A DREAM COME FALSE:

The United Nations "University"

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Alfaz del Pi, July 1981
Preface

The present author was project co-ordinator of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project of the Human and Social Development Programme of the United Nations University from 1 April 1978 [before that he had helped prepare the project] till he resigned 15 February 1981. The present paper tells why. It is critical, but that should also be taken as a sign of sincere concern and hope for the dream of a United Nations University.

I owe very much to the many people inside and outside the GPID Project and inside and outside the UNU with whom I have had occasion to discuss all these issues during the six years when I was associated, one way or the other, with the UNU; but the responsibility for the information presented and the conclusions drawn rests entirely with the author. The paper is also a contribution to the "Processes in the UN System" sub-project of the GPID Project.

Alfaz del Pi, July 1981

Johan Saltung
1. INTRODUCTION

These were the words by the Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, in September 1969, that later on led to the United Nations University:

"In recent months I have given much thought to the establishment of an international university. The idea occurred to me because my attention was drawn to the work being done by individuals to establish institutions of learning with an international character. I also have in mind some institutions of research and training which were established under international auspices and which have had considerable success in promoting economic development. I feel that the time has come when serious thought may be given to the establishment of a United Nations University, truly international in character and devoted to the Charter objectives of peace and progress. Such an institution may be staffed with professors coming from many countries and may include in its student body young men and women from many nations and cultures. Working and living together in an international atmosphere, these students from various parts of the world would be better able to understand one another. Even in their formative years they would be able to break down the barriers between nations and cultures, which create only misunderstanding and mistrust.

The primary objective of the international university would thus be to promote international understanding both at the political and cultural levels. It should have as its head a scholar of international renown. The location of the university should be in a country noted for its spirit of tolerance and freedom of thought."\[1\]

The response of the UN General Assembly was favorable. The resolutions of December 1970, December 1971, December 1972 and December 1973 show increasing specificity.\[2\] And in fall 1975 the United Nations University can call its first expert meetings to draft research proposals in the three priority program areas of World Hunger, Human and Social Development and Natural Resources - "research into the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies" [UNU Charter, Article 1.2]. Today, six years later, well into the second administration (the change of rector took place August 1980)\[3\] there is sufficient basis to form a judgment as to what happened to the dream of U Thant: did it come true or false? Of course, no judgment is final: there will be different views and interpretations, and the subject matter itself, the UNU, may change course.

However, consider the following items:
the Endowment Fund is May 1981 (eight years after the first pledge, that of Japan of $100 million) very much short of the goal of $500 million: only $140 million pledged, out of which only $107 million has been paid. The Japanese payment is as much as 84% of this, a very unhealthy dominance by the host country. And even more troublesome: only three of the 16 pledges are from the last two years, and they represent only 0.6% of the amount pledged and 0.3% of the amount paid. In other words, the interest is low, and decreasing, it seems.

- The Operating Contributions from Governments offer a similar picture. The amounts received or pledged amounted to $4.6 million as of May 1981, and even here Japan stands out with $1 million. Twenty-three countries have made 52 pledges and payments, sixteen of them from the last two years but that represents a substantial proportion of the total amount. In other words, governments tend to prefer operating contributions and project support to the blanket support of the Endowment Fund contribution.

- in spite of having as much as 28 associated institutions and 112 research and training units carrying out UNU work in more than 80 countries" the education component of the UNU amounts only to "85 UNU Fellows -- now in training, while another 75 have been identified and are waiting to begin training." Nothing reminiscent of U Thant's dream of "young men and women -- living together in an international atmosphere -- better able to understand one another" can be said to take place, not even the more modest goal of the Charter [Article 1.1] of "post-graduate training" has been obtained with this miniscule achievement.

- There is reference to 125 titles published in the period June 1980-June 1981. However, a closer scrutiny of the UNU Publications, October 1980 tells a different story. By far the highest proportion consists of pre-publication papers, working papers for limited circulation that the UNU presents as publications, of administrative documents such as reports from planning meetings, and then proceedings from meetings, meaning publications with a relatively low level [generally speaking] of integrated intellectual work, including annotated bibliographies. Genuine research has so far hardly been published by the UNU.

- It is difficult to assert that the UNU has developed any specificity as a UN institution. As pointed out by the representative of an other UN institution in the 14th Annual Meeting of Directors of UN Training, Research and Planning Institutes, Geneva, July 1979, it is "extremely difficult to explain what the UNU is all about. It was difficult to convince people that it has a new dimension. How different in the University from FAO and WHO? What are its advantages?" The UNU representative could only respond by asserting that the UNU is a university, and that an information program was being developed. At any rate, I know of nothing really published by the UNU that could not have been produced by a UN agency, or by some of them in cooperation, and perhaps even better so.
In spite of all the big meetings and the information campaigns the UNU remains almost surprisingly unknown. "Very few people who ought to know the University know it" - the expression used by the same representative who was quoted in the preceding point. The reason is hardly lack of material; a high number of newsletters, pamphlets etc. has been distributed [slide sequence on the work of the university, films on the university, representation in "media centers", contract writers, etc.] The 1980 Budget for the Information Services was \( \text{\$1,113,000} \) (for 1979 \( \text{\$1,081,000} \), for 1978 \( \text{\$1,051,000} \)) or as much as 9% of the total budget (\( \text{\$13,831,000} \)).9/ This should then be compared with the Academic Services which publishes and distributes all academic publications, does copy-editing and translation, operates the library [minuscule], builds up a UNU computer information service system, established and operates a referral system, and coordinates publication programs undertaken by outside publishers. Its budget was only \( \text{\$647,000} \) (\( \text{\$501,000} \) in 1979, \( \text{\$77,000} \) in 1978), or only 58% of the "information" [meaning public relations] budget. Clearly this is not the kind of thing one expects from an institution carrying the proud name of "university" - the best propaganda for that type of institution will be research and training output. Equally clearly, it does not work [as seen from the pledges and payments], and may even backfire. It merely projects pretentiousness.

The UNU is still largely unknown in the universities of the world; it is not seen as a source of 'guidance'. This also seems to be true for Third World universities - except that they, like all universities, of course would like to have contracts so as to supplement budgets. Some of this may have to do with the strange decision not to engage in more regular teaching, having a campus, and granting diplomas - in short entering into the competition with the universities of the old colonial countries for the best of Third World graduate students. Another reason may be that universities are more interested in scientific output than in public relations.

In the fields of information and publication, disregarding the content for the moment, the UNU has done nothing original as to forms of presentation. Other UN organizations run magazines that are highly informative, even controversial [such as UNESCO's Courier, FAO's CERES, Mazingira associated with UNEP, the WHO magazines, etc.] - the UNU Newsletter is self-serving, self-congratulatory and trivializes rather than popularizes. The Development Forum, originally by the Division for Economic and Social Information is now also sponsored by the UNU, but is not a UNU creation.

The UNU has not been able to establish any contact with grass-root movements, to speak of - popular movements and so on, indispensable in the work of other UN organizations [although often not officially recognized]. It remains elitist.

In spite of some efforts the UNU has not been able to bring about any integration of natural science and social science approaches, and the tiny efforts have been amateurish and inconclusive.127/

In short, the institution does not have much to show for itself - except, particularly recently, impeccable
Does that mean that there is nothing good to say? Of course not. Even a critic like the present author will readily concede that the UNU has had two great merits:

- through its funding the UNU makes it possible for a great number and variety of scholars from different parts of the world, different disciplines and persuasions to do research together on highly important subjects;

- this research is done without any negative academic interference, there is very little "don't do research on that" and "don't say this", once the project has been launched.

In short, the UNU has offered great opportunities. The tragedy is that the UNU itself seems so unable to make use of the opportunities it offers, thus, essentially, leading its many researchers into a blind alley, a real cul-de-sac entirely of the UNU's own making. It is my contention that it does not have to be like that; the institution is not beyond change, nothing is irremediable. But some very basic structural changes are needed, and I do have my doubts whether sufficient momentum can be generated, or will be generated, after so many years to undertake a basic course correction. Six years are a lot.

To see what the problems are one has to go into some depth, and this will be done in the following five sections that lead up to some concluding remarks, all of it based on the author's own experience. To say it again, this is a highly critical analysis. But the effort will be made to go beyond the trivia of organizational quarrels, found everywhere, trying to put the matters more in perspective, and to point to constructive alternatives. And then only time will show whether the dream could still come true. So far it has most definitely not. It is not a university, should not carry that proud name, and should perhaps better be renamed as the United Nations Research Organization. At present it still offers an umbrella of protection and prestige to some, but that lasts only as long as the reality of the UNU is as little known as the UNU itself. It is in the interest of everybody to change this, including the interest of the sponsors of the UNU.

In the following five sections points of criticism will be explored, and in the conclusion five points to arrive at some explanation why the UNU became the way it did — all with the understanding that the author's knowledge of the UNU is limited. Many others have more to say, and it is to be hoped that they will come forth and say it.
2. THE INADEQUACY OF THE PUBLICATION PROCESS

Publications are by no means the only outputs from research work, perhaps not even the most important. Researchers can also express themselves in lectures, conferences, meetings, mass media etc., for education and/or information purposes, in a scholarly or more popular vein. And they can enter into action, being consultants or participants with political actors of various kinds, from ministries and corporations to grassroot movements. Oral communication has the tremendous advantage of being quick, even immediate, and of permitting dialogue; practice of various kinds confronts the researcher with reality in a direct way and offers some opportunities of testing the insights.

The UNU, however, differs from universities in not offering a joint educational experience and in being very isolated from social and political actors.\textsuperscript{17} Hence publications become very important as an output, actually the only one. But after six years it still does not have a publication process, only a United Nations University Policy on Scholarly Publishing.\textsuperscript{18} This policy, and the little practice there is, will here be explored under the headings of \textit{why} to publish, \textit{what, who} should publish it, \textit{how, to whom, where} and \textit{when}.

\[1\] Why to publish: quantitative output for bureaucratic ends

For the other UN organizations the answer is much easier: there is usually a regular or ad hoc conference where some decisions are taken of policy relevance, and the publications have to be geared to that. In other words, the organization has a calendar which constitutes the \textit{raison d’être} of the organization. The UNU has nothing of this kind except its own governing body, the Council, that meets about twice a year. Hence a major preoccupation of the staff in the UNU Centre becomes that of having something ready for the Council meetings so as to impress them favorably with "output!" Council deadlines are respected meticulously. An other very good reason to publish, viz. to provide a feedback to the researchers themselves, stimulating their research process by having [pre-]publications ready in time for their meetings has
never emerged as a major concern. The reason for this will be seen in the next sections; the UNU Centre is too far removed from the research work they themselves direct or at least coordinate! As a consequence the answer to the why to publish will tend to become simply to have an output, measurable in quantitative terms so as to impress the Council and beyond that the UN institutions represented on the Council and other organs of the UN - in short the immediate bureaucratic context - not to mention actual and potential donors. Being far removed from real academic target audiences, including their own researchers, such considerations will come lower on the ranking list.


In principle everything produced by those who sign the standard UN Consultant contract, with its clause on

8. TITLE RIGHTS. The United Nations shall have the right to all property rights, including but not limited to patents, copyrights and trademarks, in material which bears a direct relation to or is made in consequence of the work performed under a consultant's contract with the United Nations. At the request of the UN/ the consultant shall do the necessary to secure such property rights and to transfer them to the Organization in compliance with the requirements of the applicable law. The United Nations shall not be bound to publish any manuscript or material made in relation to the work performed under this contract.

This is a very strong formulation, in fact giving the UN(U) all rights, but no obligation. As will be shown later, under the heading of UNU Mis-management, the UNU has interpreted this both in the direction of not publishing when the authors want it, and of publishing when the author does not want it.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, practice shows that the UNU feels entitled to a strict interpretation of the clause, not the weaker interpretation whereby they simply may decide not to make use of these rights.

One basic problem here is that this clause for UN consultants makes much more sense within the usual context of a UN consultancy:

"A contract may be granted - - normally for a maximum period of six months or -- for a series of shorter periods /that/ does not exceed six months within any one period of 12 consecutive months".\textsuperscript{19}
In other words, the consultancy is seen as being of limited duration, which in general would mean that the consultant has a more permanent job and takes a short leave, or does the consultancy on the side, and that the task performed is of limited scope. Under such conditions it does not seem unreasonable that the UN secure for itself the rights to the product produced. But in the UNU case the programs and projects are of long duration, five years for instance, and they would only make sense if the same researchers continued throughout the period - with some changes, of course. What this clause means, when interpreted strictly, is actually that the UNU has a right to everything, as stated in the Policy on Scholarly Publishing:

5(a). The University shall have the primary right to publish in its name any book, monograph or report of collaborative research resulting from research activities conducted under its sole authority or sponsorship.

Again these are strong formulations given that researchers, of course, enter a contract with the UNU with their whole research experience even if the contract only stipulates work to be done in a more limited field. "Sole authority or sponsorship" probably means any activity entered in the UNU Calendar of Programme Activities as such, which in practice means an activity where the travel funds and per diems come from the UNU. This, by extension, even means that researchers not under permanent contract (as "consultants") with the UNU but invited to special meetings engaging in "collaborative research" find themselves under this obligation by virtue of having received a UNU per diem - even by virtue of having been present! It may be that they are covered by 5(c) giving "individual researchers" the right to publish in any journal "any article or paper written by them in connexion with research conducted under the sole or joint authority or sponsorship of the University" provided it is attributed; but it is unclear, and at any rate only applies to articles and papers. Nor is there much comfort in 5(d) which gives a right "to publish any book, monograph or report of collaborative research" - after the University has decided not to publish it" - since nothing is said explicitly about the duration of the period needed for the University to make up its mind. And research quickly gets old.

Most problematic, however, is another circumstance. The UNU has individual contracts with the researchers in a team, and the Title Rights clause applies to every
one of them individually. Imagine now that the team of researchers decides to put a set of individual contributions together in a particular way. In that case there is no guarantee that this integrative effort as such will be respected. The UNU will be in its full right to lift out of such a combination the pieces they like, discarding the others as it has signed a contract with the individual researchers, not with the team as collective author. That way the UNU can, in principle, avoid publishing a disturbing paper - and as is well known, in such contexts it is usually not the academic quality but the political tenor that really counts. It is of little comfort to quote

Art. 27[2], Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author" or

Art. 6bis [1]Berne Convention:

Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.

The contract is not with the collective author - as stated above, in line with the general split-and-rule structure.

Thus, as a result of this "Policy on Scholarly Publishing", UNU-related researchers run the risk of not having their products published, or only after considerable delay, at the same time as they risk a publication form different from what they intended - all of this under the contractual copyright formula, modified by UNU to a "primary right" formula. Sooner or later all this will probably be sorted out in a way more consistent with the practice of universities all over the world, but still, after six years, the situation is highly unsatisfactory. And the strategy chosen by the researchers is obvious: to make use of the right to publish smaller pieces, and individually, where they can - to get it out quickly and in the form they want themselves. The loss to the UNU is obvious:

- less integration among individuals, less collective work
- less integration among articles and reports, "pieces"
- when finally it reaches a UNU acceptable form it is all not only old, but already out and known for years
What is then left to the UNU is exactly what is described in the introduction above: pre-publications (working papers) that they have to try to define as publications (without any explicit agreement from the authors), project descriptions and administrative documents in general, and proceedings from conferences and symposia, even with reference to who was in the chair, dates and hours and such things that are not of any interest at all except, perhaps, to some of the participants. In short, there is even the risk that the UNU will end up, as a result of its own policy, with that which the authors are unable to get published elsewhere.


The UNU Publications Committee consists of rector, vice-rectors for planning and development, the three programme vice-rectors, the secretary of the university, the director of information, the chief of academic services and the legal counsel. The last four will not claim to be researchers. As to the first five: whatever their academic merits have been in terms of original research in the past, research is very much like playing an instrument professionally: it cannot be laid aside but has to be exercised constantly to remain what it was, leaving alone improving it. The step from researcher to research bureaucrat/administrator is but a short one. Hence, on the committee is no active researcher — particularly as the UNU Centre staff (including the programme officers that in practice will substitute for the vice-rectors) has to focus on administrative tasks. In practice the vice-rector for planning and development becomes the chairman, and he is at the same time the major fund-raiser of the UNU. Needless to say, this is a most unfortunate combination: it would be inhuman if that person would not in the steering of the publications flow keep an eye on what he thinks will be the impact on actual and potential donors. Moreover, the committee does not communicate its reasons for its decisions, to the authors — they only become "known" through rumours — another very unhealthy practice. So again the non-university character of this institution reveals itself: no university known to this author steers the publications by means of a committee consisting of deans or whomever they designate, and four university administrators in a more limited sense.

