical world.

Thus, a friend of theirs might say: "Why don't we put the inheritance, H, in the bank at a very good interest rate and wait till the balance of the account is 2H, then either of you can take out what you want, H".

The advice sounds interesting, but if this is really a relative conflict the siblings will stand by their formulations, requesting everything.

Instead of sharing 2H equally both of them will want 2H, which means that the new (theoretical) solution with this approach would involve four times the inheritance left behind by the parents. Evidently, the bank will benefit.

Figure 2.8. Relative and Absolute Conflict

Relative conflict

Absolute conflict

This would hold insofar as the conflict is a relative conflict; if it is an absolute conflict with the two siblings really wanting H and just H the conflict would be over when 2H has been produced and properly shared. In that case changes in the empirical world, in this case brought about through compound interest, would have done the trick. But in the relative, logical conflict no change in the empirical world can solve the conflict where both of them want 100%.

One may ask, what then could solve the conflict? As indicated above: reinterpretation of the formulations, or simply reformulation, for instance to: 100% of the original inheritance H. Under that condition the bank trick would work.

Under this general heading of relative conflict there is one type that is so important that it almost overshadows the rest, like the branch that is bigger than the rest of the tree: rank conflict. This is not the same as vertical conflict although it is related to it. The point of departure in rank conflict is, indeed, the verticality of a social structure. The rank conflict perspectives does not challenge this structure, it more or less takes it for granted as a law of nature. Within this perspective rank dimensions are defined, both in terms of division of labor, in terms of centrality in the structure, and in terms of distribution of resources.

Clearly, these rank dimensions are at the same time goal dimensions, but of a special kind. They define positions in a rank structure, topdogs and underdogs if one is content with dichotomizing the rank dimension, or topdogs, middledogs and underdogs if a trichotomy is found better for analytical purposes. And so on.

Characteristic of the rank conflict, then, is that it is a conflict high on analyticity. It

is a logical conflict, and more particularly a relative conflict to the extent that everybody wants to become a topdog. Expressed in other terms: to the extent that everybody wants to have 100% of rank.

And they may not. With top rank less applaudable consequences may follow: envy, verbal and physical abuse, worry that the top rank may be stolen, erode, or wither away in any way. In addition, the rank dimension itself may wither away like a monetized inheritance under the condition of galloping inflation.

So we only say "high on analyticity" for there are changes in the empirical world that would negate the conflict, meaning changes that would negate the verticality of social structure in general, that dimension in particular or holding top rank even more particularly. What this amounts to, hence, is simply that rank conflict remains a logical, relative conflict as long as it is assumed that no such change takes place. However, if this assumption is valid for long periods of time in vast regions of space the theory of rank conflict will always be an important point in the general theory of conflict.

The point is not to have much money, but to have more than anyone else in the relevant social space: locally, in the community, nationally, in the country globally, in the whole world.

Cursed be those with such ambitions; damnation will be their fate.

2.8   Substitutability

This particular dimension brings us back to the reflections in chapter 1.4 about the difference between actor conflict and structural conflict. The basic point in this connection is known to everybody who has ever been in an organization and had "troubles" with the head of that organization. Some kind of incompatibility has arisen, for instance about the ends or means of the organization. The crucial question is the following: does the incompatibility remain after substitution of actors in the organization, and that means not only the head of the organization but also those lower down, or does the incompatibility dissipate with substitution?

In the first case, high substitutability (the incompatibility holds up) the conflict is structural; in the latter case it is an actor conflict tied to those particular actors, and disappearing with them.

The significance of this dimension, in addition to its extreme utility for analytical purposes, lies in the phenomenology of conflict as experienced by the participants. Very

many conflicts are probably held by the participants to be actor conflicts, <u>their</u> conflicts, but are nevertheless very high on substitutability, indicating that they should rather be seen as structural conflicts.

Take the so−called puberty crisis, the syndrome of rejection of parental authority and self−assertion that hits a family at a certain phase in teenage development. The ubiquity of the pattern, in time and in space, the way in which it applies not only to the first child but to the second and the third, not only to one's own children but to the neighbor's although with considerable variation, should indicate that it holds up under considerable substitution of actors. In other words, it is a structural conflict.

Or the way US imperialistic activity in Indo−China held up under substitution of US presidents, even five of them so far. Substitution of one president for the other is not the same as substitution of the total US actor in the structural position held by the United States. However, with the power given to US presidents, particularly in foreign affairs, this is more than a metaphorical illustration.

Or, instead of interpersonal and intersocietal conflict consider a structural intrapersonal conflict. A person has a dilemma, torn between work and family; a struggle between a desire to achieve and perform, and a desire to enrich and develop further profound, warm human ties inside the closest circle. This dilemma digs deeper and deeper into the person, to some extent splitting the person, in a semi-schizophrenic way into two parts, the work person during working hours, and the family person at night and during weekends. But the person is not able to make that transition: one penetrates into the other, neither becomes perfect. An unhappy, unstable, ambivalent mix develops, and the frustration becomes deeper and deeper. There are signs of breakdown at work life as well as in family life; when in the work situation the unfulfilled family obligations dominate the horizon, and in the family situation the frustrations at work are filling the mind − disturbing either.

It means much to that person's understanding of the situation whether the conflict is seen as something peculiar to him or her, an actor conflict, or something built into the particular position in the social structure where that person is located. Or, for that matter: built into practically speaking every position in the social structure and in any structure where work and family have been separated because the family is no longer a unit of production, only, and often not even that, a unit of consumption.

To know that this problem is not something wrong with me but possibly with the structure may change the situation completely, and change the person from an introvert brooder over own destiny and shortcomings to an extrovert activist, conscious, organized

for basic social change which always has to mean structural change.

Correspondingly, it means rather much, as so often pointed out, for the approach taken to conflict resolution: should it be actor oriented or structure oriented? In the former case it becomes a question of adjusting the person to the structure by seeking the root of inadequacy in his or her personality, very often diachronically, going back to early infancy. In doing so the individual actor is maintained as the basic unit in conflict analysis, and an individualistic cosmology is thereby reinforced.

But then one can also do the opposite: seeking the root of the conflict in the structural perspective, finding what causes the same kind of intrapersonal conflict in many, most or all persons located in the same position in the structure. The key to conflict resolution has to be structural change, like bringing work home, to the family.

This should not be confused with the intermediate position of social therapy of a group of persons rather than the individual person treated in psychotherapy as the unit of conflict resolution. To single out for attention not only the person with symptoms of breakdown but his "significant others", like major role partners in family, school and at work, is an important step forward from the individual oriented perspective to intrapersonal conflict. But it is still dismally actor oriented. It is still engineering at the personal level, a teaching and learning process through which those particular actors are being trained to adjust and to handle not only themselves, but also each other so as to minimize intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict.

But the structure remains the same and the conflict will not only reappear with new, untreated actors, but also remain there all the time, although possibly in a more latent form. Social therapy as well as psychotherapy of structural conflict will forever remain a cosmetic operation, trying to adjust people to a wrong structure. And one would agree with those who say that the person who performs adequately in a crazy structure will also have to be crazy for the two to negate each other sufficiently to bring about something that looks "normal".

The actor-oriented approach to a structural conflict puts a heavy load on the actor, and is compatible with fundamental christian cosmology, particularly of the protestant variety, only that "bad conscience" will be deprived of its religious overtones and show up as a feeling of inadequacy, "frustration". A structural perspective can relieve the actor of that burden, exonerate him or her so to speak, and put the structure in focus. But in doing so it also deprives the actor of his conflict. It is no longer his or her conflict, but something more abstract that could just as well have been somebody else's conflict, a predecessor, a successor, anybody in the same position anywhere at any time. The

structural perspective alienates the person from the conflict for the key to alienation in conflict is the same as to alienation at work: <u>substitutability</u>. The feeling of guilt, shame or inadequacy may disappear, but what remains is a bland, even dehumanizing depersonilization.

And that places us firmly in a dilemma where the approach to this dimension is concerned: is it "good" or "bad" that a conflict is one or the other? Of course, this is a naive way of formulating the dilemma, one reason being that it is probably fruitful to conceive of a conflict as being both at the same time, but at different levels of awareness, and at different levels of reality.

Thus, a conflict may be structural in the sense that it can only be dissolved if the structure is changed. But at the same time it may be an actor conflict in the sense that the actor relates to it as his or her conflict, as something insubstitutable, an works on it.

How can this be possible? Because through conflict dynamics the infinite richness of persons, and the varieties in structures, will approach a structural conflict as some type of raw material to be processed by the participants themselves and turned into a conflict so special that personal aspects are added to the structural nucleus.

To use a simple metaphor: it is like buying any kind of gadget, mass produced in a highly alienated factory in the sense that the product would be the same under a wide range of substitution of workers, engineers, or managers. And when the product has been acquired by the consumer it is still highly substitutable. But after some use the product acquires a personality which makes it much more difficult to part with a shaving machine used to the point where it functions below optimal efficiency than with a brand new one. A peculiar attachment develops because each little scar on the polished surface carries a message of an insubstitutable link between commodity and user. Such ties may still develop between commodities and consumers, but in "modern" societies production is organized so that should they develop between commodities and producers it is referred to as an accident, taken out of the production detected by quality control, and possibly sold on a special sale of substandard products.

We have mentioned this at some length because of the basic significance of this dimension for the phenomenology of conflict. In no sense does it mean that structural conflict is the less important category, only that it is not necessarily the "good" or "radical" perspective, nor necessarily a pure case however useful analytically.

2.9   Incompatibility

We are then in a position to approach the key concept in the theory of conflict, incompatibility, also known as contradiction. No doubt this is problematic, and the depth or lack of depth in understanding of conflict will show up more readily at this point than at any other.

As will be seen from Table 2.1 we shall treat incompatibility in a strictly parallel fashion to the way acceptability was treated. This is not an enforced parallel: the two are basically very similar, although their similarity has been stretched as far as possible in order to simplify presentation and, more importantly, in order to benefit from the analysis of one in the analysis of the other.

Thus, the point of departure is incompatibility as a function of each point in the behavior space defined under (4) above. The behavior space is the space where the set of actors can be located as a point; an incompatibility is a function of any point in that space. Actually, the function we define is the negation of incompatibility, the compatibility function, which we then assume to be positive when something is compatible (possible, feasible, attainable) and negative when something is incompatible (impossible, unfeasible, unattainable). That leaves us with the boundary, the zero region in the behavior space for which there is still compatibility, but only barely so. For incompatibility means

$$INC : COM < O$$

That is the definition of the incompatibility region.

Thus, the compatibility function defines three regions. Once more it becomes meaningful to ask whether one, two or all three of these regions are empty, and that leads us to a repetition of the problem formulation in connection with acceptability.

But there is little sense in elaborating the eight types simple combinatorics will lead us into; they are not that interesting. There is the fully fledged compatibility function which would define a compatibility region, an incompatibility region and a boundary between the two; the latter may also in some cases be a region. However, very often it is just the boundary which would make what would correspond to type 3 in Table 2.6 the typical case. Type 2 would be rather uninteresting except as a limiting case: there is no incompatibility. In that case there can be no conflict either, for unlike acceptability, incompatibility is not a question of differentials but of negative compatibility. This would make type 4 interesting and also type 5, but always on the assumption that the situation is dynamic, that compatibilities can be somehow made to appear. Types 6 and 7, however, would be out: in this case there could be no conflict either, and the same applies, of

course, to type 8. In short, this typology does not differentiate enough; a futile exercise.

Much more interesting is the next problem: the degree of compatibility, and more particularly whether it is bounded or unbounded. For this is the problem that makes us look into the very nature of conflict, evidently strongly related to the nature of incompatibility. So, just what is the degree of compatibility?

To try to answer this question let us start with some simple examples, all of them intrapersonal conflicts, i.e. dilemmas . In all conflicts a person has two goals, G1 and G2. In the first conflict he wants to buy two things that both cost three money units, and he only has three units; in the second conflict he wants to devote time to those things that both last three hours and he has only three hours; in the last conflict he wants to do two things that both require three units of energy, but he only has three units.

The three conflicts can be represented in an identical manner, and there are three obvious representations of compatibility functions, as given in Figure 2.9:

Figure 2.9. Three representations of compatibility-functions iso-compatibility

In the first representation the conventional behavioral space is equipped with iso-compatibility lines. The broken lines correspond to negative compatibility or incompatibility, and the number indicate the positive or negative balance of the number of units, in an obvious way. At the point of bliss this negative balance is obviously minus 3 since three more units would be needed in order to arrive at that point. Similarly, at the point of origin the degree of compatibility or positive balance is plus three since nothing has been expended, and on the line connecting G1 and G2 the degree of compatibility is zero: the line of equivalence, the border, the boundary.

In the second representation, two−dimensional projection, it is indicated how the

compatibility function which evidently is a plane in this particular case, cuts the line between the origin and the bliss point at the mid−point, and in the three−dimensional representation this plane is indicated, although not in a very useful way. Needless to say, much more complex compatibility−functions could be imagined, including much more complicated compatibility borders, but that kind of complication is unnecessary at this point.

Since we are not going to assume in general that positive and negative valences can be expressed in terms of units that even define an interval scale, we are not going to worry much about the form of the compatibility function anyhow.

Since three different examples can be represented in the same three different ways, they obviously have something basic in common. In other words, what is it that is placed on the positive and negative compatibility axes? In the first example, the monetary one, it is simply money: money expended in different positions on the O−B line. What is indicated is the balance, or in other words the cost of occupying a certain position. However, we are not going to interpret in terms of cost since this gives a too special monetary connotation to the analysis. A more general term is needed.

The compatibility function will here be identified as a resource function. What the compatibility function tells for each point in behavioral space is the resource balance at that point. When it is positive there is compatibility, when it is negative there is incompatibility, and when it is zero the behavioral system is at the boundary. Obviously, the three conflicts just mentioned are conflicts because the resources of money, time and energy are constant. And in general we shall conceive of a system with constant resources as a closed system and a system with changing resources as an open system. In the latter case the resources may either decrease or increase; in the former case there is a resource loss (or dissipation), in the latter case a resource gain (or accumulation).

The basic point now is that the term "resource" should be taken in a very broad sense. Thus, one resource may be imagination, another may be flexibility in a social system, a third may be tolerance and so on, far beyond the Western favorites, money, time and energy.

The important point now is to arrive at a relatively clear conception of what the key resource is in a concrete conflict. The answer to that type of question may often have to be many−dimensional, or lead to the introduction of new resource concepts not necessarily reflected in common or specialized language.

To approach this problem from a slightly different angle let us return to the question of what an unbounded compatibility function might signify. If it is unlimited and negative,

then the obvious interpretation might be not only incompatibility, but some type of absolute impossibility, infeasibility, un-attainability. Let us look at two examples, one from social science, one from physical science, indicated in Figure 2.10:

Figure 2.10. Incompatibility as Impossibility: Empirical Conflicts

In these figures there is an attempt to illustrate "laws". To the left is the social science "law": the idea that there is a choice between equality and accumulation. If you want no inequality in society then you will have to stay poor, if you want a society to grow and become rich then you will have to give up equity and accept some form of inequality. Then there is the third possibility of neither equality nor accumulation. In the figure a theory of social development is given the form of an arrow, from primitive society ("primitive communism") via traditional society to modern society.

To the right there is a similar figure, but this time indicating a physical law: how the temperature of boiling water depends on the pressure (the lower the pressure, the lower the temperature). As indicated in the figure Nature is actually less generous than Society: in the social law only the upper right hand corner is excluded as incompatible, in the

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physical law both corners are excluded, leaving for empirical reality only the narrow band between the two, an opening in which boiling water may appear under different pressure.

What is the meaning of "degree of incompatibility", and is it bounded or unbounded, the latter meaning "absolute impossibility"?

The best approach would be to re−define the "laws" as incompatibility borders by reinterpreting the diagrams as conflicts. In the first case the two axes stand for "politics of growth" and "politics of equality" respectively, and in many societies these are not abstract value dimensions but concrete goals with well defined groups backing one or the other. And this brings out the point that to the extent the variables in terms of which a "law" is formulated are goal dimensions, a "law" may be tantamount to the declaration of a region in a behavioral space to be an incompatibility region. And that means that the "law" becomes a component in a social conflict.

But what about the second figure, can this also be said to represent a conflict? In this case the conflict might sound somewhat contrived, since one would have to introduce a person, a group, a society that for some reason or another wants to have water boiling at low temperature, maintaining normal, sea level pressure, here referred to a "high". They are told by the physicist that you simply cannot do this: to high pressure corresponds high boiling temperature; if you insist on boiling water at ordinary room temperature you cannot do so at sea level pressure; you must move even uncomfortably high up.

Let us then move to the third and last figure where the term "law" is used in a completely different sense: the legal sense. In this case there is a person who wants to engage in a forbidden act, but who also wants to avoid punishment. In a perfectly functioning legal system this puts him in the situation of boiling water: he is balancing on a narrow strip between legal behavior and avoidance of punishment on the one hand and illegal, but pursued behavior and punishment on the other. On either end of that strip are the errors statisticians will recognize as errors of type I and Type II respectively: he does something illegal, but avoids punishment, or he actually does nothing wrong but is punished none the less.

The crucial question now seems to be under what condition it might be possible, nevertheless, to penetrate into the incompatibility region, and even reach the bliss point. In general it seems evident that resources will have somehow to be extended, that there may be costs involved in the broad sense of that term. In the exploration of the nature of those resources and costs would lie the answer to the question of what type of incompatibility we are dealing with.

Thus, in the first case the argument can be made that the incompatibility is based

on the assumption that the accumulation takes place in an inequitable manner. This leads to the question of how inequity, concretely, is combined with growth, and the bridging term here seems to be "vertical division of labor". The vertical division of labor means, concretely, that some people have more enriching (in the material as well as in the spiritual sense of that word) tasks to do than others. This is by definition inequity; at the same time there is no doubt that it is compatible with "growth". The history of capitalism shows that, and there might also be other economic systems combining inequity with accumulation.

But what would happen if work were organized with horizontal division of labor? By definition there would be equity, but could there also be growth, in the sense of increased accumulation? Without going into any detail the example of the people's communes in the People's Republic of China seems to indicate that there is this possibility, although they may not accumulate exactly the same things as the products accumulated under vertical division of labor. In another context we have referred to this as invariance-breaking, brought about by the variation of a third variable (vertical versus horizontal division of labor) whose constant value has been assumed. When horizontal division of labor is introduced one basic assumption would be that on the average much more creativity is released because everybody is participating in problem formulation and problem solving, not only in the implementation of solutions to problems explored by a tiny elite. But that means that the society which maintains vertical division of labor has an under−utilized resource, the creativity of the bulk of the population (the "masses").

The point about this resource, however, is that it is latent and has to be released. The system as it is does not have it available, which means that the system has somehow to be opened up so that this resource can be made available. Needless to say, that opening of the system is often referred to as a revolution. Equally needless to say: revolutions involve costs which brings in the negative aspect of the compatibility function in this case, presumably greater the more removed from the diagonal in the figure.

In short: the conclusion is that there is incompatibility only as long as no new resources are brought into the picture. The moment they are brought in, and are of the kind mentioned, the incompatibility boundary may be moved outward, towards the bliss point.

What was incompatibility proves not to be impossibility in any absolute sense. But does this also hold for the physical law in the second diagram? Are the conditions under which this contradiction may be transcended?

Using the logic of the examples just explored this can be restated as the problem of finding a third variable the variation of which will permit the penetration of the

incompatibility boundary, possibly even to the bliss point. Let us for a moment switch to another example: the Galilean $s=1/2gt2$. Simplified as $s=5t_2$ he who wants a freely falling body to traverse 50 meters in 5 seconds sounds simply ignorant, not to be taken seriously. For every educated person would know that after 5 seconds the freely falling body would have traversed something like 125 meters, neither less nor more.

But when you read it as $s=1/2gt2$ the third variable, assumed to be constant, is already there: g. It is only a matter of solving a simple equation to find that the solution is $g=(2x50):25=4$. The only question then remains: under what conditions can that particular person, impatient with nature's laws, get this constant of gravity? Again the answer is simple: by joining a space ship and performing his experiment at a certain distance from the center of gravity of the earth. Or a centrifuge: $s=250$ is obtainable with $g=(2x250):25=20$.

But, it may be objected: in the law relating pressure and temperature of boiling water there is no such third variable the variation of which would permit us to penetrate to the point of bliss. Let us image that all physicists agree that this is the case. One answer would be that this is a postulate, there is no such third variable, and that I am free to have as my guiding light the opposite postulate: there is always such a third (fourth, fifth. . .) variable the variation of which will change the form of the law.

Very different attitudes to laws will depend on which of these postulates one believes in, or sees as a basic principle of guidance. In the first case, the axiom of unlimited tenability, laws become iron laws, and incompatibilities become absolute impossibilities. In the second case, the case of limited tenability, laws become rubber laws, and no impossibility is absolute.

Again, however, we come back to the problem of resource and cost. The man who absolutely wanted freely falling bodies to fall less quickly would have to pay, literally speaking, for his particular desire: there are considerable costs involved. The system has to be an open one, permitting the introduction of resources not specified in the original description of the system.

And the same will possibly apply to the water boiler. But what about the person who wants to commit a forbidden act and at the same time avoid punishment? It is rather obvious what kind of resources he has to bring into the picture: ingenuity so as to avoid detection, alibis in case he is detected, expert counsel in case his alibis do not hold, bribing of the judges in case a counsel proves insufficient, a machinery for escape from prison in case the judges prove incorruptible, and so on. It is not that he cannot combine the illegal act with punishment avoidance, it is only that the system has to be

open enough for the new resources to be brought in.

Let us then look at a logical conflict, high on analyticity: Take

from the Church: Thou shalt not kill!

from the Military: Thou shalt kill!

Here theses have been formulated as norms. But norms are nothing but evaluated actions, which means that they are abbreviations for action dimensions (in the case not killing vs killing), and the dimensions are equipped with goal arrows, as in Figure 2.11:

Figure 2.11. Incompatibility as Impossibility: Logical Conflict

The incompatibility indicated here is the incompatibility between "P is killing" and "P is not killing". Aristotelian logic declares that these statements cannot both be true, you can have one or the other, but tertium non datur. It looks like an impossibility, like unbounded incompatibility.

Or, does it really? First, there is the possibility hinted at above in the analyticity chapter: the possibility of reinterpretation indicated in Figure 2.8. Thus, one might get:

From the Church: Thou shalt not commit murder!

From the Military: Thou shalt defend thy country!

The example is in need of no further elaboration: the bliss point may now be attained, possibly with the help of that bridge between the two norm senders, the military chaplain. But what were the costs involved, what were the resources that had to be brought in?

Reinterpretation, however, is not the only possibility. Reinterpretation is a way of accepting tertium non datur, but reinterprets so that one thesis is not the negation of the other.

But how about keeping the theses as they are, rejecting tertium non datur? In two−valued logic this is impossible, but there are other logics. And then, social reality is much richer and offers many more possibilities.

The radical, transcending compatibility is, of course, nonviolent, nonmilitary defense of the country, possibly even more effective.

But there is also the category of "nonlethal violence", incapacitation without killing, for instance by means of toxic agents of various kinds in the form of aerosols. It is killing from one point of view, nonkilling from another; but it is not the same as reinterpretation. Then, there is the possibility of a "compromise": killing, but not as much as one could do, keeping the killing oscillating somewhere between the maximum level indicated by one of the theses, and the minimum level indicated by the other. As is well known both of these dilemma−negation techniques are used by the United States in the Indo−China War.

If we now look back at all these examples it would be good to have some kind of typology of incompatibility. The basic typology was introduced in the first part of this section: analytically, the distinction between logical and empirical conflicts. As to the latter the examples have indicated another distinction: between empirical incompatibility due to scarce resources and empirical incompatibility due to "laws". Needless to say, the latter is not a good distinction for incompatibility due to scarcity of money, time, and other types of resources can also be given the form of a "law"; moreover, it was indicated that those "laws" are more or less so, that those in social science are certainly rubber laws, and those in natural science possibly, even probably so - implying a less servile attitude in the social, and natural, scientists formulating these laws. And as to the distinction between logical and empirical: it was shown also to be a rather blurred one, that it is even doubtful whether a pure contradiction (in the sense of negatively analytical proposition) can be conceived of in connection with incompatibility theory.

What remains, however, is degree of incompatibility. It somehow has to do with the amount of stiffness or rigidity in the system, which again has to do with the amount of resources needed, or costs suffered, in order to break down the incompatibility. In the case of the empirical conflicts these costs have to do with changes in the empirical world, and the examples in Figure 2.10 indicated that these costs might have to do with fundamental change in social structure, manipulation of physical structure, personal costs incurred and so on.

In the case of the logical conflict there should in principle be no change in the empirical world that would alter the incompatibility, but in practice there is because so few logical conflicts show up, on closer inspection, to be maximum high on analyticity. However, for those that are we can still talk about the costs incurred, and the resources needed–for instance in terms of imagination, intellectual and ethical risks, etc.–for reinterpretation and reformulation.

Again, rigidity/flexibility stands out as the major landmark in this landscape. But in saying so it should also be remembered that there are many other ways of negating a conflict than breaking down the incompatibility barrier. If that were not the case the history of mankind would have looked very different. The phenomenal variety of human society would have been less because the incompatibility would have forced more uniform patterns on a humanity often very short on resources.

Let us then go on to the next item on the list: the shape of the compatibility function. This is simple because the basic distinctions were already made in connection with acceptability theory: if we assume some type of monotone order then the distinctions between continuous and discontinuous functions, and the division of the latter into functions with several steps and only two steps, still holds.

Since our explorations above certainly have indicated that compatibility, like acceptability, is hard to measure, we will very often be led to the simplistic division of the behavior space in two regions, referred to as COMP and INC respectively. It is only in the case of scarce and measurable resources that some precise type of compatibility function can be defined, and the mathematics based on more complex structures, even to the point of continuity, can be made use of. However, we do not consider this a difficulty or a drawback: the history of conflict theory is replete with examples of how mathematization leads research astray, making the analyst lose himself and his problems in the desire to draw on more and more of the richness of mathematics, into complexities not mirrored in reality.

The next item to be considered is equally easily dispensed with: the derivative at the boundary. The comments made in connection with acceptability can be used here, mutatis mutandis: there is the compatibility function that cuts through the behavior space at a steep angle, and the compatibility function that "cuts" it tangentially, at a flat angle; see Figure 2.9. The interpretation of a very great resource differential is separating the compatible from the incompatible this means that very many resources have to be mobilized to push the incompatibility border further out; if there is a very small differential the difference between empirical and potential reality would be a minor one. Needless to say, these are figures of speech only, a translation of basic, if simple, aspects of incompatibility theory into a more or less mathematical language that does not in and by itself yield more insight.

We then proceed to the considerably more complicated theory of the boundary form; the shape and location of the compatibility region in the behavioral space.

In discussing this it will also be made quite clear that (in)compatibility theory is not

limited to conflict theory; it is equally useful in cooperation theory, as is evident from Figure 2.12:

Figure 2.12. Different Compatibility Regions

We have distinguished between three cases referred to as disharmony, harmony, and independence respectively. Of course, other cases could also be imagined, in accordance with the typology of compatibility functions mentioned at the beginning of this section. For instance, the whole area could be compatible or all of it could be incompatible. In the first case this would simply mean that the behavior unit is free to take any position in the space; there is no constraint whatsoever. And there is room for the case of total incompatibility, the behavior unit cannot even enter the space indicated. But, as pointed out in that connection: we are interested in the case where there is a division of the space in proper regions of compatibility and incompatibility, which means that what is not compatible in the figure above is incompatible.

All the cases discussed so far in this book have been cases of disharmony where the constraint introduced by the
notion of incompatibility has locked out simultaneous goal realization. But differently, the bliss point has been in the incompatibility region. But the compatibility region may have any location in this behavioral space.

It may, for instance, be located as in the second part of the figure, including the bliss point and the zero point, the states of complete goal realization and complete goal termination, respectively. We have referred to the two as cases of disharmony and harmony respectively, but there is also the third case: the case of mutual decoupling. In this case the degree of realization of one goal does not depend on the degree of realization of the other. For either goal there may be low, medium or high goal realization, that is

no longer the issue. The point is that whatever the level of realization of one goal does not influence the level of realization of the other.

Clearly, these are the cases of negative, positive and zero correlation between levels of realization of two goals. It is useful to have it translated into these terms since it opens for a variety of empirical indicators and techniques. Thus, into these thought forms we may pour not only synchronic, but also diachronic data. We may look at a behavior unit and observe its trajectory over time to see whether it conforms to any of the three patterns, or possibly to some other pattern.

Thus, imagine that the behavioral unit is a married couple, and that G1 and G2 are the states of well−being, even happiness, of husband and wife respectively. In the case of disharmony the situation that makes one party happy makes the other party unhappy, and vice versa. The situation may be of the trivial kind described in connection with the couple's vacation dilemma. But it may also be of a less trivial, more cruel kind: either spouse derives considerable delight from the unhappiness of the other. This, incidentally, also means that they cannot be unhappy together as the couple depicted in the second case, the harmony case: they share good days, or bad days, together and they agree as to what are good days and bad days.

And finally there is the case of the detached, literally speaking decoupled couple: the state of well-being of one is completely irrelevant for the state of well-being of the other.

As argued elsewhere synchronic data based on many units scattered in behavioral spaces of the types indicated above can never substitute for diachronic trajectories. But they may give some cue, at least enough to the formulation of an hypothesis. Thus, if one looks at the countries of the world today and interprets G1 as educational growth (the average schooling attainment in the population) and G2 as educational equality (the inverse of the disparity in schooling in the population) then the countries scatter typically as in the disharmony case. They tend either to be low on growth and relatively high on equality, or high on growth and very low on equality, with some notable exceptions.

