ALTERNATIVE SECURITY POLICIES IN EUROPE

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1. **Military doctrines: A layman's guide**

Alternative security policies have to spell out alternatives in two fields: **military policy** and **foreign policy**. The two together constitute the external posture of a country, divided into military and political postures. That this division is far from sharp is in the nature of the problem we are discussing. Military posture is an expression of foreign policy; political postures (and this is less obvious) have to be in agreement with the military policy chosen. Thus, to go straight to the point: if military policy is based on possible retaliation with weapons of mass destruction in general, and nuclear arms (later on possibly particle and laser beams)\(^1\) in particular, in other words on super-weapons then the political posture has to correspond to this. A military doctrine based on super-weapons can only make sense if the other side is not only a super-power, but a super-enemy. The construction of the enemy as "focus of evil in the modern world" or as "imperialist in the last phases of capitalism" is a concomitant of the weapons chosen, and vice versa. We are political prisoners of our military doctrines and—once more—vice versa.

The reader will find on the next page a layman's guide to military doctrine. The basic distinction made comes in the very beginning, between **offensive** and **defensive** military doctrines. It should be noted that the distinction is based on capability, not on intention. What matters is what is **possible**, not declarations about the "mission" of weapons systems. Capability can only change slowly; motivations from one moment to the other. As indi-
FIGURE 1. A Layman's Guide to Military Doctrines

- OFFENSIVE (Deterrence)
  - LONG RANGE CAPABILITY
  - VAST IMPACT AREA
  - FOR ENEMY TERRITORY

- DEFENSIVE (Deterrence)
  - SHORT RANGE CAPABILITY ONLY
  - LIMITED IMPACT AREA ONLY
  - FOR TERRITORIAL SELF-DEFENSE

First Strike (Aggression)
- MASS DESTRUCTION
  - ATOMIC
  - BIOLOGICAL
  - CHEMICAL
  - ENVIRONMENTAL
  - LASER BEAMS
  - PARTICLE BEAMS
  - RADIOLOGICAL
- CONVENTIONAL
  - PIERCING/IMPACT
  - HIGH EXPLOSION
  - INCENDIARY
  - RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES (RDF)
  - LOW INTENSITY
  - CONFLICT (LIC)

Second Strike (Retaliation)
- MASS DESTRUCTION
  - FIRST USE AMBIVALENT
  - NO FIRST USE
- CONVENTIONAL
  - MASSIVE RETALIATION (MR)
  - MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD)
  - FLEXIBLE RESPONSE (FR)
  - AIRPLAND MLISI
  - FOLLOW-UP FORCES ATTACK (FOFA)

- CONVENTIONAL
- MILITARY
- DEFENSE (PMO)
- (TERRITORIAL)
- SMALL, AUTONOMOUS, LOCALLY BASED, MOBILE, WELL TRAINED UNITS
  - BUNKERS
  - "SCHLACH" (STOL)
  - JEEPS
  - PRECISION, GUIDED MUNITION (PGM)
  - "RETREAT WHEN ATTACKED"
  - "ATTACK WHEN INVADER RETREATS"

- PARA-MILITARY
- DEFENSE (PMO)
- (TERRITORIAL)
- SELF-PROTECTED
- SUBDUED SABOTAGE
- SELF-DEFENSE
- MAINTAIN-contact WITH ANTAGONIST

- NON-MILITARY
- DEFENSE (PMO)
- (SOCIAL)
- SELF-PROTECTED
- SABOTAGE
- MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ANTAGONIST

- BORDER
- DEFENSE

- TERRITORIAL
- DEFENSE (RAUMVERTEIDIGUNG)
icated in the preceding paragraph: motivations have a tendency to follow capability, not only vice versa.

The distinction is made on the basis of the range of the weapons systems and the size of the impact area. The typical offensive doctrine would be based on long range capability with vast impact area, exemplified by inter-continental and intermediate range aircraft, submarines and ballistic and cruise missiles whether land-based, air-based or sea-based. (To this can then be added space-based). The warheads delivered by these weapons carriers often have very vast impact areas. If they should be highly precise, not in the sense of hitting the target (low CEP) but in the sense of very limited destruction, then such systems might be characterized as interdiction systems and be located in the grey territory between offensive and defensive systems.

On the other hand, there are the defensive weapons systems based on short range capability and limited impact. Just as weapons systems with the opposite configuration obviously are intended for enemy territory defensive weapons are intended for territorial self-defense—as expressed in the chart. Both of them are systems of deterrence in the sense of deterring enemy attack. But there is a question mark for the offensive systems—how can the other side know? The capability can be used for retaliation as a second strike, but it can also be used aggressively, for a first strike. Weapons systems that are only short range can by definition only be used for self-defense, that is the crucial point. A defensive doctrine would be based on that kind of system and would obviously rule out weapons of mass destruction as too destructive.
As mentioned, there is a grey zone in-between defensive and offensive systems. Anti-aircraft guns, or anti-missile systems, when shooting upwards, are clearly defensive of the part of the territory known as air space (and, possibly, protecting land space from the bombs/warheads carried by aircraft/missiles). But, when the angle is lowered and the gun is mounted on a long range carrier (a train, a ship) the same gun becomes an offensive weapon. This grey zone, however, is nothing compared to the negative window between first strike and second strike weapons systems in the offensive category where nobody really has come up with clear criteria as to what constitutes one and what constitutes the other. The same systems may be part of both first and second strike packages. This discrimination problem lies at the root of the arms race.

Another point in connection with defensive military doctrines is the missing fourth category: a weapons system with short range capability but vast impact area, such as nuclear land mines. Or scorched earth tactics in general. These could be seen as defensive weapons in the case of despair. However, another way of looking at them would be as intellectual errors, inflicting so much damage on own territory that they in fact constitute a case of self-deterrence (deterring oneself from using them). To withdraw such systems is not a disarmament measure but error-correction.

