Let us start by formulating four major problems of the world the way they appear in newspapers and everyday conversation, simply as the problems of violence, poverty, repression and environmental deterioration. They can also be formulated positively, for instance in the way it is done in the World Order Models Program, as peace, economic well-being, social justice and ecological balance. Today more and more people seem to stress how these pointers into the future somehow belong together: there is the idea of "peace with justice", or of "eco-development", combining them into pairs. None of them makes much sense without the other. Development is to move forward on all four. Development is peace--peace is another word for development.

One simple thesis can then be put forward from the very beginning: that the basic problem of our world is structural, or political as many would say. Structural properties like exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization have to be added to the problemations not only as an expansion of the problem catalogue, but in order to provide tools for a causal analysis, based on a theory. The theory is structural; it sees the two major forms of imperialism today (capitalist and social), not as a series of deliberate actions by dominance-oriented people, but as a structure, as a pattern of billions of acts, almost all of them routine, spun around the four themes of exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization.

These structures are strong. They have a great absorption capacity and can distort, even pervert, many well-intended measures. So the basic thesis as to strategies of development and peace would be that technical solutions are likely to be either irrelevant, or -- in the worst case -- even counterproductive, partly by mystifying and masking the problem, partly by strengthening the structures of dominance. Fundamental structural change is indispensable in order to create a world in which some of these more technical solutions would be meaningful--meaning both destroying old and building new structures.

Of course there is also the standard package of technical solutions to the four problem areas above looking something like this:

Table 1. Socio-technical approaches to global problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem area</th>
<th>Technical approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIOLENCE</td>
<td>arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>peace-keeping forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>legal approaches to terrorism, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POVERTY</td>
<td>technical assistance, &quot;green revolution&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>international agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSION</td>
<td>human rights conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reporting machineries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>birth control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLETION</td>
<td>recycling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLLUTION</td>
<td>clean production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By and large this constitutes major elements in the standard Western package. ("International agencies could actually be added under all headings") The criticism of these elements is also fairly standard, today – but was not some years ago:

**Violence:**
the approaches do not solve the underlying conflict but deal with symptoms of that conflict – the violence itself. In fact, the approaches may even freeze a status quo not worth keeping.

**Poverty:**
since the approaches do not attack the underlying economic structure the benefits are likely to accrue to those who need them least. The decision-making power will still be in the top of the dominance structure, and that structure is likely to be reinforced because of new dependencies on technologies introduced through technical assistance.

**Repression:**
as for violence, repression (e.g., in the form of torture) is usually generated by a structure of dominance (as an effort to maintain that structure) and like the arms race will only find new outlets if effectively stopped at one point.

**Population:**
the relation between poverty and population is a complicated one, and depends essentially on whether the economy is labor-intensive or capital/research-intensive. In the former case a big population may be a condition for development; in the latter case productivity in the center is so high that the periphery becomes unable to compete but also unable to consume the products since the price had to reflect all the research, development, etc. that went into producing them (green revolution being an example). If large segments of the population do not enter the economy, neither as producers nor as consumers (but only as labor reserves), the fascist conclusion would be to send an atom bomb in their direction. The semi-fascist, also demo-political, solution would be to limit their numbers through family planning. The human solution would be to change the structure, particularly the economic structure, to suit human needs.

**Depletion:**
the problem with these approaches is that they are expensive and make the products even less accessible for the masses of world, at the same time as they create new dependencies on anti-depletion and anti-pollution technologies. As such they are likely to reinforce the dominance structure, bringing in trans-national corporations with world-encompassing economic cycles, specializing in undoing some of the evils perpetrated on humankind by the other corporations, but being structurally identical with them. Like inter-governmental agencies they tend to reproduce world structures, even to reinforce them.

That the people at the top of the world dominance system try to solve world problems with such technical approaches is only to be expected, since they would tend to pick from a spectrum of political options those that do not challenge the structure from which they benefit. That in doing so they would by and large have the cooperation of what above has been called the center in the Periphery is not strange either – that is what penetration is all about. It is also to be expected that such technical approaches will be continued till the system runs itself into some real crisis; it would be strange if the center in the Center should start learning from their mistakes, see the structure they try to maintain as responsible rather than "problems" and undergo a basic change in strategy.
For this is probably as good a guide to the world problemation as any:

Table 2. Relations between world problems and world dominance structure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capitalist Imperialism</th>
<th>Social Imperialism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIOLENCE</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POVERTY</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRESSION</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLETION/ POLLUTION</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By and large we assume, in line with preceding sections and chapters, that the relation is about as follows:

Violence: Most wars after the Second World War are vertical - they are wars of liberation and repression. Most of them are generated by capitalist imperialism in its colonial and neo-colonial forms; but social imperialism is also of considerable importance, being the dominance formation within which the Sino-Soviet conflict should be understood.

Poverty: The political geography of poverty is simple: it coincides with the periphery of the capitalist system, mainly in the Periphery countries but also in the Center countries, including the U.S. Extreme poverty has been abolished in socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, and of the developing countries it is only the socialist four (North Korea, North Vietnam, China and Cuba) that seem to have been able - in a surprisingly short time - to satisfy the fundamental needs of the masses of their population.

