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**APPROACHING THE PECULIARITY OF THE  
CARIBBEAN PLIGHT WITHIN THE PARADOX  
OF THE REPRESENTATIVE STATE IN THE  
CONTEMPORARY WORLD-SYSTEM**

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Herb Addo

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Geneva, January 1980

Johan Galtung

It is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate dialogue on the subject at this stage of the research.

## 1. THE PURPOSE

The future of small states in the present world-system has become a major preoccupation among scholars and practitioners in the field of international relations. The importance given to the future of small states is reflected in the various General Assembly resolutions legitimizing the claims of social units to independence and sovereignty, irrespective of size; but more importantly, it is due to the firm conviction that independence, if not necessarily sovereignty, is a value in itself, and that for this reason all units, irrespective of size, are entitled to it. The question is not, therefore, whether small units are entitled to independence. But if this is not the question, then it only raises a problem. It is that the international system is going to be confronted with a novel phenomenon within the entire long history of the world capitalist system: the phenomenon not only of small states being allowed to stand on their own, but also of the bizarre sight of mini- and micro-mini-states, not only claiming to stand on their own, but actually being allowed to pretend to do so. If the present world-system were different in its essentials, then perhaps this sight would not be considered novel, let alone bizarre. But it is not. And for this reason, the future of small states is interesting because it is problematic. The least familiarity with the nature of international politics will not make this view contentious.

What then is the problematique of small states? Given the above, it would appear to have to do not so much with the survival of small states in the world-system as with the qualities of their survival, and this is exactly what is meant when the future of small states is referred to in present-day discourse.<sup>1</sup> The aspect of this problematique which interests me at the moment, however, is not so much the quality of

survival per se as the way of approaching this quality in a manner that does not falsely treat size by itself as the problem, but handles the concept small, in its relation to the concept state, so that the two concepts combine to approach the problem of small states as one generic problem. The intention is to build the idea of small into that of state, so that we can approach the problem of small from the perspective of the development of world history. All this is meant to inform policy, when it is addressed to the problems of small states as distinct from the problem of small states, in contemporary settings. In real life the problems of these states do not come in two. They are not small first, and then states later. They are states and, at the same time, they are small. The point of the matter is that the same forces which led to the statehood of these states also created their smallness.

The immediate purpose of this piece, however, is to use the approach of the oneness of the small-state concept to situate the peculiarity of small Caribbean states within the group of nations which I describe below as representative states. I argue that there is a paradoxical relationship between the weakness of the statehood of these nations and their numerical superiority in the world of states. I sustain this argument by distinguishing between the state as a legal entity, which moves in legal circles, and the state as an ensemble of attributes and attitudes which serve as instruments in the pursuit of the historic motive of the capitalist world system, viz., capital accumulation for the legal entity called state. The state as a legal entity, and the state as an instrument for accumulating capital, are only conceptually distinct. In real life, these two conceptions of the state are inseparably linked, in that they feed on each other in the complex difficulties of world politics.

Our singular aim here is to set the context in such a way that we can approach the peculiarity of what we have termed below as the Caribbean plight, and its indications for policy in the contemporary setting.

## II. THE STATE

Let us start by asking the deceptively simple question: what is the state? And let us begin to answer this question elliptically by saying that the state has many false synonyms in the common language of international relations and politics. Very often it is taken to mean the same as the nation or the nation state. This is very wrong because, in the deliberate language of scientific international relations and politics, the nation and the nation state are very much different from the state. They are different because they do not embrace identical elements. They represent different sentiments, and indicate different hopes and aspirations for the basic constituent of a definite group of people.

A nation is the work, or the product, of time welding an integrated and cohesive unit out of a definite group of individuals through the commonality of such things as race, religion, language and history. This is not to say that these commonalities may not betray differences in order to have a nation. Differences may be present; but the main thing is that such differences, should they occur in the race, religion, language, or even class aspects of the life of this definite group of individuals, are not seen by the people themselves as enough to impair the common identity which they ascribe to themselves, and which, in their minds, and in the minds of others outside this group, distinguish them from any other group of individuals. What matters in the concept nation is simply that a group of people have, through the course of time, come to regard themselves as one, distinguishable from others, and having certain indicators to prove such oneness. The connotative property of the concept nation, then, is the complex identity of aspirations, views on life, and the strength which oneness produces.

As distinct from the nation, the state has no such claim to oneness. The state is a legal entity, which moves in more or less legal circles,<sup>2</sup> in pursuit of political ends as they directly or indirectly pertain to

the allocation of scarce values.

The concept state lays no claim to cultural homogeneity. It connotes no necessary strength out of unity. The state may have a long history, it may even constitute a nation, as defined above, but it allows for, indeed it connotes, the possibility of instant creation, the admissive inclusions of government, authority, power, territory and, of course, people. Essentially, therefore, if a state is not necessarily a nation, it is principally because the strength of unity and identity of homogeneity are not necessarily associated properties of the state, while they are by definition those of the nation. And, further, if a state calls itself a nation and/or poses as such, it is either because the state is also a nation or that it is falsely laying claim to the connotative properties of the concept nation.

Many states in the world system of states are not nations. They lack the connotative properties of the nation. But, because it helps in the many-sided interactions in which states, by virtue of being states, must of necessity indulge, and since each of these interactions could very easily call for the need, and possibly the use, of the national property of oneness, it has become no more than a convention to refer to the members of the international system of legal entities as nation states. This is a convenient way to recognize those states which are nations as such, and to allow those states which are not nations the right to pretend they are. The international, or rather the world, system of states requires that to be an accepted member, a state becomes a recognized state, which simply means that some, if not all of the attributes of the state be recognized as legitimate by other states.<sup>3</sup>

What then are the attributes of a state and how much or many of these attributes must there be for a legal entity to be considered, or recognized, as a state? I presented the state above as a social entity, which moves in more or less legal circles in pursuit of the political ends — who gets what, when and how — of the scarce values of that society. This is true at the high level of abstraction. At the

concrete level, when we refer to a state we refer principally to an ensemble of certain elements. These elements are often referred to as the attributes of the state. They not only give us what must be, more or less, present to have what may be, more or less, called a state; they also help us to situate states, one with the other, in the comparative sense of big/small, rich/poor, developed/developing, etc., as well as to evaluate states in terms of their actual or potential functional utility with respect to the attainment of the historic motive of our historic period.<sup>4</sup>

### III. THE ELEMENTS OF THE STATE

A social entity is said to be a state if that entity has a clearly defined territory, in which the people of that society live; has government which can be deemed legitimate and which is charged with the authority to govern the people of the society as this governing pertains to the allocation of scarce resources in that society; and finally when that society is recognized as an independent and sovereign state by other such states in the world system of states. Thus the elements of the state consist of the following: territory, people, government, authority, resources (both human and non-human) and sovereignty.

Does this mean then that all these elements must be present in their complete and pure forms before we can refer to a social entity as a state? The short answer is: No. The elements may only be more or less present. The ensemble of attributes need not be complete for an entity to claim to be a state, or to be recognized as a state by other states. Each of the six elements constituting the ensemble may be considered more or less necessary, in the sense that they are helpful, but not one (nor perhaps even all) can be considered sufficient for the identification of a state.

