FIVE COSMOLOGIES:
An Impressionistic Presentation
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1. On Cosmologies In General And Western Cosmology In Particular
A Bird's Eye View

A glance at the world map today tells us one very important fact: there is Western civilization in layers of different depths almost all over the world, there are Westerners almost all over the world, whereas the other civilizations seem to be more concentrated in specific areas, their sedimentations in other parts of the world much less conspicuous and their representatives few and far between. This basic asymmetry alone makes it mandatory to single out Western civilization for particular attention: what is it that has made it if not world-civilization at least a dominant civilization? And, in a more moralizing vein: what is good about this, what has it brought of positive values to the rest of the world and what is bad about it - to what extent has it been a carrier of direct and structural violence, as a Western macro-culture?

To explore such questions is to explore the anatomy of civilizations in general and Western civilization in particular as nothing in this world can be understood, grasped on its own terms alone, but also has to be seen in terms of how it differs from whatever it can be compared with. Western civilization has to be seen as one among others. More particularly, we shall focus on three other civilizations: the Hindu, Sinic and Nipponic - using terms that do not refer to countries but precisely to civilizations.

By "civilization", then, we mean the culture shared by large parts of humanity, across countries and nations, even across continents and throughout vast spans of time. That this nevertheless is a fruitful concept inspite of the tremendous variations within a civilization is often more clear to outsiders than to insiders: insiders being mesmerized by the linguistic, religious and otherwise ethnic border-lines within a civilization, trying to come to grips with differences rather than with similarities, for instance in efforts to learn the idiom of their immediate neighbours in space and time. Outsiders will see similarities: a Japanese will see basic
similarities between a Norwegian liberal of protestant stock
and a Romanian marxist with an orthodox-catholic background

It is these similarities we are particularly concerned
with. They are found at the deeper layers of the civilization and do
not appear on the surface as facts and artefacts. They are partly
embedded in the deep structures of the material, human and non-human
organization of the societies in that civilization, partly in the
deep ideology, the world maps, Weltanschauungen, cosmovisiones of
that civilization. We shall refer to this deeper aspect of a civiliza-
tion as a cosmology, and see this as a concept that relates to civil-
ization much the same way as the psychological construct of a "perso-
nality" relates to a human being. In both cases there is a process of
abstraction to get down to the deeper, more invariant. In both cases
that kind of exploration leads one to the unquestioned assumptions,
to aspects so normal and so natural that they become like the air
around us, unnoticed. Consequently, the cosmology of a civilization,
much as the personality of a human being may not be known to those
people themselves - but when confronted with the results of such ex-
plorations by outsiders and insiders they will usually accept some
items, have a questioning attitude to others and reject still others.
In other words, cosmology analysis should constitute a good basis for
dialogues within and between insiders and outsiders about the nature
of a civilization.

Let us dispense with one issue from the very beginning:
cosmology analysis does not take a stand on the, in our mind very false
and also very Western, dichotomy of "materialism vs. idealism." A cos-
mology is expressed both in the street pattern of Paris with its
center at the Etoile (Place Charles de Gaulle) and the avenues radia-
ting outwards, the road map of France with its center in Paris and
the route nationale, radiating outwards, the airline network of Air France
with its center at Roissy (Charles de Gaulle again) and the airlines
radiating outwards, above all to the Communauté française; as in cer-
tain unquestioned ideas and conceptions French seem to have about

the primacy of French civilization. What comes first, deep structure or deep ideology is seen as a chicken/egg problem: the chicken begets a new chicken through the egg, and - as someone has pointed out - the egg begets a new egg through the chicken.

Thus, cosmology is a "family of things"/"scheme of things" concept. It is that which deep structures and deep ideologies of a civilization have in common. It points towards a holistic analysis of a civilization, an effort to find common themes that the material and ideal aspects of the civilization can be seen as implementations of. Ideally, one should be able to invoke a cosmology by one figure alone, an image so powerful that the essence of that civilization is carried in that image alone.

We are not in possession of such imagery so our approach will have to be more analytical. More precisely, we shall simply assume that in order to explore a cosmology we should at least have some information about how the following 6 entities are organised in that cosmology:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Person-Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Person-Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Person-Transpersonal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other aspects could be mentioned, for instance something on the nature of human action - but it will be left for the time being, just as we have left out African, Amerindian (North and South) and Pacific (Polynesian, Micronesian and Melanesian) civilizations. The focus here is on a mode of analysis rather than on completeness.

Let us then return to the civilizations singled out for attention. We shall make use of the Occident/Orient distinction, well knowing that it is problematic and by many considered out of date. Two very valid points of criticism are often levelled against this distinction: that medieval Europe in many regards is similar to the Orient, and that India, or more particularly the Hindu civilization,
has both occidental and oriental aspects. We shall accept both points, and for that reason talk in terms of two, not only one, occidental civilization, but rather than referring to them as "modern" or "medieval" or something like that we shall refer to them as the expansion mode and contraction mode, respectively. The Hindu civilization we shall see as something in-between, with both occidental and oriental aspects - an image that sees Hinduism as the cross-roads of the world; or, conversely, see the Occident and the Orient as having picked up different aspects of Hinduism - an image that would see Hinduism as the cradle of the world. The cross-road and the cradle images are mutually compatible, not contradictory. On the other end, then, would be the oriental civilizations, as mentioned sub-divided into Sinic and Nipponic. So our Occident/Orient continuum will look something like this:

```
          / \       
Occidental  Hindu  Oriental  
 \   /           \   /           \   /          
 Expansion mode Contraction mode Sinic Nipponic
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Let us then turn to the more positive, if only tentative, definitions of Occident and Orient.

