RESEARCHERS, ELITES AND PEOPLE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD

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1. Introduction: research, data, theory and value.

Researches all over the world seem to be engaged in four tasks, but with very different emphasis on these tasks.\(^{(1)}\) There is the descriptive task, to establish what is. There is the explanatory task, to establish why what is, is (and what is not is not, and what may be, could be). There is the paradigmatic, basic task of understanding how it is possible to answer the what and why questions. And there is the commentary on what other researchers do, focussing on the who and the when and the where of research, actually focussing on the research community as reality, whereas the paradigmatic task focusses on the research process.

This offers a great spectrum of possible research styles, some of them more, some of them less prominent in any given place or historical period. There is the focus on data-collection, on fact catalogues - with less emphasis on explanation, often found in the Anglo-American milieus. There is the focus on explanation often with very little data base, often found in both German and French milieus. There is the focus on paradigms only, often with little contact with the ongoing research process, often found in philosophical circles. And there is the focus on commentary, on cataloguing other researchers, so characteristic of the Japanese style.

But all these styles also have one more thing in common: the lack of explicit awareness of the relation between the research and the society - local, national, global - in which the research is done. This is not built into the style. The concern for research ethics should transcend the styles and be found everywhere. When it is not my contention is that research is by and large so effectively repressed and the researchers have worked out their individual and collective strategies so well that the problems simply do not show - for instance by focussing on one of the four tasks indicated. This can only be seen by understanding research as a social process, and by making values explicit.\(^{(2)}\)
2. Introduction: the researchers-elites-people triad.

The problem of research ethics is a problem of conflicting norms and values for the philosopher, and of interest and power relations among social groups in a society for the social scientist. When a Norwegian peace researcher recently collected data, publicly accessible, about Norwegian radar installations for navigation and/or guidance; organized the data (obtained also by observing the radar installations from a distance) and showed that they were compatible with the hypothesis that these were first strike rather than second strike installations in a possible nuclear confrontation, certain Norwegian power elites reacted swiftly and strongly. The court procedures ended with an indictment and a fine of Nkr. 40,000 in addition to six months prison, conditional. It is hard to imagine any more important area to do research in today. Moreover, it was clear that these data were no secret to US and Norwegian military elites, nor to US people who could get much of this information from more easily accessible US sources. They were essentially concealed from the Norwegian people as they were highly relevant in the ongoing debate on defense; they were even concealed from most Norwegian parliamentarians. The researcher was pursuing values of truth and relevance, as a peace researcher. He had no norm conflict or value conflict, as he was not transgressing into military territory or using graded material. What was wrong from the elite perspective was actually hardly the data-gathering as these radar installations are out in the open and can be seen by anybody, but the theory-formation, the interpretation. What constituted a threat was that his research was inductive-deductive, not merely data-collection or speculation. Styles were combined.

Research is the relentless quest for truth, or, better, for findings, the production of tenable images of reality.
But what if the truth irritates/offends somebody, or has negative consequences? A problem arises, and the following extremely simplified image of a society for the present purposes may be helpful in discussing it:[5]

Figure 1: The researchers-eliges-people triad

The researchers are encased in the usual setting of a social order with people steered by elites, regardless of democratic trappings. The elites offer a social order with a certain predictability and some goods and services depending on how rich and well organized the society is; people obey, render services, pay taxes to uphold the system. Between these two the researchers are located in a delicate balance, producing their truths/imagess/findings. In general the elites, not the researchers themselves, control the strings of the purse, meaning that some kind of equivalence between findings produced and salaries/honoraria paid will have to be established. "He who pays the piper calls the tune"; it takes a strong, autonomous, self-reliant piper to call his own tune.

The ties to the people are less institutionalized. There is some kind of obligation to disseminate findings in a popularized form, whether as a quid pro quo when people have delivered data (as objects for interviews/questionnaires/experiments in social science, for pure experiments in biological/medical sciences) or simply to enjoy their readership (which may also pay off handsomely in some cases).
Findings can be positive, neutral/indifferent/ or negative in their consequences, for elites and for people, and for other researchers. One simple, preliminary definition of these evaluative terms would be as follows:

- a finding is **positive** for a social group if they accept it,
- a finding is **negative** for a social group if they reject it,
- a finding is **neutral/indifferent** if there is no reaction.

The point about this definition is that the groups themselves evaluate the finding, not the producer. Generally acceptance means a demand for more "of the same kind", "in the same direction"; rejection means a demand to stop the production - this is where the threat to the freedom of research enters.