To this it may be objected, that the task of the
publications committee is

Art. 14: "-- ensuring that scholarly manuscripts proposed for publication by the University have been properly evaluated by an adequate number of competent assessors and by the programme staff who have judged them to be worthy of publication by the University. It formulates policies on publishing for the Council's approval".

Since they themselves appoint the "assessors", and the programme officers are both assessors and members of the committee, they can arrive at any decision they want. There is no built-in guarantee that the process is acceptable to the authors.\(^\text{21}\) It should also be noted, in passing, that the policies on publication are for the council to approve - which is obvious, this would be a major function of the council - there is no mention that it might perhaps have been a good idea to find out whether the researchers also approve, or have some comments on how to handle the products of their work.\(^\text{22}\)

But what about the famous UNU academic freedom guaranteed by the Charter? It does not necessarily stand up to closer scrutiny:

Art. II,1: The University shall enjoy autonomy within the framework of the United Nations. It shall also enjoy the academic freedom required for the achievement of its objectives, with particular reference to the choice of subjects and methods of research and training, the selection of persons and institutions to share in its task, and freedom of expression. The University shall decide freely on the use of the financial resources allocated for the execution of its functions.

The difficulty here is that all of this is, in principle, decided upon by the UNU Centre rather than by the researchers: they do not choose the subjects of research (from which the methods to a large extent follow) but are contracted to do studies on them; they do not select persons and institutions, they do generally not decide on the financial resources allocated. But what about the freedom of expression? Certainly, the researchers retain the freedom to say what they want outside the UNU, and with the attribution to the UNU (of course with the standard disclaimer clause)\(^\text{23}\), but as the committee steers the flow of manuscripts to be published "in the name of the University" (Art 5(2), by implication) it is their freedom of expression, not that of the researchers that is referred to in practice.

That this is not a far-fetched interpretation can be seen clearly from a statement of one of the vice-rectors:
"As Dr. Mushakoji put it, in the Charter only the Rector exists as a decision-maker, aside from the Council as "the governing board". Certainly, several staff members have expressed the view that decision-making is highly centralized and the Rector approves most actions by the staff".

In short, the academic freedom guaranteed is essentially that not even of the UNU Centre but of the rector - as is also illustrated very clearly in the slip accompanying publications: "With the Compliments of the Rector" (it should, of course, have been With the Compliments of the UNU and the Authors).

Given all of this it is not hard to predict what the typical UNU publication will look like when eventually the stage of pre-publications, state-of-the-art reports, planning documents, proceedings and annotated bibliographies has been overcome:

The ideal UNU publication will
- not mention any social or political actors by name, but try to phrase highly concrete, specific matters in general terms, or stay away from concrete social and political matters in order not to offend actual or potential donors or be severely criticized in the UN General Assembly;
- produce recommendations in line with general UN policy, for instance limit criticism of economic growth and - more importantly - certain aspects of the New International Economic Order - to a minimum. Recommendations have to be compatible with a world structure essentially governed by states more than by people, for economic development more than human and social development, etc. Alternative: refrain from recommendations and policy implications in any concrete way, stay at the level of generalities and "values" with no specific address;
- the style has to be "scientific", even technical, making readers believe that this is science, thereby justifying the existence of the UNU as an "objective" institution;
- there has to be a general tone of optimism, of belief in progress due to research that is constructive of something new rather than critical (except in very general terms) of something old - again to justify the existence of the UNU.

My contention is that of this type of research the world has already enough, more than enough: bland, exhortative and managerial.


So far the concern has been with the factors influencing the content of a UNU publication; let us now turn to the form, the how. Nobody will deny the significance of this factor. And the margin is actually not so broad: research publications fall somewhere between the austerity of a bureaucratic document and the colorful, even frivolous appearance of a
marketable book of fiction. Both the authors, and the readers, feel better if it is "a real book", meaning typographically well made, with justified right margin, reasonable paper and jacket quality, good binding, and good design in general. Of course, researchers have nothing against the working paper, the stencil, among other reasons because it means being informed in advance of what is happening in terms of "real" publications. But books should be books, they should be made to last.

The UNU seems to have no understanding of this, nor the UN in general [with the exception of UNESCO that has in recent years produced very nice looking books - there may also be others unknown to me]. The products referred to as books have that unmistakable administrative look, with reference codes - incomprehensible to the uninitiated including such marginal persons as authors] very prominently displayed, cheap in appearance if not in actual costs, fitting into an administrative rather than a research/debate sequence. In short, it asks to be filed away as what it essentially is: a receipt for money received, not to outlive the period of budgetary accountancy. For an author it is, in a certain sense, a fate worse than death: it means that the research products they leave behind will be forgotten long before they are. It also means something of some importance to the UNU: they will mainly attract for publication of this kind the type of products (and perhaps also authors) with no other alternatives - meaning authors to whom the alternative is no publication at all. The conclusion that follows is the same as for the preceding section.

[5] For whom to publish: (inter)governmental, status quo actors

With whom do researchers interested in all these important problems facing humankind want themselves to communicate? In general, it seems, with two key categories:

- other researchers, for criticism, for debate, as a contribution to research and science
- political actors - which ones depends very much on the political convictions of the authors, could be governments, corporations, could be grassroot movements etc., there are many possibilities - who are seen as possible carriers of the ideas and proposals in the research produced.

The United Nations University has produced a document that gives some ideas as to how the UNU thinks about these matters. The categories singled out for attention (and free distribution)
are as follows:

**OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION**

A. Covering/Sponsoring Organizations Including Their Officials [UN & UNESCO]
B. Other UN Organizations and Regional Offices
C. UN Information Centers
D. International Organizations
E. Non-governmental Organizations
F. Donor Member States and Donor Foundations
G. UNU Headquarters and Liaison Offices
H. Other Related Institutions

**SCIENTIFIC DISTRIBUTION**

A. Participants in projects
B. Scientists in UNU Networks
C. Libraries

**INFORMATIONAL DISTRIBUTION**

A. Documentation Centres
B. Review Media

As can be seen, the list is heavily UNU, UN and UN institutions oriented as is to be expected. That the donor member states and foundations get the publications goes without saying; as obvious as the fact that those who participate in the UNU work should have it. "Documentation Centres" actually boils down [October 1980] to the "FAO documentation Centre, pending a more detailed evaluation of the Project's relevance". "Review media" is also a project for the future. What is left, then [as "other related institutions" only means an American - meaning US - council for the UNU] are categories of international and non-governmental organizations. As to the former the document says that the major international organizations "are 52 in number according to the directory issued recently by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Of course there are ways according to which the hundreds of NGOs can be cut down to 52, but to rely upon one particular government, a very particular one, for that classification seems naive. And this impression of naiveté is confirmed by looking at the list of NGOs "most interested in UNU activities", chosen "from the NGO list prepared by UN New York". The 49 organizations chosen [from thousands if one should use the directory of the Union of International Associations] have a very strong US bias [much more so than the usual bias of the NGO system in favor of the North-Western corner of the world], and include such organizations as
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Rockefeller Foundation
United Nations Association of the USA
Chamber of Commerce of the USA
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
International Federation of Business and Professional Women
Jaycees International
Lions International
Chamber of Commerce of the USA

The first four, out of seven chosen to get all
UNU publications show how US oriented this NGO concept is; the
next six (out of 31 chosen to receive information publications)
tell a story of simple, straightforward right wing orientation -
especially as there is nothing to the left (except, perhaps,
World Federation of Trade Unions - but that is Socialist world
rather than to the left) to balance this orientation. It gives
a good image of the kind of target audience the UNU finds when
left to itself, in Tokyo - although with some time it will pro-
bably be improved.

But is this strange, given that the former rector
was a trustee of a transnational corporation like the Union
Carbide, the vice-rector for human and social development was
not only a member of the Trilateral Commission but of its Exe-
cutive Committee 1973-78 and the present rector had such affili-
ations as Ford Foundation, Aspen Institute and Club of Rome?31/
Only in milieu far away from progressive orientations will this
be seen as anything but conservative, status quo oriented orga-
nizations. From such angles a distribution list like the one indi-
cated probably looks natural and normal, "objective" - suitable
to distribute the type of research output attempted described in
the preceding sections.

In this connection one alleged function of the
copyright rule should be arrested: that it serves to guarantee
better distribution. Far from it, it will serve to make others
stay off. Much better is the policy followed by many other UN
publication systems, eg Development Forum, which says:

Reprint the articles, use them as source material, permission
is not required. Signed articles must bear the author's name.
Attribution would be appreciated but is not necessary.32/
Of course, author consent would be needed but would probably be
given readily as authors want broad dissemination, in general.

The UNU has decided, so far, not to establish a UNU Press that would be competitive with major publishing houses - a decision much to be regretted. At the same time the UNU has the "primary right" to major research output. What this means in practice is that the research output will be given some kind of second class treatment, exactly as indicated above: as administrative documents. In fact, the UNU information service, with its much higher budget, produces printed matter of much higher technical quality - in fact, too high, particularly as compared with the research output. In the meantime the UNU gathers the type of reputation that would make contacts with well established publishing houses less probable: they may politely decline, giving all kinds of extraneous reasons.

[7] When to publish: late, and not according to research process

The time factor is of extreme importance in research unless one is doing truly fundamental science - and for this the UNU is neither suited, nor motivated. But even to process a small booklet the UNU seems to need about two years, or at least one year and half, which is worse rather than better than a standard publishing house. And although the window series papers for pre-publication produced by the Human and Social Development Programme certainly belong to the more positive aspect of the UNU administrative system, it very often takes half a year to produce even a clean-typed paper, and as much as one year for a more problematic one. Since the rationale here is communication among the researchers themselves, this is not only detrimental to morale, but also to the research process as such: people wait for an input to produce a new output and can only be told "wait, it is coming any week/month now" again and again, till they may lose interest. It would often have been much better just to have the funds to run off photocopies and send it around in more original form.

A key question here is the point touched under [1] above: the non-existence of a real calendar to which the administration would feel committed. Obviously, either researchers themselves have to be much more in command of the process so as to impose their research agenda, or there have to be other
3. THE LOW LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

In most universities around the world the 1960s and the 1970s witnessed a struggle, partially successful, for a broader participation in the decision-making organs of universities. There were, and are, many fronts and cleavages. One would be between the university population as such [senior staff, junior staff and students; technical personnel] and outside forces such as state [ministries of education, culture, science] capital [corporations that want to steer university activity] and parliaments. The struggle actually works both ways: the outside forces might want to get in; the university might like to participate when they make decisions about the university. Another was and is inside the university itself with junior staff, students and technical staff wanting to break the senior staff [full professors] monopoly on decision-making. And a third is relative to people in general, "consumers" of research and education but not at the university: they might like to have more of a say. In general the university groups agree on keeping all others out, and then fight over the sharing of decision-making power among themselves. In this there is an academic egocentricity.

The UN university represents an extreme model: totally controlled by the administrative staff [meaning people who do not do day-to-day research] and outside forces. It may perhaps be said to be ministerial, with a board of outside academics - consistently biased against those who have as a major function to do research for the university. Four aspects of this might be worth while spelling out.

[8] The UNU Council: governing at a distance

The council is defined in the UNU charter as follows:

Art. IV(1) Council of the University. There shall be a Council of the United Nations University [hereinafter referred to as the Council], to be established on a broad geographical basis with due regard to major academic, scientific, educational and cultural trends in the world, taking into account the various fields of study, with appropriate representation of young scholars.

In other words, the "constituencies" of the council members are outside the UNU: "geographical basis" and "various fields of study". There is no representation of the internal constituencies, the UNU Centre staff and the UNU Periphery researchers. It is not even obvious that major consumers of the potential prod-
ucts of the UNU are represented. As a consequence the council members will get their information about what happens in UNU formally from the rector in his report, and informally from the hear-say in the UNU Centre and other places. If there is a key conflict somewhere in the UNU system - and that is bound to arise - then the council will only hear one side of the issue or none at all, except indirectly.\(^{34}\) The UNU Centre staff will try to "sell" their product to the council, and since they work full time and most of the council members probably not much more than the two weeks of meetings a year, the command over information is overwhelmingly in favor of the staff. This is not to neglect the significance of the experience of many council members, only that the experience is not from within the UNU.

The staff can, and do, use this not only to manipulate the council, but also to manipulate the UNU Periphery - the research system.\(^{35}\) Whenever there is a problem the staff has two clear (and well-known from other organizations) strategies:

- this has to be referred to the council because it is so important, or
- this is not a council matter and would set a dangerous precedent whereby the council will start interfering in administrative matters

The first can be used as a delay tactic, and even an indefinite one, as the council in principle sets its own agenda by its own logic; the second becomes a way of avoiding that problems are clearly articulated to council members.

As the UNU has no student body the problem of their representation has not arisen yet, but the problem of staff participation has. A letter from the General Meeting of the UNU Staff Union adds to the picture of the non-representative, undemocratic nature of the UNU Centre:

"... University staff members have every right to form a union which suits their particular circumstances, and -- your official recognition of it would be fully in accordance with --- Staff Rules. -- We therefore request you to place before the Council at its next session the question of the condition of service of UNU personnel, including the right of the staff to participate in decisions affecting their rights, interests and welfare."\(^{36}\)

No doubt this is related to the high level of internal tension in the UNU Centre. One thing is to have problems and conflicts, another to have the feeling that they cannot even be articulated adequately.
The Programme Advisory Committees: advising at a distance

According to the UNU charter the rector may "set up such advisory bodies as may be necessary," and in the first period three PACs were set up, one for each programme. There was probably general agreement that it was valuable to have outside active researchers who could help projects and programmes in their development. The major function of these committees was probably to strengthen the staff relative to the council by having committees of experts who could legitimize decisions and plans. However that may be, the project coordinators — the ones who had the major responsibility in developing the research projects and in carrying them out — were not members of these committees, and only became ex officio members after considerable pressure against this policy of non-representation had been exercised. This made for equality in those meetings: there was no longer a first class of members, and a second class of those whose job is to do the research, and to listen to not always equally insightful "evaluation". On the other hand, the decision-making power remained with the rector and the council, and efforts to get some statements from the PAC through to the council seemed doomed to failure — the channels were clogged.

In the second period, under the present rector, the situation deteriorated further. He describes his committee: "It is a single body, not three or one for each of the three programmes. It advises the Rector on programmes and various other aspects of the University. It has about 24 members, whereas the former committees together had 32 members plus 12 ex-officio members [the coordinators of the programmes]."

And that was the end of this tiny experiment in participation of those directly concerned: project co-ordinators were cut again, possibly because they [we] of course made use of membership to do something else than to listen; to articulate problems [eg the problems in this paper on the UNU]. It should be pointed out, however, that the new AC does have members who have participated and partly still participate in projects. But they are not elected in any way by the members of these projects; they are selected in the UNU Centre "by the Programme staff as scholars who had been involved with Programme activities and are therefore knowledgeable about them". The problem there, however, is that this involvement is usually a very minor one relative to the project co-ordinators.
[10] No respect for any democratic process inside a project

At this point I can only refer to the experience of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project of the Human and Social Development Programme. In the second planning meeting, Geneva 9-14 January 1978 the whole problem of decision-making was discussed extensively, and the following decisions were made:33/

26] It is decided that the network will take any decision relative to academic questions related to the GPID Project and that, in addition, it will autonomously decide about any administrative question which does not contradict the budgetary decision taken by the UNU Council and is not at odds with the UNU Charter as well as its rules and regulations.

26.1e] ---in those cases where decision need to be taken between meetings of the network, or where the network cannot be consulted with sufficient speed, the coordinator will refer decision to an elected group of five members of the network. These five network members are to be elected annually by the entire network in session. As necessary the five elected members may be consulted in person or at a distance by the coordinator. The decision of the five elected members together with the advice of the coordinator shall be final, subject only to ratification of the network in session.

26.2.7] Overall budget planning will be subject to the approval of the network in session.

26.2.8] The coordinator shall be approved by the network in session on an annual basis.