Still another point should be made clear before proceeding. There is the distinction made to the right in the chart, between border defense and territory defense. The former is an effort to stop the enemy already at the border. As a military doctrine this died with the Maginot line for the defense of France against the German
attack in 1940—Hitler's armies went around it (and if they had not done so parachutists and/or the German navy could have done the same). But even if the whole perimeter of France had been sealed off, including anti-aircraft defense for air space, the military doctrine would be irrational in addition to overly expensive. An enemy wants more than crossing the border. He wants to occupy and use the country, after military occupation, for economic, political, social and cultural (imposing his own values!) reasons. A much more rational defensive doctrine would take this as a point of departure and not only make occupation hard to obtain, or at least difficult to maintain, but also deprive the enemy of any economic, political and cultural/social benefits. And that calls for defense in depth, Raumverteidigung, to obtain the kind of protracted warfare most big powers try to avoid.

Continuing down the chart on the offensive left hand side we come to the distinction between first strike and second strike doctrines, the former being a case of aggression, the latter of retaliation. One might say that no country today admits to having an aggressive first strike offensive military doctrine. They are all at least presenting their military capability in the name of defense. But even so a first strike offensive doctrine makes sense. There is the old adage that "attack is the best defense", and the contemporary presentation of that doctrine as a "pre-emptive strike". Launch-on-warning and launch-on-suspicion, "use 'em or lose 'em" are expressions of the same basic idea. In fact, there is a continuum between first strike and second strike
not only in terms of capability, but also in terms of motivation behind the capability. It is not only those on the other side, the enemy, who will have great difficulties knowing whether a capability is intended for a first strike of aggression or a second strike of retaliation. The owners of that capability may also have the same difficulty, and waver or make the posture ambiguous.

The classical subdivision for both first strike and second strike capabilities would be between weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. The listing in the chart is traditional, only that laser and particle beams have been added as offensive weapons of mass destruction. Two examples of first strike offensive systems that still are conventional have also been added: "rapid deployment forces" and "low intensity conflict."

However, the military doctrines usually discussed under the offensive heading are second strike doctrines, triggered by verifiable enemy aggression. The subdivision for own use of weapons of mass destruction in "first use," "ambivalence" and "no first use" reflects one very important dimension in military doctrine analysis. As is well known the official Soviet position is"no first use" (of weapons of mass destruction in general and nuclear weapons in particular) whereas the US/NATO position is neither first use nor no first use, but ambivalence. We may or we may not--we decide. No self-imposed restraint, no contract with the enemy, like "if you only attack conventionally, we shall only respond conventionally."
Under that heading four major military doctrines are listed, all of them containing nuclear components: massive retaliation; then mutual assured destruction (which is certainly mainly based on weapons of mass destruction); then flexible response (but this one is somewhat more conventional since the flexibility consists in answering with weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons, depending on the nature of the attack); and last but not least, Airland Battle which integrates air force and army; chemical/nuclear and conventional systems seizing initiative from aggressor and is certainly offensive in the sense of bringing the battle outside own territory. The last point, "follow on forces attack", is not necessarily nuclear as a concept.

If we now move back again reading downwards on the right hand side, more flesh is put on the bones of defensive military doctrines. There is the classical subdivision in conventional military defense, para-military defense and non-military defense. All of them operate all over the national territory in small, autonomous, locally based, mobile and very well trained units. The border is less essential. Security not only defined in terms of a territory geographically empty of enemies but in terms of the capacity to withstand any effort, all over that territory, to use the territory including the inhabitants for purposes imposed from the outside. In this task there is a division of labor between conventional military forces that would be more geographically oriented and non-military defense that would be more socially oriented, denying the antagonist any social gains through not only
self-inflicted sabotage of physical objects (carried out at the minimum level, not as scorched earth tactics) but through massive non-cooperation, massive civil disobedience, yet maintaining contact with him and engaging in constructive action to maintain one's own social formation as much as possible.

This would then be bolstered by conventional military defense using bunkers scattered over the territory, vertical take-off and landing/short take-off and landing aircraft, motor torpedo boats, jeeps—all of this as platforms for precision guided munition (short range, but very smart rockets with passive and/or active homing devices). No doubt recent technological innovations in this field have made this particular type of defense more meaningful.

In-between is para-military defense according to the well known doctrine of retreating when the enemy attacks and attacking when the enemy retreats. It should be noted, however, that para-military forces may not be that different from conventional military defense and also have a social function when really embedded in the local society not that different from non-military defense.

A difference in the structure of the two wings of the military doctrines chart can now be pointed out. The two subdivisions under offensive doctrines, first strike and second strike, in a sense exclude each other. One cannot have them both.
Through a first strike one has already excluded oneself as holding a second strike posture. A credible, very viable and honestly pursued second strike posture excludes a first strike posture. But the subdivision on the defensive side of the chart in conventional, para-military and non-military defense is not mutually exclusive. There are efforts to conceive of them as such. Many, both pacifists and anti-pacifists see non-military defense as excluding the other two, otherwise the socio-psychological mechanisms of nonviolence cannot work. This is not necessarily the case as brought out to a large extent in the Vietnam War where the Vietnamese fought with all three types of defense, including the self-immolations of Buddhist monks as an extreme case of non-military defense. Rather, one could think in terms of a Mix with the three types supplementing each other at different points in space, different phases in time after the attack, and for different social functions.