We shall conceive of the Occident as the area covered by the peoples adhering to, if not believing in, the religions of the *Kitab* (Old Testament); essentially Judaism (about 15 million), Christianity (about one thousand million) and Islam (about 750 million). This means that we are operating with a broad concept of the Occident encompassing three very closely related religions as well as the latter day secular offsprings: liberalism and marxism, giving rise to capitalist and socialist material cultures respectively - but not yet civilizations. They will have to stand more of a test of time to be given that epithet. Within this broad concept one might have a more narrow concept that would exclude Islam, some will refer to that as "Western" civilization. And within this again a still more narrow concept focusing on Western, or perhaps particularly North-Western, Europe and North America, in other words on protestant christianity in religious terms. One might even talk about a Far West, and my own image of that would be
Correspondingly, I shall conceive of the Orient as essentially the people who are adhering to, if not believing in, Buddhism — just as for Christianity a term covering very many varieties. There is only a little fringe that today can be referred to as relatively pure Buddhist, essentially the countries of Theravada Buddhism (the Southern branch, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, what is left of Kampuchea and Laos); in a more complete treatment this should be included as a special civilization. More important today are the Mahayana countries, China with Korea and Vietnam, Japan (the Eastern branch).

Nothing in what has been said above should be taken to mean that civilizations are watertight compartments. Rather, they are in incessant interaction, lending and borrowing, sending and receiving, imposing and submitting as people, things and ideas move in space. There is that of the other in all of them, and particularly so in the Hindu civilization, given its geographical location. But in this interaction Occident and Orient seem to act and react differently, and these differences are themselves of primary significance in understanding this civilization. Thus, we shall see the Occident as fundamentally synthetic and the Orient as fundamentally eclectic, meaning by this that new elements are absorbed into the Occident in a unified construct (to be explored below), whereas new elements in the Orient are assimilated as a part of the civilization, coexisting with older elements.

One may talk about the Judaeo-Greek-Roman origins of Western civilization (a somewhat short time-perspective though, one should also mention the Sumerians, the Babylonians and Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Hittites and the Hurrians, the Canaanites and the Arameans and the Persians). But the point is that all these elements are welded together so that the components are no longer detachable. Not so in the Orient: it makes very much sense to conceive of the Sinic and Nipponic civilizations as
consisting of geological layers, something like this (with the recent
layers at the bottom):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sinic</th>
<th>Nipponic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daoism</td>
<td>Shintoism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucianism</td>
<td>Confucianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>Buddhism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occidentalism:</td>
<td>Occidentalism:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, a fullyfledged Chinese is a Daoist, a Confucian, a Buddhist,
a Christian, a liberal and a marxist - the latter element is poorly
developed in the Nipponic civilization, which also would be eclectic.

So, there is a Far East: something like a Zen monastery
meditation-oriented where the Idaho church is prayer-oriented, collec-
tivist at the micro level of the little group and the macro level
of the society. Protestant Christianity and Mahayana Buddhism are then
merely seen as examples, as manifestations of the deeper-lying cos-
mologies. They are not the source of these cosmologies, here they are
seen as expressions of them and as extremely powerful carriers of them.
Between these two extremes, then, are all kinds of in-between positions,
to be explored. And in doing so we are focussing only on the Sinic
and the Nipponic amalgams of civilizations, not on the pure Buddhist,
for instance which would also have been worthwhile had it not been for
its relative powerlessness in the world at present. This is because
we see eclecticism as crucial in the Orient today, a point best appreci-
ciated by imagining what would happen to a Westerner who declared
himself both Jew, Christian, Muslim, humanist, liberal and marxist
at the same time.
2. **Five Cosmologies Explored: Some Positions**

Against the background of what has been said in the preceding section let us now try to say something precise about the five civilizations singled out for attention. The basic ideas are indicated in Table 1; what is needed is to spell this out in the way one can do by rapidly overlying vast territories in space and time.

Only some words about the methodology of this exercise before starting. In this introductory presentation there will be no effort at all to substantiate the points made, but the methodology can be made explicit. Broadly speaking it is based on two approaches:

1. exploring the "similarities of the dissimilar": taking different structures or different ideologies within the same civilization, looking for similarities at a deeper level.

2. exploring the "dissimilarities of the similar": taking the same structures or the same ideologies within different civilizations, looking for dissimilarities at a deeper level.

An exploration of similarities between liberalism and marxism, possibly also relating both of them to Christianity and maybe to Islam would be one way of arriving at some insight about Western civilization. Correspondingly, exploring how Buddhism becomes different in India, China and Japan would yield some insight into the nature of the differences between Hindu, Sinic and Nipponic civilizations (Nakamura who did this also added Tibet - the home of Tantric Buddhism or Lamaism, the Northern branch of Buddhism - to understand Tibetan civilization). Another possibility would be to explore differences between Western and Chinese marxism; still another would be to look for similarities between Gandhism (with a Hindu-Buddhist basis) and Maoism (a typical Chinese amalgam with a Daoist-Confucian-Buddhist-Christian-liberal basis). By using both of these methods carefully results may be arrived at, but only in the form of hypotheses. The test of those hypotheses would be in terms of how useful they are in order to account for basic features in past and contemporary history of these civilizations.

The crude positions taken in Table 1 can now be explored vertically, one civilization at a time, or horizontally, one cosmological aspect at a time. We shall prefer to start with the latter as it emphasizes the differences between the cosmologies more clearly.

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1. Nakamura
2. An exploration of similarities between liberalism and marxism.
For cosmologies, as here conceived of, are discrete. There is no such thing as an Occident-Orient continuum; these are discrete types that perhaps can be placed on an abstract, many-dimensional continuum. Maybe cosmologies can be likened to biological species. They can be compared, there are homologous elements; but they are also distinct, discrete. They can interact, but inter-breeding is intra-species, between sub-types. For this reason there is a limit to how much one can change a cosmology, modify it without killing it. The latter may not be a bad idea in some cases: there are cosmologies that are pathological. But the basic point is that we are not free to make the perfect cosmology, except on paper, by combining all good features. This would be much like constructing the perfect animal by putting together features from different species - vertebrate, invertebrate; in the water, on land, in the air. Mutations may come about - but the outcome not so easily be predictable. Cross-fertilization may take place, but given the complexity of the codes the outcomes may be very diverse indeed.