In short, the project made the network in session the highest decision-making body, with control over budget, approval/disapproval of the coordinator and other important functions (such as the composition of the network, the research topics, solicitation of additional funds, the terms of the relationship of the network and the project to the UNU) - with a steering group to make decisions between sessions, but then to be ratified by the network in session [eg not by mail or telephone]. Although consensus was always reached, the understanding was that all voting would be on a "one person, one vote" basis.

It was envisaged in January 1978 that a network "decision /might be/ at odds with the UNU interpretation", in which case "negotiations can take place":40/ The system worked not badly within the GPID given the geographical constraints and the limited amount of time actually spent together, but worked very badly with the UNU Centre.41/

" -- the impression is that HSOP pays no attention to network decisions and does not even think HSOP decisions to the contrary have to be argued. Repeatedly I have said that I know there
can be conflicts between the network and the UNU Centre with its organs, and that in such cases a good negotiation procedure has to be found with a view to finding a compromise. No attention has been paid to this; instead there are the usual tricks to undermine democratic processes:

- spread suspicion that they are not democratic but manipulated -- rather naive to anyone who knows the very high level of autonomy and integrity of GPID researchers. As a matter of fact, I have been criticized, rightly or wrongly, for yielding too easily to pressure, not for the opposite.

- trying to drive wedges in all directions

- trying to impose processes from above, from HSOP, interfering with the processes generated by GPID itself

- displaying particular hostility to those thought to be particularly close to the coordinator, even engaging in efforts to throw them out of the network, indicating that they are not rooted in the local milieu, etc.

This is then documented, rather amply, in the GPID Project Report.\(^42\)

An example from the last GPID network meeting, Montreal August 1980, can be added. The GPID network adopted, unanimously, a resolution concerning the difficult problem of publications. The resolution is very moderate in its tone, and ends by saying "for these reasons we make the following recommendations":\(^43\)

--- The UNU should in general publish GPID works, recommended by the Steering Group of GPID acting as a publications committee

--- The UNU should finance such publications in their entirety

--- Publication by the UNU should be as rapid as possible with review process and publication process guided by consultation with the Steering Group of the GPID

--- Publication of materials should be in as many languages as mutually agreed upon

--- Publication should be in a fully professional manner appropriate to a university publishing house, i.e. justified type, proper binding, attractive cover, extensive distribution, and promotion and review of publications.

The reaction was:

"I wish, however, to mention to you that I will advise /the rector/ to take this general policy and inform of it all the projects of the three Programmes [sic] simultaneously rather than to reply bilaterally to a GPID network statement which tone "the UNU should do this, the UNU should do that" is not exactly reflecting what the interactions between the Rector and the Projects should be in a co-operative setting".\(^44\)

Lack of training in active participation "from below" is probably the best explanation of such an attitude. "Should" and "should not" evidently are reserved for the UNU Centre; if others use such expressions it shows lack of co-operation.
4. THE HIGH LEVEL OF EXPLOITATION

The United Nations University is a Center-Periphery system, even a relatively extreme one - in the academic world. In the preceding section this has been explored in terms of participation, with a UNU Center where decisions are taken and a UNU Periphery that does the research but is excluded from participation in key decision-making, "marginalized" to use that expression. There is a gradient in the system; the system is highly vertical. In this section the same theme will be explored from a different angle, trying to show how unjust the system is the way it is set up, and the way it is working. In order to do this the following definitions will be used:

The UNU Center: Council, rector, University Centre
The UNU Periphery: The research and training centers and programs

These are the four categories mentioned in Article III of the UNU charter, and then defined in some detail in the subsequent four articles.

The Center does work, and so does the Periphery; the Center receives a certain remuneration and so does the Periphery. Let us refer to these four entities as $C_w, P_w, C_r$ and $P_r$. The problem, it seems, is whether the relation between the remunerations can be said to correspond to the relation between the work done. Of course, one might have the extreme egalitarian view that there should be no Center and Periphery, there should be no division of work and no differential remuneration, or at least that both should be "as low as possible". As that model - for which I do have much sympathy is so far from the UNU reality as to be useless as a guide, a proportionality model (rather than an equality model) seems more appropriate. This also offers more leeway: if the conclusion is that there is some disproportion one may argue that the Center, or the Periphery, should do more/better work, or that they should have a higher/lower remuneration.

Let us start with six division of work items:

(11) The Center does no research, only decides;
the Periphery makes no major decisions, only does the work

The preceding section gave examples of this.
The basic point here is to argue against what to me is the most reactionary position one can take about this point, viz., "is that not excellent, it means the researchers can concentrate ful-
ly on research and do not have to bother about administration of which they are not very competent anyhow. This is often mirrored in a corresponding view found among researchers: "how wonderful not to have to do this "paper work" so as to concentrate fully on research". Both attitudes are expressions of a false concept of research: the idea that research is only a question of putting together a manuscript with adequate correspondence between data and theory, mindless of the context the research enters into, how it is used, by whom for what purpose, how it is disseminated, etc. And correspondingly for the administrative side: this fosters an attitude of disinterest in the content of the research, the research administrator becomes the administrator of a research process through which may pass any problem and product. In short, the division of work reinforces highly counterproductive patterns of attitudes and behavior on either side. Both have to do some of the work of the other kind.

From this, in itself, it does not follow that the division is exploitative in the sense that one side gets more out of it than the other. The argument can run both ways. In general research work is much harder and much more difficult than research administration, one reason being that the time perspective is so much longer. It takes time to close a research cycle whereas an administrative cycle may be closed relatively quickly, giving the reward of having accomplished something [e.g. when the file is closed]. Obviously both can be done well and both can be done badly; there are standards of evaluation. But it can also be argued that research work carries more non-material remuneration, it is more rewarding in and by itself. It develops the person further - but so does administrative work. It is in the light of the subsequent points that the implications of this deep division of work in the UNU become more clear.

[12] The Center can put together the pieces of research; the Periphery delivers the raw material.

Even if the Center does not do research itself, it serves as the recipient of the research because it has paid for it, as stipulated in a contract. Concretely this means that the researchers have no control whatsoever over the context in which their research is put. One example of this is the UNU Newsletter of which researchers from all programs - to my knowledge - tend to have a rather dim view: research findings are put together in a glossy, public relations oriented way that sometimes is highly
However, much more serious is the circumstance that researchers have no control over where the findings ultimately end up. Without the knowledge of the producer of the product—the "scientific worker" to use the term employed in the socialist countries—the research findings may be parts of a puzzle designed somewhere else, with the parts farmed out to researchers eager to get a contract to work on the "pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare". Thus, a high number of dialogue studies around the world might, when put together, give a picture of the state of the peoples that could be used for suppression. A high number of studies on the level of need articulation and need satisfaction might be exactly what transnational corporations would like to have as a background for marketing. They might also like studies of post-harvest conservation so as to extend the economic cycles for the produce simply because it keeps better. And they might like more research on nutritional enrichment so that the poor can do with less, less land for instance. Not to mention that research on biogas systems and solar collectors may lead to the type of standardization needed for transnational corporations to produce them on a mass scale, thereby reducing levels of local self-reliance. Above all, all of this together would constitute a package that can be used for people to become stronger, but also for governments and corporations to become stronger. The rest is a question of with whom the UNU Center is more likely to communicate—and many points have been made about that above. Upwards, not downwards.

Some statements by the present rector bear this out:

"...UNU should be an instrumentality that will help humankind to think of itself, its future and its problems as all parts of a single global totality based on human solidarity and transcending national perspectives" [p.4]

"In the world's enveloping crises, if there is to be a future at all, it is going to be a single shared one for all nations." [p.4]

"The first cluster of problems concerns the world economy and global economic crises. A great deal of theoretical work, empirical studies, and policy analyses will be required to help both governments and other institutions to acquire a better understanding of the crises and contribute to fresh thinking about these problems" [p.9]

"The second cluster of problems I would call "the management of social transformation"." [p.9].

"...a quest for a universally acceptable moral basis for the international order..." [p.11]
All of this are variations over the same theme: there is an under-
lying social, even global, harmony in the world, but right now:

"The rapidity and magnitude of social change resulting from
shifts in the international configuration of power and from
shifts in values and value perceptions within developing as
well as industrialized societies, especially among hitherto
marginalized and socially ineffective segments of the popu-
lation have upset social equilibrium and even in many cases
the viability of political systems, and have created inter-
national tensions as well" [p.10].

Many people, like the present author would disagree profoundly
with this vision of history - but this is not the place to
spell out that disagreement. Suffice it only to say that the
only actor mentioned that possibly could set the world straight
again, provided they are equipped with "a great deal of theore-
tical work, empirical studies and policy analyses" are govern-
ments. They also happen to be the only donors to the UNU. And
one instrument that will be at their disposal could be 51/

"a yearly report by the United Nations University on the
state of the human condition, a humanistic appraisal of the
state of the world" [p. 21-22]

Characteristically, the examples mentioned are The World Devel-
opment Report by the World Bank and the Brandt Commission's
North-South Programme for Survival 52/ as devoid of analyses of
class conflict, and how governments take part in them, as the
analytical views just quoted 53/.

The problem here is not that the rector comes out
with liberal/conservative (and, incidentally, very occidental)
views; he is entitled to his views and it is much better to have
them out in the open. The problem is how they will color any
effort to put the bits and pieces of research together that the
UNU Center sooner or later will do. The question "what does it
all add up to" will arise. Researchers with different views
will not produce a report as harmonious as the underlying world
harmony envisaged here. Hence, in all likelihood, a group more
or less sharing the rector's fundamental views will have to do
the job, with occasional reference to the research done. And
at that point the exploitation is already a flagrant fact.

[13] The Center decides what to publish, how and to whom;
the Periphery delivers the manuscripts

That this is the case has been elaborated in
some detail in section 2 on the inadequacy of the publication
process and section 3 on the low level of participation.
The slip "With the Compliments of the Rector" has been mentioned; it symbolizes the structure quite well. It should also be pointed out that the feudal principle of "primary right", some kind of ius primae noctis, to the manuscripts, does not solve a very important problem: if the manuscript has been rejected, is it likely that another publishing house will take it? They may know the UNU policy, and even if they disagree with it, and the criteria used may not like to be known as a publishing house to which one turns after having been rejected by the UNU. This point becomes particularly important in the light of the next point.

[14] The Center evaluates research and researchers; the Periphery has no channel for evaluation of the Center

Nobody will deny that he who pays the piper has a right to call the tune, or at least the type of tune; and also a right to say what they think of the piper's performance. In short, evaluation will have to take place. The way it has been done by the UNU, though, starting evaluating before the research has taken off the ground as if it were almost completed [evaluation of a five-year's project launched March 1973 started March 1979] was rather meaningless. A cable out of the blue suddenly saying says

"please be advised that the rector and the programme vice-rectors have asked some advisory committee members to visit your project or institution to familiarize themselves with university's activities stop we would appreciate your kind cooperation" is in itself acceptable: the Center pays and decides and has a right to know what the Periphery is doing.

However, it changes character in the light of some important statements by the new rector:

"a process of review, consultation and reflection -- has involved, in the first place, our colleagues and the staff here at the UNU Centre, some but by no means all project co-ordinators" [p.1]

"We may look at the existing Programmes as probing exercises or seedbeds to determine whether a particular problem area needs only a programmatic response through projects of limited duration on the part of the University or whether, in order to make a difference, the University should stay longer with the problem" [p.5]

"- it is important that the University should not get bogged down permanently with particular programmes or projects, thereby stultifying its growth and limiting its flexibility in dealing with new problems as they arise" [p.24]

"/the University/ cannot afford to become a prisoner of past programmes and of the projects and activities within them" [p.16]
What all of this adds up to has received a classic expression in German: "Der Mohr hat seinen Tat getan, der Mohr kann gehen". You have done your job, please leave. What it means is simply that the programmes and projects of the first period can be seen as some kind of experiment, "probing exercises or seedbeds" in which we, the Periphery, have participated, in order to be evaluated in due time. The research will be evaluated to see whether there are problems with which "the University should stay longer"; the researchers will be evaluated to see who should be offered new (and probably much better) contracts in view of past behavior, and the research products, as mentioned, will be evaluated for possible publication as UNU publication. The rest can be scrapped so that the University does "not get bogged down" or even should "become a prisoner".  

Of course, it is understandable that a new administration (in this case actually only a new rector and some council members) want to launch their own programs, and one way of clearing the ground will always be to try to get rid of the old. The function of the new rector's advisory committee is, it seems, to deliver the rationale for this process; in that light the cable quoted becomes less acceptable. It should also be noted that the rector did not consult with the project co-ordinators (eg not with the present author) except "some" of them - and this also explains why it was necessary to eliminate them from the rector advisory committee.

As a procedure this is both unwise and immoral.

It is unwise because it means destroying something that it is very difficult to build. The major capital of the UNU lies in the networks it has built to the extent they consist of people who like to work together and tackle problems together - with all the conflicts and solutions that are the landmarks of such processes. Normally one does not destroy a university building after the purpose for which it was built no longer exists: it is used for something else.

It is immoral and actually reveals a very feudal attitude to other human beings: you were appointed by my predecessor, he is gone, you should go with him after you have carried out your task. It betrays a lack of human responsibility and concern, even if most of the people are given some new contracts. A network is something organic, a little like a clan, a family;
it should not be treated too lightly.

To make this more clear one could very easily imagine what a more wise and decent approach would have been:

- to send a draft of the program statement, The United Nations University's Next Stage, to all networks for comments, thereby involving them in the process [in other words, not only to the project coordinators]

- to ask the networks themselves what kind of work they might like to undertake if they were to continue; making it clear that this would be the expression of a wish only and subject to negotiation

And - as so often indicated above - had the UNU practised a minimum of democracy, all of this could have been taken care of in a productive way.

At this point some words about publications again. What the new rector proposes as his new program is not very different from what already exists, except in wording and rhetoric: 57/

- Peace, Security, Conflict Resolution and Global Transformation
- The Global Economy
- Hunger, Poverty, Resources and the Environment
- Human and Social Development and Co-existence
- Science, Technology and their Social and Ethical Implications

If these new programs are to deliver something new they would have to compete with the programs already in the UNU for some time. It takes time to arrive at something new and good, and in the meantime much encouragement is needed rather than incessant administrative problems and conflicts. The absence of invitation to the old projects to cooperate with the new, or at least to discuss it together; the lack of response to reasonable requests for publication processes and above all the lack of interest in the projects that have evolved with all these problems -- all of that is at least compatible with the idea of paving the way for the new by disregarding the old. 58/

On the other hand, the lack of interest in the content of publications and research is not new - and will be explored a little in the next point. Let it here only be concluded that the feeling of being part in an experiment and the object of incessant "evaluation" is far from conducive to research - good research can only be done in a collegiate, dialogical setting of mutual trust and concern. And then the Periphery is spread all over and can only jointly articulate its problems with the Center if the Center pays the travel - which it only does for research meetings -- usually with a program officer present. The dice are
[15] The Center can withhold information as it likes; the Periphery is supposed to be fully accountable.

It is extremely difficult to get information about the UNU Center, except of the kind that comes out of the Information Services of the UNU as is designed to have people believe about the UNU what the UNU Center wants them to believe. This kind of secrecy comes easily for [inter]governmental organizations. More specifically, the general idea is that each part of the Periphery needs to know only what is relevant to them according to the Center - not the total picture. Even such a simple document as the itemized budget is not circulated around, that actually applies to much of the background material used for the present report. However, as is well known from organization theory, all systems have not only formal but also informal channels of communication.

The Periphery, on the other hand, is supposed to report exactly how the little money they received was spent, report on their research and related activities, and to be available for inspection, to be accountable at all times during the year when the Center suddenly wants review of something. Nobody would dispute the necessity of some minimum of orderly reporting and accounting. But it is the asymmetry that is unacceptable. One example: they know, in the Center, what the Periphery receives as remuneration; the Periphery does not know what the Center makes of money - when it becomes known it creates much more of a sensation than if it had been known all the time. In other words, an unhealthy asymmetry is created, and very much more so than in an ordinary university.

As a special example of this type of fragmentation of information may serve the following idea:

"Every year in the past the total programme fund has been divided equally among the three Programmes, and each Programme allocated its share to its various projects and activities. I believe that this "automatic" equal division should be discontinued. Instead each project or activity should bid for its share of the common fund. This new funding principle would be an incentive to programme and interprogramme funding and design."