It is now easily seen how a researcher should maneuver so as to avoid any problems: by producing only positive or neutral findings; and if the researcher cannot satisfy all three groups (or at least not offend them) satisfy elites rather than researchers (through government and business contracts, for instance), and researchers rather than people (through highly academic research). In order to do this it is usually not the exact content of the finding that matters so much as the paradigm within which the findings are cast. The intra-paradigmatic will always offend less than the extra-paradigmatic. Consequently, the recipe just quoted for the safe research career is also the recipe for research that will not challenge the deeply held images of elites and/or people - their cosmologies - nor the deeply held intellectual frameworks of researchers - their paradigms. The recipe will make contracts flow - there will be salaries to service the mortgages on the homes of researchers developing new weapons of mass extermination, such as for the Auschwitz gas chambers or the nuclear arsenal of the superpowers. There will be that consent from other researchers known as "intersubjectivity" within a competence group. And there will be an admiring populace, possibly.
3. The Kings are not Philosophers, nor the Philosophers Kings, and it is better that way.

If Truth were the clearly supreme value and the researchers were on top of the social pyramid, then their interest would be national interests, and their supreme value the supreme national value. In such a society the Kings would be not only omnipotent, but also omniscient. Would they in addition be benevolent? In a better world, perhaps, yes; but in ours there is much to indicate that of these three properties one cannot have more than at most two. Even the Christian God (or Judaic Jahve, or Islamic Allah), presumably omniscient, cannot be both omnipotent and benevolent: if omnipotent, why does He let all those evil things happen; if benevolent He seems to suffer from a power deficit unless He has master plans so that it all shows up as benevolence in the end (which is what the believers believe). However, many, perhaps most, people are dissatisfied with such answers and want better solutions during their life time, not "in the long run!"

But the point is not to lament that Kings, if omnipotent and benevolent are not omniscient and that Philosophers, if omniscient and benevolent are not omnipotent, nor that the best known exemplar of the omniscient and the omnipotent, the totalitarian secret police (like the KGB or CIA/FBI complexes) are hardly benevolent. The point is that this combination on top of society would not in itself be malevolent because it would demobilize everybody else and make them into puppets. This is the nightmare of the planned society, the scientized society, not that it works badly, that bureaucracy is heavy and inefficient and plans difficult to implement. The nightmare is that it might work, meaning substituting a perfectly operating social code for the biological codes called "instincts" in certain animal societies. Hence one should not lament the triad, nor try to make it more friction free. Rather, the goal should be more equality in the triad.
4. Researcher strategies in a rapidly changing world.

This hackneyed phrase, "a rapidly changing world", is in need of some elaboration. I do not mean by that changing values; it is very hard to discover any new values although there are some changes in their distribution. I am more thinking of changing relevance, (1) because the world is more tightly connected than before, (2) because we are more aware of such connections than before. This is true in space: a decision to use plastic in cars will create tremendous unemployment in the steel industry all around the world. It is true in time: any decision concerning the rate of exploiting ocean floor or generally offshore resources will affect ecological balances for generations to come. It is true for cultural space: there is more awareness of other values, more closeness to them, than before. The world is more tightly coupled, research gives rise to technologies which give rise to decisions of major consequences, some of the consequence chains are transparent enough to make the excuse "I was not aware that it could have such consequences" unacceptable. The relevance to people far away might have been nil before; in a world of transnational corporations and intergovernmental in addition to nongovernmental cooperation potential relevance is always there.

In this situation there are three classical researcher strategies that should be re-examined: to seek refuge with the elites, with other researchers, or with the people. The first means governmental/business research, the second ivory tower existence in universities and/or academies, the third dedication to popular movements. The first offers security on the condition of becoming a functionary, of becoming intelligentsia rather than intellectual, defined here as a person willing to give up any control over the research product, the findings, in return for security. The elites who pay may classify the findings, and/or may decide not
to publish. If one includes in the definition of research that it should be a public activity, open to an equally relentless questioning of the findings, then this is no longer research, but something else for which we do not even have a proper name.

The third offers at the first glance the opposite of this: freedom to produce the images one deems correct by associating with the right popular movement (the movement demanding that type of images), in return for very little or no security as such movements by definition are poor (when they become rich they are already part of the elite, at least at the top level - such as trade union secretariats). However, the researcher in this position may also find that his freedom becomes very circumscribed, that the movements of the people are at least as strict when it comes to demanding acceptable images, compatible with deeply held beliefs, as the elites on top. As peace researcher I have found foreign and defense ministries about equal in dogmatism with most peace movements, sharing a firm belief in some basic doctrine [balance of power, disarmament] and requesting that research should never challenge those doctrines. The only difference might be that elites can sometimes afford to be more generous and also appreciate having a couple of dissidents around to earn high grades for tolerance, and also because they might come up with something useful. As development researcher I have found more latitude as the elites are so totally confused even as to what "development" might possibly mean.

