GOALS AND PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT
An Integrated View

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To divide the world into West and East, and then into North and South, trying to persuade us that there is an East-West conflict and a North-South dialogue going on, does not yield much insight and does not even stand up against a little study of the map of our world. But if we use both divisions at the same time a surprisingly fruitful division of the world emerges into four worlds of development:

Table 1. Four worlds of development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEST</th>
<th>EAST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>First world: Private capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD countries</td>
<td>CMEA countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>Third world: NIEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America, Caribbean, Africa, Arab World, West Asia, South Asia</td>
<td>Japan, China, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand</td>
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In dividing the world this way some positions are made explicit:

- there is no "North" as an actor, the capitalist and the socialist parts are different and enter in different ways in relation to the Third world
- there is no "South" as an actor either; the countries in East and Southeast Asia, particularly the mini-Japans [Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore] are both quite rich and industrialized and enter the world more like Japan. China and other countries in this region also fit better into this picture, particularly in the slightly longer run, than in any other major grouping.
- there is no "North"-"South" conflict but certainly a major economic conflict between the world Northwest and the world Southeast, and a major conflict over dependency in general between the world Northwest and the world Southwest. The idea of a North-South conflict mystifies world reality.
- there is no "East-West" conflict, but certainly a major political conflict between the world Northwest and the world Northeast.

Thus, the world Northwest, the rich private capitalist countries, emerge as the pivot element in the conflicts: a conflict over basic economic restructing of the world with the world Southwest, the Third world; a conflict of increasingly sharp economic competition with the world Southeast; and a conflict that erupts in a major military confrontation with the world Northeast.
also some countries in the Third, Second and First worlds, but they hardly constitute a threat to Fourth world countries in the struggle for global economic hegemony as industrial suppliers.

These three major world conflicts, obscured by artificial East/West and North/South borderlines will continue to evolve and interact in ways that are difficult to predict, particularly as a new structural conflict around the increasing dependency of the Third world on the Fourth world is also taking shape. Just as the biggest country in the Fourth world, China, manages to liberate itself from the Second world the Third world may also increasingly manage to liberate itself from the First. The efforts of the First world to find major and reliable allies in the other world (with Second world as a "North" in order to share the burdens of a more equitable world order demanded by the "South"; with the Third world as a defense against "communism" in the concept of the "Free World"; with the Fourth world as a Trilateral in order to manage world capitalism are probably all bound to fail. In fact, the First world is probably slated to suffer economic defeat in the competition with the Fourth world, to suffer political defeat in its effort to continue to manipulate the Third world and may also suffer military defeat in a confrontation with the Second world - not because the Second world has more effective destructive power, but because the First world is more vulnerable.

In the shorter run the economic decline of the First world (low or negative growth rates, unemployment and inflation, decreasing market shares) will continue, as will the economic growth of the Fourth world and the stagnation of the other two worlds - with some exceptions. The Fourth world will be protected by relatively good distribution of richness, the other three will all be headed for internal revolts because of increasingly unequal distributions as the economies get tighter - particularly in the more conservative of the First world countries.
the village market; people were their own intelligentsia; police and military there were but the former for the outside and the latter local, not both operating at the national level.

Clearly, to the extent this is a correct picture "development" entails an enormous concentration of power at the national level with the goal-setting becoming a national ideology of adequate standard of material living, for all; national plans and markets providing goods and services and the PMP complex pushing where BWL and BCI provide and insufficient pull. This concentration of power takes place in what is here called the "social" space, meaning by that the country, or [wrongly] the "nation". But there are also other space: the human (or inner, the local, the global and the outer [nature]. When there was a low level of plan and market at the national level this does not mean there were no plans and markets, but they were at the local level. National articulation would generally imply local disarticulation, at least in relative terms; although processes whereby both national and local levels of power increase together are not inconceivable.