Repression: Again the political geography is relatively simple: the periphery of the capitalist system and all over the Soviet-dominate system - making it very ubiquitous. It is only in the capitalist Center (the U.S., Western Europe, Japan) that repression, as commonly conceived of, is relatively low, at present - but even there such forms as racism and sexism are well developed.

Population: The problem is essentially generated by the structure of the capitalist economy, but may also appear in socialist economies as productivity increases.

Depletion/ Pollution: This seems to be a more evenly shared problem and more related to industrialism in general.

In distributing causal connections on capitalist and social imperialism alike we are by no means engaging in the objectivistic game of symmetry, "plague on both your houses". Rather, there would be little doubt in our mind that the key source of world problems today is capitalist imperialism, and for at least four reasons. As Table 2 is intended to reflect capitalism is related to more problems - socialism (even Soviet socialism) being much more rational when it comes to problems of poverty and population. Second, it is related to more fundamental problems since it has proven so incapable of satisfying fundamental needs for the masses in its vast periphery. Third, it affects more people, simply because it is
extended. And finally, it is more deeply rooted, having a history of five hundred (after the Great Discoveries) or at least two hundred (after the Industrial Revolution) years. Social imperialism is a newcomer on the scene, having a history of only fifty (after the creation of the Soviet Union with a strong Moscow ascendency) or at most thirty (after the satelliteization of Eastern Europe) years. In fact, it may today be argued that social imperialism is to some extent integrated into the world capitalist system - the opposite may not even be argued.

In short, something has to be done about capitalist imperialism, something basic. And it is being done, every day, every month and year - so what is now listed beyond is less a catalogue of our prescriptions than a catalogue of predictions about crucial policy areas that will be activated in the years to come. Admittedly, however, it is difficult to draw a strict line between prescription and prediction because of the tendency to predict what one hopes will happen and to hope for what one predicts will happen anyhow. So let us rather stick to the terminology just introduced and talk about these as "policy areas", leaving the question of whether they are essentially predictions or essentially prescriptions for others to decide (particularly since they are obviously either).

To change a structure means partly to destroy an existing one, partly to help create a new structure. Below is then a list of key strategies in this connection; we would claim that they are not picked at random but flow easily and logically from the entire theory of dominance. They fall into four parts: changes in Center-Periphery relations, inside the Center, inside the Periphery and in the global system.

(1) Changes in Center-Periphery relations.

What already is taking place is a certain change from the old economic order to what is referred to as the new economic order. This is a progressive change because it may lay the basis for the next step to be developed below. It would imply such measures as better terms of trade, brought about through producers' cartels for raw materials (the key example being the OPEC quadrupling of oil prices) the right to control natural resource (e.g., through nationalization) and Periphery control over more of the economic cycle (e.g., shipping and insurance and some of the financial elements) so as to ensure that more of the surplus generated accrues to the Periphery. These are important structural changes brought about by a concerted Third World action - they are not technical "solutions". But they do not go far enough and are likely to cause disappointment relatively soon. Thus, improved terms of trade will only touch the top of the exploitation iceberg, the basically vertical division of labor will remain, and so will the dependency of the Periphery on the Center. Further, there is no guarantee that better control over own resources means that they will be used to satisfy fundamental needs of the masses - they could also be used to satisfy far from fundamental needs of the local elites and for national prestige projects, including militarization of the society. And Periphery control over more of the economic cycle may only imply that the masses will be exploited by their own rather than by the capitalist Center and its local bridgeheads, such as daughter companies. This is also true when a more horizontal division of labor, with increased export of industrial products from the Periphery to the Center is added to the facts of world trade (not only to the programs, and not only in the form of transfers within transnational corporations). Counter-penetration, e.g. Periphery investment of petrodollars in the Center is a strategy, but has the limitation of preserving, perhaps even strengthening the capitalist system as a whole.

Hence, consistent moves should be made into the next phase, from the new (or not so new) economic order to self-reliance. In this phase the Periphery would gain total control over its own economic activity, and would decouple itself from Center-dominated economic cycles. It would not rest content with ownership over natural resources but would also process them, in the Periphery - and for
consumption predominantly in the Periphery. This would immediately raise the question of in what direction raw materials should be processed. In the first part of this phase the answer would probably be conventional: in the old direction. Oil would be processed into gasoline; what would be new would be the idea that the Center would have to buy the processed product (and have it shipped on Periphery-owned ships) so as to keep not only the better part of the profits but also more of the spin-offs in the Periphery. In the second part of this phase, however, it is expected that strong movements will be generated to direct the processing more towards the needs of the masses. In Cuba, for instance, this meant, concretely, the processing of sugar cane into pharmaceutical house building material, etc. - not only using it as a cash crop to earn foreign currency so as to buy consumers' goods (for elites) and some capital goods, with the technological dependency that implied. Similarly, oil can obviously be processed in the direction of fundamental need satisfaction, e.g., through conversion into protein.

