"A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF IMPERIALISM" -
THE YEARS LATER *

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1. Introduction

The article "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" was written during a week-end August 1970, and first published in the Journal of Peace Research 1971. It was based on quite a lot of preparatory research, much of it focusing on the structure of the world system. Somehow the article seemed to strike a cord if one should judge by the interest it aroused, although that might certainly be much less due to any quality the article might have had than to its timeliness. There was an intellectual and political need to see imperialistic phenomena of our times within a common frame of reference, and the article was an effort to do precisely that.

We are now ten years later, and that might provide an opportunity to try to review the world situation in the light of the article and the article in the light of the world situation; that is the purpose of the present article. The focus will be on both ways of comparing the two: both an effort to see what can be grasped in the world as it has evolved (not developed) during these ten years using the perspectives implied in the article, and to see how these perspectives should be revised in the light of contemporary world history.

Doing this, one might perhaps start with a very brief summary of some crucial points in that theory. First of all, why is it referred to as "structural"? There are two answers to this: it is structural in the sense that no specific actors are indicated, and in the sense that for the concrete actors that happen to be performing roles in that structure no specific motivation is necessary. The basic
assumption is that the structure (of imperialism) is extremely strong and has its own internal logic so that once it has started operating, it is not necessary for those who are acting within it to will all the consequences. There must be a motivation to want some of them, but it is certainly not necessary to have a complete overview of the total picture. This was an important part of the theory: the consequences by most value standards to a large extent are evil and evil consequences within the Judeo-Christian ethical and legal frameworks are usually associated with evil people. Something is needed to account for the circumstance that so many people not only with good brains (capable of seeing the consequences) but also good hearts (capable of suffering the bad consequences) are participating in the structure. The structure simply goes on by itself, creates wealth for some nations, poverty for others, wealth for some classes, poverty for others and does not ask for much in terms of motivations.

However, a still more important implication of the word "structural" is the first idea alluded to above: no specific actors are named. It is like the structure of a family system as described by anthropologists: the structure can be enacted without being rooted in particular, named individuals. Hence, there is no assumption at all that the structure of imperialism has to be run from the Northwestern corner of the world, rooted in a triangle with the United States at one corner, the European Community countries at an other with appendages and Japan as some kind of honorary Northwestern citizen as the third. Perhaps, this triangle is well known that within this triangle the center of gravity of the system has been moving, perhaps never in the absolute sense of leaving one part totally, settling in another part, but in the relative sense...
of proportionate distribution of control over decisions. Given this, it would not be strange if the center should move again, and one basic point in the theory is that it opens for this possibility. It does not refer to phenomena coming out of the tremendous growth in productive capability and control in Northwestern Europe from the 16th century and onward. What the theory does is simply this: it indicates what to look for if imperialism is at work, not where to look for it.

In doing so it opens for the possibility that the center might be sliding, or even jumping across the surface of the earth, possibly settling in other quarters of our world system.

Then, what is meant by the term "imperialism"?

It is seen as a world system, the primary aspect of which is precisely center/ periphery extraction. It creates and maintains a world gradient, a verticality. To the extent there is a motivation it is clearly to enrich the center, but not necessarily to impoverish the periphery - the motivation would be to control the periphery. The question, then, is how this is done, both how gradients are developed and how they are maintained. At this point there are five theoretical perspectives in the article to be considered.

First, the concept of imperialism used here does not presuppose any primacy of economics. Attention is given also to political, military, communicative, cultural and social imperialism, depending on the precise content of the gradient. It is not assumed that all 5 or 6 go together, nor is it assumed that the process of building imperialism starts with any particular one. On the contrary, it is considered dangerous to tie the concept of imperialism too closely to the concrete historical phenomena of Western imperialism, because this might detract us systematically in recognizing similar and perhaps equally dangerous phenomena because they do not fit the Eurocentric pattern as we know it. As a matter of fact, the structural theory is more holistic in recognizing general patterns or structures and would orientate the search more in that direction than in the direction of
Linear causal chains. Again, it should be emphasized that this is not to dispute the validity of such chains in concrete analysis, but in order to keep the total scheme of reference open.

