EDUCATIONAL DISPARITIES, WORLD POLITICS AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

By

Johan Galtung

Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, UN University
Institut universitaire d'études du développement, Geneva

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1. An empirical point of departure

Some years ago a study was carried out for the UNESCO on the relationship between educational growth and educational disparity. The definition of "education" was very conventional; it was actually not education but schooling, and the level of schooling was defined in terms of the scale used by the Office of Statistics of UNESCO: no schooling, primary incomplete, primary complete, entered first cycle of secondary, entered second cycle of secondary, post secondary. The definition of "educational growth" (of a country) was the median level attained (by the population 25+, or by the cohort 25-34 years of age) on this "scale" from 1 to 6. And the definition of "educational disparity" was the distance in level of schooling, on this scale, between the top and bottom 25%, the top 5% and the bottom 50% and the top 5% and the bottom 10%. Data from 86 countries with more than 100,000 inhabitants were used for the study. What were the findings? Simply this:

"-- the higher the educational growth, the higher the disparity. Countries with high educational growth show high educational disparity, and countries with low educational growth show low educational disparity -- to some extent because they have illiteracy. The conclusion holds for all three measures of disparity, and is not affected by switching from one age group within the population to another. In other words: educational growth as it is known in the world today does not lead to educational equality".

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So much for the relation within countries, the general finding being that as the population as a whole gets more schooling the distance between the high and the low in education increases. Of course, there is more distance between the PhD and the illiterate in a developing country than between the PhD and a primary school graduate in a developed country. But whereas there are not enough people with a tertiary education in an LDC to be captured by measures in terms of 5%, not to mention 25%, they constitute already a well-sized minority in many MDCs. True, almost everybody in an MDC gets through the lower rungs on the ladder; but then more and more also get up to the upper rungs — and even extend the ladder, building new rungs (for themselves and their offspring). But what is the corresponding situation among countries?

"What happens right now seems rather to be that the countries left behind by and large are trailing behind at a snail's pace, along the same track where at the moment the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are in leading positions (together with some others). For every move the bottom countries make (for instance, by making primary education obligatory in practice, not only in theory, or by having some small expansion at the secondary and tertiary levels), the top countries would move even more, into concepts of life-long education, practically speaking obligatory secondary education, tertiary education for more than half of the cohort, and quaternary education for a sizeable fraction of the population".

At the time of writing we do not have available a comparison between the 1960 and 1970 census data to see whether and to what extent there is increasing disparity between countries, but we take this almost for granted. In other words, the general pic-
ture that emerges is that of a **schooling explosion**, starting a century or two ago as the idea of obligatory (and for that reason free) schooling started taking roots in many countries. How it all ends we do not know, but at present the explosion is still in the stage with some particles (the most schooled in the countries with most schooling) being catapulted above all others, with the most schooled countries and individuals increasingly distant from the less schooled countries and individuals. This is the image: disparity, and increasingly so, with a small educational elite in the LDCs at the schooling level of a not-so-small elite in the MDCs, both of them - and increasingly so - distant from their respective populations, but particularly the sometimes miniscule LDC educational elites given the distance down to no schooling at all, to illiteracy.

2. The relation to world politics

Have we not heard this story about increasing gaps before? Of course, it is the standard story of "development" when expressed in economic terms; all one has to do is to substitute for "schooling" the term "income" or its equivalents. There is a difference, though: although there is increasing disparity between MDCs and LDCs in economic terms, and within the LDCs, this may not be the case in the MDCs. There is a tradition of economic sharing by taking from the high and giving to the low, through taxation and
welfare state practices not found in the field of schooling. The reason for this, of course, is not that schooling is something one is, not something one has, and hence untaxable, even indelible; there could be a ceiling on years or levels of schooling just as there can be a ceiling on income (a ceiling on education, however, would be as meaningless as a ceiling on personal spiritual wealth). Why is there no such ceiling, except for the maximum posed by the expected life span of the person? - probably because those who might be hit by such ceilings have the power to impose or not impose them - and understandably would prefer not to even to put the question on the agenda. It should be noted that it was the pressure from the dispossessed in economic terms that led to progressive taxation; the dispossessed in educational terms would have to get organized first - and that will not happen as long as the school gates remain relatively open to those most likely to be their leaders.