Self-reliance implies reliance on one's own resources. It does not mean autarchy for it does not exclude trade. But the idea would be always to try to produce a product locally rather than getting it through buying and selling, through trade. The reason is not only that the latter maintains an exploitative division of labor and creates dependencies, but also that it is wasteful. It does not force the local population to ask some very fruitful questions: how can we produce that product using some other raw materials that we have rather than what is customarily used; how can we produce it developing some new technologies through our own work rather than importing foreign technology; and it is absolutely certain that we need that product, or could it be that some other product that we are able to produce can be a very satisfactory substitute (such as very cheap bicycles or scooters combined with abundant collective transporation instead of private cars)? These are the questions asked in times of war and times of economic boycott and they always generate autonomy and creativity. In fact, economic sanctions are probably among the best instruments in the world if the goal is autonomous development.

Self-reliance means that one really makes use of one's own resources, often leading to unexpected solutions, not that one only make use of own resources. In some of the most poorly endowed countries these resources will be insufficient geography is mercilessly asymmetric in its distribution of natural resources (although it is to a large extent we humans who define what is a natural resource and what is not). There is scope for trade, but with two important observations. First, to avoid dependencies this will probably witness a general decline in vertical trade and a general increase in horizontal trade. It is between countries roughly speaking at the same level of industrial development (here simply defined as capacity for processing) that the doctrine of comparative advantages makes sense, for countries at highly uneven levels the doctrine only masks the exploitation that stems from differential spin-off benefits. To pull together with other countries at the same level can be referred to as collective self-reliance - and it is already emerging as increased interaction and institution-building in regions of the Third world (and will sooner or later be Eastern Europe's answer to Soviet hegemony). What remains is only that these regions increasingly decouple themselves from their dependency on the US, the EC and Japan. As that happens the world will witness a gradual change in trade composition: a decrease in North-South trade, an increase in South-South trade and probably also an increase in North-North trade. This may be accompanied by a general decrease in world trade (which recently has grown at such astounding rates at 7-10% per year), which generally should be welcomed since trade very often implies low reliance of own resources, hence waste. Needless to say, traders and countries specializing in trade (such as the EC which handles about 40% of world trade) will view this issue differently.

The second observation on the relation between self-reliance and trade concerns internal trade. The logic of self-reliance, as the Chinese have so convincingly shown, applies equally well inside a country - because the structure
of imperialism applies equally well between central and peripheral districts as between central and peripheral countries and regions. Nowhere is this so clearly expressed as in the Arusha declaration. This is important for it constitutes a link between the ideology of self-reliance and the ideology of fundamental needs satisfaction: it is assumed that if people have control over their own economic situation then they will use productive forces first to satisfy basic needs — maybe at a low level — and then proceed to higher needs. Admittedly, there is an assumption of enlightened self-interest here, for instance that people know what is best for their health — and that assumption is sometimes doubtful. But what is not even to be doubted is that the center of a country, under the doctrine of national self-reliance, may continue, even strengthen exploitation and repression at home — as was done by the three major pre-war fascist regimes. Hence, in order for self-reliance to spread inside the country certain assumptions about the inside of the Periphery have to be made — and we now turn to that.

(2) Changes inside Periphery countries.

There are problems inside the Periphery countries beyond the structure of their relations to Center countries. Basically it is not only the problem of Periphery countries relying more on themselves, but also of ensuring that the fruits of self-reliance accrue to the masses. A good example here is the mental and economic trap of overemphasizing mineral resources, particularly ores. In what direction is iron ore, or other ores processed? Directly they do not serve fundamental needs — they figure neither in diets, nor in clothes or shelter in any significant manner (except for the urban population), very little in health and very little in education. They are important indirectly, converted into capital goods for the production of food, clothes, shelter, etc. — but not in the quantities currently exploited. Much of it goes to the production of unnecessary goods, very much of it even to the production of military hardware, the means of destruction. To a large extent the focus on minerals is a part of the vertical trade heritage that reappears in the focus on the nodules on the ocean floor, more likely to be converted into military hardware for the control of the masses of the Periphery than into goods that will lead to direct satisfaction of basic needs.

Thus, the first and basic strategy inside a Periphery country would be fundamental needs first, and from the bottom up, starting with those who rank lowest on their satisfaction. In fact, this should be the new definition of development: not some measure of average production or consumption, but the level of need-satisfaction for, say, the lowest 20, 25, 33 or 40%. Concretely, this means that groups with this kind of orientation as their political priority have to come into power, and there is little doubt that in most cases this can only happen through some kind of revolutionary process. In the preceding section an image of nonviolent revolution has been given so as to break at least the almost logical connection that seems to exist in many people's mind between "revolution" and "violence". But there are many scenarios as to how this type of change can take place, and one of the more important ones in recent years would be that the power machinery itself — the military — turns against their old masters and makes the satisfaction of the needs of the masses their top priority. A change of that kind would be objectively progressive — as it seems to have been in Peru and Portugal — even if it is not necessarily born out of a progressive ideology.

