GOALS AND PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT
An Integrated View

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1. Four worlds of (mal)development: a bird's eye view.

Let us start with a geo-political map of the world: the home and the hope of humankind, as a guide to some basic structures and processes. To divide the world into West and East, and then into North and South, trying to persuade us that there is an "East-West conflict" and a "North-South dialogue" going on, does not yield much insight and does not even stand up against a little scrutiny of the political map of our world. But if we use both divisions at the same time a surprisingly fruitful division of the world emerges into four worlds of development, or rather maldevelopment:

Table 1. Four worlds of (mal)development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>WEST</th>
<th>EAST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD countries</td>
<td>First world: Private/corporate capitalism</td>
<td>Second world: State/bureaucratic socialism</td>
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<tr>
<th>SOUTH</th>
<th>Third world: New international Economic Order</th>
<th>Fourth world: Ichi-ban: No.1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South America, Caribbean, Africa, Arab World, West Asia, South Asia</td>
<td>Japan, Mini-Japans, ASEAN, Socialist countries, Australia, N. Zealand, Oceania</td>
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In dividing the world into four worlds as geopolitical areas this way some positions are made explicit:

- there is no "North" as an actor, the capitalist and the socialist parts are different and enter in different ways in relation to the Third world in spite of having "industrialization" in common.

- there is no "South" as an actor either; the countries in East and Southeast Asia, particularly the "mini-Japans" (South Korea, Taiwan, and the city/island states Hong Kong and Singapore) are both quite rich and industrialized and enter the world more like Japan. China and other countries in this region also fit better into this picture, particularly in the slightly longer run, than in any other major grouping.

- there are, obviously, no "West" or "East" as actors either
there is no "North-South conflict" but certainly a major economic conflict between the world Northwest and the world Southeast, and a major conflict over dependency in general between the world Northwest and the world Southwest. The idea of a "North-South conflict" mystifies world reality.

there is no "East-West conflict", but certainly a major political conflict between the world Northwest and the world Northeast. The idea of an "East-West conflict" only makes sense if by the "world" one only means the Northern part, with ramifications else where.

Thus, the world Northwest, the rich private capitalist countries, emerge as the pivot element in world conflicts: a conflict that may erupt in a major military confrontation with the world Northeast; the Second World; a conflict over basic economic restructuring of the world with the world Southwest, the Third world; a conflict of increasingly sharp economic competition with the world Southeast, the Fourth world, and as a result of all this conflicts within the First world.

These four conflicts are certainly not unrelated. The common root is the structure imposed upon national and global-economies by the projet of the First world: private/corporate capitalism. The other three worlds are dialectic reactions to this structure and process, centered in the First world and rooted in particular aspects of Occidental cosmology. The first reaction, historically, was found in the First world: the reaction of the working class, trade unions, socialist parties, welfare states. The second reaction was found in the Second world; headed and dominated by the Soviet Union, partly withdrawing from the system in an effort to build an alternative projet: state/bureaucratic systems. The third reaction is found in the Third world with their projet, the New International Economic Order: essentially an effort to become subjects and not only objects on the global market by imitating nationally some of the aspects of either or both of the First and Second worlds. And the fourth reaction (although Japan actually precedes the second and the third) is found in the Fourth world: in an effort to play the game of world capitalism better than the First world, outdoing them at their own game, thereby becoming No. 1 - ichi-ban.
It is my contention that the Fourth world will or have already succeeded in this, not only because of their own skills in playing the game, but also because of the weakening of the First world through the conflict and arms race (and general militarization) with the Second world, the limits to exploitation to the Third World and the First world's proletariat, to the exploitation of nature, not to mention of the exploiters themselves. Historically important was, of course, the OPEC action of 1973, as an example of the limits to Third world exploitation leading up to the launching (and then decline and fall) of the NIEO. But the OPEC countries became rich the wrong way, by possessing rather than through processing (and hard work), and for that reason will hardly play any lasting role in the world economy. In addition, the Islamic structures on interest and the fact that most OPEC countries are Islamic, will probably make it difficult to proceed from commercial to industrial capitalism with the necessary entrepreneurial zeal and gusto— and then there is also the lack of organizational infrastructure. And the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in the Third, Second and First worlds have experienced some growth, but they hardly constitute a threat to Fourth world countries in the struggle for global economic hegemony as industrial suppliers.

These major world conflicts, obscured by dichotomies such as the East/West and North/South borderlines, will continue to evolve and interact in ways that are difficult to predict, particularly as a new structural conflict around the increasing dependency of the Third world on the Fourth world is now taking shape. The Fourth world may also develop closer ties with the Second world. Just as the biggest country in the Fourth world, China, managed to liberate itself from the Second world, the Third world may also increasingly manage to liberate itself from the First. However, the efforts of the First world to find major and reliable allies in the other worlds—with the Second world as an "industrialized North" in order to share the burdens of the more equitable world order demanded by the "South", with the Third world as a "defense against communism" in the concept of the "Free World"; with the Fourth world as a "Trilateral" in order to manage world capitalism—are probably all bound to fail because of the built-in conflicts.
In fact, the First world is probably slated to suffer economic defeat in the competition with the Fourth world, to suffer political defeat in its effort to continue to manipulate the Third world and may also suffer military defeat in a confrontation with the Second world - not because the Second world has more effective destructive power, but because the First world is more vulnerable. In addition it is a house divided against itself.

In the shorter run the economic decline of the First world (with such indicators as low or even negative economic, population and urban growth, unemployment and inflation, decreasing market shares) will continue, as will the economic growth of the Fourth world and the stagnation of the other two worlds - with some exceptions. The Fourth world will be protected by relatively good distribution of richness, the other three and particularly the Third world will be headed for internal revolts because of increasingly unequal distributions as the economies get tighter - possibly also in the more conservative of the First world countries.

In short, a turbulent world, very far from most people's demand of "development" except, perhaps, in some Fourth world countries.

2. Development as power articulation.

Why does all of this happen? Somehow it is "development" at work, a term to be criticized later, here to be used essentially as a synonym for a certain way of life with (material)'standard of living', combined with "modernization" or "nation-building". Regardless of how the term is conceived of there would be agreement that some kind of social change is involved, and since social change is politics and politics is about power, development is an exercise of and in power. The following is a sketch of a general theory of that exercise, taking "power" as the key concept, the hub around which any theory of development will have to be spun. The rest is, mainly rhetoric.
The theory would start with the traditional three types of power - the power of ideas, of the carrot and of the stick - or more technically expressed: normative, remunerative and coercive power. By and large I will stand by the thesis that developmentalism as a major creed, and a world creed at that, concretizes and legitimizes these three aspects of power in the following way: with only minor variations - (except in the mix, the relative presence of the components) - from one of the four worlds of development to the other:

**Normative power:** deriving from the goal of a bourgeois way of life for all:
- non-manual work; avoiding dirty and heavy work
- material comfort; controlling nature's fluctuations
- privatism; withdrawal into family and peer groups
- security; a pattern of lasting entitlements

**Remunerative power:** deriving from a structure providing goods/services:
- state-articulation, bureaucracies with national plans
- capital-articulation, corporations with national markets
- intelligentsia/professional articulation, for both

**Coercive power:** deriving from a structure providing force and pain:
- police, for intra-national force
- military, for inter-national force;
- party, (single party) for control of all the other components

They will be referred to as the BWL (bourgeois way of life) syndrome, the BCI (bureaucracy-corporations-intelligentsia) complex and the PMP (police, military, party) complex respectively. The BCI and PMP complexes may also be referred to as technocracy and partocracy, respectively.