The long answer, of course, is that many states would be hard pressed to be considered as such if they had to satisfy maximally all the elemental conditions. Many states have disputed territorial boundaries, both land and sea; many states in the present world have governments which are considered either not legitimate or too weak to exercise any real authority within their territories, and which are challenged by rival governments, thus putting both legitimacy and authority in doubt; some governments are even located outside the territorial boundaries which they claim to govern, or are recognized by very few other states, if any. At any time in the contemporary world, there are dozens of instances which could easily illustrate the above departures from the ideal.

In fact, one can say that of all the states in the world, by far the majority will not qualify as perfect states in the sense of having the complete and maximized attributes. This then raises the big question as to whether, in defining states, we are not to be careful to distinguish between the ideal state and the representative state. The ideal state is, of course, the state with all the elements in their complete and undisputed forms. The representative state would then be a state which is in one sense or another imperfect, like the majority of states in the world, in that its ensemble of attributes is neither complete nor maximized.

The representative state is much more of a realistic reference point than the ideal state. The perfect state is an ideal construct which is at best only approximated in very few cases in the real world.

#### IV. THE STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The state conceived as above could not be said to have existed all through social history. It cannot even be said to have been



particularly important in the large part of social history during which period production was meant for no more than immediate and anticipated consumption. The state in its present conception has become important because of its functional utility in the modern world. What has made the state important in the modern world is the role it plays in the realization of the historic motive of the modern world. The attributes of the state, both singly and collectively, are important because they are considered as a reflection of the actual and/or potential ability of a human-group entity to attain the historic motive. Thus, in their comparative senses (of big and small, rich and poor, etc.), attributes of the state merely indicate the relative positions of states on the long and complex march toward the attainment of the historic motive of the time.

But what is this modern world, the historic motive of which necessitates the utility of the state? And what is the precise nature and the precise identity of the historic motive? These two questions are the same. It is impossible to describe the modern world without reference to its historic motive, for it is this particular motive which gives the modern world its historic identity.

The roots of the modern world are closely tied in with some profound changes which began to appear in the European part of the world during the late period of the fifteenth century. For whatever reason, the European feudal orders were in states of severe crisis. Efforts to ride out the crises of European feudalism resulted in the transformation of that economic form from its feudal mode to what we know today as the capitalist mode. The period of transition may have been long and confusing and, for this reason, the very nascence of capitalism may not be all too clear. Be that as it may, the exact identity of capitalism is not in doubt. It differs from the feudal and other modes of production essentially in that in the capitalist mode, production is not meant only for immediate and anticipated consumption and for sale in localized markets, but essentially for sale in markets both localized and distant, and not so much for consumption: in the capitalist mode, production serves as the basis of further production,

and the relation between production and the market is mediated by the strong presence of the profit motive. Production is undertaken for sale in markets, both distant and near, with the motive of realizing profit to serve as the basis for further and larger production aimed at higher profits, all in aid of accumulating capital.

The transition from the feudal mode of production to the capitalist mode affected European societies profoundly. Among other things, and thereby setting in a change in the traditional production relations, it meant the separation of producers from their means of production. It meant the sharp distinction between the owners of capital, the impersonal means of production, and workers, who had nothing but their labour which they were free to sell to owners of capital for the purpose of producing profitably for markets both distant and near.

The changes that the transition from feudalism and the emergence of capitalism brought about in European societies may have been profound for the Europeans of the time. But with hindsight it is easy to see that the changes that both the period of transition and incidence of capitalism brought about in the world as a whole were even more profound.<sup>5</sup>

The new changes in Europe from the very beginning necessitated the outward expression of Europe outside itself and its traditional geographic haunts. This outward expression of Europe meant European expansion, and it initiated the creation of the one world which we know today, the evolution of which has meant a departure from the history of the world to world-history, a departure which, in its unadorned essence, means a change from unrelated localized histories of different "worlds" to the interdependent and hence related history of the one world.<sup>6</sup>

This one world to which I refer began to come about as Europe cast around, literally and figuratively, for a solution to what we are right to describe as a European problem — the crises of European feudalism in the sixteenth century.

The ostensible and real explanations of European expansion differ so radically that it is difficult to know where to begin even to strike the difference between them. The difficulties in this regard are trenchant and are centred on the apparently irreconcilable differences in the meanings and the implications which European world expansion has had for the world as such, including dominant Europe, and for the non-European world in particular. One view on this matter is gaining increasing ascendancy and it is worth mentioning in contrast to another. This first view focuses on the world as an evolutionary system, and as a system which is conceptually distinct, and hence analytically different, from the other units which constitute it.

This view maintains that there is a society at the world level of social reality which must be approached and understood on its own terms. The raison d'être of this world-level society is the increasing secular accumulation of capital at this level. And its dynamic is the use of an exploitative mechanism, both social and technological, to accumulate capital in "Europe" and away from the non-European areas.

There is the second view in which world-history is appreciated as though it were the history of the world; and in which world-history is understood not on its own terms, but where ethnocentric presentations of this world are the norm. The history of the world then is nothing but different hegemonic poetics. Since all the hegemonic powers of the modern world have been "European,"<sup>7</sup> the ethnocentric property of the history of the world is in reality Euro-centric.<sup>8</sup> The Euro-centric interpretation of world-history deals with heroics, not with the substance that attends the historic motive. And, as can legitimately be expected, the heroics, as they are presented in this history, are all European. In this history, concerns, concepts and analytic rationale, all of which must order and illuminate substance, are "European" in meaning and nuance.

The main point is that Euro-centric interpretation of world-history, which we have called here history of the world, seeks to explain the modern world, and the "European" dominance of it, to "Europeans."

Nothing would have been wrong with this view of world-history, if it were not that it has for too long been offered, and pitifully accepted, as the correct mode of explaining the present in terms of the past.

The world-system view of world-history, the first of the two views presented here, seeks to present — i.e. interpret — the world to the entire world. This view regards world-history as unique to the entire world. This approach admits the European dominance in this history, but it does not equate this dominance with the history itself. It regards Europe as merely another part of the world. In this history the thrust and flow of events are regarded as not blind and ostensible mistakes, but purposeful actions in pursuit of capital accumulation, the historic motive in this history.