A second and basic point in this connection is to find some way of dealing with local parasitic elites. A Periphery country will never be able to overcome poverty if something like 25% of the population not only decides over 75% of the social surplus, but also consumes it. These are the economically privileged groups, and the way of dealing with them is, experience seems to show, to deprive them of economic privilege. Under programs of austerity, for instance as a result of economic sanctions, they tend to emigrate to the Center country, even at the risk of entering that country at the bottom, in the periphery. Another way of
dealing with them, actually more Chinese and Eastern European than the Soviet and Cuban method hinted at above, is to let them keep some of their privileges but give them new jobs - e.g., as state bureaucrats rather than as private capitalists. They would no longer be capable of making profit, but they might even become loyal supporters of a new regime precisely because the structural change was directed against the nature of their previous job rather than against their personal level of living. The problem may still be, however, whether a Periphery country would be capable of maintaining an elite of that kind, and whether the elite may not simply turn into a "new class".

A third point would be to decentralize Periphery society, usually heavily centralized precisely because that was the only way colonial and neo-colonial regimes could run it (usually with the capital built around a harbor, with communication and transportation radiating inward in the country and outward towards the metropoles). Thus leads to a politics of Chinese boxes, of district and village autonomy and self-reliance, just as for the Periphery country itself. It also presupposes horizontal cooperation between villages at the same level, particularly at the bottom, with obvious consequences for the road network that should connect periphery villages and not only lead from the capital to the district capital and from there to the village in a feudal fashion. Some type of local, direct democracy has to be developed to release dormant sources of creativity and development, and this would probably have to be accompanied by some kind of knowledge reform, similar to a land reform, whereby knowledge is distributed more evenly in the society. This is more than a question of dissemination of knowledge through general education, adult education and popularization. Like for land reform it is a question of a more even distribution of the means of producing knowledge, which probably would imply less reliance on the universities and high schools in the centers and more reliance on locally generated knowledge, building on traditional knowledge. Needless to say, the Cultural Revolution in China is the great example here, and it is hard to see how autonomy can be generated in the Periphery, not to mention in the periphery of the Periphery, without some measures of that kind.

A fourth point, and in a sense underlying all of this: a higher level of consciousness in the Periphery about how the present structure works, about alternative structures and about strategies for destroying structures of dominance and building structures that serve human needs better. This can only develop as the Periphery's own creation. The point that import of Marxism as an antidote to liberal thinking and capitalist organization only substitutes one type of Western dependence for another should not be pressed too far, but it is important. Much of the Chinese autonomy today derives from their ability to create their own Marxism, so to speak, emphasizing much more strongly the idea of trusting the people (in addition to serving the people). Consequently much of the consciousness-formation in the Periphery will take the form of rejection of Center-generated thinking, and 'leftists' from the centers of capitalists and social imperialism would be wise to understand that they will also be objects of rejection. Westerners, left and right, usually share the assumption that they have the key to Periphery future - an accusation that also may be raised against the present author.

Finally: the need for a much stronger political mobilization in the Periphery. The masses work against tremendous odds, exposed to all means of repression, being highly manipulable, at or even below subsistence level living. A major tactic in that situation would be to prepare oneself, gain experience, and make use of the opportune moment. The structure will always produce crises because of the many contradictions built into it - those are the moments to be utilized as when the OPEC countries made use of the Yom Kippur was to launch their embargoes and price increases. There will be many such situations in the future; the wise tactic would be not to expose oneself unnecessarily to repression as long as the structure is strong, but make use of its contradictions in the moments of weakness.
Changes inside Center countries.

The basic changes that have to take place in Center countries would not, in our mind, necessarily have to be so deep as to warrant the use of the word "revolutionary". On the contrary, they may actually be seen as relatively modest - for if 'revolution' were really needed in all the Center countries the prospects would be bleak indeed. More particularly, what is needed can possibly be put into two broad categories: meaning the Center of its desecnecce on the Periphery, and making the Center keep its hands off the Periphery. Thus, what is seen here as fundamental is not that the Center countries should fulfill their promises to give 1% as technical assistance, or any percentage for that matter, for if a system works badly at 0.2% it is hardly to be expected that it will work much better at 1%. What is needed is not that the Center should give anything, but that it should stop robbing (as when the US got professionals through brain drain with a discounted educational value of $1.8 billion in 1971 alone - the value of technical assistance to the Periphery that year being $2.7 billion) - and that it should stop interfering. The problems cannot be solved with money, they have to be solved through structural change.

Thus, the first and basic strategy inside a Center country would be to prepare for Periphery self-reliance, and this can only happen through increased Center self-reliance. Concretely this means to decrease the dependence on raw materials from the Periphery for the simple reason that they may very soon no longer be available, or only be available at prices the Center will not be willing, or even able, to pay. This is partly a question of getting raw materials from elsewhere, including new sources of energy - but also a question of developing new, less consumptive styles of living in general, and less consumptive of non-renewable sources of energy in particular. Just as the Periphery countries have to raise everybody above a certain floor or minimum level when it comes to food, clothes and shelter, the Center countries have to start thinking and acting in terms of ceiling or maximum levels. Given the limitations of nature it is no longer acceptable that, for instance, the 3% of the world's population living in the US should consume 33% of the oil, partly because it taxes the resources too much, partly because it leads to an inequality that much too easily translated into a power differential that is used, for instance, to intervene militarily. At this point it is important to note that this reasoning is increasingly accepted when the Center overconsumes resources taken from the Periphery. Tomorrow we may, however, go one step further in our thinking and define certain resources as belonging to mankind as a whole regardless of where in the world they are located.