"Development", then, is the problem of articulation of all three at the national level, and integrated with each other. Of course, power of all three types there has always been and will always be. But in "traditional" societies the goal was defined by religion, to a large extent; the plans were drawn up at the (extended) family level, the market was the village market; people were their own intelligentsia; and there were but the former for local level and the latter for the outside, the global level; not both also operating at the national level. But the single party there was, the single church, the single creed - in the Occident even seen as universal, for the whole world.
Clearly, to the extent this is a correct picture "development" implies an enormous concentration of power at the national level with the national ideology including the developmental goals of adequate material standard of living, for all; and modernization, meaning national planning bureaucracies and/or market-oriented corporations providing goods and services through a massive mobilization of intelligentsia. The PMP complex enters the scene pushing where BWL and BCI provide an insufficient pull. This concentration of power takes place in what is here called the "social" space, meaning by that the country, or (wrongly) the "nation"; the "state" being an organization within the country encompassing bureaucracy, police and military and varying proportions of corporation, intelligentsia and the party. In line with customary usage we have to use the term "national" level. When there was or is little or nothing of plan and market at the national level this does not mean there are no plans and markets, only that they were or are at the local social level. National articulation of plans and markets generally implies local disarticulation, at least in relative terms; like kings and local princes they are rarely strong at the same time. But processes whereby both national and local levels of power articulation increase together are not inconceivable, and should be explored.

Before I now proceed exploring what happens in social space under "development" there is one major comment to make. Development positively understood, not as "development" or maldevelopment, can only be explored by reference to all four spaces of development: the nature (outer), human (inner), social (with the national and local levels) and global (with regional subdivisions such as the four world map presented above) spaces. What would be possible meanings of natural, human (meaning individual), social and global development? How do they relate to each other? What are possible ideal world goals of development in all four spaces, what are the processes taking place, what would be possible strategies bending these processes towards the goals, remembering that the ideal world goals are themselves in process and that
the real world processes tend to become goals in themselves? This will all be taken up elsewhere. However, I have to start at some point and choose to start where most people locate the development problématique: not only in social space, but in the economic (meaning production-distribution-consumption under conditions of scarcity) aspect of that space.

3. Development: the social space

Remunerative power

If we now take national market and plan articulations as key aspects of development of social space the four worlds of "development" can be relatively well fitted in:

Figure 2. Social development as national plan and market articulation.

In this Figure there is an effect to combine three approaches: a map of five development ideologies, a map of the five corresponding social structures and a typology for the four worlds. That is already quite a lot. In addition, however, the Figure will be used for historical trajectories and normative approaches. A tall order for such a simple diagram; let us see how it works and evaluate it at the end.
At the end of the two axes the First and Second worlds are seen as engaged in their exercises of (trans)national market and (inter)governmental articulation, respectively; building very strong Corporations and very strong Bureaucracies for the production and distribution of goods and services, with all that implies in terms of allocation of economic assets. However, it is well known that even if in the Soviet Union State is stronger than Capital and in the United States Capital is stronger than State (here meaning "state" in the sense of provider of goods and services, not in the general sense of an instrument of coercion, the PMP complex) in many countries they are more equal, Yugoslavia perhaps being the "in-betweenest" with its system of self-management (smo upravljenje). Some of those countries are called "social democracies" for various historical reasons. They have been placed here on the compromise line B + C = constant, the diagonal of modernization, of "modern" societies. Seen from the Soviet Union the social democracies look capitalist, even "petty bourgeois", seen from the United States they look socialist, even "communist".

In such countries the provision for goods and services is mixed; partly by plan, partly by market; partly with Bureaucracy as the provider, partly with the Corporation (the modern articulation of the company/firm/enterprise). Mixed economies also have to be negotiation economies, implying a lot of negotiations between state and capital to find workable compromises when one does not automatically have the upper hand over the other. There are actually several mix formulas such as national level according to plan, local level according to market (or vice versa); basic needs according to plan, non-basic according to market or other functional formulas. The structural and functional mixes can themselves be mixed.

There is the convergence thesis, that the first and the Second worlds would somehow have to meet in the middle, (arrows (1) in the Figure), in the social democratic First and a half world. But even if there is much to say in favor of the Northwest European welfare states relative to many other systems in the world as a normative model, this does not mean that in the concrete historical process
the First and Second worlds would ever "meet" there. Trajectories in the space of Figure 2 are much more complex, as we shall try to show and there is certainly no clear Endzustand, final stage in spite of the claims of all five systems that they are a coveted point in space. For one thing: even if some of the First world countries are there rather than in the corner (the corner is where the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, respectively, try to place the US and the UK during the early 1980s), they may move to other places before the Second world arrives when they introduce more market articulation through an expanding private sector - as they probably will have to do.

This thing called development, then, seems to be an effort to push Third world countries with a very weak national level superstructure, ie very little of corporate and/or bureaucratic superstructure, from the bottom left corner and up to some place on that diagonal. In other words from the Green corner to the Blue corner (2) if they get US/First world "development assistance", to the Red corner (3) if they get SU/Second world "development assistance", and towards the Rose/Pink segment in-between (4) if they get "development assistance" from such First-and-a-half countries as Yugoslavia or Norway. As all these countries are members of the United Nations it is not so easy for the UN to engage in "development assistance" without being partial to one world or the other; a problem often solved by sticking to technicalities on which there is sufficient consensus: provision for material basic needs, and for basic administrative infrastructure. In doing so they can play on what is similar rather than different along the modernity diagonal, united in the category of "developed `countries", or at least" more developed countries".

In short, development assistance is a way in which certain countries, with strong power articulations at the national level, reproduce themselves. Why they do it can be discussed: is it to produce allies in the global space; to validate their own system both within and without through reproduction; to penetrate better in something shaped the way they know and master; out of solidarity with the poor and repressed or any combination of these? Whatever one's judgment it is clear that reproduction is the only thing they can do because
it is the only thing they know how to do. A Red society cannot out of
Green raw material produce a Blue society and vice versa. But there
is a broad consensus that to be modern, developed one has to be some-
where on that diagonal, it is this consensus that constitutes the
general content of developmentalism. Cloning does the rest.

A broad consensus, yes, but with three rather major exceptions.

The first is found among the defectors from that line, the green
wave of people from any point on the diagonal (5) disenchanted with too
much plan and/or market articulation, groping for systems more rooted
in the local level, in family and peers, and in what is held to be true
human needs. At the same time as there is an effort to push and pull
Third world countries up towards some landing place on that very same diagonal
of modernity which many in countries that have already arrived and
have even had the power to define now try to leave. They can
only move, trying to invigorate local levels (collectives for pro-
duction and/or consumption in First world countries; self-managed
trade unions and even enterprises in Second world countries) to the
extent that they are free to move - and this freedom really to develop
something, for reasons to be discussed below, seems at present best
available in the Rose segment, the First-and-a-half world countries.
But people in the First and Second worlds also find local level possi-
bilities highly attractive. All together this creates a highly contra-
dictory picture of the development process: why try to arrive if
those who have arrived try to leave --- That shatters the whole myth
of development as an unambiguous exercise, if not unilinear towards
one point, at least towards a diagonal, uni-directional. Again con-
vergence seems to get lost. Not strange there is anti-Green aggressiveness.