If we now take national plan and market articulation as the key aspects of development of social space the four worlds of development can be relatively well fitted in:

Figure 2. Development as plan and market articulation, nationally

RED
State
PLAN
Bureaucracy
Marxism
[socialism]

GREEN
Local
HUMANS
Family, Peers, Village
Anarchism, Gandhism, Maoism

YELLOW
State and Capital
PLAN and MARKET
Bureaucracy and Corp.
Japanism

BLUE
Capital
MARKET
Corporation
Liberalism [capitalism]
more market articulation through an expanding private sector.

This thing called "development", then, seems to be to drag Third world countries with a very weak national level superstructure from the corner where they were, traditionally (as we were all of us), and up to some place on that diagonal - from the Green corner to the Blue corner if they get US/First world "assistance", to the Red corner if they get SU/Second world "assistance", and towards the Rose segment in-between if they get "assistance" from such 'First and a half' countries as Yugoslavia or Norway. As all these countries are members of the United Nations it is not so easy for the UN to engage in development assistance without being a party to one world or the other; a problem often solved by sticking to fundamentals on which there is sufficient consensus (provision for material basic needs and for basic administrative infrastructure).

In short, "development" is a way in which certain countries, strongly articulated at the national level, reproduce themselves. Why they do it can be discussed (to have allies in the world space, to validate their own system, to penetrate better in something shaped the way they know and master, out of solidarity with the poor and repressed); whatever one's judgment it is clear that this is the only thing they can do because it is the only thing they know how to do. There is a broad consensus that to be modern, developed one has to be somewhere on that diagonal.

A broad consensus, yes, but with three rather major exceptions.

The first is found among the defectors from that line, the green wave of people disenchanted with too much plan and/or market articulation, groping for systems more rooted in the local level in family and peers, and in what is held to be true human needs. At the same time as there is an effort to push and pull Third world countries up towards some landing place on that diagonal many peopl
and three (or four - gandhism/anarchism/maoism and japanism) along the other. Of course, practice differs and will always have to differ from theory - no reasonably coherent body of social thought can ever mirror complex and contradictory social reality without making a travesty of it.

And yet it is useful to think in terms of these five colors or six, seven theories. There is so much human aspiration and dream, and so much genuine endeavour to come to grips with the human condition in general and the development problématique in particular embedded in them! And exactly for that reason one wonders whether they really exclude each other or whether they are not also expressions of social and intellectual polarization; of one group embracing one ideology put forward by one intellectual who is then contradicted by another intellectual putting forward his theory (usually "his", women seem to be less interested in such verbal games) which is then embraced by a group with interests seen as contradictory to the first group. And so on, and so forth.

But if that is the case the search for viable combination might be interesting, seeing the polarization as due to the theory process rather than as due to any deeper social process. If we use the two axes of Figure 2, capital-articulation and state-articulation, as the two basic ideological vectors in this effort to theorize about social space, then the ideologies or theories along the main diagonal, from green to yellow, are already eclectic - including the rose one. On this diagonal $S = C$; the question is how high one wants $S + C$ to be, minimum as in the green solution, in-between as in the rose solution, or maximum as in the yellow solution?

My own predilection would be in favor of something between green and rose as that would yield the society with the highest level of complexity, with both local, state and capital articulation.
Let us now make this more complex by exploring more the other two types of power: normative and coercive, not only the structure built to provide for goods and services, making people comply as producers as otherwise they would not qualify as consumers. To expand a little on Marx: a basic key to power is to own means of production (not necessarily individually, but as a class, capitalist or bureaucrat or both) so that one can say: produce on our condition or else! [starve to death], because you will not gain what you need to consume. *Do ut des, quid pro quo.*