Then, there is also the distinction between the conventional military forces and para-military forces, the former being "legal" according to the laws of war, the second illegal. To the extent that the criteria are to wear a uniform and to carry the weapons openly para-military forces can do this. They might still, like conventional military forces prefer not to expose themselves openly to enemy attack, in other words hide, and hide well. The dichotomy is artificial and essentially brought into the laws of war to protect occupying forces, in other words big powers.
might be in the interest of the smaller powers to overcome that distinction since the weak can only defend themselves by being dispersed and unpredictable. And it is only by building this type of defense in advance that defensive defense can deter by being credible.

The important point about Figure 1 with the chart of military doctrines can now be made: with the elaboration of defensive defense, which has taken place during the last years, the entire discourse about military matters has become much richer. Not a long time ago there were only two positions. There was a majority position clearly based on offensive nuclear systems, with a majority inside the majority with clear second strike orientation (but there has always been a minority which at least can be said to be no stranger to the preemptive attack idea). And then there was the minority, deeply opposed to the arms race in general and nuclear arms in particular, in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The problem with that position always became rather clear when they were asked "and then, what?". Focussing so much on the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons had, perhaps, blinded the anti-nuclear weapons groups to the much more fundamental distinction between offensive and defensive weapons systems in general, and military doctrines in particular. To try to balance long-range missiles with long-range conventional bombers does not seem to make much sense. Hence, the nuclear unilateralists were driven back to the last position of intellectual, political and in
a sense also military defense: non-military defense. Of course, this was not only due to the lack of emphasis in the debate on defensive defense, but also due to the circumstance that anti-nuclearism to some extent was a position derived from anti-militarism in general.

However understandable this position it is certainly not a majority position in European countries. The majority position is in favor of military defense, also in favor of the NATO alliance in Western Europe, but not in favor of nuclear arms in general and more particularly not in favor of US military policy in connection with nuclear arms (at least not by the present administration in Washington). 11

Defensive defense fills the gap between the extreme positions, and opens for a number of different combinations. Taking the pacifist position as a point of departure the adherent of non-military defense could now add para-military and conventional military defense, because they are non-provocative, and open for possibilities for defense of their country for the majority part of the population not convinced about the pacifist option for non-military defense. Hence new political alliances become possible.

From positions of conventional military defense one might extend the options in the other direction to include para-military defense and an openness to non-military defense as occupation de-
fense, by civilians. In fact, it would be difficult not to open for that possibility as an additional element in a defensive defense posture. Reasons for not doing so would probably mainly be expressions of intellectual conservatism, and perhaps the fear of the military to give too much of the task of providing an occupation defense to the civilian sector (and conscientious objectors!).

But then the adherents of conventional defense could also build in the other direction, even if it is at the risk of losing the purity of non-provocative, defensive defense. An argument could be made for conventional defense in general, with no weapons of mass destruction at all, but with a range far outside the national perimeter, perhaps building on the notion of interdiction defense which, admittedly, is on the borderline between offensive and defensive systems. And he interested in that kind of military systems would probably also be interested in building further in the same direction, including weapons of mass destruction, and postures that would be compatible with a first strike capability.

In other words, the range of options is considerable and there is at least a number of different doctrines available as well as their combinations.

The key question is, of course, which doctrine is better than the others. As usual this is a question of weighing the consequences. By and large I think the key arguments can be summarized as follows, leaving out in this connection the most obvious argument: that a war fought with offensive systems might be omnicidal.
In favor of defensive military doctrines speaks one very important factor: defensive defense is non-provocative. The country cannot attack, it is "structurally impossible" to give a somewhat simplified translation into English of the expression used by the German Social Democratic Party. Hence, whatever tension there is in international relations would not derive from the offensive potential of the country. If there is an arms race it would be stimulated by internal forces, which may be strong enough, rather than by watching what the other country, the defensive defense country is doing. "Die Schweiz provoziert niemandem".

Another strong argument in favor of the defensive defense doctrine is its capacity for real defense if an attack should ever come. A country of that type would offer an enemy out to occupy and change the country considerable challenge. The argument may be made that when the Soviet Union did not attack Yugoslavia in 1948, Albania in 1960 and Poland in 1980-81 this was at least to a large extent because of the reputation all three countries had gained during the Second World War as countries capable of offering a very credible resistance. In fact, Yugoslavia and Albania were the only European countries (apart from the Soviet Union) capable of liberating themselves; and Poland would probably have done so if it had not been for Stalin's treason outside Warsaw in 1944. It belongs to the story that two other countries that were invaded by the Soviet Union, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 both came out of the Second World War
with a reputation for not defending themselves, contributing very little to their liberation from Nazi occupation.

The argument against defensive defense is the incapacity for retaliation. The country could be exposed to blackmail, threats, by the country possessing offensive weapons systems, and not necessarily with weapons of mass destruction, they could also be conventional. This is an important argument. The best rebuttal is probably not in terms of denying that this could happen, but rather in pointing out that this may also happen if that country has an offensive military doctrine or capability. The blackmail weapons may already have been installed inside a country as warheads smuggled in, to be exploded by remote ignition without anybody ever knowing who placed them there. This is the type of age in which we live, unfortunately; my guess being they are already deployed.

The argument in favor of offensive military doctrines would take exactly this as the point of departure and promise retaliation, a second strike, in case of any transgression. As already indicated this might work in case the transgressor is known; it might be considerably more difficult if the transgressor could be anybody in possession of nuclear warheads (for instance), or any terrorist national or international—and the number of such actors might soon become quite high (today, 1987, Israel, South Africa and—probably—India have to be added to the nuclear Club of Five).
Againts offensive military doctrines the argument that it offers no alternative to an all-out war should weigh heavily. The type of military systems set up under this doctrine would not be good for occupation defense. In fact, if that military system is successfully beaten there might not be any second line defense, and the country would capitulate. The pattern is just the opposite in a country with defensive defense where it might take very little to break through the first line of defense, the border—but after that the resistance would become stiffer and stiffer. Hence the temptation to break down that first line of military capability through a first strike might be considerable, knowing that there would be rewards after the first risk if the country has only border defense (or only offensive systems—like the US).