### TABLE 1: Five Cosmologies: some positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OCCIDENT</th>
<th>ORIENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPACE</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TIME</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KNOWLEDGE</strong></td>
<td>atomistic deductive</td>
<td>atomistic/holistic deductive/dialectic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATURE</strong></td>
<td>Herrschaft non-vegetarian</td>
<td>Partnerschaft vegetarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSON</strong></td>
<td>vertical/horizontal individualist</td>
<td>vertical/horizontal collectivist/individualist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSON</strong></td>
<td>personal god</td>
<td>no god</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANS-PERS</strong></td>
<td>singular universal</td>
<td>plural particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANS-PERS</strong></td>
<td>personal soul</td>
<td>no soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>eternal life</td>
<td>nibbana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Space. We start with the most basic, the medium in which we live.

Five very different conceptualizations of socio-geographical space are depicted here. The extremes are the Occident in the contraction mode and the Hindu positions: with some exaggeration it is assumed that the former is highly insular, seeing social reality as consisting of a small unit only (the manor in early Middle Ages, a lower level feudal unit during the later Middle Ages). The Hindu image is depicted here as just the opposite of that: as all-embracing, as universal - the assumption being that there is a Hindu in everybody, only that he or she may not be aware of it.

More similar are the other three: there are visions of the whole world, but also a clear conceptualization of a center as being in the West, China (the Kingdom of the Middle, Zhong guo) and Japan respectively. But these are three different concepts of a center as becomes evident when one explores how the rest of the world is conceptualized: as a periphery to be occidentalized in the Occident, but with the Occident remaining the center; as a resource with which one can have specific exchange relations but with Japan remaining its own center of concern for itself, for the Nipponic civilization, and as Barbaria with which one should have minimum relations, except those that are necessary for defense against the four types of foreigners (north Barbarians, east Barbarians, south Barbarians and west Barbarians - the former being the worst, hence the location of the Great Wall). Taken in that order there is a decreasing scope of the interaction, from a very diffuse scope in the occidental concept via a much more specific one in the Nipponic concept (except for an "inner resource" of East-Asian countries during the Dai-tō-ã period - the great East-Asian co-prosperity concept) to little or no interaction at all in the Sinic conceptualization. Obviously, these make for very different types of foreign policy, with a pattern already set for the key aspect of occidental civilization: the missionary zeal, the territorial conquest, economic expansion and exploitation.
Time. Again the conceptualizations, as depicted here, divide into two
groups with the Hindu and the occidental contraction mode in a category
by themselves. It is of course very simplistic, but what is rendered
here is the notion that in those two civilizations the external, social
conditions of life were and are seen as essentially unchanged and un-
changeable relative to chronological time - the flat line illustrates
this. In saying so one might also, perhaps, emphasize that the cosmo-
logy we are exploring is essentially social cosmology although it is
also assumed that it has ramifications into natural cosmology in general
and the cosmology of the universe, "cosmology" as more narrowly conceived
of, in particular.

This is brought out very clearly when the other
three civilizations are compared. Occidental civilization in the expan-
sion mode, and this is usually what we think of when we talk about
"western civilization" is often referred to as having a linear time
concept. This is wrong. If anything the time concept is dramatic, with
a cycle including at least seven elements: paradise-fall-darkness-en-
lightenment-progress-crisis-catharsis. True, the fifth element in this
cycle, the period of progress, may look linear (exponential might perhaps
be a better term) to people convinced that they are located in time
after enlightenment (the advent of Jesus-Christ, and such secular and
lesser figures as Adam Smith and Karl Marx) but before crisis (Arma-
geddon, the downfall of capitalism) - hence also before catharsis.
The dramatic nature of this conceptualization is emphasized even further
by the assumption that "crisis is just around the corner", an assump-
tion that seems to be a part of western cosmology.

Sinic and Nipponic time cosmologies are here de-
picted as similar, in more detailed analysis differences might be
brought out. There are obvious cyclical elements embedded in ancient
Sinic culture (12-years animal cycle, for instance, although not so
different from the 12-months astrological cycle also well-known in
the West). There are dialectical elements, known in Buddhism and very
pronounced in Daoism (hence, possibly, less present in the Nipponic
and in the Sinic cosmology) with contradictions building up, crystallizing
Thus, the very notion of revolution is probably occidental. It implies discontinuity, a sudden transformation. Something comes about which was not there before; moreover, the new is not only sui generis, it is of a new quality, hopefully better. But this can be seen as a social projection from a deeper type, firmly embedded in Occidental cosmology: a projection from the individual level paradigms for conversion and salvation. The conversion is a basic discontinuity in the state of the soul from non-faith to faith, based on an act of free will (or with an element of free will); salvation is the final consummation of conversion, the transcendental discontinuity into a state of eternal bliss. The exertion needed, the agony about the adequacy of the faith, the existential angst of the individual about his/her fate for eternity are basic in this context. In short, the metaphor, the basic paradigm is already there - paving the ground for collective, ever social in the sense of structural, discontinuities. Neither the Hindu transmigration concept, nor the Buddhist rebirth concept, would harbor in them a form that discontinuous, that einmalig and that irreversible. There are more complex processes, more long-lasting (thus, outlasting, the individual life span and not so simplistically conceived of with just one (or two, via purgatory, but they are so closely related) transitions.
and maturing till an eruption/disruption gives birth to a new form which also will be contradictory with the contradictions building up, etc. But it is assumed that the occidental element in the oriental eclectic combinations gives to this entire process also a linear element, an idea of progress, a notion that one starts at a higher level for each time. Hence, the differences are tremendous, and the implications in international affairs considerable: the Orient would be no stranger to the idea of set-backs because they will assume that afterwards there will be a new build-up and that over a longer time perspective things may sort themselves out in their favour, whereas in the Occident the idea would be built up towards a crisis that will either end with catharsis and salvation or with total downfall (the broken line indicated in the Figure).