Reasons for this are relatively obvious.

Thus, the position of dominance and control exercised by the Soviet Union over client countries is one that not only is referred to as imperialistic but also should be referred to as imperialistic. It has very many characteristics in common. But that does not mean that it is necessarily economically enriching for the center of the Soviet Union - it might even be impoverishing. It might even be that they pay in order to maintain a control which is then exercised primarily in political and military terms. Just as there is a center/periphery gradient between parents and their offspring as noticed clearly when the parents try to reproduce themselves in the children, not only biologically but also socio-culturally, there is something of the same between the fatherland of socialism and the client states: a reproduction of a socio-cultural pattern, a way of organizing society, for which reasons the Chinese term "social imperialism" seems to be a very apt one.

Another example: despite of the liberation of eastern Europe that took place from the October Revolution 1917 onwards, there is little doubt that there still is a cultural hegemony over eastern Europe, more exercised in the client states than in the Soviet Union itself (perhaps), and partly as a way of counter-balancing the enormous Soviet pressure. Characteristic of this is the sensitivity to any cultural signal coming out of the West, any new orientation, in addition to the strange, almost perverse, idea of using enemy countries of a different social formation, capitalism, as model countries not only to be caught up with, but even to be surpassed.
And then there is, as a third example, the case of Japan which clearly exercises an economic hold over other countries, not too different from that of the Northwestern corner of the world, but does not seem to have added to this the other aspects of a complete imperialist configuration: political, military, communicative, cultural and social aspects. Japanese imperialism is monochromatic and happens to be, indeed, economic whereas most of the West is polychromatic, fully-joined. Since this is the type of imperialism we are used to, what the Japanese do seems to pass more undetected and even to show up as more brutally economic because the other aspects are missing and hence are something that can more easily be dealt with, in specific contexts. The latter may be true, but it brings out the point and the fruitlessness of considering imperialism as a very-factored thing.

Second, the structural theory of imperialism had an approach to exploitation which came out of a particular question: under what condition would we say that there no longer is exploitation? When the terms of trade are right, but what then defines them as right? The theory suggested that this would never be enough; that in addition to exchange aspects of interaction one also had to look at the "in-the-exchange" aspects, the intra-action that takes place within both parties as a consequence of the interaction. Clearly, exploitation or inequity differs from inequality in being some type of structure-induced inequality. But that is not merely a question of what meets the naked eye and can be measured as the net value flow between periphery and center; it is also what goes on inside the periphery and inside the center as a result. This "something" can be referred to as spin-offs or externalities, in other words, as costs and benefits not accounted for (not compensated for, not paid for). Many of these are non-material and not easily accountable in monetary terms anymore, but that does not mean that they should escape the intellectual framework of anyone analyzing imperialism. Consequently, the answer to the question would be that the total impact of the interaction should be about equally beneficial to both parties, taking into account both inter- and intra-effects.
Third, the theory was a four-party theory:

the center in the center, the periphery in the center, the center in
the periphery and the periphery in the periphery. It was felt that in
order to analyse this phenomenon one should not have any a priori
assumption as to where the coalitions might be formed. The scheme
should be open, also opening for the possibility of new coalitions
not detected before by a theory that too much sees imperialism in di-
continuous terms, bourgeois vs. proletariat, internationally defined.
And second, the terminology was chosen so that not only class relations
in a traditionally economic sense could be analysed, but also along the
other dimensions of imperialism. There is a need for a theory of im-
perialism that does not necessarily only operate with countries and
their subdivisions into classes as building blocks. There could be
imperialism within countries, especially between ethnic groups and
along geographical center/periphery gradients; and there could be
imperialism in non-territorial systems, for instance between inter-
governmental organizations on the one hand, and non-governmental
organizations on the other. This point will not be developed further
below, but only mentioned as an example of how theories should open
for explorations of future possibilities, not be a closure accounting
for a past only, however well they account for empirical patterns.