And then, there is certainly the argument against that offensive military capability provokes. As there is no clear criterion that can be used to distinguish between first and second strike capability any present or future antagonist might be in doubt about the intentions, and for that reason prefer to err on the right side, meaning acquiring a second strike offensive capability himself for retaliatory purposes. The result is, of course, an arms race, or to be more precise: one of the mechanisms underlying an arms race.

To this could be added that the offensive system is more expensive than defensive systems, and also, because it is more capital-intensive, less capable of providing jobs in a period of
unemployment. Defensive military resistance would be based on much simpler military installations that by their very nature would be labor intensive, more based on domestic production capacity, and above all less expensive.

What about the level of militarization of the population? The argument can be made that offensive doctrines do not presuppose much in terms of militarization of the country. The systems are capital- and research-intensive, demanding highly qualified manpower that might be isolated from the rest of the society (but for that reason also constitute a danger because they may have their own vested interests). Defensive military systems are more based on civilian-soldiers who are not very different from the rest of society, particularly if para-military and non-military defense are included. A spirit of resistance will have to be engendered. Some of this might become chauvinistic even to the point of militaristic; Switzerland perhaps being an example, Yugoslavia and Finland much less so, Sweden and Austria in the view of the present author not at all.

The conclusion of the present paper is in favor of defensive military doctrines. When I draw that conclusion it is because of the risk that the military systems themselves become a major causal factor of major wars, not because I entirely disregard the difficulties in connection with the blackmail argument. Rather, I would tend to think that everything has to be done to provide an
international atmosphere that would reduce tension in general, thereby making it possible for low-key, non-aggressive political methods to be operative. For this to happen a defensive military doctrine may not be a sufficient condition but at least close to a necessary one. Under the atmosphere prevailing when major powers have offensive military doctrines we get exactly what we have today: fear, anxiety; efforts to justify the weaponry developed by one's own side by constructing the enemy in such a way that he merits that type of weapon; frustrations when disarmament negotiations break down. But why should they not break down when the logic of the whole game given the nature of offensive military doctrine would be against disarmament?

However, the relative weight of these arguments would depend on a number of factors. Some countries are more predisposed for offensive, some countries more for defensive military doctrines. The next section will spell out some of these conditions. This is important because it gives us some cues as to where the real, as opposed to the professed, difficulties may be located.
2. Factors conditioning choice of military doctrine

In a sense the title of this section is misleading. Military doctrines are not necessarily chosen consciously, after long and rational deliberations. They may also grow out of a historical tradition, being built into the social structure one way or the other, or imposed from the outside by very threatening or very helpful big neighbors, for instance.

The following is a list of factors that should be taken into consideration when a country's military doctrine is evaluated.

First, how credible is it that a country can be invaded, for economic, political, social and cultural gains, not only in order to destroy military capability? For instance, it is not very credible that the United States of America could be invaded with these goals in view. The US has four major means of defensive defense: the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, Mexico made relatively innocuous after the US took approximately half of the Mexican territory 1846-48, and Canada also made innocuous through US control of the Canadian economy. The only possibility would be through air (via space or not), but then for military purposes rather than for the other four. The effort to make a Soviet invasion credible in a recent TV series (Amerika) did not seem to carry much conviction, and the agent through which the invasion/occupation took place, the United Nations, did not offer a credible scenario either. The series was a flop.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union has repeatedly been invaded in its history, in 1941 through Operation Barbarossa. Thinking in terms of defensive defense obviously, for that reason, would come more easily to the Soviet Union than to the United States. Historical experience does matter.

On the other hand, take a small country like Switzerland. Up to 1918 surrounded by four of the major powers in Europe (Germany, France, Italy and the Austro-Hungarian empire) attack, invasion, occupation were certainly credible. Since Switzerland itself is composed essentially of German-speaking, French-speaking, and Italian-speaking people the surrounding big powers already had parts of themselves inside a country. Neutrality became the obvious solution to that problem as any position in favor of one or two of the neighbors would split that little nation. Moreover, it was certainly not the tradition in European history that they would ever be on the same side--only the Cold War crystallized Western Europe in such a way that (Western) Germany, France and Italy became members of the same alliance. At the same time it was obviously in Switzerland's interest not to have any provocative weapons systems that could be used as a pretext for a pre-emptive attack. From this a choice in favor of defensive defense flows readily. The pattern that emerged, the famous Swiss Army carried a high level of social mobilization even to the point militarization. For that reason it was, perhaps, not to be expected that non-military defense would play any prominent role in the military doctrine (but militia does). But defensive deterrence has worked, or the experience is at least compatible with that hypothesis.
Second, is it credible that the country could use its military forces aggressively, to attack others? Obviously, to the extent this is credible military thinking would tend to favor the offensive branch of military doctrines. A history of offensive use of the military, if "successful", will tend to be a part of the national tradition, even an honorable one. A change in military doctrine from offensive to defensive will tend to be interpreted as some kind of self-emasculating. At the same time the country may have a "warrior caste" of considerable magnitude, with considerable influence to whom a war is far from the worst evil.

Switzerland has that "caste", but not a tradition of expansion through aggression. Of the other NN (neutral non-aligned) countries in the center of Europe from north to south Finland and Yugoslavia cannot be said to have any tradition of expansion either. But Sweden and Austria have that tradition, and also what might be referred to as a "warrior caste", simply meaning families with a long-standing military tradition. Consequently, when Sweden and Austria opt for a defensive military doctrine they are placing more constraints on themselves than the other three to which this comes more naturally. And they should be watched for any extension of the range of their weapons systems.