The best way of using all the money set aside for technical assistance may well be for this purpose: to prepare the Center for times to come by a restructuring of the productive capacity rather than to reinforce Periphery dependence on the Center through continued 'aid'. But much of this is also a question of change of mentality, of building on the yearning for simpler life styles clearly expressed in many Center countries in recent years. It may be objected, though, that this protest is essentially an urban, intellectual youth phenomenon, which may be true. However, such life styles may soon become a necessity as the crisis deepens - wise statismanship, hence, would be to prepare the population through early warnings, and by building on such currents in Center culture.

A second and equally basic point would be to find some way of dealing with the Center instruments of direct and structural violence in the Periphery. Quite concretely this means to find some way of controlling the Center machines ready for subversion and military intervention, and the major Center instruments for capitalist imperialism, the transnational corporations. Suffice it here only to mention some key tactics. Thus, the danger of US, Western European and/or Japanese intervention to retain privilege is considerable - and well proven in the
near past. To expose all such plans, to have people inside the intelligence agencies and military forces ready to reveal them, to try to train soldiers to make a sharp distinction between military self-defense and intervention in Periphery countries when the latter somehow try to create better structural conditions for themselves—all this is basic. But stronger means would also be needed, such as denying the military research capacity by stigmatizing scientists working for such purposes, by denying them vital supplies, and so on. And the same applies to transnational corporations: they should be exposed and not only be made more accountable—the worst of them in terms of the structural damage they cause should even be boycotted as places of work. As for the military, their ‘secrets’ should be published, particularly patents, and particularly patents in the field of fundamental needs, such as pharmaceutical patents. In short: the key contribution the Center can make to Periphery development is negative, stop intervening in any way, rather than anything positive—in our present world.

A third point would be the same for Periphery society: a certain decentralization of Center societies. The motivation would be the same: only in smaller, more autonomous units can human beings be big enough to count; in over-sized, centralized countries they become too small. But there is also an additional motivation seen very clearly, in, for instance, the Indo-China wars: for a poor peasant in that part of the world it would have been a great advantage if the US consisted of fifty disunited states, incapable of producing, say, a B-52. Somehow the Center countries have to disarm not only militarily but structurally, and one way of doing that would be through decentralization.

Fourth: Just as for the Periphery there is a need for new consciousness—formation. It is in the process, and has been for several years, at least from 1983—after the US war in Indo-China made it more clear to people what the true nature of Western liberal democracy was like. It may be argued, and probably correctly, that had the US been as effective in Indo-China as the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia (or the US in the comparable case, the Dominican Republic), then there would have been no such awakening—that disenchantment, even criticism, was born out of defeat and would have been but the hobby of some cranks had the US 'won' in Indo-China (after all—who ever mentions the Dominican Republic?) But an awakening there was. More important than discussing its causal origin and its moral character would be a discussion of its depth and scope. Thus, the critique had a tendency to be actor-oriented ("a tragic mistake", "an unfortunate decision") rather than tied to structural analysis of the more lasting characteristics—an analysis that should come easily because the war was about the same even though it passed through the hands of about five different presidents. Also, the Watergate exercise in actor-oriented analysis, leading to the sacrificial demise of a president, also served effectively to block a structural analysis when it was most needed. And finally—not so many people became that conscious of what happened—after all, all of us in the Center, periphery and center alike, somehow share the soot of our imperialistic structures.

The question is how consciousness-rising can continue. Here is one simple proposal. It might help political consciousness if everybody who sells a product has to declare the price composition—simply stating in writing on the product what percentage of the price the customer pays goes to Periphery countries (to workers, to owners of means of production, to middlemen), what percentage goes to Center countries (to wholesalers, to retailers, to the government in all kinds of taxes), what percentage to middleman (shippers, insurers—and how much of that ends up where). After all, we are used to having the most weird chemical analyses presented to us on the bottles in which we buy our mineral water—If chemists can do that, economists should be capable of doing similar analyses (if they cannot, we need other types of economists)—if we can burden a product with that information we can certainly also print on it politically highly important information. Thus,
it is reported that only 11% of the price paid for a banana goes to the producer country (and out of that only a minor fraction, one would assume, to workers)-we have a right to know such things. Of course, such knowledge does not unambiguously translate into any action, particularly since the greater proportion might be the part taken by one's own government in various types of taxes. But it could clear the air.

Most important, however, would be demystifying, sharp analyses revealing in detail how the present structure works-with the explicit purpose of demoralizing the Center, and particularly the center in the Center. After all, there is a difference between an exploiter with good and bad conscience, and it is in the world interest to increase the proportion of the latter.