That type of data would be useful in analyzing an intra−actor conflict, the conflict confronted by educational decision−makers in any country as to whether they should go in for educational growth or educational equality, or find some way of breaking down this "invariance" so as to go for both of them at the same time.

But data on inter−actor relations can also be cast in the same form. Thus, take the case of imperialism. The actors in imperialism are, of course, not countries but groups within countries. As pointed out repeatedly, imperialism can be analyzed in terms of four such actors: the center in a Center country, the periphery in that same Center country,

the center in a Periphery country dominated by that Center country, and the periphery in that Periphery country; cC, pC, cP and pP respectively.

Diagrammatically they may relate to each other as indicated in Figure 2.13: In the left hand part of the figure the four groups are depicted, the arrow stands for general exploitation, the broken lines for disharmony and the unbroken line for harmony in the relationship.

Figure 2.13. <u>Imperialism, Disharmony and Harmony, I</u>

In the second part of the figure there is an indication of how LL, "level of living", a very broad term, including "material standard of living", but also autonomy and feelings, may vary over time for the four groups. So far after the Second World War there has been much growth in LL with the cC and cP groups going hand in hand, and a growth in the periphery in the central countries, for the poor man in the rich countries so to speak, by and large parallel to the growth of the rich, at a respectful distance. But the most important fact is that the periphery in the Periphery has suffered a standstill, partly by being outside the system, partly by having the surplus created by them expropriated and appropriated by the three other groups.

However, even if up to now the cC, CP ana pC groups have by and large experienced an increase in LL this may not necessarily last. And the point in the imperialistic system is that if it does not last but conditions are deteriorating they will also go down together, and possibly up together again — as indicated in the figure. There will also be oscillation corresponding to this for the pP group, but they will be very small relative to the other oscillations; that is precisely what is meant by being the periphery in the Periphery.

How, then, does this translate into the notion of compatibility regions, and disharmony, harmony and independence? It seems clear that as it is depicted here the first three groups are in a relation of harmony to each other: they go up together and possibly

down together. At the same time, however, there is no doubt that the center in the Center exploits the periphery in the Center. Thus, "harmony" as here conceived of is entirely compatible with exploitation in the sense of dependence − it is only that together they exploit even more those below them again so that in the total global setting their relationship nevertheless shows up as harmonious. We emphasize this in order to make quite clear that "harmony" is seen here as a technical term implying positive correlation between goal realization for actors, it is not seen as a value in itself, like, for instance, equity (meaning "absence of exploitation").

In the figure as it is drawn there is no clear case of disharmony for it is not assumed that the growth of the three top groups or classes is predicated on the decline of the periphery in the Periphery. We could have made this assumption and that would have given us a more drastic model of imperialism. Thus, for instance given the meaning of the relationship of the European Community and the associated states with the negligible "economic growth" in those states as a whole, given the increase in level of living of the elites in those states, it becomes clear that there must by and large have been some deterioration in the conditions of the people.

And correspondingly, if those people manage to come into power there might be some deterioration in the condition of the elites. The Cuban case is relatively clear here: the phenomenal and quick increase in the condition of the Cuban people was indeed accompanied by a deterioration in the condition of the bourgeoisie.

There would also have been a corresponding deterioration in the cC and pC groups in the United States had the United States, the Centrum country, not been so big that the Cuban affair was negligible for its economic importance, even if certainly not for its political and military importance.

However, we did not want to base the concept of imperialism on the worst possible case, for that would make any change from the worst possible to the second worst look like the end of imperialism. The case where the three upper groups show variation to their level of living independent of the lowest group would also be classified as imperialism. And the same would be the case if the lowest group showed improvement in their level of living defined in the broad sense, but insufficient to catch up with the others. One might talk about all these cases as different degrees of harmony, but in line with the use of these terms encountered in some theories of conflict we have placed the cutting point elsewhere in this connection. Moreover, the mutual irrelevance implied when one stands still and the others go up and down is also an important metaphor, because it points directly to one major mechanism of conflict resolution: decoupling. In the case of

disharmony, this would be even more the case.

Thus, the conclusion can be formulated as in Figure 2.14:

Figure 2.14. <u>Imperialism, Disharmony and Harmony, II</u>

Here four of the six possible bilateral relations between the four groups have been depicted in the form indicated in Figure 2.12. In the first case there is the relationship between the two centers: they go up together and down together, but not only in the sense of correlation but in the sense of going up to the same point − assuming that the level of living for the two centers is about the same. This would not be true, however, today if we really included in LL autonomy since the dependent cP group is not its own goal−setter. However, it is certainly not difficult to envisage an imperialism where cP and cC stand in a relation not only of complete equality but also of complete equity, with the same role where goal setting is concerned.

Where the situation inside the Center country is concerned there is harmony in the statistical sense defined above, in the sense of correlation, but not in the sense of agreement. They go up and down together, but they do not go up to the same point: there is conflict because pC does not realize its goal, assuming that it is aiming at the same LL as cC.

The last two cases compare the majority of the population in an imperialistic system, the periphery in the Periphery, with the two groups in the Center. These are cases of statistical independence, but we have also indicated in the figure the case of disharmony, the case of negative correlation.

The conclusion is that goal states may be positively correlated, negatively correlated or uncorrelated, and to the extent that this is due to some kind of interaction coupling this leads to notions of disharmony, harmony and decoupling. Let us then turn to another aspect of the compatibility and in-compatibility regions: not so much their location, as their shape.

Thus, consider these cases:

Figure 2.15. <u>Four Types of Incompatibility</u>

In all cases we have assumed the same goal dimension G but two different actors, A_1 and A_2. Thus, the two axes are comparable and the boundary form tells us something about the relation between A_1 and A_2.

Thus, in the first case this relation — as far as boundary form is concerned — is clearly symmetric (which does not mean that it may not be highly asymmetric in terms of power, to be discussed below). The slope of the boundary is minus 1, which means that if the system moves up and down on the boundary then a unit loss to one is a unit gain to the other. Moreover, in the incompatibility region.

In the next two cases the symmetry has disappeared, in the first case very clearly so because for A_2 the goal is even in the incompatibility region which means that even if A_1 suffers goal deprivation A_2 will not get full gratification. That he may get in the third case, but the asymmetry is still evident in the circumstance that this does not preclude A_1 from considerable goal satisfaction.

Moreover, in this case there is another type of asymmetry in the favor of A_1: a change that means little to A_1 means much to A_2 because the slope of the boundary is not only negative but greater than unity. This is the famous mosquito−elephant situation: it is not that what is a sneeze to the elephant is an earthquake to the mosquito, but rather that what is a little mouthful of air to the elephant is the end of life to the mosquito who happens to be flying right there.

These two asymmetries are then combined in the broken incompatibility boundary shown in the fourth figure, consisting of two lines, one having the same slope as in figure b, the second having the same slope as in figure c. Imagine the relation between center and periphery within and between countries again, as indicated in the sketchy presentation of a theory of imperialism above: the steep downward slope at the end would be A_1 reaching out for final gratification, for ultimate economic growth to improve the level of living even further — somewhat beyond the elephant's mouthful of air, thereby causing a steep decline in the level of living of the periphery, even down to the level where fundamental needs are basically left unsatisfied.

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Thus, there may be asymmetries of different kinds revealed in the shape of the incompatibility boundaries, and this is made particularly clear if the same goal dimensions are used for the two actors. The situation often looks much more symmetric if a modest goal is assumed for the underdog actor and related to the extravagant goal declared by the topdog actor. Moreover, the exercise serves to remind us of the obvious that the boundary does not have to be rectilinear: it can be broken, curved, have any shape. But the more fanciful the shape the stricter the assumptions about measurement, and these are exactly the types of assumptions we do not want to make.

In conclusion, then, some words about the relation between acceptability and incompatibility. They are both functions of the behavior space, and they both define the regions that are critical in a theory of conflict: the acceptability region (ACC) and incompatibility region (INC). Since they are subsets of the same space they can be compared, and that type of comparison yields, traditionally, five different results, as indicated in Figure 2.16:

Figure 2.16. <u>The Relation Between Acceptability and Incompatibility</u>

The first two cases only are the cases of conflict, because every point that is acceptable is at the same time incompatible if we assume that the incompatible set does not include its own boundary; on that boundary solutions can be found. For all the other cases there are acceptable points that are compatible, hence conflict solutions. In the first of these cases (c), all four combinations are found whereas in cases (d) and (e) some combinations are ruled out.

Thus, in (d) what is acceptable is compatible and what is incompatible is unacceptable. There is nothing acceptable that is incompatible, although there may be something incompatible that is unacceptable. And in the last case there is nothing that is incompatible

and also unacceptable.

Of course, the last three cases give us other approaches to a theory of harmony, since they have to do with more harmonious worlds than the ones depicted in the first two.

PURSUIT

2.10   Attitude

We then come to the dimensions that give life to these diagrams. So far one may safely say that what has been done is only to map out the positions and the situation; there is no dynamism in the system of any kind. It is then taken as axiomatic that the only type of dynamism that can be brought into the system rests with the actors, and one of the basic types would rest with their activation. The general formula applied is that of pursuit, pursuit of goals. And this is analyzed in terms of three concepts: attitude, behavior, and power.

To have an attitude is to cathect, to will, to want, which is more than to evaluate. To evaluate is to distribute pluses, zeros and minuses; to cathect is to feel this distribution. The phenomenology of cathexis is fundamental for conflict analysis along this dimension, but we will only touch upon some points in this connection.

First, as already said: attitudes may be negative, neutral, positive. These are bland terms indeed; better terms might be hatred, detachment, love.

But then, again, these terms may be too strong. There is a vast territory between detachment and the other two, and there is also the obvious point that these may be two dimensions rather than one, that there is such a thing as the both-and in the ambivalent love−hatred, that there is pure love and pure hatred (possibly), and that there is also the blandness of neither-nor.

At this point one might go into a discussion of the object of the cathexis, but that will be done under the dimension of behavior. Rather, we shall take up another point: what kind of attitude does one expect in connection with conflict? Since most answer "negative", even "hatred", it might be appropriate to question that assumption.

If one assumes that conflict is a special type of frustration, and in addition assume that frustration somehow is accompanied by aggression and that one component in aggression is an aggressive attitude, then the conclusion above can be correctly derived from definitions and the frustration-aggression hypothesis. And there is no doubt that

there is a frustrating element in conflict, but is it so obvious that it is the only element? Or, could it be that there is a fundamental distinction between conflict and a very special case of the (1,1)−conflict defined as frustration? We think there is, and it is easily seen.

The difference lies in the basic point about conflict: incompatibility between goals. But these are goals that relate to actors, the same actor or others, which means that conflict constitutes a bond within and between actors. But any bond within and between actors is the material out of which what is human in human beings and social in human society is made. Of course, that bond does not have to be in terms of conflict, it could also be cooperative; but a bond it nevertheless remains.

In a very basic sense a person with a dilemma is a richer person than a person without one because the dilemma is one kind of raw material out of which personal growth may come. Correspondingly, two persons with an interpersonal conflict are tied together in a way two persons detached from each other are not. They have at least their conflict in common, and that conflict may also be seen as raw material out of which deeper affection, understanding, or in more neutral terms a deeper relation, may grow. And correspondingly for conflicts in more complex systems; the social conflict, of the intra−societal or intersocietal varieties, are also the contradictions out of which social growth may be the result.

If conflict is viewed this way it should be welcomed rather than abhorred. In other words, the ideal might not be the conflict−free situation, the perfectly harmonious tie, but a situation where there is sufficient conflict to constitute a challenge, yet not irresolvable enough to lead to breakdown, apathy of various types.

Among the theoreticians of conflict Marx, Freud and Gandhi all understood this point, although in different ways. To Marx and Freud intrasocietal and intrapersonal conflict, respectively, were exactly the seeds out of which development would come provided the conflicts were properly understood and the contradictions properly transcended.

To Gandhi an antagonism was always seen as something the antagonists had in common that could unite them rather than divide them. For him the idea that a conflict was a frustration and the antagonist an enemy was a sign of primitivism, "the law of the jungle", as opposed to the idea of seeing the antagonist as a potential partner in the fight against the antagonism. Needless to say, for Gandhi much of the theory and practice of conflict was an effort to convey this message to an antagonist who might have another view of conflict, for instance the jungle view.

In short, we do not assume in any way that conflict attitude has to be negative. Nor,

for that matter, do we assume that there has to be a special conflict attitude. The attitude can remain exactly what it was before there was any conflict, latent and-or manifest, whether that level was already negative, neutral and positive. In fact, it is even doubtful whether there is such a thing as "conflict attitude", as distinct from attitude in general. No doubt, there is such a thing as attitude escalation, which we take to mean a process towards increasingly negative or increasingly positive attitude. But that can only be defined as a process, not as a permanent state of affairs.

The basic distinction in attitude theory would be between attitudes toward Other–easily negative unless overshadowed by a general "love thy enemy" attitude–and attitudes toward the conflict as such. Toward the antagonist vs toward the antagonism, Gandhi would have said. The former may range from love and friendly feeling to hatred and hostile feelings. And the latter may also be positive-neutral-negative; welcoming the challenge vs a neutral, clinical "wait-and-see" vs fear of what may happen. That gives us nine combinations, all of the empirically possible, including hating Other and looking forward to the challenge - and vice versa.

2.11   Behavior

And the same applies to behavior: there is such a thing as behavior escalation, and that is also a process not a state of affairs.

And, it is meaningful to distinguish between negative, neutral and positive behavior; interpreted, vaguely, as meaning destructive, neutral, and constructive behavior. And then the problem arises; towards whom? Towards what?

At this point there is a tradition in conflict theory of talking about nonrealistic or unreal conflict, usually applied to conflict behavior, but sometimes also to conflict attitude.

The idea is that it is nonrealistic or unreal when the object of the (presumably negative) conflict attitude and-or behavior is displaced, it is not where it should be. We have found this category not very meaningful, and even mystifying since the problem remains: what should the object of the attitude and behavior be?

And the problem also remains: should the realistic-real attitude and/or behavior be negative, neutral, or positive? Is it realistic to hate the right actor?

Let us look at the second problem first and restate it in line with what was said above: what are the adequate processes where attitude and behavior are concerned, are they in the negative, neutral or the positive direction?

We do assume that there is such a thing as conflict-induced attitudes and behavioral processes, and to try to stabilize our own terminology in this connection let us suggest the usage of 8 very well known terms indicated in Figure 2.17 (see next page).

As can be seen from the figure the distinction is made between negative and positive escalation.

Thus, it is not assumed that escalation is increased hatred or violence or both; that belongs to a biased conflict perspective that assumes a priori the conflict−−>frustration−−>aggression causal chain. If one wants to focus on negative escalation alone, then direct aggression (or direct violence) might be the adequate term. And the same applies for de−escalation: one can de−escalate from love-construction as well as from hatred-destruction.

Figure 2.17. <u>Conflict Induced Attitudinal and Behavioral Processes</u>

If one wants to focus on negative de−escalation only, then there seems to be no immediate term available, for which reason we have preferred to coin a new one: <u>de−aggression</u>. Concretely, this is what happens when hatred and destruction are somehow built down, for instance through gradual stepping down of a war, and eventual withdrawal.

If there is a need for special terms for negative escalation and de−escalation, then there should be even more of a need for the corresponding positive terms, and this is where association and dissociation enter the picture. In peace theory they may be known as the positive versus the negative approaches to peace respectively, since "peace" would be incompatible with the negative end of the spectrum. Here they are all seen as conflict processes.

Finally, there are the conventional twin concepts of (bi)polarization/de−polarization (block formation and its dissolution), running the entire spectrum from negative through neutral to positive and vice versa. Thus, they differ from escalation/de−escalation (of love and hatred, violence and cooperation) that reflect processes in either direction around a neutral, bland, zero point.

Naming different processes of conflict manifestation is in itself certainly not sufficient to develop an answer to what is the "adequate" conflict response. On the other hand the answer is rather obvious: there is no general answer. It depends, and more particularly, it depends on where the conflict is located on all the other dimensions.

Here we shall only point once more to the major distinction between actor conflict and structure conflict, and more particularly to the distinction between conflicts of values and conflicts of interest. There is no doubt that confrontation is one element that may contribute to conflict transformation, to transforming interests into values via consciousness formation, and transforming parties into actors via organization.

But this does not mean that the confrontation necessarily has to be negative, even if very often it is. Nor is it obvious who the enemy is in a structural conflict. It may be the topdog who will cling to his vested interest. But it may also be that the confrontation will awaken him, stirring his sluggish conscience as Gandhi said so that topdog and underdog blend together in a Gandhian type process, jointly fighting the "antagonism", the exploitative, penetrating, segmenting, fragmenting, and marginalizing structure. A tall bill to meet.

Much consciousness and organization are needed to live up to this challenge. And conflicts hang together. Adequate or inadequate attitude and behavior acquired in one may spread to the other. The sum total conflict situation is of interest, not only one at the time.

In other words, if "adequate" is defined in terms of "instrumental for conflict resolution", and conflict resolution is seen as a particular form of conflict negation highly different from conflict repression, then there can be no general answer as to what type of process, or what mixture of types of processes is "adequate". This holds for conflicts of interests, and also for conflicts of values: we simply have to have more information.

But, when a conflict is more properly understood then the distinctions just made will be useful in analyzing conflict attitudes and behavior.

Conflict being ubiquitous and pervasive and persistent it probably makes little sense to single out some conflict attitudes and behavior as non−realistic, unreal, and others as not.

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For the director of an enterprise it may be comforting to tell himself and his colleagues that the aggressive workers are only displacing their hostility which actually derives from the perceived inadequacy of the morning coffee at home, only that they had to leave too early to direct the hostility against the real enemy, the wife.

And, correspondingly for the wife: it may be comforting to say that "he takes it out on poor little me, he does not dare anything else". Such deceptions detract considerably from the rancor in an angry look, word or gesture.

Without denying that some conflict manifestations may be analyzed this way., three basic warnings should be given in connection with precisely this type of analysis.

First, as already said: this may be a dangerous way of mystifying a conflict transformation process, from one of interests to one of values. If what is actually the first manifestation of a gradually crystallizing conflict formation is not seen as such, but as a reflection from another and less relevant conflict, this is simply missing the writing on the wall. That may be in the interest of the underdog if those manipulatory devices mobilized from the top are seen as efforts to prevent the bottom from being sufficiently organized.

Proper reading of such signs may also be the way in which top and bottom together could arrive at basic changes in the structure. Thus, there is no clear conclusion as to what is advantageous for whom. But there is a clear problem of conflict mystification inherent in the very idea of "unreal", "nonrealistic" conflict.

Second, and in line with this, in the whole notion of "nonrealistic" conflict there is a class element that should not pass unnoticed. The conflict situation of the underdog is always by definition highly different from that of the topdog. He has usually a more limited range of parties with whom he interacts, and due to false consciousness also a more limited awareness of the total situation. When the agony becomes too great and the underdog lashes out against somebody, including himself, certificate of "unreal" conflict manifestation can easily be issued, particularly from topdog quarters; and there may be some superficial truth to it. But what should he do? He is not sitting in the elegant, soft, carpeted rooms of the topdog having a cool analysis of the situation with expert advice as to who is the enemy and who is not. And the point then becomes that it is often so much in the interest of topdog analysis to issue those certificates at an early stage in the game, exactly to prevent conflict transformation from taking place.

Third, in saying that some negative conflict attitude and behavior is unreal there is at the same time an implicit recognition that in other cases the same type of behavior might be "real", "realistic". But why should that be so? Why should one necessarily

assume any negative conflict attitude-behavior to be realistic, taking into account the points made above about the possibility of positive attitude-behavior, not to mention the Gandhian point of conflict as a unifier. In short, this seems to be little but a social cultural stereotype, arising out of one conflict culture, and should not carry the stamp of universal approval. One might argue that a much better distinction if these terms are to be used would be to say that attitudes-behavior directed against an antagonist is unreal, nonrealistic; and that the only real, realistic attitude-behavior is directed against the antagonism. No reconciliation with the evil structure, conciliatory attitude-behavior toward the "evil actor − for he is also only a product of that structure!

And, finally: there is also often a hidden assumption of reductionism, the idea that some conflicts are more real than others, that others should be seen as projections from them. Analysis mind should not be set at rest before any type of conflict manifestation is traced back to the primordial, fundamental conflict, the basic raw material out of which all conflict manifestations are ultimately made.

There have been two major candidates produced by Western civilization recently to serve this role as conflict demiurgus: the Freudian assumption of intrapersonal conflicts of a special kind as basic, and the Marxian assumptions about intrasocial conflicts of a special kind as equally basic. Interestingly, both trends of thinking arose in a period when reductionism played a considerable role in natural science, and natural science served as model science.

2.12   Resource

Clearly, to have a theory of conflict without a theory of power is meaningless, although it is sometimes done under the assumption that conflicts are actor conflicts, and that actors are equal. Here the assumption is that actors are generally not equal, that the balance of power is in favor of one or the other which is another way of saying that conflicts are usually not symmetric but asymmetric.

As pointed out above (under (2), structure of actors) asymmetric conflicts should not be confused with vertical conflicts, nor should symmetric conflict with horizontal conflict. Vertical-horizontal is defined relative to the structural situation of the actors, whereas asymmetric- symmetric is a more general concept referring to all kinds of power, including structural power. When we use the terms "topdogs" and "underdogs" it is relative to this broader concept, and that leads immediately to the distinction between

three types of conflicts:

> symmetric: topdog−topdog conflict, underdog−underdog conflict
>
> asymmetric: topdog−underdog conflict.

Thus, a special type of the latter would be vertical conflict. One thing is distribution of power; quite another and more difficult problem is the nature of power. To this there are many answers, and we shall follow three lines of thinking in this connection.

First, there is the fundamental distinction between structural, power and resource power, growing directly out of the distinction between structure-oriented and actor-oriented perspectives on society. This basic distinction in the theory of power falls like a ripe fruit in our basket: structural power as something built into a position in the social structure, resource power as something an actor has or is. To balance structural power the structure has to be more equitable; to balance resource power the resource distribution has to be more equal.

Second, both types of power are relational. A gun possessed by a person in and by itself does not constitute power; there has to be somebody who is afraid of it for power to emerge. But the power relation is different in the two cases. The actor on top of some kind of vertical division of labor has power by virtue of the position he occupies, built into the structure itself. In addition to this he may or may not have resource power, for instance a gun to distribute "bads", or a coffer to distribute "goods"; threats and bribes; sticks and carrots, respectively. The classical capitalist in position of means of production can give the means of livelihood, the difference between life and death, in return for the wage-earners labor, but this is built into the structure and should be differentiated from the goods and bads he may decide to distribute on top of that. Thus, structural power is institutionalized, resource power depends for its use on ad hoc divisions.

And this leads immediately to the doubleness of social structure in this connection: it is both the source and nature of (structural) conflict, and the source and nature of (structural) power applied in that conflict. Those who have vested interest in a structure in which they benefit from any combination of exploitation, penetration, segmentation, fragmentation and marginalization are also at the same time those who have most structural power by virtue of their position with which to retain their privileges, and negate any effort by those with vested disinterest to change the structure. Or to kick them out, which may or may not be the same thing.

But if the nature of structural power serves to maintain the nature of structural conflict how is it ever possible to get out of it when those at the top also have more resources at their disposal? They cannot afford resource power and have no structural power?

Third, those at the bottom have latent resources, and the stability of the situation is predicated on the assumption that they are not aware of this, or unable to mobilize them. It is in the mobilization of latent resources at the bottom that the key to the solution of structural conflict is located, and that mobilization is, of course, a basic aspect of any theory of revolution. The key concept here would be countervailing power, and of that power there are two kinds: power balance, and power negation.

Balance of power would rest on the assumption of having the same kind of power as the other side and about equally much. If we use the conventional distinction between ideological, remunerative and punitive power, depending on whether it is based on internal or external sanctions, and in the latter case on gratification or deprivation, goodies and badies respectively, then the approach to balance of power is obvious. It simply means to develop the same kind of thing: a counter−ideology, producing goods that can be thrown into the conflict bargaining to tip the balance in the other direction, or producing bads that can be used to inflict sufficient damage.

The trouble with this kind of theory of countervailing resource power is that it does not indicate any escape, any way out for those at the bottom of a vertical structure, just as little as the theory of structural power does. Of course there is the case of the guerrilla freedom fighters in a people's war who liberate districts and make use of the resources acquired to produce the means of remunerative and punitive power, in addition to the ideological power they have already. But that does not explain how they were able to get that far; hence, there must be an additional element in the theory of power that can not only help explain underdog liberation, but also in very concrete ways help the underdog.

Fourth, rather than countervailing power there is power negation. It is based on a more profound analysis of the nature of power entirely in line with the combination of structure- and actor-oriented perspectives advocated in this book. The basic point is to understand that resource power only bites provided the bottom is sufficiently penetrated. More particularly, this means a sufficiently high level of identification with the topdog to be susceptible to his ideological power; sufficiently high dependency on the topdog to be steered by his carrots, his goods; and sufficient fear of the topdog to be directed by his sticks, his bads.

Power negation consists in negating these three assumptions, developing the type of self−respect that makes him see his own situation and define his own values in line with his interests; in developing the type of self−reliance that makes him independent of the various goods and rewards offered by the topdog, and in developing the type of fearlessness that no longer makes him afraid of topdog destructive power. It can be

likened to an inoculation against power, to fighting enemy bacteriological warfare through inoculation and the immune system rather than through counter−bacteriological warfare.

The three properties mentioned (self−respect, self−reliance and fearlessness) are the material out of which real autonomy is made, and do not carry a monetary price tag. By that is certainly not meant that they are easily developed, nor that such mental characteristics are developed through some type of isolated, idealistic process of consciousness formation alone.

On the contrary, they are probably best developed through confrontation with power used for repressive purposes, but that problem belongs to the theory of conflict dynamics, not to an effort to outline the major components in such a theory.

In general it is felt that the theory of power negation is the missing link explaining how vertical conflicts can nevertheless be solved. A theory that only emphasizes resource power will usually be a theory for the strong, like all the strategic theories of the 1950s (deterrence, first strike and second strike, credibility and what not) was only a power theory that could be used to understand superpower relations.

In that sense this is a theory of the poor man's power. And, it may also in a certain sense be said to be a theory of Asian power as opposed to Western power because the Western perspective on power became focused on the power of things rather than of the mind, on power as vested in hardware rather than in the human "software".

Why, then, is power analysis an indispensable ingredient in any conflict analysis?

First, because the difference in structural power is what conflicts of interest are about, making power enter both sides of the conflict equation, so to speak. Evidently more power has to accrue to the bottom of the structure to make the conflict more symmetric, and power negation is more available than countervailing power matching the topdog point for point.

Second, because the notion of incompatibility is itself linked to the notion of resource, meaning that he who has more resources is also he who can better move the incompatibility border and further, because the more resource power you have, the more elements you can throw into the conflict process, to your own advantage.

Third, because power negation based on self-respect, self-reliance and fearlessness make people autonomous grown-ups, less leaning on others and filled with fear. In other words, power negation is not a road to peace but peace itself, to quote Gandhi.

THE ABC TRIANGLE

Conflict has been defined in terms of incompatibilities, of contradictions, and that should not be confused with the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of conflict, often destructive (hatred and violence against objects and people).

They all come together in an A-B-C triangle, as illustrated in the figure, often in an ever escalating spiral:

Figure 2.18. The conflict triangle

The triangle serves the double purpose of keeping the three apart, and of relating them with the arrows of two-way causation.

The original conflict, through the mechanisms of behavioral escalation, leads to new incompatibilities, a string of derived conflict generated by acts of physical and verbal violence ("I want to hurt you" vs "I want to stay unmolested"). Since they are derived their solution in isolation will not solve the basic conflict, but may serve the purpose of de-escalation, and hence prepare the ground for solving the basic conflict. Another aspect is the use of derived conflicts for bargaining according to the general principle that the more issues two parties have in common, the more possibilities would there be for trading off one issues against the other. But that also constitutes an incentive to engage in destructive behavior.

In this entire conflict dynamic attitudinal processes also take place, with their well known tendency to develop in a parallel fashion. There are important symmetries in the perception, they are to some extent mirror images of each other, through imitation and projection. The task: de-escalation of all three, A, B and C.

Chapter 3

NEGATIONS OF CONFLICT

We cannot proceed further in any discussion of conflict before that concept has been further clarified, and one way of clarifying it is to explore its negation. What would one fill into the open space in the expression "The opposite of conflict is ..."? This projective conceptual test would definitely be answered differently by different students of conflict, and each answer–including the non-answer of rejecting this method–would give a special connotation to "conflict" as such.

Through the exploration of the negation of a concept some steering is given to the meaning of the concept itself. Thus, it makes a lot of difference whether one sees the negation of "vertical division of labor" as being "horizontal division of labor" or as being "mutual isolation". The former is a negation of "vertical", the latter a negation of "division of labor". The political perspectives thrown on, say, trade would differ entirely, and through that the light shed on the very idea of "vertical division of labor". In the first case attention would be geared towards better terms of trade, for instance through better sharing of positive and negative spin−off effects; in the latter case it would be geared towards self-reliance, self−sufficiency, autonomy etc.

We have chosen to base the theory of conflict on the notion of "incompatibility of goals"; "goals" being interpreted to include values as well as interests. However, conflict is not seen as an abstract notion, but as something highly concrete that can be tested empirically. If somebody claims that there is a conflict somewhere then he should be willing to stipulate the conditions under which specified actors may be observed in the pursuit or defense of specified goals.

In the case of a conflict of values this should be relatively easy: direct methods of observation would in general be available. In the case of conflict of interests it is more

difficult since the social conditions under which the conflict would be manifest might only be realized under exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, we shall assume that in such cases empirical evidence can be presented so that the inference about the existence of a conflict would be tenable beyond reasonable doubt.