Before moving on it should be mentioned that in the field of health the situation is actually quite different: there is decreasing disparity, both between countries (eg., as measured in terms of life span lived) and within countries (using the same percentile measures as above). The higher the average life span
in a country, the shorter the distance in number of years lived between the top a% and the bottom b% - for a very wide range of a and b, it seems. Why? Because there is some kind of upper limit to life span - at least with our present level of knowledge, and with the exception of some particularly long lived groups. The MDCs in health are pushing against that limit, so much so that the less privileged are being pushed towards the more privileged. There may also be an upper limit to level of schooling but we are far away from it; and there is no known upper limit to income, except the limits set by the society itself.

Thus, the conclusion is that at present there is a very high level of isomorphism between income and schooling. Both of them can be used as individual property, as something an individual has; and can be discussed at the level of the country, both in per capita terms and in disparity terms. More significantly, the distributions of these goods are relatively similar, and so are the processes these distributions are undergoing over time - in global and very gross terms. And most importantly: these are not formal similarities but substantive relations: there is an intrinsic relationship between income and schooling, between economy and education.

That relationship can now be discussed in two ways that do not quite exclude each other, but they yield very different
One approach would be to see it as a bivariate relationship and study, synchronically and diachronically, how the two correlate with each other. The diachronic study of this relation is always interesting as it will give insight in the relationship over time of these two important components in the syndrome of development: what happens if education growth comes before, parallel to, or after economic growth? The synchronic study, however, is less interesting: we are informed how much richer, on the average, is a country X time more educated than an other country - but not about how this happened, and why.

The other approach would be to see the distributions of income and schooling as two different expressions of the same phenomenon, and try to come to grips with that phenomenon - the way medical diagnosis would proceed on the basis of two symptoms, not being much interested in how much one symptom is related to the other, not exploring causal relations between them. In fact, that type of research would impede rather effectively any search for the underlying common factor, in casu the disease.

One simple theory that has the advantage of being compatible with the empirical point of departure would be as follows.
Since the Great Discoveries world politics has been dominated by the West. Which part of the West has varied through the centuries and there have been internal conflicts in the West over where in the West the world center should be located, but the Western dominance is a major historic fact. That dominance has been exercised through a particular Western innovation: a formula of cooperation between state and corporation, both of them vertical, hierarchically constructed structures, with bureaucrat and capitalist on the top. Roughly speaking the cooperation is simply this: the state takes care of the infrastructure, including the military operations to secure raw materials and markets and the roads back and forth and the police operations to keep the masses at bay; the corporations set up economic cycles in such a way the West is enriched, particularly the center in the Western Center. The corporations have to pay taxes to the state, the state offers protection to the corporations. As the state grows richer they can also offer more: they can place orders for products the corporations can deliver and not only when business is slack; ultimately the state can guarantee survival beyond bankruptcy. Recently the role of the state in trying to solve the many problems created by the corporations (environmental degradation, unemployment) has become more pronounced; the state may then ask for more than taxes in return, they may take over the whole
corporation (and the corporation may ask them to do so!).

That this formula has proved extremely effective in making the West rich is well known; it has also been effective in keeping other parts of the world poor by peripherizing them -- until recently when decolonization at least loosened the grip the Western states had directly on its colonies, including the power to exact taxes (but as decolonization proceeded, the West compensated through tremendous growth in the transnational corporation, paralleled by a growth in intergovernmental cooperation, such as the EC, the OECD, the Trilateral Commission, etc.). But what does this have to do with the relation between income and schooling, between getting rich and getting educated?

The relation is probably less intrinsic than one might be led to believe. The thesis is simply this: the state-corporation alliance, when operating globally, is instrumental in making its center rich and it tends to be staffed by people with higher education; consequently, the two phenomena are found together. But we shall not assume that intellectuals are that indispensable in running a state and in running a corporation, although well educated people may tend to believe this. On the contrary, in earlier ages both were to a large extent run by (lower) nobility -- and one might have been led to speculate how the nobility is able to enrich itself and
how rich people are able to get into (by buying titles?) the nobility.