There is a difference here between Occident and Orient, not easily depicted in such simple figures. Perhaps one may say that the Occident has a project of a very definite kind: the name of the project is a process which consists in sorting good and evil, and having the good prevail over the evil. For that reason the catharsis is the final state of affairs, the Endzustand, where the perfectible has become perfect and the non-perfect has been discarded as the garbage of history. In other words, social time has a beginning and an end, and in a sense it ends where it started: with paradise (perfect markets in the liberal vision, Urkommunismus in the marxist vision). The Orient does not have such visions of beginning or end, the dialectic from eternity to eternity, and consequently there will not be any sorting either of the good away from the bad as all such dichotomies are to be conceived of dialectically as inseparable, working on each other, coexisting as parts of a whole, but in varying proportions. If there is a project it would consist in understanding this and in steering this process towards more distant goals that in themselves must be to dialectically conceived. Clearly, however, with increasing occidentalization of the Orient this linear or exponential element may take the upper hand and the cyclical, dialectical element recede into the background as small ripples on the wave only. And on purpose we say wave, not waves, as the true occidental concept implies one cycle only, the one, "our era", AD.
Knowledge. Epistemology is the part of cosmology dealing with the deeper aspects of how to arrive at knowledge, about what is, and why it is so, with description and explanation of factual, empirical reality and possible potential reality. Again, grossly simplified we have tried to conceive of this in terms of two modes of description: an atomistic one that would cut reality into pieces, for instance, referred to as "units" and "variables" characterizing units in the aristotelian/cartesian manner, and a holistic one, trying to come to grips with the essence of totalities. Further, we have distinguished between two modes of explanation, one deductive inferring lower level propositions about the units from higher level propositions by means of a logical relation of implication, and one dialectic that would try to explain what is not in terms of logical relations but in terms of "inner" forces and processes that in turn follow general laws, within the whole intuited by holism.

**TABLE 2. A Typology Of Epistemologies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>atomistic</th>
<th>holistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deductive</td>
<td>occidental</td>
<td>occidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expansionist</td>
<td>contractive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dialectic</td>
<td></td>
<td>sinhatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>nipponic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clearly, occidental civilization in the expansion mode is predominantly atomistic and deductive. The social institution concerned with producing valid knowledge, the institution of science, has two tasks: to subdivide reality in a suitable manner, characterizing units and relations between units so as to arrive at propositions; and the effort to link these propositions together in theoretical pyramids. The final edifice can then be verified, inductively by working upwards from empirically confirmed propositions, or deductively by working downwards from axioms towards empirically verified propositions that constitute an image of empirical reality, possibly also through empirically verifiable propositions that would give hints about potential reality.

The opposite of this, the holistic/dialectic combination as exemplified by the yin-yang mode of thought is seen as characteristic of the Sinic and Nipponic epistemologies, but just as for the time aspect not ruling the ground alone. Occidentalization has gone so far that the atomistic/deductive approach also can be found, and it is not obvious that any synthesis has been attained - it is rather, as usual, a question of peaceful coexistence within a highly eclectic and also tolerant epistemology. Possibly the same can be said about Hindu cosmology but then as something located more towards the occidental end of the spectrum: more atomistic than holistic, more deductive than dialectic. In a position by itself is medieval occidental cosmology, highly deductive, but also holistic in its effort to deal with essences rather than atoms of reality.

Again, implications for concrete behaviour of individuals, nations and countries are many. The oriental mode would be more attentive to the totality of situations, viewing it, then putting the ear to the ground to try to catch the dialectic process.
as it unfolds itself. From an occidental point of view this looks passive and contemplative because the efforts to align oneself and to steer these processes are not so clearly seen. On the other hand there is the occidental approach: controlling reality, not only nature, but also social and human reality by controlling it at key points of entry, following meticulously theoretical schemes as guides to action.

**Person-Nature.** The distinction here is drawn between the two occidental civilizations and the other three, seeing the former as dominance-oriented, highly exploitative of nature in all its forms, including killing and eating animals of all kinds, provided they are edible. Nature exists for the sake of human beings, it is a clear Herrschaft relationship. In the other three there are certainly elements of this, but there is a clear trend (indicated by the arrows) favouring Partnerschaft, coexistence with nature, respecting nature on its own terms and particularly its regenerating capacity, including a form of respect for higher forms of nature (in an anthropocentric world meaning forms of nature closer to human beings themselves) that would lead to vegetarianism of various degrees. Underlying this distinction is a deeper aspect of the nature of nature: in the first two nature is desouled, deprived of that which characterizes human beings; in the other three nature is besouled, possibly even being the abode of the souls of human beings in a transmigratory process. In medieval occidental civilization there were also elements of this but more emphasizing evil spirits as finding their place in nature, thus encouraging rather than preventing destruction of nature (for instance destruction of forests where the evil spirits were particularly frequent). The distinction between these two groups of civilizations may be exemplified by the difference between Muslim attitudes to pigs and Hindu attitudes to cows: neither can be eaten, in the first case because the pig is too low, in the second case because the cow is too high. Christians gladly eat either.

Again, the implications are clear: the Occident receives training in aggressive behaviour towards other human beings through their behaviour towards animals and other forms of nature, orientals receive training in the opposite direction. The metabolism may also differ.
From a cosmological point of view civilizations do differ in their ability to come to grips with the problems posed by the ecological dimension of the contemporary human predicament. A desouled nature, even animal kingdom – as in the occidental religions – is obviously easier to destroy, plunder, pillage quickly or slowly than a besouled one – one that is the abode not only of soul, but potentially of the soul of your ancestors eventually of yourself (transmigration in Hinduism) or as a place where vital forces once being oneself may recohere (rebirth in Buddhism). A desouled nature is a part of a pyramid with god (pure soul?) on top, persons (part soul, part matter) in the middle, and then, matter (including animals). It is theocentric – with secularization the top of the pyramid withers away and the vision becomes anthropocentric. In such atheistic "religions" as confucianism and shintoism this has already happened – the system perhaps becoming elite-centered and state (tenno) – centered rather than just anthropo-centric (as it also is in the Occident). In amerindian belief systems, most african systems, daoism, in pacific cultures the metaphor of a besouled rather than desouled view holds. In the Occident humanism is by definition anthropocentric, and so are, in principle, liberalism and marxism although they may also be said to be elite actor-centered and social structure-centered, respectively.