As see conflict as the condition under which there are actors in pursuit, and-or defense, of incompatible goals the negation of conflict would be all other conditions. But this is not what we mean by negating a conflict, or conflict negation: by that we would mean a process starting with a conflict and ending with a non−conflict. The problem is how to conceive of this process, and for that purpose the definition of conflict just given may serve as a point of departure. The definition includes four terms: actors, goals, incompatibility and pursuits/defense. Together they, and they alone, define the conflict system. For a conflict to be negated one or more of the four components will have to be modified. If they are all maintained, then the conflict continues unabated, not negated.

What kind of modifications, then, can we conceive of - based on these four components of the conflict system? Theoretically we could try to modify one at a time, and since there are four components, that would give us $2^4 = 16$ possibilities, one of which would leave the system as it is. However, although this reasoning is flawless from a combinatorial point of view, it does not yield much insight, one reason being that "modified" is a somewhat crude category, another reason being that it produces modifications that do not make much sense.

Thus, it would not make much sense to modify both the "incompatibility" and the "pursuit" components. To modify the latter can only mean one thing: that one or both parties for some reason or another no longer pursues or defends the goals. But in that case what happens to the incompatibility is of less interest. Correspondingly, modification of the incompatibility would not make sense unless the pursuits/defenses are somehow maintained.

This simple reasoning gives rise to the fundamental distinction in conflict negation theory between incompatibility modification and pursuit-defense modification. We shall refer to the former as conflict resolution, and to the latter as conflict repression. In both cases "conflict" in the sense defined above has been negated. But in the first case this negation is strong, touching the real core of the conflict, the incompatibility itself. In the second case the negation is weak, touching, modifying the pursuit of incompatible goals, but leaving the fundamental incompatibility untouched.

If the incompatibility is likened to a red light then it has been extinguished and-or green light has come up in the first case. In the second case it is only receding into the

background, because it is overshadowed by so many other lights, shades, destroyed, or what not.

We are aiming at conflict resolution, but it is strongly felt that a theory of conflict negation would be incomplete if it only included that. There is an obvious parallel to psychotherapy–and there should be since psychotherapy is dealing with intra−personal conflicts–the fundamental distinction between solving a personal conflict by confronting it and working it out, and repressing it. This is reflected by this broader concept of conflict negation. However, putting them together under one heading should not make us oblivious to the fundamental distinction between resolution and repression.

In the first case the conflict negation is somehow accepted, the "extinguished light" symbolizing an internalization of the solution in the intra-actor case, or an institutionalization of the solution in the inter-actor case. Or both.

In the second case of conflict repression there is no such acceptance. At most the conflict is no longer at the top of the agenda. Somewhere there is still a red light.

Let us then proceed to the other two components, the actor system and the goal system. Both of them can be modified. Thus, both of them can be expanded, adding more actors and-or more goals. And both of them can be contracted, eliminating actors and-or goals, but this can to some extent be seen as the same process.

And then there is the possibility of changing the actors by changing the relation between them, and of changing the goals by modifying them, particularly by the type of modifications often referred to as "moderation". In principle this gives us more possibilities for either system–including maintaining them as they are–altogether 16 combinations. But once again, we do not have to delve into all that; some simple factors come to our rescue and simplify the analysis.

Thus, it is not necessary to consider joint modifications of the two systems. Such combinations are logically meaningful and may even be empirically frequent, but they fall as ripened fruits into our basket of conflict negations once we shake the tree carrying the more fundamental possibilities.

In short, they will just be seen as combinations of more elementary possibilities. If in addition we do not have to consider both contraction of actor system and goal system (but only the former), we end up with 6 possibilities, not 16.

The result of all this is shown in the following table, yielding a typology of 12 types of conflict negations.

These 12 types of conflict negation arrived at by multiplying the basic dichotomy (incompatibility modified vs pursuit/defense modified) by the six possible things that can

happen to the actor and goal systems combined, have now been given names. Such names may not necessarily carry the same connotations as are warranted by their position in the typology: sometimes they may be too broad, sometimes too narrow. But we have chosen these particular terms because they seem by and large to steer the thoughts in the direction wanted.

In order to comment on them, explore them, make them more "meaty" these 12 types can conveniently be dealt with in pairs, as the terms also indicate. The types in each pair are also each other's negation, in the sense of being contrary rather than contradictory to each other, but this will be dealt with at some length below.

Table 3.1. <u>A Typology of Conflict Negation</u>

CONFLICT SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Actor system	Goal System	**Incompatibility modified,** pursuit/defense maintained	**Pursuit/defense modified,** Incompatibility maintained
Maintain	Maintain	(1) TRANSCENDENCE	(7) INTRA−ACTION
Maintain	Change	(2) COMPROMISE	(8) INTER−ACTION
Maintain	Expand	(3) DEEPENING	(9) CONFLICT−ADDITION
Expand	Maintain	(4) BROADENING	(10) ACTOR−ADDITION
Change	Maintain	(5) FISSION, DECOUPLING DISINTEGRATION	(11) INCAPACITATION DIRECT VIOLENCE
Contract	Contract	(6) FUSION, RECOUPLING INTEGRATION	(12) PENETRATION STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
		Conflict Resolution	**Conflict Repression**

3.1 Transcendence and 3.2 Compromise

When most people, including many social scientists, talk about conflict resolution these are probably the two things foremost on their mind. The goals define what is acceptable to the actors, the compatibility function what is attainable. Off-hand there would be two simple ways of handling this type of problem, referred to as a conflict: either by making what is acceptable compatible (i.e. attainable), or by making what is attainable (i.e. compatible) acceptable. In the first case actors and goals are maintained exactly as they are, but there has been a breakthrough, the incompatibility barrier has been lifted, the system has been transcended. What was impossible has become possible, not only the region of acceptability, but sometimes even the point of bliss has become attainable.

In the latter case the actors remain as they were, but the goals change, they are modified in the sense of being moderated. In this case the original compatibility barrier is entirely respected, it is only that the acceptability region has been expanded in such a way as to touch the barrier. The point where the acceptability region touches the barrier is referred to as the point of compromise.

Diagrammatically the two conflict negations can be illustrated as shown in Figure:

Figure 3.1. Transcendence and Compromise

Transcendence:
The acceptable
made compatible

Compromise:
The compatible
made accepable

It should be noted that in the case of transcendence and only in that case is the contradiction underlying the conflict transcended in the sense defined above: a new empirical reality has been created. Of course, this new reality may only be new to the actors themselves. What is empirical and what is potential is relative to the point of reference, and the point of reference here is the conflict system.

In all the other types, including compromise, the fundamental underlying contradiction somehow remains. This, incidentally, is also one reason why this book is called Theories of Conflict and not Theories of Contradictions − it is felt that the notion of "contradiction" is not only too broad, but also too narrow to serve the purpose of a rich social theory.

3.3 Deepening and 3.4 Broadening

As seen from the implicit definition given in Table these are each other's contraries in the sense that in the first case the actor−system remains constant but the goal system is expanded, whereas in the second case the goal system is maintained where the original actors are concerned, but the actor−system is expanded, and with that expansion some new goals are brought in. Let us now give meaning to the words.

Through deepening the general scope of interaction between the actors is "deepened", made more "diffuse", given a broader "scope". There are more points on the interaction agenda; the agenda has been widened. However, this is not in itself sufficient to bring about any kind of conflict negation. What is needed is the kind of deepening that brings with it more conflict, so that one conflict can be traded off against the other or more particularly: the original conflict can be traded off against some new conflict. This is not the same as compromise although the distinction is not a very clear one. Compromise can be used when there is only one conflict "object", so to speak, and the actors will agree on a solution somewhere between the two extremes "everything to me, nothing to you" and "vice versa". Trading can only be used when there are at least two conflict "objects", and one extreme position is exchanged for the other. Thus, as will be developed later, compromise can only be used when the goal dimension in question is divisible, for instance defined in terms of money or time; two fundamentals under capitalism,(the divisibility being a good reason why the system is so successful) so that in between positions can be found; whereas trading will have to be resorted to when the value dimension is indivisible: it is everything or nothing.

An example of such an indivisible goal is the horse, at least as a material object. Access to the horse, for instance in terms of time, or profit rights, is certainly divisible. If ownership of a horse is defined in all or nothing terms conflicts over a horse cannot be solved by means of compromise, but they can be solved by means of trading, provided there is another conflict between the same actors, for instance over cattle. The reason for this example is clear enough: hence the term "horse−trading".

There is also another reason why the distinction is not too clear. Thus, the actors may be locked into what they regard as "one conflict". They are unable to transcend it, and unable to find a compromise. However, by suitably subdividing the conflict into any number of sub−conflicts and trading one off against the other the conflict may be dissolved. We would see this as a way of expanding the goal system for the sum of all these sub−goals is never quite the same as the original goals. Needless to say, this is a

very important and powerful technique of conflict resolution, often engaged in by third parties/mediators.

Let us then turn to broadening, giving to the system a larger "domain". Again, this is not just a question of adding more actors. The new actors have to bring with them more conflicts, and more particularly conflicts with the old actors. Again, the idea is that of trading one conflict against another. But the trading no longer takes place between the two original actors. It takes place in a conflict market which at least would have to be trilateral, for which reason this way of negating a conflict can appropriately be referred to as multilateralization. And just as for the case of deepening, the expansion of the actor system may come about by splitting actors into sub−actors, organizing some kind of conflict market among them.

And just as for the case of deepening the logic is very simple: what an actor loses in one conflict he gains in another. In the case of broadening a cyclical arrangement is needed for this to work

$$A \quad \succ\!\!\!-\!\!\!-\!\!\!- \quad B$$

This means that B yields to A, has a deficit relative to A.

Figure 3.2. Deepening and Broadening

Deepening:
Adding compensating conflicts

Broadening
Adding compensating actors

Broadening or multilateralization is very well known in the theory of international trade as "multilateral clearing". When B has a trade deficit relative to A, C relative to B and A relative to C they may cancel them provided some type of multilateral market (e.g. through convertible currencies) is set up.

A basic similarity between deepening and broadening can now easily be seen: there is an implicit assumption that A, B and C are more or less at the same level, more or less

equal on various power dimensions. If, for instance, A were far above the others then A would be likely to have a trade surplus relative to both B and C Which in turn, with the current international structure, would be most likely to have neither deficit nor surplus but simply a void between them. In that cyclical canceling would evidently not work; for that to work there must be limits to inequality.

And the same applies to the case of deepening: if A is much more powerful than B he might prefer not to yield in any conflict but simply impose solutions. In saying so, we have evidently introduced a notion of power that so far has been kept outside this theory, which meaning anticipating something to be developed later on.

This is important for it indicates how a theory of conflict resolution based on the four types so far developed has built into it assumptions of equality not necessarily satisfied in the real world. Thus, for compromise to be arrived at (meaning any point on the compatibility perimeter short of the extreme points) it is assumed that neither party wants to, or is capable of, imposing his will completely on the other party. And this, in turn, means that so far we have only given the elements of a theory of relatively egalitarian conflict negation, including an element of optimism: transcendence.

3.5 Fission and 3.6 Fusion

At this point something more dramatic starts happening to the conflict system, something profoundly affecting the original actors and very different from just adding some new actors. It is assumed that one factor behind the incompatibility lies in the circumstance that the original actors have somehow been tied to each other. Of course, they are different actors, but they also come in each other's way - otherwise there would be no conflict. Under the formula of "fission" this problem is resolved by the two actors cutting loose from each other, by decoupling, disintegration. The intention, and often also the consequence, would be to obtain autonomy not only in goal−setting, but also in the pursuit of goals, opening for the possibility of pursuing goals unimpeded by what the other party does. For the general purpose here it does not matter whether the underdog or the top-dog actor breaks loose. But by using these two terms it is generally assumed that this is the type of conflict negation likely to obtain under conditions of inequality, for instance because the four types mentioned above have been tried and found wanting. A formula for fission, decoupling, in marriage known as divorce.

Correspondingly, under the formula of "fusion" the actors fuse into one so that it is

no longer meaningful to distinguish between them. From the vantage point of conflict theory this does not mean any kind of mystical body amalgamation or supranational integration in the institutional sense, but simply that if there is still a conflict it would now be an intra−actor conflict.

If we now assume that <u>one</u> actor is more capable of coordinating goal-setting so that incompatibilities are foreseen and removed by appropriate goal-setting than two or more actors, then fusion of an actor system into one actor should tend to negate conflicts.

But for this to happen the components of the new single actor would have to be genuine in their new goal setting. For instance, one actor might give up his original goal and see as a goal that situation which obtains when the other actor has realized <u>his</u> original goal. The term "conversion" would be appropriate here, since the underlying assumption would evidently be that a change in goal setting has taken place somewhere. The total goal system has become less extravagant for which reason one could talk about a contraction. It should be distinguished from a compromise where the actors settle for less than what they actually want. The difference between the two approaches, and the difference between them and the preceding approaches, can be illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3. <u>Fission and Fusion</u>

Fission:
Total decoupling,
separate pursuit of goals

Fusion:
Total coupling,
joint pursuit of goals

The basic difference is that we no longer have a conflict diagram: the decoupling/coupling is assumed to be so complete that the two actors no longer come in each others way, in the case of fission because they are operating on different planes, so to speak, in the case of fusion because they are walking together on the same road.

That concludes our survey of types of conflict resolution. Let us then turn to the types of conflict repression, which also come in pairs, and in this parallel fashion induced by the construction of the typology.

3.7 Intra-Action and 3.8 Inter-Action

In a sense the logic these two types have in common, and also shared with the next pair of types, is to keep the actors busy with something else so that the conflict recedes into the background. The incompatibilities are maintained, nothing happens to them, but there is no longer active pursuit or defense of the goals. The actors are the same in the two cases, and in the first case even the goals remain the same. So, what would then be the meaning of "intra−action"? What is happening?

The meaning would simply be that the actor turns in work, and starts seeing himself as a closed system. If he does not realize the goal he pursues he will then no longer see this as due to a conflict, as due to somebody else's goal pursuit standing in his way, but as due to some objective bloc in the way of his own goal realization. In other words, he will stop conceiving of the situation in which he finds himself as a conflict system and will start seeing it as a frustration system indeed. Since the barrier is seen as objective the adequate mode of behavior is action –here called intra−action–, not interaction with another actor, another subject. In this situation of frustration he may do one out of two: engage in aggressive action (the frustration−aggression hypothesis), or engage in something completely different. The aggressive action may be directed toward others or towards self, in either case it would be some kind of displaced reaction. The aggression directed against others may also be directed against the actor with whom he actually is locked into a conflict, but in that case this is not seen as instrumental to the pursuit of a goal, but as "irrational behavior" due to a "propensity for hostility" either caused by the frustration, or possibly seen as innate.

And if he engages in something completely new, some other goal pursuit for instance, this is a clear case of diversion from the original goal which is still maintained − but receding into the background.

The second type of interaction, may also bs seen as a case of diversion. The general idea would be to try to engage in other activities than those that are related to the incompatible goals, thus spinning the incompatibility into a cocoon of compatibility, partly to make it disappear, partly to create the type of framework within which solutions might later appear. In game theoretical terms this is often referred to as "engaging in some increasing sum" activity, not only in constant sum (often misleadingly referred to as zero sum) or decreasing sum activity. Competitive sports, individual or collective, as substitute for class struggle?

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3.9 Conflict-Addition and 3.10 Actor-Addition

In a sense these two have already been explained: they have the same structure as deepening and broadening, except for the conflict-solving conditions introduced into the definition of those types.

Thus, conflict addition would mean exactly that more conflicts are added, but not in such a way that one compensates for the other through trading but so that the original conflict recedes into the background because it is overshadowed by the next one. Thus, if I steal your car today chances are that you will forget about it if I burn down your house tomorrow. One conflict diverts the attention away from the other, and correspondingly for actor addition: interaction with third and fourth actors would divert attention away from the original actor system. Israel vs Palestine?

3.11 Penetration and 3.12 Incapacitation

These are not each other's opposites. In fact, penetration can be seen as a special case of incapacitation, for what it means is that one actor dominates the goal setting of another actor so much that the dominated actor becomes a replication or reproduction of the dominating actor. Penetration works on the consciousness of the actor and produces false goals by producing false consciousness, for which reason pursuit or defense are modified, but real incompatibility is maintained. Obviously, this is precisely one of the basic elements in the situation defined as a "conflict of interest" so what this type amounts to is nothing less than the repression of conflict by turning it into a conflict of interest. For that reason the opposite of penetration is disintegration, the decoupling as described above, and this can only take place through consciousness formation and mobilization sufficient to break loose and establish autonomy.

Incapacitation carries this further. Under penetration there are still two actors, but one of them has the consciousness formed by the other. Under incapacitation one actor has been removed, made incapable of pursuing goals even if still having them. To prevent an actor from realizing goals is to prevent an actor from self-realization, which is tantamount to violence. And of violence there are two types: structural and direct. Consequently we may distinguish between two types of incapacitation: social incapacitation and physical incapacitation. Under the former the actor is made incapable of goal pursuit by being exploited so that he is impoverished below the level needed in order to stand up and defend and pursue what is rightfully his. Or, he may be so fragmented, so split that

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he is not able to organize, or made so marginal that he is outside the general field of multilateral participation.

And then, adding to this, there are indeed the standard techniques of physical incapacitation, banishing the actor, excluding the actor and, eventually, maiming or killing him which would be the final solution, the Endlösung. There is also the possibility that both actors engage in this type of conflict repression simultaneously, by committing joint suicide, thus effectively repressing the conflict forever. Violence, in order to serve conflict repression, does not have to be other-directed - it can also be self-directed.

And that concludes our survey of types of conflict repression. Let us now try to look at the total picture emerging from Table 3.11.

First, it should be noted that there is no assumption that all these types are at the disposal of any conflict system. Each conflict system has its own peculiarities when studied in sufficiently concrete detail. Due to factors and circumstances some types may be excluded in a particular conflict or class of conflicts, and it is important to know which ones. For a theory of conflict negation, as opposed to a typology of conflict negation, such factors have to be explored.

Second, although there is a certain claim to the logical exhaustiveness of the scheme there are many other things that may happen in connection with conflicts than their negation. What is claimed is only that when the conflict is negated then the way in which that happened can be located in this typology, which means that the types can be identified empirically, singly or combined.

There is certainly no assumption that these types are mutually exclusive. Social reality is so complicated that not even disintegration and integration are mutually exclusive: actors may disintegrate along one dimension, integrate among another like couples do, married or not. "Our relation is over, but we are still good friends" is a very frequent expression of that idea.

Let us now try out this theory of conflict negation on an example, to see first of all whether the theory makes us discover types that we would not otherwise so easily have seen, and secondly to test whether the types stand up when confronted with empirical examples and do not merely collapse as logical constructs, theoretical artifacts with no empirical counterparts. Our test case is an interpersonal conflict, complex enough to serve as a pons asinorum into the whole subject of conflict theory.

The actor system is a couple, husband (H) and wife (W); a very normal, bourgeois couple with a four-week's vacation coming up next summer. They spend much of the winter debating the where-to-go issue, and this is where the conflict arises. The husband

is a passionate mountaineer and needs steep mountains not too easily scaled; the wife wants to live by the sea, beaching, possibly also bitching, just a little bit. They have both good reasons, splendid arguments why the style of vacation they favored would be good not only for themselves, but also for the other party. At the same time they both feel that in order to really consume the two natural habitats they go in for four weeks are needed, no less, no more.

In short, the conflict is there: the point of bliss with the husband having four weeks in the mountains and the wife four weeks by the sea is clearly located in the incompatibility region. Or, is it?

In the experience of the present author it is almost surprising how few conflict negations most people are able to come up with when confronted with this particular problem, or most other conflicts for that matter. Moreover, it is certainly not the experience that academically trained people, for instance social scientists, are any better than people equipped with nothing but ordinary human imagination and experience in seeing ways out.

Presumably this would also apply to the real husband and the real wife in the story: they might be blinded, not only by the mind-contracting impact of the conflict, but also by the generally speaking low emphasis in our cultures on what for want of a better word we might call conflict imagination.

Let us then peruse the types in Table and see what we get.

Transcendence is simple enough: a vacation spot should be found where a steep, attractive mountain rises just above a beautiful beach, with a hotel or a cabin just in between.

The interesting point about this type of resolution is that it may be obvious to people living in some parts of the world, like the part of Egypt bordering on the Red Sea, or Taormina in eastern Sicily; considerably less obvious to people living in some other places, like the western part of Denmark. For the latter beach with adjacent mountains simply do not belong to empirical reality. They would certainly be able to conceive of it as a potential reality, but contradictions are not transcended in potential reality, only by making the potential empirical.

The nearest mountain that could tempt the husband might be in the Alps, and that would not solve the conflict given the absence of true beaches.

In other words, it should again be emphasized how much the distinction between empirical and potential reality is person and situation contingent, and not an absolute. It also brings out the obvious point that a third party equipped with the empirical

experience of, say, the particularly fortunate Taormina combination from the point of view of this couple, would also be equipped to give them a piece of advice that would open for a type of resolution they would not themselves have found. Empirical experience may help.

Compromise is something they would usually have come across as a possibility in their deliberations, which may make one wonder what it is in our culture that makes compromise stand out to many people as the method of conflict resolution. In the Figure we have indicated a compromise point in favor of the husband's inclinations, assuming that he imposes his will more readily. There is also an indication of how the compromise moves the compatibility border because of the time lost in moving from one habitat to the other. Of course, a compromise does not have to be according to a 50,50 formula, but according to any formula p,q such that p+q = 100 and both p and q are neither 0, nor 100.

Deepening would be a method also frequently resorted to. The wife might dig up from her memory some other conflict, for instance over some accessory coveted by her but not admitted into the budget over which we assume that this particular husband has monopolistic control. The basis for a deal is obvious: "I go with you to your mountains provided we find a good solution to the accessory problem". The example shows clearly how close trading is to the bribe, but that need not concern us here. If it works in the sense that no conflict any longer exists because both parties are satisfied with the total outcome, then it works.

The strategy of sub-dividing the goal can also be applied here. Husband or wife can realize that this discussion is one they will have year after year as long as their marriage lasts, and one way of subdividing it would be to "take one year at a time". The trading formula is obvious: "I go to the sea with you this year, provided you go with me to the mountains next year", and so on. It should be noted that this differs from compromise precisely because the solution is found by combining two extremes, not in any in-between position.

Broadening is a more refined category because it requires the introduction of at least one more actor. What kind of actor can be imagined? Let us assume that the wife yields to the husband and consents to go to the mountains. This gives her some kind of a deficit, and the husband some kind of a surplus. Needed is a third actor in some kind of conflict with either, and a formula whereby that actor would induce a deficit in the husband and a surplus in the wife.

There are several possibilities: the wife's mother, the wife's lover, and the wife's child,

all of them referred to, somewhat dryly, as C. The point, however, is not that the wife necessarily likes being with them or having them join her as a compensation in her mountain martyrdom. We have assumed the conflict system somehow to be closed except for what is explicitly introduced into it as deepening and broadening. This means that the wife cannot simply comfort herself by something taken from the outside. At one point or the other the husband would have to pay for the compensation, and the whole idea of broadening is that he pays to C, who in turn pays to the wife. Each payment means parting with something, which means giving in, in some conflict. The typical example would be the case of the child whom the father would prefer to send somewhere else for vacation, and the mother would prefer to have for company.

If the gain from the wife's point of view is insufficient to compensate for her loss in the barren and steep mountain side, and what she sees as the loss to the husband is insufficient as punishment, she might increase the price either way by throwing in the mother-in-law (provided she is of the proverbial type), or even the (suspected) lover. This may look like an artificial approach, but it is felt that this is only so because most people might not be able to verbalize it when they engage in such practices.

Fission or disintegration has a very clear meaning in this connection: after endless debates that gradually take the form of quarrels they make a very simple decision: "I go to the sea and you go to the mountains, we come together after vacation and compare notes". Separation for vacation purposes may be the beginning of the slippery slope leading to separation in marriage, resulting in divorce, and then it may also be exactly the opposite. The basic point is the realization that the incompatibility disappears with decoupling. There is only incompatibility under the assumption that husband and wife have to be together during their vacation.

Fusion or integration would be the exact opposite: a fusion into one at least where perspectives on vacations are concerned. Shared perspectives develop, sincerely shared, accepted, internalized by both. The content does not matter. It may be that the husband converts to the wife's view, or the wife to that of the husband, that they both convert to a compromise formula, going in for vacation in the desert, or on the plains, or for no vacation at all. They might also go in for a vacation on the moon for that matter –indicating that whatever they go in for might still be unattainable– but in that case this would be tantamount to the frustration of the husband-wife actor, not to a conflict between husband and wife.

Altogether this offers them six possible conflict resolution formulas, which is not too bad; it should not be impossible to find something reasonably acceptable. Admittedly,

transcendence may be out for geographical reasons, and compromise may be out because of the losses incurred. But that still leaves four possibilities, of which the last might have to be the result of some deep non-intellectual dialogue leading to a fundamentally emotional sharing that would make the term fusion or "integration" warranted. The term "love" is close.

However, even if some, most or all of these possible types are objectively available they may not be subjectively at hand for the simple reason that they neither pre-existed in the actors minds, nor developed during the conflict. In fact, there seems to be little evidence to indicate that participation in conflict as such stimulates conflict imagination and expands the space of possibilities. There are certainly types of conflict participation that have this effect, such as reflected, dialectical conflict participation; but these are not necessarily empirically the dominant forms. Hence, it is certainly not unlikely that our couple would relatively quickly, even from the very beginning, fall into one of the conflict repression types.

Thus, they may drift away from each other both of them frustrated, dropping the issue, sometimes announcing to themselves, to each other, and to friends that "vacations are not for us". They may reach out for each other doing other types of things, engaging in all kinds of positive activity, trying to forget about the frustrated vacation hopes. They may add to this conflict other conflicts, for instance over the accessories, gradually deepening the conflict gap between them. They may turn to other persons including child, mother-in-law and lover where activities that also would permit the vacation would recede into the background.

Or, one of them may so effectively brain-wash the other with his or her arguments that the other gives in or up: "Yes, dear husband, now I see that the mountains are better, not only for you but also for me". And finally, there is the drama of incapacitation: one of them making the other actor incapable of pursuing the goal. We do not have to think in terms of poisoned food; more important is the secret hope that illness, some kind of social obligation or work load would give to the other the freedom to pursue his or her goal at will.

There are subtle and not so subtle ways, out of which the type mentioned immediately above, penetration, (so important that it is singled out as a special case of social incapacitation) would probably be the most significant one for this type of conflict. In figure form:

Figure 3.4. <u>The Couple's Dilemma: Vacation by the Sea, or in the Mountains?</u>

In the compatibility region they find compromises like 2 weeks in the mountains and 1 week at the sea, losing vacation time traveling from one to the other. Their loss may then become the travel agent's gain. There are usually hidden parties somewhere, benefiting from inability to resolve conflict.

Conclusion: the typology of conflict negation stood up against this conflict, not only producing a range of resolution formulas, but also a range of repression formulas. What the typology does not, and should not, provide, is a prediction of the couple's choice.

At this point their knowledge and skills, and above all their free will, singly or combined, enters. Conflict is a challenge and they may or may not rise to the occasion. Of course what eventually happens is conditioned by something to be explored in a deeper conflict theory than this one. But "conditioned" is not the same as "determined". There is space for "conflict imagination" mentioned above. The more of that precious capacity, the wiser the choice.

Chapter 4

FORMATIONS OF CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

A conflict involves parties in some kind of incompatibility. There are two basic kinds of incompatibilities: one is over relatively clearly formulated, explicit <u>values</u> like a piece of territory, a commercial right; the other is over more implicit <u>interests</u> like the mutually incompatible interests between slaves and slave-owners, colonies and colonial countries, the exploited and the exploiters, the repressed and the repressors. In this case there is not even an assumption that the parties to the conflict are aware of the conflict. A major mistake in politics is only to include in political analyses the first category. And a further frequent mistake would be to only include those conflicts within the first category that have already erupted with clear conflict manifestations, including the use of violence.

If the task of conflict analysis is to help understand the future better, even in the sense of promoting the forces one thinks deserve support, conflict analysis has to include both types. Many, perhaps most of the conflicts of interest will sooner or later be <u>transformed</u> into a conflict of values, through increased <u>consciousness formation</u>, <u>organization</u>, and above all <u>confrontations</u>. The latter is often a question of incidents that may look innocent to the outsider but are highly meaningful to the parties to the conflict because they are seen within a framework of thinking, feeling, a context of despair and hope, that gives them a coded meaning, hidden to the outsider.

For he whose conflict analysis is limited to the first kind only, and perhaps only to the small category within the first kind where there is "trouble", "shooting in the streets", etc., such things will come as a surprise.

Since he will need an explanation for the source of his surprise he will easily resort to

reductionism and see what happened as the manifestation of evil intentions and strong capabilities drawn from some other conflict he already knows, put to work at "wrong" and unexpected places. This will, in turn, easily lead him to irrational, even stupid, policies, like in Vietnam.

The following is an effort to provide a simplified conflict map of the world today. In making such a map the concept "formation" plays a considerable role. Roughly speaking this is the key to the context of the conflict: which are the parties, actual and potential, that are participants to it, which are the "third parties", what do they all stand for? Needless to say, these parties are not necessarily countries: they may be groups within countries such as classes and racial-ethnic groups; they may be non-territorial actors (intergovernmental organizations, international associations, "multinational" corporations); they may even be Nature.

It is within the formation that the incompatibility gets concrete meaning, that the skeleton of conflict analysis is clothed with meat and blood, although in the form of a hypothesis.