The United States and the Soviet Union both have traditions of expansion through aggression, readily recognized by comparing the series of maps of the 200 years history of the United States and 1000 years history of Russia over time. Both of them will justify the expan-
sion in terms of a "civilizing mission" and for defensive reasons, to have sufficient security behind defensible borders against hostile forces. Others might see these as factors in the calculations and expansion for economic and political gains as equally important factors. However, regardless of how that may be one might take note that the United States, given the two factors explored so far, have an unambiguous tradition favoring offensive military doctrines whereas the Soviet Union has a more ambiguous pattern. One possible prediction from this "finding" would be a higher level of readiness in the Soviet Union at least to discuss defensive military doctrines than in the United States.

But what about the other countries in Europe? In Eastern Europe Poland is perhaps the only country with an expansionist, aggressive inclination in some part of recent history. But Western Europe is full of such countries: Germany, France, Italy as already mentioned, Great Britain and—if we stretch the historical perspective—Spain, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands that all were colonial powers until recently (if we stretch the historical perspective any further back it would be hard to find any country without an aggressive tradition somewhere in the past). Thus, again we will come to the same conclusion: it would be easier for Eastern European countries to adapt a more defensive military doctrine than for those in Western Europe. The latter would have to overcome more of their own historical traditions, particularly France and Great Britain—as evidenced by their insistence on keeping an "independent deterrent" (which is certainly offensive even if it is not aggressive).
However, it is also clear that this would present no major problem for the smaller countries such as Norway and Denmark (and indeed Iceland), Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. It is the "hard core", the four big Western European countries, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain that will have major problems to overcome. On the other hand, it should also be noticed that in two of these countries (Western Germany and Great Britain) the largest opposition parties have now on their programs both the reduction of offensive weapons systems and steps towards the creation of a more credible defensive defense (SPD in Western Germany and the Labour party in Great Britain).

Given the novelty of such propositions, combined with their historical traditions and, perhaps, insufficient training in thinking and discussing from the point of view of defensive military doctrine there will probably still be some time before the electorate would be willing to accept the idea.

Above, in connection with the credibility of being attacked, the factor of ethnic pluralism was mentioned. Switzerland was seen as driven into a defensive posture, and more particularly non-alignment, even neutrality, through ethnic identification with all neighbors. What about the United States and the Soviet Union in this connection, they are both ethnically very diverse?

Any analysis of this problem shows how ambiguous the factor turns out to be. In the US the most important categories of Caucasians populating the country are Germans, Italians, British,
Polish, Irish, and Russians (particularly Jews); in that order. Again the argument can be made that there is no experience in history where all these nationalities were on the same side which the US could then favor or be against, with no risk of splitting the population. The argument is strengthened if we go further down the list, passing the Scandinavians towards the Asian and Hispanic elements; and even much further if the Africans forced into the country, and native Americans forced out of the country as legitimate inhabitants, are taken into consideration. Alignment would have a close to zero probability.

Hence, there should be a tendency in the US towards neutralism, withdrawing into itself precisely in order not to split the nation. But there could also be a tendency in the opposite direction: being "a nation of nations." The US could see itself as above other nations, supra-national, not only with the right but with a duty to intervene and set matters straight. Thus, the ethnic diversity of the US would, in a sense, be compatible with the two major patterns of US foreign policy behavior: "isolationism" versus "global responsibility".

What about the Soviet Union? Historically the Soviet Union has intervened abroad considerably less often than the US. And then there is a major difference: the minorities in the Soviet Union of the same nationality as the neighbors would be small, and relatively powerless both nationally and internationally. There are Tadzhiks/Uzbeks both in the Soviet Union and in Afghanistan. But
this does not prevent the Soviet Union from attacking Afghanistan and may have also been a contributing factor. The Soviet Union might have been afraid of some influence coming from Afghanistan into the Soviet Union precisely because of ethnic similarity (not too different from the US fear of Japanese-Americans in the Second World War, leading to the internment of 130 thousand of them). And they are afraid of the Americans coming in.

In other words, the small country would certainly have to take ethnic divisions into account. The bigger countries can afford not to do so, and might even see them as factors favoring aggressive responses to international situations.

Third, the internal situation of the country. Offensive military doctrines are based on long-range weapons not very useful for crushing internal revolts, as experienced by the Shah of Iran when he was faced precisely by this phenomenon and had long-range aircraft at his disposal. Defensive weapon systems are short-range systems and very useful for internal warfare against dissident elements in the population. The way Switzerland has been able to accommodate this factor is admirable: first, by creating unity out of diversity through a federal system uniting different religions and different languages; second, by trusting the population so much that the Swiss soldiers literally have their army guns at home (and are reputed not to use them for violent assault against their compatriots).
In other words, one might argue that only a country that has overcome major internal social contradictions is really ready for defensive military doctrines. On the other hand, the argument might also be made that this situation obtains in a substantial number of European countries. It is hard to believe that the military institution would be abused in most of these countries, so far advanced along not only the first generation of human rights (civil and political rights) but also the second generation (social and economic rights). The point made is simply that this is a factor that has to be taken into consideration.

Fourth, if the preceding factor was about social costs this would be the factor of economic costs. The argument can certainly be made that offensive weapon systems are considerably more expensive than the defensive ones. This should not be confused with the costs of nuclear weapons. They are inexpensive, but the weapon carriers, with the whole infra-structure that goes with it, are not. A considerable national and international machinery will have to be constructed to make that type of weapon system credible. All defensive weapon systems alluded to above are much more modest. They are also more locally based which means that local resources can be drawn upon as is done by most countries when they construct their militia systems. It may very well be that a military doctrine based on conventional but offensive weapon systems would be as or even more expensive than a military doctrine based on nuclear weapons; but that is not the argument made here. The argu-
ment made here would compare defensive and offensive systems, not conventional weapons with weapons of mass destruction.