It is the second possibility that traditionally has been the solution: the campus as a society within the society, even with close to extra-territorial rights (even more so, in a sense, for the science academies in Eastern Europe). Truth can be pursued and security can be obtained as long as the resources keep coming. But whereas the first and the third solution offers relevance by tying the researchers to important social actors, the second solution may tie the researcher to very little but other re-
searchers, in a more or less golden ghetto.\footnote{10} The academic community becomes heavy and professionalized and fosters people who actually know no other community - except through data and the writings of others. And then, as research grows more capital-intensive at the same time as there is less capital around, the squeeze is on, security diminishes and may only be available at the heavy price of compliance. Theoretically the non-tenured university researcher may actually end up in the worst of all worlds with neither security, nor freedom, nor relevance, losing on the other two the moment he makes some gains on the third one. In a rapidly changing world.

This leads to an obvious prediction: that researchers will increasingly leave the universities and opt for the first or the third solutions (the latter was very frequent in the years following 1968), or a new version of the academic community, the academic commune.\footnote{11} This would be a group of researchers trying to become self-sufficient in the production of findings, ultimately even consisting of the single researcher. It is not to stoop to trivialities to say that this is only possible if there are no housing mortgages (or other major mortgages) to service - these institutions are probably among the major disciplinary forces in contemporary society (the Eastern European analogue is the permit of residence as housing is incredibly inexpensive). For that reason this will tend to attract the older and the younger among researchers, those who have become economically relatively independent and those who have not acquired expensive habits and have found that inexpensive, big house in the countryside somewhere. Needless to say the research production will have to be labor- and brain-intensive rather than capital- and laboratory-intensive -- there are good reasons to argue that such a change would today only be to the good for the development of science in general. The commune may have to be tied to some economic side activity, including food pro-
duction, to become sufficiently self-reliant - if the production of findings does not pay for itself (which it usually does not). Many may find this a minor sacrifice relative to the security and freedom and relevance found - the latter provided ties are kept and built to any group in society to which ties are wanted.

It may be objected that this means back to the point of origin, the medieval monastery, which is correct. But then, why not? They were the keepers and carriers of intellectual activity and pursuits in a period marked by intolerance - there are good reasons to believe that we are entering such a period again as so much is now at stake in military, political, economic and cultural conflicts practically all over the world. It may also be objected that the monasteries gave rise to universities which gave rise to the giant multiversities of today - ultimately not even a good setting for the pursuit of the most neutral truths because they become so demanding on the time budgets of their members for all kinds of other purposes. But if this should happen again, the step from community to commune, very similar to the step from church to sect, will probably have to be taken again. And so on, and so forth.

Does this not lead to sectarianism? Of course it does. Each commune will tend to be built around the sharing of some basic beliefs, and more so than universities. But if a country can have pluralism among communes and interaction between them, it may be better off in terms of research production than the pluralism among individuals who hardly ever communicate found in universities today. However, one form of organization does not exclude the other.

Conclusion: the only way for researchers to become truly free is to become economically independent. It is as true for researchers as for women and for youth and for Third world countries. That may solve the problem of how to become strong enough to resist the pressure to engage in research with evil consequences. But it does not in and by itself lead to research with good consequences.
5. Basic needs as a basic guideline.

Are there some values that like the value of "truth" are universal, yet are higher than "truth" in the sense that the search for truth should serve these values rather than vice versa? If the answer is no, then research is the supreme activity with no limitation whatsoever on the production of findings, even those that please the rulers and greatly displease the ruled - such as the victims of German and Japanese medical experiments during the last war, or the victims of over-eager nuclear physics in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and in and around some Pacific test sites[13]. But the horror and controversy around this research is ample testimony to the existence and internalization of other values.

I would base this kind of reasoning on the theory of basic human needs[14], arguing that some values differ from others in that their negation leads to basic disintegration of human beings.