And then - the second exception: there are those in the Third
world who are firmly rooted in the Green pole of development as not only
the most realistic, but also the most desirable (6). Like all these
ways of conceiving of development, the ideological formulation may be
more fundamentalist than really intended. There would be a state, even
some state planning at the national level, but the point of gravity would be more towards the local level. Clearly, what liberalism has meant for the blue pole of development, and marxism for the red pole, gandhism and maoism (and anarchism in general) are for the green pole - those two giant theories of development coming out of the Third world itself. India today, however, is heading for the diagonal, changing course all the time, and today's China could be - and better I think - classified as heading for the Fourth world, using a zig-zag course.

And then there is the third exception: the yellow or golden (to use a less racist expression) pole of development, with Japan as the supreme exemplar, with an unwritten ideology that can only be referred to as "japanism" - but clearly succesful, clearly concerned with development however defined, and clearly different from the others among other things because of the way in which state and capital, plan and market etc. seem to go hand in hand, overcoming (to some extent) the contradiction between them so heralded in Western theory. Of course they are imitated from all points on the diagonal by countries in crisis (7), tired or desperate of moving a little up and down the diagonal (8), e.g. pushed by an electorate trained to think and act in terms of the Red-Blue, left-right continuum only. But that does not mean that the Fourth world countries are themselves immune to crises: they may become the victims of their own succes, and turn in any direction (9).

**Five theories of development**, three (liberalism, social democracy, marxism) along one diagonal, and two (gandhism/anarchism/maoism and japanism) along the other. Of course, practise differs and will always have to differ from theory. No reasonably coherent body of social thought can ever mirror complex and contradictory social reality without making a travesty of it, more or less - so the correspondence between development ideology (the five) and development worlds (the four) may be far from perfect. Incidentally, this may also be a reason why social democracy does not function so badly: the theory is so lousy - a theme to be developed below. Nevertheless, it is useful to think in terms of these five colors and five theories. Actually, the colors are useful because they are more neutral, not so overloaded (and because of an obvious point about rainbows that will have to be made later). There
is so much human aspiration and dream, and so much genuine endeavour to come to grips with the human condition in general and the development problématique in particular embedded in these visions! And exactly for that reason one wonders whether they really exclude each other or whether they are not also expressions of social and intellectual polarization; of one group embracing one ideology put forward by some intellectual who is then contradicted by another intellectual putting forward his anti-thetical theory (usually "his", women seem to be less interested in such verbal games) which is then embraced by a group with interests seen as contradictory to the first group. And so on, and so forth, the world of ideas, of articles, lectures and books, takes on its own life relatively independent of reality - as all intellectuals know, leading to certain mental deformations they can only be cured through dialogue with non-intellectuals.

But if that is the case, the search for viable combinations might be interesting, seeing the left-right, red-blue polarization as due to the theory in intellectual communities just as much as processes rather due to any deeper social process in human communities. If we use the two axes of Figure 2, capital-articulation and state-articulation, as the two basic ideological vectors in this effort to theorize about social space, then the ideologies or theories along the main diagonal, from green to yellow, are already eclectic, depolarized - including the rose one. On this diagonal $B = C$; the question is how high one wants $B + C$ to be: minimum as in the green solution, inbetween as in the rose solution, or maximum as in the yellow solution? The problem is no longer capital-accumulation for the corporation versus power-accumulation for the state, but how much power of any kind should be accumulated where? According to this perspective it is the similarity between red and blue, ((trans)national) level centralism rather than dissimilarities in terms of public vs. private, differences in access to public capital, etc. that is significant.

There is an interesting difference between this main diagonal and the diagonal BC of Figure 2. The latter coincides with the spectrum of
political parties as generated by the First world; in the tradition where favoring strong capital and weak state is seen as a "rightist" position, whereas favoring a strong state and weak capital is seen as a "leftist" position, even a progressive position. Marxist statism grew partly out of the idea that if "capital is the enemy of the workers" and "the state is the enemy of capital" then the state can be seen as the possible protector of the victims of capital, the working class, even as their friend - after having been "conquered" (consult Polish workers on that idea). A concrete consequence of this is that much of the political theory, and practise, in the world is a reflection of a division into parties along a political axis that takes in only some alternatives, and only from the recent social history of some parts of the world. The focus on the diagonal BC obscures, even reduces the whole development dialogue to an unrealistic and ethnocentric simplification shared by liberal and marxist thinkers alike - both of them hostile to the "archaic" green pole, to the eclectic, non-pure rose/pink pole and both ignorant and confused about the yellow/golden pole. It is high time to broaden that dialogue. Figure 2 is an effort to do that, at least making it two-dimensional rather than that simplistic First world based diagonal.

Normative power

Let us now make this more complex by turning to the other two types of power: normative and coercive. The structures built to provide goods and services, making people comply as producers are not sufficient to qualify as consumers. Marx has pointed out that a basic key to power is to own means of production (not necessarily individually, but as a class, capitalist or bureaucrat or both) so that one can say: produce on our conditions or else! (starve to death), because you will not earn what you need in order to consume. You will literally not "make a living". Do ut des, quid pro quo. But people also have to want to consume that which the structures produces. They have to want the goods and services produced, not other goods and services. Marx could have added: consume on our conditions or else! because you will not be able to produce in
any other way than that articulated by bureaucracy and corporation
and their helpers in the intelligentsia, at least not after "development".

The promulgation of the bourgeois way of life serves this purpose,
particularly under the second point, "material comfort". It goes beyond
consumerism, however; the goal is an entire way of life. Of course, there
is the problem of how to produce all these material goods when "non-
manual work" is also promised: the contradiction presumably resolved
through very high productivity and automation, and at the expense
of those in other worlds who still have to engage in manual work of
the heavy, dirty and otherwise demeaning varieties. The services
come under the third and fourth points, but who "serves" whom? Privatism
means withdrawal from the local level into a micro space around the indi-
vidual. But that little space alone cannot possibly supply all the goods
or all the services; "love and tender care" may be, but not medical
care and schooling. The local level is made vacuous by that micro-
space and the national level which is emerging as having a monopoly
on essential services. Local economic cycles, both for goods and services
are broken up, the cycles are expanded and become national, spun through
B and/or C. The state, not the local level and not even capital, is seen
as the ultimate guarantor of security - not only in the limited sense
of survival, of protection against violence, but in the sense of social
security, lasting provision for all basic needs, the famous security net.
L'etat providence - the providential, the omni-provider - is a part of
the development syndrome.

But BWL ideology is not all that is needed in terms of normative
power. It is not sufficient to want the goods and services; one also has
to accept, even want, the structures set up for their production.
So let us for a moment agree with conventional wisdom and see the green
pole not as one approach to development but simply as lack of development,
as un-development. A green country is a country that is undeveloped
or underdeveloped (relative to its capacity). In this country we now
insert processes of capital and/or state articulation, markets and/or
plans. A simple but rather important proposition from sociology now be-
comes useful: people comply best when they want to do what they have to
do, in other words when basic values underlying social structures are
internalized, meaning that they have become personal values. It is easily seen what these key values would be:

for the market: competition, among producers to be the best sellers, among consumers to be the best buyers

for the plan: rationality, at the social level, and at the individual level to accept the "best" social solutions

for bureaucracy and corporation: discipline, respect for authority, and belief in the authority that be as the best possible.

The task of inculcating precisely these values is, of course, the major function of schooling under the ideology of developmentalism.