In short, the general thesis would be the Soviet Union has more than enough work to do within its own borders. The task of constructing a viable and attractive socialist society as conceived of by people in the Soviet Union is a formidable one and incompatible with a war economy, an arms race, once a hostile relation with most of the neighbors of the Soviet Union. There is also the challenge from present and former communist countries diversifying their economy considerably, not giving up planning but modifying it with an expanding market sector (Hungary, Yugoslavia, China). The corresponding peace theory would not be based on convergence (there seems to be no basis for assuming that countries similar to each other necessarily are more peaceful; they could also be more competitive with each other). The basis would be interdependence theory. Neither ideology in particular nor culture in general, nor military postures--offensive or defensive--are so good at making countries interdependent with each other as economic relations. What has to be watched, however, is that those economic interdependencies do not become too asymmetric, with one of the parties exploiting the other which then starts accumulating resentment till the whole situation becomes a source of peacelessness rather than peace. Europe has still much too much of that: both North-South and West-East.

Soviet Union needs a less expensive defense and so does the biggest debt nation in the world, the United States. A change towards defensive defense might be an answer.
3. Political considerations

More than forty years after the Second World War the peoples of Europe, and of the NATO-WTO systems in general from the United States of America to the Soviet Union via Western Europe, the NN countries and Eastern Europe, should be entitled to live without the threat of an impending nuclear war. At the same time anybody who knows European history also knows that Europe is a dangerous place to live. Given this one possible way of "squaring the circle" might be to try to get rid of the offensive component in military systems in order to take the threat away, yet develop a defensive component in order to be prepared lest something should happen.

The question is whether the conditions are ripe for any such major transformation, also referred to by some, as transarmament. The basis for those reflections is actually presented in the preceding section, let me only point to some additional factors.

It is natural for Western Europeans to ask that question first of all of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is now in a major transformation in its history. The transformation is associated with the name of one particular person, Gorbachev. It is probably a major mistake to discuss the politics of a major country in the name of one person. Rather, I feel one should concentrate on the social factors underlying the Gorbachev phenomenon, and they are, in my view, as follows.
From being a country run by the triad **Party-KGB-Soviet Army** we are now witnessing the breakthrough of the Soviet **technocracy**, a triad of **bureaucracy-big state monopolies-intelligentsia/professionals**. The usual commentary on the Soviet Union, that the economy is not functioning very well (although not entirely badly, misery has been abolished and they are fully capable of matching the United States in the arms race) obscures the rather basic factor that education is functioning extremely well. There are millions and millions of people in the group described above as "technocracy", and this is the group behind the Gorbachev transformation. Saying this is not the same as saying that Gorbachev is not also supported by many people in the party, the KGB and the army, and opposed by many people in bureaucracy, and among the professionals. The basic point is that a new logic is entering Soviet society, more familiar to countries in the west: the primacy of technocratic rather than ideological adequacy, even efficiency.

As a result the Soviet Union should become a much more amenable party to negotiations. This does not necessarily mean that disagreements will disappear. But they will be expressed in the same idiom—if not in the same language—familiar to people in the West, less ideology, less threat—more trade and exchange in general.

The old Soviet Union, ruled by the **partocracy**, had essentially cultural—meaning ideological—and military power to rely upon. The new Soviet Union, increasingly ruled by the logic of **technocracy**, will base itself more on economic power, knowing that any
ideological message will fail unless the Soviet Union is viable economically, both domestically and in foreign trade. The new elites want to show what they are capable of doing, untrammeled by partocracy constraints. They want a materially better life for their own citizens as well as a better trade posture: trade is also an act of communication. Like the US they are overspending on armies to the point of killing their economies--above all by putting so much of their creativity on the military sector. A defensive defense posture, hence, may be very attractive.

How does this apply to the Eastern European countries? I think generally speaking that Eastern European countries would be ready for transformations that would permit them to become politically more pluralistic societies by having a system of election with a real choice of candidates (in the future perhaps also parties, although it is not obvious that party choices are more democratic than candidate choices). This development has already taken place in Hungary and seems to be coming in the Soviet Union, definitely to be repeated elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

The general model for relationship between an Eastern European country and the Soviet Union would, it seems, be Finland. Characteristically this model has not only pluralism, in other words democracy, but also a certain social profile to that democracy. In addition there are two basic rules in the relationship to the
Soviet Union: armed neutrality with a guaranteed readiness to defend the country in case the Soviet Union is attacked through that country ("by Germany or a country allied to Germany"), and economic exchange.32

There are reasons to believe that the Soviet Union today is much more satisfied with its arrangement with Finland than with other countries in Eastern Europe. The problem the Soviet Union has had with the socialist countries in Eastern Europe can perhaps be summarized as follows: either the population is also in favor of socialism in which case the whole country might like to establish its own national variety, independent of the Soviet Union (Yugoslavia, Albania, to some extent Rumania), or the population in general is against socialism in which case the Soviet Union (for security reasons? for "historical reasons"?) will have to maintain an unpopular government at considerable economic and political expense to itself, to that country, and to the rest of the world. Finland offers both security to a Soviet Union more badly in need of that commodity than almost any other country in the world, and economic opportunities.