Finally, the need for a much stronger political mobilization in the Center. Again, it is not a question of mobilizing public opinion to 'give' more technical assistance; it is a question of mobilizing people of all kinds to help change structures-and as a very minimum to prevent the Center from using its repertory of direct and structural violence. This is not going to be easy in the years to come. In general, it is not very likely that the Center will turn in time towards more self-reliance. When the Periphery proceeds via the new economic order towards more self-reliance the changes will hit the Center, increasingly, and the more so the less prepared it is. The first to lose their jobs, as is already seen very clearly, will be the workers, starting with 'guest-workers' and the unskilled. But these are also the first to be used as soldiers, in a military machinery that will expand, partly because its expansion is used as a neo-Keynesian device, partly because the contradiction in the imperialist conflict formation is sharpening. This may create very dangerous situations, for workers would be tremendously useful allies with radical youth, students and others.

Changes in the global system.

The world is not only Center and Periphery and their relations: there is also a global superstructure. Most of this will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8, but in a section dealing with 'strategies of development' at least three key points should be made already here.

First, new concepts of technical assistance. Nothing of what has been said above should be interpreted to mean a total stop to the transfer of capital and know-how from the Center to the Periphery. Nor is there any reason to regard these transfers as gifts-they could be seen as reparations, and not only for damage done in the past, but as some step towards compensation for the continuous damage built into the structure. This type of reasoning, however, is mainly interesting as a way of getting rid of feelings of gratitude; it does not give any answer to three crucial questions: what is the best setting for technical assistance, what should be the content and how can one diminish the asymmetry between donors and recipients?

As to the setting: the arguments in favor of using UN institutions seem by and large to outweigh the contra-arguments in terms of excessive bureaucracy and slowness. It is not only that UN assistance is somewhat less open to manipulation in favor of strong national (US, Soviet, Japanese aid) or regional (EC, Nordic aid) interests, but also that the UN in principle can draw on know-how from the whole world. Multilateralism however, should not stop at the level of the UN (Specialized Agency) Headquarters but be carried into the field. It should take some of the form the Cubans practice so wisely when they invite experts in the same field from several countries, (72) presenting them not with a Cuban counterpart but a 'counter-committee', drawing on their (often contradictory) advice, but implementing it themselves. Somehow it is important to get away from the idea that one
expert, one country, one region or the whole world for that matter has the solution and face the contradictory nature of any social situation in an open dialogue, from which, ultimately, all will learn.

As to the content: underlying everything said above is the idea of increased self-reliance in smaller units. Phrased in different language: the idea of intermediate economic cycles, which is an extension of the concept of intermediate technology. Probably these concepts, full of promise as they are, are now forced to carry too much of the answer to the development problem site - but they are nevertheless pointers to a new future. Here are some of the elements:

- the idea of using local resources as much as possible, trading only in relatively small cycles - cutting down (but not to zero) on the monocycles that span the whole world, and expanding the mini-cycles that only operate within a small village.

- the idea of production without waste, of a shift towards renewable sources of raw materials and energy etc. in order to counter depletion and pollution,

- the idea of non-alienating work and non-exploitative work relations, partly through more labor-intensive economics, partly through labor-saving devices and automation. In short: technologies and economic cycles that do not generate exploitative structures, respect the limits of nature, and at the same time respect the human nature of human beings.

As to the asymmetry: one should search for the type of technical assistance needed in all countries, and the content just mentioned, the intermediate technology and the socioeconomic structure that goes with it, would constitute a good example. Take the field of health: the Center countries have much to learn from the socialist developing countries, such as Cuba and China, when it comes to middle-level health manpower - e.g. the barefoot doctor. But the Periphery has much to learn from Center countries when it comes to intermediate technology in the field of non-formal education - study circles, adult education of various types, and so on. To the extent that the world moves should move towards a higher level of local self-reliance there will be the new technologies, their implementation will be the new idea of development, and relative to that all countries, underdeveloped and overdeveloped alike are 'less developed countries'. So, we are not suggesting a new UN agency for intermediate technology, but that the concept should permeate all existing agencies.

Second, globalization of the world's commons. Essentially this is the old list: internationalize (e.g. by establishing some type of UN jurisdiction) everything not under national jurisdiction (certain unclaimed regions of the world, the oceans, the ocean floor and what is below, the air space above the oceans, outer space and celestial bodies) and use it partly to levy taxes on the users (e.g. ships, airplanes, tele-communication) partly to explore and exploit, to process and market. There are some important caveats, though, partly hinted at above, partly to be explored in later chapters. Thus, the UN agencies still mirror the dominance structure of the world, although less so than they used to do. Hence an international seabed regime might easily become like the World Bank, a reflection of certain interests and certain ways of organizing answers to the world's problems. Moreover, there is no built-in guarantee that more resources in the hands of Periphery governments or global agencies would benefit those most in need of these resources. Often their representatives would not fit into any international framework, neither in terms of form nor in terms of the content of their presentations. And this is one of the key reasons why we would place more emphasis, in general, on local self-reliance than on global institutions: only the former harbor some promise of giving people a say over their own affairs - the latter should mainly help
in providing a setting in which self-reliance could unfold itself.