The point of departure which undeniably distinguishes the world-system view from the Euro-centric view of the modern world is the conception of world-level society as capitalist. The reasoning which informs this conception is detailed and complex, even if, on the face of it, it is appealing to the intuitive. In its barest form the argument is that the world-economy from its very nebulous and limited beginning contributed very much to the development of capitalism in Europe; and that the development of European capitalism also contributed very much to the development of the world-economy.<sup>9</sup> Does this mutually aiding relationship make the world-economy necessarily capitalist? This is a moot point. Attempts have been made to resolve this in volumes of books. It is here that the confrontation between the Euro-centric and world-system critiques are at their sharpest. The answer can either be reasoned or it can be posed. I choose here to pose it thus: if the world-economy has such a close relationship with the European capitalist dominance, then what other form could the world-economy take, knowing that the profit motive of the capitalist form transforms all else into forms that make profit realization toward the accumulation of capital possible? Our view on the question then is that, until it is addressed to remove the ground from under the appearance of intuitive and substantial validity, the world-economy is best viewed as a capitalist economy. Such validity, we believe, can be impressively

undermined only if the tone of the validation is pitched right in the world-system terms of reference, which consider the modern world as sui generis. We do not think this possible. Within the Euro-centric terms of reference, the argument will be most unimpressive. The key question in any such debate should be what constitutes capitalism. The argument will be whether to understand capitalism in its developmental and world-wide form or in its developed and Euro-centric form.<sup>10</sup>

Granting that the modern world-economy is capitalist, it becomes easy to appreciate that world-history is nothing but the world capitalist economy in evolutionary motion. There are clearly many dimensions to this history, but, to our mind, there is only one approach to it if the concern is to give heroics no more than their colourful places in world-history, and if the real intention is to concentrate upon understanding the present in terms of the past with the sublime intention of transforming the future. The approach I adumbrate here leads to the fundamental realization that the nature of the historic concomitants and the historic logical attendants will be determined by the nature of the development of capitalism at world level, at any one point in time.<sup>11</sup>

Of the many dimensions to this history, however, none, to our mind, is as important as the contextual relationship between the integration of development and underdevelopment — the accumulation of capital in some parts of the world and the de-accumulation of it in other parts. This is the logic, not the paradox, of world-history. It is the logic which explains, as well as supports, the vexing distinction between the centre of the world capitalist economy and the periphery of it, as far as the historic motive of capital accumulation is concerned.

It is in this context that both the comparative meaning and the utilitarian role of the legal entity called state are to be understood. States are, or become, big or small, rich or poor, weak or powerful, influential or not, all in relation to the degree to which they can manipulate the props of statehood in the arena of world politics in order to accrue capital in their favour. The state becomes an

instrument in the accumulation of capital in the cherished belief that the more capital a state commands, the better the state is in a position to satisfy the needs of its subjects.<sup>12</sup> In this context what becomes apparent is the strength of the state, the power which the state, conceived as the ensemble of its attributes, can exert in the allocation of the resources of the world-society in its favour.

In short, the texture of the relations between the legal entities called states, while appearing to be political, is essentially motivated by the economic phenomenon of capital accumulation.

From here, let us proceed to do two things. First let us present the paradox of the representative state being the "handicapped" state in the world-system of states, within which the ability to amass capital is a measure of strength and the inability to do so is the measure of weakness; and second, let us attempt to relate this paradox to the definition of small state as one concept.

## V. THE PARADOX OF THE REPRESENTATIVE STATE

The question here is this: why is it that the representative state, which we defined above as the state which is like most other states in that it does not have all the attributes of the state assembled and/or maximized, is the one which is most unable to compete in the system when it comes to accumulating capital? And when it can, why is it that the accumulation occurs in such a way that the benefits of it do not appear to be reflected positively in the enhancing of the quality/standard factor<sup>13</sup> of life for the state's inhabitants? This question is as important as it is long. It is long because it must incorporate, in a coherent manner, certain crucial aspects of the history of the world capitalist economy, if we are to understand the nature of our present world. And it is important because if we aim in any way to

affect the unenviable position of the representative state for the better, we need to blow away the froth (of faddish simplicity) that very often covers the coherence of the crucial aspects of world-history to which the long question above is addressed.

To answer this question, we must introduce one vital attribute of the state omitted so far, for the convenience of the argument. The attribute is maturity. By maturity we refer to how long a state has been a sovereign and independent part, possibly (and helpfully so) a recognized part, of the world-economy and its history. The longer a state has been part of the system, it is easy to suggest, the longer it has had the opportunity to influence the workings of the system in its favour, because it has had a longer time to learn about both the written and the unwritten rules informing the game of world politics in pursuit of capital accumulation. Most importantly, the longer a state has been a part, the more it is likely to have tailored its internal order to suit the world-system's requirements for accumulation of capital the best it can, thus, to its cost, avoiding de-accumulation the best it can. This point bears re-statement. As we shall soon come to see, the world-economy, the world-system, is based on interdependence of a peculiar kind. This peculiarity notwithstanding, or perhaps because of it, the politics of the interaction constituting the interdependence are a curious blend of actions and reactions of various types, all aimed at maximizing gains and minimizing necessary or unavoidable costs.<sup>14</sup>

We state the above in this manner only to make it possible to call attention to the crucial matter that how a state behaves in the system depends to some large extent on whether the state knows what the games played in this system are about. But there is something even more crucial than this if a state is to play in the system to its advantage. Even more crucial is whether the state knows its position in the peculiar interdependent structure that forms the scales of the system. Assuming the aim is to win the most and lose the least, a nation's stance and moves, in short, its reading of the international game, will depend upon its knowledge of its position in the hierarchy of the

system of states.

Presented in this way, the position of a nation is not merely one more attribute. It is the summary attribute. All the other attributes combine, or resolve, into the single summary attribute of the position of the state. Knowing a nation's position in the hierarchy is enough to deduce what its other attributes are most likely to be. One more attribute detail which we can infer from a state's position is its attitude. This attribute refers to the posture of the governing elites of the state toward the external environment. Since the world is capitalist, a state's attitude towards it could fall anywhere in the range between extreme friendliness and extreme hostility towards it. A state's attitude also can depend on more than the posture of the elites. It could depend on the internal conditions of the country, principally the nature of its internal organization. Above all, a state determines the extent to which it believes that the capitalist form of world-system is responsible for its position in the hierarchy.

The point is simply that a majority of nations, and hence the representative states, fall in the lower categories of the hierarchy of states. And when we recall that a state is not much of a state to the extent that its utilitarian value is not conducive to accumulation of capital, then we can rephrase the question with which we opened this section of the paper and ask: why is it that the representative state is not much of a state?

The question is this: why is it that the states which are most representative of the entities which are regarded as and which call themselves such are not really such, in that they lack the properties and the attributes which should make them states in fact as well as in name? The question intimates a paradox, the paradox of the representative state, a paradox being a statement which is contrary to received opinion, a statement which is seemingly absurd, though well-founded.

This paradox is resolved on the historic foundation that the



representative states are, in the great majority of cases, the creations of the few non-representative states. The representative states were created in the evolution of the world capitalist economy by the non-representative states to serve the latter in their competitive quest for capital. This is not the place to discuss the resolution of this paradox in full. Suffice it to say that if the creations had a purpose, they also had a method. The method, with hindsight, seems to be the creation of entities which had been exploited enough — plundered, colonized and penetrated enough — to make their assumption of sovereign status not very meaningful in interfering with the steady accumulation of capital in the non-representative states. This explains why the only attribute indicator on which a majority of nations share a commonality is the attribute of sovereignty. One may ask why this is so. And the answer is that a majority of nations became sovereign only when it was expedient to let them become so. It was expedient because either resistance to independence and sovereign status was unnecessarily costly, or the world-economy had changed enough to ensure that the continuity of exploitation of the representative states could proceed uninterrupted in the face of independence and sovereign status. What is true in all cases is that the representative states had been penetrated enough to ensure the continuing flow of capital out of these representative states to the non-representative states, because of the domination of the former by the latter.