These three values can now serve as a basis for understanding why the green and the yellow are poles apart, in reality, not only in Figure 2. Most anarchist philosophies/ideologies would stress cooperation rather than competition, participation rather than planning from above, and solidarity rather than discipline (instead of discipline one might also have said loyalty above - meaning vertical discipline as opposed to the horizontal discipline of solidarity). Social democracy would combine the competition for rationality with rationality of competition. In Japan, on the other hand, all three developmental values above are very well internalized. Discipline is found both in the form of loyalty to state and nation in general (shinto), respect for authority (confucianism) and solidarity with others (buddhism). Competition and rationality were always there, in the bushido tradition, perhaps with groups rather than individuals as the actors. But they can also be seen as parts of the occidentalization of Japan, as values or orientations added to what was originally Japanese. It is the value combination that makes it possible for Japan to engage in such a rich and effective development process.

Coercive power

But few systems have this value density. In the Occident, for instance, it took a long time to bend Christianity (originally a religion highly compatible with green values) so that a good Christian would
serve the state (Emperor Constantin, Roman Empire) and/or capital (Calvin?) - perhaps only successful the last centuries. To ensure that people do what they have to do even when they do not want to do it, "social control", a euphemism for force, is needed. The carrot of products, if available only to the few, does not motivate, nor to produce in the prescribed manner when it is as slave, serf, worker. The stick, of pain inflicted, is used to keep people in line. Basic values insufficiently internalized have at least to be institutionalized. And thus the history of development also becomes the history of coercion, force, violence: both the coercion needed to keep a system in a certain region in the social space of development, the coercion needed to move it (breaking down the structures that upheld the preceding pattern, for instance) and the coercion needed to settle the society in a new region. Each formation serves the interests of some groups more than others and in general one would expect the overprivileged to resist and the underprivileged to favor, possibly also to promote a change. The Herr of the old system exercises violence to maintain power and privilege; the Knecht mobilizes counter-violence, and moves the system; the Knecht becomes a new Herr, and so on. The police-military-party complex changes uniforms and colors - but plus ça change, plus c'est-la même chose.

Is any world of development inherently more or less repressive than the others? Empirical studies may certainly give correlations between geo-political location of a country and level of repression. But methodologically such correlations may be difficult to interpret. Is the repression an intrinsic part of the formation or is it a reaction from within and/or without to all the efforts to alter status quo? Or is the repression an effort to alter the status quo in and by itself? Is it a formation on the way to something else? The safest position to take on this issue is probably that any system can be found with or without high levels of repression, with or without the brown element of the PMP complex so to speak, with its torture, prisons, murder of the population, its dictatorship. Thus, feudalism was to a large extent repression exercised over fragmented, relatively self-sufficient local
communities. The transition to capitalism presupposed some opening and expansion of economic cycles of local self-sufficiency, forcing labor into (trans)national labor markets such as plantations to pay taxes with cash, imposing a national capital market through monetization of as much as possible of the economy, then supplying goods and services centrally into that monetized economy. The green economy, with production for own consumption, or for barter, or for monetized exchange but then in very small economic cycles, decreases in size and significance as the blue economy takes over. Repression is needed, and is used - like in Central America today - to force people into a monetized national economy.

This is also true of the transition to socialism. The marxist hypothesis was that the reduction would take place above all in mature capitalist economies where capital and market and the productive forces in general are fully articulated, by inverting the structural dictatorship of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat into a direct dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie through the conquest of the state. Over time the state as repression will then wither away, leaving the state as an instrument for planning, production and distribution of goods and services. Normative and remunerative power alone are sufficient; coercive power is no longer needed.

However,

- the revolution takes place not in mature but in semi-articulated capitalist societies
- it may also take place in feudal societies, "by-passing capitalism"
- the dictatorship is not so much by the proletariat as by the PMP complex itself, and not so much over the bourgeoisie as (1) over the peasants to see to it that they continue delivering food-stuff at very low prices, (2) over workers to see to it that they continue producing the goods at low costs, feeding them cheap food-stuffs and (3) over intellectuals to see to it that they become a serving intelligentsia.
- the state does not wither away but solidifies as a setting both for the PMP complex and the BCI complex B in the sense of planning, C in the sense of production of goods and services, I in the sense of professionals - the two complexes becoming increasingly integrated within essentially the same social formation.
Evidently, there are some problems with marxist theory. But it is far superior to liberal theory which only sees continued and cumulative articulation of capital, with ever more production, turnover and accumulation; an unending "progress" along the line from green to blue, in Figure 2. Marxism equips time with a history, with the discontinuities, the social transformations, we know from history. The difficulty is the way in which it presupposes a linear sequence; in our terms:

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\text{green (feudalism)} \rightarrow \text{blue (capitalism)} \rightarrow \text{red (socialism)} \rightarrow \text{green (communism)}
\]

where the transition from socialism to communism seems to consist in first a withering away of the state as instrument of centralized planning, opening for smaller and self-reliant communities (hence commune-ism). The question of course, is: if History is to be a transition from green to green, is it really necessary to do it in such a complicated way? Is there not some more direct and less painful way?

From the position that repressive structures may be found anywhere it does not follow that they are equally likely anywhere. A non-repressive structure is one that gives people a chance to participate, to have not only a say but even the final word, meaning that the authorities are ultimately accountable to the people to whom they are an authority. There are many ways in which this may happen. Parliamentary, nation-wide democracy is said to be one, constitutional guarantees for basic human rights is also one. However, the stand taken here will be that an assembly (which can be dissolved very easily) or a constitution (which can be violated equally easily) are insufficient to stem the powers of coercion of the PMP complex, particularly when coupled to a monopolistic BCI complex and a BWL ideology leaving a people without alternatives. The state is theirs as an organization, a state that in addition organizes goods and services and promulgates ideology. For that state not to be repressive it has to be balanced by something more than assemblies and words. It has to be balanced by another structure of some solidity, and there has even to be some built-in contradiction, even antagonism between the structures for them to balance each other in such a way that people can get some latitude, some space in-between.
There seem to be three possibilities here; one coming out of liberal theory (but actually much more from social democratic practise), one coming out of federalist theory and practise, and one from anarchist/socialist (anarcho-socialist) theory and practise.

The first is the idea of having capital balance the state. It is a very old and very bourgeois idea, and by state is then usually meant only the PMP part, not the BCI part. But if the state is taken in a somewhat broader sense as also implying planning and execution for a range of goods and services, then we are in the social democratic part of the development space. It cannot be quite by chance that those welfare states in Northwestern Europe (and some Commonwealth countries highly inspired by them) are both mixed economies and quite democratic in the usual sense of that term, including fairly good human rights records, at home but also to some extent abroad. Of course this is a two-way relation because of a democratic tradition one group or even class cannot impose itself completely on the other. Compromises have to be worked out in order to provide a basis for a consensus that makes it possible to play the democratic game further. On the other hand, with state and capital both well rooted and in constant quarrel and conflicts (usually minor ones, otherwise there would not have been that much consensus) there is some space for people. But if state and capital are harmonized, like they are in Japan, the thesis would be that it becomes very difficult for people to be even heard, leaving alone having the last word. The crust is too thick, the burden too heavy: with the state on the left and capital on the right shoulders people become small when both of them are very heavy. And this may also to some extent be the case in France and in Switzerland with high levels of elite-integration across state-capital dividing lines or watersheds: in France through les grandes écoles (where people are made highly substitutable across the public/private divide); in Switzerland through the military (where people meet repeatedly, two to three weeks repetition each year for twelve years after basic service of four months). This is not that different from Japan with the strong cohesiveness in a university class of graduates who rise in a rather parallel fashion wherever they are in Japanese society (B or C or I; or
P or M or P for that matter) because of the principles of life-long employment and promotion by seniority. Hence, France and Switzerland may be the most successful in imitating Japan (arrow (7) in Figure 2), substituting l'arrogance française and die Schweiz ist ein Sonderfall for shintō definition of Japan as the chosen nation. The implication for participation and democracy is obvious and negative.