Of course, there are reasons why bureaucrats and corporations both tend to be staffed by intellectuals. For one, as they grow very big and handle global problems, abstraction and generalization become necessary; things cannot be handled on a person-to-person or case-to-case basis. Intellectuals are specialists in this. Second, there are some more specific technical skills, often associated with the term research, that have been useful — although the basic relationship between and within countries existed much before research became a part of the game. Third, and perhaps most importantly: these were positions of power and privilege. They should not be open to all, yet they should not be closed to anybody under the doctrines of liberalism and democracy. What could suit this better than a system of schooling organized as a set of filters to be passed, if the filters could be organized in such a way that only the right people got through? The new nobility, like a mandarinate, in principle open, yet so selective one might want by instituting one more filter on top of the already existing ones, emerges, and quickly so.

So intellectuals started occupying these positions, pushing out, gradually, those who based their claim to such positions on birth and/or money. And in the background were the universities
and other centers of higher learning and study, the breeding ground for the other two, balancing between that role and the role as independent institution. For some reason politics in these Western countries even tended to become mystified to the point that it was/is considered more leftist for an intellectual to work for/be in favor of the state, more rightist if the leaning is towards the corporation. This is important, because it goes a far distance towards explaining why the state/corporation alliance has been able to command the allegiance of so many intellectuals: there is something for any political taste (even mixed institutions for the people in the center politically), and there are the universities/academies/think tanks to withdraw to. Of course, we are not insisting that all intellectuals without exception are employed by the state, the corporations and/or the universities etc. -there are also the free professions - but most of them are.

Thus, we see the growth of "education" as intrinsically linked to the growth of the state and corporation machineries according to the Western model. This growth is today often identified as "modernization" ("nation-state building"), and seen as a necessary (some may say sufficient) condition for development. As both states and corporations are organized hierarchically the schooling systems fit them perfectly: it delivers people in layers, prima-
ry, secondary and tertiary, that can be fitted into the levels of
the organizations, with the mail clerks and sales girls at the bot-
tom and the business school graduates at the top of either. As they
expand the education system has to expand, and vice versa; which is
a much more important thesis. To understand the future of schooling
one has to have some ideas about the future of these two particular
institutions, the state and the corporation.

As they operate today, with the centers by and large
in the West (and in Japan) what is needed in the Third world is only
what is needed to staff the bridge-heads -- from a Western point of
view. A totally subservient LDC would have the intellectuals needed
for the state organization to play the role given it by states in
the West, eg., in terms of preparing infrastructure, suppressing re-
bellion, etc. And it would have corporations that more or less
openly would be the daughter companies of corporations with head-
quarters in the West. The jobs to be done would be routine jobs,
in either branch of the state/corporation alliance; hence, not much
would be needed in terms of creative intell igentsia - it would ra-
ther be a question of receptive, imitative and obedient intelligent-
sia. What is produced by local or foreign institutions for higher
education in excess of this demand would either go into brain drain
or into the fields, the forests, the mountains as guerrillas.
As this global system grows the following will happen:

(1) in the center countries more and more people will try to make use of schooling to get into these positions, which are materially non-productive, but non-materially interesting and well rewarded in terms of power and privilege;

(2) as these positions nevertheless are scarce the schooling gaps, as well as the power and privilege gaps (but not the income gaps, and certainly not the health gaps) inside the center countries will grow;

(3) in the periphery countries there will be a tremendous pressure on these positions which will remain scarce, for which reason the channels of higher (or highest) education will be well controlled so that not too many will be eligible;

(4) the gaps between those who make it and those who do not will increase, particularly as those who "make it" will have the center in the Center countries as their models both where schooling level and level of power and privilege are concerned.

All of this is consistent with the data, up till now. Moreover, it is quite consistent with the strong relation between income and schooling, both at the individual and at the country levels. It is, however, rather obvious. It only becomes really significant analytically, and indeed also practically, when the boat is rocked, when something happens to this system. And there is something happening: there is a range of phenomena conveniently lumped together under the formula the New International Economic Order; there are third world countries that are not subservient.