Third, globalization of world production for fundamental needs. Later we shall have occasion to discuss globalization of transnational corporations; here we shall only focus on the production for fundamental needs. The point can be made in one sentence: food (and water), clothes, housing materials, products needed for health and education, probably also for transportation and communication, should not be treated as commodities. They should not be for buying and selling, they should be seen as birthrights of everybody, like the right to be free, not a slave. These products, like paper for textbooks to be used in schools, should not be seen as something that can be given or withdrawn as the suppliers wish - their availability should be built into the productive system. Above a certain minimum they may be treated as commodities - like the luxury restaurants still available in China - but satisfaction of fundamental needs should be hedged around as jealously as the right not to be a slave - after all, it concerns the right to be a human being. Given the global nature of these problems today the best guarantor of these birthrights would probably be some global institutions, capable of global budgeting, allocation, even rationing - always giving priority to the most needy - and not using availability and withdrawal for political pressure. It will take time to institutionalize something like this, for one thing because it should also be solidly built into our concepts of human rights - but it will have to come in one form or the other.

So much for key strategies, let us then return to the probable areas again to arrive at some judgment as to the relevance of these approaches.

VIOLENCE. We are here in a somewhat ambivalent position. On the one hand there is hardly much doubt that most of the large-scale violence we have in the world today is related to the structure of dominance, as wars of liberation and repression. But from this follows that many of the strategies mentioned above are likely to increase the amount of direct violence, in a sense converting structural violence into the direct variety. By many this will be used as an argument not to proceed: the Third world should not liberate itself for fear of US-EC-Japan counterattacks, nor should Eastern Europe for fear of violent Soviet reprisal. The answer is that the situation is already violent, only that the violence is of the structural variety - and that the conclusion must be as much as possible to use the methods of nonviolent revolution and watchdog strategies inside Center countries to impede their use of counter-revolutionary violence. Even so it is hardly to be expected that the curve of violence since 1965 is in for a sharp drop - rather, it is likely to continue rising. The responsibility for that, however, will in most cases rest with the Center countries.

POVERTY. Here we are less ambivalent: the strategies indicated will in all likelihood lead to considerable decrease in poverty and even quickly. The socialist countries give evidence in that direction, particularly China. But structural change is only the necessary condition for this - it only provides the setting within which new technologies can be put to work. Thus, in the field of food relatively small cycles using human fertilizer instead of depleting and polluting with artificial fertilizer and human waste; three-dimensional agriculture (e.g. by cultivating the seabed with highly extended plants kept vertical through water buoyancy and also tied to a buoy at the surface, to be harvested at several levels of altitude); all kinds of new cycles set us (e.g. combining rice paddy with fish ponds) - doing all this labor - rather than capital/research/intensively. In the field of shelter: much more use of industrial waste for housing material, more use of age-old housing traditions (improving adobe houses rather than replacing them). In the field of health: developing further traditional medicine, introduction of health technicians in all countries, use of herbs, but above all a return to societies that produce fewer patients (and clients) through stress,
alienation, pollution (all of them possibly related to cancer for instance). In the field of education: much more use of the highly innovation techniques developed by the Cubans and the Chinese of horizontal learning, learning together - deprofessionalizing to a large extent the teaching profession. In the field of communication/transportation: the development of cheap methods, e.g. by developing further sailing ships, collective ground transportation based on renewable forms of energy, and so on. The possibilities are many once the structure is changed.

DEPRESSION. There is no illusion that repression would disappear through such measures as we have indicated, but in a world where neo-colonialism, not only colonialism belongs to the past there would at least not be the repression that stems from that particular international structure, for instance in the form of torture.

There might be intra-national repression, for instance to maintain some internal hegemony - the cities over the villages, the Capital over the rest, the local center over the local periphery. It is also with a view to this that local self-reliance has been stressed so much above, in the Center as well as in the Periphery.

But what about social imperialism: It has been, particularly in the stalinist period, one of the more repressive systems in world history. It also illustrates one basic point: there are needs beyond the fundamental needs. There is the need for freedom to express oneself and to be impressed, through communication and travel; the need for work that permits creative self-expression, not merely jobs; and the need for politics - for some kind of process that permits free consciousness-formation, mobilization, confrontation, fight and at least some limited type of transcendence. All these needs have been left highly unsatisfied in the Moscow-dominated system, through censorship, limited travel (even within the country), taylorism and elite monopolization of politics, which then degenerates to fierce struggle between factions and interest groups at the top.

Such a system cannot last. It generates periphery apathy and consumerism, but also periphery protest that will take nationalistic, religious and highly political forms. Sooner or later the system will develop cracks; one of the elite groups may join the people - even the army against the apparatus, for instance. In such moments it is very important that the repressed have relatively clear answers to the basic problem of Soviet type socialism: after satisfaction of fundamental needs, what? If no socialist answers are given to his question (and they do exist, e.g. in China) the danger might be that the system would develop into some type of nationalism with religious undercurrents, as expressed, for instance, by Solzhenitsyn.

Then there are all the other types of repression in the world, not captured by the formulations 'capitalist and social imperialism.' More particularly, we are thinking of racism, sexism and - to coin an expression - agism (age-ism - the suppression of the young and the old by the middle-aged). These are highly ubiquitous phenomena, and although capitalist imperialism has made use of them in creating a system ruled by white, middle-aged males it does not follow that these repressive structures will disappear with capitalism. And yet 'development' should not be permitted to be conceived of as transfer of power from one group of middle-aged males to another.