The second is the idea of balancing the national level with the local level. However, this will never work unless the local units can cooperate; if they are fragmented away from each other, the central, national level has an easy play. The idea would be to counterbalance the national level with an association of local levels - like positing against Beijing an association of 70,000 People's Communes. Different angles give different perspectives to articulate, again making it possible for people to become the arbiters of key structural conflicts. It is difficult to organize public opinion, to conscientize and mobilize - the structures are at work all the time and the key people in them work full time, a public rally or manifestation is an event, not a "permanent" like bureaucracies or corporations at work. Structures can only be balanced with structures, counter-structures.

And then there is the third possibility: a society where there is direct democracy in all local units because they are sufficiently small, in other words self-reliance, self-management, autogestion. But is this a society, or just a set of local units? For it to become a society some central or at least common element is needed, call it a national level or whatever. The thesis would then be that it is not enough that each local unit is "democratic" in the sense that the authorities are fully accountable to the people and can be recalled; the local units must also be able to act together, otherwise they would be too easy a prey, one by one, for central powers. And that points in the direction of the second idea above.

Of course there is also a fourth possibility, totally green (dark green), with the local unit as a society in its own right, with
with a self-reliance bordering on self-sufficiency. After all, the classical European state was very often a mini-state and there are still some remnants of that system - Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Faeroe Islands, Åland Islands (Luxembourg is too big, the Vatican is a big office). This would be a solution provided they do not become too easy prey to bigger fish in the global waters. In other words, it may only be a solution if it is not only a local but also a global solution. But even so it may become too inward-looking.

According to this way of thinking the potentially least repressive society would be one with both balance mechanisms at work: state balances capital, and national level balances local level; and in addition there is a very high level of self-reliance at the local level. One may think of Switzerland, but that is hardly correct: state and capital work too well together, the cantons are too fragmented, and there is insufficient local autonomy. Hence, even in the country of very frequent referenda it may be very difficult for the population to override a center that is too well harmonized when the people are socially too geographically and structurally fragmented. Yet, it is one of the more successful exemplars in this great human experiment and as a consequence, of course, conservative.

These explorations point to the lower half around the main diagonal in social development space as the region where the best solutions seem to be located, reasoning from the principle of balance. To this should be added a principle of complexity, or maturity, derived from ecological reasoning, as applied to Figure 2. Balance is then seen as an antidote to repression. But repression also serves a social function beyond infliction of pain: to assure a minimum of stability, resilience. How can resilience be obtained if the regressive character of the state is partly neutralized through counterstructures? Ecology informs us of the significance of complexity or maturity of a system, based on the level of diversity and the level of symbiosis among the elements. In the present analysis there are three elements: the local
level, state and capital - the green, the red and the blue. Any system based on only one of these would have very low diversity: resting on only one pillar so to speak with the system well into the ideologically pure corners. In the more eclectic yellow/golden, fourth world, Japanese corner there are two pillars but they have been amalgated into one very solid one. Best would be social systems based on all three in symbiosis: should one pillar fail, there are still two; and relations can be spun in all directions. Social democracy is based on two pillars; should one fail there is still one. Systems based on only capital/market articulation or only state/plan articulation become too vulnerable: if the pillar fails everything fails and all kinds of maldevelopment will be the result at all levels - as witnessed relatively clearly today in the absurd aspects of the major (dark) blue and (dark) red societies: the United States and the Soviet Union. What is left, then, is normative and coercive power, and a population increasingly frustrated and increasingly repressed by a system victim of its own onesidedness.

The two approaches, the balance approach and the complexity approach, can now be compared. The balance approach first points to the main diagonal (never capital or state alone); then to the lower half since the local level enters in balance with the national level, then towards the green corner with high level of local self-reliance. The complexity approach also points to the main diagonal, but away from the green corner as it is based on only one component, the local level. The question has also been raised whether in the yellow/golden corner there really are two elements, capital and state, or only one solid one, the amalgamated capital-state administering state-capital (after all the bureaucracy and corporation quarters in Tokyo, Kasumigaseki and Marinouchi, are close enough to each other to allow for very frequent and easy interaction!). Conclusion: a region around the main diagonal, between (but not including) the green and rose/pink points should satisfy both approaches at the same time, reasoning from a purely social system point of view, not taking into account the other three spaces of development. To which we now turn.
4. Development: the world space

Let us now try the same exercise for the world space by simply asking the question: what are the consequences of the various styles of development for the world space, the space of governments (states), but also of nongovernments (international nongovernmental organizations, profit and non-profit). This is both a more easy and a more difficult exercise; easy because the consequences of this tremendous accumulation of normative, remunerative and coercive power in the hands of the ruling elites (BCI, PMP) of the 150 or so states are so obvious; difficult because there is so little explicit thinking about what a developed world space would look like. In a sense this is both strange and obvious, strange because it should be so tremendously significant and also tempting as an intellectual exercise; obvious because the recognition of the world as a system with possible development dimensions of its own is recent. At any rate, it is more recent than the recognition of the society as such a system, which again is more recent than the recognition of human beings as "systems" with dimensions of human development. On the other hand nature, or "environment" conceived of as a system with development dimensions is perhaps even more recent. However that may be, in the absence of thinking many people become prey to the easiest type of analysis, reductionist analysis, failing to see the sui generis nature of these four spaces. According to such reductionist views a developed society is any set of developed human beings, and a developed world any set of developed societies. One also hears, but that would be from the "commissar" end of the spectrum rather than from the "yogi" end just referred to, reducing everything to human development: a developed human being is what comes out of a developed society - for instance a socialist society. One never hears, however, that a developed society is the product of a developed world, for the very simple reason that no such concept seems to have emerged.

About a maldeveloped world, however, we know a lot. Again the three power aspects are useful. If the world should consist of only one society then one could, of course, apply the analysis of section 3 above and end up with five world models plus a sixth one: the balanced and complex one. In that world politics would be Weltinnenpolitik (von Weizsäcker)
and my preferred world would be in the area between the green and the blue and the red, with a high level of both complexity and balance.

But we do not live in that world; we live in a world of governments and nongovernments, of people and nonpeople. In that world the countries are building increasingly strong BCI and PMP complexes. Both governments and nongovernments, through their BCI complexes, operate not only national economic cycles in general, and markets in particular, but transnational cycles and markets, spun around the world, but always in such a way that they divide the world in an internal sector where some consideration is given to the needs of other actors, and an external sector where there is no (or much less) such consideration, and rather catch as catch can.

This system can best be understood in its totality, relative to all production factors:

Table 2. Asymmetric exchange between internal and external sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>From external sector to internal sector</th>
<th>From internal sector to external sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>raw materials</td>
<td>waste products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>body drain, cheap labor in situ</td>
<td>excess labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>deposits, profits untied capital</td>
<td>investment tied capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>brain drain, cheap research in situ</td>
<td>sale of technology experiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy (administration)</td>
<td>obedience implementation</td>
<td>decision, commands standard operating procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products (goods/services)</td>
<td>semi-processed goods and services</td>
<td>processed goods and services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the world this is clearly what capialist imperialism is about, hence it is the specialty of the blue and the yellow systems. However, for all non-green development styles this division also applies inside the countries, in state socialist countries perhaps more to the nonmaterial needs of identity and freedom (but also to the material) under primary/primitive accumulation; in private capitalist countries perhaps more to the material (but also to the non-material). But the blue and yellow styles, in addition, presuppose a large external sector in the outside world - that is why they had colonialism and are clinging to neo-colonialism, refusing to let it go. In order to consolidate this the blue and yellow governments may cooperate and together constitute an internal sector which would than be administered by intergovernmental transnational BCI complexes (OECD, EC). If the countries are welfare states most of the population would be in the internal sector; many of the yellow countries are. The blue countries are the predators of the world, also on their own.

