A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

by

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FOREWORD:

The present paper is based on lectures given at Columbia University (Sociology of Conflict, Sociology 127) Winter Term 1958. Its aim is to present the outlines of a conceptual framework in sociological terms that can be used for the analysis of social conflict, a set of propositions with no claim to completeness, and a more thorough analysis of two selected topics.

At some points illustrations are given of the propositions, but no claim is made to tenability except a kind of theoretical claim: the propositions make sense within the framework presented. The quasi-axiomatic form the paper is given is not intended to be the final form, but to serve as an aid in this preliminary and more programmatic stage. However, it seems that some parts of the sociology of conflict are quite amenable to more formalized treatment, at least within a word-calculus.

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1. From general sociological theory.

**DEF 1:** By an action-system we mean a system of actors. If there is only one actor, we shall call it a personal system. If there are two or more actors interacting, we shall call it a social system.

"Actor" and "interaction" are to be conceived of as primitive terms.

**DEF 1.1:** By a group we mean a social system whose members perceive themselves as set apart from other individuals. A group is hence a dichotomy of all individuals in in-group members and out-group members.

**DEF 1.2:** By a society we mean a group which is self-maintaining and has a life-span longer than the lives of the single individual.

**DEF 1.3:** By individualistic orientation we mean an orientation where all actions are evaluated as to the effects for the personal system of the individual actor.

By collectivistic orientation we mean the orientation where all actions are evaluated as to the effects for a social system the individual actor is a member of.

A person with an individualistic orientation acts on behalf of himself; a person with a collectivistic orientation acts on behalf of a social system which he may be said to represent or to be an executive of.

We make use of the remaining four of Parsons' pattern variables to define primary and secondary relation:

**DEF 1.4:** By a primary relation we mean a relation between actors where the orientation is particularistic diffuse affective quality

By a secondary relation we mean a relation between actors where the orientation is universalistic specific affectively performance neutral

**DEF 1.5:** By a status in a social system we mean a set of expectations (norms) from others directed to the holder of the status.

**DEF 1.6:** By a status-set we mean the set of statuses held by one individual.

**DEF 1.7:** By a role the expected interaction of one status-holder with holders of one other status.

**DEF 1.8:** By a role-set we mean the set of roles constituting one status.
We then introduce four variables of importance for all interaction-analysis:

1. Frequency of interaction with Alter: infrequent -- frequent
2. Scope of interaction with Alter: specific -- diffuse
3. Extent of cognition of Alter as a person: weak -- strong
4. Cathexis of Alter: strongly negative neutral positive strongly negative positive

The following propositions seem important:

PROP 1.1: The more frequent the interaction, the stronger the cognition

PROP 1.2: The stronger the cognition, the more diffuse the scope of the interaction

and these two together give:

PROP 1.3: The more frequent the interaction the more diffuse the scope of the interaction.

The last proposition is obviously not valid for the case where the interacting parties share the knowledge that the interaction will be highly infrequent, so that the famous "stranger-effect" may develop. These three propositions express to some extent the same thing, i.e., how different factors relating to how "primary" a relation between Ego and Alter is are related.

The three variables can be tentatively related to the fourth variable:

PROP 1.4: The more primary the relation to Alter, the stronger the cathexis - negative or positive.

Prop 1.4.1: The more frequent the interaction, the stronger the cathexis.
Prop 1.4.2: The more diffuse the interaction, the stronger the cathexis.
Prop 1.4.3: The stronger the cognition, the stronger the cathexis.

What we essentially say is that more knowledge, more frequent interaction and more diffuse orientation do not necessarily lead to "friendship" or positive cathexis, only to stronger cathexis. If this is right, we would expect the high amount of ambivalence in primary relations - the rapid change from love to hatred - to increase with increments of the first three variables, and that techniques for avoidance of the ambivalence consist in decrements in the three variables, or at least the first two (making the interaction less frequent limiting the scope of the interaction), This seems to make good sense.
2. Values and means-end matrices.

DEF 2: A value-standard is a standard according to which phenomena can be divided into those which are good (have positive value, should be pursued), those which are bad (have negative value, should be avoided) and those which are neutral (where the attitude is indifferent).

Instead of "positive value" we often say for short just "value". "Good", "bad" and "neutral" are to be conceived of as primitive terms.

DEF 2.1: By a value-chain (or a value-hierarchy) we mean an ordered or (partially ordered) set of values, such that realization of one value in the chain is instrumental to the realization of the values above it.

DEF 2.2: A value is a means-value (heterotelic value) if it is instrumental to some value. A value is an end-value (autotelic value, goal-state) if it is not perceived as instrumental to any value, but "is a value in itself."

"Means" and "ends" are relative concepts only, in the sense that it depends on the context (where we are in the value-chain or the value-pyramid) whether a value shall be conceived of as a means or an end.

DEF 2.3: A value is an ultimate end (goal) if it is conceived of as a means in none or very few contexts only.

Imagine that we have a set of ends and a set of means. Clearly, the same means may have consequences that are conducive to the realization of one end and detrimental to another end. This means that a means-value can be evaluated by using an end-value as a standard as to the kind of consequences it has for the end. These evaluations can be conceived of as forming a scale from -1 (completely detrimental) through 0 (no relevant consequence for that end-value) to +1 (completely conducive). To make better use of these ideas, we define:

DEF 2.4: A means-end matrix is a matrix with elements \( e_{ij} \) where \( e_{ij} \) is the evaluation of the consequences of means no. \( i \) when end no. \( j \) is used as a value-standard:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
& 1 & 2 & 3 & \cdots & n \\
1 & e_{11} & e_{12} & e_{13} & \cdots & e_{1n} \\
2 & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
i & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
m & e_{m1} & e_{m2} & e_{m3} & \cdots & e_{mn} \\
\end{array}
\]

Read horizontally, the matrix tells us to what extent a means is able to satisfy different ends. Read vertically, the matrix tells us to what extent an end is satisfied by the different means.
To make it more complete, we must give different weights to the means and to the ends:

**Means** can be given weights according to their relative presence.  
**Ends** can be given weights according to their relative importance.

Clearly, the culture of a social system or particularly of a group or a society expresses itself in the means-end matrix of the system, although it might be dangerous to identify it with the matrix. For some of the positions about conflict we need a definition concerning the relation of an individual to a group:

**DEF 2.5:** We say that an individual is the more integrated into a group

1. the more he has internalized the means-end matrix of the group, and

2. the more he has of a collectivistic orientation relative to out-groups.

DEF 3: By a structure we mean something which is described as a means. By a function we mean a value-standard for evaluating the effects of structures as positively functional, negatively functional and non-functional.

Instead of saying that a "structure has a positive function" we often say for short that it "has a function". Thus "function" is given a double meaning: as the name of the standard and as the name of the positive values the standard gives to the effects of some structures.

With these definitions of "structure" and "function" it becomes clear that what is called "structural-functional" analysis can be conceived of as the analysis of suitable slice of a value-hierarchy, where the bottom layer of the slice is the structures (i.e., the means) and the upper layer the functions (i.e., the ends to be pursued). A useful tool for this analysis is the means-end matrix, which we now shall call the structural-functional matrix.

DEF 3.1: By a perceived s-f matrix we mean the functions, structures and evaluations as they are perceived by a system member or group. By the actual s-f matrix we mean the s-f matrix as the "disinterested observer" would assess them after careful observation of the system.

The s-f matrix is above all an analytical tool for the analysis of social change, as we have argued elsewhere. For action-system to be in equilibrium there must obviously be some kind of balance between structures and functions, in the sense that a structure must not be too negatively functional, nor must a function be such that it evaluates too many structures negatively, etc. This leads to

DEF 3.2: By a balanced s-f matrix we mean the matrix of a system in equilibrium.

A necessary condition for the matrix to be balanced seems to be that no structures have non-positive weighted sums of consequences, and no functions have non-positive weighted sums of evaluations. If the matrix is not balanced change can be predicted in such a direction as to contain a balanced matrix, or more correctly: a matrix that is perceived by the power-holders to be balanced.

With this as a background three very fundamental and comprehensive axioms can be formulated:

Axiom 3.1: All action-systems will try to achieve s-f matrices that are perceived as balanced. This is an expression of the famous "goal-directedness of human behavior", where it is understood that the goal is constantly changed and the efforts to obtain balance between structures and functions constantly redirected.

Axiom 3.2: All action-systems will try to avoid disparate s-f matrices for the system, because they want "to be of one mind" about action. This is an expression of the famous "avoidance of dissonance". The avoidance will take the following form:

1. Efforts to obtain consensus about the s-f matrices, i.e., of the functions to be pursued, the structures to be used and the evaluations of the structures.
2. Suppression of parts of the system with divergent perceived s-f matrices, by
   a. Segregation and devaluation
   b. Denial of expression
   c. Extinction

3. Splitting of the system in sub-systems with maximum within and minimum between consensus.

The first of these patterns is used in groups favoring the practice of "unanimous vote" and in persons arriving at rational choices. The second pattern is used in very different forms, as when a democracy suppresses the minority and lets the majority s-f matrix be that of the system, when a dictatorship suppresses the opposition by extermination or by denying it means of expression and when a person suppresses a diverging urge. The third pattern is the usual phenomenon of faction-formation, or of "split personality". Essentially, all of these very different dissonance-avoidance techniques are made use of by both personal and social systems.

Axiom 3.3: All action-systems with similar perceived s-f matrices will tend to form super-systems. This is an expression of the tendency towards group-formation on the basis of similar goals, etc.

We are now in a position to define "conflict" as a property of an action system:

**DEF 4a:** Conflict is said to exist in an action-system if two or more values are pursued and they are perceived as incompatible or mutually exclusive.

Conflict thus becomes a concept closely linked to the concept of "value". To link this definition better in with what we have said in sections 2 and 3, let us add a definition which is considered as a more precise version of the definition above:

**DEF 4b:** Conflict is said to exist in an action-system if two or more s-f matrices are pursued and they are perceived as incompatible or mutually exclusive (see axiom 3.2).