3. Enter the New International Economic Order.

The NIEO definitely has to do with the creation of strong state/corporation alliances in the Third world, capable of holding their own against the Western center. NIEO does not stand for sub-imperialism; it may show up to stand for the imperialism of
strong third world countries relative to the weaker ones, but is not as NIEO subservient to Western powers. What those stronger state/corporation alliances will do is quite clear, historically obvious, and absolutely in line with any principle of elementary international justice: get the power to control the economic activity inside the third world country, increase the level of exchange between third world countries, and as to the trade with the first world: improve the terms of trade, and change the composition of the trade, away from the colonial formula of commodity export, manufacture import. These three aspects of NIEO are intimately related, as can readily be seen. The intrinsic need for intellectuals to carry out all this may not be so high; the need for power vested in states and corporations is considerable and they have to be staffed, presumably by people with higher education. Consequently, there are going to be more openings for people with higher education in these countries. The third world elites will expand in size. What will happen to the first world and to the third world masses?

To start with the first world: it is very difficult to believe that all of this can happen without even more serious economic problems than the first world is experiencing at present. This means that the economic basis for maintaining a large, materially non-productive elite will shrink. In all probability that elite
will do what elites usually do: try to keep its positions, laying off other people (workers) instead. This will increase the pressure on institutions of higher education since parents, and students as well, will see that education is more than the gateway to power and privilege, it may also be the gateway to job security in economically not very secure periods. More importantly, the state/corporation alliances will search for new outlets for their tremendous energies and capacities. A number of people with higher education training will be in search of administration-intensive, capital-intensive and research-intensive things to do, since only these things, and only when they look socially indispensable enough, will legitimize their position in power, or their having any position at all in times of heavy unemployment.

In other words, from a situation where means of production that are administration-, capital- and research-intensive call for a certain mode of production with bureaucrats, capitalists and researchers on top we are getting into a situation where that mode of production, that intellectual-heavy social structure calls for continued, even increased use of those means of production. If the third world raw material supply is dwindling (because they process themselves) and the markets are closing (because they supply
then themselves), then that entire structure has to turn on the first world itself. This is the period where nuclear energy will be expanding, not as a solution to any energy problem (except in some places), but as a solution to the problem of intellectual power elites threatened by decentralizing, administration-, capital- and research-extensive energy schemes (solar, wind and wave, geo-thermal, biogas and biomass). This is also a period where the structure will be searching for new military means of destruction that can make the structure top look indispensable; including the search for a rationale for those new means of destruction and a strategy for their application.

In short, the situation in the first world, where the well-educated elites are concerned, will be the opposite of the situation for the third world elites: too much manpower supply relative to the structural demand as opposed to too little supply relative to the demand. As a result there will be an increasing tendency towards inverse brain drain, people with higher education moving from the first to the third world to staff the new structures that are emerging in connection with state (including, of course, the military and the police), corporation and university building. After some time the third world may discover that it will not be so easy to get them out when their own people are ready - that new pre
texts for hanging on will be found. Obviously, these brain drain expatriates prefer a working situation in a structure that is expanding at the places where their skills are demanded, not a society threatened by contraction, with a population to a large extent sceptical of their skills and inclinations, many of them experimenting with alternative ways of life that all of them, one way or the other, trying with less input from higher education power intellectuals in the state and the corporations. In short, the class character of intellectuals will become more evident, transcending such minor distinctions as whether they work for themselves, for the state or for the corporation -- or at a university etc.

What about the non-intellectuals, for sake of simplicity those with less than tertiary education? The prediction is increasing unemployment in the first world and increasing tendency to look for other social constructions that will ensure that their basic needs are met and at the same time diminish the power of the centralizing elites. Much of this type of movement will be, and is, spearheaded by young well-educated people who under periods of expansion would have found their positions with little difficulty and now find all the niches occupied. The movement will have its waves, its ups and downs but with accessible world outside the first world failing to expand as much as first world organizational and productive capa-
city there obviously is a problem. As a matter of fact, a slight de-
industrialization process in the first world has already been visibil-
le for some time. Of course, the corresponding industrialization
process in the third world is to some extent controlled by the first
world, by that will not last long: strong third world states will
use their power to nationalize such industries and hand them over
to strong third world transnational corporations. They may or may
not employ first world intellectuals.