Running through all this, then, is the basic idea
of imperialism as a structure/process. There has to be a relatively
cohesive Center, there is a Periphery - the exact content of the re-
lation between the two will change all the time, but the form of the
relation may remain the same. There is a logic to the structure. It
is centripetal, vertical and universalist in the sense of being, at least
potentially, world-encapsuring. In other words, it is a perfect im-
plementation of the basic aspects of Western social cosmology. As such
imperialism can be seen as a genuine offspring of Western civiliza-
tion, which does not mean it may not also be found in other parts of
the world, but perhaps not with the same universal aspirations.(17)
2. The last ten years: an overview

I shall now simply set this review of the article as a table of content for the events on what happened during the last ten years, and on the theory as such—starting with the structure itself.

The hypothesis is that the structure is sliding, and more particularly in the sense that the center of gravity is moving from the world Northwest to the world Southeast—a triangle the corners of which would be the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Southeast Asia with Australia/New Zealand. Detailed argumentation for this is developed elsewhere, suffice it only to emphasize that the theory opens for such possibilities as it is not linked to any particular center or any particular periphery. In other words, it cannot be held against the theory that the Northwestern corner of the world has been weakened since it was written. As a matter of fact, a number of strategies for how to weaken it were outlined at the end of the article, many of these being exactly of the type that have been pursued energetically during the 1970s (particularly periphery control policies, with increased periphery-periphery interaction).

However, the theory not only permits this, but also points to one important factor: as it is structuralist it is a holistic theory, about a configuration, and the underlying assumption would be that the whole configuration will tend to reproduce itself, if not necessarily at the same geographical place, so elsewhere. In other words, there is an internal logic to the configuration supported by rather compelling structural forces. And one part of that internal logic would be that it is reasonably undirected, not in the sense of being concentrated in one street, in one city, in one country (the Wall Street syndrome beloved by people who prefer operating within very steeply pointed conceptual pyramids that they try to project onto the real world, in equally steep pyramids of control), but in the sense of an area, not necessarily contiguous, where control can be coordinated and from which control can be exerted. And in this there is an implicit theory of
contemporary history, separating the forces tearing down, gradually, the Northeastern platform of control from the forces building up, gradually, a Southeastern new platform of control, gradually attaining more significance than the Northeastern one in the world economic system as a whole. There is no reason why these two forces should be the same. If the point of departure is a cosmos of a relatively orderly, imperialistic nature, then there could be forces of chaos, and there could also be forces creating a new cosmos. Thus, one might say that the point of departure was, and to a large extent still is, the Old International Economic Order, then comes the New International Economic Order spearheaded by the Third world as a block (at least as a voting block in the United Nations system) creating considerable chaos starting with the OPEC action, and then comes the Southeastern corner of the world using this chaos as a raw material to be processed into a New/Old International Economic Order. The structure is like a feudal society for a center; if the Northwest is not able to deliver the goods somebody else must. That somebody else cannot possibly be Third World countries in general because they are not cohesive enough, nor regionally because they are generally too poor and unable to run a world system. It could be the newly industrializing countries (NICs), but they are located far apart, are not cohesive, do not constitute a center - they are, in fact, only an economic abstraction based on some statistics. But in the Southeast the situation is totally different: here is a shared Confucian/Buddhist/occidentalizing ethos, practically speaking all the production factors necessary and sufficient to run a system, the will to do so, and the patient work of building a cohesive political structure.

This, however, immediately opens for the question of motivation: why should they do it? There is capability, is there also motivation?

The whole history of Japan certainly shows that there is ability. A theory, perhaps most forcefully formulated by the Japanese economist Nakata, of gradually substituting for labor other factors of production, natural resources in general and energy in particular for raw, but then more and more capital and research, has worked to Japan's
advantage. The condition for this, however, has been exactly the same for Japan as for the world as a whole: that not everybody does the same. In other words, the condition has been the validity of the law of uneven development. Moreover, there has been the advantage of being new-comers, of not being tied by the strings of conventional wisdom but having a fresh approach, including fresh factors of production, to production of goods and services and their distribution. The Japanese have known how to place themselves on the up-slopes of economic cycles where value is really added, and they have known how to use that value so that the cycles are not only reinforced, but expanded and deepened. Moreover, they seem now increasingly willing to share this with their dai-ichi environment. So the ability is there, as well as some element of opportunity. But about the motivation, why do they do it?