With reference to the three fundamental axioms at the end of section 3, it becomes at once clear what we should mean by "solving a conflict":

**DEF 4c:** A conflict is said to be solved if a unified s-f matrix is obtained for the action-system (see axiom 3.3).

With these definitions as our point of departure we can start building a real conceptual framework for the analysis of conflicts. This will here be done by introducing 10 dichotomies in the definitions 4.1 to 4.10. Like most dichotomies in sociology, they are really disguised continua and should be conceived as such, but the simplification that dichotomizing brings about is so useful for our purpose that we shall present it that way.

**DEF 4.1:** By **cognitive disagreement** in the action-system we mean dissensus about what is to be considered "true" or "false".

By **value-disagreement** or conflict in the action-system we mean dissensus about what is to be considered "good" or "bad".

It seems very important to distinguish between these two forms of disagreement, as only the latter will be called conflict. A totally different thing is that a latent value-disagreement may manifest itself as a cognitive disagreement, where this is one of many forms in which a conflict may be acted out - but in this case we would say that we are really dealing with a conflict.

As we have tied "conflict" to "value", all the dimensions for classifying values become automatically dimensions for the classification of conflicts. We shall not here try to classify values according to "institutional realm" (see section 9) but make use of two important dimensions: **position** of the value in the hierarchy, and **salience**.

**DEF 4.2:** The conflict is fundamental if it is over end-values or functions. It is less fundamental if there is agreement about which functions to be pursued, but disagreement about the relative weights to be given to them.
The conflict is non-fundamental if it is over means-values or structures, and there is agreement about the ends. It is even less fundamental if there is agreement about which structures to be used, but disagreement about the relative weights to be given to them.

If there is agreement about the functions, agreement about the structures and agreement about the two kinds of relative weights, we can safely say that there is no conflict present in the system. There may still be disagreement about exactly what are the effects of the structures so that the evaluations will be different, but that will be cognitive disagreement only. Many non-fundamental conflicts will probably be reducible to cognitive disagreement.

DEF 4.3: There is said to be actual conflict in the system if a “disinterested observer” finds that there is conflict. There is said to be perceived conflict or conflict alone in the system if the actor (s) consciously or subconsciously perceived (s) a conflict.

Hence we get the trivial, but useful fourfold-table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>actual</th>
<th>not actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>perceived</td>
<td>conflict</td>
<td>“perceived only”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not perceived</td>
<td>“actual only”</td>
<td>no conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where terminology is suggested. We have chosen not to follow the "disinterested observer" (among other reasons, because he is so difficult to find) and define both conflict and conflict solution from perceptions. This does not mean that we do not think that "actual only" conflicts are not of tremendous importance, among other reasons because they may not have been perceived because of lack of or distortion of communication.

If two persons want to be the sole possessor of the same girl, the statement that "there is a conflict" needs no further empirical testing because it follows immediately from the nature of the two values being pursued: "A being the sole possessor" and "B being the sole possessor", A ≠ B. But in a society where one party wants industrialization and the other party wants a consanguineal family system, the conclusion that there is a conflict in the system cannot be reached by purely formal inspection of the two values, but is an empirical matter.

We introduce:

DEF 4.4: If the statement that "the values are incompatible or mutually exclusive" is analytic or logically true, we say that the conflict is of the logical kind.

If the statement that "the values are incompatible or mutually exclusive" is synthetic or needs empirical testing to be verified, we say that the conflict is of the empirical kind.

We assume that these conclusions are arrived at by the "disinterested observer". More important than his conclusion, however, is whether the conflict is perceived as logical or empirical by the parties to the conflict.
DEF 4.5: A conflict is said to be at the latent level if it is perceived as a conflict consciously or subconsciously, but no relevant overt action has ensued.

A conflict is said to be at the manifest level if it is perceived as a conflict and relevant overt actions have ensued.

Again we get a trivial, but useful fourfold-table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>conflict on latent level</th>
<th>conflict not on latent level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>conflict on manifest level</td>
<td>&quot;full&quot; conflict</td>
<td>conflict-behavior only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict not on manifest level</td>
<td>conflict-sentiment only</td>
<td>no (perceived) conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We identify the manifest level with the conflict-behavior, and the latent level with the conflict-sentiment. The first can be observed, the second can, by definition, only be inferred. The sentiment may, however, have varying degrees of consciousness to the person concerned. The important thing to realize is that a conflict may be latent only, and it may also be manifest only as when people engage in a conflict because they are told to do so with no idea "what it's all about".

We now turn to a classification of conflicts depending on the nature of the action-system (s) where the conflict is found, and make use of the distinctions introduced in section 1. But first we need:

DEF 4.6: A conflict is an intra-system conflict if it is contained within a system, and within each subsystem of the system.

A conflict is an inter-system conflict if it is between two or more systems, and not within the systems.

These are ideal types in Weber's sense of the term. A true intra-system conflict is such that one may subdivide the system, down to the single person and still find the value-disagreement and in the true inter-system conflict there is no value-disagreement within the systems in conflict, only between.

In many cases it will obviously be a matter of convention whether we want to conceive of a conflict as intra-system or inter-system; it depends on what systems we are looking at. We then introduce the following typology:
We need the full typology and the distinction between for instance the inter-person and the intra-group conflict. The first is a conflict between persons, the second is within the group and is found inside each member of the group. It is, however, not the same as n intra-person conflicts, where n is the number of members of the group, but a shared intra-person conflict, at the group level. Further, an inter-group conflict is not the same as an inter-person conflict. In the former, the persons who act out the conflict do so on behalf of the group, i.e., with a collectivistic orientation, in the latter each individual fights with an individualistic orientation. We shall present one proposition here to throw more light on the definition (see also section 6).

PROP 4.1. An intra-system conflict is not stable, but will either be solved, or lead to an inter-system conflict one type lower. This may in turn develop into an inter-system conflict of the original type. (follows from axioms 3.2 and 3.3).

Prop 4.1.1: An intra-group conflict will lead to an inter-person conflict and in turn to group formation and an inter-group conflict (the typical community conflict).

Prop 4.1.2: An intra-society conflict will lead to an inter-group conflict and in turn to society formation and an inter-society conflict. (the early formation of the United States).

Extrapolations:

Prop 4.1.3: An intra-person conflict may lead to the splitting of of the personality (not of the physical person) into two parts, and the acting out of the conflict as an inter-person conflict (several forms of mental illness).

Prop 4.1.4: An intra-alliance conflict may lead to an inter-society conflict and in turn to new alliance-formation and an inter-alliance conflict. (the anti-nazi alliance).

We shall later examine in some detail the nature of this general process intra-system to inter-system one type lower to inter-system original type. Survey of definitions and characteristics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Definition:</th>
<th>Extreme outcomes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Intra-person</td>
<td>contained within individual</td>
<td>suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inter-person</td>
<td>between individuals, but individualistic orientation</td>
<td>homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intra-group</td>
<td>contained within individuals, but shared between them</td>
<td>dissolution, annihilation, apathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inter-group</td>
<td>between groups, but collectivistic orientation</td>
<td>killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Intra-society</td>
<td>contained within groups and individuals, but shared between them</td>
<td>dissolution, annihilation, apathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Inter-society</td>
<td>between societies, but collectivistic orientation</td>
<td>extinction through warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the six above, the first is a personal conflict, and the others social conflicts. Because of the instability of intra-group and intra-society conflicts, a typology consisting of 1, 2, 4 and 6 will do for most purposes.

In addition to the conflict types we have already introduced, we may also have "mixed types" of the inter-system conflicts: There are three possibilities with our distinctions:

Mixed type I-II: conflict between a person and a group, as in the case of the heretic.

Mixed type I-III: conflict between a person and a society, as in the case of the traitor and the case of the criminal; according to legal tradition the conflict is transformed from being inter-personal to being a conflict of this type.

Mixed type II-III: conflict between a group and a society, as in the case of the Communist Parties in Western countries after WWII.

We shall not deal with these mixed-type conflicts, but indeed feel that a good theory of social conflict should be able to integrate them into the general analysis.

We then turn to the introduction of realistic vs. non-realistic conflicts, which has to do with a comparison between manifest conflict-behavior and latent conflict-sentiment, whether the conflicts are real or perceived.

DEF 4.7: A conflict is said to be realistic if the latent conflict is acted out on the manifest level in a way directly relevant to the solution of that conflict. A conflict is said to be non-realistic relative to a value-disagreement if the conflict-behavior on the manifest level has no direct, relevant relation to that on the latent level, but possibly to some other conflict value-disagreement.

As a kind of operational definition level we may add that a realistic conflict will be solved if the manifest conflict is solved, whereas the non-realistic conflict will only take on other forms - the latent level conflict will manifest itself in some new conflict.

We thus form our judgment on the basis of a comparison between the conflict-behavior we watch (between poor whites and Negroes) and the underlying conflict we assume (e.g., the intra-group conflict among the poor whites due to poverty, for instance over the values "set aside grain" and "have enough to eat"). In this case a latent intra-group conflict has been acted out as a manifest inter-group conflict.
We get the following possibilities (R for realistic, NR for non-realistic):

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{LATENT LEVEL} & \text{intra-person} & \text{inter-person} & \text{inter-group} & \text{inter-society} \\
\hline
\text{intra-person} & \text{NR or R} & \text{NR} & \text{NR} & \text{NR} \\
& 1, 1 & 1, 2 & 1, 3 & 1, 4 \\
\hline
\text{inter-person} & \text{NR} & \text{NR or R} & \text{NR} & \text{NR} \\
& 2, 1 & 2, 2 & 2, 3 & 2, 4 \\
\hline
\text{inter-group} & \text{NR} & \text{NR} & \text{NR or R} & \text{NR} \\
& 3, 1 & 3, 2 & 3, 3 & 3, 4 \\
\hline
\text{inter-society} & \text{NR} & \text{NR} & \text{NR} & \text{NR or R} \\
& 4, 1 & 4, 2 & 4, 3 & 4, 4 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

In all off-diagonal cells we shall of course have non-realistic conflicts only, but in the diagonal cells both possibilities are possible.