Domination is a very broad expression of a much more precise fact of international life. The fact of life is that the non-representative states developed certain mechanisms by which they exploited the periphery. By the different times they granted independence to the states in the periphery, these mechanisms had developed into visible, and not so visible, mechanisms of penetration. By penetration we mean the presence of the non-representative states in the representative states, which ensures that for as long as possible the modern world-system will unfold and rebound to the benefit of the former group of states. The idea of penetration embraces all aspects of social life; but it must be seen as a concept of means and not a concept of ends.

To the extent that means are interim ends in themselves, it is legitimate to see penetration as a concept of interim ends, the master end; the historic motive being, of course, accumulation of capital in the non-representative states. As a concept of means, penetration has its economic, political, cultural, military and other aspects, each reinforcing the other to create a potent means of making the representative states both unequal to the non-representative states and dependent on them. The augmented inequality and the induced dependency, facts of international life, are the mechanisms of exploitation, but the dynamism of exploitation is the mutually reinforcing relationship between them. All this is made possible by penetration as it is initiated by domination.

It is in the context of domination and penetration that the axiom to the effect that states in this world are interdependent is to be understood. This is what makes the interdependent nature of the international system also historic, in that it was caused by the same imperatives which have attended the evolution of the world-system and the pursuit of the historic motive. This interdependence, however, is not equal. It is unequal and asymmetric. It has to be so in order to make it near-impossible for the representative states to organize themselves to act in such ways as could make it possible for them to accumulate capital.

It is this aspect of world reality that the theory of dependency deals with. The dependency theory informs us that this is the case mainly because the economic dynamism which these dependent economies need to generate and accumulate capital, and its attendant social benefits, are located outside these economies and reside with the economies upon which they depend. In the language of the theory of dependency, the relatively autonomous economies are called the centre and the dependent economies are called the periphery. In the language we have adopted here, the non-representative states constitute the centre and the representative states the periphery.

The periphery states, because they also tend to be representative

states, are weak states; and, as we saw above, this is because they are not strong on all the attributes constituting states. The only attribute to which they can lay as much claim as the non-representative states is sovereignty. But because they are weak on all the others, even their claims to sovereignty, while it cannot be questioned in law, can in most cases be questioned in fact. This is so when sovereignty is understood, among other things, to mean the right to behave toward other states in any way a state chooses to, even with impunity.<sup>15</sup> To behave with impunity toward others from a position of weakness is not really the wisest thing to do, even for a state.

But all this should not come as a surprise. As we stated above, not only are the periphery nations new in the international system but, even worse and for that reason, their claims to statehood, in most cases, are based on the very history which weakened them in the first place. The history is world-history, which I understand as the history of the unfolding of the historic force which had propelled the system toward the attainment of its historic motive, as it was perceived at different times. To put it very bluntly, the periphery states are creatures of the centre states. The periphery states were created first as colonial territories, after they had in most cases been plundered and rendered weaker than they were before; and later, when they were granted independence and sovereign status, each nation in its turn, this was done when it would not, in any significant way, affect the domination of the representative states by the non-representative states.

## VI. THE DEFINITION OF THE SMALL STATE CONCEPT

The paradox of representative states should lead us to ask the pertinent question as to what is a small state. We should, in this regard, recall that representative states compose the bulk of the weak states,

the majority of states, in the world. We should recall also that the representative states tend to be weak states because the combined effects of their attributes of state are small and so ineffective in terms of their functional utility for capital accumulation. But this is not all. We have attempted to indicate all through this piece that the concept small state should be seen as a historic concept. A historic concept is a concept which has no precise meaning outside specific historic, as distinct from historical, referents. To be precise then, the concept small state is not just historic; it is a single concept within its very precise historicity, simply because, as we indicated above, the same historic forces which created the statehood of small states also created their smallness.

So if at this point the question is put, "What then is the definitional meaning of small state?" I would like to suggest that this same question be put in this form: "What historic images are reflexively conjured in our minds when we confront the concept small state?" The answer, I believe, is this: a small state is a state which is small in terms of the size of its attributes compared to other states and/or ineffective in its use of these attributes as an instrument for the accumulation of capital.

From this, I suggest that we can conceive two dimensions which compose the concept small state: the dimension of comparative small size and the dimension of instrumental small size. There is a hierarchical relationship between these two dimensions of the concept, within the world-system methodology which we have employed here in this piece. It is that instrumental small size precedes comparative small size. This simply means that we need both dimensions to identify a small state within the capitalist world-system of states, but because this world is capitalist and therefore motivated by capital accumulation, the dimension of instrumental small size carries more weight than comparative small size does in any such identification. For this reason, a state is unambiguously small when it is small in size on both dimensions of small. A state, however, is not necessarily small even though it may be small in comparative size, if it can hold its own

and perhaps even do more than just that on the dimension of instrumental size. And a state may not be small in comparative size and yet may be considered small if it is small in terms of instrumental size.

On the matter of small states, then, I suggest that we extract from the above the cautious world-system methodology-based proposition that: a state which is small only on the comparative size dimension need not necessarily be small, but a state which is small on the instrumental size dimension is probably a small state in the context of the turbulence of international politics in pursuit of capital.

Two pertinent points must be raised here before we can move on to approach the peculiarity of the Caribbean plight within the paradox of the small state in the contemporary world-system. The first is that, objectively, a state can be identified as small for analytic purposes by this method of identifying small states but, subjectively, whether a state considers itself small or not will depend on many factors, prominent among them being how big the state wants to be, and how much this is determined by that state's governing elite's reference to the "self-over-environment" attitudinal relations between that state and the capitalist world environment. The second is that the agony of exploitation which attaches to representative states as a consequence of their smallness, while common to most if not all such states as we know them in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, betrays differences between areas within the commonality of this agony.

## VII. THE PECULIARITY OF THE CARIBBEAN PLIGHT

The first thing we should address ourselves to is the identity of the Caribbean: what do we mean by the Caribbean or the Caribbean Area? The second thing we should deal with is: following from what the Caribbean is, are the differences between the Caribbean and the other parts of

the group of representative states in the world-economy sharp enough to point to the peculiarity of the Caribbean plight within the general plight of the representative states in the world-economy?