So much for the BCI complex; then the military aspect. Extended economic cycles that in addition are exploitative because of sharp internal/external divides have to be backed up by coercive power. Partly for this purpose governments have at their disposal enormous quantities of means of coercion, of offensive destructive power - two of them, the superpowers, even having enormous quantities of offensive superweapons against which there is no defense. Intergovernmental cooperation takes the form of alliances and pacts, polarizing the system, magnifying the amount of means of destruction at the disposal of one actor - meaning a system of countries with a relatively harmonized goal and strategy. It is clear consequence of the developmental strategies referred to as blue, red and yellow (and to a lesser extent the pink) above that there should be this concentration of destructive power, partly because the developmental styles are centralizing, partly because they presuppose coercion both for their inception, growth and stabilization, in competition among rivaling development worlds and structures.

In saying all of this there is no illusion that in a world of only green countries there would be no war; history informs us otherwise. But in a world with blue and yellow countries there almost has to be war in order to expand and protect economic cycles, from green and red rebellion and from blue and yellow competition, with the pink oscillating between them. It is difficult to see that there can ever be a developed world space as long as countries are operating such strong internal/external divides.
In the world in which we live, furthermore, the general ethos becomes dominated by the dominant ethos of the dominant elites in the dominant countries. Concretely, this means a general world ideology with the materialism of the bourgeois way of life at its center, easily the most popular (in the sense of number of adherents) ideology in human history, no doubt far above even Christianity in number of followers. At the social level three elements had to be added to this image: competition, rationality and discipline, as mentioned in section 3 above.

But it does not quite work like that at the world level. Competition there certainly is, leading to economic races (particularly between the First and the Fourth worlds) and to military races (particularly between the First and the Second worlds). There are also efforts to obtain economic/trade balance (zones of influence, quotas, rules of the game, etc.), and military/power balance using arms control and disarmament conferences as comparison fora, but when this does not succeed, the races may spill over into economic wars and military wars, increasingly devastating with higher levels of military technology in particular and production technology in general. In the social space such phenomena, by no means unknown, could be tempered by the combination of rationality and discipline. But in the world space both seem to be curiously absent: the tragedy of the commons is enacted in world space rather than in social space and is, of course, an exercise in lack of both rationality and discipline. Which all serves to prove one thing: some kind of world central authority is necessary, commanding either, thereby regulating competition among governments and nongovernments, people and nonpeople and based on both of these. Something between the United Nations, as we know it, and world government of strong states as we - indeed - also know it. A federation with a central authority based on a stronger localism and a weaker statism and capitalism than today: the sixth development style, as argued for social space.

But that does not solve our problem. As argued above, this is reductionism, not only in the sense of reducing the world space to the social space, but even to one society. Maybe some time in human history there will be that world society, but today the world space is different. And it may not even be desirable, being too homogeneous - e.g. with
the same bourgeois way of life for everybody, all over the world. So again the question has to be put: what is world development? What would be the kind of minimum perspective that could be used today?

I would use the analysis above and try the following definition:

**Development in the world space means:**

(a) that countries decreasingly use each other as culturally external sectors, with aggressive cultural practises

(b) that countries decreasingly use each other as economically external sectors, with aggressive economic practises,

(c) that countries decreasingly use each other as militarily external sectors, with aggressive military practises

Obviously, this has to do with three aspects of power. Concretely it means:

(a) more diversity in the choice of way of life/goal of life

(b) that no country treats another country as an external sector of its economy

(c) that no country possesses offensive weapons

The first presupposes a high level of self-confidence, faith in own values; the second a transformation of the economic system towards that combination of economic autonomy and economic equity known as economic self-reliance, and the third a transarmament of the military system from offensive to defensive military capabilities. Needless to say such transformations would rule out or at least change profoundly the development styles in the upper triangle of Figure 2, particularly the blue and the yellow, but also the red to the extent it uses its strong state to build offensive military systems and to promulgate a homogeneous world way of life. And it points to the lower triangle away from the BC diagonal as the part of social development space generating the type of societies best fit for co-existence in the type of world space in which we live.

Let us then return to our point of departure, development as commonly conceived of, as social development, starting with the economic aspect of how to provide goods and services, then moving (as was done) towards more political aspects, all the time with an undercurrent emphasizing the significance of cultural aspects. Imagine some "good" region has been defined in this development space. Is there any guarantee that what is good for social development is also good for human development? We know that the formations on the BC diagonal and beyond, into the upper triangle and the "yellow corner", can be very good on economic growth, whether plan or market, state or capital oriented, or both - if we accept rate of growth of the gross national product (perhaps divided by a population figure to open for an exploration of distribution possibilities) as a measure of the production of goods and services at the national level - which is what this type of development is about. Moreover it looks as if the yellow are better at it than the blue who in turn may be better than the red in the short term. In the longer or even medium term the blue is hit by crises - like a tired Achilles relative to an uninspiring and uninspired tortoise. But how does this relate to any reasonable conceptualization of human development?

I then conceive of development in the human space in terms of basic human needs, that rock bottom which, if not satisfied, means that human beings are so much less than they could be, even to the point of break-down, somatic or mental disintegration, or both. Human needs are, of course, time and space variant; they are not constants when made sufficiently precise, nor are - indeed - the ways of satisfying them constant. But at a more general level I assume that one can recognize four classes of needs, needs for survival, well-being, identity and freedom, the negations being violence, misery, alienation and repression. The first two classes of needs are what in the literature often is referred to as deficit needs: a person has a deficit in well-being when there is insufficient food, air, water, sleep, sex, protection against the hazards of nature (this is where clothing and shelter enter),
or insufficient health (morbidity) not to mention insufficient life (premature mortality - this is where survival enters). The deficit has to be removed through satisfaction of these needs that are or can be seen as more somatic, material.

But then there are the growth or development needs, more mental/spiritual, less material although there certainly also is a material basis for them, e.g. a rock, rock bottom level satisfaction of the material needs. Needs for identity and needs for freedom are becoming needs as opposed to the having needs just mentioned. There are no limits to their satisfaction. From their dissatisfaction, in the shape of alienation and repression, respectively it is not a finite, definable range, like for hunger, up to a point of satisfaction. There is a ladder which can be climbed, up from the murky swamps of alienation and repression, into daylight - but that ladder just goes on and on: like Jacob's ladder in the Bible, but unlike Jacob's ladder it does not even end in Paradise, in Heaven. There is no end. And there are many ladders, not just one. Moreover, much of the climbing one has to do oneself, neither pushing, nor pulling would be sufficient however necessary they may be in certain stages. A person can be fed and clothed and so on, but can only to a very limited degree be given identity and freedom. They are aspects of the person's personality, evolving through exertion, ever more, and then even more. There is no limit to becoming, or at least they are far away, like in Goethe's Faust (wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können wir erlösen) or in the buddhist vision of human growth, ending in a state of maximum entropy, nibbana.

This is not a place to explore in any depth a theory of identity and freedom, and particularly the fascinating relation between the two. Had we lived in a less economistic/material, more humanistic/spiritual era vocabularies for quick, but also deep communication would have been around - but we do not. Suffice it only to say that there are many foci with which a person can identify: outer space, nature (at the level of micro-, meso- and macro-cosm); inner space, self (including things produced, and things for consumption); persons (in the micro space
around oneself), the local (meso-) space, the macro space (country with its institutions, nation with its culture), the region, the whole world (humanity); and that which is beyond, the transpersonal and transnatural, that with which religion, but also ideology, is concerned.