DEF 4.7.1: A non-realistic conflict is said to be down-projected if its manifest type is lower than its latent type.

A non-realistic conflict is said to be up-projected if its manifest type is higher than the latent type.

We then need two variables to express the intensity of the conflict: one on the latent level, the other on the manifest level:

DEF 4.8: By intensity on the latent level, latent intensity, we mean degree of emotional involvement by the actors.

By intensity on the manifest level, manifest intensity, we mean kind and degree of intensity of the actions made use of by the actors as responses to the conflict.

The latent intensity, or the intensity of the conflict-sentiment, can vary all the way from zero to extreme hatred via various degrees of hostility. Conceivably, also positive sentiment embracing different shades of love and friendship can ensue from a conflict. The conflict-sentiment is very often expressed as "individual tension," "hostility," "moral indignation," "feeling of being strongly engaged," etc.

The manifest intensity, or the intensity of the conflict-behavior, can also vary all the way from zero to dropping of atom bombs. Conceivably, also positive actions involving all kinds of friendly acts can be possible results of a conflict.

We distinguish between two kinds of manifest acts, depending on the functions they serve:

DEF 4.9: Conflict-behavior is said to be instrumental to the extent it is intended to lead to conflict resolution.
Conflict-behavior is said to be expressive to the extent it serves as an outlet for cumulated conflict-sentiment (from the same or from other conflicts, depending on whether the conflict is realistic or non-realistic).

One way in which conflict-behavior may be instrumental is by serving as a social control of the other party to the conflict. This gives us a cue to the "kind and degree" mentioned in DEF 4.8 of manifest intensity:

**SOCIAL CONTROL MECHANISM**

**Kinds:** informal control; verbal and non-verbal acts of omission: non-cooperation acts of commission: civil disobedience; physical force, etc.

**Degree:** "Low" to "high".

The kind and degree of the social control mechanisms made use of are very often dependent on techniques, external resources, etc. Further, it should be remembered that what is high manifest intensity in one context may not be it in another, e.g., the use of pistols in a desegregation conflict and in a world war. Similarly, the latent intensity may vary with personal capacity or internal resources, and its intensity must be judged against the background of the conflict context.

**PROP 4.5:** All combinations of zero, low and high latent intensity and of zero, low and high manifest intensity are empirically possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LATENT INTENSITY</th>
<th>MANIFEST INTENSITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Hatred)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>latent hatred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East-West conflict right after Hungarian revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>latent hostility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mild quarrel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World War II, e.g., Italy front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>no conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>top-level meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>extermination of Jews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**friendly acts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zero</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**(Friendship)**

**(love)**
and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures"). The passing individual will be in a transition state with two cultures internalized at the same time, and the difficulties of reconciling them will inevitably lead him into an intra-person conflict.

b. The pattern of overconformity, the meticulous and exaggerated compliance with selected topdog norms. His lack of training in topdog life, the factor of social myopia which makes it difficult to see clearly statuses socially distant from the status in which or to which one is raised, and the desire to conform will of course all contribute to making this a very painful experience for the individual. It may be explained on two bases:

1. It is a way of gaining access to topdog life, of pleasing the topdog — and even though they may laugh at him, they will also to some extent feel flattered.

2. The exaggeration is a way of killing the underdog in oneself, thus relieving oneself of the burden of the intra-person conflict described above.

c. As a special, but very important case of this, the passer will overconform especially when it comes to expressing the topdog ideology with regard to the underdog. He will probably be especially harsh on underdog leaders who struggle for underdog recognition or equality; i.e., who have a collectivistic outlook and not the individualistic outlook the underdog individual has proved to have (but they may both have a universalistic orientation; the passer may sincerely feel that the road to underdog salvation goes through individual passing only). By this, he hopes to obtain the following:

1. Removal of any doubt as to his loyalty — especially removal of suspicion that he is really a disguised spy or agent from the underdog, or out for contamination of them with his underdog blood or mentality.

2. A struggle against his own past, a denial of the underdog in him, a real attempt to kill him, because he knows there is no return.

3. Retaliation against the underdog group or selected individuals for actual, perceived or anticipated negative sanctions against him for his passing.

d. The underdog reaction to him will probably by this time be a mixture of envy because he is enjoying topdog rights, some admiration for the skills he has displayed in the process, and more negative feelings. These will be highly dependent on the social structure or the cultural climate. If the culture is universalistic and the group is struggling for equality, the passer will probably be perceived as a traitor to the cause, one who did not show the necessary postponement of individual gratification and did not have sufficient collectivistic orientation to share the underdog fate and work for recognition as a group, not only as successful individuals. He will probably also be suspected of being unloyal and be regarded as a renegade, for whom "we apparently are not good enough". Support for this will be found in the pattern mentioned under c. above, as a special case of the overconformity.
It is tempting to suggest a proposition to the effect that there will be a regression towards the main diagonal, i.e., that the sentiment will somehow be adjusted to the behavior or vice-versa, but the examples are so obvious that this seems not to be the case at all. Further, intuitive conceptions of what are "corresponding" sentiment and behavior may be very misleading and culturally biased. It seems that the American culture has norms prescribing "acting it out" and "getting it straight" if intense and negative conflicts-sentiment is felt, but other cultures certainly have other prescriptions. Further, there seems to be no reason why the most hostile and cruel acts cannot be done with little or no negative sentiment at all, possibly even with a positive sentiment. The conclusion is that we can have conflict behavior with no sentiment, and intense hatred with no conflict behavior. In the first case we probably are dealing with institutionalized statuses with a very collectivistic orientation, as the man who pushes the button in the push-button war. In the other case we shall probably sooner or later have an outburst on the manifest level in the same or a different case. But both are empirically possible and frequent.

Finally, we turn to our definition of conflict solution as the achievement in the system of one s-f matrix. We want to catch in our terms the important distinction between the case where the opposition is suppressed in one way or another, and the case where the parties have arrived at a shared solution:

**DEF 4.10:** We say that the solution of the conflict is **accepted** if the conflicting parties both agree on the solution.

We say that the solution of the conflict is **unaccepted** if the conflicting parties do not agree on the solution.
We need first two very fundamental definitions and propositions from general sociological theory:

DEF 5. 1: By a status-dimension in a social system we mean a set of statuses which for logical reasons are exhaustive and mutually exclusive so that each individual in the social system must have one and only one of them in his status-set (e.g., parent-child in the family, high-middle-low class in the society, etc.).

PROP 5. 1: Status-differentiation (also called "division of labor" in a wider sense) is a functional requirement of any society.

DEF 5. 2: By a rank-dimension in a social system we mean a status-dimension that is stratified, i.e., the statuses are differentially evaluated (as in the examples above).

PROP 5. 2: Differential evaluation along at least some of the status-dimensions is a functional requirement of any society, whereas the selection of status-dimensions for ranking and the direction of the ranking is culturally dependent in most cases.

To make the exposition simpler, we shall only consider dichotomous, ranked status-dimensions, and call the high status the "topdog" and the low status the "underdog" (other names could have been "elite" and "followers", but we prefer the connotations of the former names in this connection). As indicated in the propositions, we shall have topdog and underdog statuses in any society, which means that the theory to be developed will have a very wide field of application.

To make it more concrete, let us arrive at some major examples of rank-dimensions and try to make the list, if not exhaustive, at least sufficient to cover the most important cases. Obviously, rank-dimensions can be of two kinds: achieved and ascribed.

1. Achieved rank-dimensions. If we agree with Zetterberg ( ) that an achieved rank can be used as a basis for the definition of an institutional realm, we get:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional realm</th>
<th>Rank-dimension, or value to be maximized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>1. Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>2. Skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>3. Taste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion/Ideology</td>
<td>4. Holiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>5. Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>6. Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>7. Legality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8. Health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these eight dimensions, the first three are more pure cases of achieved dimensions, whereas the last five certainly may be considered ascribed dimensions in very many cases.
The topdog reaction to him will depend on a number of structural properties of the society. If achievement is a salient pattern and the rank-dimension is of the achieved or mixed kind, the successful and tactful upward mobile underdog individual will be more than welcomed, because he satisfies the function of serving as a proof for the underdog that it is possible. Some individuals of this kind will be selected by the topdog group and their success will be made highly visible to the rest of the society. With passing it is a different story, for in this case it is not the meaning that there shall be any crossing of the line. However, we surmise that passers will be permitted in a limited number for the same reason as with mobility, to serve as a safety-valve mechanism in the society, but the process will have to be covert and even more tactfully performed, and it will not be made visible. Under all circumstances will the rate of underdog individuals moving or passing be regulated so as not to impair the rank-distribution.
2. **Ascribed rank-dimensions.** An ascribed status or ascribed rank is a status or rank that is known with very high probability for the individual at birth. They may be subdivided into **indelible** and **not indelible**, and the latter into **visible** and **not visible**. We get:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characterization</th>
<th>Rank-dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not indelible</td>
<td>9. Nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indelible, not visible</td>
<td>14. Kinship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Relative Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Race</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Sex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Along all these eighteen dimensions we can very meaningfully talk about topdog and underdog statuses, and the task is to develop some kind of general theory for them, in the first run ignoring the differences between achieved and ascribed ranks, and the subdivisions for the ascribed statuses.

**General propositions:**

1. **Rank is scarce** - that is, there must be a definition of the rank-dimension so that only a minority can have top-rank (not every actor can meaningfully be a movie-star, unless movie-star shall become the designation for all statuses filled by movie actors).

2. **Rank is a non-distributive value** - that is, one cannot distribute increase in rank as one pleases, because rank is essentially "differential rank", and hence it cannot be given to others without affecting one's own rank.

3. **The differential ranking may take on very many different forms**

   **on the latent level:** from mere awareness of differential evaluation to scorn or hatred for the other statuses, combined with stereotypes and prejudice.

   **on the manifest level:** from a slight tendency to avoid primary relations with holders of the other status to extreme discrimination and direct subjugation.