Person-Person. As a general guide to where civilizations stand on social relations the following scheme is proposed:

TABLE 3. A Typology Of Social Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Collectivist</th>
<th>Individualist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Contractive</td>
<td>Expansionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nipponic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, all the civilizations are vertical, meaning not only that there are steep differences in power and privilege (liberal interpretation), but that there is that particular dialectic relationship known as exploitation at work. As a consequence social formations are better understood in a holistic/dialectic mode of thinking than in the atomistic/deductive mode, but the former was only a trickle in the West, the latter the main stream. That this correct mode of understanding is not a sufficient condition for the abolition of verticality the Orient gives ample testimony to: steeply vertical, yet dialectical. (31)

It is instructive to compare the classical vertical formation in these civilizations, as follows:

TABLE 4. Five Classical Caste Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feudal Europe</th>
<th>Classical India</th>
<th>Feudal China</th>
<th>Tokugawa Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobility</td>
<td>Brahmins</td>
<td>Shih (nobility, scholars)</td>
<td>shi (samurai, military, low nobility)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landowners, military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>Kshatriyas (aristocrats, warriors)</td>
<td>Nung (farmers)</td>
<td>No (farmers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burghers</td>
<td>Vaishyas (traders and merchants)</td>
<td>Kung (artisans)</td>
<td>Ko (artisans)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(traders and merchants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants, workers</td>
<td>Shudras (farmers, workers)</td>
<td>Shang (merchants)</td>
<td>Shō (merchants)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies, Arabs, Jews, women</td>
<td>Pariahs (women)</td>
<td>Nomads, barbarians, women</td>
<td>Dowa-chiku, gaijin, women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All four are seen in terms of four basic classes or rather castes since such rules as endogamy, commensalism and, of course, "like father, like son" were found in all four of them (in the Indian system there was and is in addition rules of pollution and ablation more explicit and deeper in their implications than in the other systems - even to the point that shudras and pariahs were seen as desouled). We have also added a fifth bottom layer of highly marginalized people doing the kinds of things others would/could not do - usually a source of renewal. 

Today, there is a "modern" system superimposed on all these four with bureaucrats, capitalists and intelligentsia (with monopolies on decision-making, capital formation and knowledge production respectively) on top, legitimizing their positions in terms of education achieved rather than position ascribed at birth. The level of detachability from other people of the social atom, the individual, is highest in expansionist, occidental civilization, lowest in medieval and nipponic civilization; in the latter groups rather than individuals can, perhaps, be seen as the basic social units Japan is here seen as the country that most successfully has absorbed modern patterns of schooling without changing the social formation by exposing the individual to ruthless competition (verticality combined with individualism!) up till the point where the individual is safely launched in a group, through the institution of entrance examinations. In the Occident this institution does not exist, hence competition lasts throughout life. In India, and to some extent also in China, all these trends combine and blend into very complex informations with inter-caste verticality and intra-caste horizontality, with fierce individualism combined with groupism; all of this setting patterns for how nations and countries will behave in international affairs.

Person-Transpersonal. How do people in these civilizations envisage that which is beyond themselves, outlasting ourselves and those with whom we interact? As religions, but also as secularized religions, as ideologies that in many respects may reveal the same structures as
religions? Religions, in turn, may have transcendental elements or not—non-transcendental religions differing from secular ideologies in their ability to give answers to the ultimate questions, what happened before birth, what happens after death—.(38)

We shall envisage the Occident/Orient spectrum as some kind of continuum with five particularly important themes in it. At the extreme West we would find the faith in a personal God, the only one (with the unity in trinity characteristic of Christianity), equally valid for all humanity, for the whole world; and human beings equipped with personal souls, capable of making choices, relevant for an eternal life in salvation or damnation. With some variations this theme is found in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but with the important exception that in Judaism there is no claim for universality, Jahve being a special God for his particular people, the Jews.(39)

Then, in the Far East, in the Mahayana Buddhist countries, one would find the negations of all this: there is no God, there is a plurality of coexisting faiths, there is no claim to universality, there is no soul (the anata doctrine, hence no transmigration, but rebirth), and the goal is not eternal life in salvation, but extinction from the cycles, nibbana, through enlightenment. In the middle, in Hinduism, it is probably safe to say that one can find all of this, both the occidental and oriental extremes, together: atheism, pantheism, monotheism, polytheism, all combined.(40)

The variations are enormous, and it will be pointed out how in the Occident Protestantism is closer to the extreme than Catholicism, Sunni Islam possibly closer than Shia Islam, the latter having more oriental characteristics, usually identified with Sufism; and correspondingly that there are types of Buddhism (for instance the worship of the Amida Buddha) that seem to be very similar to occidental religions. Nevertheless, as a rule of thumb, the position is that the spectrum is more or less as indicated.
One word about Hinduism, not to be confused with India where the Delhi Muslim Sultanate was established already in 1192. But it is at least 85% of it, covering at least half a billion of humankind. What makes it distinct?

Characteristic of Hinduism is that incredible richness; Hinduism as a repository — and already for a very long period — of a wealth of forms and types. Everything is there. For that reason it is wrong or unfruitful to talk about Hinduism as "hospitality to foreign elements". It is not so much a question of hospitality as of recognition of types and forms already there — of a-, mono-, poly- or pantheism; of decentralized or centralized governance; of individualism or collectivism — and of all of these coexisting, blending, cross-cutting. To the Hindu, then, as seen here, nothing is really new and hence nothing really challenging. What comes from the outside is received and enveloped, sinking down in the gelatinous, amorphous body of a culture so rich that almost anything is possible, sinking till it meets and blends with its opposite number in Hinduism and is transformed till it becomes sufficiently close to its opposite number. In that Hindu civilization, precisely because of its richness, its diversity, exhibits what in ecology is known as maturity, a resilience that leads to invulnerability. But in this case it is so mature and resilient that the stability becomes a static ultra-stability, not a dynamic stability, flexible enough to take up new challenges. It becomes an instrument countering any challenge, blunting it, transforming it till it is neutralized.