In a sense the motivation is simple enough: the enrichment of the center—whether it means building strong and rich countries as such, strong and rich allies, or a strong and rich population. From the point of view of the structure of imperialism it does not matter much which motivation, nationalism, elite privileges or a welfare state orientation dominates. What matters is the construction of interactive cycles with highly asymmetric net benefits and to be located in the right segments of these cycles.

Of course there is a difference here between the Japanese/Chinese motivation and the Western motivation then it comes to all the other aspects of imperialism. Western imperialism is more complete, the Japanese pattern is a highly reduced configuration built around economic world market operations. With Japanese economic expansion does not go a corresponding expansion of the circle of Japanese language speakers, dissemination of such patterns as the use of kimonos, kites, or koi ponds; etc. What the Japanese ask from the world system is only that the economic market operates to their advantage. What is at the roots of this may be discussed, but it is probably a disinclination to see the rest of the world as a periphery in which
the center can reproduce itself. The world is (Chinese) more seen as
an entity in itself, possibly in need of being converted, but hardly
able to undertake that process, and (Japanese) as a vast resource through
which economic cycles can profitably be spun.

In other words, the motivation for Japanese im-
perialism is seen as predominantly economic, but that economic does
not stop in our analysis from any characteristic of imperialism as such,
but from a characteristic of the Japanese of orienting itself towards
the world, meaning by that the world outside dai-to-i. There is cer-
tainly a concept of an East Asian family tied together with cultural,
historical and social ties, and when that family was exposed to Japanese
militarism from the Sino-Japanese war 1894-5 onwards to the capitulation
15 August 1945, it may be seen not as the result of Japan being so strong,
but possibly as an outcome of China being so weak, weakened by western
imperialism. Today that situation no longer applies and the best Japan
can hope for in an East Asian context would be a condominium with China,
perhaps gradually recognizing her political/military supremacy provided
she recognizes Japan's economic/technological supremacy. Together they
would then not about dominating the world market, at least to the cor-
ners of the world where tariff and non-tariff barriers are not effectively
built too high for them to jump over (or too deep to creep under, a usually
more subtle approach).

In no way does this mean that there is a return
in the theory to the primacy of economics. To the contrary, the events
during the last 10 years seem apply to have confirmed the significant-
ance of, for instance, cultural dimensions as something very real around which
world structures can be built. It is still too early to see what will
come out of these in this connection, but when the Imam (Khomeini) talks
about an Islamic world, without barriers, what he means is not that all
barriers will disappear, but that they will be insignificant relative to the unifying force of Islam. During the last decade, moreover, both
the New International Military Order and the New International Commu-
nication Order have taken shape relatively clearly, both of them chal-
eging the old International Orders, neither of them with a very clear
center so far, the prediction being that new centers will emerge as long as the search for "international order" goes on. So much for the structure.

Thus, what has happened in the general field of exploitation? Are these new patterns of exploitation, was the distinction between inter- and intra-exploitation a useful one?

It seems clear from the last 10 years that what could be called the terms of exchange (or more narrowly terms of trade) approach is an insufficient approach to the historical understanding of the structure. More particularly, in one of the basic concepts defining the New International Economic Order in United Nations' terms, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, it is quite clear that industrialization of Third world countries is an important part of the total approach, although the explicit references to the many spin-off effects of this are often missing. The point, however, is that not only the ideology of material progress in the sense of getting richer has arrived in the most remote corners of the world. The ideology of the multiple benefits of industrialization and world co-operation, among other things based on periphery-periphery trade, has also arrived.