4. **In this situation we may have conflicts on all levels,** from the barely perceived to the full-blown manifest. We may have

   *intra-person conflict* as when the individual underdog finds himself under cross-pressures from the underdog and topdog groups, with attraction and avoidance feelings towards both.

   *inter-person conflict* as when the individual underdog decides to change his status because of the cross-pressures mentioned above and gets into conflict with individuals in either or both groups.
inter-group conflict as between the underdog and topdog statusholders as groups.

5. There are only two ways open for the underdog of accommodating to the situation:

5.1. The individual underdog may become a member of the topdog group, if the ranking-dimension is
   a. achieved - by the pattern of individual mobility.
   b. ascribed - by the pattern of individual passing.
   and then gradually acquire topdog rank if he is successful.

5.2. The underdog group as a whole may try to
   a. keep the status-dimension, but abolish the differential ranking along it, "the struggle for equality".
   b. keep the status-dimension and the ranking, but reverse the order of the ranking, "revolutionary upheaval".

The way open to the individual underdog, viz., passing or mobility into the topdog group is not open to the group as a whole for the reasons mentioned under propositions nos. 1 and 2 above.

6. The extent to which there is conflict, and which way the underdog chooses will be culturally dependent. It seems that we here can make use of Parsons' way of characterizing cultural systems by means of two of his pattern variables, when we apply them to our problem in the following way:

Universalism: the pattern of treating all members of the status-group according to the same criteria.

Particularism: the pattern of differential treatment of members of the status-group depending on particular relations to them.

Achievement: the pattern of structural provision for individual mobility depending on the individual performance.

Ascription: the pattern of not permitting individual mobility, but regarding the status-position as fixed and independent of any performance by the individual.

This gives us

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Universalism</th>
<th>Particularism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Individual mobility</td>
<td>Individual mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group struggle for equality</td>
<td>Underdog group unorganized, everybody looks out for himself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascription</td>
<td>Individual passing only</td>
<td>Individual passing by topdog grace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Underdog compliance, or preparation for revolution</td>
<td>Underdog compliance, everybody waiting for the topdog grace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We now turn to the other case, the underdog as a group struggling for recognition, equality, upheaval - in short, for social change. This struggle will by definition be a conflict, because the simultaneous realisation of the topdog value (leave the rank-dimension intact!) and the underdog value (abolish the ranking, or reverse the order!) is impossible for logical reasons. The following reflections and propositions seem to be valid:

1. The conflict over rank may start like any other conflict, though we may assume that it has been latent for some time, and that some concrete issue starts the conflict and brings it out on the manifest level. From then on we can assume a development to take place along the lines indicated in section 5, but very rapidly if it is possible to use underdog-topdog labels for the two conflicting groups. An important thing is that a conflict is a sufficient condition for making groups out of the social categories the topdog and underdog statusholders form, and it may even be too far from being a necessary condition (if we make use of the definition of "conflict" as "perceived conflict, whether actual or not").

2. We get a very important case of non-realistic conflict, if a conflict is transformed on the manifest level to an underdog-topdog conflict (what communists are so often, rightly or wrongly, accused of doing!) It seems that very many conflicts with very varying contents have a tendency to gravitate in people's minds towards some selected underdog-topdog conflicts and be fought out as such. This will of course not contribute very much to the solution of the original conflict: compare how the enormous conflict between underdeveloped and overdeveloped countries has been partly transformed into an East-West conflict.

3. During the conflict ideologies will develop in the underdog and topdog groups, with functions along the lines suggested in section 5. It seems that these functions can be classified as follows:

   a. for the topdog group - the ideology is a justification of the status quo and of their power over the underdogs.

   b. for the underdog group - the ideology has the function of "anticipatory equalisation" - of making the groups equal in the minds of the underdogs, or even with a superiority for the underdog group. Important here are derisive terms and descriptions of the topdogs and consistent ideologies with answers to everything the topdog might say (see the following pages for both).

4. The word "equal" has three very different interpretations, viz.,

   a. "equal" in the meaning factually equal, not that all underdogs are equal to all topdogs, but that as a group, "on the average" they are equal, i.e., that some selected statistical parameters are equal for distributions of group characteristics. We shall call this cognitive equality, equality.
However, regardless of cultural background, if the rank-dimension is ascribed the pattern of individual mobility will be meaningless. One can only "pass" from one race to another, not "move" socially. It may well be that bottom row characterizations of the underdog group behavior are better in these cases, even if the culture is of the universalism type.

Let us then return to the two possibilities open to the underdog and try to find a common pattern when the individual underdog wants to make use of the techniques of passing or mobility into the topdog level. We suggest that the following will take place:

1. At some point in the individual's life a change in reference-group takes place. This may be a slow or a sudden process and may be analyzed as the special case of migration-analysis: a combination of pull towards the topdog status and push away from the underdog status. The change is highly dependent on exposure to topdog life, whether this comes through the mass-culture media or direct interaction. We assume in the following that he acquires a sincere desire to become topdog.

2. After this, a more or less conscious and systematic sounding out of topdog behavior takes place, a searching for cues as to how topdogs behave. Depending on the social distance between the two levels, the social experience and imagination of the individual more or less valid results may be obtained. Movies are of course highly instrumental here, and so are commercial ads.

3. After some time, the individual underdog may feel he is prepared, if not for passing, at least for a rehearsal for passing. He will play the topdog role for a well selected audience of only topdogs or only underdogs - and he will play it with reservations, e.g., jokingly, so that the retreat is open for him in case of failure. This is the case of the young girl wearing one of her mother's or elder sister's dresses, of the habitually sick person trying to ignore his sickness, of the criminal trying to be law-abiding, of the Negro behaving like a white, etc.

4. If the rehearsal is to the individual's satisfaction; that is, if he believes that both topdog and underdog have accepted him as topdog, the passing itself may take place. This time it is done without reservations, and he knows that from now on there is no return without suffering at least humiliation. Attempts are often made to make the passing invisible to those who know him, but if successful, attempts will be made to make the result highly visible to those who know him (e.g., the adolescent who benefits from a vacation to change to a much more adult style and her parents' shock and dismay when they discover how much "the new persons she has been associating with have done to her"); the emigrant who changes style when he becomes immigrant and returns after a sufficient number of years to feel secure that he will be taken seriously, etc.). It seems to be highly important for a society that proclaims achievement, mobility and possibility of passing to provide for the possibility of making the change itself invisible to those closest to the changer. It is an old experience that the child who hangs on to his family way into adulthood will never be quite acknowledged as grown-up - the chance lies in a stay away from home.

5. From now on a number of things will happen more or less inevitably, and they can very well be described as the classical pattern of individual passing:

a. The passing individual becomes a marginal man (as defined by Robert E. Park in the preface to the book by Stonequist, E. V.: The Marginal Man, (New York, 1937), "one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies..."
b. "equal" in the meaning equal in rights, they may be evaluated differently, but still have the same rights, or obligations. We shall call this normative equality, equality_2.

c. "equal" in the meaning equal in evaluation, they may be different but are still evaluated the same, none is better than the other. We shall call this evaluative equality, equality_3.

As we see, inequality_1 has to do with status-qualifiers for holders of topdog and underdog status, inequality_2 has to do with differentiation of the statuses, and inequality_3 to do with differential evaluation, stratification or ranking of the different statuses.

It is most important to see that these three kinds of equality-inequality are logically independent, though they may well be empirically correlated. It is possible to perceive two persons as very different, e.g., in height, and still give them the same status and the same rank. It is possible to see them as equal in all status-relevant respects, but let the inequality in skin-color serve as the basis for the denial of equality_2. And it is possible to give equality_2 at least to a very large extent as it is given to women, and still deny them equality_3.

5. The polarization in a rank-conflict will bring with it a polarization of the three concepts of equality - i.e., it may start out as inequality in status-rights and end up as inequality in evaluation and inequality in perceived characteristics. The following mechanisms seem to be particularly important:

a. underdogs who fight for equality_2 and equality_3 will claim that there is equality_1 on all status-relevant dimensions.

b. topdogs who strive to maintain inequality_2 with or without inequality_3 will support their stand by claiming that there is status-relevant inequality_1.

This makes for a lot of confusion, part of which can be traced back to ambiguous use of the term "equality".

6. The underdog is functionally necessary for the topdogs, because he is the background against which he can see himself as a topdog, the constant reinsurance that this is a rank-dimension, not just a status-dimension. This is trivially true for whites, upper-class people, adults etc. less trivial but still true for law-abiding people (who need the criminals) and healthy people (who need sick people). This functional requirement might be seen as a way of correcting for the fatal asymmetry in life, that human beings to a large extent are unable to feel their health as something positive or their habit to abide by the laws as praise worthy but as something just normal - like having air around to breathe. One must see people who do not have this "normal but so positive" property to appreciate it better.
7. **Visibility theorems.**

a. **Underdog** latent intensity is increased with increasing visibility of the difference in rights between underdogs and topdogs. This may then be expressed as manifest intensity.

b. **Underdog** latent intensity is increased with increasing visibility of successful passing of underdog individuals into the topdog group.

c. **Topdogs** will use their power to regulate the mutual visibility of topdogs and underdogs so that

1. they do not have to face underdog misery resulting from the devaluation of them directly

2. they do not create too much resentment directed against themselves

3. on the other hand, they see sufficiently much of the underdogs to feel superior.

Important techniques here are residential segregation of races, ethnic groups, communities and classes; segregation of women and adolescents to women's rooms etc.; seclusion of ill people and criminals (but for these two categories it seems that the function of "social sanitation" has taken precedence over the function of reinforcing rank-dimensions).

8. **The polarization and intensity of the conflict is highly dependent on how underdog and topdog statuses correlate (see section 5).**

In a social system with dichotomous rank-dimensions there will be $2^n$ possible status-sets. If only two of these are realized in practice, so that each individual has either only topdog or only underdog statuses, conflict on one rank-dimension will probably very rapidly spread to the other dimensions. If there is an ideology around to the effect that all the n conflicts "in reality" are different aspects of the same fundamental conflict (between the exploiters and the exploited, between the generalized topdog and the generalized underdog) such an ideology will easily be adopted and may increase polarization and intensity immensely. It seems that much of communist strategy and success derives from their ability to unify underdogs of different kinds and to invoke unifying ideologies.