But people have to want to consume that which they produce. They have to want the goods and services produced, not other goods and services; leaving alone that they should not be able to produce in any other way than that articulated by B and C and their helpers in the intelligentsia. The promulgation of BWL serves this purpose under the second point, "material comfort". There is the problem of how to produce all these material goods when non-manual work is also promised: the contradiction presumably resolved through very high productivity and automation, at the expense of those in other worlds who still have to engage in manual work. The need for services is assured under the third and fourth points: privatism means withdrawal from the local level into a micro space that cannot possibly supply neither goods nor all the services ["*love* and *tendercare*" may be, but not medical care and schooling], hence the local level is left in *vacuo*, and the national level is emerging as having a monopoly on essential services. Local economic [goods and services] cycles are broken up, the cycles expand and become national, spun through B and/or C. The state, not the local level and not even capital, is seen as the ultimate guarantor of security - not only in the limited sense of protection against violence, but in the sense of *social* security, lasting provision for basic needs, the famous security net.

But the BWL ideology is not all that is needed in terms
But few systems have this value density. In the Occident, for instance, it took long time to bend Christianity (originally a religion highly compatible with green values) so that a good Christian would serve the state (Emperor Constantin, Roman Empire) and/or capital (Calvin?). To ensure that one does what one has to do even if one does not want to do it, social control [a euphemism for force] is needed, not the carrot of products if one produces in the prescribed manner (as slave, serf, worker), but the stick of pain inflicted. Basic values insufficiently internalized have to be institutionalized. And thus the history of development also becomes the history of coercion, force, violence: both the coercion needed to keep a system in a certain region in the space of development (Figure 2), the coercion needed to move it [breaking down the structures that upheld the preceding pattern, for instance] and the coercion needed to settle in a new region. Each formation serves the interests of some groups more than others and in general one would expect the overprivileged to resist and the underprivileged to promote a change.

Is any world of development more inherently repressive than the others? Empirical studies may certainly give correlations between location of a country (according to Table 1) and level of repression. But methodologically they may be difficult to interpret. Is the repression a part of the formation or is it a reaction to efforts to alter status quo, from within and/or without? Or is it an effort to alter the status quo in and by itself, a formation on the way to something else? The safest position to take on this issue is probably that any system can be found with or without high levels of repression, with or without the brown element, so to speak. Thus, feudalism was to a large extent repression exercised over fragmented, relatively self-sufficient local communities. The transition to capitalism presupposed some opening of cycles of local self-sufficiency, forcing labor into nation-
From the position that repressive structures may be found anywhere it does not follow that they are equally likely anywhere. A non-repressive structure is one that gives people a chance to participate, to have not only a say but even the final word, meaning that the authorities are ultimately accountable to the people [to whom they are an authority]. There are many ways in which this may happen. Parliamentary, nation-wide democracy is said to be one, constitutional guarantees for basic human rights is also one. However, the stand taken here will be that an assembly [which can be dissolved very easily] or a constitution [which can be violated equally easily] are insufficient to stem the powers of coercion of the PMP complex. Theirs is the state as organization, a state that in addition organizes goods and services and promulgates ideology. For that state not to be repressive it has has to be balanced by something more than assemblies and words. It has to be balanced by another structure of some solidity, and there has even to be some built in contradiction, even antagonism between the structures for them to balance each other in such a way that people can get some latitude, some space in-between.

There seem to be two possibilities here; one coming out of liberal theory but actually much more from social democratic practise, and one coming out of federalist theory and practise.

The first is the idea of having capital balance the state. It is a very old and very bourgeois idea, and by state is then usually meant only the PMP part, not the BGI part. But if the state is taken in a somewhat broader sense as also implying planning and execution for a range of goods and services, then we are in the social democrat part of the development space. It cannot be quite by chance that those welfare states in Northwestern Europe [and some Commonwealth countries highly inspired by them] are both mixed economies and quite democratic in the usual sense of that term. Of course it works both ways: because of a democratic tradition
One might now add a third possibility: a totally green (dark green) society where there is direct democracy in all local units because they are sufficiently small, and that is it. But is this a society, or just a set of local units? For it to become a society some central element is needed, call it a national level or whatever, and the thesis is that it is not enough that each local level is democratic (in the sense that the authorities are fully accountable to the people and can be recalled). The local levels must also be able to act together, otherwise they would be too easy prey, one by one, for central powers.