I doubt that. With the present communication structure the projects would be fighting in the dark, and only the Center would know how much is to shared now, and keep the formulas to themselves. It is pure divide et impera, one of the hallmarks of highly vertical relationships, and capitalistic rather than feudal.
The Periphery contributes ideas to the Center; the Center offers no intellectual stimulation to the Periphery.

The UNU does not differ from other UN institutions in the way consultants are made use of: the problem is to squeeze as much out of them as possible in a limited time and for a limited amount of money. This takes many forms, to be discussed below. One of them is the meeting, in the UNU Centre, at a time chosen by the Center to fit into its calendar of events, offering the Periphery nothing but travel and per diems. The consultation, often lasting five days (one week) can become quite fatiguing and the assumption is that the consultant puts at the disposal of the UNU Center all s/he has to offer within the field of discourse - a life time’s experience for that matter. What is said is usually tapped for scrutiny, sifting and transformation by the UNU Centre staff afterwards. It is then processed into documents, usually of administrative content, there is a polite letter of thanks for having sacrificed one’s time, and the Center is, as a rule, left with more ideas than it will ever be able to process.

Why do people do this? There is the travel to an exotic place, the per diems - but there is also the reward in meeting colleagues, possibly having a good discussion, possibly the reward of a contract in the future - and there is the attractive power that the UN in general radiates to most countries in the world. So there are some rewards, at no cost to the Center.

Compare this to the flow in the opposite direction. Over a period of close to six years with the UNU I never experienced anything like an intellectual debate of a paper prepared - except once, about one hour in a PAC meeting. The only staff member who ever commented on a paper was the legal counsel, because of special interest. All the time was spent on giving ideas to the Center and on administrative matters, most of them not solved, nor even permitted to be articulated. Whatever research was done was certainly in spite of, rather than because of, any intellectual stimulation from the Center, making meetings increasingly frustrating (this may have been different in other programmes). In addition it should be remembered that the meetings invariably meant sacrificing a weekend (with the family), finding substitutes for the weekly lectures. It is assumed that one is available, and weekend meetings were preferred by UNU Centre staff members who would get extra pay for overtime - the Periphery got nothing. And then we are already dealing with differential remuneration.
The Center gets Periphery researchers on the cheap

Actually, the Center gets the researchers free of charge, quite often, as there is no fixed contract defining a salary for participating researchers, or at least an honorarium. In the GPID project research units in developing countries receive: an annual lump sum of $16,000, and research units in the industrialized countries the sum of $3,000. Some of this money can be used as salaries and can help out, there is no doubt about that. But, as will be seen later, when comparison is made with UNU Center remuneration, the discrepancy is enormous. In fact, the Center is only paying added infrastructure expenses needed for meetings (travel, per diems), secretarial help, some funds for research but actually very limited, and in some cases the money allotted can be stretched further. The explanation of how this is possible lies in the next point.

The Center is riding piggy-back on Periphery universities

The explanation is simply that the universities, or in general research institutes, where the researchers hired by the UNU are working pay the rest: the permanent salary, the office, the library - the whole research infrastructure [there are cases where this is not the case - such infrastructure may be virtually absent]. What the UNU pays may be something like 5-25%, closer to the lower estimate - the local university or research institute paying 75-95%. But even if the UNU pays only the top, it expects much more than its share in the total amount needed to do the research. If a researcher participates in a project s/he deems to be important, s/he participates with the whole person and offers a complete experience, if not the whole annual time budget. The copyright rules as well as the rules for publication, makes this amply clear.

This can only work because research institutes, and particularly universities, are usually generous with the time of their researchers - they have considerably less regular office hours [and annual schedules] than most people in working life. The UNU makes use of these time pockets: who else can take one week off as often as researchers can, and do? And the other reason is that nothing is so welcome as the grant on top of whatever else one has - that also applies to the university. But it is still unjust. What it means is that each meeting of the UNU actually is a joint meeting - UNU with those universities,
The Center has job security, the Periphery does not.

There are many aspects to this, all problematic, even much so. One is tenure: five years for the rector, six years for the council members, two years for the PAC members, as opposed to the annual contract for the Periphery, with no guarantee of renewal. What this means, in practice, is that the Center can think and act in terms of a longer time perspective as it is a guaranteed tenure, in practice - the Periphery can only think in terms of one year at the time although with the assumption that there will be renewal.

Another aspect is security in the more limited sense. That there is no pension can be understood in the light of the preceding point: most of the Periphery is probably covered by a pension scheme somewhere else - that is a part of the piggy-back riding of the UNU. But the problem goes deeper.

"Unfortunately, and I mean it, there is no provision for medical insurance for participants at UNU sponsored meetings. Participants holding a contract with UNU, or any other agency for that matter, are covered while in travel status for service incurred injuries under what is called Appendix D provisions. If you refer to your own contract [as project co-ordinator] page 2 paragraph 4, you will see that even consultants like yourself are requested to make their own arrangements for health insurance. So, as matters stand today, participants to UNU or GPID meetings are covered for air accident insurance and nothing else. This procedure is standard for all UN agencies."

It should only be added that the UNU Centre staff has very good coverage. But, again, it could perhaps be said that short term consultants will normally have some coverage elsewhere or at least cannot expect that the UN can cover them. The problem is only that the researchers working for a project of, say, five years duration are no longer short term even if their commitment is partial due to other, and usually major, commitments -- they should at least be covered for the periods of the meetings whether illness is service-incurred or not.

The Center has very high salaries, the Periphery does not.

Here are some UNU Center salaries with post-adjustments for Tokyo (as of December 1980):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rector [US$]</td>
<td>$108,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-rector [D2]</td>
<td>$83,099 - 88,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Information [D1]</td>
<td>$73,959 - 83,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme officers [P5]</td>
<td>$67,254 - 78,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; [P4]</td>
<td>$56,016 - 70,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; [P1]</td>
<td>$30,926 - 40,339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is interesting to compare this with the honoraria paid to the UNU co-ordinators. If one calculates them on an annual basis and adds amounts allotted as "incidental expenses" one gets the following amounts for eight coordinators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>$64,232</th>
<th>$7,200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human and Social Development</td>
<td>$9,600</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>$28,000</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources Programme</td>
<td>$19,200</td>
<td>$9,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(my own would have been, for 1981, SF 40,900 or $20,450 assuming an average rate of $1=SF2 - no incidental expenses). Only one of these honoraria is comparable to UNU Centre salaries, a regional coordinator, but then he is working full time and 40% of the salary is refunded by another organization. My own would have been 1/2 of P1.

About these discrepancies much can be said. Some of it has been said in an interesting staff self-evaluation meeting held 8-10 February 1978 at the UNU Centre in Tokyo [report written by Jose V Abueva, the Secretary of the University].

"Related to the idea that the UNU should be a good employer, in a recent Executive Committee meeting Dr Abueva questioned a supposed rule that the salary of University personnel being recruited should not be much higher than their salary at the time of hiring by the UNU. Dr Abueva asked whether the salaries of staff members should not be determined solely by the nature of their positions in the UNU and the qualifications they bring to these positions. If this were not the case, the terms of employment would be prejudicial to scholars from Third World countries where salaries and fringe benefits are lower for comparable if not higher positions and for similar if not superior qualifications. Staff members recruited from the rich countries or from within the UN system itself would have an unfair advantage and they would tend to predominate in the University especially by holding most of its high positions. The resulting double-standard, which would in effect devalue scholars from poor countries during their entire short-term employment in the University, will adversely affect the University in practice and in the view of scholars in the Third World!"

It is easy to agree with this, and had this opinion, essentially an "equal pay for equal work" principle prevailed the discrepancies above would have disappeared.
In the same report there is also a comment that might bear on the discrepancy between UNU Centre and UNU Periphery salaries referred to above:

"The position classification and organization of the University were originally based on the structural model of the United Nations Headquarters and of U.N. Agencies, and also on the model of organizational and budgetary elements that was determined in 1976. Below the level of Vice-Rector, the practice based on these models has been to recruit administrative officers with no preference for scholarly qualifications or for administrative experience in academic institutions, and in fact with preference for UN experience. Difficulties began emerging in 1977 when programme officers and administrative officers with scholarly backgrounds, some of whom from Third World countries, were recruited. The oft-stated dictum that "administration exists only to serve the programmes" might sound hollow to programme and scholarly administrators who find out that, contrary to their previous academic experience, in the UNU they are paid less than some administrators who have not had academic careers or even equivalent administrative training and experience. Where the tasks are of enormous and unfamiliar complexity, as in the UNU, the consequences of mismanagement in dealing with scholars and of perceived inequities in status can be costly. Unfamiliarity with academic administration can also adversely affect the University's relations with co-operating scholars and academic institutions." 33/

No doubt this reveals considerable self-insight. However, it refers almost exclusively to relations between different types of personnel within the UNU Centre. But the discrepancies within the UNU Centre are small relative to the discrepancies between Centre and Periphery.

It is true that these very high salaries for the UNU Center personnel are adjusted to a very expensive city, Tokyo. But then it is not without reason that Tokyo is expensive: it is a fascinating place. It is also true that these are regular UN salaries, but that is a bad argument: they may be too high for all UN personnel (attracting people who go after money rather than because of devotion to the job), and it is very difficult to see that the UNU had to use these salaries and could not, voluntarily if case may be, step down to more regular university level salaries. Thus, the UNU rector salary is about two and a half times that of the Norwegian prime minister (but then she pays taxes, the UN personnel do not). It is well above such a top British civil servant as the Lord Chief Justice [who gets £ 44,500]. 70/

Something is wrong here and has been wrong from the beginning,
But this is not enough. The UNU Center also receives first class travel [UNU Council members, for instance, when on long distance travel for the UNU] and 40% higher per diems. The UNU Centre staff are holders of a UN Laisser Passer; the project co-ordinators only of the [practically speaking worthless] UN Certificate that will describe them as "consultants".

It makes some sense to compare the UNU Centre salaries not only to the project co-ordinators across the board, but also to one particular part of the UNU system in a sense comparable to the UNU Centre: the co-ordinating unit of a big project, the CIPD Project, in Geneva when it still existed. The salaries were [as of January 1981; the dollar was lower]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Exchange Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinator (&quot;consultant&quot;)</td>
<td>$22,977</td>
<td>SF 40.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative ass't. (&quot;consultant&quot;)</td>
<td>$20,224</td>
<td>SF 36.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full time researcher</td>
<td>$32,120</td>
<td>SF 57.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half time researcher</td>
<td>$16,050</td>
<td>SF 28.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>$22,283</td>
<td>SF 39.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 Secretary</td>
<td>$17,237</td>
<td>SF 30.683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The administrative assistant had a contract directly with the UNU amounting to SF 3,000 per month; the other five had their salaries tuned to the associated institution that served as an employer [receiving the funds from the UNU]: the Insitut Universitaire d'Etudes du Développement. Thus, the project co-ordinator was also half-time professor at that institute, meaning that his total salary was SF 61,800 - which is a very good salary, as good as the highest ranking P1 in Tokyo. The job for the UNU was much more than a full time job, however. But never in the history of these relations has the argument been that that salary should be higher. It is stipulated as one half a professor's salary at the IUED, and that is it. What could be argued would be an increase of the three lowest salaries [the administrative assistant and the two secretaries], but even without such an increase the discrepancy between high and low is considerably less than in the UNU Centre, where the secretaries are not even included in the list of salaries given.

The rector has five times as much as a project co-ordinator who is well paid because he lives in Geneva, the vice-rector has four times as much; all are working full time, what they might earn on the side is a question of private economy, not of structural analysis. However, this is only counting the salaries, not all the other benefits of the UNU Center people.
The project co-ordinator: consultancy turned into exploitation

The project co-ordinator is linked to the UNU Center through the instrument of a consultant contract. A document from the United Nations Secretariat, Use of Outside Expertise and Professional Services sets out "the policies and procedures governing the use of outside expertise and professional services". Some points:

2. "Consultants, experts and contractors are not staff members of the United Nations in any sense"

3. "Consultants may or may not receive remuneration for their services. In either case, the United Nations may provide for their travel expenses and pay them a subsistence allowance"

5. "A contractor --- concludes a contract for the performance of a specific, specialized task or piece of work against payment for an all-inclusive fee"

6(c). "Outside expertise should only be resorted to for assignments of a temporary and/or short-term nature and for tasks capable of being performed within a specified period of time."

9. "Consultants --- may not communicate --- any information known to them by reason of their association with the United Nations which has not been made public, except in the course of their duties ---"

10. "A contract may be granted -- normally for a maximum period of six months or --- for a series of shorter periods /that/ does not exceed six months within any one period of 12 consecutive months."

14(b). "The remuneration to be paid to a consultant or contractor shall be the minimum amount necessary to secure the services, due consideration being given to the current market rate, if any, for comparable work!"

18. "A consultant may not be authorized to travel at the expense of the United Nations unless the individual submits a recent medical certificate ---"

19. "Consultants, experts and contractors or their employees are not eligible to participate in the health insurance schemes available to United Nations staff members. Responsibility for insurance against sickness rests with the consultant, expert or contractor."

22. "The contract of a consultant or contractor may be terminated before the expiry date by either the consultant/contractor or the United Nations; such termination shall be made by one party giving the other party notice in writing of its intention to do so. The period of notice for consultants shall be five days in the case of contracts for a period of actual employment of less than two months and 14 days for contracts of more than two months!"

This is all very clear and consistent: the UN wants "services to be performed --- for which provision cannot be found within the staff resources of the Secretariat for lack of specialized knowledge and/or expertise" [6(c)]. Outside services are
contracted for a specific, specialized task of a temporary and/or short-term nature (specified to "normally for a maximum period of six months"); there is a remuneration that actually can be at any level except that it should be the "minimum amount necessary to secure the services"; there is no health insurance and the UN wants to secure itself by having the consultant checked by a "recognized physician"; and there is a very short termination notice. Moreover, the consultant is not supposed to communicate anything that has not been made public.\textsuperscript{74} The specificity of the work and its short duration make contracts of this type perfectly reasonable - including the title rights discussed in 2(2) above and not repeated here. It can, perhaps, also be argued that it makes sense with contracts of this type if only one of these two conditions is satisfied:

- it is not specific, but of short duration - in which case the United Nations has the category of "temporary staff" (7), also limited to six months.
- it is specific, but of long duration, which may be said to be the case with most individual researchers under UNU contracts working on specific research topics.

But it is definitely not the case for the project co-ordinator. Here are the "nature and duration of services" items as defined in the contract of the present author:

(a) Act as Project Co-ordinator for the UNU research project on Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development.

(b) Be responsible to, and work in close co-operation with, the Vice-Rector of the Human and Social Development Programme for the implementation of the research project on Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development. --

(c) The Project Co-ordinator will be responsible for the co-ordination of the research carried by the research units of the network.

(d) In order to co-ordinate the activities of the network, the Project Co-ordinator will act from the Co-ordinating Unit established by the Institut Universitaire d'études du développement, located in the Geneva office of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. The unit will provide the academic, administrative and secretarial assistance which is necessary for the Project Co-ordinator to carry out his duties. For this purpose, the United Nations University will make appropriate arrangements with the Institut universitaire d'études du développement.

(e) The Project Co-ordinator will undertake, in co-operation with other researchers in the Geneva Unit, research for which the Unit is responsible in order to contribute to the theoretical and methodological basis for the development of the Project.

(f) He will take initiative in planning and organizing the annual network meeting. He will also take initiative in planning and organizing a number of GPOD sub-project meetings and study groups according to a calendar agreed upon with the Vice-Rector of the Human and Social Development Programme.
He will prepare one report which should be submitted by November 1981. The report will be submitted by the Project Co-ordinator to research units included in the matrix of the Project, for consideration and endorsement before its final submission.

Clearly this is a job description, and of a quite demanding and complicated job, and not a "specific, specialized task or piece of work". And the duration was, in principle, from the appointment dated 27 March 1978 ["I have the pleasure to inform you of your appointment as Project Co-ordinator -- from 1 April 1978", signed by the then rector of UNU] till end of 1982; in other words very far from a case of "assignments of temporary and/or short-term nature". Of course, each contract was for a period of one year only, but that is already too much for what in practice is more than a full time job. And even if one year had been within the rules it cannot become legitimate by adding year after year with no interval, for the same assignment -- that would be like trying to make child labor legal by hiring the minor only for one day at a time.