For the conflicts in a stage of mature development, even manifesting themselves violently, there is usually little doubt as to who are the parties opposed to each other even if the parties actually fighting each other are not necessarily the same as the parties with an objective incompatibility. But for the conflicts of interest, the more latent contradictions in the social web of relations, it may be easier to talk about the incompatibilities than to predict correctly along which lines society will show its cracks when the contradiction matures through the transformation process indicated above. Arguments in this connection will be presented in the text below.

4.2   The Key Conflict Formations: A Brief Guide

We assume that the parties of which world conflict formations are made are the territorial actors (countries and other territories), the non-territorial actors (organizations, associations, corporations), human groups (that may be national or transnational), humans in general and nature. No doubt the territorial actors will continue to be major parties to conflicts for many years to come, but conflicts formulated in terms of them may often more correctly be seen as conflicts involving a mixture of national, subnational, and transnational elements.

However that may be, let us start with a simple division of the countries of the world

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using such categories as "capitalist" versus "socialist" depending on whether the dominant economic system is market economy or centralized economy, and "Center", "Periphery", "Autonomous" depending on whether the dominant relation relative to the outside is one of domination, of being dominated, or neither one nor the other:

Table 4.1. A Typology of Countries

	"Capitalist"	"Socialist"
Center	US, EC, Japan	Soviet Union
Sub-Center	Canada, Rest-EFTA	
Periphery	Third World	Eastern Europe, Mongolia, N. Korea, Cuba
Autonomous	Perú? Tanzania? Burma? Algeria?	Yugoslavia, China, Albania, N. Korea, N. Vietnam

Some years ago there would be people whose conflict thinking concerning the world would be limited to one formation: "the East-West conflict". Their focus would be on the top row in Table 4.1 only. Later on it became fashionable to talk about the "North-South conflict", and the focus would be on the left-hand column in Table 4.1, with some uncertainty as to exactly how the "socialist camp" should be fitted into the picture.

There was the idea of a 90° rotation of the conflict axes of the world, indicating that we now have a conflict between the Center in general and at least the capitalist part of Periphery in particular.

We hope below to show how tenacious both types of thinking were and still are, and want here to give only one indication in that direction. Both of them, singly or combined, were efforts to give a map of the world in terms of conflict formations; in other words the same exercises as we are engaging in here.

But, both singly and combined they gave a much too insufficient basis for understanding of the present, leaving alone some predictions about the future that might lead to more adequate action in the present.

Of particular importance is the ability to draw upon several types of conflicts simultaneously, not all of them reducible to one basic pattern of thinking, so that one is at least mentally prepared to receive signals from various layers and different parts of a highly complex world. Several formations should be present in our minds so that we can receive and process signals from several of them, not try to fit them into the formation that enjoys a privileged position in our mind.

For this a much more diversified analytical basis is needed.

Here, then, is a list of conflict formations with which one might work, as a point of reference (see Table 4.2).

It should be pointed out that the list is neither exclusive nor exhaustive: there are certainly others to be added, and the fifteen already mentioned should be seen as aspects of a concrete reality rather than as fifteen empirically separated phenomena. They obviously feed into each other and interact with each other, in ways to be explored later.

Table 4.2. A List of Conflict Formations

I. CENTER vs PERIPHERY
   Imperialistic formations
   (1) Capitalist Imperialism
   (2) Social Imperialism
   Center countries vs Periphery countries
   (3) Superpowers vs the rest
   (4) Big powers vs the rest
   (5) North vs South

II. Center vs Center
   (6) Capitalist vs socialist
   (7) Capitalist vs capitalist
   (8) Socialist vs socialist
   (9) European vs Asian

III. Periphery vs Periphery
   (10) Periphery vs periphery

IV. Intra-Country Formations
   (11) Class conflicts
   (12) Racial/ethnic conflicts
   (13) Territorial conflicts

V. NON-TERRITORIAL FORMATIONS
   (14) Territorial vs non-territorial actors
   (15) Man vs Nature

The present part of the book, however, is limited to (1) to (9). The remaining six vary so much around the world that as a minimum a whole book would be needed. But the Epilogue is an effort to explore these formations under a general perspective: basic human needs.

4.3   Center vs Periphery Formations

We start with these since we consider them to be the most important ones in the world today, affecting the highest number of people and in the most dramatic - at present as well as in terms of potential levels of violence - formations.

Most important among these are the <u>imperialist</u> formations. They have all several elements in common that will not be elaborated here, suffice it only to mention them very briefly:

<u>exploitation</u>: There is a Center country which interacts with Periphery countries in such a way as to receive economic, political, military, cultural and other benefits more than the Periphery does from the Center;

<u>penetration</u>: This is done by establishing a <u>bridgehead</u>, a center in the Periphery linked to the center in the Center through ties of harmony; as members of the same multinational corporation, the same international political movement, the same international military alliance, the same cultural system-organization;

<u>fragmentation</u>: Whereas the domineering groups in the Center are well integrated, kept together, the units in the Periphery are kept apart;

<u>marginalization</u>: The Periphery is kept as a second class outside the inner circle, even when it is not excessively fragmented and exploited.

So much for the general theory of imperialism, let us then turn to two specific cases; capitalist and socialist imperialism.

(1) Capitalist Imperialism

In this case the exploitation is above all economic: transnational, often in world-encompassing economic cycles set up in such a way that both in term of spin-off effects, and in terms of trade benefits, much more wealth accumulates in the Center than in the Periphery; and to the extent they also accumulate in the Periphery it is in the center of the Periphery rather than the vast periphery.

The characteristic features of the consequences of this pattern show up in terms of living standard: the level of living of the two cooperating center groups is increasing, so is the level of living of the periphery in the Center–the working classes in the Center countries–but at a respectful distance from the former two.

But the level of living of the periphery in the Periphery is not only not increasing; it has recently even experienced severe signs of decline from the very low level already existing.

This is crucial because it is at this level that not even basic human needs (food, clothes, shelter, health, education) are adequately satisfied. Throughout its history capitalist imperialism has shown itself incapable of providing the satisfaction of basic needs for the masses in the Periphery countries, however much it has proven itself capable of increased level of living for the other three groups.

This explains, or has to do with, three very simple findings from the history of revolutions in our century:

(a) Revolutions have only taken place in Periphery countries where the proletariat has nothing to lose, not in Center countries where they might have something to lose, viz. the sharing of the spoils of exploitation with the upper classes; in terms of welfare state-systems, protection of industries through tariff and non-tariff measures, etc.

(b) Revolutions have usually taken place in situations where basic needs were even less satisfied than before, and have arisen right out of this fundamental dissatisfaction.

(c) Even so, almost all socialist revolutions (with the exception of Cuba) have taken place only after a war has so much weakened the national and international power structure that the revolutionary forces became strong enough to tip the power balances in their favor.

If we now assume that capitalism in its imperialist form will continue to be unable to satisfy basic needs for the masses, partly because they need the masses as cheap labor

(including as labor reservoirs) - partly because of the uncontrolled greediness of the upper classes, nationally and internationally, then it is likely that upheavals will be a continuing feature wherever capitalist imperialism is found, and for a long time to come, simply because the first two conditions above, (a) and (b), will remain satisfied.

They are likely to be successful if the power structure has been weakened for some other reason, and-or is inattentive (Cuba), etc.

There seem to be three ways in which this can happen if it happens at all; all of them having to do with how the four groupings characteristic of any imperialist formation. The center and the periphery in the Center and Periphery countries can be reduced to two, opposed to each other in a clear bipolar conflict formation:

(1) The People's War of Liberation: this is the masses in the Periphery countries against a tripartite alliance of the other three, the metropolitan elite together with their workers, Lumpen-Proletariat, marginals, and with the elites at the Periphery level. This was the pattern found in the Indo-China wars, and more or less in all colonial and neo-colonial wars after the Second Word War. If transnationalized this becomes the "Lin Biao" model.

(2) The National War of Liberation: in this pattern there is a crystallization by country; it is the Periphery country against the Center country because the local elite has solidarized itself sufficiently with the people, even to the point of leading the local masses. The most frequent pattern in earlier wars of liberation, for instance in the 19th century. If transnationalized this becomes the "North-South conflict", between regions.

(3) The Marxist Model: Proletarians, Unite!: both peripheries might join forces against the oppressor they have in common, the harmonized centers. This pattern is much less likely because of the geographical and social distance between the two peripheries. Whereas the centers are highly mobile and use the means of transportation and communication in their command to apply the means of destruction with pin-point accuracy, the peripheries are considerably more fragmented.

There are, however, two conditions under which this fragmentation can be overcome: geographically by having the masses of the Periphery countries move into the Center countries as migrant workers, the first examples on a large scale being the importation of slaves during four centuries, from the western coast of Africa to the eastern coast of the Americas, in an arch from Washington to Rio de Janeiro; and

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<u>socially</u>, through a recession, or rather a world depression that would so much reduce the living standard of the masses in the center countries that they would with considerable more ease identify with the masses of the Periphery countries.

Inside European countries in the 19th century neither geographical nor social separation were important enough to make the thesis of the unification of the proletariat look ludicrous.

On a world scale, however, it looked rather unrealistic, then as also today. But the two conditions mentioned might come into being, in which case new conflict formations would appear.

This is very well known by the forces interested in maintaining capitalist imperialism, for which reason they will keep the number of foreign workers low and-or control their political activity.

Thus, there will be the obvious threat that the migrant workers will be the first to be dismissed in case of economic difficulties.

They will also see to it that the distance in standard of living between the two proletariats, in the Center and in the Periphery, the "Third World", is maintained.

This also implies significant use of Keynesian techniques in order to avoid the type of conditions whereby standard or living may sink so much in the rich countries that global world identification of the world proletariat takes place.

(2) Social Imperialism

Social imperialism is imperialist, but different from capitalist imperialism. It refers to the right hand column in Table 4.1, and is today only exercised by the Soviet Union over six of the Eastern European countries, Mongolia, and to some extent Cuba and North Korea.

It may be argued, however, that China has a similar relation to Tibet and possibly to other autonomous regions in western China, but whatever stand one has on this issue it is at least of a different scale of magnitude from the operation run by the Soviet Union.

Like for any other type of imperialism social imperialism has lasting effects on the Periphery countries in the sense that the Center reproduces some of itself in the Periphery, and is based on both vertical division of labor and bridgehead formations. However, there is one basic difference that is central to any theory of social imperialism: it does not presuppose economic exploitation. Social imperialism can certainly very easily be combined with capitalist imperialism, but this is an empirical, not a logical or automatic

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connection. Thus, of the many accusations China has against the Soviet Union economic exploitation does not seem to play any important role. And it can also be said that whatever the Soviet Union does in Eastern Europe it is Eastern Europe that exploits the Soviet Union economically rather than vice versa.

Before proceeding this last point should be elaborated. We would have talked about economic exploitation if:

1. Eastern European countries were systematically given tasks within CMEA which kept their productive machinery at a low level of processing,

   and-or

2. the terms of trade were extremely unfavorable to the Eastern European countries.

However, the general trade composition between the Soviet Union and the six Eastern European countries does not seem to be indicative of division of labor in the direction indicated; as mentioned, if anybody is exploited then it is the Soviet Union by the Eastern European countries. There are the cases of the Galati steel mills in Rumania and the terms of trade with Czechoslovakia, but it is not obvious that these cases alone serve to prove a general thesis about the Soviet Union exploiting Eastern Europe economically, even if one adds to them several other examples.

But if neither the purpose, not the consequence, is economic exploitation, what is then the mechanisms of social imperialism? As the name indicates it can be seen as a way of imprinting the social structure of the Center on the Periphery, for which reason a more clear term might be "structural imperialism". It is a way of creating a mirror image of oneself, of bringing about homology with oneself. But why is that done when there is no promise of economic gain?

Because the theory of motivation behind the forces impelling individuals and countries to exercise power over others is based on more than the pillar of economic processes alone. To make others like oneself is already an exercise of power, with two clear benefits:

The surrounding world becomes more predictable by reprogramming them so that they are run according to the same rules as oneself, and doing what is right by spreading the correct, socialist pattern to others who may not understand that this is to their own best.

These are reformulations of what the Soviet Union is accused of: building a cordon sanitaire of obedient, predictable, satellites, and of spreading "communism" to as many countries as possible.

Both reasons are good enough in and by themselves, they do not have to be further bolstered by promises of economic profit. On the contrary, it is clear that the Soviet Union is often willing to pay a high economic price if the other two benefits are forthcoming.

If social imperialism is the export of a certain structure it now makes sense to ask what this structure is. For imperialism to have any meaning there has to be a center-periphery gradient inside the Center as well as inside the Periphery country; in other words, the structure that is exported is vertical. And we can assume that the center in the Soviet Union more or less consists of three poles: the Party (or rather, the Party elite), the Apparat (or rather, the higher levels of the enormous state, regional and local bureaucracy) and the Military-Police machinery.

This power triangle is also integrated through personal unions (the same person occupying positions in two, even three of the poles), and benefits from a number of elite privileges. It exercises its power over such groups as all the minorities, the peasants-farmers and the intelligentsia through a number of methods out of which policing techniques and direct repression form only a minor part.

Even more significant are built-in depolitization, promise of elite privileges on the condition of loyalty, combined with a threat of losing them if the loyalty shows signs of attrition. Add to this daily struggle for food, clothes, housing and other amenities and the general effort to overcome bureaucratic red tape, and so much of citizen time is wasted on trivialities that little is left for political activities, even if it had been permitted.

By reproducing this structure in other countries the Soviet Union is by and large guaranteed against unpredictable, disagreeable changes. Eastern Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Poland in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland again in 1970, do not prove to the center of the Center that this is an impossible goal, only that it is difficult to obtain; meaning that the homology was not perfect enough, not that some flexibility has to be exercised due to "local conditions".

How is this structure reproduced? Quite simply by building a military-political division of labor where the Center gives the basic command and the Periphery offers obedience, in return for protection of the Periphery elite, and - we hypothesize - for some right to exploit the Center economically.

Concretely this division of labor is exercised through a local bridgehead, with the same structure as in the Center and loyal to the Center. It is hardly fruitful to discuss what comes first, the division of labor or the bridgehead, since it is obvious that they have to develop dialectically. Like for capitalist imperialism the stability of the system depends on the harmony between the Center and the Periphery elites, and one of the

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pillars in the foundation of that harmony has to be some rewards extended by the Center elite to the Periphery elite. They can be personal, such as positions in their international military, political and economic machineries, or they can be collective such as promises of military, political and economic support in moments of distress, when the local elites are threatened and "brotherly assistance" is needed. Thus, the Soviet elites offer the Periphery elites protection, and they on their side offer the Soviet elites something important: an environment sufficiently similar to the Soviet Union itself to make the Soviet system look "normal".

Thus, the price the Periphery countries as a whole have to pay for social imperialism is considerable: their structure cannot deviate in any significant manner from that of the Soviet Union without challenging her, and their elites cannot deviate in any significant manner from the Soviet foreign policy without also challenging her. The net result: repression inside the Periphery country, lack of autonomy outside; in short lack of freedom.

Under what condition could this system, possibly, break down?

Neither lack of freedom, nor lack of autonomy, threaten the most basic human needs referred to above, since that particular type of political energy cannot be mobilized. But people have made great sacrifices throughout human history in order to obtain freedom and autonomy, and there is no reason why this could not happen inside the configuration of social imperialism.

Applying the same type of analysis as in connection with capitalist imperialism we have to look into the conditions under which the four classes characteristic of an imperialist configuration would reduce to two.

In general, we would assume that the masses of the Soviet Union would side with the two elites in maintaining the structure. First, it is in their interest to do so since the structure at least in the short run is tied to the security of the Soviet Union. Second, there would be an element of pure jealously: why should the Periphery countries undergo changes whereby the lot of their masses would be easier when the masses of the Soviet Union are kept down the way they are? It is very well known in the Soviet Union that the Periphery countries are "kept" in a certain way and often at considerable cost to the Soviet Union; to upset this system will be seen as a sign of extreme ingratitude.

On the other hand there is no reason to assume that the masses of the Soviet Union could not some day enter into a much more basic type of identification with the masses of the Periphery countries. The condition for this would probably not be that the repression becomes worse but that it is perceived as coming from the same quarters (Moscow). And

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here it might well be that we are dealing with the opposite mechanism of that found under capitalist imperialism where exploitation is typically worse in the Periphery than in the Center. It may well be that if the repression should become less in the Soviet Union then these countries will all become more similar and the possibility of identification will increase at the same time as the jealousy factor mentioned above would vanish.

Another condition in this connection, however, would be increased travel or communication in general giving the masses more of a basis for comparison. Today that basis is present at the level of the elite, and it is probably fair to say that Center and Periphery in this system of social imperialism are constantly comparing their conditions when they meet at international meetings, conferences of various kinds, etc.

If the Periphery elites are treated badly then conditions for some type of national liberation would be present according to general theories. Obviously there is some type of positive feedback at work here: when there are signs of independence then the elites will be treated badly, and this will accelerate the moves towards independence, with the danger that the Soviet Union will aggress and stifle any further attempt towards autonomy.

That gives us two scenarios of liberation corresponding to the national war of liberation and the marxist paradigms indicated under the heading of "Capitalist Imperialism" above.

The third pattern, a people's war of liberation, is not very likely in this connection, partly because the masses are not deprived of basic material needs; "freedom" and "autonomy" being more the concern of the elites; and the situations when they are deprived of basic needs satisfaction are few and far between as evidenced by the list above. Also, the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union, and the joint repressive machinery in the hands of the other three groupings, makes for such a formidable enemy that the war is hardly likely to succeed. Either or both of the two ambivalent groups must fight with the masses in the Periphery and that would bring us back to the two patterns discussed, singly or combined. And just as for the case of capitalist imperialism we can certainly assume that the repressive powers know very well about these mechanisms and will do their best to be on guard against any factor that would tip the balance of power in its disfavor.

Generally we would be inclined to feel that liberation in the Periphery countries in this system would come about as a consequence of the weakening of the Center country where internal repression is concerned. But how likely is a development of that kind? Difficult to say, but three scenarios pointed to seem relatively unlikely.

The first is the idea that internal rebellion might come about as the result of liberal-

ization in the economic sense, in other words "Liebermanism". Whether decentralized decision-making when it comes to production is really taking place in the Soviet Union can be discussed, and whether there really is increased sensitivity to consumption demands from the population is also far from obvious. But the basic point is that decentralization, combined with the operation of demand-supply mechanisms of the kind known in capitalist societies, do not in and by themselves imply more freedom for the masses.

A wider range in products, more individual design to meet or change consumer habits, are not identical with "freedom" as such. On the contrary, it might very well be that in addition to the repressive state apparatus currently found in the Soviet Union a neo-capitalist elite might emerge who would also manipulate the population. Thus, state propaganda and capitalist commercial propaganda are two aspects of general mass manipulation and could very well go hand in hand, as already to some extent witnessed in some of the socialist countries.

<u>Second</u>, there is the idea that more freedom might come about as a result of the demands brought upon the government by the Soviet <u>intelligentsia</u>. However, this is also far from obvious. The Soviet intelligentsia is a class in its own right, although possibly not in the marxist sense (we would actually dispute this: if one definition of "class" is that surplus would be expropriated and decided over by others then the intellectual products produced by this class are certainly decided over by the <u>apparat</u>). But this class has its own interests, and there are reasons to doubt that it is sufficiently identified with the masses at large not to rest content with the satisfaction of their own demand for an extension of their actions space, more access to literature, more freedom to write and talk as they want; or travel abroad and receiving more visits from abroad.

<u>Third</u>, there is the idea that more freedom might come about as a result of external pressure. But in a highly nationalistic country like the Soviet Union the opposite is more likely to be the result.

Hence, changes in the system of social imperialism will probably come about as the result of accumulated, small changes throughout the space dominated by social imperialism and over time. But it is highly unlikely that the system will last: it is too repressive to constitute a lasting condition for such a large portion of mankind.

(3) Superpowers vs the Rest

This configuration is much talked about today, and for good reasons. It is quite clear what the formation is: the superpowers pitted against the rest of the world–presumably

able to dictate their will–when there is a coincidence of their interests, on everybody else. The superpower condominium is a conflict because it is hardly to be expected that what is in the interest of the superpowers would always be in the interest of the rest of the world.

However, the pattern is in need of some analysis, for it is not clear exactly what the mechanism of the superpower condominium is, nor the precise way in which it is operating on the rest of the world. And at this point it looks as if the distinction between resource power and structural power may be used in a theoretically profitable manner, for if the superpowers are able to impose their will on somebody else then it has to happen through the exercise of power.

However, it cannot primarily be in terms of resource power. For this splits into three components: ideological power, remunerative power and punitive power, and in general we would not expect the superpowers to be able to pool their two ideologies, to put their assets together, or to make a credible threat out of the potential use of a joint nuclear force. We say "in general" for it is not obvious that this could not in some cases operate in such a way as to give tremendous power to the superpowers.

Thus, although the probability is low it is not zero that China might once be the target of not only joint superpower blackmail, but a joint superpower nuclear attack. And if the superpowers to some extent are able to pool their assets in order to explore space then they might also much more than so far is indicated be able to pool assets to manipulate poor countries through technical assistance.

And, finally, there is a certain joint superpower ideology that might be exported to the rest of the world. This ideology would be neither capitalism nor socialism as economic system, neither liberalism nor marxism as a philosophical creed, but superpowerism. By that we would refer to a certain division of the world into vertical blocs, each one headed by one superpower, coupled with the idea that it is at present the best one. Superpowerism as ideology might be negative: it is not that the superpowers are perfect, only that any alternative is even more imperfect. To the extent that the centers in the Periphery of capitalist and social imperialism believe in this, and agree, the ground is prepared for a much more formidable type of power: the structural power of the two empires described under (1) and (2) above dividing the world in spheres of interest.

Hence, our hypothesis is that the superpower condominium insists on the joint and coordinate use of the structural power built into these two empires. But it is more than the sum of two already existing imperialisms. It is coordinated and thereby united imperialism according to the formula "If you take care of yours, I'll take care of mine".

The machineries for "taking care of" are already described under the two preceding formations. They would consist in appeal to ideology, in manipulation with promises of remuneration and threats of punishment, pulling all the strings woven into the fabrics of the two imperialisms.

There are two contexts in which this united imperialism might be profitably used: one is the context of conflict, the other the context of cooperation. In either case the basic point is to keep the Periphery under control, in the first case so that their conflicts do not threaten superpowers directly or indirectly, in the second case so that superpower cooperation is not threatened by their conflict.

There are several theories as to why superpowers might have a joint interest in repressing or at least managing Periphery conflict. One of them is simply that such conflicts might escalate and hence threaten the superpowers' Hinterland unless brought under control at a sufficiently early stage. This would involve some measure of de-escalation, but for de-escalation to work it has to be two-sided and this is where the other superpower is brought into the picture.

Another theory would point to the significance of the economic blackmail brought to bear upon the superpowers by Periphery countries in conflicts. Any such country, and particularly the center in that Periphery country, might tell its Superpowers: "If you don't come forward with sufficient investments in military and-or development assistance, then the opposition will gain the upper hand". No doubt the superpower condominium might in part be seen as the obvious counter-tactic against this Periphery action pattern, particularly when Periphery countries with highly limited buying power are involved (the Vietnam case).

However, there is a third point that seems to be more important in explaining this prevalence of superpower coordination at the time being: the role of the superpowers as conflict managers per se. This is not in order to save them from any kind of nuclear, economic or other blackmail. But what would remain of this feudal structure imposed upon the world of states through the institution of the superpower if they were not given an important say in connection with the general regulation of conflict?

To see this more clearly three alternatives to a superpower condominium should be mentioned: conflict regulation through the United Nations, conflict regulation by the parties to the conflict themselves, and conflict regulation by one superpower doing it alone.

The latter is probably what both of them would prefer to see happen, but very difficult to achieve unless both parties to the conflict are within their own camp–and even in that

case it might not be so easy as evidenced by the case of Cyprus.

Joint conflict management will at least preserve the superpower status as such if not any universal claim by either of them. Conflict management by the UN, unless it were by the Security Council in a way sufficiently dominated by the superpowers, would mean serious degradation of the superpowers; conflict management by the parties themselves even more so. Hence, they would have a joint interest in doing it together when doing it alone is impossible.

The point made here is closely related to the important role played by the superpowers in being the primary definers of other states through the institution of recognition, a ius prima noctis. He who presides over the birth of a state may also preside over its death through conflict management. In doing so they are only exercising their feudal prerogatives in the international system.

Then there is the second aspect of superpower condominium: the context of superpower cooperation. There is cooperation for mutual benefit between the superpowers today, and the condominium would in this case take the form of joint efforts to prevent the Periphery countries from "rocking the boat" of that cooperation. There was no major Soviet protest when the USA invaded the Dominican Republic 1965, nor US protest when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia 1968.

But is this not simply another way of stating what we have already said before? The thesis was that the superpowers cooperate in order to control the conflicts of the Periphery; but here the idea is in a sense the opposite: they control the Periphery (and not only their conflicts) in order for the superpowers to cooperate. Why?

This is not the place to develop in detail the nature of superpower cooperation, but if one should phrase it in one sentence it might run something like this: it is an effort to control the most costly aspects of the arms race so as to liberate productive forces for other purposes; and the economic transaction between the superpowers consists essentially in a trade and cooperation pattern whereby technology flows from west to east and raw materials, also in energy like gas and oil, from east to west. In doing so both elites and the masses in both blocs get short term gains: the capitalist system exchange processed goods for raw materials and the socialist countries get the technology their rigid, uncreative, repressive systems have been unable to develop by themselves and thereby satisfy some of the consumer needs of their masses. In other words, there is much at stake and hence considerable incentive to control the Periphery countries so that this type of system can remain stable.

Our thesis is that what makes this a joint operation over and above conventional su-

perpower control of their own Periphery by means of conventional imperialist mechanisms would be an implicit contract. Rather than the old "I shall stay off your periphery if you stay off mine", which is essentially negative, there is a positive joint command "I shall control mine if you control yours".

This, however, presupposes a joint interest in that type of control. But, would not the United States prefer to see a change towards capitalist-liberal systems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and would not the Soviet Union prefer to see a corresponding change in a socialist-marxist direction in Western Europe, actually in the West in general? In a sense they probably would. But although that was the professed goal of the 1950's and may still be a long term goal, it does not seem to be the short term goal.

For any such change might seriously upset the present balance. It would in all probability expand the group of non-aligned countries, it might also bring non-alignment to power regimes that might be highly critical of the type of economic cooperations currently being expanded. A truly capitalist regime in the relatively developed countries in Eastern Europe would thoroughly appreciate the significance of being one's own processor of goods; and a truly socialist regime among the relatively liberal countries of the West would at least have an opposition sufficiently opposed to continued exploitation of East Europe, knowing themselves its true meaning.

However, in addition to these factors there is the obvious point that any change would lead to increased uncertainty, decreased predictability. The present situation is one the parties in general, and the superpowers in particular, have gotten used to. Any change would necessitate a transition from routine action to ad hoc activity. Hence, sufficient motivation exists to try to institutionalize the present pattern. And what would be more adapted to that purpose than the military machineries, turning inward rather than outward.

Thus, we are in fact hypothesizing a new military balance, where the military machineries are gradually turning their attention more to what happens inside their own bloc than to the relation with the other bloc; leaving the external relations more to the diplomats, arms control and "disarmament" negotiators, etc. The balance element would consist in "I watch mine provided you watch yours"; the tacit agreement of balanced internal watchdog activity. The balance would consist in being approximately equally able to guarantee stability, with the same or different means: there would be no balance if one party were significantly superior to the other in stability-keeping operations.

Thus, the superpower condominium has a structure and functions. But the parallel is not perfect. The power the Soviet Union exercises over its six Periphery countries in

Eastern Europe is not the same as what the USA is able to, or willing to do, in Western Europe; but to some extent paralleled by what the USA is doing in Latin America.

And that leads us to a second hypothesis, that the watchdog balance may be divided into two:

A "tough" one where US control over Latin America and perhaps some parts of southeast Asia like the Philippines, will be exchanged for Soviet control over non-European countries, such as Mongolia, North Korea, partly Cuba and perhaps some Arab states like Syria; and A "soft" watchdog balance in Europe. For the Eastern European countries this would mean some relaxation, possibly brought about as a result of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe but not too much as seen by the coup in Greece and near-coup in Italy.

This raises one rather important question: under what conditions will this superpower condominium be used? There are two answers to that question: that the superpowers start quarreling again between themselves, or more seriously expressed: that the contradiction between them surface; and that the various Periphery countries use the occasion to not only express but even enact some kind of solidarity among themselves relative to the superpowers. The latter must not be confused with the Periphery countries of one superpower standing up jointly against the pressure from above: that would be one of the scenarios for overcoming capitalist or social imperialism.

Rather, the idea, to take an example from the 1960's, the Dominican Republic (1965) and Czechoslovakia (1968) standing up together, appealing for Periphery solidarity across camps, in the name of a very simple principle: protection against superpower protection.

(4) Big Powers vs the Rest

There are five big powers in the world today: the two superpowers, and then the European Community (EC), China and Japan. Together they constitute the Center in Figure 4.1 of which the two superpowers, that have figured very prominently in the first three conflict formations, constitute some kind of a top.

For our purposes it might be useful to introduce another dimension in addition to the capitalist vs socialist dimension used in Figure 4.1, viz. the European (or Occidental) vs Asian (or Oriental) dimension. The result is given in Figure 4.1:

Figure 4.1. Enters Europe vs. Asia

	Capitalist	Socialist
European-Occidental	US, EC	Soviet Union
Asian-Oriental	Japan	China

This is a point of departure for discussing conflict formations (6), (7), (8) and (9), but here our task is to look at a joint big power condominium, today often referred to as "global pentagonalism", a term derived from the number of big powers and the important role played by the United States in launching concepts of this kind, and the name of Henry Kissinger whose thinking has a world span.