9. **Intra- and inter-underdogs theorems.**

a. **Self-hatred** among the underdogs (Kerwin, ch. 12). This is partly a hatred for other underdogs of the same kind because they are constant reminders of one's own underdog-status or because of their actual, perceived or anticipated reaction to one's own efforts to pass or to move upwards. And partly it is a real self-hatred, directed against one's own person, "I hate the woman, the Jew, the Negro, etc. in me ---". This pattern may be seen as special cases of the frustration-agression hypothesis.
b. Hatred for other kinds of underdogs. This may be interpreted as a kind of displaced other-aggression when one does not dare to direct it against the topdog and as a desire to create new rank-dimensions where one's own group is no longer on the bottom and hence can transfer perceived topdog sentiment against one's own group to the created under-underdog. This is of course also a technique for gaining some reward from the topdog. In some segregation cases it seems that lower class women from the countryside are especially anti-Negro (they have three underdog statuses to compensate for).

10. Underdog resentment against their leaders. There seems, in the first stages particularly, of a rank-conflict to be a very ambivalent attitude in the underdog group to their leaders, if by leaders we mean those who struggle for group equality. This antagonism is explainable on the following bases:

a. The suspicion that the leader has an individualistic orientation, and makes use of the group to further his own interests in order to be able to pass or to move upwards. His relatively frequent contacts with the topdog group (which is in the nature of the conflict as an inter-group conflict) are given as evidence for this.

b. The internalization of topdog ideology, which tells them that the situation is to their own good and that the power of the topdog is justified power, awe-inspiring and sacred which results in aggression against leaders who deny this ideology. It must be remembered that the topdogs "own the society" and the main means for dissemination of ideology.

c. Aggression against the leader because he is the leader, how can he justify his power? In the beginning, the leaders will have to be charismatic and/or self-selected, and hence have some difficulties justifying their power.

d. "Why can't he take it when we take it" - attitudes, we have suffered and why is he not able to suffer the same as we do? What makes him believe that he is of a more refined kind than we are, so that he can't take it?

e. The leader is a threat to them in their complacency as underdogs, and may stir the conscience.

11. Underdog leaders' reaction to the resentment. The leaders will try to counteract this resentment with a number of techniques, as for instance:

1. Make visible to the underdogs how they are against the topdog and have not converted to his values. This is the famous phenomenon of top-level meetings between conflict leaders, where the leaders talk for their followers, not for the benefit of conflict resolution.

2. Making visible that they still are the good, old underdogs they should be - the laborleader who is pictured in his shop, the emancipationist woman who dresses a little bit frivolously etc., to assure identification of the rank-and-file underdog with them and (though this is not said) that they themselves do not loose the contact.
3. Making visible how they sacrifice for the underdog cause, so that they will not be suspected of having a good time as leaders. Especially important, if possible, is to make visible some kind of severe discrimination they have suffered as underdogs.

4. Sacrificing the big long-term goals for the smaller short-term ones in order to justify the power they want to retain, even if this may lead to a corruption of the cause. Justification of this by means of formulas like "politics is to obtain the possible", "we are not fighting for utopia", "we are realists", etc.

12. The possibility of exploitation of the conflict by an external enemy. As mentioned before, it is only when external threat is considered a threat against the group as a whole that it will have a unifying effect. External enemies can claim that they are only against the topdogs, or only against the underdogs, and that they want to help the one against the other. To exploit internal conflict is a very common technique, though external enemies may very easily miscalculate the conflict and take its saliency in absence of other conflicts for genuine saliency.

A very common technique is to make use of underdog individuals to keep occupied territories or power-positions. They can be given high positions, be used as police, henchmen, concentration camp guards, etc., for the following reasons:

a. If they can obtain some or most of the topdog life they have been longing for and which has been their only goal for a long time, they will be willing to make use of the bad means.

b. These individual underdogs know that their new position is not guaranteed in the social structure, but is highly dependent on the new power-holders -- and will hence do their best to protect their power.

c. They know that they are hated more than anyone else by their former fellow underdogs, and hence that they have come to the point where there is no return: either maintain the position, die or leave the society.

d. They are now given the best chance possible of acting out resentment against underdog leaders (see point 10).

This technique has been fully made use of in all modern dictatorships - and in older ones too, for that matter. An interesting reflection is how the communist revolution in the Soviet Union may be seen as an alliance between the numerically quite inconspicuous Bolshevik Party (those who took the train -- ) and different kinds of underdogs: those without money, without power, the minorities, the young people, the women, etc.
Assumptions underlying this scheme:

1. The underdogs have already externalized the topdog ideology
2. The topdogs have not yet internalized the underdog ideology
3. In the culture of the supersystem, the patterns of universalism and achievement are dominant, and the culture is sensate or mixed.

Read vertically, this table gives outlines of the two ideologies.
Read horizontally it gives corresponding pairs of arguments.

The ideologies we present are relatively sophisticated versions, and must be reworded to fit the purely achieved dimensions.

**TOPDOG IDEOLOGY**

Basic outlook: Change of the society as a whole, but stability of the relation to the underdog as this is in the interest of the society and of the underdog (not to mention the topdog, but that is not said).

An ideational ideology should be disseminated to the underdog, to comfort them, to provide for stability, to make them see that "God meant it this way". Belief may be sincere or not.

There is cognitive inequality between the two groups, and it has to do with biological, intrinsic factors - which no external change can ameliorate - like bodily constitution, blood, inferiority in general. This is proved by showing differential results obtained by underdogs and topdogs, the underdogs were never that creative, they have always been the helpers of the topdogs.

But history proves that civilizations were always made by the topdogs, and however far you go back you find that those who are topdogs today, were topdogs and this is the way it has always been.

But these are the most valid criteria, they are the criteria the civilizations are founded on.

**UNDERDOG IDEOLOGY**

Basic outlook: Change of the society as a whole, and change of the relation to the topdog, as this is in the interest of the society and of the topdog (not to mention the underdog, and that may be said, though not necessarily as the main reason).

Rejection of reinterpretation of these parts of the ideational ideology, claiming that it was a trick devised to keep the underdogs down.

First, there is no cognitive inequality and secondly, if there is, it is due to extrinsic factors like better access to resources, an ascribed status that gives them a better start, they are expected to create, etc. If we were given the same chances, we would be just as good. Derisive terms etc. for the topdog.

This is true by definition, besides, it depends on the historical perspective, people North of the Alps were barbarians to the Romans.

And these comparisons between topdogs and underdogs are always made with the topdogs' criteria.
Hence we simply cannot take the risk of letting the underdogs have exactly the same rights as we have, after all we owe something to civilization, to those who founded our society. There must be some inequality in rights, no society has ever done without! A borderline must be drawn even though it may be unjust to some. Besides, the appearance may deceive.

We always do our best to help the individual underdog pass or move, it is the recognition of the underdog group as a whole we are against, because the group as a whole is simply not that good. But individual recognition must not be construed to mean group recognition.

This does not mean that we devaluate the underdogs, there is no evaluative inequality. On the contrary, we have tremendous respect for the individual underdog and think they are wonderful people. But on the other hand, they are somewhat like children, they want somebody to respect and to look up to, so we have to play the difficult role of the authority! But underdogs only look at our rights, never at our obligations.

The underdog is actually completely dependent upon us, he owes all he is to us and should rather express some gratitude than this discontent, which actually is mainly stirred up by some outside people and some very few crazy underdogs.

But we cannot trust the underdog completely, he may be dangerous when given power because he does not have the sense of responsibility it takes centuries to develop. He is not really of the society, and look at differential crime rates, laziness, etc.

And how dull wouldn't life be if everybody should be equal? (cognitively) It is exactly the diversity, with its implicit challenge that makes life and history so fascinating. Rather, let each group develop its own characteristics and develop a pride in them, and a recognition that not everybody is made to do the same job or have the same rights.

But there is no doubt that some underdogs are better than some topdogs even measured with their standards, there is such a tremendous overlap, and it is under no condition just to let these individual underdogs down!

It is good if conditions can become better for some underdogs but we want the recognition built into the social structure. We don't want the pattern of each topdog adopting one or more underdogs with paternalistic protection.

There is evaluative inequality, and this is the main reason why there is normative inequality, they just want somebody to look down at. And even if you abolish the normative inequality, the evaluative one will still remain as a more subtle way of retaining their illusion of superiority.

The topdog is actually completely dependent upon us, without us he could achieve nothing, all his civilization is based on underdog toil. But we are pushed in the background, and he has the power to define his part of the work as the functionally most important and difficult. More radical version: we are really the most important, the topdogs are parasites.

You can trust the underdog if you give him lost class citizenship, and challenge him to do his best, then he will develop that sense of responsibility, and perceive the society as something that deserves his loyalty. Topdog argument is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

We have nothing against diversity, but feel it should be on more important and relevant dimensions than ascriptive dimensions, and we feel that the fundament cognitive equality is much more important than the dissimilarities.

Emphasis on individual achievement and values common for both groups.