But what about the third world masses? Of course, the situation will vary very much from one country to the other, but there is probably a general pattern. We can start with the worst case, probably not a very untypical one. The struggle to bridge
the gap between MDCs and LDCs can often, more realistically, be seen as a struggle to bridge possible gaps between MDC and LDC elites (of the three types mentioned), seeing to it that they have the
same material living standard and (at least) the same power and priv-
ilege. A modernization program serves this end, a third world
elite emerges, in most regards a true replication of the first world
model. They are materially non-productive like their first world
counterparts, hence, they have to be maintained by someone. Loans
and grants from first world countries cannot last forever; they also
become increasingly expensive. Other sources of revenue have to be
found; the NIEO offers a catalogue of possibilities. The NIEO is about the "economic rights and duties of states", not about the needs of human beings -- the latter are almost unmentioned in major NIEO documents.

Hence, they are probably in for a tough time. It took the first world two centuries or so before their masses got a standard of living which did not set them totally apart from the elites, and the first world had almost the whole world to exploit, including their own. It is difficult to see that the third world countries, in general, will be able to secure for themselves that much hinterland, except, perhaps, for a few of them that are among the first out (the first one was, of course, Japan, and she has been playing this game well - now threatened herself by the next waves of imperialism). Failing that they will have to turn inward to secure the material basis of the elites, and since these elites are much more numerous than before it stands to reason that the masses in such countries will be squeezed more than before. In all such cases an educational ladder will be stretched down to these masses, divided in sections called primary, secondary and tertiary, with twelve to sixteen rungs on them -- and as mentioned, the hope of getting to the top will not be entirely unwarranted as long as the system is expanding. But the proportion making it will be miniscule.
But there are, of course, also more optimistic models. Thus, there is the idea that elites will share the social surplus, cut down on their material living standard and privileges, if not necessarily on their power excess, go in for a policy of meeting basic needs for the masses (meaning basic material needs), and from there to a general policy of converging living standards between elites and masses. All of this is actually compatible with the same educational model as has been outlined above: a small elite with tertiary education working in the upper echelons of the tertiary sector, a labor aristocracy with secondary education working in the secondary sector and a vast majority with primary education working in the primary sector, extracting raw materials, including foodstuffs, from nature.

And then there is a totally different model, based on educational sharing, not only on economic sharing. According to this model there would be no sharp distinction between a well educated elite engaged in non-material work and production, and masses just enough schooled to read and follow the instructions emanating from the elites, and engaged wholly in material production (and distribution). The elites would also engage in material production, on a rotation basis, and the non-elites would be stimulated to use a maximum of creativity and to participate in the design of the production processes.
Clearly, this was the Chinese model up to the death of Mao Tse-tung, and the technology favored was "walking on two legs", a mixture of administration-, capital- and research-intensive technologies with participation, labor- and creativity-intensive technologies. Since the latter make elites of the type usually heading or staffing the top of the states, the corporations and the universities less indispensable if not right out superfluous they would be expected to resist this type of development and wait for an occasion to come back. They waited till the death of Mao Tse-tung.

The educational implications of this last model are also quite clear: the whole classical ladder of schooling narrowing the focus to increasingly non-material, intellectual concerns producing graduates who cannot function outside a materially non-productive pocket in society is rejected. In its place would come all those things that educational reformers always tend to talk about: an education that drives no wedges between manual and mental work, between material and non-material production; that is closely linked to everything else that goes on in society with the pupils/students participating in the work processes of as many kinds as possible and all kinds of workers also going to school. In all of this it might still make sense to think in terms of years and levels of schooling passed, so the whole population would some-
how grow educationally together. But as the educational experience
would be less stratified disparities might decrease rather than increa-
se all the time. In other words, schooling would no longer serve so
well as a basis for a new class formation, and it should be pointed out
that the need for such a basis would be particularly strongly felt a-
mong elites in socialist countries where some other bases have been
eliminated (such as hereditary ownership of means of production). Hence
we would expect socialist countries to be particularly afraid of such
educational experiments as there is more for the elites to lose:
there is not so much to fall back upon (except the naked power of the
party cadres, but even that would be in need of some educational legi-
timation). Capitalist countries with a firm basis for elite power in
other sectors of society would be more likely to engaged in experiments
Thus, China seems now to be heading back to normal, in a sense; it took
the extraordinary energies and insights of the Mao Tse-tung era to
head in another direction.