The theory of big power condominium would be relatively similar to that of superpower condominium, splitting into two: "Big powers against Periphery" conflicts, and protecting "Big power cooperation from Periphery efforts to upset it." New would be the domain of the operation, adding the European Community Periphery in Black Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Japan mainly in East Asia, and China mainly in terms of the inside China Periphery. Reminiscent of the European Concert of the 19th century, a five power condominium dividing most of the world into "I stay off yours if you stay off mine" and "I take care of mine if you take care of yours" spheres. The architect of the latter is a specialist on the architect of the former: Metternich.

However, with as many as five powers involved on the top there is a new heavy focus of interest: the internal relations among them, beyond who gets the upper hand in what field, the USA or the Soviets. Between two states the pattern cannot be that complex, between five there are many possibilities. One of the is depicted in Figure 4.2:

Figure 4.2. A US-Centered Pentagonal World

In this figure the United States appears as the center, with a special tie to the European Community: the Atlantic partnership. In a sphere outside this there is Japan, tied to the others through such organizations as the OECD, but not quite in the same orbit as the EC countries. Then there is an outer orbit on which China and the Soviet Union are

located, diametrically opposed to each other and with a direct link to the small center of this Center: the United States.

This is not the classical atomic model where the United States is in the center as a nucleus, the EC on the k orbit, Japan on the l orbit and the Soviet Union and China on the m orbits respectively. for the latter two are supposed to come closer to the nucleus than to the other orbiting powers; like the other two also tied to the United States by "special relations". And special relations they are: for long-lasting arch-enemies the distance progressed towards more neutral and semi-friendly relations is considerably more impressive than the distance from a cool to a lukewarm relationship. As time passes on, however, that psychological distance will rapidly contract.

There are clearly two things to discuss here: the idea of a big power condominium as a whole, and the possibility for the United States to carve out a new position as a leader of that condominium.

We would regard both aspects of this formation to be non-starters. There will not be a sufficiently well developed cooperative pattern between all the five, at the same time, for anybody to talk or act meaningfully on behalf of this big power condominium. The contradictions and antagonisms are too pronounced and important for reasons spelt out in connection with conflict formations (6)-(9). The United States will not be able to maintain a position anything like what is depicted in Figure 4.3 for the same reasons: there are other forces of repulsion and attraction operating at the top of the world, not only those that are compatible with the US-centric configuration.

More particularly, that image is incompatible with three trends or processes that seem to have a high probability:

(1) the slow and painful emergence of the European Community as a superpower also in the political, and perhaps even in the military sense; opposed to anything but real parity with the United States,

(3) the gradual emergence of an increasingly associative relationship between China and Japan, even to the point of alignment, and

(3) the continued decline of both the United States and the Soviet Union as powers in an ideological-moral sense.

This is not simply "down with the superpowers, up with the other three" - it is rather some strange configuration of this type:

Figure 4.3. A Declining Superpower World

US-SU	China-Japan
Third World	

In other words, we assume a more scattered world at the top, and some sort of continuation of the Nixon-Brezhnev relationship as a model for decreasingly important US-Soviet cooperation. We assume that this will continue for some time, but that the other big powers will liberate themselves from it, become more prominent, and to a large extent be followed by their entourage.

But, however that may be where the details are concerned, the gross features of the future of the big power system seem to be sufficiently different from any big power condominium model with the United States in its center to make that model look like what it is: a phantasmagoria, grown out of a long time dated tradition of seeing the US as the world's Number one country in all respects. A corollary of this tradition is the tendency to see the relationship anyone has to the United States as the most important aspect of that state - - and this is precisely the type of thinking underlying Figure 4.2. In short, the problem of a strategy for the resolution of this conflict does not arise: the formation will not crystallize except for a very short lived period for the simple reasons that it does not have sufficiently built-in viability.

Which is not to say that there isn't a grain of truth in it. For what is implied by the model, taking the United States as a point of departure, is the well known idea that the US is now willing to recognize "communist" regimes in the Center (the Soviet-Union and China), and in a Periphery dominated by a country in that Center (which means Eastern Europe). Similarly, the Soviet-Union has probably come around to accepting capitalism at the Center of that system, and perhaps also in some of its Periphery – it is somewhat uncertain in how large a part of the Periphery. Further, both of them would loathe the emergence of countries with regimes of the opposite kind inside their sphere of interest and would cooperate with this purpose in mind. All this, however, is already implied by conflict formations n ° 1 to 3: There is nothing new in it. What would have been new would have been to extend the same kinds of rights and uses to the other three members of any contract, and that is precisely what does not seem to be in the cards for the time being.

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(5) North vs South

This is a very frequently found figure of speech, but it is not that clear what the "North-South" conflict actually refers to, bringing out clearly the virtue of talking in terms of "conflict formation". It forces one to specify the conflict, including the parties to the conflict. And where this is concerned the term is ripe for several interpretations.

First, there is the idea that it simply refers to the conflict between most of the Third World and the capitalist countries, in other words, the capitalist imperialism described as conflict formation (1) above. However, this interpretation is either wrong or not sufficiently elaborated.

The terms North and South are clearly geographical concepts, and as such refer to conflicts between countries rather than to conflicts between groups, for instance classes. It would lead to thinking in terms of a conflict between the United States and Brazil, for instance, and not between the United States and its sizeable bridgehead in Brazil on the one hand, and the masses of Brazil on the other.

In so doing this figure of speech is highly misleading, even a propaganda figure that has already had a rather unfortunate impact on world consciousness. It leads to actor-oriented thinking in terms of countries as billiard balls, rather than to a structure-oriented thinking that would go deeper into country structures.

Moreover, it makes it impossible to understand why the elites of the "South" so often, and so easily, are bought off; for instance through the deals set up between the European Community and the "associated states". Any two-country theory of imperialism is bound to fail; the billiard balls have to be opened up and structured.

On the other hand the figure of speech might also refer to a special outcome of the formation of capitalist imperialism: the scenario whereby the Periphery country as a whole would stand against the Center country as a whole. Thus, it may simply refer to the condition whereby there would be a truly united Third World against the capitalist Center of the world, the US-EC-Japan triad. As mentioned above, however, this condition is pretty far from its realization.

Second, there is the interpretation which goes beyond the capitalist imperialism conflict formation and sees the conflict in terms of all "developing" countries against all "developed" countries. In terms of Figure 4.3 this would mean the bottom left corner against all the rest, but with China joining the former–potentially even as their leader–rather than the rest. No doubt, there is some reality to this image, but some care has to be exercised in the analysis.

Thus, generally speaking there is a difference between the relations of capitalist countries and socialist countries to the Third World: the latter is less exploitative.

The trade composition is less asymmetric, the technical assistance given in different forms is less bridgehead building if one excludes what is made for military and very clearly political purposes, the financial aid given less tied to economic pressure.

Hence, there would be less of a conflict of interests with the socialist countries as there is with the capitalist countries. But this does not exclude that there may be a conflict of values. And the value is simple enough: that of the North getting an even better share of the total world power than the South, and even more so than has been the case so far. That points to political, military and cultural power, but also the world surplus in an economic sense.

The "world surplus" can be said to be divided into two: world resources, and world productive surplus. In both fields a general North-South conflict shows up in the sense that there is a conflict over both. The idea that the world has a limited reservoir of resources that somehow belongs to all of humankind is gradually taking root as a new basis for a distribution formula, and there is a similar idea concerning the world productive surplus.

However, there are difficulties with either approach. Most of the world is divided into contiguous territorial units called countries, and there is the old tradition that what is found inside the country belongs to that country. Hence, only that which is outside these conventional limits or confines of distribution can still be redistributed, the world commons: the oceans, the ocean floor, and what is underneath, the air space above the oceans, possibly the polar regions, outer space. No doubt there are resources available and untapped so far, and one idea would be that the proceeds from them should asymmetrically favor countries that are "developing", "poor" or "poor on resources". And there is the corresponding idea for the productive surplus: to redistribute it as famine relief, development assistance, etc.

There seems by and large to be even more conflict over the first, world resources, than over the latter, world productive surplus. In a sense this is not strange for the world productive surplus is produced somewhere, i.e. inside a country, or countries as would be the case for some multi- or trans-national corporations, and is hence firmly under control. If redistributed, then according to somebody's will. But the world resources are still up for division as objects of some kind of primary competition or conflict, not a secondary conflict after the ownership question has been settled.

This shows up very clearly in connection with the question of the 200 mile limit and

similar problems: the Soviet Union, for instance, is here clearly on the side of the North. Hence, what we would generally imagine is that the most powerful countries want to impose upon the unclaimed resources a pattern of ownership similar to that which already exists in the world in order not to introduce a disequilibrium that might be to their disadvantage.

There might be one major exception to this: Japan which is the only country among the five big powers systematically "resource poor", and at the same time certainly "developed". For Japan, hence, the division between resource rich and resource poor countries will become a major one, and Japan will probably to some extent try to align herself with other resource poor countries in order to exercise a joint pressure on the big powers and the world authorities in general in favor of some type of redistribution. But that puts Japan in a special niche, with North in being resource dependent (which the Soviet Union is not), with the South in making distributive claims.

When it comes to the world productive surplus the situation is today colored by the experience of the last decades. Thus, it has probably been made relatively clear that there may be more to gain from being on the sending than the receiving end of this type of distribution.

In other words, to produce goods for redistribution on a non-commercial basis may in itself be an important economic mechanism; not only for keynesian purposes, but as a general force motrice of the whole productive machinery.

To get access to more of the world's resources and process it oneself may therefore offer an attractive perspective to what is referred to as the "South".

A more modest claim would be control over the resources located inside one's territory so that they do not flow out of the country.

For these problems it is quite probable that the center and the periphery in the Periphery might stand relatively united, and for that reason we might talk about the North-South conflict in some cases, keeping in mind that the deeper aspects of the international structure concern more the countries in the capitalist sphere than those in the socialist part of the world.

The capitalist countries made a mistake which probably will be repeated many times in the future, and has already been repeated, to believe that the redistribution of resources according to some market formula would make people and countries forget about exploitative relations, whether they be of the economic, political, military or other kinds.

One important aspect of the North-South conflict is that it may cut across other

conflict formations and produce some interesting configurations.

Defining the Soviet Union as "North" may serve to reinforce the superpower condominium, and this may serve to weaken the capitalist North-South formation rather than strengthen it because the superpowers are so much more visible. And correspondingly for China and Japan: they are big powers–but the former is poor and autonomous, the second is resource poor and therefore not so autonomous–both of them making the world more complicated than it otherwise might have been if all the big powers had been rich and resource rich.

In short: the North-South conflict is more a figure of speech t than an empirical reality. Turning the world 90º might weaken the East-West conflict. However, for this to happen there has to be more solidity to the formation than the present analysis brings out.

4.4   Center vs Center Formations

We now proceed to the second of the five major categories of conflict formations, this time focussing on what is known in political analysis as "big power politics". Frequent references will be made to Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 above, particularly to the latter. That figure is a map to big power politics, simple in its configuration, rich in its implications.

One might feel that devoting much analytical energy to five countries alone is to commit a fallacy of elitism, and we would certainly have agreed if this had been the only perspective, as is quite often the case in political analysis. But it is only one out of five, and, moreover; the significance of these powers lies not only in the high proportion they have of world power resources, including population (perhaps 1,600 million on the world total), but above all in the structural power they have at their command, to some extent analyzed above as center vs periphery conflict formations. The relations between them are therefore of prime interest, and even more so because the relation between their peripheries, by the very nature of imperialist bloc formations, are relatively insignificant. As will be developed later, at least for the time being, Periphery vs Periphery formations are likely to be within the same bloc, not between blocs.

Looking at Figure 4.1 there are several ways of slicing the big power cake for political analysis. The first would be the classical one: capitalist vs socialist, which would have two subdivisions: one in Europe (including North America), and one in Asia, including USA. With typical eurocentrism this is known as the "East-West" conflict, although in Asia it would be a "West-East" conflict. Another set of terms would be the Atlantic as

opposed to the Pacific "theaters".

Then, there is the opposite way of reading the table, vertically: the European vs Asian conflict formation. This also splits into two: within the capitalist system and within the socialist system.

Together we get a total of six angles, but we prefer to simplify it, starting with "capitalist vs socialist", going on to "capitalist vs capitalist", then "socialist vs socialist", and finally "Western vs Eastern", preferring those terms to "occidental vs oriental".

Of course, there are also more possibilities: one of them against the other three (or four), not to mention the interesting diagonal formation: US-EC and China vs Soviet Union and Japan. We shall have some comments on that particular configuration towards the end of Part Four.

(6) Capitalist vs Socialist

As mentioned this is the old, well-known East-West conflict, the actors of which were very clearly defined through the alliance and treaty systems established in the late 1940s and mid 1950s: NATO roughly coinciding with the US-EC combination, AMPO (the treaty linking Japan to the United States), WTO providing the Soviet Union with buffer support, and the treaty of "eternal friendship" between the Soviet Union and China. It was an almost perfectly crystallized system, with the vertical lines dividing capitalist and socialist countries by all the mechanisms known to polarization theory. In other words, the actors were perfectly defined, but how about the issues?

Roughly speaking they can be divided into two parts: those arising from World War II and those that have a broader implication, sometimes referred to as "ideological", sometimes referred to as the "struggle for world domination". We shall deal with them in that order, an it will very soon become clear that there is an intermediate category between the two.

A glance at Figure 4.1 will give the neutral observer one key to understanding the conflict of considerable importance, although usually denied by the capitalist camp: the aggressors of the World War II – Germany, Italy, Japan, are all within the capitalist part of the configuration. Moreover, their fight during World War II was disproportionately more cruel when directed against the countries now in the socialist camp than in its fight with European, capitalist powers. Facing westward, Nazi Germany fought a relatively classical war by modern means; facing eastward it was a war of brutal extermination not unlike the wars colonial powers had fought to eradicate the "natives". The same applies

to Japan's fight in Asia: the "Rape of Nanking" has all the characteristics of the Nazi German war in Eastern Europe.

All this has an important consequence: the conflict does not have a symmetric history. For the socialist camp there was an admixture consisting of a continuation of the World War II, systematically underestimated in the capitalist camp, deliberately or not.

What the capitalist camp was most concerned with was the change of regime, that took place during World War II, affecting in a major way capitalist interests. These interests were partly highly concrete: property (fixed or mobile) had been confiscated-nationalized in Eastern Europe and China, as had happened before in the Soviet Union. The problem of appropriate indemnification looked difficult, almost insolvable. More important, however, were the perspectives where future interests were concerned: it definitely looked as if the days when Eastern Europe and China could be used as peripheries of capitalist imperialism were counted, both with regard to imports of raw materials, and possibly also raw labor, from them, and to export of manufactured goods and capital to them. And, the right to settle.

All this was then quickly given an ideological form, particularly as reports of harsh punitive or "educative" measures were taken against former elites, who had willingly served as bridgeheads for Western European and Japanese penetration, were flowing into Western news media. In short, the basic conflict issue took the form of a conflict over the economic and political system in areas formerly under capitalist domination.

However, very soon, the conflict was reproduced in other areas. First, there was the threat that "communism" might spread to the countries in the capitalist bloc, partly because of contradictions within the system, and partly because of subversive activities. And, second, to areas in the Third World, roughly that which is left of the world when the alliance systems just described are removed. This was then increasingly generalized to a combined conflict over power and over ideology.

After the conflict took root in the world structure, and it quickly did, building on the polarization the Soviet Union had been exposed to after the Bolshevik revolution 1917 and its foundation in 1922, as well as some of the conflict attitude and behavior engendered by World War II. The most comprehensive–quantitatively and qualitatively–arms race in world history unfolded itself.

From what has been said above, it is quite clear what would be its three major dimensions: a horizontal system between the two Centers, to deter and fight aggression; a vertical system within the formations of capital imperialism in the West and social imperialism in the East to maintain status quo, and a vertical system within the Center

countries themselves to deter and fight any subversion.

Unfortunately most of the debate and political action have focussed only on the former, and particularly on its nuclear dimension.

But the control systems inside the empires form a part of the capitalist vs socialist conflict formation, although they certainly also can be seen as conflicts in their own right, as done above. Here the methods are different: bases, local military missions, training of officers in the Center countries, dependency of the local elite on military, economic and political aid from the Center for their political survival, and so on. And finally there is the conventional apparatus inside the Center countries: secret police, national guards and militia (all the time with conventional armies in the background), all kinds of control methods to make sure that any opposition bent on fundamental change is kept at bay. The total magnitude for this system of war and repression has certainly not yet been grasped by anybody; because it has never been seen in its totality.

Formulated this way, it is also clear under what conditions the "East-West conflict" would diminish in salience; under what conditions it might even wither away. Fundamentally seen, it is probably correct to say that a conflict will decrease in significance, and even sink below the political horizon, to the extent that issues are being resolved, and this can happen partly because they are no longer salient, partly because a new equilibrium is found, deemed satisfactory to either party. It is our contention that both these mechanisms have been operative during the thirty years after World War II, particularly during the last ten years.

First, time has passed and the issues arising from World War II, such as confiscation and nationalization, not to mention the general change of regimes in what used to be countries in the capitalist periphery, will only remain psychologically and politically important to those who not only remember the alternative but had some kind of interest (not necessarily material) in its continuation.

Such a person would probably have had to be born in the beginning of this century, which means that he and she today is either dead, retired, or in the process of passing out of the political process. Most important in that connection were those who had fought on the Axis side in these countries, in Europe and in Asia, and at least the officers among them are now on that age category. A purely demographic process, hence, is therefore responsible for a part of the conflict resolution.

Second, to the extent that the conflict has to do with less past-oriented, more dynamic aspects of international interaction, considerable change has been produced during the last years, after the so-called détente set in. More particularly, this process is, at least

in Europe, characterized by some kind of reopening of these countries for economic transactions that are - although both form and terminology differ - remarkably similar to what went on before.

Fundamentally speaking, it is still a question of exporting technology and capital from the capitalist center to the socialist periphery, and importing raw materials and products at a relatively low level of processing to the capitalist center. There is one basic difference, however, at least so far: there is no import of raw labor, that only comes from a semi-socialist country like Yugoslavia, not to mention from the entire capitalist periphery, such as Portugal, Spain Southern Italy, Turkey, and indeed Third World countries in general.

These two factors are probably sufficient to explain why the East-West conflict has abated in its central, hard-core area. The high level horizontal war system the two Center direct at each other is standing there without a real target. They are not irrational enough to launch a first strike, knowing the nature of the second strike; unless the provocation has been intolerable.

The level of the arms race between East and West has probably been of less significance for the détente: the demographic process, and the economic adjustment process in the interest of particularly the elites of both systems, could take place at any level of the arms race. The threat of a mutual destruction far canceling any possible gains resulting from an aggressive war was already established with the explosion of the atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The tremendous overkill capacity of today was not necessary to make that point.

It may, however, be argued that the arms race had to continue for a long time in order to constitute such a drain of all kinds of resources that it became too competitive to, for instance, consumers' needs in the Soviet Union, and urban renewal and general renovation in the United States. This factor, however, has to be weighed against the stimulus the arms race has given to the military-industrial complex in the West and the military –bureaucratic complex in the East.

There is one effect/the arms race in all probability has not had, however, and that is the major function attributed to it: that of deterring an attack. In order to deter an attack, there has to be an attack to deter. That such an intention was ever seriously considered on either side, in spite of the ever increasing capability, has never been established. Objectively speaking, if any side should attack it would have been the West, since the West had suffered the loss of its traditional capitalist periphery in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union had already gained after World War II, as crystallized in the

Teheran-Jalta-Potsdam agreements and would only be prepared to defend them.

However, it does not look as if anybody has so far established a serious attempt in this aggressive direction from the West.

The same applies to the East: what actually happened was soviet withdrawal from such areas as northernmost Norway, Denmark (Bornholm) Finland, Austria and northern Iran.

This does not mean that there was no interest in the East for a basic change in the West, but this was to be brought about by revolutionary upheavals within the general formation of capitalist imperialism, including internal revolts in their Center countries. Nor is there any doubt that the Soviet Union and some groups within the periphery of social imperialism wanted to contribute to this, but by means short of a belligerent attack.

(7) Capitalist vs Capitalist

Difficult to tell. The East-West conflict formation being so powerful that intra-bloc conflicts even if objectively existing will not be given any space for articulation. And, EC and Japan are both tied to the US in powerful, well controlled alliances.

On the other hand, capitalism is based on competition and "comparative advantages" which is what counts.

The comparative advantages of the EC, so far only six countries, will take time to crystallize as economies of scale with increasing integration of the six. Singly none of them can rival the US; combined they might constitute a challenge.

The comparative advantage of Japan - the size of two big European countries - lies in its high level of skilled labor, labor-capital, and capital-state cooperation.

They felt very badly treated by the "Nixon Shock" of 1971 (the US dollar no longer backed by gold), and the textile crisis, and will increasingly demand export access in return for the US bases in Japan in general, and Okinawa (also after its return to Japan in 1972) in particular.

(8) Socialist vs Socialist

The world does not have much experience with this conflict formation since the history of socialist countries is a short one. Moreover, it must not be confused with social imperialism, the second conflict formation above, since that is a Center-Periphery conflict.

But within that formation, in Eastern Europe, there might have been important

Periphery-Periphery conflicts, and it is quite possible that such conflicts will emerge if the lid is taken off the Eastern European international dialectic, which is another way of saying "if the power of the Soviet Union is significantly reduced".

However, it is unclear, whether conflicts, that might then come out in the open would have a clearly socialist character, or simply take the age-old form of territorial conflict (e.g. between Hungary and Rumania over Transsylvania, etc.).

Needless to say, the conflict formation "socialist vs socialist" above all refers to the relation between the Soviet-Union and the People's Republic of China.

In saying so it is quite clear who the actors are: those two countries, or at least certain elites in those two countries. It is considerably less clear what the conflict is about, and this may serve to illustrate an obvious point in general conflict theory: if the conflict issue is very clear, then the definition of the actors to a large extent becomes empirical, and hence considerable less clear. And conversely: when the actors are well defined, then the conflict issues between them may be rather multidimensional indeed, in need of empirical exploration.

One way of summarizing six major conflict issues between these two major actors in world politics today, ordered from the less important to the more important, might run as follows.

The North-China issue. This is the most well-known issue between the two, and probably also the least important one. It concerns the territories North of the present border, territories referred to in China sometimes as "North China", in the Soviet Union known as the "Far East". The issue has a very concrete aspect in the Ussuri river, where certain islands are sometimes under, sometimes above water and where the river itself changes its course. However, such issues are not too badly defined by international law.

Closely related to this are the broader issues under the heading of the "unequal treaties". It is not obvious that China wants any major territorial change, except for, possibly, some regulation concerning the agro-geography of the Ussuri-river.

Rather, it may look as if the conflict is more about the definition of the past than about any territorial regulation of present or future. In other words, it might well be that what the Chinese really want, is an unequivocal admission from the Russians to the effect that the treaty was unequal, and continues to be unequal regardless of any change of regime in Moscow.

What is wanted seems to be some kind of admission of having committed a wrong rather than any real rectification of that wrong. The problem is whether the Russians would be willing to concede this, particularly since it would be tantamount to an admission

that a socialist state continues the imperialist practices of its feudal- capitalist predecessor state.

Formulated this way, it is clear that the Chinese ask for rather much, and it is doubtful that a compromise can be found, particularly since two very different dimensions (one territorial, one political) are involved, and it would require much flexibility to strike a horse-bargain between the two.

The Mongolian Issue. Again, it does not look as if the Chinese have a territorial modification on their mind. In other words, the point does not seem to be that the Chinese feel "Mongolia is ours".

But they definitely feel that Mongolia should not be a part of Soviet social imperialism either, which again brings us back to Conflict Formation No. 2 above.

The only difference is that in this case China is involved, with which the Soviet Union has a much broader and longer conflict border than with Western Europe (and might have a similar relation to the countries in Eastern Europe). Mongolia is in the Soviet zone of influence. China wants it out of that zone and might also feel that the Chinese type of socialism is better suited for the Asian Mongolians than the European Soviet version. After all, Mongolia was a feudal country far from the Eastern European capitalist experience.

The Central Asian Soviet Republics. The same issue applies to these five republics (Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan): the Chinese seem to feel that these republics are populated by people more similar to themselves. If they had been in a position to decide for themselves their pattern of socialism would have been different, and certainly not directed from Moscow.

Again, the issue is probably not that the Chinese want it to be directed from Peking in the same sense as it now is from Moscow, but that they should enjoy considerably more autonomy, perhaps even independence.

Needless to say, if this is the case, one is already touching a conflict issue of considerable deeper significance than the preceding two. And, as they are parts of the Soviet Union the integrity of that construction is at stake. We would expect high hostility in this key antagonism.

The Past History of Soviet-Chinese Relations. From the very beginning of the Chinese revolutionary efforts in the early 1920s the Soviet-Union was influencing the course of events in a high-handed manner; sometimes using Comintern as an instrument for domination, referred to as "leadership out of experience". That relationship was also direct, in the period of reconstruction after the Chinese civil war and World War II, and

construction of socialism in the early 1950s.

The submissiveness went so far as to send a delegation of cooks to Moscow to study Soviet cuisine; if there is any field where the Chinese were in no need of a master it is the culinary aspect of life. The bitterness relative to the old master is profound, also since the Chinese feel that Mao should have succeeded Stalin, not Malenkov.

Conflict over the Correct Definition of Socialism. First, to the Chinese, collectivization of the means of production and economic planning are seen only as necessary and not as sufficient conditions for a socialist society to come into being. Second, the Chinese seem to have a less "ascriptive" view of what constitutes a good socialist leader: he and she have to prove themselves again and again, there is no such thing as "being born red". Third, the Chinese see socialist- communist society as something to be created new and fresh every day.

These points are rather different from Soviet conceptions. If practiced in the Soviet-Union they constitute a threat to the Soviet elite view of permanence, finality to socialism, of having arrived. For the Chinese nothing is permanent except, maybe, China itself.

Conflicts in the Third World. By and large, this conflict issue can be summarized in one sentence: most Third world countries are, one way or the other, trying to get out of capitalist imperialism, and the major question confronting them is: what is to succeed that stage? The Soviet appeal is decreasing with more knowledge of Soviet reality.

(9) European vs Asian

Again, difficult to tell, and again because of the overpowering influence of the East-West conflict formation perspective. But with rapid decolonization, the hold of Europe–England, Netherlands, Portugal, France–over Asia is vanishing fast. China rises in autonomy if not (yet) economically. Japan rises economically if not (yet) in autonomy. We are dealing with giant forces that have been repressed for a long time and it stands to reason that when unleashed they will change the world.

Combining this formation with what has been said under (7) above, who is going to be the major loser in the longer run is clear: the United States of America. Who is going to the major winner is less clear, however.

Epilogue: Basic humand needs, conflict and peace reasearch

The basis thesis to be defended and explored here can be formulated simply: the point of departure for any study of politics in general, and international or global politics in particular, must be basic human needs. We have two arguments in favor of that thesis, and they can also be formulated in a very simple manner.

First, politics is not a random process; there is an element of goal-directedness. Actors, individual or collective, subnational national or supranational (including transnational) try to attain something. There is an everlasting effort to realize goals, to implement programs written in a goal language, which leads to conflicts, including conflicts over the definitions of those programs.

Which goals should be taken most seriously? The argument would be that these goals should be as close to human beings as possible, and should express social reality as it is experienced by us, the humans, presumably the means and ends of politics.

An argument of this kind is only meaningful if it is also stated what the argument rejects. Thus, it rejects an analysis of politics in terms of abstractions only; and particularly abstractions related to such large-scale systems as states and the interstate, world system.

There is no scarcity of variables with which to describe such systems: states can be seen as poor vs rich, powerless vs powerful; societies can be conceived of as open vs closed, capitalist vs socialist; the world system can be seen as unipolar vs bipolar vs multipolar, having few states as members or many states, being composed only of states (territorial actors) or also of non- territorial actors, and so on. But these are all abstractions relative to the concrete satisfaction of basic human needs.

What does it help when a state is rich and powerful if the citizens, at least many, even most of them, are poor and powerless, living in misery? What does it help that a society is socialist if the citizens are unfree, incapable of deciding over their own conditions?

Of course, many theories exist to the effect that there is either an automatic empirical connection between what happens at state and society levels, or the local level, and human needs satisfaction; or to the effect that this relation is even a logical implication, a tautology.

It is probably only the last years' events, that have led so many towards a highly skeptical attitude when it comes to the relation between such abstractions as "GNP/capita" or "public ownership of means of production". The events have forced us always to ask the question: yes, but how is the situation at the level where concrete human beings are born, grow up, live and work, live and hate and die – exactly how do they experience their lives? Poverty in the midst of plenty, powerlessness in the midst of power, repression in spite of claims to the opposite? Great contradictions between the concrete level where human lives are lived, and the abstract level where human lives join together in systems, and systems into supersystems.

What we are saying is in fact just this: homo mensura, man is the measure of all things. But this is not seen here as an abstract, value-loaded position only. It does not imply any rejection of the obvious, that there are collective actors that do pursue goals seen as "abstract"–in the preceding paragraph–such as wealth, power, democratic organization of political life, socialist organization of economic life. Nor is there any a priori rejection of the hypothesis that some of these strategies may lead to human need satisfaction for people below the politicians directly responsible for such exercises.

However, nor is there any acceptance of such hypotheses, always keeping open the possibility that goal realization at the collective level may be irrelevant or even counter-productive when it comes to basic needs satisfaction at the individual, human level.

And this leads us to our second anchoring point: the idea that however much collective actors are capable of realizing abstract goals, ultimately, sooner or later the failure to satisfy basic human needs will generate forces–popular movements that is–that will threaten even the most beautiful construction in social-political architectonics. Hence, it is important to conceive of human needs in such a way that their non-satisfaction, both from empirical experience and from more general and theoretical points of view, will with very high likelihood lead to such movements. The needs may for some time be suppressed, the movements may for some time be repressed, but sooner or later the forces will be there.