There is a band of foci of identification. No person can identify with all of this, at least not to the higher levels of identification, known as unity, even union - the latter also with the connotations given it in mysticism. But one might say that if the band becomes very narrow, and mainly focussed on self and things rather than on persons and humanity, then, however deep the identity, what has happened is actually human mal-development rather than development. And this is where freedom enters, the freedom to choose foci of identification, to expand them and change them - but also to contract them and to stick to them. Identification without freedom becomes meaningless, only one more form of repression. Under what conditions in social space is development in human space most likely, even for a very wide range of conceptualizations for both aspects of development? Two factors seem to stand out, both very relevant for development theory and practise.

First, in order to grow along the becoming need dimensions there should be neither too much deficit, nor too much excess along the deficit need dimensions. A minimum should be guaranteed, but there should also be consciousness about a maximum; about a ceiling, not only a floor. If not, too much having will stand in the way of growth in being, becoming, as pointed out by so many at all times in all places, but perhaps nowhere so clearly as by the Buddha, with the idea of the Middle Way.

Second, human development in the sense of growth in identity and freedom probably can only take place in a human inner space, and probably best when supported and supporting a micro space of friends and family, and a local space, not too distracted by the larger spaces humans have constructed at the national, regional and global levels. On the other hand, there must also be the freedom to move in these spaces, not only in one's personal inner space - otherwise identity
becomes vacuous. Close contact with nature may also be very significant. But there is a general condition of quiet which is probably better found in the small than in the big—well knowing that any family life can be very noisy, and serenity can be found in the midst of megalopolis hustle-bustle. There is no perfect correlation here, and yet persons who seem to have come far along such roads, if not attaining "buddhahood" at least attaining what one might call "personhood", and communicating what they have attained to others through acts of creation, have done so living in the small even sometimes isolated in an unencumbered setting of neither too little, nor too much of material things.

How, then, does all this relate to the development exercise as we know it from social space? I think there is little doubt that the strong point of the blue, red and yellow development styles is their ability, at least in the first run, to give satisfaction in different ways to the needs for material survival and well-being. There is no critical scarcity of having for most, or at least many people in these three worlds; in fact, the system goes on producing as if there is, or should be, no limit to having. But as to the other two need classes the picture is more negative. Normative power is exercised so as to legitimize the BCI complex at work with its termite like production mania, with no built-in stop signal, demanding identification with the goals of the highly materialistic bourgeois way of life to the exclusion of other concerns if they are at variance with that goal pattern. Then there are the ideas, or values, of competition, rationality and discipline, all defined at the level of the nation, well inculcated in people through family, school and job. But this means a general dislocation of the identification foci towards things for private level consumption and towards the institutions of bureaucracy, corporation, intelligentsia, perhaps even police, military and party—in short human maldevelopment by the position taken above. BWL, BCI and PMP are meager foci of identification for the human spirit. And if on top of that there is repression exercised by the PMP complex, not permitting the freedom to seek alternative ways of life, with more
possibility for reflection, deepening, identity to the point of unity then the maldevelopment gets institutionalized and becomes a lasting pattern, built into the structure. This is the kind of thing Europeans (East and West) refer to when they find so many US people to be shallow, only concerned with things and self - and what many Third world people refer to when they find both of them shallow.

So the conclusion is definitely that "development" in social space takes place at the expense of considerable maldevelopment in human space, if by "development" we mean the blue, yellow and red styles or worlds. This is less so in societies sufficiently pluralistic to permit alternative thinking and even alternative practise, at least up to a certain point, and here one might again look at the rose/pink social democracies of Northwestern Europe (and some Commonwealth countries). If alternative movements, green waves etc. are particularly pronounced there it is not necessarily because they are more needed there than elsewhere, but because they are more possible there than in the more purist, less complex, less balanced, blue and red societies. And there is no argument that any society will have some persons so strong, in material and/or spiritual power, that they can escape from the standard norms and attain levels of identity and freedom unheard of for others. The concern here is with the average.

But by and large these well-known development styles are travesties of total human development because of the way having overshadows becoming, and beyond that also because of general patterns of alienation and repression. So the conclusion is ambivalent: upper triangle for material human development, lower triangle for non-material development, with some possible compromise in-between.

6. Development: the nature space

The word "nature" is used here, not "environment". The reason is simply that we human beings are part of nature; the word "environment" (German: "Umwelt") somehow detaches us from nature in the old Occidental
pattern of setting us aside. As parts of nature we can contribute both
to development and maldevelopment of all of nature just as other parts
of nature can contribute to the development of humans by feeding and
clothing/sheltering us and to our maldevelopment by infecting us,
crushing us, etc. But, what, concretely, could development of nature
possibly mean?

Ecology gives us answers in terms of "stable eco-systems" or
"mature eco-systems", but that is close to a tautology. One has to break
"maturity" into components and talk, for instance, in terms of "diversity"
and "symbiosis", in terms of the number of biota and a-biota in the
eco-system and the level of interaction among them. This is actually
very similar to the two terms used for social development above: com-
plexity (having several types) and balance (stable interaction among
them). But this does not link nature development sufficiently to power
and politics, in other words to "development" as here conceived of.
We have to see clearly some of the mechanisms that link style of develop-
ment to nature. Two mechanisms that stand out as particularly significant,
touching directly on the man-in-nature problématique, and on what
happens to nature as a result of human activity, particularly in the
economic field, would be the following:

(1) the transition from limited, small economic cycles to extended
and even expanding economic cycles, as a result of commercialism,
and

(2) the transition from cyclical to linear ecological processes,
as a result of industrialism.

Under commercial capitalism (trans)national markets and economic
cycles have been built, in principle linking nature (for raw materials
and waste products), production and consumption - the three nodes
on the cycle - together, from any part of the world. As a result
economic relations have become increasingly abstract: very few know
from where products come and to where the waste goes, nor from where
the money comes or from where the raw materials (including energy) originate - and very few care. If and when things go wrong it is very unclear where the responsible agent or cause may be located.

Under industrialism conditions arise under which things will go wrong, because of the increasingly linear nature of the ecological processes. Traditional agriculture extracts nutrients from the soil, water and CO₂ from the air, and returns it all through the decomposition of waste products, including, ultimately, the decomposition of the human body. Industrialism shifts the extraction from nature away from renewable organic material towards non-renewable inorganic material, processes it, and produces non-degradable waste, some of it toxic to human beings and other parts of the biosphere. As a result there are the twin problems of depletion and pollution, and consequently reduction of maturity, including among the biota as industrialism spreads into the biosphere to, as industrial agriculture, industrial fishing/hunting, etc. The rest of the story is well known to any reasonably conscious person today: through depletion diversity is reduced, through pollution symbiosis is by and large - impeded. The net result is maldevelopment of nature.