I could then divide the basic human needs, in three (or more) classes, such as:

[1] The most basic need:
   - the need for survival, not to be killed

[2] The basic material needs:
   - food, water and other physiological needs
   - clothes, shelter
   - health
   - comfort, labor-saving devices up to a certain point

[3] The basic non-material needs:
   - identity (with self, others, things, society, nature, culture)
   - freedom (eg to choose how to satisfy the other basic needs)

These are not only necessary conditions in a theoretical sense for human well-being; they are also the type of things human beings fight for all through history. Evidently they are important. That they are also problematic is very clear. One need may stand in the way of another because of scarce resources, my needs in the way of yours. A major task of social science is to clarify how they can
become compatible, e.g. by avoiding both over- and under-satisfaction of them. And this means satisfaction not only for the greatest number, but always with all of humankind in mind—a perspective as universal as that of science in its search for truths that transcend space, time and culture. One might also add a stronger requirement: with priority to those most in need, with the most serious deficits of satisfaction.

Let us now define "constructive knowledge" as the type of knowledge that with likelihood leads to the satisfaction of basic needs for those most in need, and destructive knowledge as the type of knowledge that can be used to counteract the satisfaction of basic human needs. This leads to some kind of knowledge-continuum:

Figure 2: A knowledge continuum based on basic human needs

Constructive knowledge - Destructive knowledge


[the numbers refer to the three groups of human needs mentioned above].

The point here is not only the negative one of trying to avoid the production of destructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge that can be used to counteract the satisfaction of basic human needs, particularly knowledge that can be used to kill people—which is the essence of so much of military research, employing an incredible 40-50% of scientists at work today—saying something about their moral caliber. The point is also to steer research towards the production of more constructive knowledge, promoting life and healthy life at that, non-alienated and non-repressed. To object that this would be to direct research is of course correct, just as our current society and articulation of group interests steer research in the destructive direction we find today. The point would be that the current research profile is institutionalized and almost passes unnoticed by most people. How is that done?
To steer research in a more constructive direction new research norms are needed. We have those only in one field but that field yields a major model: medical science, and the Hippocratic Oath. The horror experienced in connection with German and Japanese (and US and Soviet) experiments on human beings reflects the trust people have in the medical profession - it is somehow seen as less of an infraction when physicists develop nuclear arms or social scientists pool their knowledge about how to compose combat group with maximum fighting [meaning killing] capacity. One expects less from such people.

The idea of a professional oath for all researchers to the effect that "I shall try to the best of my ability to pursue constructive and avoid the pursuit of destructive knowledge" would be useful. That such norms are problematic goes without saying - if they were not one would probably not need them. The whole Decalogue is problematic, yet is an important and useful guideline for many people. A profession, or a line of research, that takes this step is already a norm-setter; it will be ridiculed, yet will be emulated. Too many study commissions on how to do it will probably not promote the idea; promotion will probably be best at the hands of the somewhat naive and somewhat peripheral.

Very important in this connection would be the debunking of Nobel prizes. As they exist today the constructive-destructive dimension does not enter. What is rewarded is the inductive-deductive exercise, new data with old theories, old data with new theories, or best, but also difficult because it may be extra-paradigmatic: new data with new theories. There is no denial of the mental achievement behind this, not to mention the capital and social investment in the infra-structure. But in rewarding so prominently knowledge that probably can more easily be used for destruct-
tive rather than constructive purposes the effort to be value-neutral in fact makes the Nobel prizes a part of the problem rather than of the solution. I know of no Nobel peace prize given to any candidate whose peace praxis was incompatible with Norwegian foreign policy at the time of the prize; and one would assume that similar rules will hold for the natural science prizes. That so many Nobel prize winners on either side have been working on the perfection of nuclear weapons would strengthen this hypothesis. Obviously, what is needed would be equal prominence given to research that leads to constructive knowledge rather than complex knowledge.

7. The remunerative approach.

The approach is obvious: to steer research funds more in the direction of the pursuit of constructive knowledge. In practice this means heavy reduction in military research - probably the only way of doing anything serious about the arms race anyhow - and increased resources food, health, shelter and so on, to experiments with alternative ways of life, less aggressive forms of societies, etc. It should be emphasized that it is a question of proportion of funds that should change, not the absolute amount - constructive research may also be less expensive than the destructive one. After all people like better to be built up than to be bombed to pieces, so they cooperate with the former, but try to build destructive devices so as to destroy destructive devices, leading to ever more complicated and costly weapons. A small physical invention, such as an energy unit a family could place in the sun in the morning, use to accumulate solar energy and then draw upon for heating and cooking the rest of the day cannot possibly cost much in terms of research, yet it does not exist. A small social innovation, a method that villages could use to find out how much they are exploited by their environment is in the same class, would be highly
useful, yet does not exist. Why - in all these cases the elite interests favoring one type and disfavoring the other type of research are relatively obvious; in other cases they may be more hidden. One more argument, probably, for looser ties between researchers and elites, stronger ties to people, but not too strong. And stronger ties to the environment: there is something anthropocentric to the whole basic needs approach, so ecological balance should be added to the three types of basic human needs, as a basic natural need.