And at this point, of course, the most important aspect would be the brahminic aspect of Hinduism, which I take to be a genuine, not an accidental, part of it. There are horizontal, intra-caste forms and types — but they will not be permitted to displace the vertical forms. New elements, eg. under the headings of modernization/development, will fall on fertile soil to the extent they can be connected into means of reproduction of verticality, securing new bases for the power and privilege of brahmins, Kshatriyays and to a lesser extent vaishyas. The efforts at basic reform, by the Buddha and Gandhi 2,500 years apart, were effectively marginalized — in fact, exported to Sri Lanka where today they blend in a Buddhist-inspired Sarvodaya movement. The both challenged the verticality of caste — a primordial type in Hindu cosmology. Will it take 2,500 years for the next attempt?
As an example, property takes shape according to the transcendental cosmology. A cosmology with an individual, personal soul as a key element already has individual property, its management, responsibility processing and enrichment and individual bookkeeping and accountability built into it. The cosmology has already prejudged the issue in favor of the individual property. A cosmology with a common soul and collective bookkeeping, sharing of merits and elements, paves the way for collective property, an ethical common budget, and collective management. A trusteeship concept, individual management on behalf of a collectivity might be a Hindu combination, drawing on either type.
It is easily seen how the secular ideologies can be inserted in this picture. Instead of "personal god" would come the ideology itself, possibly with prophets. It would be seen as singular, as the only possible ideology. It would be seen as universal, as valid for the whole world. Instead of personal soul would come the personal faith, and the eternal life would take the form of the perfect society, on earth. All of this would be different in the Orient since the religion already is non-transcendental, references to gods, paradises and hells being metaphorical only. There would be ideologies rather than ideology, the claims for universal applicability would yield for co-existence of ideologies and religions within the same person, which means a tolerance of ambiguity usually not achieved in the West, more concerned with tolerance of others, with a peaceful coexistence concept between rather than within persons. Hence, there would be much less emphasis on faith – faith constituting the linkage between personal soul and personal god in the Occident. The focus would be on behaviour, and it would be on harmony in the process rather than on a perfect future society.

It is against the background of perspectives such as these that the remarkable similarities between liberalism and marxism have to be understood, as also the dissimilarities between Occidental and Oriental marxism. A metaphor: the Occident as a machine that feeds on many types of raw material and transforms/perverts it till it is brought on standard form – as true of what the first Rome did to Christianity as what the fourth Rome (Moscow) has done to marxism (and the fifth Rome, New York/Washington, to liberalism). Singularism rules in all cases: Oriental eclecticism would be like being Jew, Christian, Muslim, liberal and marxist at the same time for an occidental – a combination characterized as insanity in the Occident – as wisdom in the Orient.
3. Five Cosmologies Explored: Some More Holistic Images

Time has now come to try to put this together again. Obviously one may even ask the question: are we really dealing with the same humankind? Reading Table 1 vertically the differences are tremendous, differences that today are concealed, masked, even mystified through a layer of occidentalization, as mentioned with varying depth, almost all over the world. It is only when other peoples manage to get through this layer, usually through lower class revolts since this is where occidentalization has not yet penetrated, that the domineering Occident gets shocked at experiencing how different we are.

Thus, looking at occidental civilization in the expansion mode the pattern is clear: it is centrist and universalist. God is over people and people are over nature in a hierarchy between the purely spiritual (Allah, most clear in the depersonalized Islamic version) and the purely material (desouled nature). Inside the social formation this is mirrored in an occupational hierarchy from the purely manual engaged in heavy and dirty work at the bottom to the purely non-manual. But then this hierarchy is also found in other civilizations; indeed, civilizations give rise to such hierarchies and tend to legitimize them. In space there is a similar hierarchy with the center in the West and the periphery elsewhere; with the causal mass of history heavily concentrated in the center. Knowledge is put on a form that makes this centrist and universalist pattern of dominance more effective, and millions are working with the ticking of a time bomb in their ears, crisis is coming, crisis is coming -- will we attain salvation, will we attain salvation!

Clearly, a civilization of this kind becomes a threat to its surroundings. It will tend to fill whatever open space there is, meaning whatever space there is that does not either offer effective absorption (the Hindu case) or effective resistance by fencing itself off (the Sinic case) or by fighting back, economically and/or mili-
tarily (the Nipponic case). Precisely because of its tremendous richness Hindu civilization can receive any type of civilization (or so one might hypothesize) as an invader and defeat the invaders by enveloping them, absorbing and changing some useful elements. For the Sinic and the Nipponic civilizations confrontations with the Occident were more of a shock, but in both cases it led to the addition of new civilizational components.(47) Other parts of the world were subdued.(48)

Clearly, expansion can only work as long as it works, until it hits the limit, overextends itself, and ultimately is defeated. That this is not unexpected in the cosmology is built into the time concept: there is an expectation of crisis. So when defeat comes occidental civilization turns the other side up: the contraction mode that before then was a latent civilization, marginalized, found in remote corners of the society, perhaps among women, children and the old becomes the dominant mode. In the corners there may still be people whispering about expansionism, like the tradesmen of the Middle-Ages when Western Europe was contracting after the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire, le Bas-Empire.(50) A modest Occident then comes into being, an Occident with many of the most important features of oriental cosmology but not so dialectic. In a sense it suffers from the same disease as occidental civilization in the expansion mode: it is too pure, too clear, and for that reason vulnerable - it is an exaggeration in contraction just as the other ones, dominant during Antiquity and the modern period, it can be seen as an exaggeration in expansion. Consequently, it is also headed for disaster, and the key to that disaster is clearly seen from the second column in Table 1: the exploitation of nature and social exploitation of other human beings without being able to compensate for it through geographical expansion and exploitation. So it goes under, and again the other side is turned up: the expansionist mode.