What, then, is our catalogue of basic human needs? It is with some hesitation one puts forward such a catalogue, but the two anchoring points mentioned above can be used not only to justify the theory of basic human needs as a point of departure for

a theory of politics, but also to serve as guidelines for defining something as a basic human need. Thus, one has to feel fairly certain that these needs stand for goals that human beings more or less all over the world really want to see satisfied–there will be exceptions of course, but relatively few–and so strongly that non-satisfaction has social and political consequences. It has to be demonstrated that non-satisfaction can be identified with major social-political problems; recurrent phenomena that are well known in contemporary politics, in past politics for that matter, and likely to be with us forever – as long as human beings are populating the Planet Earth.

One possible catalogue with a corresponding list of socio-political problems would look as follows:

Table 1 Basic Needs, Socio-Political Problems

	BASIC NEEDS	SOCIO-POLITICAL PROBLEMS
I.	THE MOST BASIC NEED	
	life, survival	violence - security, absence of violence
II.	BASIC NEEDS	poverty - growth, well-being
	Input:	
	food, water	
	Environment protection:	
	clothes, shelter, health	
	Community:	
	education, togetherness	
III.	NEAR-BASIC NEEDS	repression - human rights, social justice
	work, creativity	
	freedom, mobility	
	politics, participation	
IV.	RELATION TO NATURE	environmental deterioration
	partnership	ecological balance
		- depletion problem
		- pollution problem
		- population problem

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We have divided the basic human needs into four groups, corresponding to what seems to be the major problems in the world today: violence, misery, repression and environmental deterioration. The latter split into three: depletion – of raw materials, today particularly discussed in connection with "energy crisis", pollution of nature and humans, and the population problem. The relation between lack of need satisfaction and these problems is so immediate, so tautological one might say, that this seems to pass the test where this criterion is concerned.

Is the list sufficiently universal? We take it that humans everywhere with very few exceptions want to survive, that human beings cling to life. They also want to be guaranteed the minimum needed for continued survival: the inputs to the body in the form of food and water, protection of the body from the hazards of a sometimes very hostile nature (in the form of shelter, and in the form of health care which may one day also extend to the type of internal deterioration of the human body known as "ageing"); and the need for community with others, membership in a culture so as to make human communication and dialogue possible – here referred to as "education" as opposed to "schooling"; and togetherness with others, with friendship, love, sex as major ways of expression and impression. Without the needed inputs and protection from the environment humans as biological beings cannot survive; nor can they without community with others, as social beings. And still, this is only a modest, even primitive concept of human beings defined by satisfying the basic needs mentioned so far. Hence the more controversial category of "near basic" needs; like the need for some form of work that permits creative self-expression, the need for freedom, the need to engage in politics in order to shape the conditions of one's own life.

We then conceive of freedom essentially according to the old liberal formula of "free mobility of persons and ideas". This means free mobility from and free mobility to, mobility as a sender and as a receiver, the freedom to travel and be travel to, the freedom to communicate and be communicated to. Put differently: the freedom of expression, and the freedom of impression, of association and 0f dissociation, person-to-person and by means of long-distance communication (letters, telephone and telegraph, mass media). It means all that is needed at the personal level to bring about consciousness formation defined as insight in the forces acting upon oneself.

The need to engage in politics brings this one step further. We do not see it merely as a right, but as a need. It is taken as axiomatic that everyone has a need to participate actively in shaping one's own condition of life. Politics goes beyond consciousness formation and includes the possibility of association, organization, mobilization.

Politics is a difficult concept to define. But it seems to involve two elements: on the one hand, the transformation of consciousness and organization into some type of confrontation and <u>struggle</u>, with a view to transcending existing social political orders at the micro or macro levels; and on the other hand some element of <u>regulation</u> of this struggle, even institutionalization.

Politics implies fighting, but fighting according to rules. Politics may become very raw and crude when the first element becomes dominant; at other times, it becomes extremely flat and stale because the second element becomes dominant, perhaps most clearly seen in contemporary presidential and parliamentary democracies. Both of them are forms of repression, perhaps adequately referred to as "repressive intolerance" and "repressive tolerance" respectively.

We have used the term "repression" more extensively so that it also covers the non-satisfaction of the need for creativity.

One example would be the perversion of work into jobs with no creative element; in other words alienation, the total absence of freedom as defined above.

Another example would be the effort to consolidate an existing social order rather than to permit politics, or social dialectics, to unfold itself. Of course, we are not saying that human beings cannot for a long time tolerate lack of creativity, freedom and politics. But in the longer run the assumption is that these needs are so basic that they will assert themselves, working their way into the open and become a political "problem" regardless of what is done to conceal it.

Finally, there is the relation to nature. Humans are parts of nature, of the biosphere. Some harmony in the biosphere is a further condition for further survival. When we list this as a basic need and not only as a problem, it is because of an assumption that deeper down, there is a yearning for some type of closeness to nature attempted expressed in the word "partnership", and incompatible with the major imbalances referred to as depletion, pollution and population problems. These problems also lead to non-satisfaction of basic needs, and ultimately even threaten the most basic need for human survival.

But we also need a more direct relationship to nature and close contact, and if these needs are not very strongly felt in our current society, and not so easily given expression to, it is because they have been suppressed by that society, not because they do not exist. Thus, ecological imbalance is seen as something deeper than simply a threat to the satisfaction of basic needs. It is also a threat to something deeply spiritual, severing ties to the basis in basic needs.

<u>This catalogue of progressive basic human needs may now also be read as a catalogue</u>

of expanding frontiers in peace research.

In the beginning peace research was mainly concerned with <u>direct violence</u>, or violence as an intended human act, quick in execution. But if the basic concern of peace research was the deprivation of life, then it very soon became obvious that there were other ways in which human lives were taken, perhaps not so quick and often not intended. But human lives were nevertheless wasted through hunger and inadequate protection from the hazards of the environment. However, since this violence was not directly exercised another concept and approach to violence was needed, and the category of <u>structural violence</u> served some of that purpose. The concerns of peace research were expanded from understanding the conditions of reducing direct violence to include the reduction of structural violence.

Although the focus now became much broader, making it possible to discuss a much wider range of political problems in general, and those of international politics in particular, peace research was still staying within the confines of "negative peace". It was still a question of a very modest conception of humans as something kept going, surviving. This is seen very clearly if one includes under the purview of peace research the basic need for community with the two components of education and togetherness, not to mention the near-basic needs for real work, freedom and access to politics.

One might include those under the general heading of "self realization", or "personal growth"; and such terms and research programs would lead into "positive peace". If peace is seen as a condition for human fulfilment then there is no reason to place an arbitrary borderline on the list of needs defining the concerns of peace research to the minimum conditions of human existence.

Hence, it is argued strongly, that peace research should undergo a second expansion and be less modest in its concept of the human condition. The expansion from direct violence to the inclusion of structural violence made it possible to discuss an enormous new range of phenomena under the umbrella of peace research. The expansion from negative peace to the inclusion of positive peace should be at least equally enriching.

In addition, this kind of expansion would also bring peace research in much closer contact with future studies because empirical reality, past studies, offers much fewer cases of societies where higher needs were satisfied. For instance, there are societies that offer a relatively high level of security to its members as well as satisfaction of basic needs, but only segments of some societies can be said to provide their members with such basic conditions of human fulfilment as creative work, freedom and real politics.

How about ecological balance in this connection? It is both a higher order need and

a deeper need, and as such should fall under the concept of positive peace. But it also enters as one of the most important determinants in connection with negative peace, which is only one more reason for including environmental concerns.

In the field of development studies the term "eco-development" has already been coined; maybe one could also talk about "eco-peace"? It would have something to do not only with living in peace with other human beings but also with the nature of which human beings are one, of many, parts.

Actually, as seen from this type of perspective "development" and "peace" become almost synonymous concepts: they refer to a process more than a state of affairs whereby all these needs become satisfied, for everybody.

The level of satisfaction, then, should not be measured as elite satisfaction by studying the level of freedom enjoyed by the top 10%, nor as average satisfaction by studying average protein and calorie consumption per person per day, but as the level of need satisfaction for the people, for instance by studying the extent of satisfaction of all these needs for the bottom 10, 20 or 25%. If a society expands the level of need satisfaction for the elites, or for the top 25%, even 50% so that the average goes up, keeping constant the level of non-satisfaction at the bottom, then that society is not undergoing development. There is no peace; there is violence, at least of the structural, possibly also of the direct, intentional kind.

So much for the basic idea, that politics should be studied from the vantage point of concrete basic human needs, and that this should be the point of departure for peace research. Peace research should concern itself more with new frontiers, with what happens, or should happen, after basic needs have been satisfied. In this there is a program of political action as well as political analysis.

However, neither action nor analysis will stop with this type of catalogue, but immediately proceed to the next questions: why are there non-satisfaction problems, and in what direction would solutions to the problems be located?

The general view taken here is that the answers to political problems have to be found in political (meaning power) formations, and their conflict formations, and more particularly in the structures built into human societies and the relations between human societies. Structural analysis becomes indispensable as a tool for the diagnosis and solution of problems. This position is a rejection of the idea that there are technical solutions available for these problems without structural changes.

Typical examples of such solutions would be:

	Problem	Typical Solutions
1	Violence	Balance of power, Peace keeping forces
2	Poverty	Development assistance programs, Trade and Aid
3	Repression	Human Rights Commissions, legislation
4	Depletion	Renewable Resources
5	Pollution	Recycling
6	Population	Family planing

All these are technical solutions that not only maintain structures, but sometimes even reinforce them. If these structures are at the same time the structures that produce the problems, the technical solutions will clearly be counterproductive. On the other hand, if a situation is created whereby structures are fundamentally changed, there might still be a very important scope for such technical solutions. The basic point is to understand the conditions under which they are productive and not irrelevant, counterproductive, or even reproductive of the problems they are supposed to solve.

Appendix: A Framework for the Analysis of Social Conflict

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

by

Johan Galtung

December 1958

FOREWORD:

The present paper is based on lectures given at Columbia
University (Sociology of Conflict, Sociology 127) Winter Term 1958.
Its aim is to present the outlines of a conceptual framework in socio-
logical terms that can be used for the analysis of social conflict, a
set of propositions with no claim to completeness, and a more thorough
analysis of two selected topics.

At some points illustrations are given of the propositions,
but no claim is made to tenability except a kind of theoretical claim:
the propositions make sense within the framework presented. The quasi-
axiomatic form the paper is given is not intended to be the final form,
but to serve as an aid in this preliminary and more programmatic stage.
However, it seems that some parts of the sociology of conflict are quite
amenable to more formalized treatment, at least within a word-calculus.

Johan Galtung
Department of Sociology
Columbia University
New York

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1. <u>From general sociological theory.</u>

DEF 1: By an <u>action-system</u> we mean a system of actors. If there is only one actor, we shall call it a <u>personal system</u>. If there are two or more actors interacting, we shall call it a <u>social system</u>.

"Actor" and "interaction" are to be conceived of as primitive terms

DEF 1.1: By a <u>group</u> we mean a social system whose members perceive themselves as set apart from other individuals. A group is hence a dichotomy of all individuals in in-group members and out-group members.

DEF 1.2: By a <u>society</u> we mean a group which is self-maintaining and has a life-span longer than the lives of the single individual.

DEF 1.3: By <u>individualistic orientation</u> we mean an orientation where all actions are evaluated as to the effects for the personal system of the individual actor.

By <u>collectivistic orientation</u> we mean the orientation where all actions are evaluated as to the effects for a social system the individual actor is a member of.

A person with an individualistic orientation acts on behalf of himself; a person with a collectivistic orientation acts on behalf of a social system which he may be said to represent or to be an executive of.

We make use of the remaining four of Parsons' pattern variables to define primary and secondary relation:

DEF 1.4: By a <u>primary relation</u> we mean a relation between actors where the orientation is

particularistic   diffuse   affective   quality

By a <u>secondary relation</u> we mean a relation between actors where the orientation is

universalistic   specific   affectively   performance
neutral

DEF 1.5: By a <u>status</u> in a social system we mean a set of expectations (norms) from others directed to the holder of the status.

DEF 1.6: By a <u>status-set</u> we mean the set of statuses held by one individual.

DEF 1.7: By a <u>role</u> the expected interaction of one status-holder with holders of <u>one</u> other status.

DEF 1.8: By a <u>role-set</u> we mean the set of roles constituting one status.

We then introduce four variables of importance for all interaction-analysis:

1. Frequency of interaction with Alter: infrequent - - frequent
2. Scope of interaction with Alter: specific - - diffuse
3. Extent of cognition of Alter as a person: weak - - strong

and 4. Cathexis of Alter: strongly   negative   neutral   positive   strongly
                          negative   positive

The following propositions seem important:

PROP 1.1: The more frequent the interaction, the stronger the cognition

PROP 1.2: The stronger the cognition, the more diffuse the scope of
           the interaction

and these two together give:

PROP 1.3: The more frequent the interaction the more diffuse the scope of
           the interaction.

The last proposition is obviously not valid for the case where the interacting
parties share the knowledge that the interaction will be highly infrequent,
so that the famous "stranger-effect" may develop. These three propositions
express to some extent the same thing, i.e., how different factors relating
to how "primary" a relation between Ego and Alter is are related.

The three variables can be tentatively related to the fourth variable:

PROP 1.4: The more primary the relation to Alter, the stronger the cathexis -
           negative or positive.

    Prop 1.4.1: The more frequent the interaction, the stronger the cathexis.
    Prop 1.4.2: The more diffuse the interaction, the stronger the cathexis.
    Prop 1.4.3: The stronger the cognition, the stronger the cathexis.

What we essentially say is that more knowledge, more frequent interaction
and more diffuse orientation do not necessarily lead to "friendship"
or positive cathexis, only to stronger cathexis. If this is right, we
would expect the high amount of ambivalence in primary relations - the
rapid change from love to hatred-to increase with increments of the first
three variables, and that techniques for avoidance of the ambivalence
consist in decrements in the three variables, or at least the first two
(making the interaction less frequent limiting the scope of the interaction),
This seems to make good sense.

2. Values and means-end matrices.

DEF 2: A value-standard is a standard according to which phenomena can be divided into those which are good (have positive value, should be pursued), those which are bad (have negative value, should be avoided) and those which are neutral (where the attitude is indifferent).

Instead of "positive value" we often say for short just "value". "Good", "bad" and "neutral" are to be conceived of as primitive terms.

DEF 2.1: By a value-chain (or a value-hierarchy) we mean an ordered or (partially ordered) set of values, such that realization of one value in the chain is instrumental to the realization of the values above it.

DEF 2.2: A value is a means-value (heterotelic value) if it is instrumental to some value.
A value is an end-value (autotelic value, goal-state) if it it not perceived as instrumental to any value, but "is a value in itself."

"Means" and "ends" are relative concepts only, in the sense that it depends on the context (where we are in the value-chain or the value-pyramid) whether a value shall be conceived of as a means or an end.

DEF 2.3: A value is an ultimate end (goal) if it is conceived of as a means in none or very few contexts only.

Imagine that we have a set of ends and a set of means. Clearly, the same means may have consequences that are conducive to the realization of one end and detrimental to another end. This means that a means-value can be evaluated by using an end-value as a standard as to the kind of consequences it has for the end. These evaluations can be conceived of as forming a scale from -1 (completely detrimental) through 0 (no relevant consequence for that end-value) to +1 (completely conducive). To make better use of these ideas, we define:

DEF 2.4: A means-end matrix is a matrix with elements e_{ij} where e_{ij} is the evaluation of the consequences of means no. i when end no. j is used as a value-standard:

$$
\begin{array}{c}
\text{means} \\
\\
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{ends} \\
\begin{array}{cccccc}
 & 1 & 2 & 3 & j & n \\
1 & e_{11} & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & e_{1n} \\
2 & \vdots & & & & \vdots \\
i & \cdots & \cdots & e_{ij} & \cdots & \\
m & e_{m1} & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & e_{mn}
\end{array}
\end{array}
$$

Read horizontally, the matrix tells us to what extent a means is able to satisfy different ends.
Read vertically, the matrix tells us to what extent an end is satisfied by the different means.

To make it more complete, we must give different weights to the means and to the ends:

Means can be given weights according to their relative presence.
Ends can be given weights according to ther relative importance.

Clearly, the culture of a social system or particularly of a group or a society expresses itself in the means-end matrix of the system, although it might be dangerous to identify it with the matrix. For some of the propositions about conflict we need a definition concerning the relation of an individual to a group:

DEF 2.5:   We say that an individual is the more integrated into a group

    1. the more he has internalized the means-end matrix of the group, and

    2. the more he has of a collectivistic orientation relative to out-groups.

3. Structural-functional analysis and social change.

DEF 3: By a structure we mean something which is described as a means. By a function we mean a value-standard for evaluating the effects of structures as positively functional, negatively functional and non-functional.

Instead of saying that a "structure has a positive function" we often say for short that it "has a function". Thus "function" is given a double meaning: as the name of the standard and as the name of the positive values the standard gives to the effects of some structures.

With these definitions of "structure" and "function" it becomes clear that what is called "structural-functional" analysis can be conceived of as the analysis of suitable slice of a value-hierarchy, where the bottom layer of the slice is the structures (i.e., the means) and the top layer the functions (i.e., the ends to be pursued). A useful tool for this analysis is the means-end matrix, which we now shall call the structural-functional matrix.

DEF. 3.1: By a perceived s-f matrix we mean the functions, structures and evaluations as they are perceived by a system member or group. By the actual s-f matrix we mean the s-f matrix as the "disinterested observer" would assess them after careful observation of the system.

The s-f matrix is above all an analytical tool for the analysis of social change, as we have argued elsewhere. For action-system to be in equilibrium there must obviously be some kind of a balance between structures and functions, in the sense that a structure must not be too negatively functional, nor must a function be such that it evaluates too many structures negatively, etc. This leads to

DEF 3.2: By a balanced s-f matrix we mean the matrix of a system in equilibrium.

A necessary condition for the matrix to be balanced seems to be that no structures have non-positive weighted sums of consequences, and no functions have non-positive weighted sums of evaluations. If the matrix is not balanced change can be predicted in such a direction as to obtain a balanced matrix, or more correctly: a matrix that is perceived by the power-holders to be balanced.

With this as a background three very fundamental and comprehensive axioms can be formulated:

Axiom 3.1: All action-systems will try to achieve s-f matrices that are perceived as balanced. This is an expression of the famous "goal-directedness of human behavior", where it is understood that the goal is constantly changed and the efforts to obtain balance between structures and functions constantly redirected.

Axiom 3.2: All action-systems will try to avoid disparate s-f matrices for the system, because they want "to be of one mind" for action. This is an expression of the famous "avoidance of dissonance". The avoidance will take the following forms:

1. Efforts to obtain consensus about the s-f matrices, i. e., of the functions to be pursued, the structures to be used and the evaluations of the structures.

2. **Suppression of parts of the system** with divergent perceived
s-f matrices, by

   a. Segregation and devaluation

   b. Denial of expression

   c. Extinction

3. **Splitting of the system in sub-systems** with maximum within
and minimum between consensus.

The first of these patterns is used in groups favoring the prac-
tice of "unanimous vote", and in persons arriving at rational
choices. The second pattern is used in very different forms, as
when a democracy suppresses the minority and lets the majority
s-f matrix be that of the system, when a dictatorship suppresses
the opposition by extermination or by denying it means of expres-
sion and when a person suppresses a diverging urge. The third
pattern is the usual phenomenon of faction-formation, or of "split
personality". Essentially, all of these very different disso-
nance-avoidance techniques are made use of by both personal and
social systems.

Axiom 3.3: **All action-systems with similar perceived s-f matrices will tend
to form super-systems.** This is an expression of the tendency
towards group-formation on the basis of similar goals, etc.

4. Fundamental Concepts in The Theory of Conflict

We are now in a position to define "conflict" as a property of an action system:

DEF 4a: **Conflict** is said to exist in an action-system if two or more values are pursued and they are perceived as incompatible or mutually exclusive.

Conflict thus becomes a concept closely linked to the concept of "value". To link this definition better in with what we have said in sections 2 and 3, let us add a definition which is considered as a more precise version of the definition above:

DEF 4b: **Conflict** is said to exist in an action-system if two or more s-f matrices are pursued and they are perceived as incompatible or mutually exclusive (see axiom 3.2).

With reference to the three fundamental axioms at the end of section 3, it becomes at once clear what we should mean by "solving a conflict":

DEF 4c: A conflict is said to be **solved** if a unified s-f matrix is obtained for the action-system (see axiom 3.3).

With these definitions as our point of departure we can start building a real conceptual framework for the analysis of conflicts. This will here be done by introducing 10 dichotomies in the definitions 4.1 to 4.10. Like most dichotomies in sociology, they are really disguised continua and should be conceived as such, but the simplification that dichotomizing brings about is so useful for our purpose that we shall present it that way.

DEF 4.1: By **cognitive disagreement** in the action-system we mean dissensus about what is to be considered "true" or "false."

By **value-disagreement** or **conflict** in the action-system we mean dissensus about what is to be considered "good" or "bad".

It seems very important to distinguish between these two forms of disagreement, as only the latter will be called conflict. A totally different thing is that a latent value-disagreement may manifest itself as a cognitive disagreement, where this is one of many forms in which a conflict may be acted out- but in this case we would say that we are really dealing with a **conflict**.

As we have tied "conflict" to "value", all the dimensions for classifying values become automatically dimensions for the classification of conflicts. We shall not here try to classify values according to "institutional realm" (see section 9) but make use of two important dimensions: **position** of the value in the hierarchy, and **salience**.

DEF 4.2: The conflict is **fundamental** if it is over end-values or functions. It is less fundamental if there is agreement about **which** functions to be pursued, but disagreement about the relative weights to be given to them.

The conflict is non-fundamental if it is over means-values
or structures, and there is agreement about the ends.
It is even less fundamental if there is agreement about
which structures to be used, but disagreement about the
relative weights to be given to them.

If there is agreement about the functions, agreement about the structures and
agreement about the two kinds of relative weights, we can safely say that
there is no conflict present in the system. There may still be disagreement
about exactly what are the effects of the structures so that the evaluations
will be different, but that will be cognitive disagreement only. Many non-
fundamental conflicts will probably be reducible to cognitive disagreement.

DEF 4.3: There is said to be actual conflict in the system if a "disinterested
observer" finds that there is conflict.

There is said to be perceived conflict or conflict alone in the
system if the actor (s) consciously or subconsciously perceived (s)
a conflict.

Hence we get the trivial, but useful fourfold-table

	actual	not actual
perceived	conflict	"perceived only"
not perceived	"actual only"	no conflict

where terminology is suggested. We have chosen not to follow the "disinterested
observer" (among other reasons, because he is so difficult to find) and define
both conflict and conflict solution from perceptions. This does not mean that
we do not think that "actual only" conflicts are not of tremendous importance,
among other reasons because they may not have been perceived because of lack of
or distortion of communication.

If two persons want to be the sole possessor of the same girl, the statement
that "there is a conflict" needs no further empirical testing because it follows
immediately from the nature of the two values being pursued: "A being the sole
possessor" and "B being the sole possessor", A≠B. But in a society where one
party wants industrialization and the other party wants a consangioma] family
system, the conclusion that there is a conflict in the system cannot be reached
by purely formal inspection of the two values, but is an empirical matter.
We introduce:

DEF 4.4: If the statement that "the values are incompatible or mutually exclusive"
is analytic or logically true, we say that the conflict is of the logical
kind.

If the statement that "the values are incompatible or mutually
exclusive" is synthetic or needs empirical testing to be
verified, we say that the conflict is of the empirical kind.

We assume that these conclusions are arrived at by the "disinterested observer".
More important than his conclusion, however, is whether the conflict is perceived
as logical or empirical by the parties to the conflict.

DEF 4.5:   A conflict is said to be at the latent level if it is perceived as
a conflict consciously or subconsciously, but no relevant overt
action has ensued.

A conflict is said to be at the manifest level if it is perceived
as a conflict and relevant overt actions have ensued.

Again we get a trivial, but useful fourfold-table:

	conflict on latent level	conflict not on latent level
conflict on manifest level	"full" conflict	conflict-behavior only
conflict not on manifest level	conflict-sentiment only	no (perceived) conflict

We identify the manifest level with the conflict-behavior, and the latent level
with the conflict-sentiment. The first can be observed, the second can, by
definition, only be inferred. The sentiment may, however, have varying degrees
of consciousness to the person concerned. The important thing to realize is that
a conflict may be latent only, and it may also be manifest only as when people
engage in a conflict because they are told to do so with no idea "what it's all about".

We now turn to a classification of conflicts depending on the nature of the action-
system (s) where the conflict is found, and make use of the distinctions introduced
in section 1. But first we need:

DEF 4.6:   A conflict is an intra-system conflict if it is contained within a
system, and within each subsystem of the system.
A conflict is an inter-system conflict if it is between two or more
systems, and not within the systems.

These are ideal types in Weber's sense of the term. A true intra-system conflict
is such that one may subdivide the system, down to the single person and still
find the value-disagreement and in the true inter-system conflict there is no
value-disagreement within the systems in conflict, only between.

In many cases it will obviously be a matter of convention whether we want to conceive
of a conflict as intra-system or inter-system; it depends on what systems we are
looking at. We then introduce the following typology:

Basic-type	Action-systems		
	Personal systems	Social systems	
	Person	Group	Society
Intra-system	1. intra-person	3. intra-group	5. intra-society
Inter-system	2. inter-person	4. inter-group	8. inter-society
	TYPE I	TYPE II	TYPE III

We need the full typology and the distinction between for instance the inter-person and the intra-group conflict. The first is a conflict between persons, the second is within the group and is found inside each member of the group. It is, however, not the same as n intra-person conflicts, where n is the number of members of the group, but a shared intra-person conflict, at the group level. Further, an inter-group conflict is not the same as an inter-person conflict. In the former, the persons who act out the conflict do so on behalf of the group, i.e., with a collectivistic orientation, in the latter each individual fights with an individualistic orientation. We shall present one proposition here to throw more light on the definition (see also section 6).

PROP 4.1. An intra-system conflict is not stable, but will either be solved, or lead to an inter-system conflict one type lower. This may in turn develop into an inter-system conflict of the original type. (follows from axioms 3.2 and 3.3).

Prop 4.1.1: An intra-group conflict will lead to an inter-person conflict and in turn to group formation and an inter-group conflict (the typical community conflict).

Prop 4.1.2: An intra-society conflict will lead to an inter-group conflict and in turn to society formation and an inter-society conflict. (the early formation of the United States).

Extrapolations:

Prop 4.1.3: An intra-person conflict may lead to the splitting of of the personality (not of the physical person) into two parts, and the acting out of the conflict as an inter-person conflict (several forms of mental illness).

Prop 4.1.4: An intra-alliance conflict may lead to an inter-society conflict and in turn to new alliance-formation and an inter-alliance conflict. (the anti-nazi alliance).

We shall later examine in some detail the nature of this general process intra-system to inter-system one type lower to inter-system original type. Survey of definitions and characteristics:

	Typology:	Definition:	Extreme outcomes:
1.	Intra-person	contained within individual	suicide
2.	Inter-person	between individuals, but individualistic orientation	homicide
3.	Intra-group	contained within individuals, but shared between them	dissolution, annihilation, apathy
4.	Inter-group	between groups, but collectivistic orientation	killing
5.	Intra-society	contained within groups and individuals, but shared between them	dissolution, annihilation, apathy
6.	Inter-society	between societies, but collectivistic orientation	extinction through warfare

Of the six above, the first is a **personal** conflict, and the others **social** conflicts. Because of the instability of intra-group and intra-society conflicts, a typology consisting of 1, 2, 4 and 6 will do for most purposes.

In addition to the conflict types we have already introduced, we may also have "mixed types" of the inter-system conflicts: There are three possibilities with our distinctions:

> Mixed type I-II: conflict between a person and a group, as in the case of the heretic.

> Mixed type I-III: conflict between a person and a society, as in the case of the traitor and the case of the criminal; according to legal tradition the conflict is transformed from being inter-personal to being a conflict of this type.

> Mixed type II-III: conflict between a group and a society, as in the case of the Communist Parties in Western countries after WWII.

We shall not deal with these mixed-type conflicts, but indeed feel that a good theory of social conflict should be able to integrate them into the general analysis.

We then turn to the introduction of realistic vs. non-realistic conflicts, which has to do with a comparison between manifest conflict-behavior and latent conflict-sentiment, whether the conflicts are real or perceived.

DEF 4.7: A conflict is said to be **realistic** if the latent conflict is acted out on the manifest level in a way directly relevant to the solution of that conflict.
A conflict is said to be **non-realistic** relative to a value-disagreement if the conflict-behavior on the manifest level has no direct, relevant relation to that on the latent level, but possibly to some other conflict value-disagreement.

As a kind of operational definition level we may add that a **realistic** conflict will be solved if the manifest conflict is solved, whereas the non-realistic conflict will only take on other forms - the latent level conflict will manifest itself in some new conflict.

We thus form our judgment on the basis of a comparison between the conflict-behavior we watch (between poor whites and Negroes) and the underlying conflict we assume (e.g., the intra-group conflict among the poor whites due to poverty, for instance over the values "set aside grain" and "have enough to eat"). In this case a latent intra-group conflict has been acted out as a manifest inter-group conflict.