8. The punitive approach.

This is the third type of power, also something to be built into a social structure if one really is serious about institutionalizing the type of research that would be less destructive. We would today punish a chemist who works for a narcotics gang on such jobs as the processing of raw narcotics, or something more sophisticated: how to build narcotics into other compounds so that they cannot be detected, yet can easily be recovered [unscrambled].

Why should we not in the future, in a better world, punish people who work on the perfection of killing techniques? We would punish a medical doctor who does research on how most effectively to kill his patients, and be sceptical about he who helps executioners develop more effective, and painless, ways of being killed. [20]

At the informal level there has been boycott of military researchers during the Vietnam war. [21] More important, perhaps, would be their exclusion from scientific associations, something that might apply to all not making their research public. [They would then have their own associations - yet the social stigma would be felt].

In short, there are several approaches that may be for the future. Do we need one more world war, probably a nuclear holocaust, to become more interested in such approaches?
9. Conclusion: on shallow and deep approaches

I do not believe that the problem of research ethics is one of identifying interesting conflicts, trying to discuss them in depth. What is a moral issue to the researcher may be an issue of life and death for people, somewhere, sometime. These issues are generated by a research institution that has somehow gone wrong. And it is not only a question of establishing a set of warning lights, careful here [recombinant DNA] - careful there [sex selection]. First, the warning lights tend to be post hoc rather than anticipatory - because the consciousness is so low that there have to be empirical cases of wrong-doing before warnings come up. Second, the same research structure will continue to generate that type of problems, and probably at accelerating speeds as the research establishment grows.

Rather, I have tried to locate the roots of the problems in two places.

First, the dependency of the researchers on the national elites, meaning a willingness to sell their services to national causes that may very well be at odds with those of the people of other nations, and to causes that serve some [usually upper] classes considerably more than other. The solution is not necessarily to become dependent on popular movements - there is no illusion that they offer both latitude and freedom. The solution indicated is more back to our historical roots, to settings with economic independence built into them. Not the commune, but communes.

Second, it is not a question of supplying current research patterns with a catalogue of do's and don't's - that would be a shallow approach. It is also, and more profoundly, a question of redirecting that exercise in a more constructive direction. But this should be institutionalized, and that requires both new norms, new patterns of research allocation, and patterns of discouragement.
NOTES

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[2] For an effort to state social science methodology in terms of explicit data, theory and values, see Johan Galtung: "Empiricism, Criticism, Constructivism", in Methodology and Ideology, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1977, Ch. 2.

[3] For the basic information on this important case showing limitations in the freedom of research in Norway, see the report itself [a] and five comments on the trial [b, c, d, e, f]:

[a] Wilkes and Gleditsch, Intelligence Installations in Norway: Their Number, Location, Function and Legality, PRIO, Oslo, xerox 1979


[e] Annen runde: Høyesteretts behandling av straffesaken mot Gleditsch og Wilkes Februar 1982, PRIO, Oslo, xerox, April 1982. [PRIO-publication P - 12/82]

In general, elites are probably more worried about data than theory ("speculation without documentation") but there is hardly any doubt that it was the two together that made this research illegal. This was also clearly stated in the premisses for the sentence - even if the single pieces of information are legally obtained, they can be pieced together so as to give an image that constitutes an infraction of the laws of the country.

See Johan Galtung, "Dialogue as Development", in Tools of Development Studies, Ejlers, Copenhagen, forthcoming, Ch. 1, for implications of this type of analysis for data-collection. A major application lies in the effort to arrive at more equality between researchers and people when the latter are also used as a data source, e.g., through group dialogues rather than the fragmentation and domination brought about by simple random sampling (or corresponding technique).

Robert Jungk, in private communication, from interviews with US nuclear weapons researchers June 1982.

This is important by ruling out idiosyncratic subjectivity, yet a strange "operationalization" of objectivity as it obviously depends very much on the composition of the competence group, its shared beliefs and prejudices, etc. In the terms of this paper the corresponding researcher strategy could be characterized as aiming at positive reception from peers, colleagues, and neutrality indifference from others, from elites and people (in order not to be disturbed in the research). In a world that is also changing in the sense of deteriorating economic conditions the search for improved security may lead to more efforts to please elites, however.