Interestingly enough, the last contract, for 1984, drawn up by the present administration, is more in line with the general rules for consultants, meaning more restrictive. A clause that had been added to the contracts for 1978, 1979 and 1980 to the effect that "the contract is renewable, subject to annual reviews, for additional periods until 31 December 1982, which is the expected date for the completion of the GPID project" had suddenly been dropped. On the other hand, the termination notice, which had been left blank in the preceding contracts (except for 1978 when it was filled as "90 days") was suddenly filled in, as "14 days" -- in other words according to the contract formula. And when the present author finally resigned, on 16 February 1981, it was practised: "resignation accepted as from first March 1981". Needless to say, these two changes, although in line with the rules for consultant contracts, made the position of the project co-ordinator even more precarious. In the usual style they were introduced without any warning or discussion, just for people to sign. And there was no explanation why earlier it had been possible to deviate so much from the consultant rules.

But, leaving this aside, the basic point is the way in which the UNU gets people, on the cheap, to do jobs they are unable to do themselves and under highly inferior conditions
to what they have obtained for themselves. A regular consultant
doing a job that is specific and/or of short duration can keep
his/her regular job, possibly with a short leave of absence [which
may even coincide with vacations] - that was impossible for the
present author whose regular job had to be cut down to half time
[buts of course with decent security provisions as to health, pen-
sion and notice in the case of termination of contract; but then
only for half of the total job]. There is no need to go into any
detail, suffice it only to say that the basic framework for the
GPIOD Project was drawn up by the present author, including its
design into 29 sub-projects and study groups and 27 research units
making their choices among the 29 research themes; that 80 re-
search meetings were organized, almost all of them attended by the
project co-ordinator who had the responsibility for the over-all
planning including [since 1980 when GPIOD got the only concession
of any importance, the right to handle subproject meetings funds
directly, not via Tokyo] budgeting and accounting; this involved
more than 250 researchers from all over the world; more than 400
research papers went through this system; 85 papers were written
by the present author, most of them in excess of the obligation
to "contribute to the theoretical and methodological basis for
the development of the Project"; 45 books were being planned.

And yet all of this was unproblematic. The meetings,
particularly the more specific ones, were a delight; the research
fascinating. The real job was somewhere else: constant and incess-
ant problems of a structural and of a more ad hoc character
with the UNU. As expressed repeatedly: on my side there was
not the slightest objection to the bad, probably also illegal by
the UN's own standards- conditions of work provided two simple
conditions were fulfilled:

- an adequate publication process that would make the whole
  work meaningful
- an adequate administrative process that would make the whole
  work effective

As has been seen already there is still, after six years, no pub-
lication process; nor is one in sight. The low level of partici-
pation and the high level of exploitation would be contrary to
good management, in general. But the UNU adds a level of mis-
management all of its own - the theme of the next section. Before
that, however, there is something else that also has to be looked
into, neither division of work, nor differential remuneration.
(22) The UNU Centre in Japan: location turned into exploitation?

In one of the early documents concerning the UNU, "Summary of the Offers of Facilities and other Types of Contributions Received from Member States" there is the following very substantial entry under the heading "Japan": 30/1

Japan is prepared to consider the following contributions if the programming and co-ordination centre of the United Nations University will be located in Japan:

[a] A financial contribution to the "United Nations University Fund" — in the amount of US $100 million — provided that contributions to the fund will be made by member countries and other sources; Japan will bear all the capital costs required for the establishment of the centre in the Tokyo metropolitan area.  

[b] Japan wishes to be one of the host countries of research and training units of the United Nations University; the Japanese Government is ready to consider bearing all the capital costs required for the establishment of such a unit at an appropriate place in Japan; it will also bear at least half of the current expenses for the unit and is prepared to bear up to two thirds of such expenses — — —

[c] Japan is prepared to consider appropriate contribution, together with other developed countries, to the capital costs for establishing research and training units of the University in developing countries when such co-operation is requested by the United Nations University" [all italics mine]

This is certainly a most generous offer: a contribution of $100 million of the fund, the capital costs for the UNU Centre, the capital costs for a research and training centre in Japan, half to two thirds of the current expenses of that unit, the capital costs of research and training units in developing countries. The offer was accepted, and Japan still carries the burden almost alone (84% of the fund, for instance). The question is, what does Japan expect to get in return for such a major contribution? And in political analysis one has to go one step further, beyond intentions and motivations, and ask the question: what are the consequences, deliberate or not, of this particular dominance by one particular country that has the by far most dynamic economy in the world?

Obviously it places Japan more firmly within the United Nations system as a headquarter of a UN institution — all the others [with the exception of UNEP] being located in the North-western corner of the world. It might also contribute to giving Japan a less "economic animal" image by being the major donor in this type of global research cooperation — but then the problem is that the Japanese contribution is economic rather than intellectual, so it might also reinforce that image.
But what could be more useful to Japan, a country somewhat isolated in the world, than having in Japan some major international centres of research and training, thereby guaranteeing that scholars from all over the world, some of them of international renown, would come to the country and work with Japanese colleagues so that the latter could be completely up-to-date with thinking in key fields, much before publication? And what could be more useful than having this institution focusing on the Third world so that a number of Third world students and scholars come, increasing the knowledge in Japan of their countries, possibly also starting looking to Japan as a metropolitan country, a country to look to for learning and more research, not to mention a country where orders could be placed, a country whose formal or informal representative one might become? Clearly, if all of this, that the forward-looking Japanese government proposed as early as 1973 really should come through, there is no doubt that the result would be a brain drain towards Japan - for who would resist a research stay in Japan, well paid and in generous surroundings?

The Charter says:

Art. I,6. "It shall endeavour to alleviate the intellectual isolation of persons in such communities in the developing countries which might otherwise become a reason for their moving to developed countries".

And U Thant said:

"The location of the university should be in a country noted for its spirit of tolerance and freedom of thought".

In a sense Japan meets the bill where the latter is concerned: there is a spirit of tolerance, but it may well be that there is this tolerance because the Japanese establishment (the state-capital-intelligentsia nexus) is so firmly in command that it does not have to pay much attention to what is being said anyhow. And as to the former, Japan is most definitely a "developed country" -- moving there for an extended stay is definitely a part of the brain drain syndrome, although not of the US kind.

The UNU is now moving in the direction of implementing the promise Japan gave to the UN Secretary General in 1973; under the present rector:

"In this regard, the Government of Japan has also offered to establish a research and training centre, i.e., an incorporated institution, in Japan. Such a research and training centre could evolve into the Institute for Advanced Studies on Human
Survival, Development, and Welfare --. It should determine priorities, respond to internal and external expectations, plan its operations accordingly, and become a meeting ground for distinguished scholars from around the world and their Japanese colleagues. Such an Institute for Advances Studies could ideally be considered as implementing the third offer in Japan's agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the establishment of an incorporated institution in Japan.

But Japan has also other interests although not [yet?] proposed to the UN university:

"The Japanese Government's interest in establishing an institute in Okinawa dealing with North-South relations" and there is talk of an institute for peace studies in Hiroshima. Naturally, Japan wants to participate in the production of forms of understanding of the new world that is now evolving -- "Japan" here meaning the Japanese government, a major actor in and on that world. But should the UNU be an instrument of that?

The question is to what extent all of this will fall on fertile soil in the center of the UNU Center. Some quotes seem to indicate that it may:

" -- humankind has to/develop the commensurate capacity to make the proper ethical and social choices among the options posed by the rapid advances in science and technology as we move into the 21st century. Japan seems to be an appropriate venue for this theme /the address by Pope John Paul II on "Technology, Society and Peace"/ because, as one of the most advanced non-Western societies, which has shown a considerable degree of social ingenuity, she is beginning to grapple with these problems." That must be interesting news for the thousands working for Japanese transnational corporations in the developing countries, for instance in Indonesia.

"In general, I believe that Japan's pre-eminence in science, technology, and industry in the world today should add a rich resource to the general work of the University and that the University could build a forum for fruitful dialogue and interaction between Japan and the rest of the world to the mutual advantage of all concerned". Of course, one does not openly criticize a generous host country. But is it not rather evident that with the extension of Japanese investment all over the world Japan will sooner or later become as overextended as the Western powers were (and partially are), and that this will sooner or later lead to severe problems? Does it really promote an image of free, unimpeded research if the rector of a university, even a UN university, talks as if there are no problems at all in this connection? And what does that imply for the future of the UNU?
Looking back at these points on exploitation, what would be the conclusion? If we disregard the last point as somewhat special or also hypothetical, we are left with six points relating more to the division of work, and five points relating more to differential remuneration. I think there can be very little doubt as to the conclusion: the whole UNU system is an exercise in blatant exploitation. As to remuneration the differential is very clear, flagrantly in egalitarian. But the division of work is equally serious.

It can readily be admitted that many research tasks are considerably more intrinsically rewarding than many administrative tasks. But there is more to it than that. The UNU Center is not only concerned with administration; they also have power over the research, the researchers, and the research products. They have set up a system like a textbook exercise in a theory of imperialism: not only division of work, but programming from the Center conditioning the Periphery; marginalization of the Periphery because almost all decision making of any significance takes place in the Center; fragmentation of the Periphery keeping them apart from each other and much more so than any authoritarian university president/rector could ever hope because of the way in which the networks are scattered around the world; and segmentation of the Periphery by giving to each part a little piece of a puzzle which only the Center knows how to put together (whether they are able to put it together is another matter). What this means is actually that not only the most boring, but also the most exciting tasks in the whole enterprise, that of seeing totalities, are reserved for the Center. Consequently, even the non-material forms of remuneration are in their favor.

But do they not work much more? I doubt it - at times yes, but not more than a researcher really involved in his/her theme. Hence, there is disproportion - and even more so if the poor quality of management is taken into account.

What can one do about it to get better proportions? Give the Periphery more money - to Third world researchers yes, not to us from the First world, in general. Ask the Periphery to work less - hardly, the task is too important. Give the Center less money: an excellent idea. Ask them to work better and be more democratic and less exploitative: the best idea of them all; particularly in view of the content of the next section.
5. THE HIGH LEVEL OF MIS-MANAGEMENT

What is reported in this section are twenty examples of day-to-day life within the UNU system - as seen from its periphery. At the time they appeared they all looked like mis-management, many of them still do - a major reason being that the UNU Center never bothered to communicate reasons when they did something which appeared wrong, or failed to do something that would have seemed right - from the point of view of the periphery. In retrospect, however, they are perhaps more understandable - which certainly is not the same as acceptable - because they fit into the patterns explored in the preceding sections. They can be organized into three groups corresponding to the preceding three sections. But first two types of mis-management proper:

[23] The HSOP has an inadequate filing system

Letters get lost, papers get lost - important information becomes, it seems, irretrievable. As a result much communication has consisted in sending them copies of letters and documents they have already received. A visit of the administrative assistant of the GFDL project to the UNU January 1981 was partly designed to make the filing systems in the UNU Centre and the UNU Periphery compatible - but that did not work out.

[24] The HSOP has an inadequate budget/accounting system

Installments of money granted are sent with no mention of what they are for, they may be sent according to columns of proposed rather than agreed budget items; efforts to find out what is left in an account reveal basic confusions about the project structure, etc. In earlier years there were also very late payments, or none at all, and some times double payments (that then had to be repaid, not a simple process) - but that has improved. Much of this is related to the preceding point.

Whereas these are the types of difficulties found in many big organizations (which is no excuse, and the level of HSOP mis-management is far beyond what can be tolerated), the more serious items relate to the substance itself, of the project. To start with the items relating to the inadequate publication process:

[25] Processing of pre-publications good but much too slow

It has been mentioned above how important it is that research papers at least can become an input into the re-
search process that generated them, and that delays of half a
year up to one year are unacceptable when it is only a question
of working papers. This seems to be a question of budget priori-
ties, and as also indicated above the priorities seem simply to
be wrong by standards of anything like a university. It should
also be noticed that this series only came into existence after
considerable fighting, and basically after GPIP (meaning the
Geneva co-ordinating unit in this case) became so frustrated
with the number of papers with no outlet that a separate print-
ing system was explored and efforts to locate funds were made.

[26] HSDP does not publish what GPIP wants to publish

The traumatic example that has thrown a dark shadow over
GPIP/HSDP relations since spring 1978 is the book edited
by Eleanora Masini, Visions of Desirable Societies [published
in Spanish, in Mexico, by CEESTEM, 1979, to be published in
English by Pergamon Press]. The story is as follows. In April 1978
the World Future Studies Federation and the Centro Estudios Eco-
nomicos y Sociales del Tercer Mundo in Mexico organized a meet-
ing [the first of three] on Visions of Desirable Societies, at
the same time a sub-project of the GPIP project. The meeting was
paid for by CEESTEM and very well organized and attended. The
papers were immediately forwarded to HSDP at the UNU Centre in
Tokyo with the indication that this could become a book. Some
interest was then expressed at the Third GPIP Network Meeting
in Geneva 2-8 October 1978, and referees were identified. Six
months later there was still no response [early March 1979], and
steps had to be finalized to have it published elsewhere. At
the Fourth GPIP Network Meeting, Dakar 23-29 April 1979 an HSDP
programme officer communicated orally that the UNU could not pub-
lish the book [at that time there would have been no difficulty
making arrangements with the publishing institutions, it was not
too late] - nothing was communicated in writing. What had hap-
pened? Why was a manuscript turned down although it had been
recommended in very positive terms by a referee - Soedjatmoko,
later to become rector of the university?

About this there are many speculations. According
to one participant in the publication committee meeting the book
was discussed over a period of six months, was refused, and the
records of the meeting were changed three times. The final re-
port of the publication committee meeting held 20 April 1979
[just before the Dakar meeting] uses this formulation:
"The Committee studied the circumstances of the case, namely, that the UNU had not directly contributed to the financing of the workshop and that only one-third of the participants could be considered as UNU-related persons. Therefore, the committee resolved that without making this decision a precedent for future cases, it would be better for the UNU to be identified as co-sponsor of the workshop but not as co-publisher of the book." \[27\]

Something like this had been communicated orally in Dakar and is still the only concrete guideline - in practice, not in the theory of some document - that the GPID received -- and in writing only as late as 18 February 1981 - two years later! The decision has afterwards been referred to by another UNU official much concerned with publication as "unauthorized" and "unfortunate". When I asked for clarification from the chairman of the publications committee, in the meeting in the UNU Centre February 1981 when this was discussed, with the two arguments that (1) he might have some reasons that I do not understand now and that would make the decision look more reasonable and (2) for once it might be useful if the UNU Centre were accountable to the UNU Periphery, the request was rejected by HSOR vice-rector [I then left the meeting].

It is interesting to look at the reasons given in the document finally released: purely formalistic, nothing about the content and what the book could mean as a book. It also shows very convincingly that the publications committee can decide what it wants, referee statements ["peer reviews" as they are called in UNU parlance] notwithstanding. On the other hand, they do not want to make it a rule, which may indicate that the allegation - that they disagreed with the content - is correct. The committee has, of course, its right to disagree as much as it wants, but in that case there is no longer any academic freedom in the UNU, maybe not even of the rector!

From the very beginning I got the impression when I talked about book manuscripts that this was something they were afraid of - the problem seemed to be not how to publish it as soon as possible, but how to reject it. Clearly, if the UNU wants good publications the opposite approach is needed: go out to the researchers, ask them "what is cooking", when can it be ready, ask for a look at a preliminary version, offer some guidance like "maybe you could develop this part more, we could help with a small contract to get one more chapter in that particular field" and so on. Never, never did anything like that happen.
[27] HSOF does publish what GPO does not want to publish

A manuscript by the project co-ordinator on the GPO project, never intended for publication as it was merely a little administrative piece giving the structure of the project, was published by HSOF[1] without any consultation, [2] without any updating and [3] without chance to read proofs. An updated version was handed over January 1980, but got lost in the UNU Centre. A short note by me, prepared for the UNU sponsored workshop on The Right to Health as a Human Right (co-sponsored by the Academy of International Law, the Hague July 1978) was published without any consultation, without even seeing the proofs although it was explicitly not for publication - as expressed both to HSOF and to the organizer of the workshop. In this connection it should also be mentioned that the image given of GPO in the UNU Newsletter is entirely produced in the UNU Centre, never discussed with the GPO beforehand, and in general rather misleading. But this is all entirely in line with the idea that the UNU considers itself the owner of the research products because they have paid for some of the means of research production (judging from the case of the book rejected for publication travel and per diem seem to be particularly important) - and think they can make use of work products any way they deem fit. In short, a highly capitalistic attitude. And that is probably the key to understanding these three cases: as seen from HSOF/UNU, these three cases are not cases of mis-management but simply management: they did not want to publish a serious research work but did want to publish administrative papers and discussion notes - and did it. What the researchers might want is their problem.