However, at this point something was not said sufficiently explicit in the original article. Not so much in the article as in the operationalization of the theory the externalities are too much linked to the nature of the concrete goods exported and imported rather than to the total cycle itself. Thus, it has rightly been pointed out that it is possible to be a net exporter of very highly sophisticated industrial goods without benefiting from the externalities in terms of, say, research and education, because that is being done elsewhere, just as it is possible to be a net exporter of very crude raw materials or semi-manufactured goods because the very close co-operation are extracted and distributed into the world market might be highly sophisticated and externally producing. As to the former one might think of the relocation of industries from the First world into the Third world and as to the latter such cases as Sweden (coffee and ore), Australia, and New Zealand (cotton). Thus, in the case of Sweden what we expected might
have been made, but there was forestry science, mining science, highly complex organisations, schools at all levels related to these processes, and so on. And needless to say, these two cases are similar: in the case of relocated industries the spin-offs do not go to the country where the industries are located, but accrue to the home countries of the industries where they have been developed. In the second case the countries where the commodities are extracted are in control of the entire process on local ground and hence able to internalise the externalities (including the negative ones, such as pollution and the various types of costs that come with increasing productivity).

The conclusion is not that the division between the visible and less visible parts of the exploitation theory was a fallacious one, only that it should not be identified too closely with the nature of the product exchanged. In a matter of fact, that identification would be a mistake precisely of the type the argument is directed against: the tendency to identify exploitation with exchange effects, not adding the exchange effects as the focus is on the concrete product moving between countries. The focus should be on the whole process.

But then there are some other aspects of exploitation theory that could be improved upon. In this terribly important—both practically and theoretically—but also highly elusive concept there seem to be two lines of definition or precision: exploitation in the sense of unequal exchange, and exploitation in the sense of "using up beyond capacities for reproduction." Where the unequal exchange definition is concerned there are many sub-divisions, depending on to what extent intra-effects are really considered, and depending on what dimension one is looking at (terms of trade in monetary or physical terms over time, the number of hours on either side that have gone into producing the goods and services, and so on.

The second approach, however, also opens for some interesting perspectives. During the 1970s this was brought in particularity in connection with the one and absence of nature. It was pointed out that when nature in "exploited" beyond its reproductive capacity,
its capacity for renewal, then something dramatic starts happening: outer limits have been impressed. This certainly also applies to human beings: the capacity for reproduction can be destroyed, the ability to raise one's own children, not to mention the ability to raise oneself. Since the unit of reproduction of human beings traditionally also is a little ecological habitat, the family, what is being talked about is exploitation of the family rather than of the individual worker. And since the woman/wife/mother is the one on whom traditionally most of the tasks of reproduction have fallen - she is the one producing and raising the children and mainly trying to make them fit for life outside the family - most of the pressure falls on her. The question can be or should be raised: if the "reproduction" the children and the husband, who reproduces her? Possibly the combination of the absence of a good answer to that question, and the load put on her, go far towards explaining the higher incidence of suicide in women in patriarchal societies than in men.(27)

Similarly, one might talk about countries being exploited beyond their capacity of renewal, renewal possibly defined here as the capacity for new goal setting and pursuit of goals with means at their own disposal. In other words, one could see exploitation as defining the bottom level being which one can go but should not do so, unless harm is being wrought, even sought. It should be noted that to Marx exploitation was an exchange concept rather than a rock-bottom concept: workers were being exploited to the extent that they did not themselves dispose of the surplus value, the surplus value being profits minus that was needed for the reproduction of the workers. Thus, in order to account for the fact that workers are often paid wages with which reproduction would be impossible, certain thinkers have had to introduce the concept of super-exploitation, exploitation beyond exploitation. This does not necessarily mean that the workers starve and die, but that they have to fall back upon an informal sector not accounted for, not counted when salaries are decided upon. In other words, in the "modern" sector survival is impossible; but if the worker in addition can rely upon the support of the "traditional" sector it might nevertheless be possible to eke out a living.
What we are aiming at with this is essentially an opening for how we are understanding the subject of exploitation is. It is not merely a book-keeping concept, a subtitle under the larger heading of economic and social justice. It is not simply a question of the other guy not getting too much of the cake; it is a question of life and death. And this has become even more clear during the 1970s: however defined the rate of exploitation has increased in the Third world, possibly also in the First world. In the Third world even the rock-bottom type exploitation may have increased in many quarters, but this may not have been the case in the First world. The standard of living has increased for the workers, the consequences in terms of life and death have been reduced or are less visible, but the economic justice type exploitation has probably increased above any preexisting level because of the way in which ever increasing productivity opens for higher rates of surplus produced by the workers, but decided over by the managers.