The first question could have many answers. To illustrate this, two references will do. Lately, Leslie Manigat, addressing himself to the same problem, has said: "Competing and conflicting definitions (mingle) with competing interests and conflicting ideologies, so that we can say, 'Tell me what is your definition of the Caribbean and I will tell you where you are politically situated,' or almost."<sup>16</sup> Manigat divides general views on the Caribbean into what he calls, "Caribbean as the arc-shaped island archipelago of the West Indies," and "Caribbean as all the lands bordering the Caribbean Sea." It is this latter view that he develops into four different definitions of the area. He concludes by saying:

After all, what imports for the international relations scientist is to distinguish the hard-core countries which have a clear Caribbean identity . . . , the wider group of countries which share a common "Caribbean appearance" . . . , (and a still wider group of countries) which have specific Caribbean involvement because of either geographical vicinity and/or historico-economic presence and, finally, those which show a general Caribbean interest like West Germany, Israel, China, Japan, some African countries and others.<sup>17</sup>

And Jacques Freymond approaches the same question this way:

Of course, it can be seen on the map with admirable clarity, with the line of the Greater and Lesser Antilles flanking the curving isthmus which links the two Americas; but appearances can be deceptive. The eyes of the inhabitants of the lands bordering the Caribbean do not all converge on the same sea. They may be directed inland, as in the case of Latin America or towards the Atlantic or the Pacific.<sup>18</sup>

It is not surprising that political and other reasons lead to different definitions of the Caribbean. It is even less surprising that the so-called international relations scientist is more interested in the definition for "working unit" purposes. Neither the "working unit" nor the political reasons subserving the various definitions need be taken seriously enough to interfere with the fact that there is a way to

approach a definition of the Caribbean. It is to follow the history of the development of the world-economy without the pretence that by imposing definitions of broad kinds, the present would obscure the past and its relevance to the understanding of the current. If one does not take shortcuts, but confronts the present as the product of the historic, one can see very clearly that those who have "Caribbean interest" and those who have "Caribbean involvement" need not be Caribbean. This is because, by Caribbean, we understand and mean much more than mere involvement or mere interest. By Caribbean, we mean a way of life, and an attitude to life in an area which has been shaped largely by its past colossal contribution to the accumulation of capital enterprise. In this sense, what is interesting is not the lifestyle, which seems to be defined most concretely by the reactions of the dominated and the exploited to the actions of the dominators and the exploiters. What matters for our purposes is what world-history has made of the area.

The way of life and the attitude toward it, which we describe above, are most clearly observed in the area that Manigat describes as having clear Caribbean identity. This area is clearly marked on any good map, as Freymond says. It is composed of the islands of the Greater and Lesser Antilles, from the Bahamas in the north, through the larger islands of Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, taking in the smaller islands of the Windwards and Leewards up to Trinidad in the south.

This is where we must recall Freymond's phrase to the effect that appearances could be deceptive because the eyes of the inhabitants of the lands washed by the Caribbean sea "do not all converge on the same sea." The three Guianas — Guyana, Surinam and Cayenne — and Belize, even though geographically removed, share some common cultural traits with the Caribbean, as we have described it, but because their eyes converge on the Caribbean sea and it has been among their separate aspirations to be part of the area, they are usually considered Caribbean. Lately Anthony Maingot situated the problem of what the Caribbean is in its much more meaningful context, when he posed the

difference between "culture area" and "interest area" definitions, and discussed that difference in terms of current Trinidad-Venezuela political rivalries. Maingot wrote:

"What is the Caribbean?" is no longer an academic question. How a particular government answers might determine initiatives of all kinds; to mention a few of an institutional nature: participation in development banks, shipping arrangements, scholarships, and aluminium smelter arrangements. Then there is that equally important dimension of international relations: the attitudes of the peoples of the region towards each other — friendship and understanding or ignorance and mistrust.

Recently, and for the first time, the peoples (or at least the leaders) of this geographic region have had an opportunity to lead the discussion on this vital question, a discussion which has taken on the appearance of a debate. Yet, it is clear that if measured, for instance, in terms of press coverage, the two principal protagonists are Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago on the one side, and the collective leadership of Venezuela on the other.

The Venezuelan "definition" is not so much a definition as it is a geopolitical claim: that Venezuela is a Caribbean country through the "simple" fact that it has 1,100 miles of coast on the Caribbean and seventy-two islands therein. By that accounting, Colombia, Central America and Mexico are Caribbean countries and are so considered by Venezuela. Together with the islands (the archipelago) they form what Venezuela calls the "Caribbean Basin."

Challenging this whole concept is Eric Williams. Williams defines the Caribbean archipelago in terms approximating a "culture area" definition, a definition which has geohistory as its centre of gravity. The Caribbean area, he notes, has a "fundamental unity and distinctive identity":

. . . the product of a common historical experience, a common social movement, and the similarity of our economic problems and political aspiration . . . the long and oppressive domination of sugar in the colonial period, the ethnic diversity encouraged by it, the subordination of our colonial interest to the exclusive requirements of the metropolitan economies, our political struggles for freedom and independence.



Our world-system methodology does not allow us to engage in fruitless discussions on this or any other question. We shall therefore go straight to the heart of the matter by stating that world-history is on the side of Eric Williams' definition of the area by the "fundamental unity and distinctive identity" of the area that he defines as the Caribbean. He is right when he says: "I expect next to hear that Tierra del Fuego is Caribbean." Williams' extreme distaste for the term "Caribbean Basin" is for these purposes well founded, and well argued for that matter, when he says:

All this raises the question of the Caribbean Basin Conference, whatever the Caribbean Basin is. I do not know what sort of basin it is supposed to be. I am not being facetious, but I do not understand it. The Caribbean is normally defined, and has been so defined by us in particular, as an area of the islands and adjoining mainland countries in which the plantation economy first developed under the control of metropolitan powers from Europe with the bringing in of masses of alien labour, cheap labour, coerced labour from Africa, from India, from China and from other places. That is a distinctive unit, the Caribbean. It brings in Puerto Rico, it brings in Surinam, it brings in Cuba, it brings in Martinique, it brings in Guadeloupe. There was slavery in Venezuela but not to the same extent. There was slavery in Mexico but not of the same type. This was a particular area which did not fit into the traditional North American or Latin American opposition to the old colonial regime of Europe, America of 1776 and Latin America with Simon Bolivar and others. The Americans have always sought to say the Caribbean is the "American Mediterranean" and include in it Venezuela, Colombia and all the blooming countries under the sun and that has always been resisted, but steadily seeking to keep out Cuba which has special relations with America. The section of the State Department dealing with Cuba was not the section dealing with Trinidad and the rest of it. They deal with Cuba separately now, I know, as an independent state. It was always in relation to America with Latin America, Haiti, and so on, and they keep the colonial territories by themselves with Britain, or with France or with Holland.<sup>20</sup>

In this same speech, Eric Williams pointed to a prominent fact in the development of the history of world-capitalism. He said: "The simple fact of the matter is that Canada, whose first real economic progress was stimulated by its West Indian connections, has outgrown the West Indies, as is true of the UK, the USA and many other countries.

Everyone knows that except the West Indies."<sup>21</sup> This point is indisputable, and it only brings to mind the growing into the area of some of the larger countries whose shores are washed by the Caribbean Sea. The argument is that the "growing out of" or "growing into" the Caribbean area may very well be the historic lot of the Caribbean area, but this should not in any way be allowed to interfere with the precise and specifically historic identity of the Caribbean area. What has grown into and out of nothing, but remained the Caribbean, is the string of islands running from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad in the south, together with the three Guianas and Belize, because these latter countries have had their eyes focused on the Caribbean Sea and share the experience of the historic burdens of capitalist development with the islands in the Caribbean Sea.