Let me then turn to cases referring, in one way or the other, to the low level of participation, or - better expressed - to the way the UNU Center wants to control the whole pattern of participation. The first five cases have to do with membership in GPO as a network.

[28] The cases of Tanzania and Papua New Guinea

Switzerland made a contribution to UNU by making a contribution to the GPO project (as the co-ordinating unit was to be located in Geneva). One condition for the grant was the participation of countries designated by the UN as "least developed" in the GPO project, as Switzerland favored these coun-
tries in her aid programs. As Tanzania had already been represented by a very well known Zimbabwean political scientist, Nathan Shamuyarira—who was also working in Maputo (Mozambique) and Lusaka (Zambia) in addition to Dar-es-Salaam—at the First GPOD planning meeting in Dubrovnik April 1977 one such country was already in it. Another opportunity arose by inviting Patrick Healey, British, Director of External Studies at the University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, to join the project. In that way the Swiss request had been met and the network had been strengthened. In both countries the universities gave their consent although neither was a national of the country. It would lead too far here to relate in detail all the ways in which the two were counteracted. But the net outcome was important: Patrick Healey expressed willingness to work without contract with the UNU because of disenchantment with the whole administrative process as handled by the HSDP (for which a personal letter of apology was received from another part of the UNU). And Nathan Shamuyarira, who became minister of information and tourism in the first government of liberated Zimbabwe, summarized his impressions this way:

"Our government is setting up a research and statistics institute which will continue some of the work we started in Maputo, Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka. The UNU experience will be instructive on what not to in promoting research and human and social development".

[29] The case of Iran

That this is a complex case goes without saying: the case is a reflection of recent Iranian history. A first-rate Iranian researcher, Taghi Farvar, then Vice-rector of eco-development of the Bu-ali Sina university in Hamadan was a part of the network from the first beginning in 1977 and was the first member elected chairman of the network committee (in January 1978). The third network meeting was supposed to take place in Hamadan October 1978 but had to be relocated to Geneva because of the events in Iran. Farvar managed to come to the meeting, and asked for—and got—an expression of solidarity from the members of the GPOD project in the fight of the Hamadan faculty and students against the shah regime (this led to a non-unanimous rebuke from the UNU council as another example of how far the freedom of expression goes in the UNU. It was stated very clearly in the resolution that the people endorsing it were members of GPOD—not UNU as such, of course—and in their personal capacity only).
The research unit in Hamadan had to be abandoned after the change of regime and Farvar and his colleagues founded a new unit in Tehran called CENESTA. The continuation of that unit with the OPID was fully recommended by OPID, but never really supported by the HSDP/UNU, in spite of a positive report from the UNDP representative on site. In a letter May 1994 Farvar expresses it this way:

"Let me take this opportunity to remind you that our present unclear status within the project -- that we are not formally a member of the network after all these years of active participation, as far as the UNU formal lists are concerned, and the fact that the conditions for our membership have changed without prior notice from time to time -- obviously a device to exclude us as a non-conformist group, is but one syndrome of the same causes that led to your resignation in protest. As we have mentioned before, we are in the midst of one of the most exciting revolutions in history, and, due to both administrative ineptitude and political considerations, we have been excluded in a process that could have benefited both the UNU and us".

What Farvar says is truth. And the disagreeable impression one is left with is the same as the impression from the Shamuyrariri case: the UNU cannot take left wing, at times revolutionary views, nor can they take people who dare criticize the UNU openly, as both of them have done. Of course, UNU is not exactly alone in that as an organization.

[30] The cases of Union of International Associations and World Future Studies Federation

The cases are simple: they were both present at the first planning meeting in Dubrovnik, represented by the assistant secretary general Tony Judge and Eleonora Masini, secretary general, respectively; both of them excellent researchers in their own right in addition to possessing access to very important non-governmental networks. Yet they were counteracted for years by the UNU Centre, HSDP, with all kinds of pretexts, trying to keep them in with a contract as low as $ 500! Their inclusion in the network as members just like others, with the grant used for units in industrialized countries (the secretariats were in Brussels and Rome, respectively) - $ 3000 - finally came through, but as late as 1990 -- with considerable demoralization as a consequence. What was behind it? Difficult to say - probably simply a failure to accommodate non-governmental organizations in the "member states" oriented conceptualization of the world according to the UNU Centre. The little money that was saved by the delay was a very meagre compensation for the lack of solidarity with people who had been in it from the beginning.
[31] The case of a consultant

The GPID attached to it for the second meeting a consultant in forms of presentation, particularly - but also in other matters due to his excellence - Yona Friedman. The case is simply this: the slowness with which a little contract was concluded, the duration of time needed to process the fee that accrued to him for some very interesting work made it impossible to ask him to continue his work with the GPID. Demoralizing and unnecessary.

[32] The case of the People's Republic of China

This is the case of another opportunity lost. The GPID is concerned with paradigms of development, nobody will deny that China has made a unique contribution in this field. The project co-ordinator has no difficulty in getting access to China for himself - but it should be for the whole network or at least for a part of it. In spite of the contacts the HSDP/UNU has with China this opportunity was never offered.

And then, again the same comment: maybe this was not mis-management but rather management. Maybe the HSDP did not want the GPID to be too important lest it should overshadow other things - there is a way in which a branch can be bigger than the tree on which it grows. Maybe they simply wanted to cut it down -- who knows?

Let us turn to the second batch of five cases under the same general heading: the steering of participation. The concern is no longer with the composition of the network, but with its internal structure, and the internal structure of all of the UNU for that matter. Any organization with a center, UNU or GPID, runs the danger of developing an "alpha structure":31/ centralized, hierarchical, with most interaction between center and periphery and very little between periphery and periphery. This tendency has to be counteracted, consciously, deliberately. Here is what happened:

[33] The effort to promote periphery cooperation in GPID, I

A workshop was requested after GPID III October 1978 [endorsed by the project co-ordinator] by Zemelman (Mexico) and Nudler (Argentina), in order to continue the steering group discussion [May 1979] about integration of the GPID and methods of analysis, was not acted upon by HSDP in 1978 - but in 1979 in a way totally contrary to what was intended and had to be cancelled.
The joint project by Nathan Shamuyarira and Ian Miles, on investment patterns in Zimbabwe, requested by them after GPID III October 1978 (and endorsed by the project coordinator) was not acted upon in 1978. When it finally took place it was so half-hearted from the HSDP that it could not be carried out. It took until 1980 before a small amount for research assistance was paid to a person who had done some initial research.

The joint project by Patrick Healey and David Pitt to initiate some research in South Pacific, suggested by them (and endorsed by the project co-ordinator) was not acted upon.

In all cases the amounts needed were very small; the research output could have been considerable, and the contribution to a more healthy structure of a network fundamental. Unfortunately, when the participants are scattered all over the globe periphery-periphery cooperation of a direct nature does require money - but not necessarily much if it is combined with other meetings. In all cases: Third world scholars were penalized.

[34] The effort to promote periphery cooperation in GPID/III

This is the case of the effort to establish a system of exchange fellowships, of short duration, promised by HSDP/UNU, in order to facilitate contact between researchers in the network so that they could stay with each other and carry out some joint research. Twelve such twinning projects between a visitor and a host within the GPID project were set up during GPID V in Montreal August 1981 - only one took place. Several of them wanted to go to Bariloche [and were welcomed by Carlos Mallmann] where there also was to be a GPID subproject meeting in the month of December [for one week]. The following characteristic exchange of letters took place:

"--- as for the exchange of researchers' programme, please note the following remarks:
(a) This project should not be in anyway considered as a means to increase the number of participants in the sub-project meetings [like Bariloche, for instance]. ---

And the reply:

"As to the exchange programme, please note that there is a difference between an extended research stay and participation in a meeting. You are, of course, right that we wanted to combine the two, that has been obvious from the very beginning. We consider that to be simply a matter of rationalization, to make the research stay much more, not less valuable. You should not see it as a way of trying to get extension of meetings, it is a way of doing serious work"

So, one more chance lost to make the structure of GPID/UNU better.
[35] The effort to promote periphery cooperation in the HSODP

An inter-project cooperation meeting between the GPIOD and the Sharing of Traditional Technology projects of the HSODP, scheduled for Colombo, Sri Lanka August 1979 [benefitting from the presence of several GPIOD researchers for another conference and from the fact that the STT coordinator lives in Colombo] was suddenly cancelled by HSODP without informing the project co-ordinator, and with no reason given. This was not communicated to the STT project co-ordinator; he announced the meeting to the STT network as late as April 1979. So, one chance lost to make the HSODP structure better - based on a spontaneous urge to "compare notes" (particularly frameworks of analysis) that had arisen between the two project co-ordinators themselves; and it would have cost almost nothing.

[36] The effort to promote periphery cooperation in the UNU

In January 1980 a joint meeting was held in Tokyo of the three PACs, for the three programmes. The meeting was good because it was not only administrative but was geared to the development of joint projects in order to tie UNU better together. A dialogue meeting between the GPIOD Energy Study Group and energy specialists from the Natural Resources programme was proposed by the present author - and was very positively received by the NR people. The reaction in HSODP, however, was negative or cold, probably partly because they wanted such initiatives to come from the UNU Centre rather than from the periphery, and possibly because they feared budgetary consequences [it looked from the beginning as if they would be covered by the NR programme and by UNU funds for inter-programme activities]. The workshop has been postponed repeatedly, and has still not taken place.

[37] The effort to promote better UNU Centre-Periphery relations

As is evident from most of what has been said so far the relations were less than perfect. One theory was that this was essentially due to the extreme division of labor: administration and decisions, no research in the Centre; research and no decisions [but quite a lot of administration] in the Periphery. Of course, all were part of the UNU "family", but that family was somewhat feudal, with the pater familias located in Tokyo. So, one idea was for the project co-ordinator to spend fall 1981 in Tokyo, doing research, entering the write-up phase, but doing some of it in the UNU Centre so as to bring more research to the place, and so as to - as a by-product - clear up administrative
problems. This was discussed briefly with the new rector in Geneva in July 1980; he expressed particular interest in the indicators aspect of the GPIOD. What I suggested in a letter to the secretary of the university, Dr Jose Abueva, was a little different:

"Work: integrative research based on GPIOD material, if possible also together with other GPIOD members who could be invited at the same time for shorter or longer periods (I would recommend particularly Hellmann and Velaskakis who together with me are convenors of the three integrative workshops we have now constituted inside the GPIOD - -"

The stay was to be for four months in order really to get some work done, and at the expense of extending a ticket to a GPIOD network meeting and per diems - no honoraria involved.

In January 1981 the administrative assistant of GPIOD could report from Tokyo that the rector was interested, particularly in indicators (that would have been no problem for me, only I thought integration was more important as it would also integrate the integrators, and in a UNU Centre setting. But it was also reported that the HSDP was cool to the idea. Upon arrival in Tokyo 15 February 1981 I got from the secretary a memo from another UNU Centre staff:

Subject: Project Co-ordinators' Visit to Tokyo
Dr. Mushakoji has made the following comments:
(1) He has no objection to Co-ordinators spending up to a month in Tokyo for interaction with staff.
(4) Dr. Galtung could come to Tokyo in the autumn.

In my reply I wrote:

"The memorandum is a flat rejection... What I had in mind, of course, was to come for some time - at least three months - with the research material, be staying at the International House, working at the UNU Centre as I understand you are now getting some special quarters for visiting researchers, and interact not with staff but with other researchers, among them Japanese scholars!

And thus ended this effort - entered into in very good faith:
"I understand the offer has been rejected, so it is withdrawn. The research will take place somewhere else. Let me only add that this was one, but by no means the only one, reason for my decision to resign as a UNU consultant. And the responsibility rests entirely with Dr. Mushakoji as far as I can read from the memorandum".

Again, then, the same comment: is this mis-management or simply management, management of information and control, keeping people, projects, programs apart unless they interact on the initiative, and the premises of, the UNU Centre?
This theme will now be pursued with four cases that relate more directly to the high level of exploitation in the sense of division of work with the Periphery delivering the material and the Center using it, passing judgments that are not communicated, etc. It should be noted, by way of introduction, that the contract for the project co-ordinator stipulates that he shall "work in close co-operation with the Vice Rector of the Human and Social Development Programme for the implementation of the research project on Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development". The question is now that is possible under the following circumstances:

[38] The UNU Center never commented on research calendars

From 1978 on, for each year and well ahead of time, a proposal for meetings to be held the following year was communicated to the vice rector. Since this was the concrete manifestation of the GPID research work, one would have expected some comments (less of this, more of that - for instance), some kind of dialogue. But that never happened. And the NEWS from the Geneva coordinating unit containing all the information about what went on was filed away and apparently almost never read in the UNU Centre, meaning that they were practically uninformed about what went on in the project presumably under their direction [during the last year this improved somewhat].

[39] The UNU Center never commented on research plans

This is considerably more serious. In May 1978 the steering group of the GPID, elected by the Second GPID network meeting met in Geneva and drafted a research plan for the entire duration of the project, with decreasing emphasis on sub-projects and increasing emphasis of integration - a plan meticulously adhered to ever since.\footnote{For the meetings 1980 and 1981 all of this was concretized further by working out terms of reference for all meetings [it was actually also done for 1979, but not so far ahead of time as the meetings were less predictable: there was no way of knowing what would be cancelled, what would be funded, and so on]. Never a comment - they were probably not even read till spring 1981. In other words, the vice rector failed completely in contributing his part of a dialogue on how the project was to proceed - and I am not prepared to interpret laisser faire as tolerance. There was no way of knowing whether he thought well or badly of what happened as there were never any comments - neither positive, nor negative - no intellectual}
stimulation whatsoever.

[40] The UNU Center did not communicate budgets

It goes without saying that a major task of the project co-ordinator, in consultation with the whole project, is to prepare a budget for the coming year - and this was always done [although the H5DP failed to communicate the deadlines]. The whole research for the coming year would depend on what happens to the budget plan: does the UNU Centre propose it to the Council or do they change it; does the Council approve of it? It would seem that the project co-ordinator would have a right to be informed about that process, but no:

"gpid budget will be communicated after approval by council in december due to possible changes...however at this stage all your proposals included in draft document"[100]

The problem was, of course, that the UNU Centre and GPID might have had different perceptions of what those proposals were, for which reason a final check before council deliberation might have been useful. And the budget was not communicated after the December meeting: it was not communicated before mid-February, making planning for the year 1981 a relatively random exercise. When it finally came, it proved to be identical with what had been proposed almost exactly one year earlier - but that is not the point. The point is the right for the Periphery to know what is going on in the Center on such a vital issue.

[41] The UNU Center handles research in a mechanistic manner

As mentioned many times, the instrument regulating the relation between the research units and the Center is a consultant contract. In the contract the researcher specifies, say in November the year before, what research plans the unit has for the coming year. The contract form asks for a certain specificity in this regard, including titles of papers to be written (could be preliminary titles). The argument is, of course, that the researcher enters a contractual relation, and to be accountable s/he has to some extent to be predictable. The problem is obvious, and is very well put by the present rector:[101/

"As we know, scientists and scholars require freedom for their investigations and creative pursuits which are open-ended and serendipitous. Their work requires continual reassessment and course correction and is often unpredictable".

Precisely, and even more so in a project like GPID, so much based on mutual"reassessment and course correction" where each
meeting may be an occasion to change a paper - often in a differ-
ent field - away from what was originally intended. Here is the
Center reaction to a researcher who "wrote other papers instead
due to changing research priorities in a dynamic project": "

"--- contract signed /For/ receipt of 20-30 page paper on esta-
blishing the links between organizational design and problems of
concept organization in research development --- please indicate
which paper corresponds to the above if already sent to UNU in
batch for publication --"

The helplessness of this cable is evident, and it
belong to the story that the vice rector has assigned this rather
important task to somebody with absolutely no research experience.
With the contract in one hand, the report in the second and the
papers lying in-between efforts will be made to find out what
corresponds to what. Reading a paper is out of question [I prac-
tically never got the impression that any paper was ever read as
there were never reference to specifics in a paper, beyond the
title and what the programme officers had picked up, attending
meetings]; it becomes a bureaucratic and mechanistic matter of
establishing correspondence between three sets, remitting money
after correspondence has been established, then filing it all
away. As a procedure it is entirely compatible with the three
preceding points.