We get the following possibilities (R for realistic, NR for non-realistic):

LATENT LEVEL	MANIFEST LEVEL			
	intra-person	inter-person	inter-group	inter-society
intra-person	NR or R 1, 1	NR 1, 2	NR 1, 3	NR 1, 4
inter-person	NR 2, 1	NR or R 2, 2	NR 2, 3	NR 2, 4
inter-group	NR 3, 1	NR 3, 2	NR or R 3, 3	NR 3, 4
inter-society	NR 4, 1	NR 4, 2	NR 4, 3	NR or R 4, 4

In all off-diagonal cells we shall of course have non-realistic conflicts only, but in the diagonal cells both possibilities are possible.

DEF 4.7.1: A non-realistic conflict is said to be down-projected if its manifest type is lower than its latent type.

A non-realistic conflict is said to be up-projected if its manifest type is higher than the latent type.

We then need two variables to express the intensity of the conflict: one on the latent level, the other on the manifest level:

DEF 4.8: By intensity on the latent level, latent intensity, we mean degree of emotional involvement by the actors.

By intensity on the manifest level, manifest intensity, we mean kind and degree of intensity of the actions made use of by the actors as responses to the conflict.

The latent intensity, or the intensity of the conflict-sentiment, can vary all the way from zero to extreme hatred via various degrees of hostility. Conceivably, also positive sentiment embracing different shades of love and friendship can ensue from a conflict. The conflict-sentiment is very often expressed as "individual tension," "hostility," "moral indignation," "feeling of being strongly engaged," etc.

The manifest intensity, or the intensity of the conflict-behavior, can also vary all the way from zero to dropping of atom bombs. Conceivably, also positive actions involving all kinds of friendly acts can be possible results of a conflict.

We distinguish between two kinds of manifest acts, depending on the functions they serve:

DEF 4.9: Conflict-behavior is said to be instrumental to the extent it is intended to lead to conflict resolution.

Conflict-behavior is said to be expressive to the extent it serves as an outlet for cumulated conflict-sentiment (from the same or from other conflicts, depending on whether the conflict is realistic or non-realistic).

One way in which conflict-behavior may be instrumental is by serving as a __social control__ of the other party to the conflict. This gives us a cue to the "kind and degree" mentioned in DEF 4.8 of manifest intensity:

SOCIAL CONTROL MECHANISM

    __Kinds:__   informal control; verbal and non-verbal acts of omission: non-cooperation
                acts of commission: civil disobedience; physical force, etc.

    __Degree:__   "Low" to "high".

The kind and degree of the social control mechanisms made use of are very often dependent on techniques, external resources, etc. Further, it should be remembered that what is high manifest intensity in one context may not be it in another, e.g., the use of pistols in a desegregation conflict and in a world war. Similarly, the latent intensity may vary with personal capacity or internal resources, and its intensity must be judged against the background of the conflict context.

PROP 4.5:   All combinations of zero, low and high latent intensity and of zero, low and high manifest intensity are empirically possible.

LATENT INTENSITY			
(Hatred) High	latent hatred	East-West conflict right after Hungarian revolution	Southern lynching
(Hostility) Low	latent hostility	mild quarrel	World War II, e.g., Italy front
(Neutral) Zero	no conflict	top-level meeting	extermination of Jews
friendly acts	Zero	Low	High MANIFEST INTENSITY

(Friendship)

(love)

and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures"). The passing individual will be in a transition state with two cultures internalized at the same time, and the difficulties of reconciling them will inevitably lead him into an intra-person conflict.

b. The pattern of overconformity, the meticulous and exaggerated compliance with selected topdog norms. His lack of training in topdog life, the factor of social myopia which makes it difficult to see clearly statuses socially distant from the status in which or to which one is raised, and the desire to conform will of course all contribute to making this a very painful experience for the individual. It may be explained on two bases:

1. It is a way of gaining access to topdog life, of pleasing the topdog - and even though they may laugh at him, they will also to some extent feel flattered.

2. The exaggeration is a way of killing the underdog in oneself, thus relieving oneself of the burden of the intra-person conflict described above.

c. As a special, but very important case of this, the passer will overconform especially when it comes to expressing the topdog ideology with regard to the underdog. He will probably be especially harsh on underdog leaders who struggle for underdog recognition or equality; i.e., who have a collectivistic outlook and not the individualistic outlook the underdog individual has proved to have (but they may both have a universalistic orientation; the passer may sincerely feel that the road to underdog salvation goes through individual passing only). By this, he hopes to obtain the following:

1. Removal of any doubt as to his loyalty - especially removal of suspicion that he is really a disguised spy or agent from the underdog, or out for contamination of them with his underdog blood or mentality.

2. A struggle against his own past, a denial of the underdog in him, a real attempt to kill him, because he knows there is no return.

3. Retaliation against the underdog group or selected individuals for actual, perceived or anticipated negative sanctions against him for his passing.

d. The underdog reaction to him will probably by this time be a mixture of envy because he is enjoying topdog rights, some admiration for the skills he has displayed in the process, and more negative feelings. These will be highly dependent on the social structure or the cultural climate. If the culture is universalistic and the group is struggling for equality, the passer will probably be perceived as a traitor to the cause, one who did not show the necessary postponement of individual gratification and did not have sufficient collectivistic orientation to share the underdog fate and work for recognition as a group, not only as successful individuals. He will probably also be suspected of being unloyal and be regarded as a renegade, for whom "we apparently are not good enough". Support for this will be found in the pattern mentioned under c. above, as a special case of the overconformity.

It is tempting to suggest a proposition to the effect that there will be a regression towards the main diagonal, i.e., that the sentiment will somehow be adjusted to the behavior or vice-versa, but the examples are so obvious that this seems not to be the case at all. Further, intuitive conceptions of what are "corresponding" sentiment and behavior may be very misleading and culturally biased. It seems that the American culture has norms prescribing "acting it out" and "getting it straight" if intense and negative conflicts-sentiment is felt, but other cultures certainly have other prescriptions. Further, there seems to be no reason why the most hostile and cruel acts cannot be done with little or no negative sentiment at all, possibly even with a positive sentiment. The conclusion is that we can have conflict behavior with no sentiment, and intense hatred with no conflict behavior. In the first case we probably are dealing with institutionalized statuses with a very collectivistic orientation, as the man who pushes the button in the push-button war. In the other case we shall probably sooner or later have an outburst on the manifest level in the same or a different case. But both are empirically possible and frequent.

Finally, we turn to our definition of conflict solution as the achievement in the system of one s-f matrix. We want to catch in our terms the important distinction between the case where the opposition is suppressed in one way or another, and the case where the parties have arrived at a shared solution:

DEF 4.10:   We say that the solution of the conflict is accepted if the conflicting parties both agree on the solution.

We say that the solution of the conflict is unaccepted if the conflicting parties do not agree on the solution.

5. TOPDOG AND UNDERDOG: THE STRUGGLE FOR SCARCE RANK.

We need first two very fundamental definitions and propositions from general sociological theory:

DEF 5. 1: By a **status-dimension** in a social system we mean a set of statuses which for logical reasons are exhaustive and mutually exclusive so that each individual in the social system must have one and only one of them in his status-set (e.g., parent-child in the family, high-middle-low class in the society, etc.).

PROP 5 1: Status-differentiation (also called "division of labor" in a wider sense) is a functional requirement of any society.

DEF 5. 2: By a **rank-dimension** in a social system we mean a status-dimension that is stratified, i.e., the statuses are differentially evaluated (as in the examples above).

PROP 5. 2: Differential evaluation along at least some of the status-dimensions is a functional requirement of any society, whereas the selection of status-dimensions for ranking and the direction of the ranking is culturally dependent in most cases.

To make the exposition simpler, we shall only consider dichotomous, ranked status-dimensions, and call the high status the "topdog" and the low status the "underdog" (other names could have been "elite" and "followers", but we prefer the connotations of the former names in this connection). As indicated in the propositions, we shall have topdog and underdog statuses in any society, which means that the theory to be developed will have a very wide field of application.

To make it more concrete, let us arrive at some major examples of rank-dimensions and try to make the list, if not exhaustive, at least sufficient to cover the most important cases. Obviously, rank-dimensions can be of two kinds: achieved and ascribed.

1. Achieved rank-dimensions. If we agree with Zetterberg ( ) that an achieved rank can be used as a basis for the definition of an institutional realm, we get:

Institutional realm	Rank-dimension, or value to be maximized
Science	1. Knowledge
Technology	2. Skill
Art	3. Taste
Religion/Ideology	4. Holiness
Politics	5. Power
Economics	6. Property
Law	7. Legality
Health	8. Health

Of these eight dimensions, the first three are more pure cases of achieved dimensions, whereas the last five certainly may be considered ascribed dimensions in very many cases.

e. <u>The topdog reaction to him</u> will depend on a number of structural proper-ties of the society. If achievement is a <u>salient pattern</u> and the rank-dimension is of the achieved or mixed kind, the successful and tactful upward mobile underdog individual will be more than welcomed, because he satisfies the function of serving as a proof for the underdog that it is possible. Some individuals of this kind will be selected by the topdog group and their success will be made highly visible to the rest of the society. <u>With passing it is a different story</u>, for in this case it is not the meaning that there shall be any crossing of the line. However, we surmise that passers will be permitted in a limited number for the same reason as with mobility, to serve as a <u>safety-valve mechanism</u> in the so-ciety, but the process will have to be covert and even more tactfully per-formed, and it will not be made visible. Under all circumstances will the rate of underdog individuals moving or passing be regulated so as not to impair the rank-distribution.

2. **Ascribed rank-dimensions.** An ascribed status or ascribed rank is a status or rank that is known with very high probability for the individual at birth. They may be subdivided into <u>indelible</u> and <u>not indelible</u>, and the latter into <u>visible</u> and <u>not visible</u>. We get:

Characterization	Rank-dimension	
	9.	Nationality
	10.	Community
Not indelible	11.	Religion
	12.	Ethnic group
	13.	Class
Indelible, not visible	14.	Kinship
	15.	Relative Age
	16.	Age
Indelible, visible	17.	Race
	18.	Sex

Along all these eighteen dimensions we can very meaningfully talk about topdog and underdog statuses, and the task is to develop some kind of general theory for them, in the first run ignoring the differences between achieved and ascribed ranks, and the subdivisions for the ascribed statuses.

General propositions:

1. Rank is scarce - that is, there must be a definition of the rank-dimension so that only a minority can have top-rank (not every actor can meaningfully be a movie-star, unless movie-star shall become the designation for all statuses filled by movie actors).

2. Rank is a non-distributive value - that is, one cannot distribute increase in rank as one pleases, because rank is essentially "differential rank", and hence it cannot be given to others without affecting one's own rank,

3. The differential ranking may take on very many different forms

   on the latent level: from mere awareness of differential evaluation to scorn or hatred for the other status, combined with stereotypes and prejudice.

   on the manifest level: from a slight tendency to avoid primary relations with holders of the other status to extreme discrimination and direct subjugation.

4. In this situation we may have conflicts on all levels, from the barely perceived to the full-blown manifest. We may have

   intra-person conflict as when the individual underdog finds himself under cross-pressures from the underdog and topdog groups, with attraction and avoidance feelings towards both.

   inter-person conflict as when the individual underdog decides to change his status because of the cross-pressures mentioned above and gets into conflict with individuals in either or both groups.

inter-group conflict as between the underdog and topdog statusholders as groups.

5. **There are only two ways open for the underdog of accommodating to the situation:**

   5.1. The **individual underdog** may become a member of the topdog group, if the ranking-dimension is

      a. **achieved** - by the pattern of **individual mobility**.

      b. **ascribed** - by the pattern of **individual passing**.

      and then gradually acquire topdog rank if he is successful.

   5.2. The **underdog group** as a whole may try to

      a. keep the status-dimension, but **abolish the differential ranking along it**, "the struggle for equality".

      b. keep the status-dimension and the ranking, but **reverse the order of the ranking**, "revolutionary upheaval".

   The way open to the individual underdog, viz., passing or mobility into the topdog group **is not open to the group as a whole** for the reasons mentioned under propositions nos. 1 and 2 above.

6. **The extent to which there is conflict, and which way the underdog chooses will be culturally dependent.** It seems that we here can make use of Parsons' way of characterizing cultural systems by means of two of his pattern variables, when we apply them to our problem in the following way:

   Universalism: the pattern of treating all members of the status-group according to the same criteria.

   Particularism: the pattern of differential treatment of members of the status-group depending on particular relations to them.

   Achievement: the pattern of structural provision for individual mobility depending on the individual performance.

   Ascription: the pattern of not permitting individual mobility, but regarding the status-position as fixed and independent of any performance by the individual.

This gives us

	Universalism	Particularism
Achievement	Individual mobility	Individual mobility
	Group struggle for equality	Underdog group unorganized, everybody looks out for himself
Ascription	Individual passing only	Individual passing by topdog grace
	Underdog compliance, or preparation for revolution	Underdog compliance, everybody waiting for the topdog grace

We now turn to the other case, the underdog as a group struggling for recognition, equality, upheaval -- in short, for social change. This struggle will by definition be a conflict, because the simultaneous realization of the topdog value (leave the rank-dimension intact!) and the underdog value (abolish the ranking, or reverse the order!) is impossible for logical reasons. The following reflections and propositions seem to be valid:

1. The conflict over rank may start like any other conflict, though we may assume that it has been latent for some time, and that some concrete issue starts the conflict and brings it out on the manifest level. From then on we can assume a development to take place along the lines indicated in section 5, but very rapidly if it is possible to use underdog - topdog labels for the two conflicting groups. An important thing is that a conflict is a sufficient condition for making groups out of the social categories the topdog and underdog statusholders form, and it may even be it is not too far from being a necessary condition (if we make use of the definition of "conflict" as "perceived conflict, whether actual or not").

2. We get a very important case of non-realistic conflict, if a conflict is transformed on the manifest level to an underdog-topdog conflict (what communists are so often, rightly or wrongly, accused of doing!) It seems that very many conflicts with very varying contents have a tendency to gravitate in people's minds towards some selected underdog-topdog conflicts and be fought out as such. This will of course not contribute very much to the solution of the original conflict: compare how the enormous conflict between underdeveloped and overdeveloped countries has been partly transformed into an East-West conflict.

3. During the conflict ideologies will develop in the underdog and topdog groups, with functions along the lines suggested in section 5. It seems that these functions can be classified as follows:

   a. for the topdog group - the ideology is a justification of the status quo and of their power over the underdogs.

   b. for the underdog group - the ideology has the function of "anticipatory equalization" - of making the groups equal in the minds of the underdogs, or even with a superiority for the underdog group. Important here are derisive terms and descriptions of the topdogs and consistent ideologies with answers to everything the topdog might say (see the following pages for both).

4. The word "equal" has three very different interpretations, viz.,

   a. "equal" in the meaning factually equal, not that all underdogs are equal to all topdogs, but that as a group, "on the average" they are equal, i.e., that some selected statistical parameters are equal for distributions of group characteristics. We shall call this cognitive equality, equality$_1$.

However, regardless of cultural background, if the rank-dimension is ascribed the pattern of individual mobility will be meaningless. One can only "pass" from one race to another, not "move" socially. It may well be that bottom row characterizations of the underdog group behavior are better in these cases, even if the culture is of the universalism type.

Let us then return to the two possibilities open to the underdog under 5 and try to find a common pattern when the individual underdog wants to make use of the techniques of passing or mobility into the topdog level. We suggest that the following will take place:

1. At some point in the individual's life a change in reference-group takes place. This may be a slow or a sudden process and may be analyzed as the special case of migration-analysis: a combination of pull towards the topdog status and push away from the underdog status. The change is highly dependent on exposure to topdog life, whether this comes through the mass-culture media or direct interaction. We assume in the following that he acquires a sincere desire to become topdog.

2. After this, a more or less conscious and systematic sounding out of topdog behavior takes place, a searching for cues as to how topdogs behave. Depending on the social distance between the two levels, the social experience and imagination of the individual more or less valid results may be obtained. Movies are of course highly instrumental here, and so are commercial ads.

3. After some time, the individual underdog may feel he is prepared, if not for passing, at least for a rehearsal for passing. He will play the topdog role for a well selected audience of only topdogs or only underdogs -- and he will play it with reservations, e.g., jokingly, so that the retreat is open for him in case of failure. This is the case of the young girl wearing one of her mother's or elder sister's dresses, of the habitually sick person trying to ignore his sickness, of the criminal trying to be law-abiding, of the Negro behaving like a white, etc.

4. If the rehearsal is to the individual's satisfaction; that is, if he believes that both topdog and underdog have accepted him as topdog, the passing itself may take place. This time it is done without reservations, and he knows that from now on there is no return without suffering at least humiliation. Attempts are often made to make the passing invisible to those who know him, but if successful, attempts will be made to make the result highly visible to those who know him (e.g., the adolescent who benefits from a vacation to change to a much more adult style /and her parents' shock and dismay when they discover how much "the new persons she has been associating with have done to her"/, the emigrant who changes style when he becomes immigrant and returns after a sufficient number of years to feel secure that he will be taken seriously, etc.). It seems to be highly important for a society that proclaims achievement, mobility and possibility of passing to provide for the possibility of making the change itself invisible to those closest to the changer. It is an old experience that the child who hangs on to his family way into adulthood will never be quite acknowledged as grown-up -- the chance lies in a stay away from home.

5. From now on a number of things will happen more or less inevitably, and they can very well be described as the classical pattern of individual passing:

a. The passing individual becomes a marginal man (as defined by Robert E. Park in the preface to the book by Stonequist, E. V.: The Marginal Man, (New York, 1937), "one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies

b. "equal" in the meaning equal in rights, they may be evaluated differently, but still have the same rights, or obligations. We shall call this **normative equality**, equality$_2$.

c. "equal" in the meaning equal in evaluation, they may be different but are still evaluated the same, none is better than the other. We shall call this **evaluative equality**, equality$_3$.

As we see, inequality$_1$ has to do with status-qualifiers for holders of topdog and underdog status, inequality$_2$ has to do with differentiation of the statuses, and inequality$_3$ to do with differential evaluation, stratification or ranking of the different statuses.

It is most important to see that these three kinds of equality-inequality are logically independent, though they may well be empirically correlated. It is possible to perceive two persons as very different, e.g., in height, and still give them the same status and the same rank. It is possible to see them as equal in all status-relevant respects, but let the inequality in skin-color serve as the basis for the denial of equality.2 And it is possible to give equality$_2$ at least to a very large extent as it is given to women, and still deny them equality$_3$.

5. The polarization in a rank-conflict will bring with it a polarization of the three concepts of equality - i.e., it may start out as inequality in status-rights and end up as inequality in evaluation and inequality in perceived characteristics. The following mechanisms seem to be particularly important:

a. underdogs who fight for equality$_2$ and equality$_3$ will claim that there is equality$_1$ on all status-relevant dimensions.

b. topdogs who strive to maintain inequality$_2$ with or without inequality$_3$ will support their stand by claiming that there is status-relevant inequality$_1$.

This makes for a lot of confusion, part of which can be traced back to ambiguous use of the term "equality".

6. The underdog is functionally necessary for the topdogs, because he is the background against which he can see himself as a topdog, the constant reinsurance that this is a rank-dimension, not just a status-dimension. This is trivially true for whites, upper-class people, adults etc. less trivial but still true for law-abiding people (who need the criminals) and healthy people (who need sick people). This functional requirement might be seen as a way of correcting for the fatal assymmetry in life, that human beings to a large extent are unable to feel their health as something positive or their habit to abide by the laws as praise worthy but as something just normal, - like having air around to breathe. One must see people who do not have this "normal but so positive" property to appreciate it better.

7. Visibility theorems.

   a. Underdog latent intensity is increased with increasing visibility of the difference in rights between underdogs and topdogs. This may then be expressed as manifest intensity.

   b. Underdog latent intensity is increased with increasing visibility of successful passing of underdog individuals into the topdog group.

   c. Topdogs will use their power to regulate the mutual visibility of topdogs and underdogs so that

      1. they do not have to face underdog misery resulting from the devaluation of them directly

      2. they do not create too much resentment directed against themselves

      3. on the other hand, they see sufficiently much of the underdogs to feel superior.

Important techniques here are residential segregation of races, ethnic groups, communities and classes; segregation of women and adolescents to woman's rooms etc., seclusion of ill people and criminals (but for these two categories it seems that the function of "social sanitation" has taken precedence over the function of reinforcing rank-dimensions).

8. The polarization and intensity of the conflict is highly dependent on how underdog and topdog statuses correlate (see section 5).

In a social system with dichotomous rank-dimensions there will be 2^n possible status-sets. If only two of these are realized in practice, so that each individual has either only topdog or only underdog statuses, conflict on one rank-dimension will probably very rapidly spread to the other dimensions. If there is an ideology around to the effect that all the n conflicts "in reality" are different aspects of the same fundamental conflict (between the exploiters and the exploited, between the generalized topdog and the generalized underdog) such an ideology will easily be adopted and may increase polarization and intensity immensely. It seems that much of communist strategy and success derives from their ability to unify underdogs of different kinds and to invoke unifying ideologies.

9. Intra- and inter-underdogs theorems.

   a. Self-hatred among the underdogs (Lewin, ch. 12). This is partly a hatred for other underdogs of the same kind because they are constant reminders of one's own underdog-status or because of their actual, perceived or anticipated reaction to one's own efforts to pass or to move upwards. And partly it is a real self-hatred, directed against one's own person, "I hate the woman, the Jew, the Negro, etc. in me —". This pattern may be seen as special cases of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

b. Hatred for other kinds of underdogs. This may be interpreted as a kind of displaced other-aggression when one does not dare to direct it against the topdog and as a desire to create new rank-dimensions where one's own group is no longer on the bottom and hence can transfer perceived topdog sentiment against one's own group to the created under-underdog. This is of course also a technique for gaining some reward from the topdog. In some segregation cases it seems that lower class women from the countryside are especially anti-Negro (they have three underdog statuses to compensate for).

10. Underdog resentment against their leaders. There seems, in the first stages particularly, of a rank-conflict to be a very ambivalent attitude in the underdog group to their leaders, if by leaders we mean those who struggle for group equality. This antagonism is explainable on the following bases:

a. The suspicion that the leader has an individualistic orientation, and makes use of the group to further his own interests in order to be able to pass or to move upwards. His relatively frequent contacts with the topdog group (which is in the nature of the conflict as an inter-group conflict) are given as evidence for this.

b. The internalization of topdog ideology, which tells them that the situation is to their own good and that the power of the topdog is justified power, awe-inspiring and sacred which results in aggression against leaders who deny this ideology. It must be remembered that the topdogs "own the society" and the main means for dissemination of ideology.

c. Aggression against the leader because he is the leader, how can he justify his power? In the beginning, the leaders will have to be charismatic and/or selfpselected, and hence have some difficulties justifying their power.

d. "Why can't he take it when we take it" - attitudes, we have suffered and why is he not able to suffer the same as we do? What makes him believe that he is of a more refined kind than we are, so that he can't take it?

e. The leader is a threat to them in their complacency as underdogs, and may stir the conscience.

11. Underdog leaders' reaction to the resentment. The leaders will try to counteract this resentment with a number of techniques, as for instance:

1. Make visible to the underdogs how they are against the topdog and have not converted to his values. This is the famous phenomenon of top-level meetings between conflict leaders, where the leaders talk for their followers, not for the benefit of conflict resolution.

2. Making visible that they still are the good, old underdogs they should be - the laborleader who is pictured in his shop, the emancipationist woman who dresses a little bit frivolously etc., to assure identification of the rank-and-file underdog with them and (though this is not said) that they themselves do not loose the contact.

3. **Making visible how they sacrifice for the underdog cause**, so that they will not be suspected of having a good time as leaders. Especially important, if possible, is to make visible some kind of severe discrimination they have suffered as underdogs.

4. **Sacrificing the big long-term goals for the smaller short-term ones** in order to justify the power they want to retain, even if this may lead to a corruption of the cause. Justification of this by means of formulas like "politics is to obtain the possible", "we are not fighting for utopia", "we are realists", etc.

12. **The possibility of exploitation of the conflict by an external enemy.** As mentioned before, it is only when external threat is considered a threat against the group as a whole that it will have a unifying effect. External enemies can claim that they are only against the topdogs, or only against the underdogs, and that they want to help the one against the other. To exploit internal conflict is a very common technique, though external enemies may very easily miscalculate the conflict and take its saliency in absence of other conflicts for genuine saliency.

A very common technique is to make use of underdog individuals to keep occupied territories or power-positions. They can be given high positions, be used as police, henchmen, concentration camp guards, etc., for the following reasons:

a. If they can obtain some or most of the topdog life they have been longing for and which has been their only goal for a long time, they will be willing to make use of the bad means.

b. These individual underdogs know that their new position is not guaranteed in the social structure, but is highly dependent on the new power-holders -- and will hence do their best to protect their power.

c. They know that they are hated more than anyone else by their former fellow underdogs, and hence that they have come to the point where there is no return: either maintain the position, die or leave the society.

d. They are now given the best chance possible of acting out resentment against underdog leaders (see point 10).

This technique has been fully made use of in all modern dictatorships - and in older ones too, for that matter. An interesting reflection is how the communist revolution in the Soviet Union may be seen as an alliance between the numerically quite inconspicuous Bolshevik Party (those who took the train - -) and different kinds of underdogs: those without money, without power, the minorities, the young people, the women, etc.

IDEOLOGIES EASILY DEVELOPED IN A RANK CONFLICT BY THE TWO GROUPS

Assumptions underlying this scheme:

1. The underdogs have already externalized the topdog ideology
2. The topdogs have not yet internalized the underdog ideology
3. In the culture of the supersystem, the patterns of universalism and achievement are dominant, and the culture is sensate or mixed.

Read vertically, this table gives outlines of the two ideologies.

Read horizontally it gives corresponding pairs of arguments.

The ideologies we present are relatively sophisticated versions, and must be reworded to fit the purely achieved dimensions.

TOPDOG IDEOLOGY	UNDERDOG IDEOLOGY
Basic outlook: Change of the society as a whole, but stability of the relation to the underdog as this is in the interest of the society and of the underdog (not to mention the topdog, but that is not said).	Basic outlook: Change of the society as a whole, and change of the relation to the topdog, as this is in the interest of the society and of the topdog (not to mention the underdog, and that may be said, though not necessarily as the main reason).
An ideational ideology should be disseminated to the underdog, to comfort them, to provide for stability, to make them see that "God meant it this way". Belief may be sincere or not.	Rejection of reinterpretation of these parts of the ideational ideology, claiming that it was a trick devised to keep the underdogs down.
There is cognitive inequality between the two groups, and it has to do with biological, intrinsic, factors – which no external change can ameliorate – like bodily constitution, blood, inferiorability in general. This is proved by showing differential results obtained by underdogs and topdogs, the underdogs were never that creative, they have always been the helpers of the topdogs.	First, there is no cognitive inequality and secondly, if there is, it is due to extrinsic factors like better access to resources, an ascribed status that gives them a better start, they are expected to create, etc. If we were given the same chances, we would be just as good. Derisive terms etc. for the topdog.
But history proves that civilizations were always made by the topdogs, and however far you go back you find that those who are topdogs today, were topdogs and this is the way it has always been.	This is true by definition, besides, it depends on the historical perspective, people North of the Alps were barbarians to the Romans.
But these are the most valid criteria, they are the criteria the civilizations are founded on.	And these comparisons between topdogs and underdogs are always made with the topdogs' criteria.

Hence we simply cannot take the risk of letting the underdogs have exactly the same rights as we have, after all we owe something to civilization, to those who founded our society. There must be some _inequality in rights_, no society has ever done without! A borderline must be drawn even though it may be unjust to some. Besides, the appearance may deceive.

But there is no doubt that some underdogs are better than some topdogs even measured with their standards, there is such a _tremendous overlap_, and it is under no condition just to let these individual underdogs down!

We always do our best to _help the individual underdog_ pass or move, it is the recognition of the underdog group as a whole we are against, because the group as a whole is simply not that good. But individual recognition must not be construed to mean group recognition.

It is good if conditions can become better for some underdogs but we want the recognition _built into the social structure_. We _don't want_ the pattern of each topdog adopting one or more underdogs with _paternalistic protection_.

This does not mean that we devaluate the underdogs, there is no evaluative inequality. On the contrary, we have tremendous respect for the individual underdog and think they are wonderful people. But on the other hand, they are somewhat like children, _they want somebody to respect and to look up to_, so we have to play the difficult role of the authority! But underdogs only look at our rights, never at our obligations.

There is evaluative inequality, and this is the main reason why there is normative inequality, _they just want somebody to look down at_. And even if you abolish the normative inequality, the evaluative one will still remain as a more subtle way of retaining their illusion of superiority.

The underdog is actually completely dependent upon us, he owes all he is to us and should rather express some gratitude than this discontent, which actually is mainly stirred up by some outside people and some very few crazy underdogs.

The topdog is actually completely dependent upon us, without us he could achieve nothing, all his civilization is based on underdog toil. But we are pushed in the background, and he has the power to define his part of the work as the functionally most important and difficult. More radical version: we are really the most important, the topdogs are parasites.

But we cannot trust the underdog completely, he may be dangerous when given power because he does not have the sense of responsibility it takes centuries to develop. He is not really of the society, and look at differential crime rates, laziness, etc.

You can trust the underdog if you give him 1st class citizenship, and challenge him to do his best, then he will develop that sense of responsibility, and perceive the society as something that deserves his loyalty. Topdog argument is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

And how dull wouldn't life be if everybody should be equal! (cognitively) It is exactly the diversity, with its implicit challenge that makes life and history so fascinating. Rather, let each group develop its own characteristics and develop a pride in them, and a recognition that not everybody is made to do the same job or have the same rights.

We have nothing against diversity, but feel it should be on more important and relevant dimensions than ascriptive dimensions, and we feel that the fundamental cognitive equality is much more important than the dissimilarities.

Emphasis on individual achievement and values common for both groups.

Emphasis on total group universalism and values common for both groups.