If these impacts are produced by commercialism and industrialism it would look as if the blue and the yellow/golden systems are particularly conducive to nature maldevelopment. But the pink and the red systems are equally based on industrialism, and even if not purely capitalist the principle of extended and expanding economic cycles holds also under conditions of state planning. In fact, the planning is used exactly for that purpose, as an expression of rationality. How limited this rationality is can be seen clearly when the old mechanisms for keeping human activity within the bonds set by ecology break down: patterns of enlightened self-interest, based on the need for survival and well-being for oneself and one's offspring break down when the economic actors does not him/her-self suffer the consequences of depletion and pollution - like a farmer had to do for times immemorial. And so far nobody has come up with an equally efficient warning and control system for the expansive development styles in the upper triangle. Or, more precisely: warnings there are, but not the incentive to control, hence accumulated degradation bordering on eco-catastrophe.
7. Conclusion: five development theories compared, and a sixth one

Time has now come to try to pull all of this together. Five development theories have been presented using a very classical point of departure: social space (as opposed to world, human and nature spaces); economic aspects of social space (as opposed to more social and political); capital vs. state/, corporation vs. bureaucracy as the key dimensions to explore the economic aspect of social space (as opposed to, for instance, more purely economic variables such as growth vs. distribution). Clearly, this type of exercise could have been done and has been done in very many different ways. The defense for the present way of doing it would be that most theory and practise about development use social space as the entry point anyhow; that we live in an age of economism, and that the use of those two dimensions as separate dimensions makes it possible to generate five major development theories or systems more or less in their own terms, and in doing so locate the major geo-political regions in terms of where they are and where they are heading, in terms of their goals and processes. With all its short-comings it is at least superior to any uni-dimensional exercise.

But this would have been a very poor approach to development, and a very traditional one indeed, if we had stopped with the social space. It is only by exploring the implications position and trajectory in social development space would have on human, world and nature development, and on social development itself, that some more extensive, possibly also deeper insights can be obtained. In order to do this we have to have relatively clear views of what development in all four spaces might possibly mean. Table 3 gives a short recapitulation of the approaches used in the preceding four sections (see next page). There are four spaces of development, two dimensions have been singled out for attention for each space, yielding a total of eight components in a relatively rich definition of development. It should be noted that the definition of world development is negative for the reasons given; the other definitions are positive.
Table 3. Four aspects of development: a survey of definitions.

Nature development: mature/stable eco-systems, based on diversity and symbiosis

Human development: mature/stable human beings, based on satisfaction of having/deficit/material needs; satisfaction of becoming/growth/nonmaterial needs

Social development: mature/stable societies, based on complexity/balance of components and levels, and self-management/autonomy for the basic units

World development: mature/stable world systems, based on non-aggressive socio-economic systems, and non-aggressive political-military systems

The definition is easily spelt out:

Development is the move towards (and maldevelopment the move away from) a world community of societies that do not use other societies as external sectors in their economies and do not possess offensive arms; with a high level of local self-reliance and balance between local and national levels as well as between local, corporate and bureaucratic components; with a nature capable of sustaining also the human part as to all reasonable material needs; and then with humans free to develop with no limits to spiritual growth.

There are hundreds, thousands of such sentences in circulation today, with the UN system probably producing dozens per week, possibly per day. The problem is what to do with them. Here is a short list of what to do:

- check if all aspects of development are there;
- check how major development styles perform;
- check for internal consistency

So, in conclusion, let us try to do that.

First, it should be noted that economic growth is not even seen as a part of the definition; it is seen as a possible instrumentality, like energy. Production is an obvious conditio sine qua non under
scarcity (not in the proverbial South Pacific island of abundance); it is not itself a part of development, nor are such "modern" organizations as corporations and bureaucracies. Development refers to more basic aspects. And it will be seen from the list that all four are systems with maturity/stability as a common characteristic - the latter being very different from "static". Then there are the specificities: for nature ecological balance, for human beings a basic needs approach (which immediately implies distribution, both in the sense of equality and social justice), for the social system what in practise would be a federal and pluralistic society with much local autonomy; and for the world only the pious admonition to each society to leave the others in peace, to abstain from direct and structural violence, in other words.

Second, there is the question of how the development styles perform on these dimensions. This can be explored in a very crude and impressionistic way, simply by filling in a matrix, as it is attempted done on the next page. It should be noted that this is an effort to characterize the potentials of the development style, not necessarily what is happening in reality. Thus, all upper triangle styles are seen as potentially high in production the way "production" is defined by these styles themselves, and the green style is seen as "low", with the "mix", here introduced as the "rainbow" style, as "medium" (otherwise I have tried to avoid that grading). Obviously the rainbow style, style No. 6, is the one favored by the author so it gets good grades on all eight dimensions and ends up with an 8. For all the others the table is nothing but a summary of the reasoning already given in the text, so there is no need to repeat that here. A comparison of terminologies is included. It is approximate because of the many connotations but shows how undifferentiated "green" is, and hence the necessity for "rainbow"; and how much better the color scheme is for the present than for past and future formations. Question: is the scheme too tied to the present?

Third, there is the question of internal consistency in the normative development model, the rainbow model. Put differently, is
Table 4: Development and development dimension: A summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Development Style</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Social development</th>
<th>World development</th>
<th>Human development</th>
<th>Nature development</th>
<th>No. of &quot;high&quot; for development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Primitive Traditional</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Modern/industrial</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>(high)/low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Industrial socialist</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pink</td>
<td>Modern/industrial</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Modern/industrial</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>(high)/low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainbow</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
there, at least on paper, some point in the social space of development that with some justification can be said to combine the eight aspects of development mentioned in the definition? Clearly, this can only be arrived at through the principle of exclusion, and it would work the following way: make a diagram with the five development styles, and use the eight development dimensions to exclude styles that are "low". This is not so formidable as it sounds, for five of them exclude the same four styles – the styles of the upper triangle. The other three cuts the development space in different ways, as shown in Figure 5.
The principle of exclusion makes solid bite into the figure, reflecting the mess we are in. The mess is simply this: the five models work badly. The green is on the whole better than the others but it produces poverty even when it avoids misery, and that is impermissible in the present age. The pink model does better than the other three, but share in the important problems of aggression against nature, against the spiritual dimension of human beings and against the local - actually also in developing offensive arms, but that is perhaps more by association than by sincere motivation: social democracies have never attacked other countries directly. But the positive message contained in Figure 5 is that there should be a region in this social space, a triangle away from the axes and from the BC diagonal where all eight developmental goals, in principle are attainable. It is a region, not a point, opening for many interpretations. And it is eclectic, perhaps too much so for some; it does not have the purity of the corners.
We are in a mess, entirely of our own creation. The primacy given to the social space has been at the expense of nature, human and world development, and the primacy given to the production of material goods and services has been at the expense of other considerations in social space. This fourfold maldevelopment is most obvious in the blue and the red models, with primitive, clumsy attempts at steering people through values and institutions that in practise become both alienating, and repressive, and even replete with all kinds of direct and structural violence. The good thing about development is the effort, that there is this idea of pushing societies, deliberately, in certain directions. The bad thing about it is the misguided direction, with little or no consideration given to social structure, global structure, or to the delicate nature of human beings and nature itself.

So development has to be rethought, to say the least - and thousands, millions of people (rather than their leaders) already do so. No clear now trajectories in the development space of Figure 2 are emerging. There are doubts, and to some extent resignation all over, particularly as the old idols, blue and red developmental styles, become unmasked because of their consequences in all four spaces. What can be said here is only one thing: a clear distinction should be made between "development" as a certain material way of life with modernization and nation-building, and "true" development, which may be what people do all over the world in defense against "development".

And the experience from many corners of the world is that people seem to be attracted by that little triangle left in the middle of Figure 5, held here to be the open window for development. The rest of the space leads to maldevelopment of up to eight kinds at the same time, with the worst combination the corporate/capitalist one, regardless of (or precisely because of) how much it manages to produce. A little area of hope. The window is not closed, the model is consistent. A rainbow even, since it obviously combines some light green, light blue and light red elements - perhaps also an element of the yellow in the light pink -- To be explored further.