With the identity of the Caribbean area disposed of, let us proceed to identify the peculiarity of the Caribbean plight within the general exploitation agony of the representative states. Let us start by saying that when we consider all the attributes of the state, the states which fall within our conception of the Caribbean area are unambiguously small. In the Caribbean, the two dimensions of smallness — comparative small size and instrumental small size — coincide to leave no doubt as to the small size of the Caribbean states. Cuba may be an exception, since it could be considered, within context, as small on neither the comparative nor the instrumental dimensions of the concept small size. Even with this possible exception within the area, the Caribbean still remains small as an area within the world-economy. This is not to say that the area has always been small in the history of the development of the world-economy.<sup>22</sup>

The elements which constitute the Caribbean plight are the small size of the area and the long history of this area's participation in the world-economy. The argument is that, if the Caribbean is small, and if this smallness is taken together with the long participation in world-history, it points to the peculiarity of the Caribbean area within the group of representative states. The peculiarity is the depth and the breadth of the penetration of the Caribbean area.

In the particular case of the Caribbean, and the world-economy penetration of it, a lot can and indeed has been said. In fact, the Caribbean area cannot be said to have known anything else, since in its modern world form the Caribbean was entirely re-created by the metropolitan powers who have been involved in the area at different times since the late fifteenth century. In this sense, the Caribbean is very much unlike most parts of Africa and Asia and even, perhaps, in this regard, very much unlike some parts of Latin America. In the sense that the Caribbean is unlike most parts of the periphery, it was very much like the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the early phases of these latter countries' re-creations and their absorption into the world-economy. The Caribbean was different from these countries in terms of its size and racial composition, and the particular character of its plantation economy. All these factors conspired to produce the twist which explains why the Caribbean today is very much unlike the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Because the full treatment of this twist is an exercise by itself, it is enough at the moment just to point to the curious intimation that by all appearances the Caribbean appears to have been created by the world capitalist economy in evolution as a microcosm of itself within itself. And thus, to the extent that the evolution of the world-economy has meant the methodical penetration of the representative states, it must be realized that the Caribbean, by virtue of its total re-creation and aided by size, racial composition, etc., can only be more penetrated than the other larger, racially homogeneous, less culturally "westernized" parts of the representative group of states.

In fact, when we approach the Caribbean in this way, we can isolate the peculiarity of the plight of the Caribbean in the world-economy, and we should identify this peculiarity in such a way that it incorporates, as an essential part, the idea that the Caribbean area is by definition highly penetrated. This conception of the Caribbean as a highly penetrated area is what I suggest should be viewed and studied as the Caribbean plight within the general agony of exploitation. The plight represents the idea that the Caribbean

islands' histories and economies have produced a dependence peculiar to the Caribbean and very different from the dependence of the other Third World nations. The difference lies mainly in the degree of intensity of that dependence and in its comprehensiveness.

What I am suggesting is that the Caribbean should be viewed and defined not in terms of mere geographic proximity nor of some nebulous similarity of persistent cultural traits, but rather in terms of some specific and precise substance in the evolution of world-history. Once we do this, we do not interrupt the coherent appreciation of world-history, and once we have done this we shall come to see the Caribbean identity in terms of its peculiar plight with a coherence and a clarity which goes a long way in putting the contemporary problems of the area in their proper forms to inform policy.

The abdication of world hegemony by Britain, the assumption of it by the United States, the granting of independence to some of the states in the Caribbean, the presence of some colonies still in the area, and the various attempts at one regional grouping or the other, all form part of one global history of the world-system. Nothing is unnatural to this history. Nothing is a pernicious intrusion of an unexpected kind into the Caribbean area.

If, therefore, our interest is to work toward policies beneficial to the Caribbean in the present "new international division of labour"<sup>23</sup> phase of world-capitalism, the suggestion is that we should first isolate the Caribbean plight and consider it in the context of existing policies within the region. False questions should be avoided in this regard. One question that should not be asked is whether the Caribbean is generally more deeply penetrated than other Third World areas. The question that should be asked is this: since independence began to arrive in the Caribbean during the 1960s, have policies adopted by the independent states of the region contributed toward lessening the peculiar penetration that the Caribbean suffers from? The next question to follow would be: if not, why not? Whatever answers we come up with ought to force us to take very seriously the

reality and possibly the persistence of the Caribbean plight.

In pursuing the Caribbean plight to inform policies, another question that should not be put is whether the many and the different units constituting the region, no matter how small, should seek, or are entitled to, independence. The question that should be put, however, is this: whether, given the peculiar nature of Caribbean dependence and the consequent peculiar nature of the penetration of the area, the very attributes which constitute the legal entity called the state should not, in the case of the Caribbean, be re-examined and viewed with the contemporary circumstances of the present phase of world-capitalism firmly in mind?

The strict determination of the attributes of the state was done by few non-representative states; and their utilitarian application to amassing capital has benefitted these very few nations. Among the attributes mentioned in this paper, none has played a more utilitarian role than the sovereignty attribute. It has been used to shield states, one from the other, while capital was competitively pursued. In the cause of using sovereignty in this restrictive or negative manner, the non-representative states came to see sovereignty also as a positive instrument of cooperation in amassing more capital, both individually and collectively. This positive use of sovereignty has meant surrendering aspects of the independence of action which sovereignty confers on a state. It has meant, for the non-representative states, the re-interpretation of sovereignty as the changing phases of the capitalist development dictated, and the rendering of their changing conception of sovereignty to fit the development of the world capitalist system. Toward which end do these states change their conceptions of sovereignty to fit changes in the world-economy? The answer is: toward capital accumulation. The two changes involved here compensate to ensure the constancy of the direction of flow of capital into the non-representative states of the world.

Two references to the changes in the non-representative states' conception of "sovereignty" will suffice to illustrate the point made

above. From the rigid use of sovereignty in the nineteenth century, the non-representative states entered the twentieth century with the Hague Conference of 1899. Following the First World War, they blundered through the League of Nations and its imperfect agencies and offices into the Second World War. Following this war, they reconstituted themselves, and marshalled the rest of the world to follow them, into the United Nations and its numerous agencies. The post-Second World War era has seen the creation of the European Economic Community, the strong economic connection between the US and Canada, and the strengthening of the ties between the ten most non-representative states in the world. All these instances involve the compromising of rigid sovereignty, a compromise relating to the changing nature of the world capitalist reality to ensure one thing, and one thing only, viz. the constancy of the direction of the flow of capital from the representative to the non-representative state.