But then there is the fourth possibility, that of having the local unit as a society in its own right! After all, the classical European state was very often a mini-state - there are still some remnants of that system (such as Andorra, San Marino, Lichtenstein). This would be a solution provided they do not become too easy prey to bigger fish in the global waters. In other words, it may only be a solution if it is not only a local but also a global solution.

According to this way of thinking the potentially least repressive society would be one with both balance mechanisms at work: state balances capital, and national level in balance with local level. One may think of Switzerland, but that is hardly correct: state and capital work too well together, and the cantons are too fragmented. Hence, even in the country of very frequent referenda it may be very difficult for the population to override a center that is too well harmonized when the people are too geographically fragmented.

Again, it is along the main diagonal in development space solutions seem to be located. The principle of balance should be added to the principle of complexity above, again focusing on the main diagonal, and particularly on the segment between green and rose, not towards the yellow as it becomes too top heavy.
these needs that are or can be seen as more somatic, material.

But then there are the growth or development needs, more mental/spiritual, less material although there certainly also is a material basis for them, eg a rock, rock bottom level satisfaction of the material needs. Needs for identity and needs for freedom are being needs as opposed to the having needs just mentioned. There is no limits to their satisfaction. From their dissatisfaction, in the shape of alienation and repression, respectively it is not a range, like for hunger, up to a point of satisfaction. There is a ladder which can be climbed, up from the murky swamps of alienation and repression, into daylight - but that ladder just goes on and on like Jacob's ladder in the Bible, but unlike Jacob's ladder it does not even end in Paradise, in Heaven. There is no end. And there are many ladders, not just one. Moreover, much of the climbing one has to do oneself, neither pushing, nor pulling are sufficient however necessary they may be in certain stages. A person can be fed and clothed and so on, but cannot be given identity and freedom. They are aspects of the person's personality, evolving through exertion, ever more, and then even more. There is no limit to being, or at least they are far away, like in Goethe's Faust (wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können wir erlösen) or in the buddhist vision of human growth, ending in a state of maximum entropy, nibbana.

This is not a place to explore in any depth a theory of identity and freedom. Had we lived in a less economistic/material, more humanistic/spiritual era vocabularies for quick, but also deep communication would have been around - but we do not. Suffice it only to say that there are many foci with which a person can identify: self [including work products], persons in the micro space around oneself, the local space, the macro space (country with its institutions, nation with its culture), the region, the
The present paper gives a brief description of some of the basic assumptions in a world model coming out of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, the GPID Project. Where the present author is concerned that project came out of research done at the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research at the University of Oslo in the period 1972-1977, in the Trends in Western Civilization Program and the World Indicators Program. Continuation of that research was then for a period supported by the United Nations University, Tokyo. I am indebted to the many colleagues in the GPID Project for good discussions, to the Institut Universitaire d'Études du Développment, Genève, and to Dietrich Fischer in particular.

For some publications by the present author from the GPID Project, all in one way or the other feeding into the GPID model, see:

"Sobre alfafa y beta y sus muchas combinaciones", in [pp. 19-95] Masini, E. Ed., Visiones de sociedades deseables, CEESTEM, Mexico, 19...


"Towards a New International Technological Order", in Alternatives, A Journal of World Policy, Delhi, 1978-79, pp. 277-300


"On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared", Review, 1980


"Society and Health: Some Health-related Societal Trends in Industrialized Countries", Psychiatry and Social Science, 1981, pp. 3-15


Also see Essays in Peace Research, Vols. I-V, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1975


megalopolis hustle-bustle. There is no perfect correlation here, and yet persons who seem to have come far along such roads, if not attaining buddhahood at least attaining what one might call "person-hood", and communicating what they have attained to others through acts of creation have done so living in the small, even sometimes isolated, in an unencumbered setting of neither too little, nor too much of material things.