Thus, our conclusion is that the first world may not only
be forced to go in for another type of schooling policy; they may also
like it although there will be heavy resistance from the entrenched
state/corporation elites. The second world will continue on its pre-
SENT course. And the third world, with the exception of a handful or
at most a dozen of countries, will serve the elites more than the
masses and, with ever increasing educational disparities, go in for a
development model in general and a schooling model in particular
that they will one day wake up to discover that the first world coun-
tries they are imitating are about to leave. At the same time the in-
verse brain drain will have been in operation for some decades, consti-
tuting a neo-colonial nucleus that will be used, many times, as a pre-
text for first world military intervention "in order to save (name of
first world nationality) lives". Thus, the interface between educa-
tional policy and military policy becomes very clear: it may look bet-
ter for world public opinion when the paras and the marines (or the peo-
ple they have trained locally) enter the scene of revolt to save some
missionaries and nuns (particularly the nuns) and a handful of profes-
sors of social science than when the purpose is to come to the rescue
of over-privileged corporate elites, foreign and/or domestic and their
hardware.

4. Conclusion

It should be clear from the above that what we have
been looking at, and critically, is schooling rather than education.
Education, properly understood, is a form of human growth and devel-
opment, by acquiring, critically, skills and knowledge, vertically
from one who has more of these things, horizontally in dialogue with
others engaged in the same search, alone, as self-education. School-

ing is something quite different: it is a system for the production of vertically and horizontally arranged status: vertically in terms of level of schooling passed "successfully" (with some extra nuances added because schools at the same level are often ranked among themselves, and the graduates are ranked by grading); horizontally in terms of specialization. Schools prepare human material for allocation into a vertically and horizontally fragmented social order by putting tags on them indicating where they would fit (best). There is also some education going on in schools, that should not be denied, but it is hardly the primary purpose.

In general schools follow the social order, domestic and global, not vice versa; but the coordination is never perfect except under conditions of extreme autocracy. The demand for intellectuals in materially non-productive positions and the supply of tertiary education graduates fit to fill these positions will almost never be perfectly matched. Gaps between demand and supply in this field will be among the important sources of social dynamics for any system based on "modernization" in the sense outlined above. When there is more demand than supply the schooling system will expand, particularly at the level of tertiary education, and internal disparities will increase. When there is more supply than demand for these positions, for instance because of over-production of intellectuals, there will be
a pressure to expand - for instance by nationalizing small business
or "co-ordinating" local crafts and shops so that new positions are
created in state bureaucracies for intellectuals, presumably of a
leftist persuasion.

More important, however, because it has more clearly
international implications: when there is less demand than supply
for the activities of these positions - for administering other peo-
ple's territory or doing their business for them - then there is a
crisis. The system will try to solve the crisis by restoring status
quo ante, e.g. by creating international bureaucracies for ex-colonial
bureaucrats or by means of brain drain into third world run corpora-
tions rather than trying to run it all from back home. But that may
not work, in which case the system will try to find new and important
tasks at home. If this still proves insufficient to provide posi-
tions for graduates worthy of their level of schooling the crisis is
deep. The countries in the first world may even be heading for a si-
tuation where the economies no longer can maintain these enormous
non-productive (all the time in the direct material sense, in the
sense of growing potatoes, of constructing houses, of making clo-
thes, in short of meeting basic material needs) elites. The signs
are there when the paychecks to bureaucrats, managers and professors
no longer arrive in time - the first sign, of course, being the stop sign for any new openings. In such a situation the elites will be in need of new types of skills, as many of them will start settling in a countryside with better possibilities of growing potatoes and wheat and rice. They will certainly demand an other type of education for their children than the one they got themselves.