Obviously, the Finnish solution is not only compatible with but indeed demands a defensive, non-provocative defense. How would that work in other countries in Eastern Europe? Armed neutrality has to be two-sided (at least), not only for defense of the country against an attack from the west, but also from the east—meaning
rather unambiguously from the Soviet Union. Post Second World War history seems to indicate that the Soviet Union would be in favor of that type of arrangement as it is embedded in the Staatsvertrag with Austria in 1955 to almost any other relations short of what might be ideal: unswerving loyalty to the building of socialism and to the Soviet Union (the Bulgarian solution?). Hence, if this solution at the same time is acceptable to the peoples in Eastern Europe, to the Soviet Union, then the solution should certainly also be acceptable to the west.

What about Western Europe in this connection? Western Europe is economically strong but has relied on the United States for its military security. Whether there ever was a credible Soviet threat to Western Europe or not will not be discussed here; whether the arrangement with the United States was a rational reaction to that kind of threat or had other goals (possibly in addition) will not be taken up either. The basic point, as argued above, is that defensive defense on the average would provide a higher level of security than offensive, provocative defense. Neither socially nor mentally would the Western European populations in general be prepared for general and complete disarmament. There is a whole military-bureaucratic-corporate-research complex that certainly will not disappear over night and would demand some type of military establishment. They might, conceivably, be persuaded in favor of a defensive rather than an offensive military doctrine but not in favor of no military doctrine at all. Nor would the Western European populations, accustomed not only to a military
establishment in their midst but also to the idea of a threat be sufficiently convinced about the virtues of disarmament as argued by one wing of the peace movement.

But the historical opportunity for a great compromise, in favor of turning to defensive defense in Europe both east and west, imitating the nonaligned countries, has perhaps never been so close as now. There are also good reasons to assume that the Soviet Union might be interested in the same type of arrangement. And if it is acceptable both to the Soviet Union, to Eastern Europe and to Western Europe (with the possible exclusion of France which is building its security policy around a force de frappe for which no disarmament plans seem to exist) then it should also be acceptable to the United States. In fact, both super-powers could insist on maintaining the two alliances as arrangements for collective bargaining as long as the military doctrines of the alliances could be revised. And they could help each other develop defensive defense. And serve as a peaceful setting for likeminded countries.

And that leads to the final conclusion: the time has come to discuss military doctrine. We have, for much too long now been discussing separate weapon systems, sometimes singly, sometimes combined, and not the underlying rationale. We would take a great step forward if somebody could call for a multilateral discussion of military doctrine, preferably under United Nations auspices. All countries would benefit from this, particularly the countries squeezed in-between the two super-powers: Europe, east and west, north and south.
NOTES

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[2] However, what is to the right in the chart may well be more to the left politically, and vice versa!

[3] Like many of the categories in the chart they do not exclude each other: RDF may conceivably be used to get LIC started.


[5] For the Airland Battle see Militarpolitik Dokumentation, Heft 34/35 (prepared by Randolph Nakutta), Frankfurt, Haag/Herchen, 1983 - also p. 6 for a brief summary of military doctrines in general.

[6] At present both NATO and the Soviet Union can be interpreted as having doctrines of that type, which would designate Eastern Europe as a battlefield based on an underlying consensus - clearly unacceptable to Eastern Europeans.

[7] For an elaboration of this, see Johan Galtung, There Are Alternatives!, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984 (also in German, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish, Italian, Spanish and Japanese editions), chapter 5, particularly 5.1. and 5.2 (the latter also appears as an article in the Journal of Peace Research, 1984, pp. 127-39, "Transarmament: from Offensive to Defensive Defense", with references to some of the earlier literature in the field. Most of that literature, however, is marked by a one-sided focus on CMD alone, to the exclusion of PMD and NMD.

[9] Who else would be in a position to occupy? There is something feudal in the whole concept: once overlordship has been set up it is not to be contested, except on the terms defined by the lords.

[10] Thus, the official discourse in the West, dominated by the US, is still limited to the left hand (but politically right wing) part of the chart of doctrines. But the official discourse has less of a monopolistic position than before. The achievement of the peace movement of the early 1980s was not to bring about any concrete political decision, eg about deployment of INF weapons, but to change the thinking and the discourse about security affairs.

[11] As a very rough rule of thumb public opinion polls tend to show about 2/3 in favor of NATO, in the five INF stationing countries (which does not mean that as many as 1/3 are against), and about the same fraction sceptical of US nuclear policies, eg. INF (which does not mean that 1/3 are in favor).

[12] Looking at the chart of military doctrines three political alliance possibilities stand out: pacifist with conventional, defensive military (in Germany roughly the Green "realos" with left to center social democrats); conventional defensive with conventional offensive, against all weapons of mass destruction but less sensitive to the offensive/defensive distinction (in Germany center SPD with FDP?); conventional defense with a clear no first use doctrine for nuclear arms and other arms of mass destruction (in Germany FDP far into CDU?). In other words, the discourse on doctrines may have considerable impact on military politics by filling conceptual gaps. A discontinuous discourse makes for isolation of the "extremists". And for social democrats, traditionally thriving in the middle "die Vernunft ist in der Mitte") this is a much better situation for concrete politics.

[13] A particularly acute problem in Switzerland with the harsh treatment of conscientious objectors. A defensive defense system like the Yugoslav system might be better for this particular purpose. There is the "General People's Defense (GPD), instituted in 1957 and 1958, divided into the 260.000 elite forces of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and the one million members of the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) - "ordinary citizens organized at the larger factories, in urban and rural communities, and at the level of the various federal republics". (E.R. Alterman, "Central Europe: Misperceived Threats and Unforeseen Dangers", World
Policy, 1985, pp. 681-709 – the quote is from p. 691).
Obviously, TDF could accommodate conscientious objectors.


[15] Defensive defense does not reduce anybody's security since it is incapable of being directed effectively against anybody else's territory. However, defensive defense does provoke anybody whose extra-territorial goals are thwarted. An offensive stance is more conventional in today's world; a defensive stance signals a certain "holier than thou"ism by saying both "I am not going to attack anybody" and "I am not so sure about others". Unilateral disarmament does not carry the second message.