The second instance of deviation from the rigid conception of sovereignty is the granting of independence to the many representative states, and their assumption of sovereignties, since the Second World War. Up to this point in the history of the world, the reasoning had been that an imperial power hung on to a colony for as long as it could, and that the loss of a colony was a real loss and was to be admitted as such. Thus the loss of the American colonies to Britain was a real loss, and historians did not for a long time forgive King George III and those around him who lost the American colonies for Britain in the eighteenth century. The loss of the colonies in South America to Spain and Portugal were no less real losses. Winston Churchill made it clear, very clear in fact, that he had not become Prime Minister in order to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire; and even in 1949 there were a lot of words painfully expressing how America "lost China" to the communists and communism. All this is to raise the question as to why, beginning with India and Pakistan in the late 1940s, other colonies were granted independence without the outward expressions of loss. Indeed, why were these other colonies even encouraged to cease being extensions and integral parts of their various sovereign and imperial states? It is frivolous to answer by

saying that it was because the various metropolitan states were weakened by the war, or that the various nationalist movements demanding independence were too strong to resist. It is fashionable in certain circles which view world-history wrongly, as though it were the story of heroics, to answer in this manner.

This answer is, in my view, frivolous because, when we come to view world-history fundamentally as the ever-changing variations in and between the historic force, the historic concomitants, and the historic logical attendants all constituting and expressing the pursuit of and the motion toward the historic motive of capital accumulation, it becomes clear that the apparent weakness of the colonial powers and the apparent strength of the nationalist movements were all indicative parts of the changing nature of the world capitalist order which made colonies, as possessions concretely held, obsolete so long as the meaning of history remained the "rational" and efficient accumulation of capital in the non-representative states. To reiterate, the very strength of nationalist movements and the weakness of colonial powers indicated the need for these powers to reconceive their idea of sovereignty to include the granting of independence to, and to recognize the sovereign status of, the colonial territories, if the historic motive was still, or was to remain, the accumulation of capital, and if this motive was to be pursued "rationally" and efficiently. The historic motive remained the same, and there was no doubt that its pursuit had to be rational in the sense of being efficient to the non-representative states. In this respect, the resolution of the complex calculations which go into the maintenance of the particular nature of the world capitalist order was that the non-representative states of the system would remain its centre and the representative states in it would remain its periphery and that, in fact, this retention of the status quo would be aided by granting independence to the periphery.

If this was the case, then the question should be this: are independence and sovereignty then meaningless for the representative state? The simple answer is: Yes. The explanation is that

independence and sovereignty came about when the mechanism of penetration had been so well entrenched in the representative states that it made little or not difference what they were called or thought they were — independent or sovereign. By the time most of the representative states became independent and sovereign in name, after the war, the ideology of dependent capitalism, centring on trans-national corporations as the main vehicles of exploitation, and constituting the basic ideas in the concept of development, understood as the use of human beings to create the growth of things, had already been firmly established. And this is precisely what is to be admitted and then creatively rejected if independence is to become meaningful, and if sovereignty is to be useful as an instrument for improving the quality of survival for small states in the Caribbean.

#### VIII. TERMS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR POST-INDEPENDENCE CARIBBEAN POLITICS

What should the post-independence politics of the states of the periphery be? Before we can answer this question, it is clear to me that we should first ask what it is that these states want, because the politics would depend upon the end sought. This is all very simple to ask, but it is not easy to discern the choices involved, let alone derive coherent and motivated policies from them. There are many representative states in the world today, and each of them, and groups of them, will presumably have to choose for themselves. This however, does not prevent us from making some general comments regarding the basic choice involved here.

The basic choice is between remaining a periphery in world capitalism, and therefore pursuing policies which ensure this, and opting to act in such a way that the historic onus on the periphery will be removed. The choice is not between capitalism and socialism: that choice is simplistic and destructively Euro-centric. Our conception of world



capitalism admits the interdependent co-existence of capitalism and socialism. Indeed, it stresses the similarity between the two in so far as both, in the forms we have known them to date, deal with the putsuit of capital for its own sake. And by world capitalism therefore, we mean the structural relationships between parts of the world which ensure the accumulation of capital in some parts (both socialist and non-socialist) and its desertion from others (both socialist and non-socialist).

The real choice, as I see it, is for the states of the periphery to take steps to abolish the status of the periphery. It will take too long to explain this in detail here. Suffice it to say that this involves a radically creative conception of development in which the human being is the centre and not the growth of things. This new conception of development will not pit the periphery of the world-economy against the centre of it in a competitive struggle in which the periphery seeks to become only the lagging, pale shadow of the centre. It will mean the representative states turning into and onto themselves more and more as they challenge the centre of world-economy at the international level to ensure that the pernicious penetration which keeps them subject to the non-representative states is at least neutralized.

Such a task calls for the creative conception and the creative use of sovereignty. In this task, the concept of sovereignty would admit self-abnegation, where rigid and falsely proud application of it could keep a state in the periphery penetrated. Sovereignty is very useful in building both the state and the nation. Sovereignty should be so understood and used as to relate the other attributes of the state, realistically appreciated, into a solution toward the negation of the penetration of the states in the periphery of the world-economy.

If this is so, and if we understand the Caribbean plight in the way we described it above, then I believe it is fair to say that the states of the Commonwealth Caribbean have not used their sovereignties creatively to negate penetration in the area. Why is this the case? Because the states in the area still hang on to outmoded conceptions

of sovereignty which bear little relation to the realities and challenges of the area in so far as they derive from what we have called the Caribbean plight, which is itself the product of the development of the capitalist world-economy.

In the particular case of the Caribbean, and, principally because of the identity of the Caribbean plight as defined above, the task calls for the creative conception and the creative use of sovereignty. This task will involve the realization that, if the end sought in the Caribbean at this "new international division of labour" phase of world-capitalism is to cut the Caribbean area's losses<sup>24</sup> within this world-economy while the foundations are laid to minimize penetration, the main factor in the Caribbean plight, then sovereignty should be seen not as God-given but as man-conceived and man-employed. The sanctity which wraps so tightly around the rigid conception of sovereignty must be removed, even if slowly and cautiously; but it must be removed, no matter how painful it would appear to do so, and no matter how frightening it would appear even to contemplate.

Before this sanctity which surrounds sovereignty can be removed, the sanctity must be demystified, but not to the point of utter desecration. What is involved is to strip the idea of sovereignty of its shrouds of myths enough to see its instrumental utility in relation to the problem as posed by the Caribbean plight and as defined essentially by the idea of penetration.

The main suggestion here is that if in the past the Commonwealth Caribbean countries tried to build a nation out of states,<sup>25</sup> using the rigid conceptions of sovereignty as the main stumbling blocks to ensure failure, then perhaps past experience and present-day realities would suggest that the time has come for the bold initiation of experimentation with the creation of a Caribbean state out of Caribbean nations, using a demystified conception of sovereignty as a man-conceived, man-employed and situation-determined instrument in this experimentation. Indeed, if the Commonwealth Caribbean is to raise its quality of survival, it becomes difficult to suggest any way other than that

sovereignty so conceived be used as the red heat to weld the separate attributes of Commonwealth Caribbean countries into one common one, and that the nations as they are be seen as, and possibly remain, different.