Conclusion: our statistics about schooling are not the outcome of educational philosophy or anything like that, but the outcome of strong political forces in our contemporary world. With state machineries, corporations and universities expanding, and more so in the first than in the third worlds, the predictable outcome will be the type of data reported in the introduction: increasing disparities between first and third world countries, increasing disparities within either group of countries. With the first world in crisis disparities between first and third world countries will taper off and may even start decreasing, at least at the level of tertiary education. The same may happen inside the first world countries, but not inside the third world countries: in them disparities will continue to increase, probably for a long time.

Further, the stage is set for major educational reforms in the first world, out of sheer necessity. Some third world
countries will participate in, even spearhead this type of movement and create a setting for very interesting forms of international cooperation, no longer based on the transmission of schooling technology from overschooled to underschooled countries. China was such a country, maybe the former Portuguese colonies in Africa are now in that stage.

At any rate, these are the outcomes of major political struggles and decisions, although often in frozen form: modernization and its concomitant, increased schooling at all levels, are taken for granted, as a law of social nature, without asking whose interests they serve. The elites most served by systems so based on vertical division of labor with intellectuals on top, not only having the most interesting (challenging, personality expanding, creativity-demanding) jobs but in addition also managing to get better paid than anybody else, will not tend to question the system — they will rather change the basis of legitimation from serving democracy (old, nineteenth century bourgeois vintage) to serving socialism (new, more twentieth century — but not very convincing to Europeans living under socialism or the mixture of the two, social democracy). To the extent it remains unchallenged the system will continue, strong social forces would be needed to change its course. And those forces are only like
Finally, lest this analysis should look too materialistic: of course changes in the sector of schooling and education may sometimes lead, not lag, major socio-political changes. A massive desertion of the schools of business administration and engineering, to mention two key production sites for the staffs of the state/corporation alliance, would have tremendous impact on the system: there is a limit to how much it can manage without an inflow of staff. The Vietnam war in the US was accompanied by a change of that type - for some time. However, and that is a major point: it did not last, when system legitimacy was somehow restored (eg. through the brilliant management of the Watergate affair) the youth started filling up the vacancies again. Stronger shocks would be needed.

But the measure of impact of new tendencies in schooling and education should not be limited to frequencies of attendance. Just to think in terms of something new and alternative, and to start some action in that direction, some experiments however small, poorly funded and attended is significant because it shows that the dominant form and process is not a law of nature never to be transcended. So, as we live now very much in an age of great transformations we are probably in for great surprises in the years to come, and for great opportunities to practice many of the excellent plans for reform.
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. Ibid., p. 15

4. Research done in the World Indicators Program, CCPR, University of Oslo.


6. This tradition is to a large extent associated with the names Harbison and Myers.

7. For one use of this as a theme in Western history (not during the Middle Ages, though), see Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad and Erik Rudeng, "On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared", Papers, CCPR, University of Oslo, No. 75, 1978.

8. This would be the type of research that would have been carried out had one followed the analytical tradition of investigating bivariate (synchronic or diachronic) correlations only.


10. Thus, we doubt that there are many with tertiary education and a job experience among the famous OECD 17 million unemployed; among the tertiary education graduates there are, of course, many unemployed.

11. Of course, the easy channels along which to flow would be the old imperial channels, with Britons flowing backwards into the former colonies of the Empire, the French intellectuals staffing the whole Communauté, and so on. Lest someone might say that this is the typical sentiment voiced by an envious Norwegian it should be pointed out that the Norwegian empire is all over, at least where our ships and lutheran Christianity went.

12. This, incidentally, does not mean that technologies cannot be research intensive; solar energy, cycles based on biogas and algae ponds etc. certainly can be research intensive. It only means that there should be no built-in reliance on intellectuals in power positions.


14. A triangular cooperation between Africans, Brazilians (Paulo Freire and his colleagues) and the base in Geneva, at the World Council of Churches.