But is it management or mis-management? Is it not
simply a display of power: you are accountable to us, not we to
you, we do not have to comment to you, only among ourselves, if
something does not work we may terminate the contract, we do not
even have to give reasons? The sphinx as a style of management?

Concluding this set of twenty cases that I still
prefer to conceive of as mis-management rather than management
is a curious one:

[42] The UNU Center allegation of Third world exploitation

Rumours went around that an HSIP programme officer
had said, repeatedly, that GPID was a mechanism for the project
coordinator to get information about and from the Third world,
then writing it up himself. I wrote in my report on the GPID
project October 1979: "

"This kind of statement, to which there are witnesses, is of
such a kind that I am demanding either an apology or documen-
tation, at or before the PAC meeting 2-6 November 1979. As long
as I have had anything to do with the Third world there are few
things I have been more conscious about than this type of scien-
tific colonialism. In the GPIOD project I may even have carried my concern for this point too far: look at the list of my papers, there is not a single paper drawing on third world material developed inside the GPIOD project. The only paper I have presented at a network meeting is on the Roman Empire (compared with Western imperialism); all the rest is based on my own research on the first world, the second world and on the world as a whole!

Neither apology, nor documentation was offered, so the situation became more tense. Several very strong statements supporting my view came to the UNU Center from Third world scholars in the GPIOD. After an enormous amount of time spent on the subject the rector finally withdrew the allegation [the programme officer had in the meantime left the UNU, his contract had not been renewed for other reasons] in the following agreement signed by both of us:

AGREEMENT. We have agreed on the following:

"Given the highly unequal distribution of resources for intellectual production around the world, and given the way in which intellectual/scientific interaction has mirrored economic/political interaction, there is clearly the risk that net benefits of research co-operation, regardless of the intentions of the participants and organizers, where it is "co-ordinated", who is the "co-ordinator" might accrue more to the researchers in the more developed countries than to those in the less developed countries. This is something to be kept in mind and to be counter-acted in all parts of the UNU, and there is no basis for any allegation that it should apply particularly to the GPIOD Project."

So, at least that one was out of the way, had it not been I would have resigned on the spot. But this was not the only issue of key importance, as may have become clear from the above.
S. THE BROKEN PROMISES

Spring 1980 there were so many unresolved problems that it was decided to have a meeting between GIPID and the UNU Centre to try to resolve them. The meeting was held in Geneva 5 June 1980 and was attended by three persons from each side. The meeting proceeded very well, there was total agreement on the fifteen decisions taken (including the one just mentioned, the agreement referred to under [42] above). The happy atmosphere and felicitous outcome were even celebrated after the meeting. However, very little happened afterwards with the more difficult items, and it showed up that the UNU Center had not even taken notes during the meeting, and had misplaced or failed to receive the report on the decisions from GIPID. Fall 1980 cable went back and forth concerning this, and when the administrative assistant came back from the meeting in Tokyo January 1981 the report was negative on many important items. More particularly, there were six of them, all known from the preceding sections: two concerning problems of publication, and four concerning the composition and structure of the network:

[43] The copyright issue

Agreed: "New views on the copyright issue will hopefully emerge by September"

Outcome: No such views, in a clear and authoritative (meaning authorized by the rector and/or the council emerged "by September"; they still have not emerged.

[44] The publications issue

Agreed: "Detailed plans for the GIPID Journal/monograph series will be elaborated by September, the be decided upon by the UNU Council in Fall 1980, with possible implementation by January 1981. Nassar Issa was authorized to make a first draft on the basis of ideas already presented in NEWS 12 [December 1979]."

Outcome: Nothing was elaborated "by September"; it has still not been elaborated. The GIPID Fifth network meeting in Montreal August 1980 decided that the journal was no longer a viable form and made a resolution concerning a series of publications. [see point [10] above, in section 3] - in five points. As an indicator of how confused the UNU Centre was about the issue may serve these two statements from letters received:

"... I have no objection to the content of the five points, except point 2. I would feel that in some cases good publishing houses should be approached for publication by them."...........

"Now the Publications Committe has reported to /the Rector/that your recommendations 3, 4 and 5 are acceptable, but not recommendations 1 and 2 which would run counter to the UNU Policy on Scholarly Publishing approved by the Council..."

But the basic point remains that no proposal for a concrete process emerged, based on a dialogue and consensus between the
parties involved. The reason is quite clear: neither the UNU in general, nor the HSOP in particular knew how to proceed in this matter, and when finally an HSOP position emerged - but not endorsed by the rector and/or the council, hence essentially not a basis for action - then they had to base it all on ideas from the UNU Periphery - without attribution.

[45] The Shamuyarira issue

Agreed: "After studying the facts of the matter it was agreed that there had been a delay of at least three months before Shamuyarira's request for research funds on investment patterns in Zimbabwe (Fall 1978) had been acted upon or answered. It was further agreed upon that fresh initiatives should be taken in order to reopen relations with Shamuyarira and his research team. These would conceivably be [a] the new rector will come up with new initiatives, [b] Shamuyarira will be invited to make concrete proposals himself, and [c] a formal request will be made asking Shamuyarira if he would consider continuing some of the research started on the role of liberated zones in development thinking.

Outcome: Nothing was done.

[46] The CENESTA issue

Agreed: "--UNU Center will release the funds for 1979 upon receipt of the last two of CENESTA's papers (these are revised versions of papers presented at the Needs meeting in Berlin and the Dialogues meeting in Penang). As soon as possible after the installation of the new UNU administration, a site visit to CENESTA will be organized to unblock the funds for 1980 (probably in September).

Outcome: It transpired that the paper for the Dialogues meeting was found in the UNU Centre files when the administrative assistant was in Tokyo; and the editor of the book from the Needs meeting, Patrick Healey, certified the adequacy of the other CENESTA paper. But as to the outcome: see letter from Teghi Farvar under point [29], section 4 above - nothing has been settled.

[47] The Center-Periphery division of work issue

Agreed: "Hossein Issa, the new Programme Officer dealing with the GPD Project, will attend /GPD V in Montreal/ from UNU Center with a paper". This has been an old point in GPD history: the idea that the UNU Centre should participate in the research, not only sit as observers with administrative and reporting functions -- in order to break down the division of work.

Outcome: Hossein Issa came and made an excellent impression - but without a paper that could contribute concretely to the research process. His priorities had not been organized by the UNU Centre in such a way that this became possible - hence no outcome. The old pattern of performing for the UNU Centre remains unchanged.

[49] The exchange fellows issue

Agreed: "Third World units [and in some cases other units as well] will receive funds to permit extended exchange of researchers for GPD work from the HSOP budget".

Outcome: Only one exchange took place - see point [34] above.
And thus ends the story. But, one might ask, why take these broken promises so seriously - had that not happened before? It has, but this time the agreement was entered into very solemnly. My personal feeling was strongest in connection with no. 45:111/

"I am deeply distressed that the UNU Center has not followed up our agreement last June and extended an invitation to Shamuyarira to formulate some plans. I understand the mishandling of Shamuyarira continues in spite of our explicit agreement, which I am afraid also tells something about the value of having an "agreement" with the UNU Center!"

To break a promise is one thing. In addition not to be able to right some of the many wrongs that were committed in that particular case shows, in addition to lack of trustworthiness, a certain smallness which speaks very, very badly for the UNU in general and for the HSDP - concerned with human and social development in particular.

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So I resigned when in mid-February 1981 it became clear that all these matters had so low priority to the HSDP and the UNU in general that they did not even come forward with proposals, leaving along solving them:

"I hereby resign as a UNU consultant, because of - primarily - the way in which the Human and Social Development Programme treated the agreement between HSDP and GPO of 6 June 1980; partly by ignoring it, partly by breaking it. When the HSDP does not live up to an agreement the basis for trusting any other agreement no longer exists, and without a minimum of mutual trust a working relationship cannot continue. I am afraid Dr Shamuyarira's words about the experience with the HSDP being an example of how not to do research in the fields of human and social development are now also mine. -- "112 /

I felt and feel that working with the UNU led to nowhere, leading one up a blind alley. And I did not accept the very cynical view, held by many, that one could just view the UNU as a funding agency, take the money and do with it what one wants. It is not that simple: the UNU has the money of a foundation but not its freedom, combining, as it does, a copyright clause with lack of an adequate publication process. Of course, the UNU has long ago forfeited their rights with the way they have broken explicit and implicit obligations to the researchers (and the co-ordinator). But then there is another matter of considerable importance: should there not be some kind of consistency between the values one stands for and tries to promote through research and the
way in which this research is being done? The GPIO project, very
clearly, stands for such values as participation and equity [ab-
sence of exploitation] - the UNU seems to be a continuous exer-
cise in how to be undemocratic and exploitative [sections 3 and 4
above, with all the examples given in section 5]. In the struc-
ture lies a good portion of the total message of an institution,
maybe more than half - and when combined with the pretentious-
ness of the UNU whatever message it has may sound somewhat false.
As one GPIO researcher expressed it - are all these values only
something UNU preaches for others and does not have to practice
themselves?

But then there is another aspect to it. As another
GPIO researcher expresses it: engaging in a paper war with the
UNU is not a real struggle in terms of the issues and problems
of the world. In a sense it is a waste of energy that could be
better used to engage in that real struggle outside the UNU sys-
tem - except that there is something to learn also from the UNU
struggle and there was the hope that it might one day lead to
something. Yet, perhaps one might be forgiven for feeling that
there are other things on which to spend some years of one's life!
The waste of time, not to mention the tremendous waste of money
in that institution, issuing tickets and per diems for Center and
Periphery to travel all around the world for meetings and work-
shops when they are not even able to process the results! Some-
times one might almost get a feeling that the whole thing is a
way of tying up people in a context where they believe something
might happen so that they do less in other contexts.

There is considerable tradition behind universities,
thousands of years (in the West there is the provincia habit of
only counting Western universities). If the UNU really is to be
referred to as a "university" then this represents a step back-
wards from the battles gained - for a minimum of efficiency, for
freedom, for a good balance between research and administration,
for a reasonable internal structure, and so on. The UNU should
be a model, something to learn from not because of what it preach-
es or teaches but simply because of what it is and does. Instead
it has become a top heavy monster which probably even may have
a negative impact by giving implicit support to corresponding
tendencies of inefficiency, low level of participation, exploita-
tion and mis-management found in many places in all parts of the
world - but not something to emulate.
5. CONCLUSION

Did the UNU have to become this way - so far from the dream envisaged by U Thant? The answer would depend on whether one thinks the UNU has a structure that, given the right people, could still have become an adequate vehicle for "research, post-graduate training and dissemination of knowledge in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations", or whether the structure itself is wrong. My own view is somewhere in-between. Thus, it does not look as if the UNU has always had good luck with recruitment, given that "the basic criteria for selection shall be the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.--"\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, just as administrators do not become good researchers over night, the assumption that a researcher becomes good administrator just by appointing the person to an administrative job is obviously wrong. These are simply two different modes of operation although the gap is and should be bridged by giving to both the chance of acquiring some of the skills of the other, to become more professional.

But leaving the personnel issue aside there are some structural factors that should be highlighted more explicitly than has been done in the preceding sections. It is probably at this level that changes will have to be made since these structural factors are likely to generate the same malfunctioning again and again, regardless of changes of personnel and whether the UNU is organized in "programmes" (the first administration) or in "modes" (the second administration).\textsuperscript{114} More particularly, there are five such factors that seem important:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item The UNU as ministerial/corporate rather than university/academic model for doing research. In an earlier paper on the UNU the distinction is made between the university/academic and the ministerial/corporate model for doing research. In the former the basic assumption is that researchers themselves know best what to do, with whom, when and where and how - and that the task of the university is to provide a setting for this based on much trust and freedom. More particularly, the creativity rhythms, and the frequent alternation between the times when the creative person wants to contract into lonely acts of creativity --/and/ times when interaction with others is indispensable to have conclusions arrived at criticized, and for sessions of intensive collective creativity, filled with synergy -- have to be respected. In the latter
the ministries/corporations decide the why and the what of re-
search and go very far towards deciding how, where and when - and
then go out to find the people willing to work under such condi-
tions. If the structure of the former tends to become anarchic
with small cells of cooperative teams, organized horizontally or
vertically depending on personal and social factors, the structure
of the latter is already given - huge, vertical, centralizing,
fragmenting and marginalizing -- in short "bureaucratic". Minis-
tries and corporations have a given structure and then try to
fit research and researchers into a "research division" although,
admittedly, the more clever of them know that this does not pro-
vide for enough creativity and establish something on the side
more reminiscent of a university campus - the famous "think tank!"
There are well known arguments for and against either model:
the university/academy model is best for pure research, for ori-
ginality but can also become wasteful and detached from real life;
the ministerial/corporate model is best for applied research be-
cause of the precise goals and the ties to "clients", but may be-
come subservient to the other goals of the ministries and corpo-
tations, to their administrative and economic control of countries
and the world.

The UNU is a strange hybrid of these two. The
drather, designed by people of both kinds, is an effort to fit
an institution with "academic freedom" into an essentially minis-
terial/corporate structure where the rector and the council (cor-
responding to cabinet or board, just as the rector is more like
a minister/secretary or a director than a university rector) are
the only decision-makers. Hence, the UNU Center is clearly of
the ministerial/corporate variety, but it is presiding over a vast
UNU Periphery with many kinds of elements, many of them of the
university/academy variety. This means that researchers in the
Periphery do their job more or less the usual way then to discov-
er strange unacademic obstacles when they come closer to the
ministerial/corporate UNU Center. As there is no doubt as to who
has the power, formally speaking, of the two, the heading of this
point is correct. But it is only correct insofar as the research-
ers accept it, the power is only formal. There is always the
informal countervailing power of overtly or covertly going on
strike, refusing to deliver the goods - meaning that the UNU will
have no "output" to show for itself. The hunch is that the low
output so far is tied to this factor, consciously or unconsciously.
(II) The UNU as an institution of the United Nations

Given that the UNU is not really a university, it is certainly an institution of the United Nations - but what kind? The charter defines the UNU as "an autonomous organ of the General Assembly", "the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Director-General of the UNESCO and the Executive Director of UNITAR and ex officio members of the Council" and the council shall "report annually to the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Executive Board of UNESCO". These are the only ties to the outside world explicitly defined in the charter. It is a part of a system, and that raises at least two important organizational questions:

- does it do the same kind of work as other parts ["duplication"] or does it do something different [specificity]?
- is it at the same level as other, comparable parts, or is it "above" or "below"?

The questions are related.

As mentioned earlier, there is [and there continues to be] doubt about the specificity: could it be that the UNU is a big exercise in duplication of what research divisions and institutes elsewhere in the UN system are already doing [particularly in FAO and WHO]? And could it even be inferior because these parts of the system do in-house research so that the research is available in corpore, not only as documents? Something like this must have been the UNU Center nightmare, hence the perennial search for "specificity" [which sometimes goes together with distorted images of other parts of the system, like denying their research capacity]. But that specificity would be destined to be a think tank, focusing on more general problems of a more long lasting nature - a change clearly seen in the program of the new rector. The UN system, and the world in general, probably needs such institutions- although there is very much the danger of elitism and demobilization of people in general with all these think tanks sprouting around the world. Quite another question is how the rest of the UN system will like having a think tank in its midst, even one with a program so ambitious that it borders on giantism on a very tiny and shaky organizational basis. To be the brain of the UN system would put the UNU "above" - and the UNU Center will probably be sensitive to the problems that will lead to.

At this a very simple point can be introduced:
a major motivating force in the UNU Center is the struggle and
c ompetition inside the UN system - as that is where the covering
and sponsoring organizations are found and the other institutions
with which the UNU can most easily compare itself. There seem to
be two ways of getting ahead in that competition:

- the think tank approach just mentioned, being the place where
  knowledge is put together, where the grand overview is devel-
  oped, where the twenty-first century is being prepared, and/or
- the expert/expertise tank approach with the UNU as a big reser-
  voir of experts and expertise in many fields, always making it
  possible for the UNU to say "we have someone in this field, we
  have a paper in that field".