How, then, does all this relate to the development exercise as we know it from social space, with its three power articulation dimensions: normative power expressed as the general goal of BWL, remunerative power expressed as the goods and services BCI can produce, and coercive power as the control, force, pain etc. that PMP can exert? The conclusions are both simple and obvious and well known, but they have to be drawn and even as often as possible. But let us first note the correspondence [not accidental] between the dimensions of power and the classes of needs: normative power defines with what to identify; remunerative power defines goods and services - certainly relevant for survival and well-being; and coercive power sets the limits to freedom.

I think there is little doubt that the strong point of the development styles seen as blue, red and yellow above is there ability, at least in the first run, to give satisfaction to the material needs for survival and [material] well-being. There is no scarcity of having for most, or at least many people in these three worlds; in fact, the system behaves as if there is, or should be, no limit to having. But as to the other two needs classes the picture is negative. Normative power is exercised so as to legitimate the BCI complex at work with its termite like production mania, demanding identification with the goals of the highly materialistic BWL to the exclusion of other concerns if they are at variance with that goal pattern. More than that: there are also ideas or values of competition, rationality and discipline, all defined
4. Development: the world space

Let us now try the same exercise for the world space, simply asking the question: what are the consequences of the various styles of development for the world space, the space of governments [states], but also of nongovernments [international nongovernmental organizations, profit and non-profit]. This is both a more easy and a more difficult exercise; easy because the consequences of this tremendous accumulation of normative, remunerative and coercive power in the hands of the ruling elites [BCI, PMP] of the states are so obvious, difficult because there is so little explicit thinking about what a developed world space would look like.

In a sense this is both strange and obvious: strange because it should be so tremendously significant and also tempting as an intellectual exercise; obvious because recognition of the world as a system with possible development dimensions is recent, at any rate more recent than the recognition of the society as such a system which again is more recent than the recognition of human beings as systems with such dimensions - of human growth. And in the absence of thinking many people become prey to the easiest type of analysis, reductionist analysis, failing to see the sui generis nature of these spaces. According to such views a developed society is a set of developed human beings, and a developed world a set of developed societies. One also hears, but that would be from the commissar rather than from the yogi just referred, reducing everything to human growth: a developed human being is what comes out of a developed society - for instance a socialist society. One never hears, however, that a developed society is the product of a developed world for the very simple reason that no such concept seems to have emerged.

About a maldeveloped world, however, we know a lot. Again the three power aspects are useful. If the world should consist of only one society then one could, of course, apply the ana
blue governments may very well cooperate and together constitute an internal sector which would then be intergovernmental [if in addition it is social democrat it might include most of the participant countries where their population is concerned].

In the world in which we live, furthermore, the general ethos becomes dominated by the dominant ethos of the dominant elites in the dominant countries. Concretely, this means a general world ideology with the materialism of the bourgeois way of life at its center, easily the most popular [in the sense of number of adherents] ideology in human history. At the social level three elements had to be added to this: competition, rationality and discipline. But it does not quite work like that at the world level. Competition there certainly is, leading to military races and economic races, to efforts to obtain military balance and economic balance [zones of influence, quotas, rules of the game, etc.], and when this does not succeed, ultimately to military wars and economic wars, increasingly devastating with higher levels of military technology in particular and production technology in general. In the social space such phenomena, by no means unknown, could be tempered by the combination of rationality and discipline. But in the world space both seem to be curiously absent: the tragedy of the commons is enacted in world space rather than in social space and is, of course, an exercise in lack of both rationality and discipline. Which all serve to prove one thing: some kind of world central authority is necessary, commanding either, thereby regulating competition among governments and nongovernments and based on both of these as well as on the world population directly. Something between the United Nations, as we know it, and world government of strong states as we - indeed - also know it.

So again we are led to the same conclusion: the primacy given to the social space leads to human maldevelopment and also world maldevelopment - to the pauperization of those in the exter