The general norm of 'social justice' would direct our attention towards societies with participation more equally shared at all levels between sex and age groups, in the family, at school, at work, in public life - including, just to mention, what might look like a very small item, making public transportation in such a way that it does not exclude very young and very old people (simply because they are not able to enter.) And yet - development cannot possibly mean
equal participation of the colored, the women, the very young and the very old, in, say CIA and KG3; in an exploitative multinational corporation making senseless products, or in a regressive university system, however much "social justice" would make us move in that direction. It is very much to be hoped that the energy created by the women and youth revolutions (later on, hopefully, to be followed by the revolution of old people for the right to participate, not be marginalized in old age homes etc.) will make us move more towards more horizontal societies, not only a more egalitarian distribution of the right to exploit others. In saying so the author himself, a white middle-aged male - is painfully aware that such changes will hurt (being a male non-capitalist it is considerably easier to act against capitalism than against male dominance), but also full of hope that other groups could infuse society with other styles of living, less vertical, individualistic and competitive - not only with the desire to conquer the power positions in the society we have created.

POPULATION. Will the measures indicated above contribute to the solution of the 'population problem'? The answer depends on how one defines the problem. If it is taken as axiomatic that the solution consists in reducing the world population (or at least preventing it from increasing much more), then the answer is clearly no. But we have criticized this assumption by pointing to the obvious: in a highly capital-and research-intensive economy with very high productivity in the center the periphery will be increasingly unable to participate, neither asproducer, nor as consumer; in a labor-intensive economy their labor would be converted into products at least for their own reproduction, possibly also for a surplus when combined with intermediate technologies. Since this is the gist of what is suggested above - self-reliance, intermediate cycles, lower productivity - there is a built-in solution to the population problem: another economic system, more similar to what is found in China. But the very reference to that country brings out the point that this can at most be one factor in the total picture - for the Chinese themselves practice family planning, even quite rigorously.

Family planning should, in our view, be practiced, but not as a way of relieving the pressure on our resources - at least not at present, only if the population becomes much bigger. The success of the socialist countries in satisfying fundamental needs gives strong evidence to the contention that poor countries are able to support quite adequately even a growing population once some basic structural change has taken place. But there are at least three other, very good, reasons, for limiting the population:

- if parents, particularly the women (giving our conventional division of labor) are to live more fully, realize themselves more completely, there is a limit to how many children they should have.

- if human society is to continue to be innovative, to create new forms, we need space, we cannot overcrowd the whole planet even if we could feed the population adequately.

- sooner or later the outer limits will be reached - it is obvious that we cannot go on multiplying for ever even if we are still far from those limits today (except, possibly, in South Asia.)

We would also be careful in formulating norms. Obviously, the simplest one would be that from two people should come, on the average, two people - but this may be too little for underpopulated regions about to introduce labor-intensive economies (Africa? Latin America?) The norm might make sense in the Center countries, though, but the basic point would be to avoid any norm that singles out any specific group - e.g. the poor in the poor countries as the group that should limit
their number. That this is demopolitics can be most clearly seen by arguing the opposite way, asking: who have participated in most wars since 1945? who are on top of most of the institutions that constitute capitalist imperialism? who are on top of the structure where most of today's repression can be found? who are responsible for most of the depletion and pollution in the world-where are the consuming 33% of the world's annual oil output? An institute in New York staffed with Latin American, African and Asian demographers exploring how US people can overcome prejudices against drastic reduction of their numbers might be resisted in the US-and the corresponding resistance against US institutes of the same kind (e.g. in New Delhi) was what exploded in the face of the Western delegations to the UN Bucharest conference on population problems in 1974. In short, the argument is not against family planning, but its use as an instrument in the interest of capitalist economics (and to protect those at the top of it by reducing the numbers of those at the bottom.)

DEPLETION/POLLUTION. When it comes to this type of pressure on the environment the package above has a definite structural change that, we claim, contains much of the solution; the intermediate economic cycle. The insanity of depleting our resources and polluting nature and all of us is clear enough in principle. In practice it is not very clear when the economic cycle is so world-encompassing that decisions are made in one corner, depletion in another, pollution in the third and consumption in the fourth corner of the world. The temptation will be to locate depletion and pollution where there is little or no resistance either because there are no people or because they are weak. As we know today that only works for a limited time: people, or nature, or both hit back. Contrast this with the way farming has been done for ages: a very limited economic cycle with the farmer perfectly well knowing that if he depletes or pollutes his soil he will not survive for long. He can himself, see, feel, smell the consequences of ecological imbalance, and generate his own countermeasures, more or less effectively. But we do not have to go back to family farming to generate this social force, all that is needed would be cycles short enough to generate the necessary social forces against depletion and pollution within a workable autonomous unit - say of the magnitude of 10^3-5.

Again, this structural change would only be a necessary, not a sufficient condition (and the optimists would say it is not even necessary, that we can plan on a global scale so that these twin evils are avoided - which may be true but only at the expense of a very powerful world bureaucracy). There is also the scope for new technologies, or for the improvement of traditional types of recycling. The way the Chinese are practising their slogan of 'production without waste' is highly inspiring and would put them very high on the list of technical assistance experts in the field once the structural conditions have been made available.