SURVEY OF MAIN RANK DIMENSIONS, RANK GROUPS AND CONFLICT PROCESSES

Rank-dimension	Name of topdog and derisive terms	Name of underdog / Process of individual change / Process of group change
1. Knowledge	Scientist (egghead, high-brow)	Layman / individual achievement / universal, popular education
2. Skill	Technician, expert (technocrat, narrow-headed specialist)	Layman / individual achievement / "do-it-yourself"-movement
3. Taste	Artists, Connoisseurs (long-haired dreamers, mad people, high-brow)	Layman / individual achievement / "non-popular", devaluation of art
4. Holiness	Priests ("out of this world")	Layman / lay preacher, saint, eremite / Protestantism
5. Power	Leader, government (power corrupts, bosses)	Followers, people / charismatic leaders / revolutions
6. Property	Wealthy people, owners of means of production (greedy, parasites)	Poor people / individual achievement, heritage / socialism, welfare state
7. Legality	Law-abiding people (cowards, people with connections)	Law-breakers / resocialization / redefinition of crimes
8. Health	Well people (lucky people)	Sick people / rehabilitation / emphasis on sickness as extr.
9. Nationality	Over-developed peoples (exploiters, good resources and climate)	Underdeveloped peoples / emigration-immigration / development, aid, etc.
10. Community	Urban people (city-slickers)	Rural people / individual migration / adoption of city-culture
11. Religion	Protestants, Presbyt. ("high church", not really religious)	Catholics, Baptists / change of religion / pan-religious movements
12. Ethnic group	Gentiles (goyim, pork-eaters)	Jews / assimilation / anti-defamation
13. Class	Upper-class (exploiters, snobs)	Lower-class / individual mobility / decreasing visibility
14. Kinship	"Good" families (snobs)	"Bad" families / marry into a good family / reduce saliency
15. Relative age (primogeniture)	1st born ?	2nd born, etc. / kill the first born / reduce saliency
16. Absolute age	Adults (the "old men" senile)	Children, adolescents, aged / conceal real age / redefinition of maturity
17. Race	White people "okay"	Negroes / individual passing / desegregation integration
18. Sex	Men ("men!")	Women / behave like men / emancipation

6. DYNAMICS OF INTRA-GROUP CONFLICT.

The following presentation of the different phases in an intra-group conflict (or what starts out as an intra-group conflict) is to a large extent based on Coleman (ch. II). The phases are to be conceived of as being temporally and logically ordered, but the development can be extremely rapid or very slow, some phases may be omitted, and the process may be stopped at any point.

Phase 1. An issue is brought into the group. It may be fundamental or non-fundamental, logical or empirical, perceived or real, but we assume it is presented as an issue for the group, relevant for the group as a whole. It is claimed that the issue is of such a nature that it should be a shared concern for everybody in the group.

Phase 2. Differential presentation of courses of action. This is a kind of division of labor process: if the issue is brought in for discussion at the group level, there will be a group need for proponents of the different courses of action (compare the judicial procedure of division of labor between the accuser and the defendant). In principle, each member of the group should be able to house the arguments on both sides within himself and discuss them with himself and others. But in practice it seems that this dialectic process is more easily carried out between than within persons.

Phase 3. Generalization of the issue. By some stretch of the imagination any issue can be considered a special case of a more general problem, and any course for action can be considered a specialization of some more general norm. Generalizations will at least to some extent be brought into the picture, for the following reasons:

a. The members of the group will consider all conflicts a challenge to their culture, and more or less consciously use the conflict as an opportunity to adjust parts of their culture. The conflict will thus be taken as representative of a set of conflicts that may or may not appear in the future.

b. By generalizing the suggested course to a more general norm, one may stand stronger in defense or in attack by showing (at least to one's own satisfaction) how the norm fits in with or is contrary to the general cultural pattern.

It may be surmised that if there are intellectuals around, this generalization will be greatly facilitated.

Phase 4. Introduction of new issues. At this point, new issues may be introduced, for two reasons:

a. More or less consciously, the points of view have been associated with those who have the task of being their proponents. The points of view may be both attacked and defended by widening the front: one can refer to the persons' attitudes in other cases and use this as a general indicator of how unwise or wise it will be to pay attention to the persons' point of view.

b. Through the foregoing phases, a conflict has been brought into the open. This may serve as an occasion for bringing up other issues which so far have been latent only, because conflict is now "declared". The struggle over these issues may take the form of non-

realistic or realistic conflicts depending on their logical distance from the original issue. It seems reasonable to assume that the broader the scope of interaction the more issues that are distant from the original one may be brought in.

Phase 5. **Polarization in the personal system.** In the minds of the persons participating in the conflict separate processes now start taking place:

1. An **awareness** of the values, norms, ideas, etc., characteristic of the other party and those of one's own party.

2. An **all-over evaluation** of that which is associated with the other party as bad or inferior and that which is associated with one's own party as good or superior. This is a new phenomenon; so far we have not introduced any evaluation of ideas, but looked at the conflict as a disagreement only.

3. A **self-purification** by abandoning symbols of the other party, so that there is no or little impurity in oneself.

4. A **distorted perception** of the other party so that the remaining "good" symbols he may be attached to are not seen any longer.

The main reasons why this happens seem to be:

a. The urge to avoid **ambivalence** and dissonance, so that symbols or values appearing in clusters (as when they are tied to oneself or to the opponent) are either totally good or totally bad.

b. A kind of **cultural contagion-effect**, a carry-over from one symbol to the other because of their meaningful association.

Phase 6. **Transition to inter-person conflict.** This is logically the next step, and empirically very important. We have already had a shift of attention from the original issue to the totality of issues and from there to evaluation of these totalities or ideologies. What now seems to go on is:

1. A **shift of attention from the ideology of the opponent to the opponent as a person.**

2. A change to the perception of the **individual opponent as the impediment** to the solution of the conflict, not only his ideology.

3. A carry-over of the devaluation of his ideology to a devaluation of him as a person - i.e., a **transition from disagreement to dislike.**

4. A corresponding development in the attitude to individuals with whom one agrees - a **transition from agreement to liking.**

The main reasons why this happens seem to be:

a. An **increase in concreteness** - instead of attacking or defending abstract ideas or ideologies, concrete individuals may be attacked or defended.

b. An extrapolation from the bad or good ideology of a person to the person himself — after all, he is the person behind the ideology and may be attacked or defended as such.

The conflict has now ceased completely to be an **intra-group conflict** and has become an **inter-person conflict.**

Phase 7. Polarization in the social system. This is again the logically next step; it is the attitudes discussed in the two foregoing phases acted out on the social level:

1. Primary relations between antagonists are broken or, as indicated in 1 reduced by decreasing frequency of interaction or making the scope of interaction more specific. Family members will in most cases all be on the same side; otherwise the family will be disrupted.

2. Secondary relations that easily lead to primary relations are avoided or abolished (separate schooling, etc.).

3. Secondary relations in general may be avoided or completely broken to the point where interaction only takes place at a very collectivistic level (see next phase).

In race conflicts these three stages of the social polarization process are called desegregation, segregation and apartheid respectively. The last two steps are fairly drastic.

The reasons for the social polarization seem to be the following ones:

a. "Stripping for action", in order not to be hampered by primary relations, present or in the future.

b. Conscious or unconscious avoidance of chances for falsifying the theories about the antagonists.

c. The fear of the ideological contagion that contact might bring; just as any sick person should be avoided.

d. The feeling of self-righteousness, being too pure to associate with that kind of persons - they do not deserve it.

e. Breaking of relations as an expressive act, expresses the latent sentiment against the antagonist on the manifest level.

f. Breaking of relations as an instrumental act, designed to

1. Punish the antagonist for his attitudes and actions.

2. Put him in a situation where he will see that he is wrong and change.

In both of these cases can we talk about social control.

Phase 8. Transition to inter-group conflict. This is only a short step from the foregoing phase:

1. _Formation of groups_ by persons with the same view. These will be the conflict-organizations.

2. A shift of attention from the individual antagonist to the antagonist group as a whole; introduction of a _group-perspective_ on both parties.

3. A carry-over from the conception of the individual antagonist as the impediment to the _antagonist group as the impediment._

4. A carry-over of the devaluation of the individual antagonist to a devaluation of the antagonist group as a whole and from there back again to a _devaluation of the individual antagonist because he belongs to the antagonist group._ This is very important when the conflict is only at the latent level and is known as _xenophobia_ (in the most general in-group vs. out-group case) or _ethnocentrism_ (when the groups are ethnic groups) or _racism_ (when the groups are racial groups).

5. _Emergence of leaders_ who can cope with the new situation and express properly the sentiment and provide for actions. These leaders may have very little relation to the original issue but be adjusted to the group need for leadership.

6. An introduction of _a collectivistic orientation_ when dealing with the other group - a tendency to see both oneself and the individual antagonist as representatives only, carefully evaluating: "what does this action mean to my group", not "what does it mean to myself". The leaders will have the control of inter-group interaction as one of their main tasks.

The main reasons for this phase seem to be:

a. Group-formation will in most cases _increase the action-potential_, and in all cases increase the _visibility_ of persons with the same view.

b. A great _facilitation of perception_ of the conflict if the groups can be dealt with as a whole.

c. A fear that _interaction on an individualistic level_ may impair the _group-perspective_ and create attachments and contagion and show a _less united front_ than considered desirable.

Phase 9. _The disappearance of the real and perceived neutrals._ At this point there is very little place left for neutrals in the group, at least if the issue is sufficiently fundamental to engage many persons. They may either leave the group or join one of the two antagonist groups. The main reasons seem to be:

a. The _norm shared_ by the two antagonist groups: "This issue is so important that you shall at least take a stand!" will have high saliency with increasing polarization.

b. In a highly polarized system the dimensions for judging attitudes will be different for the two parties and the neutrals, because

they will have different anchoring points. If we assume that most
persons have a tendency to judge their own attitude, or attitudes
close to their own as somehow "normal" and "neutral", it is clear
that both extreme groups will perceive the neutrals as "really be-
longing to the other side", and the other party as way out in the
extreme. But both parties will have ambivalent attitudes to the
neutrals, and their policy will be decided by what tendency is
strongest, the "those who are not for me are against me"-tendency,
or the "those who are against me are not for me"-tendency. The neu-
trals will thus probably be under cross-pressure from both parties,
and this may entail self-fulfilling or self-denying processes de-
pending on the original inclination of the neutral, whether he is
of the general conformist or non-conformist type and what group he
most frequently associates with. The "you are really of the other
party" may be very dangerous if one wants to hire members, because
of the tendency for human beings to internalize other-descriptions
and make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. Compare the prisoner who
says, "If they say I am so bad, well, then I'll show them how bad I
can be!"

The outcome of the conflict may to a large extent depend on where the
neutrals go. With the neutrals absent, there is now very little to pre-
vent the coming of the next phases:

Phase 10. Systematic distortion of the position of the antagonist group of the
techniques commonly made use of are:

1. Not paying any attention to the arguments of the other group that
are close to own position or to common values of the two groups -
but disclaiming them as tricks, "not really believed in".

2. Not paying any attention to the members of the other group who have
the best argumentation or who are close to common symbols of the two
groups - but disclaiming them as "not typical of the group".

3. Projection of the other group's position into the extreme so that it
becomes easier to attack.

4. Use of psychologistic and sociologistic arguments: shifts of atten-
tion to reasons why the antagonist has the argument away from the
content of the argument. "Bad environment", "childhood experience"
considered more relevant than the content of the argument.

The reasons why this can happen seem to be:

a. It increases the evaluation of own group and decreases the evalua-
tion of the other group - or rather, the opposite policy might have
the opposite effect.

b. It prevents any change in the balance the polarization has brought
about.

c. Repeated argumentation requires exaggeration to have any effect on
oneself and one's own group, because of change of anchoring points.

Phase 11. Systematic distortion of the perception of the other group. Of the tech-
niques commonly made use of are:

1. Quantitative distortion - reducing the number of members of the other group. This can be done in two ways: either by simply giving a lower number than the "disinterested observer" would find, or by invoking hypotheses to the effect that a large portion of the group only follows their leaders willy-nilly, or are forced by the leaders to follow them and would stay neutral or join one's own group if the decision were up to themselves. Another version of this argument is the "mental enforcement", whether it goes under the name of "misleading" or "brainwashing".

2. Qualitative distortion - reducing the quality of the members of the other group. This can be done in a number of ways: by decreasing the proportion of high-status people in the group and increasing the proportion of low-status people (claiming that they are all "women, youngsters and uneducated people") or redefining status-criteria so that high-status people become low-status people ("egg-heads" and derisive use of the term "educated").

The reasons why this can happen seem to be:

a. The very limited interaction between the two groups makes automatically for the quantitative reduction - simply based on experience.

b. The general tendency to see only the cases that verify the general hypothesis about the low value of the other group - selective perception.

Phase 12. Systematic suspicion of the other group. Of the techniques most commonly used are:

1. Implying that the other group is fighting a non-realistic conflict - they fight the conflict on the manifest level just in order to conceal activities in other fields or to prepare the ground for some other latent conflicts they want to fight. This is the "dubious motives" argument.

2. Implying that the other group are led from the outside and actually are only functioning as puppets, thus degrading them as independent persons and trying to evoke the fear of an external threat or enemy with high saliency in the group. This is the "puppet-argument".

The reasons why this can happen seem to be:

a. The social polarization makes almost any hypothesis about the other group unfalsifiable by individual members of the group, since even if individuals should want to interact, they will be stopped by leaders.

b. The general description of members of the other group as bad persons makes it only natural to accept the explanation of bad motives hidden somewhere. The current "Communism"-argument plays on both techniques above: on the one hand the antagonist group is fighting for Communist goals; on the other hand they are naive persons exploited by hidden communists to serve their cause.

Phase 13: Sorokin's law: Increased intensity with increased polarization and vice versa.

We have split the concept of intensity into two parts, manifest intensity on the behavioral level and latent intensity on the attitudinal level. We shall reformulate the law as two propositions:

1. The higher the polarization, the higher the manifest intensity.

2. The more primary the relation was before the polarization, the higher the latent intensity.

a. The reason for the first seems to be that the stripping for action, the polarization, the distorted perception, distortion of position and systematic suspicion all contribute to the same thing: facilitation of the adoption of stronger measures, because of decreasing identification with the other group.

b. The factor of transition to intergroup perspective seems to be extremely important — acting on behalf of the group makes it possible to be much more merciless.

c. Former primary relations will leave an impression of ambivalent cathexis of the other group which we assume that the polarization is not able to erase completely. The more intense this primary relation was the more emotion will there be to put into the conflict (compare the cases of civil war, factional fights in religious and political groups, etc.).

From now on the conflict, so to say, feeds on itself. The polarization has brought increasing manifest intensity, and increasing manifest intensity will be used to reinforce the conceptions of the other group mentioned under the three foregoing phases. This will in turn bring about even more polarization, etc. This vicious circle, however, is by no means to be considered unavoidable, but rather as something an intra-group conflict will very easily lead into if the tendencies are not efficiently counteracted.

Some important factors facilitating or impeding polarization:

1. The interlocking of status-sets.

It seems reasonable to assume that the more statuses tend to go together, the more will this facilitate polarization. If we have a system with m status-dimension and the number of statuses in each is $n_1, n_2 \ldots n_i \ldots n_m$ where we always have $n_i \geq 2$, the number of possible status-sets becomes:

$$n_1 \cdot n_2 \cdot \ldots \cdot n_m$$

which in the special case where all $n_i = 2$ reduces to

$$2^m$$

The most polarized system will be a system where only two of these status-sets are realized in the system, with 50% of the members of the system in each. There seem to be three dimensions to the polarization of status-sets:

a. How many of the possible status-sets are realized in the system,
b. How much overlap is there between the realized status-sets, and
c. How even or skewed is the distribution of the members.

We shall refer to this as status-polarization. If we assume that people interact more with persons with the same status than with people with a different status and hence more with people with whom they have a great or complete overlap in status-sets - then it seems reasonable to assume that

the higher the status-polarization, the higher the conflict-
                                                        polarization

the lower the status-polarization, the lower the conflict-polari-
                                                        zation

There are two important special cases of status-dimensions:

1. The case where the status-dimensions are conflict-dimensions. This is the famous old proposition (Coser, Williams) about how a society can be "sewn together by the conflicts", provided that there is no polarization along the conflict-dimensions. Conversely the more there is of a tendency to have the same groupings of people in meaningfully different conflicts, the more will the polarization due to a new conflict with the same parties be facilitated.

2. The case where the status-dimensions are rank-dimensions. In this case, we will get status-polarization of topdog and underdog statuses. We refer to section 5 for further analysis.

2. The interlocking of role-interaction or formal interaction.

It seems reasonable to believe that the more people are tied together in their role-relations, the more will the conflict-polarization be impeded. The extreme case is where holders of all

statuses interact with holders of all the other statuses - but in more complex systems we will only have this realized within sub-systems and only few formal contacts between the sub-systems. We shall refer to this as role-polarization and assume that

the higher the role-polarization, the higher the conflict-
                                                    polarization

the lower the role-polarization, the lower the conflict-polari-
                                                            zation

3. The interlocking of informal interaction.

It seems reasonable to believe that the more people are tied together in their informal relations, the more will the conflict-polarization be impeded. The extreme case is where all individuals interact with all other individuals - but in more com-plex systems we will only have this realized within sub-systems and only few informal contacts between the systems. We shall refer to this as informal polarization and assume that

the higher the informal polarization, the higher the conflict-
                                                    polarization

the lower the informal polarization, the lower the conflict-polar-
                                                            ization

7. Propositions about the genesis of conflict.

PROP 7.1: The more a party to a conflict considers it possible and desirable to change the mind of the other party, the more will the conflict be presented as non-fundamental and/or empirical and/or perceived only.

The more a party to a conflict considers it impossible or undesirable to change the mind of the other party, the more will the conflict be presented as fundamental and/or logical and/or actual.

This seems to be the case because:

The first kind of presentation will facilitate the "change of mind" because of the implied downgrading of the importance of the conflict.

The second kind of presentation will facilitate the mobilization of energy and sentiment in one's own group because of the upgrading of the importance of the conflict.

It seems that a distinction can be made between "other-directed" and "inner-directed" attitudes and behavior in conflicts - where the first is the kind of behavior directed primarily at the other party, the second the kind of behavior directed towards one's own group. The propositions point out important fields of "other-directed" and "inner-directed" conflict-behavior.

PROP 7.2: There exist conflicts that are perceived only, because of the possibility of:

1. Insufficient or distorted communication about the values of the other party,

   a. because of no channels of communication,
   b. because of blocking of pre-existing channels of communication,
   c. because of noise in the communication channels so that the information is distorted, deliberately or not. A very important special case here is semantic noise where verbal ambiguities cause distorted perceptions.

2. Insufficient or distorted insight about the means available for the satisfaction of the values at issue.

PROP 7.3: There exist conflicts that are non-realistic, and they can be of all the sixteen types indicated in the diagram in section 4.

Examples of all sixteen types:

1,1: An intra-personal conflict because of a choice between two candidates for marriage can be acted out as a choice between two careers (e.g., as a choice between two majors).

1,2: Incapacity to make a choice between two conflicting demands can lead to a frustration that is acted out as an aggression against wife, etc.

1,3: The theory that the conflict between sexual stimulation and sexual repression may be acted out as attacks on other groups, especially as suspicions that they are planning sexual assaults.

1,4: The theory that for instance Prussian aggression can be retraced to conflicting demands in the early childhood, e.g., between urge for excretion and premature toilet-training.

2,1: The bad conscience effect of a hostility between close friends which is not acted out but manifests itself on the intra-personal level only. The internalization of family problems.

2,2: The classic story about the subjugated husband who takes it out on his workers as a supervisor.

2,3: The theory that worker-management conflicts give the workers a patterned outlet for tension cumulated in family conflicts or other inter-personal conflicts.

2,4: The systematic use of inter-personal hostility in inter-societal warfare.

3,1: The internalization of one's own group's problems with another group, e.g., the Christian's internalization of doubt in the latent conflict with atheist groups.

3,2: Sudden inter-personal hostility may result from group-conflicts because of the pressure and the cumulated tension. Life in conflict-organizations may be taken as an example.

3,3: The invention of scapegoat groups, e.g., the clever transformation of the latent follower-leader conflict in Nazi Germany to an anti-Jewish movement.

3,4: The escape from "troubles at home", e.g., the often mentioned theory for Arab anti-Israel campaigns.

4,1: The classic case: Durkheim's altruistic officer, who commits suicide of desperation even when the inter-society conflict is latent only.

4,2: As 3.2, no difference in principle. Life in a society when there is a feeling of external threat but before the threat has materialized. Prisoners' translation of their conflict with society to a conflict with the prison guards.

4,3: As 3.2 and 4.2 - nervousness and tension resulting in escape into non-realistic group conflicts within the society.

4,4: The at least partial contemporary translation of the conflict between under-developed and over-developed countries to a conflict between East and West.

PROP 7.4: One conflict on the manifest level may serve as a safety-valve for other conflicts on the latent level.

This seems to be possible because:

a. **Expressive outlet** – through conflict behavior on the manifest level some or all of the cumulated conflict-sentiment from the other conflicts may be released.

b. **Displaced aggression, scapegoatism** – conflict-behavior aggression against an antagonist from one latent conflict may be channeled against the perceived antagonist in the manifest conflict. This is the scapegoat technique.

c. **Direct aggression** – this is a more adequate tension release than the two foregoing if it is possible to identify the party to the manifest conflict with the party to the latent conflict. The safety-valve mechanism will then only ensue if the manifest conflict is less intense (e.g., because less fundamental values are involved) than the latent conflict would be if acted out.

d. **Displaced attention** – through manifest activity, the attention may be directed away from the latent conflict.

e. **Unifying effects** – this is the opposite of c above: if the manifest conflict defines other conflicting parties than the latent conflict does, it may serve as a unifier of the latent antagonists.

PROP 7.5: <u>Non-realistic conflicts will tend to be</u>

<u>down-projected in introvert, intropunitive cultures</u>
<u>up-projected in extrovert, extropunitive cultures</u>

PROP If we assume that the Scandinavian culture is relatively introvert, there should be a high rate of self-destructive acts as suicide and alcoholism in Scandinavian countries.

PROP If we assume that the Mediterranean culture is relatively extrovert, there should be a high rate of other-destructive acts as homicide and assaults in Mediterranean countries.

For confirming empirical evidence, see Fromm: The Sane Society, pp. 8-9. What is suggested is that the high rate of suicide in the three Scandinavian countries is partly due to the tendency for social conflicts to be expressed as personal conflicts, and vice versa for Latin countries.

PROP 7.6: The more visible a group is
the more vulnerable a group is, i.e., in a position not to retaliate,
the more culturally distant it is, i.e., so that an attack on it is not at the same time an attack on the culture of one's own group, and
the more contact there is with the group –

the higher is the probability that the group will be selected as the party to a non-realistic conflict. The group can, however, have higher or lower rank in the super-system.

PROP 7.7: The more primary the relationship, the more non-realistic elements will be brought into the conflict.

The more secondary the relationship, the less non-realistic elements will be brought into the conflict.

This seems to be the case because:

a. The more primary a relationship is, the more diffuse is it, and with increasing diffuseness comes increasing contact-surface so that there will be more value-disagreement to choose from.

b. The more secondary the relationship is the more specific will it be; hence the less possibility will there be of finding additional value-disagreement.

PROP 7.8: If participation in a primary relationship is considered valuable by both parties, then: the more primary the relationship the more will conflicts that are fundamental, realistic and manifest be avoided.

1. The more primary the relationship, the more will fundamental conflicts be latent only.

2. The more primary the relationship, the more will realistic conflicts be transformed to non-realistic conflicts.

3. The more primary the relationship, the more will the saliency of conflict-issues be reduced.

This seems to be the case because of:

a. the importance of a primary relationship to the participants and the fear of losing it;

b. the fear of letting loose the forces associated with primary relations.

PROP 7.9: If participation in a relationship is not considered valuable by both parties, then:

1. the more manifest will all kinds of conflicts be;

2. the more will non-realistic conflicts be transformed to realistic conflicts;

3. the more will the saliency of conflict-issues be increased.

This seems to be the case, because all three can be regarded as techniques for severing ties with a party in a relationship.

PROP 7.10: If participation in a relationship is considered valuable by both parties, then:

1. the less shared consensus there is about the fundamental values, the less manifest will non-fundamental conflicts be.

2. <u>the more shared consensus there is about the fundamental values, the more manifest will non-fundamental conflicts be.</u>

This seems to be the case because:

a. in the first case, the parties will not take the risk of bringing any conflict out in the open (e.g., newly formed couples, people recently fallen in love, the sweetness of the first days of any alliance).

b. in the second case, the parties will take the risk of bringing a conflict out in the open (e.g., well-trained couples, confident that "we have something in common even though we quarrel a lot", neighboring countries with no big but many small fights, etc.). In these relationships, the conflicts can be afforded.

8. <u>Propositions about the genesis of conflict</u> (ctd).

PROP 8.1: If the relative size of classes of people with different ranks changes, the probability of some kind of conflict will increase. (Andrezejeski, p. 19 for class-conflict).

1. if the topdog class increases relatively (through differential birthrate, polygyny, better living standards, etc.) something must be done to maintain their rank. If their economic rank is threatened, the result may be further suppression of the under-dog or external conflict. If the social rank is threatened, the result may be a differentiation of the topdog group in the "real" topdogs and a middle class.

2. if the underdog class increases relatively (through differ-ential birthrate, mainly), the result will probably be increasing frustration because their conditions will at least relatively speaking become worse. The aggression resulting from this may be turned outward against an external enemy, against the topdogs: or inward against the underdogs (self-hatred).

PROP 8.2: The more visible and the more rapid the change in the rank-distance between two groups, the higher the probability of conflict (Williams, p. 60).

PROP 8.3: The more rapid the social change, the higher the probability of conflict. (Williams, p. 56).

Because adjustment to the new values (or s-f matrices) introduced by the social change will more likely than not be differential, and this means that subsystems will have different values and try to realize them.

PROP 8.4: If there is a break-down in status-expectations, conflict is likely to ensue.(Williams p. 57).

Because a break-down of this kind, will make the different action-systems less aware of the social means available to them in different situations.

PROP 8.5: The greater the division of labor in the system:

1. the greater the tendency to suppress fundamental conflict, and

2. the greater the tendency to have non-fundamental conflicts.

This seems to be the case because:

a. division of labor means interdependence, and hence there will be a fear of disruption of the supersystem.

b. division of labor means differential values.

9. <u>Propositions about the intensity of conflicts.</u>

PROP 9.1: The latent intensity will be higher,

1. the more identification there is with the supersystem within which the conflict takes place,

2. the more fundamental the conflict is, if the values are internalized,

3. the more primary the relationship between the parties to the conflict.

This seems to be the case, because:

a. the identification will cause greater concern,

b. a primary relationship will call for a more total devotion to the relation, also in times of conflict,

c. the two together will be particularly important in promoting high latent intensity.

To what extent the intensity becomes manifest seems to be dependent on a number of other factors, as indicated in

PROP 9.2: The manifest intensity will be higher,

1. the more there are of secondary relationships between the conflicting parties,

2. the less there are of primary relationships between the conflicting parties (e.g., intermarriages).

3. the less the identification with the supersystem,

4. the more collectivistic the orientation.

This seems to be the case, because:

a. there will be fewer restraints and less identification with the other party, which in turn will make extreme manifest measures possible.

b. identification with the sypersystem will inhibit the conflicting parties because of the loyalty to the symbols they have in common - but the condition is that they see the system as a supersystem for both parties, not only as a system one party alone represents, with the other party as a deviant group.

c. a collectivistic orientation will give the individual more
security because of the feeling of representing something
higher than himself -- a collectivity, and this feeling may
be reinforced by means of suitable symbols.

PROP 9.3:   The more primary the relationship was before the conflict, and
the more secondary it has become because of polarization, the
higher both manifest and latent intensity.

This is a very important combination of the two foregoing ones,
and important for the analysis of civil wars, jealously, etc.

10. **Propositions about conflict-organizations.**

The church-sect dichotomy seems useful here as in organizational theory in general:

DEF 10.1: A conflict-organization is of the <u>church-type</u> if it is formal, tolerant within, mainly secondary within, with a specific, segmental devotion and leadership with legal or traditional power.

A conflict-organization is of the <u>sect-type</u> if it is informal, intolerant within, mainly primary, with a diffuse, total devotion and charismatic leadership.

PROP 10.1: The likelihood is that the conflict-organization will be of the church-type,

1. the more <u>ad hoc</u> the conflicts are,

2. the larger the group is, and

3. the more it embodies of the values of the sypersystem.

The likelihood is that the conflict-organization will be of the sect-type,

1. the more continuous the conflicts are,

2. the smaller the group is, and

3. the more it embodies of deviant values.

PROP 10.2: The conflict-group will be the more monocratic, hierarchic and centralized,

1. the more the conflict requires of division of labor,

2. the greater the group

3. the less cohesive the group was before the conflict,

4. the more fundamental the conflict,

5. the more frequent the conflicts (Andrzejewski 92).

PROP 10.3: The predominance of attack over defense promotes centralization
The predominance of defense over attack promotes decentralization.

This seems to be the case because attack and defense have to do with taking of the initiative in the conflict, and it seems reasonable to believe that it takes more centralization in a conflict-situation to take initiative than to yield or respond to initiative, because of the differential amount of planning and coordination involved. (Andrezejewski 75)

PROP 10.4: All conflicts will contribute to the establishment of borderlines around systems that are parties to the conflict, because system-membership will become more salient.

PROP 10.5: A conflict will have a unifying effect on an action-system:

1. the more it is considered a threat to the system as a whole, and

2. the more there is of homogenous desire to belong to the system (Williams p. 58).