In the first case the specificity of the UNU would be its general-
ity, its capacity to be global and holistic. In the second case
the specificity would be its lack of specificity, the fact of hav-
ing a number of specificities so as to be the only part of the
system able to compete with most other parts. And that competi-
tion is real: anyone familiar with the system knows how import-
ant it is for one part of it to impress the other parts, how jeal-
sously they guard their own territories against intrusion from the
outside, how important it is to have a place in the sun when some
new UN activity is emerging (there may also be some new funds a-
vailable). Thus, it is not my experience that parts of the UN
system are good at quoting each other - there is rather a tenden-
cy to ignore the other parts. And yet there is no doubt that they
work in competition with each other, to impress each other and
to impress upper echelons of the total system.

The upshot of all of this is that UNU activities
may be steered too much by the structure and process of the UN
system since that is the part of the world to which the UNU is or-
ganically related. The UNU Center, in deciding what to publish,
for instance, will of course have donor countries - actual and
potential in mind - but also the impact in the UN system and the
power struggle inside the system -- not quite the same as "press-
ing global problems of human survival, development and welfare!"

[III] The UNU as an isolated institution

The other side of the preceding point is the high
level of isolation of this institution. Just to mention some
factors:

- it is not really related to the universities of the world as
  a university center of the International Association of Universi-
sities might have been
- it is not related to students, the "young men and women from many nations and cultures, working and living together in an international atmosphere" that U Thant was dreaming of.
- it is not related to governments or non-governmental orga-
nizations directly, or to other political actors for that matter
- it is not even really related to the action programs of the
United Nations
- it is not very clear that is has any customers at all, not to
be confused with people just asking for publications

Had it been run by universities, they would probably have been much
more interested and used it as a probing ground and meeting point
for staff and students. Had it had students, it would have had to
be accountable to young people, usually much more in contact with
"pressing global problems" because they have a much longer part
of their lives unlive. They also occasionally articulate their
views in ways that have to be paid attention to, demonstrations,
occupying the rector's office that sometimes may be counterproduc-
tive but also can have a very healthy impact on institutions going
stale. In short, the deplorable lack of students is not only be-
cause of the students missing an opportunity, not receiving some-
thing from the UNU [in dialogue, as it should be rather than just
instruction], but the UNU missing the opportunity of corrections
from students. And the same actually applies to governments
and non-governments, maybe the UNU simply has gone much too far
in interpreting "academic freedom" as meaning "splendid isolation"?

[IV] The UNU as an institution located in Japan

That the very high transportation and living costs
make for isolation relative to the rest of the world is obvious -
and this is not compensated for by having a very high and mutually
inspiring interaction with all kinds of parts of Japanese society.
But attention here should be drawn to other aspects. First, the
Japanese style of doing research, in general, is highly minister-
ial/corporate, which means that the location in Japan already pro-
vides a setting that tilts the UNU in that direction. The scien-
tific establishment of Japan tends to fear students unless they
are completely adjusted to the plans as designed by the Ministry
of Education. And it tends not to foster so much pure research,
and also to be sceptical of free-floating intellectuals who often
tend to become radical. The Ministry of Education and the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs have very much influence over the concrete
planning of the UNU - nothing of it stated or warranted by the
charter. It is very difficult to lay one's hand on this, but it
seems clear that they have a veto when it comes to the appointment
of the rector, that Japanese ambassadors are used around the world to inquire about candidates for that position, there is a high ranking Japanese Senior Adviser to the Rector, but with the exception of the vice rector for human and social development no high ranking Japanese in the UNU. This is actually close to discrimination against the background of a high number of rarely mentioned Japanese secretaries and other functionaries, hard working and indispensable, but anonymous. It would be much better to have the Japanese in well defined, high ranking jobs than in the background. The political implications remain to be seen.

[V] The UNU as a money-oriented institution.

It was clear that over and beyond the Japanese grant the UNU had to raise its own money, and that has led to a setting where the concerns for money have been very much on the surface. This has led to a peculiar combination of trying to get researchers and co-ordinators on the cheap - as amply demonstrated in section 3 above - and wastefulness in the UNU Center, expensive meetings bringing people to Tokyo in spite of poor preparation and poor follow-up, overstretching the capacity of the system. At the same time there is no doubt that the UNU could have won the allegiance of many researchers around the world, getting them "on the cheap" and "riding piggy-back" on universities had the UNU been much more of a university -- the rewards of a researcher being the certainty that his/her research product enters a scientific cycle which includes publication and feedback to the researcher from colleagues and students and others; and that it enters a meaningful political cycle, that it is relevant for action s/he believes in[about the nature of such cycles there are many views, the UNU obviously will have to be pluralistic]. To the extent that the UNU is a blind alley in both fields, the exploitation will be much more strongly felt. As it now is, there is not much (or any at all] space for maneuver between the Scylla of offending donors and the Charybdis of making the researchers unhappy.

It is pathetic to witness how the UNU wastes money on bringing to Tokyo "eminent" people who have almost no contact with the research work in order to advise and legitimize, trying to save money by forcing the people who do the job to travel on cheap flights, discounts etc that limit their freedom of choice considerably. And yet these are the people on which to build - provided the UNU would give democracy a chance.
Will they? Will they, for instance, try to call an assembly of those who have done and are doing the work, with the cheapest possible tickets (or by saving some money from remunerations given to the UNU Center) to get their advice, and turn most of that advice into decisions? Hardly. What they will do with this report, for instance, is to find out how not to learn from it, by the usual techniques of:

- blaming it all on the author
- scrutinizing it for possible errors
- paying no public attention to it but make some cosmetic changes
- filing it away

Time will show. Only one thing is certain: had this organization been operating at the national level with an administration at least moderately accountable to public opinion it would not have been allowed to continue operating that way. Let us now see if forces of correction are strong enough also in this case of an international institution.
NOTES


3. From former president of the New York University, James M. Hester to former development advisor to the Indonesian government, Soedjatmoko.


5. It can hardly be assumed that this is all due to the economic crisis as the fund-raising has been in its entirety - apart from the initial Japanese contribution - a post-OPEC 73 phenomenon. But some of the lack of interest can be attributed to this factor.

6. ibid., p. 74.

7. op. cit., p. 1, "Highlights of the Year".

8. The document is dated 1 November 1979, JVA/CDV; see p. 3.


10. It is hardly far-fetched to surmise that U Thant had something like this in mind.


12. I am referring particularly to the joint workshop between the World Hunger Programme and the Human and Social Development Programme, MIT, Boston, March 1979. A workshop, considerably better prepared, between GPFID and the Natural Resources programme scheduled for October 1981 has been cancelled - for more about this see point (36) in the text.

13. It is difficult to refrain from quoting the following passage where the new rector, Soedjatmoko explains:

" -- our institutional values as we relate to colleagues and co-operating institutions in our international community of scholars. We believe in diversity, pluralism, autonomy, collegial participation, co-archiecal rather than hierarchical relationships, development from below, solidarity based on some shared purposes and means, responsiveness to global concerns and problems not only as we in the UNU perceive them but also as viewed from the specific vantage points of our varied and far-flung constituencies". And " -- we need continually to reach out to more and more intellectuals around the world and bring them into the
UNU's growing community, involving them in our planning, our scholarly work, our dissemination of knowledge, and our institutional development".

From Comments on the Medium-term Planning Process, Sixteenth Session, UNU Council, Tokyo, December 1980. Unfortunately, rhetoric is one thing, reality another.

14. Thus, the former rector, James M. Hester, according to all accounts did his best to stop the GPID Project from being launched, but once it was accepted in no way tried to interfere with its goals and processes and was very helpful when things got stuck in the UNU Bureaucracy.

15. Thus, the structure has already been decided, there is a considerable amount of vested interest (eg in the high salaries that will continually create a distance to the scholars doing the work, and in the contract structure), the institution is still very insecure and uncertain of itself and takes very badly to criticism.

16. This will not be done in the present paper, but on some later occasion. One reason for this is that I want to learn from the critical comments reasons for what I consider unfortunate aspects of the UNU but that I might have overlooked.

17. This point is so important that it is included among the analytical conclusions in the final chapter.

18. See points nos. (26) and (27) in the text.


20. More about this under point (21) in the text.

21. For that a dialogue is needed, also with the evaluators, for which reason the standard pattern of anonymous evaluation is no good: it smacks of a tribunal rather than of research cooperation.

22. No such process has existed at all in the UNU till the GPID more or less has forced some kind of discussion, so far inconclusive, to take place.

23. The standard clause, used for the pre-publication papers, reads: "The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the United Nations University". This should go very far towards "protecting" the UNU.


25. In other words, be "tactful", "objective", no cutting edges, but at the same time fill the documents with all kinds of crises and values as long as there is not too much mention of where the roots of the crises are located, and exactly where and when and how and by whom the values are broken/not lived up to. I would also guess that it would be very difficult to publish anything really critical of Third world governmental policies. Natural science research would most easily meet the bill.
26. The trick, that of presenting the pre-publications, the working papers was actually quite clever from the UNU point of view: they do not have to accept full responsibility yet it can give them some image of being productive. When criticized for some content they can say "but this is not a publication!"; when praised they will count it fully - as they have done by including it in the UNU Publications.

27. From Provisional Outlines, Agreements and Practices on Distribution of Academic Publications, October 1980. The list is from the Table of Contents, sections II, III and IV.

28. ibid., p. 6
29. ibid., p. 7
30. ibid., App. 2.

31. Which amounts to saying that they all had stands on key issues. There is nothing wrong in that, but the general loading is bureaucratic and managerial, certainly not grass-root oriented - which makes statements about inclusion of grassroot leaders not very convincing.


33. Thus, the report from the meeting referred to in footnote 12 above took that much time, and it is merely a small report.

34. Council members are also reported not to make use of opportunities to visit projects, co-ordination centers etc. and get better acquainted. The excuse, that there are so many places and they cannot visit only some but should visit all is a very bad one: make use of occasions to visit as many as possible, then have some extra funds to visit the rest.

35. Whenever the reference in this paper is to "research" it should be mentioned that all research implies an element of training - at the very least of the researchers themselves. For the GPID this is particularly true as it probably had the youngest team on the average in the UNU.

36. This letter is dated 17 February 1981, and looks like a typical example of efforts to bring about "development from below".

37. Art. 5, 3(e).


40. Loc. cit.


46. Something like this: \( C_w : P_w :: C_r : P_r \)

47. Poleszynski, see footnote 11 above, gives good examples of this.

48. My first paper written in a UNU setting was actually about this: it was addressed to the first rector, was a critical analysis of the report from the expert meeting October 1975 that brought into being the World Hunger Programme, and mentioned most of the points that later on proved to be key bones of contention concerning that highly controversial programme. The report was never circulated, was not even shown to the WHF people.

49. This is the type of argument developed in some detail in Johan Galtung, Development, Environment, Technology, UNCTAD, Geneva, 1979.

50. From The United Nations University's Next Stage, Statement before the Sixteenth Session of the UN University on 1 December 1980, by Soedjatmoko, rector.

51. And then there are the old war horses:

"-- the production of UNU monographs providing authoritative state-of-the-art and state-of-research studies on a particular problem or technology. These could include, for instance, assessments of the materials and studies produced at the national and regional level that have gone into the preparations of the global conferences of the United Nations -- " Apart from the fact that many others produce state-of-the-art reports and the naiveté in the idea that they could ever be "authoritative" this means that the UNU should not only tell the whole world what the state of the world is, but also serve as an evaluator of the poor efforts governments do to put together some papers for conferences! One wonders whether governments would appreciate this very much.

52. The correct title is actually somewhat different, from p. 9

53. This becomes particularly serious as the rector is the only person in the UNU system with real academic freedom, as defined by the Charter.


55. From the document referred to in footnote 50 above.

56. The capitalist attitude consists in the idea of scrapping people, substituting others - the feudal lord was at least to some extent tied to the people he exploited!

57. From Some Basic Considerations for the Institutional and Programme Development of the UN University Within a Medium-Term Perspective (1982-1987), by Soedjatmoko, p. 9.

58. An interview given by the new rector in Sekai, No. 426, May 1981, pp. 180-193 - "A Global Community in the 21st Century - In Search of a New International Order" bears this out very clearly. What the new rector presents as his programme is on so many points identical with what GPID is about that it looks very strange indeed. For that reason GPID has to be presented as
very limited indeed.

59. Most of the GPID meetings were subproject meetings, though, without programme officers present. Money was only made available explicitly for steering group meetings of an administrative nature when the HSHP had to react to the present author's resignation: that released funds remarkably well.

60. From the paper referred to in footnote 50 above, p. 16.

61. A new variation of the same theme: the new rector seems to want a market mechanism with competitive bidding; very different from the protection given to the serfs in a feudal system!

62. Tokyo is one of the worst points in the world in terms of maximizing the total sum of jet-lag suffered by participants from all corners of the world -- except those who work in the UNU Centre (but they admittedly also travel a lot -- of programme officer reputedly being away 275 out of 365 days!).

63. This is particularly important for Third world units, and also for the socialist countries.

64. Letter from the Director of Administration of 14 August 1981.

65. One participant in Fifth GPID Network meeting had to leave the meeting because he felt ill and feared expenses incurred in a North American hospital might not be covered.

66. The basic information was made available by the UNU Centre, the calculations were carried out in Geneva. The salaries fluctuate with exchange rates and costs of living. The real salaries are still higher due to the many fringe benefits. Thus, there is a UN housing subsidy which comes into effect if a staff member with dependents pays more than 26 percent of his total income, including allowances, for his rent: after that the UN pays 80 percent.

67. In addition there are four others who receive no salary at all, evidently a very high level of piggy-back riding on institutions elsewhere.

68. This is the report referred to in footnote 24 above, p.10.

69. ibid., p. 12.


71. On the contrary, I have even turned back money because the last contract was too high relative to the base-line, one half of the IUED salary.

72. In addition to housing, such as pensions, medical insurance, allowance for dependants, schooling, etc. - not to mention home leave and frequent access to travel with extra per diems for which some staff members gladly volunteer.

73. From the document referred to in footnote 19 above.

74. Everything communicated in this paper was made public "in the course of/my/duties", nothing is or was restricted information.

76. The rules of the United Nations, that is.

77. In saying this I am not saying that I accept that formula. I think the UNU has done wrong in imposing this contract; I signed it in good faith, but now see that the contract itself was wrong -- which does not mean that it cannot be the right contract in other situations.

78. Cable, February 1981.

79. Out of these sixty became "red papers", with the editing that involved the project co-ordinator in.


82. From Institutional Relations - Incorporated Institutions, UNU/C/16/L.5 add 1, p. 6.

83. From the document referred to in footnote 38 above, p. 1.

84. See the special issue of AMPO on Japanese Transnational Corporations in Indonesia, spring 1981.


86. Of all the things that should have been done, this was the one excluded.


88. This is done, to some extent, in the report referred to in footnote 41 above.

89. In a letter to HSDP of 29 March 1980.

90. Centre for Ecodevelopment Studies and Application.

91. This has been pointed out, rightly, by several GPID members, among them Solomon Marcus in a paper for the Fifth GPID Network meeting. But that structure was attempted counteracted in so many ways, and these attempts were, in turn, counteracted by the UNU Centre.

92. All three examples are from the 1979 report, footnote 41.

93. Letter dated from HSDP

94. Letter dated to HSDP

95. From 1979 report, footnote 41.

96. Letter dated 28 November 1980

97. In a "note for the file", dated 2 February 1981.

99. See the paper by the present author, "Towards Synergy in Networks of People with Networks of Problems: A GPID Methodology", GPIP Papers, 1979; where this particular research plan is included as an appendix.

100. Cable, 21 October 1980.


104. Signed 6 June 1980.

105. The participants were Mushakoji, Issa and Manson from the UNU Centre, Aseniero, Mallmann and Galtung from GPID.

106. The unit in Delhi actually preferred never to sign the contract because this issue was not solved — and they were right. Money was then kept "in abeyance" for them so that they nevertheless could participate in meetings.


109. Most of the ideas passed on as HSDP ideas were taken from my own intervention (and some from that of Ambar Abdel-Malek's excellent intervention) — and I was at that time not even a UNU consultant! Unfortunately, there has also been other cases of this tendency to lift ideas of others and pass them on in the name of a UNU official.

110. These are subproject meetings of the GPIP project.


113. Article VIII, 1 of the Charter of the UNU

114. These modes are explained in the document referred to in footnote 57 above, pp. 14 ff.


116. ibid., pp. 3, 4

117. Article XI, 1 of the Charter of the UNU