Emphasis on total group universalism and values common for both groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank-dimension</th>
<th>Name of topdog and derogative terms</th>
<th>Name of underdog</th>
<th>Process of individual change</th>
<th>Process of group change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Knowledge</td>
<td>Scientist (egghead, high-brow)</td>
<td>Layman</td>
<td>Individual achievement</td>
<td>universal, popular education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Skill</td>
<td>Technician, expert (technocrat, narrow-headed specialist)</td>
<td>Layman</td>
<td>Individual achievement</td>
<td>&quot;do-it-yourself&quot;-movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Taste</td>
<td>Artists, Connoisseurs (long-haired dreamers, mad people, high-brow)</td>
<td>Layman</td>
<td>Individual achievement</td>
<td>&quot;non-popular&quot;, devaluation of art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Holiness</td>
<td>Priests (&quot;out of this world&quot;)</td>
<td>Layman</td>
<td>Lay preacher, saint, eremite</td>
<td>Protestantism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Power</td>
<td>Leader, government (power corrupts, bosses)</td>
<td>Followers, people</td>
<td>charismatic leaders</td>
<td>revolts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Property</td>
<td>Wealthy people, owners of means of production (greedy, parasites)</td>
<td>Poor people</td>
<td>Individual achievement, heritage</td>
<td>socialism, welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Legality</td>
<td>Law-abiding people (cowards, people with connections)</td>
<td>Law-breakers</td>
<td>resocialization</td>
<td>redifinition of crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Health</td>
<td>Well people (lucky people)</td>
<td>Sick people</td>
<td>rehabilitation</td>
<td>emphasis on sickness as extr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Nationality</td>
<td>Over-developed peoples (exploiters, good resources and climate)</td>
<td>Under-developed peoples</td>
<td>emigration-immigration</td>
<td>development, aid, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Community</td>
<td>Urban people (city-slickers)</td>
<td>Rural people</td>
<td>Individual migration</td>
<td>adoption of city-culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Religion</td>
<td>Protestants, Presbyt. (&quot;high church&quot;, not really religious)</td>
<td>Catholics, Baptists</td>
<td>change of religion</td>
<td>pan-religious movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ethnic group</td>
<td>Gentiles (goyim, pork-eaters)</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>assimilation</td>
<td>anti-defamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Class</td>
<td>Upper-class (exploiters, snobs)</td>
<td>Lower-class</td>
<td>individual mobility</td>
<td>decreasing visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Kinship</td>
<td>&quot;Good&quot; families (snobs)</td>
<td>&quot;Bad&quot; families</td>
<td>marry into a good family</td>
<td>reduce saliency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Relative age (primogeniture)</td>
<td>1st born</td>
<td>2nd born, etc.</td>
<td>kill the first born</td>
<td>reduce saliency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Absolute age</td>
<td>Adults (the &quot;old men&quot; senile)</td>
<td>Children, adolescents, aged</td>
<td>conceal real age</td>
<td>redefinition of maturity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Race</td>
<td>White people &quot;okay&quot;</td>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>Individual passing</td>
<td>desegregation integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Sex</td>
<td>Men (&quot;Men!&quot;)</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>behave like men</td>
<td>emancipation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. DYNAMICS OF INTRA-GROUP CONFLICT.

The following presentation of the different phases in an intra-group conflict (or what starts out as an intra-group conflict) is to a large extent based on Coleman (ch. III). The phases are to be conceived of as being temporally and logically ordered, but the development can be extremely rapid or very slow, some phases may be omitted, and the process may be stopped at any point.

Phase 1. An issue is brought into the group. It may be fundamental or non-fundamental, logical or empirical, perceived or real, but we assume it is presented as an issue for the group, relevant for the group as a whole. It is claimed that the issue is of such a nature that it should be a shared concern for everybody in the group.

Phase 2. Differential presentation of courses of action. This is a kind of division of labor process: if the issue is brought in for discussion at the group level, there will be a group need for proponents of the different courses of action (compare the judicial procedure of division of labor between the accuser and the defendant). In principle, each member of the group should be able to house the arguments on both sides within himself and discuss them with himself and others. But in practice it seems that this dialectic process is more easily carried out between than within persons.

Phase 3. Generalization of the issue. By some stretch of the imagination any issue can be considered a special case of a more general problem, and any course for action can be considered a specialization of some more general norm. Generalizations will at least to some extent be brought into the picture, for the following reasons:

a. The members of the group will consider all conflicts a challenge to their culture, and more or less consciously use the conflict as an opportunity to adjust parts of their culture. The conflict will thus be taken as representative of a set of conflicts that may or may not appear in the future.

b. By generalizing the suggested course to a more general norm, one may stand stronger in defense or in attack by showing (at least to one's own satisfaction) how the norm fits in with or is contrary to the general cultural pattern.

It may be surmised that if there are intellectuals around, this generalization will be greatly facilitated.

Phase 4. Introduction of new issues. At this point, new issues may be introduced, for two reasons:

a. More or less consciously, the points of view have been associated with those who have the task of being their proponents. The points of view may be both attacked and defended by widening the front: one can refer to the persons' attitudes in other cases and use this as a general indicator of how wise or wise it will be to pay attention to the persons' point of view.

b. Through the foregoing phases, a conflict has been brought into the open. This may serve as an occasion for bringing up other issues which so far have been latent only, because conflict is now "declared". The struggle over these issues may take the form of non-
realistic or realistic conflicts depending on their logical distance from the original issue. It seems reasonable to assume that the broader the scope of interaction the more issues that are distant from the original one may be brought in.

Phase 5. Polarization in the personal system. In the minds of the persons participating in the conflict separate processes now start taking place:

1. An awareness of the values, norms, ideas, etc., characteristic of the other party and those of one's own party.

2. An all-over evaluation of that which is associated with the other party as bad or inferior and that which is associated with one's own party as good or superior. This is a new phenomenon; so far we have not introduced any evaluation of ideas, but looked at the conflict as a disagreement only.

3. A self-purification by abandoning symbols of the other party, so that there is no or little impurity in oneself.

4. A distorted perception of the other party so that the remaining "good" symbols he may be attached to are not seen any longer.

The main reasons why this happens seem to be:

a. The urge to avoid ambivalence and dissonance, so that symbols or values appearing in clusters (as when they are tied to oneself or to the opponent) are either totally good or totally bad.

b. A kind of cultural contagion-effect, a carry-over from one symbol to the other because of their meaningful association.

Phase 6. Transition to inter-person conflict. This is logically the next step, and empirically very important. We have already had a shift of attention from the original issue to the totality of issues and from there to evaluation of these totalities or ideologies. What now seems to go on is:

1. A shift of attention from the ideology of the opponent to the opponent as a person.

2. A change to the perception of the individual opponent as the impediment to the solution of the conflict, not only his ideology.

3. A carry-over of the devaluation of his ideology to a devaluation of him as a person - i.e., a transition from disagreement to dislike.

4. A corresponding development in the attitude to individuals with whom one agrees - a transition from agreement to liking.

The main reasons why this happens seem to be:

a. An increase in concreteness - instead of attacking or defending abstract ideas or ideologies, concrete individuals may be attacked or defended.
b. An extrapolation from the bad or good ideology of a person to the person himself — after all, he is the person behind the ideology and may be attacked or defended as such.

The conflict has now ceased completely to be an intra-group conflict and has become an inter-person conflict.

**Phase 7. Polarization in the social system.** This is again the logically next step; it is the attitudes discussed in the two foregoing phases acted out on the social level:

1. **Primary relations** between antagonists are broken or, as indicated in I reduced by decreasing frequency of interaction or making the scope of interaction more specific. Family members will in most cases all be on the same side; otherwise the family will be disrupted.

2. Secondary relations that easily lead to primary relations are avoided or abolished (separate schooling, etc.).

3. Secondary relations in general may be avoided or completely broken to the point where interaction only takes place at a very collectivistic level (see next phase).

In race conflicts these three stages of the social polarization process are called desegregation, segregation and apartheid respectively. The last two steps are fairly drastic.

The reasons for the social polarization seem to be the following ones:

- **"Stripping for action"**, in order not to be hampered by primary relations, present or in the future.

- Conscious or unconscious avoidance of chances for falsifying the theories about the antagonists.

- The fear of the ideological contagion that contact might bring; just as any sick person should be avoided.

- The feeling of self-righteousness, being too pure to associate with that kind of persons — they do not deserve it.

- Breaking of relations as an expressive act, expresses the latent sentiment against the antagonist on the manifest level.

- Breaking of relations as an instrumental act, designed to
  1. Punish the antagonist for his attitudes and actions.
  2. Put him in a situation where he will see that he is wrong and change.

  In both of these cases can we talk about social control.

**Phase 8. Transition to inter-group conflict.** This is only a short step from the foregoing phase:
1. Formation of groups by persons with the same view. These will be the conflict-organizations.

2. A shift of attention from the individual antagonist to the antagonist group as a whole; introduction of a group-perspective on both parties.

3. A carry-over from the conception of the individual antagonist as the impediment to the antagonist group as the impediment.

4. A carry-over of the devaluation of the individual antagonist to a devaluation of the antagonist group as a whole and from there back again to a devaluation of the individual antagonist because he belongs to the antagonist group. This is very important when the conflict is only at the latent level and is known as xenophobia (in the most general in-group vs. out-group case) or ethnocentrism (when the groups are ethnic groups) or racism (when the groups are racial groups).

5. Emergence of leaders who can cope with the new situation and express properly the sentiment and provide for actions. These leaders may have very little relation to the original issue but be adjusted to the group need for leadership.

6. An introduction of a collectivistic orientation when dealing with the other group - a tendency to see both oneself and the individual antagonist as representatives only, carefully evaluating: "what does this action mean to my group", not "what does it mean to myself". The leaders will have the control of inter-group interaction as one of their main tasks.

The main reasons for this phase seem to be:

a. Group-formation will in most cases increase the action-potential and in all cases increase the visibility of persons with the same view.

b. A great facilitation of perception of the conflict if the groups can be dealt with as a whole,

c. A fear that interaction on an individualistic level may impair the group-perspective and create attachments and contagion and show a less united front than considered desirable.