Where are we today? The positions taken here can be stated as three hypotheses:
(1) The Occident in the narrow sense, Western Europe and North America, are near the end of the expansion mode and preparing for the contraction mode, for the "new Middle Ages".\(^{(52)}\)

(2) The second Occident, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are further away from the end of the expansion mode and will probably continue the expansion still for some time.\(^{(53)}\)

(3) The third Occident, Islam, apparently counter-cyclical to the Christian Occident are entering the expansion mode, and

(4) the other 3 are occidentalizing, the nipponic more than the sinic, and the sinic more than the Hindu civilizations.\(^{(55)}\)

Thus, the basic hypothesis here where the inner West is concerned is an S-curve or accordion hypothesis:\(^{(56)}\) expansion (Antiquity), Greek and particularly the Roman systems; contraction (Middle Ages, manorial and feudal systems); expansion (Western imperialism; contraction - what is going on now, before our eyes. The inner West is being tamed, becoming tame; teeth are extracted, or withering away.

But that is not the only thing going on in the world. The second Occident was already at the time of the Roman Empire in another phase, to a large extent counter-cyclical - and that may also be said about the third Occident. They both solidified and expanded when the first Occident went down, but then the third continued expanding at the expense of the second (the Ottoman empire). The first resurrected its imperial tradition from the Middle Ages Renaissance onwards, building to some extent on what in the Middle Ages had been superstructures (not unlike the UN system today) floating in thin air, such as the Carolingian Empire and the Papacy. Eventually this explosively expansionist Western imperialism also caught up with the Ottoman empire and sent the third Occident into a decline from which it is now emerging - at the expense of a declining first Occident.
The distinction is criticized by many. Thus, Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York Vintage Books, 1979, puts it this way:

"Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say, of men into "us" (westerners) and "they" (orientals). For such divisions are generalities whose use historically and actually has been to press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually towards not especially admirable ends. When one uses such categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy ---the result is usually to polarize the distinction—the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western—and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions and societies". (p.45)

TRUE — but he himself makes distinctions. (p. 6)— "Gramsci has made the useful analytic distinction between civil and political society in which the former is made up of voluntary (or at least rational and noncoercive) affiliations like schools, families and unions, the latter of state prostitution (the army, the police, the central bureaucracy) whose role in the party is direct domination." The issue is not whether or not to make distinctions, but whether they are fruitful and whether they are reified. Incidentally, Said also talks of men and women quite a lot of places in the book."
Most of this is intra-occidental and the way it is seen here underlines one point: one thing is the human nature, the sweetness and subtlety of Occidental doctrine in the contraction phase, quite another what happens when the other side is turned up. It is assumed that this is as valid for Islam as it has been for Christianity and marxism - they all come in soft and hard versions, the latter being not just versions but perversions, vulgarizations, according to the adherents of the former. Maybe. But it may also be that they have these two sides, making it so easy for the reader of the Bible or the Koran, or marxist-leninist writings, to find backing for almost any position in the spectrum of human behaviour, from the expansionist to the inner-directed.

For that reason the present position is one of scepticism when it comes to the intra-occidental dialogue, the marxist critique of the west, the muslin critique of the west, etc. Medieval thought was as bitterly critical of antiquity as the modern period of the Middle Ages - referring to them as "dark", for instance. Maybe this should rather be seen as versions of occidentalism in different phases "dialoguing" with each other from different positions in historical time. However that may be, the inner West, the first Occident, is probably ready now not only to enter into such dialogues but to surrender, to yield to all modes of thought compatible with a cosmology that would, in turn, be compatible with the contraction mode into which the inner West is now forced to enter, anyhow.

Consequently, it is not the critique of the Occident which is so interesting, it has a ring of the obvious, but the alternative to the expansionist Occident. The alternative is not found in something that will turn expansionist the moment it has a chance, because expansionism is written into its code, its program, as a project. Consequently, I would see the alternative more as located towards the Oriental end of the spectrum, (or in other cosmologies not yet treated here) but not to the extent it is occidentalizing, and not to the extent it is based on state doctrine (tenno worship into shintoism, blended with confucian and zen buddhist values, for instance). But the search for alternative is outside the scope of this paper so let me only conclude, with Garavdy: Occident = Accident - but only for the expansionist mode.
NOTES

1. This paper should be seen as a non-axiom to a very complex subject that will be treated in much more detail in other contexts. The present version was discussed at the World Order Models Project meeting Lisbon 13-19 July 1980 and the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development meeting (of the UN University) Montreal 27 July-4 August 1980.

2. Uwe Kripenko, with a group of students at the Johns Hopkins Center in Bolgana, has produced some very interesting, unpublished, data on exactly this - but mainly on direct violence.

3. The terms are "Tonga" and "suicide", few have done so much to bring civilization into the picture as a crucial historical unit. It is, of course, not the only one: civilizational analysis not being the same as historical or macro-historical analysis. No connotation of "high" or "higher" is implied.

4. Needless to say, I am most grateful to my wife, Oniko Nakamura, for all her efforts to sensitize me in these matters.

5. The term is chosen very much in purpose, as it is only bringing the apparent. I am no reason why anthropologists should have a monopoly on such a fine word - but it may sometimes be useful to put the adjective "social" in front.


7. I have chosen the word "person" instead of "human" in order to arrive at that little point about personal-tranpersonal - "transpersonal" sounds more like inhuman.

8. We doubt the term had a colonialist connotation, not because of the terms themselves, but because they were used by colonialists. That period is, however, to a large extent over, and the two terms are at least symmetric, unlike the term "Aboriginal and "European".


10. This is explored in some detail in Caltung, Postcard, Bodun, "On the Last 2500 Years in Western History", The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII, Companion Volume, 318-361 - particularly section 4, pp. 343-353.

11. Some researchers maintain, for instance, that there were elements of Buddhism in Britain before the birth of Christ.


14. The book referred to in footnote 12 above is exactly about this.
18. The diffuse/specific refers, of course, to Parsons' old classification, actually developed by Sorokin and Weber. The zero category is very important.
19. This discards inner life which may be tremendously eventful: the flat lines for outer, social time may even be a condition for that eventful inner life like in a prison.
21. For Hitler there were two possible outcomes of his Armageddon: Tausend-Jahr Reich, or total destruktion. He almost managed the latter.