Let us then turn to the third aspect: the quadri-partite structure of imperialism based on Center and Periphery countries and center and periphery groupings:

Figure 1: The quadri-partite structure of imperialism

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

The central axis of the whole theory is harmony of interest between the two centers: this is a permanent norm of the whole structure of imperialism. But what about the other five relations? How do they connect - for instance, is the structure colored, clearly divided into two mutually opposed camps? Or, could it be that it is not, it is not clearly divided and as a result relatively well protected against disruption because there is only one permanent alliance? (29)
There is of course the disharmony in center/periphery relations inside the country, be that a Center or a Periphery country. This certainly does not mean that they cannot both grow together, as they can also both go down together. The disharmony is expressed in very different rates, even when they are both positive and they are both negative (thus, it is not at all presupposed that it is positive for the center and zero or negative for the periphery). Moreover, it is assumed that the disharmony in the Periphery is bigger than the disharmony in the Center; this is the second major axis around which the theory of the four amendments is woven.

As to the rest, several possibilities can be imagined. Clearly the two peripheries can find themselves on the same course; at a distance, but parallel enough to feel that they go up together and down together with the oscillation of the cycles. In that case a natural basis for the moving scenario, "pedestrians in all countries, unite!" will be present. But there are also other possibilities pointed at in the original article: the national war of liberation where groups in the Periphery go together against the Center, and the peoples' war of liberation where the periphery of the Periphery tries to go it alone against an alliance constituted by the other three.

This opens for the possibility of a relationship, a dynamic and dialectical one, between inter- and intra-conflicts. The nucleus of that type of theory would be that when the inter-conflict (between Center and Periphery) exceeds a certain level, then the intra-relations start changing. Those changes are usually seen under the heading of "nationalism": conflict without leads to cohesion within. No doubt there is something to that, but what would happen if the intra-conflict exceeds a limit with tremendous contradictions within systems, what would be the consequence? There is the old hypothesis that the leaders will try to manage these contradictions by stepping up the level of inter-conflict so as to have the first process become operational: internal cohesion due to conflict without. But there is also the other possibility that this might simply lead to a decrease in the level of the inter-conflict through lack of attention given to it, or possibly even because both parties inside the system look for support from their opposite members outside the system. And that the two-level system may be oscillating between national conflict "horizontal" wars (the pure inter-conflict) and class-conflict, "vertical" wars (the pure intra-conflict). In short, the structure is ambiguous and may be manipulated from one articulation to the other.
3. Policy Implications

What is the policy implication of viewing the world this way? Clearly, a basic point would be to get out of a peripheral position in an imperialist structure; a second basic conclusion drawn by many would be to get into a center position. And the third conclusion, if you are already in a center position, would be to try to keep it with all possible means, including military action.

The first conclusion drawn will in general lead to a developmental policy characterized by one word: self-reliance. Not only do ties with the already existing center have to be selectively cut (selective delinking), one also has to rely on one's own resources, develop them as far as possible, individually or collectively - at the local, national or regional level. The nation is probably relatively sure, but also shall not require much stimulus and a relatively petitio-ten ethic in order not to yield to the temptation of selling the raw in order to receive the cooked from the center countries, ultimately running out of raw materials to satisfy Center appetites.

The second conclusion leads to a totally different developmental policy: selective entry into the world market in center positions, starting with substitution of labor for other factors at home, but as soon as possible adding the processing of raw materials and raw factors in general that are not only one's own but also come from, or are located in, other places. In other words: an effort to achieve a center position as quickly as possible, more or less playing the system the same way as the present center countries do. One may say that this is the policy pursued by the NICs in general and the South-east and East Asian NICs in particular.