[16] "Strukturelle Nichtangriffsfähigkeit".


[18] Of course, a major power like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union or the United States can invade and overrun the defenses in many other countries. But that is, fortunately, not the whole story. No power, and even less a superpower, wants to be entangled for years, months, perhaps not even for weeks in protracted warfare with no clear victory in sight within an acceptable time horizon. This is not so much because of the human and material losses as because of the loss of prestige. Czechoslovakia 1968 and Grenada 1983 are what superpowers prefer; definitely not Vietnam and Afghanistan. Hence deterrence theory has its basis more in the capacity to sustain defense than to evict the invader. The same holds for all the other big-small power relations in this paper.

[19] There are others, such as the superpower need to be stronger than alliance members as a symbol of political superiority; the need to be strong as the duty of a "chosen people" to project leadership; the economic pressures from inside and outside, not only for corporate profit, for something to reallocate from federal funds and for earnings from arms trade, but also to bolster the national currency by projecting strength in general.

[20] A comparison of the military expenditure of neutral and NATO countries in Europe brings out this point to some extent. In 1985 the six neutral countries Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia had an average expenditure of $208 per capita whereas NATO Europe had $371 and total NATO had $ 557 (due to the very high military expenses of the US). It may be objected that this is because the countries are so small. But their military expenditure per km² was 8.9 as against 42.5 for NATO-Europe and 14.7 for total NATO (partly because of the size of Canada). To what extent these countries have a sufficient
defensive defense, however, is a matter to be debated. See Vicenc Fisas Armengol, "Los gastos militares en los paises neutrales", EL PAIS, 30 August 1986.

[21] This point is made very strongly by Freymond, op.cit., p. 527.

[22] According to Dieter Fischer one method for the Swiss (and also for the Swedes) of not provoking the Germans during the Second world war was not to have long range bombers.

[23] As Freymond puts it: "Thus, after having seen the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire, after having lived in safety through two world wars in which Germany was destroyed, France and Italy badly damaged, they cannot help feeling that they have succeeded" (op.cit. p. 526).

[24] A point that is particularly important in connection with Swedish fighter-bombers, and Austrian missiles - the latter given the location of Austria, bordering on two NATO, two neutral and two WTO countries.

[25] There are many signs that this is now happening. Martin Walker of The Guardian, perhaps the best informed of Western journalists in Moscow, reports (The Guardian, February 18 1987) that the discussion between Marshal Ogarkov (victory in a nuclear war remains an "objective possibility") and Marshal Ustinov (to count on victory in a nuclear war is madness) seems to have ended in favor of Ustinov's position. According to Walker, "a consensus has been achieved within the Soviet government that says not only is nuclear war unthinkable, but that the very idea of war as a continuation of politics by other means must be rethought". Boserup and Neild go one step further (in "The Best Form of Defense is Real Defense", International Herald Tribune, July 10 1987): "What is interesting and new is that since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have taken up these ideas that originated in the West. Mr. Gorbachev has publicly said that the doctrine of the East bloc's nonnuclear forces must be defensive. The Warsaw Pact countries declared that to be their position in June 1986. Then at the end of this May they proposed consultations with NATO at the expert level to compare and analyse military doctrines, and ensure that the doctrines of both blocs "be based on defensive principles".

(Permit this author a personal note: In August 1983, at the tenth conference of the International Peace Research Association I was approached by a Soviet researcher very well placed in the Soviet research establishment on these matters. He expressed his frustration at the stalemate with the Reagan administration and asked what I would advice. And my advice was, as it had been for many years: explore transarmament towards defensive defense; call an international conference on military doctrines. He understood immediately. Many others undoubtedly have given the same advice. But the same points, mentioned in a US setting, tend to draw a blank).
[26] For the Bulow-Papier, see Frankfurter Rundschau, 13-14 September, 1985. The SPD program from June 1986 states that NATO should be "strikt defensiv" and talks about "Abbau von Drohpotentialien bis hin zur beiderseitigen strukturellen Nichtangriffsfähigkeit".

[27] The Labour Party approach is simpler:
- the reliance on nuclear weapons must be brought to an end;
- NATO's conventional strength must be enhanced.

[28] Like SPD, Labour lost elections spring, possibly partly due to the stance on defense, a stance new to themselves. Thus, Kinnock in the US (Harvard, fall 1986) argued only point 1, not the more novel point 2.

[29] This dimension should not be confused with left-right as used in European politics - it is a separate dimension typical of US political discourse.

[30] The cost of an anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missile is very low relative to the target; for anti-missile missiles the reverse is the case. However, such comparisons tend to leave out the need for a dense network of defense installations and the logistics to go with it. Thus, short take-off aircraft for intercept, deployed in bunkers all over, using numerous highways as airstrips, would cost. So would man-made forests and other barriers, also well dispersed, even randomly. And yet the savings should be considerable, although there are obvious arms manufacturer interests in seeing to it that this is not the case.

[31] The general rule is probably that no other country should introduce such measures before the fatherland of socialism does so. Like all rules this one has an exception: Hungary. Why Hungary is the exception is interesting. Neither Slav, nor Orthodox?

[32] It should be noted that the Soviet-Finnish treaty will soon celebrate its fortieth anniversary - a sign that it has stood the test of time given the very high level of support for the treaty in the Finnish public, and for the Soviet Union as a "friend". Which brings up the obvious point that alternative security politics is much more than alternative defense: for instance, reduction of the role of the superpowers through processes of decoupling from them; a higher level of economic, political etc. self-reliance and in general cooperative relations in all directions (in the view of the present author, as spelt out in There Are Alternatives!)