22. See Johan Galtung, "In Defense of Ecological Holocentrism" for more on these themes. The distinction between empirical and potential reality is developed in Johan Galtung, "Ideology and Ideology", Oslo, Copenhagen, 1977, pp. 68 ff.
23. My own book Theory and Methods of Social Research, Allen and Unwin, London, 1967 is an example of this, an exercise in atomistic/inductive epistemology. But I do not disavow this approach, only would like to see it as a special case of epistemology more broadly conceived.
24. Or, some of it was, of course, there all the time.
25. Scholasticism would come into this category, epistemists being nitty about essences and inductive.
26. I am indebted to Eleonora Nasi for inspiring presentations of Chinese thinking on several occasions, particularly in connection with visions of desirable societies.
27. A good typology of vegetarianism is needed here - does anybody have one?
28. Ignacy Sachs has made this point in his article.
29. This, of course, is one of the key Chinese theories of why Westerners are the aggressive way we are: we simply eat too much meat.
30. This particular typology is explored in more detail in chapter 1, "Social Structure and Science Structure", of Ideology and Ideology.
31. Mao Zedong, of course, was the one who tried to put that dialectical tool to work exactly to break down some of that verticality. How much of his work will remain in another question, the structure may be stronger than the tool.
32. This typology is used in connection with CPM work on Exploitation/Expansion processes.
33. The criterion being, of course, whether brainsins would accept food.
34. We have, of course, added women in this category, but not the old and not necessarily the very young either - if they are male they would not be marginalized over to the point of infanticide. Women, as a major source of renewal is today an obvious theme of contemporary Western history.
42. See Johan Galtung, "Global Goals, Global Processes and the Prospects for Human and Social Development". For details on this (Geneva, 1972-80).

43. A key theme in most Japanology, e.g. in Tiele Nakane's works.


45. Considerably more important questions, incidentally, than those usually answered by ideologies and by that particular ideological cluster called Western science.


47. "Hinduism is the most spurious of all religions, with comfortable accommodations for the disciplines of one god, many gods and no god at all, for the worship of animals, ancestors and even", from Ronald Segal, The India of India, Jonathan Cape, London, 1945.

48. Meaning that it is faith in a god more than the personal effort that counts on the way to salvation.

49. This is a major theme in Sorokin's famous distinction between ideational and sensate mentalities.

50. Thus, both for the Christian, the marrow (and somewhat less) for the liberal it is the enemy within that counts most, within oneself, that is.

51. Which of course is the reason why the African, American and Pacific cosmologies do not appear in our preliminary list: they are more covered by Western layers, they show less. Only the Hindu, Sinic and Nipponese really were able to withstand the pressure, so far, from the Occident, and the first two actually very much eroded by the Islamic onslaught.

52. The single word "Khomeini" is an indication of this, actually a very occidental type, only from another part of the occident - that makes him ever more frightening to the inner West (and the innermost West, the SS).

53. Civilizations are based on cities, by definition - no cities are places where people are not necessarily materially productive - hence they have to be materially supported by others, and they have to legitimize that they are worthy of being supported. Consequently civilizations tend to be exploitative in order to generate surplus.

54. It is exactly this ability to add that makes for so much resilience.

55. For this reason they have to be lifted up, by their own efforts and those of others. The bias in exercises such as the present one has to be overcome.

56. See the article referred to in Footnote 10 above.


58. See the paper referred to in Footnote 17 above.

59. This is explored in some detail in the Alternative Ways of Life subproject of the GRIP project, see papers by Monica Wteogah.

60. This is explored in Johan Galtung, "On the Eastern-European Social Formation And Its Future", Geneva, 1979-80.

61. Khomeini - will the capital of Islam become Qom rather than Mecca?

62. See the paper referred to in Footnote 35 above.

63. The forthcoming book by the Oslo team, Macro-history and Western Civilization has this as its key theme.
For a short glimpse of the history of Islam the following may be useful (references from Janet K. O'Dea, T.F. O'Dea and C.J. Adams, Religion and Man: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Harper & Row, New York, 1972.

When the inner West receded into the localism of the Middle Ages, with a weak superstructure, something very different happened in the outer reaches of the Occident. From about + 610 till his death in + 632, Muhammad the Prophet created Islam. After his death the (rightly guided) Khalifahs took over. Islam spread at tremendous speed, and at the tip of the sword. "Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt came under Muslim control, later (the battle of Nihavand (641) the entire Sassanian Empire was brought crashing down to disappear from the pages of history, and the whole of the Iranian plateau was added to Muslim territories. By the end of the century North Africa had been overrun on the west, followed soon afterward by the establishment of an Ummawi state in Spain, and on the east the Muslims were penetrating all of Central Asia beyond the Oxus River." (p.169) "One of the later waves of Islamic expansion brought the faith to the Indian subcontinent in a decisive way - /with/ the establishment of the Sultanate of Delhi by Muhammad Ghori in 1192..." A still later wave of growth, introduced Islamic faith into the islands of the Indonesian archipelago, this time through the agency of traders and wandering mystics—"it was a factor in the life of the islands by the twelfth century. In the fifteenth century the first Muslim Sultanate took form..." (p.169) And then Anatolia, the Turks "who began to enter Islamic territories and the service of rulers in large numbers in the tenth century, to subdue the vast region of Anatolia and Asia Minor for Islam—eventually the Ottomans overthrew Christian power in Constantinople (1453) and drove their armies far into Eastern Europe." (p.170)

But then something happened: the inner West re-emerged in its expansion phase, drove the Muslims out of Spain and back into Africa— but they held on to the other conquests, only did not expand. And the West then had its religious expansion, covering the Americas and large parts of Africa but not Islam territory and only to a minor extent Hindu and Buddhist territory. Since the Second World War, however, Christian missionary activity is suffering set-backs, and now it is said that the ratio of African converts to Islam and to Christianity is like 10:1. A problem, however, is whether the capital of Islam will remain Mecca, or be moved to Qom..."