Scientific socialism as opposed to utopian socialism, still the leading guidelight of a major part of human-kind. Maybe it will fade in significance when the reefs surrounding that lighthouse become more clear as one approaches?
(9) This does not hold true for the present gigantic popular wave, just referred to as "the peace movement". It is simply too big to hold any particular belief, except a deep resentment against nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, and considerable scepticism towards foreign and defense policy elites.

(10) Of course, there are the excursions out of the ghetto known as consultancies, but that is for a minor part of the research community, and for some disciplines only.

(11) The word "commune" should not be taken literally here. It does not necessarily mean living together, but it does mean producing together. One form is the private institute, bringing together a small number of people who like to do things together. The form has been very frequent in peace studies, development studies and future studies and other transdisciplinary fields where ties of affinity have been stronger than ties of disciplinary and university corridor vicinity. The price for high temperature production and high productivity may at times be over-enthusiasm, and the communes might also have a short life expectancy. But why not?

(12) Again, the rapidly changing world. Academic freedom, tolerance and similar virtues may be more easily practised at times of economic growth and assured supremacy as during periods of decline and threat. The [security, academic freedom, relevance] vector pursued by so many researchers will be ever more difficult to realize.

(13) Such as Bikini, Eniwetok, 1954.


(15) Some of this has been developed in Johan Galtung, "Basic Human Needs as a Guideline for Research Activity", in Papers on Methodology Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1979, ch. 7.3, pp. 185-190.
[16] I am thinking particularly of experiments on populations of prisoners; under that condition nobody is a "volunteer".

[17] In Norway professor Harald Wergeland has been working in this field.

[18] Of course, research for constructive purposes may also become very expensive because of spiraling costs due to competition; one corporation trying to outcompete another, the customers paying the costs of "improvements" not asked for. The simple, inexpensive product may serve neither corporate needs for profit, nor governmental needs for taxes.

[19] Studies of exploitation, of "who gains what at the expense of whom" is usually not what elites sponsor with most eagerness.

[20] See the editorial "Calm, Pleasant Death", International Herald Tribune, 17 August 1982. "Once a neutral fluid is flowing well, the executioners administer a huge dose of anesthetic, a muscle relaxant, and then a drug to stop the heart". -- /But/ "Making death less dramatic and less painful does not make it more rational. The death penalty still offers no demonstrable deterrent effect, nor does it protect the public any more than life imprisonment without parole".

[21] Particularly important in this connection was the Jason division.

[22] The report from the Central Committee for Norwegian Research (CCNR) in this field, Forskning og etisk ansvar, Oslo, October 1981, is a good example: good social science prose, devoid of any firm recommendation, or position taken, beyond the perennial demand for new committees and studies.
The paper locates the problem of research ethics in a "value-free" science that has made researchers value-blind, insufficiently able to foresee possible negative consequences of what they do, but very able to design strategies of agreeing to structures that protect them.

The intellectual style of a given research community enters as a key variable, and most intellectual styles are seen as ways of making scientific findings less threatening by focusing on data with little interpretation or speculation with little documentation. The famous Wilkes/Gleditsch case in Norway is cited as an example of research that offered both data [obtained from open sources] and interpretation, and was met with disapproval and sentence.

The moral problem of value conflicts can best be understood by studying researchers in a social setting, together with elites and people. Only if researchers were on top and Truth was the supreme value would the researchers' situation be unproblematic. But Philosophers-Kings, however omniscient and omnipotent, are rarely benevolent, and the very fact of concentrating so much on top leads to highly unacceptable societies, by demobilizing the rest, turning them into clients.

Hence, researchers will live with their problems of being tempted into sins of commission - to pursue destructive knowledge - and sins of omission - not to pursue constructive knowledge, and not to pursue unpleasant truths, not because they want this, but because the structure leads them in that direction. Most researchers probably want [security, academic freedom, relevance], and the problem is:

Elites offer security and relevance, not academic freedom
Universities offer security and academic freedom, not relevance
People may offer relevance, but neither security, nor freedom

In a rapidly changing world the interconnections and possibly destructive effects of research far away in space and time have become more evident, at the same time as formerly rich and dominating countries now are in economic and political decline. Universities may soon offer neither security, nor academic freedom, nor relevance. Researchers may find the academic commune more suitable, with economic independence. And they may argue for a redirection of research to satisfy basic needs - material and non-material - for everybody.