Phase 9. The disappearance of the real and perceived neutrals. At this point there is very little place left for neutrals in the group, at least if the issue is sufficiently fundamental to engage many persons. They may either leave the group or join one of the two antagonist groups. The main reasons seem to be:

a. The norm shared by the two antagonist groups: "This issue is so important that you shall at least take a stand!" will have high saliency with increasing polarization.

b. In a highly polarized system the dimensions for judging attitudes will be different for the two parties and the neutrals, because
they will have different anchoring points. If we assume that most persons have a tendency to judge their own attitude, or attitudes close to their own as somehow "normal" and "neutral", it is clear that both extreme groups will perceive the neutrals as "really belonging to the other side", and the other party as way out in the extreme. But both parties will have ambivalent attitudes to the neutrals, and their policy will be decided by what tendency is strongest, the "those who are not for me are against me"-tendency, or the "those who are against me are not for me"-tendency. The neutrals will thus probably be under cross-pressure from both parties, and this may entail self-fulfilling or self-denying processes depending on the original inclination of the neutral, whether he is of the general conformist or non-conformist type and what group he most frequently associates with. The "you are really of the other party" may be very dangerous if one wants to hire members, because of the tendency for human beings to internalize other-descriptions and make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. Compare the prisoner who says, "If they say I am so bad, well, then I'll show them how bad I can be!"

The outcome of the conflict may to a large extent depend on where the neutrals go. With the neutrals absent, there is now very little to prevent the coming of the next phases:

Phase 10. Systematic distortion of the position of the antagonist group of the techniques commonly made use of are:

1. Not paying any attention to the arguments of the other group that are close to own position or to common values of the two groups -- but disclaiming them as tricks, "not really believed in".

2. Not paying any attention to the members of the other group who have the best argumentation or who are close to common symbols of the two groups -- but disclaiming them as "not typical of the group".

3. Projection of the other group's position into the extreme so that it becomes easier to attack.

4. Use of psychologistic and sociologistic arguments: shifts of attention to reasons why the antagonist has the argument away from the content of the argument. "Bad environment", "childhood experience" considered more relevant than the content of the argument.

The reasons why this can happen seem to be:

a. It increases the evaluation of own group and decreases the evaluation of the other group -- or rather, the opposite policy might have the opposite effect.

b. It prevents any change in the balance the polarization has brought about.

c. Repeated argumentation requires exaggeration to have any effect on oneself and one's own group, because of change of anchoring points.

Phase 11. Systematic distortion of the perception of the other group. Of the techniques commonly made use of are:
1. **Quantitative distortion** - reducing the number of members of the other group. This can be done in two ways: either by simply giving a lower number than the "disinterested observer" would find, or by involving hypotheses to the effect that a large portion of the group only follows their leaders willy-nilly, or are forced by the leaders to follow them and would stay neutral or join one's own group if the decision were up to themselves. Another version of this argument is the "mental enforcement", whether it goes under the name of "misleading" or "brainwashing".

2. **Qualitative distortion** - reducing the quality of the members of the other group. This can be done in a number of ways: by decreasing the proportion of high-status people in the group and increasing the proportion of low-status people (claiming that they are all "women, youngsters and uneducated people") or redefining status-criteria so that high-status people become low-status people ("egg-heads" and derogative use of the term "educated").

The reasons why this can happen seem to be:

a. The very limited interaction between the two groups makes automatically for the quantitative reduction - simply based on experience.

b. The general tendency to see only the cases that verify the general hypothesis about the low value of the other group - selective perception.

**Phase 12:** Systematic suspicion of the other group. Of the techniques most commonly used are:

1. Implying that the other group is fighting a non-realistic conflict - they fight the conflict on the manifest level just in order to conceal activities in other fields or to prepare the ground for some other latent conflicts they want to fight. This is the "dubious motives" argument.

2. Implying that the other group are led from the outside and actually are only functioning as puppets, thus degrading them as independent persons and trying to evoke the fear of an external threat or enemy with high saliency in the group. This is the "puppet-argument".

The reasons why this can happen seem to be:

a. The social polarization makes almost any hypothesis about the other group unfalsifiable by individual members of the group, since even if individuals should want to interact, they will be stopped by leaders.

b. The general description of members of the other group as bad persons makes it only natural to accept the explanation of bad motives hidden somewhere. The current "Communism"-argument plays on both techniques above: on the one hand the antagonist group is fighting for Communist goals; on the other hand they are naive persons exploited by hidden communists to serve their cause.

**Phase 13:** Sorokin's law: Increased intensity with increased polarization and vice versa.
We have split the concept of intensity into two parts, manifest intensity on the behavioral level and latent intensity on the attitudinal level. We shall reformulate the law as two propositions:

1. The higher the polarization, the higher the manifest intensity.

2. The more primary the relation was before the polarization, the higher the latent intensity.

a. The reason for the first seems to be that the stripping for action, the polarization, the distorted perception, distortion of position and systematic suspicion all contribute to the same thing: facilitation of the adoption of stronger measures, because of decreasing identification with the other group.

b. The factor of transition to intergroup perspective seems to be extremely important — acting on behalf of the group makes it possible to be much more merciless.

c. Former primary relations will leave an impression of ambivalent cathexis of the other group which we assume that the polarization is not able to erase completely. The more intense this primary relation was the more emotion will there be to put into the conflict (compare the cases of civil war, factional fights in religious and political groups, etc.).

From now on the conflict, so to say, feeds on itself. The polarization has brought increasing manifest intensity, and increasing manifest intensity will be used to reinforce the conceptions of the other group mentioned under the three foregoing phases. This will in turn bring about even more polarization, etc. This vicious circle, however, is by no means to be considered unavoidable, but rather as something an intra-group conflict will very easily lead into if the tendencies are not efficiently counteracted.
Some important factors facilitating or impeding polarization:

1. **The interlocking of status-sets.**

   It seems reasonable to assume that the more statuses tend to go together, the more will this facilitate polarization. If we have a system with $m$ status-dimensions and the number of statuses in each is $n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_m$ where we always have $n_i > 2$, the number of possible status-sets becomes:

   \[
   n_1 \cdot n_2 \cdot \ldots \cdot n_m
   \]

   which in the special case where all $n_i = 2$ reduces to

   \[
   2^m
   \]

   The most polarized system will be a system where only two of these status-sets are realized in the system, with 50% of the members of the system in each. There seem to be three dimensions to the polarization of status-sets:

   a. **How many of the possible status-sets are realized in the system.**

   b. **How much overlap is there between the realized status-sets, and**

   c. **How even or skewed is the distribution of the members.**

   We shall refer to this as status-polarization. If we assume that people interact more with persons with the same status than with people with a different status and hence more with people with whom they have a great or complete overlap in status-sets — then it seems reasonable to assume that

   the higher the status-polarization, the higher the conflict-polarization

   the lower the status-polarization, the lower the conflict-polarization

   There are two important special cases of status-dimensions:

   1. **The case where the status-dimensions are conflict-dimensions.**

   This is the famous old proposition (Coser, Williams) about how a society can be "sewn together by the conflicts", provided that there is no polarization along the conflict-dimensions. Conversely, the more there is of a tendency to have the same groupings of people in meaningfully different conflicts, the more will the polarization due to a new conflict with the same parties be facilitated.

   2. **The case where the status-dimensions are rank-dimensions.**

   In this case, we will get status-polarization of topdog and underdog statuses. We refer to section 5 for further analysis.

   2. **The interlocking of role-interaction or formal interaction.**

   It seems reasonable to believe that the more people are tied together in their role-relations, the more will the conflict-polarization be impeded. The extreme case is where holders of all
statuses interact with holders of all the other statuses - but in more complex systems we will only have this realized within sub-systems and only few formal contacts between the sub-systems. We shall refer to this as role-polarization and assume that

the higher the role-polarization, the higher the conflict-polarization
the lower the role-polarization, the lower the conflict-polarization

3. The interlocking of informal interaction.

It seems reasonable to believe that the more people are tied together in their informal relations, the more will the conflict-polarization be impeded. The extreme case is where all individuals interact with all other individuals - but in more complex systems we will only have this realized within sub-systems and only few informal contacts between the systems. We shall refer to this as informal polarization and assume that

the higher the informal polarization, the higher the conflict-polarization
the lower the informal polarization, the lower the conflict-polarization
7. Propositions about the genesis of conflict.

PROP 7.1: The more a party to a conflict considers it possible and desirable to change the mind of the other party, the more will the conflict be presented as non-fundamental and/or empirical and/or perceived only.

The more a party to a conflict considers it impossible or undesirable to change the mind of the other party, the more will the conflict be presented as fundamental and/or logical and/or actual.

This seems to be the case because:

The first kind of presentation will facilitate the "change of mind" because of the implied downgrading of the importance of the conflict.

The second kind of presentation will facilitate the mobilization of energy and sentiment in one's own group because of the upgrading of the importance of the conflict.

It seems that a distinction can be made between "other-directed" and "inner-directed" attitudes and behavior in conflicts — where the first is the kind of behavior directed primarily at the other party, the second the kind of behavior directed towards one's own group. The propositions point out important fields of "other-directed" and "inner-directed" conflict-behavior.

PROP 7.2: There exist conflicts that are perceived only, because of the possibility of:

1. Insufficient or distorted communication about the values of the other party,
   a. because of no channels of communication,
   b. because of blocking of pre-existing channels of communication,
   c. because of noise in the communication channels so that the information is distorted, deliberately or not. A very important special case here is semantic noise where verbal ambiguities cause distorted perceptions.

2. Insufficient or distorted insight about the means available for the satisfaction of the values at issue.

PROP 7.3: There exist conflicts that are non-realistic, and they can be of all the sixteen types indicated in the diagram in section 4.

Examples of all sixteen types:

1.4: An intra-personal conflict because of a choice between two candidates for marriage can be acted out as a choice between two careers (e.g., as a choice between two majors).

1.2: Incapacity to make a choice between two conflicting demands can lead to a frustration that is acted out as an aggression against wife, etc.
1.3: The theory that the conflict between sexual stimulation and sexual repression may be acted out as attacks on other groups, especially as suspicions that they are planning sexual assaults.

1.4: The theory that for instance Prussian aggression can be retraced to conflicting demands in the early childhood, e.g., between urge for excretion and premature toilet-training.

2.1: The bad conscience effect of a hostility between close friends which is not acted out but manifests itself on the intra-personal level only. The internalization of family problems.

2.2: The classic story about the subjugated husband who takes it out on his workers as a supervisor.

2.3: The theory that worker-management conflicts give the workers a patterned outlet for tension culminated in family conflicts or other inter-personal conflicts.