The third conclusion has as development policy consequence the idea of fighting in order to protect privileges. Since these privileges are located in the Periphery countries, the struggle will generally be in Periphery countries - hence the export of intelligent activity in the post Second World War period to those countries.\(^{(3)}\)
Of these three options, the first one is certainly the ethically most defensible one, and in the longer run may also be the one that pays off. To get into a center position is tantamount to get in quick return, but also quick loses; these are vulnerable positions indeed. To be in a periphery position is, by definition, to be vulnerable. To be neither, selectively cutting links with the system, developing oneself with one's own means, which in most cases would mean regionally in the present world, could probably be the strongest option. But it does require a time perspective different from the other two, and a willingness to sacrifice immediate gains in order to build a more secure position for the future.
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REFERENCES


2. This applies to all the works reproduced in Vol. IV of Essays in Peace Research, the first two editions entitled "International Interaction" and "World Structure".

3. In J.J. Peter Gohin, et al., Johan Coling, A Bibliography of His Scholarship and Publications 1959-82 (Oslo, Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1980), "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" was found to be the most frequently quoted work, e.g., Lack, e.g., p. 77.

4. Perhaps the major need was to have a concept of imperialism that permitted people to talk both of U.S. and Soviet imperialism, breaking down some of the conceptual divisions of labor between the ideological divisions of labor between the ideological left and the ideological right that formed only on one or the other side.

5. For more on this point, see "Two perspectives on society," Chapter 2.1 in The True World, op. cit.

6. This is developed in some detail in World Conflict Formation Processes (CIPD Press, Geneva, 1980).

7. In the Costs, Processes, and Impact of Development Project Ruth Aoki, Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, has focused particularly...
contacting between capital and labour intensive production, making for a production that is both laborious and capital excessive.

6. Japan is neither cynical about global conflicts, using the world as a resource in general, but being time or money on sides as in an alliance framework with one side rather than the other, thereby foregoing important business opportunities — as at least doing so for the others.

7. Some of the rigidity of the Japanese technology is not seen in the individual components of a product, but in the ways in which they are combined — excellent watches with computers built into them, for example.

8. Another important aspect of Japanese technology is the way in which it is not so out of existing paradigms. An example is the idea of transporting both goods by crane, through very slow ocean subduction

9. Then, there is the very famous long-term planning horizon, at least 50 years, that makes it possible to understand short-term disaster.

10. There is the famous Japan Inc, particularly based on the way in which bureaucrats, capitalists and workers are integrated into the functioning system in Japan.

11. There is the other aspect of the whole thing, called the, for instance, Capitalism, Soviet and Western elements. The Chinese would have a focus on Russia rather than Shintoism making Chinese more flexible, more dialectical, but the Japanese are more similar in what they are doing in pursuing their course under prescribed by Shintoism.

11. Japan has been playing on planned obsolescence by others, precisely because when people are sent to the Japanese companies then to lot knowing that the consumers would not produce that.

12. Of course, Japan is competing in damaging by having either constraints in the system, such that planning entity — for instance, complements of economic ones where no us can stand the pressure another part to the system could not have been able to absorb it.

13. The Japanese population and not only the Government may keep cost of foreign products — if the Government is forced to start really impinging, the Japanese population may simply dissolve.

14. Japan has the good luck that it is not so poorly understood in the West, that the West, when it constructs a Japan which is in fact its own, but to conceive of it as real. An example of that is the attack on Japan in Tosh's novel, March 10, 1981 — better than what it used to be, but still very weak in understanding the religious basis of the Japanese constitution.

15. Incidentally, Japan will probably soon back fire from this, by being a major exporter of communication hardware, not only to developing countries, but also to others.


17. These two can be explored in Julian Galtung, Two Concepts of Exploitation (GIPIC Project, Geneva, 1956).

18. One is particularly thinking of the Japanese case where there is a pronounced swing in the whole number of women who are through the reproductive period and large, leading productive effort, in a scene that is integrated in the whole social structure.

19. The impact on World Economies of the II. World in Europe in Europe made very limited use of the concept in their work as in the new International Division of Labor.

20. This, of course, would constitute a bridge between “split and whole,” politics and society, and what can be planned from the theory of reciprocal andslash; and complex national formations.

21. For more on this, see the book by Julian Galtung, Peter Weik and Roy Prentiss, eds., Self-Determination (Cambridge, 1974).

22. This is particularly well demonstrated in the very important works by James Kabe, “Post-War Japan After 1945,” Journal of Peace Research, 1978.