#### IX. CONCLUSION: THE CONNECTING OR CONCENTRIC CIRCLES THEORY OF STATE

In conclusion, it would appear that to create a state out of nations, Caribbean states should soften their sovereignties where these sovereignties connect, reserving the rigid parts for other purposes in the capitalist world-economy. This may be the case, but are Caribbean sovereignty circles merely connecting or are they concentric? I am inclined to think that they are concentric.

This conclusion is admittedly abrupt, but as Galtung has said with telling effect somewhere, "I choose to stop."<sup>26</sup> In this case I choose to stop to reflect on an appropriate theory of state for the Caribbean, bearing in mind the peculiarity of the Caribbean plight within the paradox of the representative state in the contemporary world-system. My first reaction to such a theory of the state is that, if it were not to be misled by Euro-centric conceptions of the global imperialist problematique, which I would describe as the dissolution of the "internal-periphery" and the "internal-centre" nexus of imperialism, it should argue against the thesis of the obsolescence of the state. The state may appear obsolete at the present new international division of labour phase of the capitalist world-system for the non-representative states of the centre, but precisely because of the imperialist problematique, a strong state of a particular kind is very much the needed fulcrum for an appropriate theory of the state, if the aim is to sever the connections between the internal sources of imperialism in order to help bring about the removal of the periphery status in international life.

Such a theory of the state will have to consider many things, and among them will be the meaning of the state to be understood in terms of: what alliance(s) should constitute the dominance in the state, and what policies such alliance(s) should pursue if the intention is to negate penetration as a contribution toward the removal of the periphery status. Toward this end, the domestic and foreign policies of the state will feed on each other; and self-reliance and collective self-reliance will be viewed as essential parts of the responses to dependency at this phase of the world capitalist system.

Responses to dependency could take either of two broad forms: the politics of de-orientation or the politics of re-creation. The first aims at no more than the sanitization and the freezing of the capitalist world-economy, with the status of the periphery preserved intact for the masses of the present representative states. The second shows properties indicating a probable transition from the present capitalist historic mode to another, and different, historic mode, which will not include the status of the periphery.

In the peculiar case of the Caribbean, a theory of the state would have to pay some respect to the belief that a state which hangs on to a rigid conception of sovereignty is not likely to be a strong state of the kind required for the politics of re-creation.

## NOTES

1. The following references will demonstrate this point adequately: James N. Rosenau, "The Adaptation of Small States," and my comments on this essay in "Three Basic Fallacies Attaching to Resenau's Theory of Adaptation of Small States," both forthcoming in the IIR-UWI publication of the proceedings of the conference on the Contemporary Trend and Issues in Caribbean International Affairs, Hilton Hotel, Port of Spain, May 23-27 1977; and see also Louis Lindsay, ed., Methodology and Change: Problems of Applied Social Science Research Techniques in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Working Paper No. 14, ISER-UWI, Mona, Jamaica, 1978; note particularly the unfortunately too brief contribution by George Beckford, "The Plantation System and the Penetration of International Capitalism," pp. 23-27, especially where he says: "What I am making here is a plea for the development of a theoretical framework that recognizes Caribbean Society as part of the international capitalist system — but as a unique part of that system — that uniqueness having to do with the labour question and the way race is instituted in the process of production as well as the process of international exchange." Vaughn Lewis has written and edited extensively on the subject of Caribbean small states. See his edited Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean, ISER-UWI, Mona, Jamaica, 1976; and his "The Architecture of Political Integration in the Caribbean," forthcoming in the IIR-UWI publication referred to above.
2. Ernest Barker describes the state in these terms in his Theory of Social and Political Thought, London: Oxford University Press (1960).
3. It must be stated here that the word nation may have preferences over the word state in the common language of international relations for the above reasons, but also because the word nation allows itself more linguistic versatility than the word state. The word nation can form the stems for national, international, nationalistic, nationalism, while the word state can form the stem perhaps only of the word stately.
4. We regard the world capitalist system as a uniquely distinct historic form, best described by the historic dominance of the historic period. This particular dominance of the period is described and explained by such categories, and their derivative concepts, as the historic motive, the historic force, the historic concomitants and the historic logical attendants. These

categories are defined and related in my mimeo, "Toward a World System Methodology" (August 1979).

5. This point should be taken seriously. The cultural shock which non-Europeans suffered in the differing origins of the capitalist conquest of the world must have been immense. This shock and the insecurity it breeds in non-Europeans in the world capitalist reality is still immense. The main point here, however, is that capitalist expansion was principally due to the need for markets.
6. The apparently semantic distinction between history of the world and world-history is our way of emphasizing the unique identity of the capitalist world-system.
7. By "Europe" I refer to Europe proper and the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
8. For a lengthier discussion of Euro-centricity see my "World-System Critique of Euro-centric Conceptions of Imperialism (Mimeo, March 1979).
9. I am partial to the view which says that the world contributed more to Europe.
10. A lot has been written on this. Presently I am joining the controversy in my forthcoming "World-system Critique of Euro-centric Theories of Capitalism."
11. See Herb Addo, "Informing Visions of Desirable Future Societies through Dialogue of Civilisation: A Peripheral View," paper prepared for the WSFS-UNUGPID meeting held in Mexico City in May 1979 and forthcoming as part of Proceedings, Paragon Press (1980). In this piece I use concepts such as historic force, historic concomitants, and historic logical attendants to explain the concept historic motive and to link it with the uniqueness of the world capitalist system.
12. For some reasoned discussions on the subject of basic needs and on needs in general see the papers presented at the UNU-GPID meetings in Berlin, 1978 and 1979. These papers can be obtained from UNU-GPID, c/o UNITAR, Geneva, Switzerland, and are forthcoming as Proceedings.
13. Our increasing awareness of the quality of life compels us nowadays to consider the standard of living together with the quality of life.
14. This is the realm of national and nation-group policies, though, sadly, it is often wrongly assumed to be the sole preserve of war games theorists.
15. This conception of sovereignty is due to Harold Laski, as he treats the subject in his A Grammar of Politics, London: Allan Unwin (1967).
16. Leslie F. Manigat, ed., Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations, Lynden: Sijthof (1975), pp. 57-58.
17. Ibid., p. 61.

18. Jacques Freymond, "Forward" to Roy Preiswerk, ed., Documents in International Relations in the Caribbean, St. Augustine, Trinidad: IIR-UWI (1970), p. 28. Emphases added.
19. Anthony P. Maingot, "National Responses to External Dependency: The Caribbean as an Interest Area," forthcoming in the above IIR-UWI publication.
20. Eric Williams, "The Threat to the Caribbean Community," mimeo, p. 16: A speech delivered at the 1975 convention of the Trinidad and Tobago People's National Movement.
21. Ibid., p. 4.
22. See Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, London: André Deutsch (1964).
23. See Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour (forthcoming in English, Cambridge University Press), where the implications and the structural meaning of this new phase of the world-economy are admirably discussed.
24. See the second reference to Vaughn Lewis's works in note 1 above.
25. Carl Parris expresses similar sentiments in his contribution in Vaughn Lewis, ed., Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean, op. cit.
26. Johan Galtung, "Global Processes and the World in the 1980s," mimeo (1979), p. 23.