2.4: The systematic use of inter-personal hostility in inter-societal warfare.

3.1: The internalization of one's own group's problems with another group, e.g., the Christian's internalization of doubt in the latent conflict with atheist groups.

3.2: Sudden inter-personal hostility may result from group-conflicts because of the pressure and the cumulated tension. Life in conflict-organizations may be taken as an example.

3.3: The invention of scapegoat groups, e.g., the clever transformation of the latent follower-leader conflict in Nazi Germany to an anti-Jewish movement.

3.4: The escape from “troubles at home”, e.g., the often mentioned theory for Arab anti-Israel campaigns.

4.1: The classic case: Durkheim's altruistic officer, who commits suicide of desperation even when the inter-society conflict is latent only.

4.2: As 3.2, no difference in principle. Life in a society when there is a feeling of external threat but before the threat has materialized. Prisoners' translation of their conflict with society to a conflict with the prison guards.

4.3: As 3.2 and 4.2 - nervousness and tension resulting in escape into non-realistic group conflicts within the society.

4.4: The at least partial contemporary translation of the conflict between under-developed and over-developed countries to a conflict between East and West.

PROP 7.4: One conflict on the manifest level may serve as a safety-valve for other conflicts on the latent level.
This seems to be possible because:

a. **Expressive outlet** - through conflict behavior on the manifest level some or all of the cumulated conflict-sentiment from the other conflicts may be released.

b. **Displaced aggression, scapegoating** - conflict-behavior aggression against an antagonist from one latent conflict may be channeled against the perceived antagonist in the manifest conflict. This is the scapegoat technique.

c. **Direct aggression** - this is a more adequate tension release than the two foregoing if it is possible to identify the party to the manifest conflict with the party to the latent conflict. The safety-valve mechanism will then only ensue if the manifest conflict is less intense (e.g., because less fundamental values are involved) than the latent conflict would be if acted out.

d. **Displaced attention** - through manifest activity, the attention may be directed away from the latent conflict.

e. **Unifying effects** - this is the opposite of c above: if the manifest conflict defines other conflicting parties than the latent conflict does, it may serve as a unifier of the latent antagonists.

**PROP 7.5: Non-realistic conflicts will tend to be**

down-projected in introvert, intropunitive cultures
up-projected in extrovert, extropunitive cultures

PROP If we assume that the Scandinavian culture is relatively introvert, there should be a high rate of self-destructive acts as suicide and alcoholism in Scandinavian countries.

PROP If we assume that the Mediterranean culture is relatively extrovert, there should be a high rate of other-destructive acts as homicides and assaults in Mediterranean countries.

For confirming empirical evidence, see Fromm: The Sane Society, pp. 8-9. What is suggested is that the high rate of suicide in the three Scandinavian countries is partly due to the tendency for social conflicts to be expressed as personal conflicts, and vice versa for Latin countries.

**PROP 7.6: The more visible a group is**
the more vulnerable a group is, i.e., in a position not to retaliate,
the more culturally distant it is, i.e., so that an attack on it is not at the same time an attack on the culture of one's own group, and
the more contact there is with the group -

the higher is the probability that the group will be selected as the party to a non-realistic conflict. The group can, however, have higher or lower rank in the super-system.
PROP 7.7: The more primary the relationship, the more non-realistic elements will be brought into the conflict.

The more secondary the relationship, the less non-realistic elements will be brought into the conflict.

This seems to be the case because:

a. The more primary a relationship is, the more diffuse is it, and with increasing diffuseness comes increasing contact-surface so that there will be more value-disagreement to choose from.

b. The more secondary the relationship is the more specific will it be; hence the less possibility will there be of finding additional value-disagreement.

PROP 7.8: If participation in a primary relationship is considered valuable by both parties, then:

1. The more primary the relationship, the more fundamental conflicts be latent only.

2. The more primary the relationship, the more will realistic conflicts be transformed to non-realistic conflicts.

3. The more primary the relationship, the more will the saliency of conflict-issues be reduced.

This seems to be the case because of:

a. the importance of a primary relationship to the participants and the fear of losing it;

b. the fear of letting loose the forces associated with primary relations.

PROP 7.9: If participation in a relationship is not considered valuable by both parties, then:

1. the more manifest will all kinds of conflicts be;

2. the more will non-realistic conflicts be transformed to realistic conflicts;

3. the more will the saliency of conflict-issues be increased.

This seems to be the case because all these can be regarded as techniques for severing ties with a party in a relationship.

PROP 7.10: If participation in a relationship is considered valuable by both parties, then:

1. the less shared consensus there is about the fundamental values, the less manifest will non-fundamental conflicts be.
2. the more shared consensus there is about the fundamental values, the more manifest will non-fundamental conflicts be.

This seems to be the case because:

a. in the first case, the parties will not take the risk of bringing any conflict out in the open (e.g., newly formed couples, people recently fallen in love, the sweetness of the first days of any alliance).

b. in the second case, the parties will take the risk of bringing a conflict out in the open (e.g., well-trained couples, confident that "we have something in common even though we quarrel a lot", neighboring countries with no big but many small fights, etc.). In these relationships, the conflicts can be afforded.
8. Propositions about the genesis of conflict (ctd).

PROP 8.1: If the relative size of classes of people with different ranks changes, the probability of some kind of conflict will increase. (Andrezejeski, p. 19 for class-conflict).

1. if the topdog class increases relatively (through differential birthrate, polygyny, better living standards, etc.) something must be done to maintain their rank. If their economic rank is threatened, the result may be further suppression of the underdog or external conflict. If the social rank is threatened, the result may be a differentiation of the topdog group in the "real" topdogs and a middle class.

2. if the underdog class increases relatively (through differential birthrate, mainly), the result will probably be increasing frustration because their conditions will at least relatively speaking become worse. The aggression resulting from this may be turned outward against an external enemy, against the topdogs: or inward against the underdogs (self-hatred).

PROP 8.2: The more visible and the more rapid the change in the rank-distance between two groups, the higher the probability of conflict (Williams, p. 69).

PROP 8.3: The more rapid the social change, the higher the probability of conflict. (Williams, p. 56).

Because adjustment to the new values (or s-f matrices) introduced by the social change will more likely than not be differential, and this means that subsystems will have different values and try to realize them.

PROP 8.4: If there is a break-down in status-expectations, conflict is likely to ensue. (Williams p. 57).

Because a break-down of this kind, will make the different action-systems less aware of the social means available to them in different situations.

PROP 8.5: The greater the division of labor in the system:

1. the greater the tendency to suppress fundamental conflict, and
2. the greater the tendency to have non-fundamental conflicts.

This seems to be the case because:

a. division of labor means interdependence, and hence there will be a fear of disruption of the supersystem.

b. division of labor means differential values.
9. Propositions about the intensity of conflicts.

PROP 9.1: The latent intensity will be higher,

1. the more identification there is with the supersystem within which the conflict takes place,
2. the more fundamental the conflict is, if the values are internalized,
3. the more primary the relationship between the parties to the conflict.

This seems to be the case, because:

a. the identification will cause greater concern,
b. a primary relationship will call for a more total devotion to the relation, also in times of conflict,
c. the two together will be particularly important in promoting high latent intensity.

To what extent the intensity becomes manifest seems to be dependent on a number of other factors, as indicated in

PROP 9.2: The manifest intensity will be higher,

1. the more there are of secondary relationships between the conflicting parties,
2. the less there are of primary relationships between the conflicting parties (e.g., intermarriages).
3. the less the identification with the supersystem,
4. the more collectivistic the orientation.

This seems to be the case, because:

a. there will be fewer restraints and less identification with the other party, which in turn will make extreme manifest measures possible.
b. identification with the supersystem will inhibit the conflicting parties because of the loyalty to the symbols they have in common - but the condition is that they see the system as a supersystem for both parties, not only as a system one party alone represents, with the other party as a deviant group.
c. a collectivistic orientation will give the individual more security because of the feeling of representing something higher than himself -- a collectivity, and this feeling may be reinforced by means of suitable symbols.

PROP 9.3: The more primary the relationship was before the conflict, and the more secondary it has become because of polarization, the higher both manifest and latent intensity.

This is a very important combination of the two foregoing ones, and important for the analysis of civil wars, jealously, etc.
10. **Propositions about conflict-organizations.**

The church-sect dichotomy seems useful here as in organizational theory in general:

**DEF 10.1:** A conflict-organization is of the church-type if it is formal, tolerant within, mainly secondary within, with a specific, segmental devotion and leadership with legal or traditional power.

A conflict-organization is of the sect-type if it is informal, intolerant within, mainly primary, with a diffuse, total devotion and charismatic leadership.

**PROP 10.1:** The likelihood is that the conflict-organization will be of the church-type,

1. the more ad hoc the conflicts are,
2. the larger the group is, and
3. the more it embodies of the values of the hypersystem.

The likelihood is that the conflict-organization will be of the sect-type,

1. the more continuous the conflicts are,
2. the smaller the group is, and
3. the more it embodies of deviant values.

**PROP 10.2:** The conflict-group will be the more monocratic, hierarchic and centralized,

1. the more the conflict requires of division of labor,
2. the greater the group
3. the less cohesive the group was before the conflict,
4. the more fundamental the conflict,
5. the more frequent the conflicts (Andrzejewski 92).

**PROP 10.3:** The predominance of attack over defense promotes centralization. The predominance of defense over attack promotes decentralization.

This seems to be the case because attack and defense have to do with taking of the initiative in the conflict, and it seems reasonable to believe that it takes more centralization in a conflict-situation to take initiative than to yield or respond to initiative, because of the differential amount of planning and coordination involved. (Andrzejewski 75)
PROP 10.4: All conflicts will contribute to the establishment of borderlines around systems that are parties to the conflict, because system-membership will become more salient.

PROP 10.5: A conflict will have a unifying effect on an action-system:

1. the more it is considered a threat to the system as a whole, and

2. the more there is of homogenous desire to belong to the system (Williams p. 58).