Printed in Japan

ISBN 92-808-0147-3

HSDRGPID-33/UNUP-147

ON SOCIAL INDICATORS AND DEVELOPMENT

Cadman Atta Mills

United Nations African Institute
for Economic Development and Planning
Dakar, Senegal

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

This paper by Cadman Atta Mills was first presented at the GPID III Meeting, Geneva, 2-8 October 1978. It can be considered as a contribution to the Indicators sub-projects of the GPID project.

Geneva, March 1980

Johan Galtung

It is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate dialogue on the subject at this stage of the research.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Social Indicator Movement: a Critical Review.

To date, the reaction of the Left to the whole social indicator movement has been one of cold stares or open hostility. For the most part this reaction has been justified.

In the first instance there has been a total confusion as to what should constitute a social indicator. Wolfgang Zapf summarizes the "debate":

> Some wanted social indicators to mean above all highly aggregated magnitudes such as "Expectancy of healthy life" or the "Total learning force." Others wanted to define them as statistics of "direct normative interest," i.e., of the end product as far as individual welfare was concerned. Still others demanded a direct reference to theory, i.e., causal models for explaining the indicator values.[1]

Rather than clearing up the confusion, however, the social indicator movement has been content to take the escapist route; namely, "to emphasize their function and their technical properties." It has to be admitted, however, that with the proliferation of articles on social indicators it becomes more and more possible for an outsider to discern what the majority definition of a social indicator is. Our deduction of what the majority opinion means by the social indicator movement is that social indicators are indices of the social condition. Indicators may, of course, be defined at the level of individuals, groups within the society, or the society as a whole. What searching for indicators amounts to then is identifying elements in the welfare functions of individuals, groups, or society as a whole.

These elements affect either the material, psychic, or spiritual well-being of the individual, group, or society concerned. But it is precisely here that the social indicator movement runs into a major (if not insurmountable) problem. It is far from clear whether on either theoretical or pragmatic grounds one can meaningfully select the components of a welfare function at any level, namely, individual, group, or society. In the end one may be reduced to saying that anything that affects, concerns, or is descriptive of any individual group or society directly or indirectly is a social indicator. Further, even if the components of individual welfare functions were to be meaningfully identified, it is less than clear that their structure could be unambigously determined. This involves a problem of measurement as well as assigning weights to the individual components. The same problems apply with even more force as far as group or society welfare functions are concerned. We only need to note here that, among other things, to the extent that individual welfare may not just simply be a function of the objective condition of the individual, but include his expectations and aspirations as well as his perceptions of other people's welfare, group or society welfare functions can not be a simple aggregation of individual welfare functions.

The second reason why the social indicator movement has so far failed to win many adherents among the Left relates to the historical circumstances that led to the emergence of the movement. Basically the movement (and its variants: the "basic needs" movement, the qualitative growth movement, etc.) emerged as a liberal reformist response to the failures of capitalist development. To limit our discussion to the Third World, one could not fail to notice that even when high levels of sustained economic growth were achieved within the context of the international division of labour, they were achieved at the high price of increasing marginalization and impoverishment of vast segments of the population. But all said and done, the contribution of the social movement to policies for combatting these social ills has not amounted to much more than treating the symptoms of perverted development. In the best of conditions (that is, in situations where the class alliance that controls state power is obliged to be responsive to mass needs) the effect of the social indicator movement is to bring about hastily assembled programmes to improve such indices as school enrolment ratios, hospital beds per 1,000 of population, percentage of households with access to safe drinking water, etc. Not surprisingly, the results are rarely what these programmes were intended to achieve: more educated unemployed, accentuated rural-urban migrations, unutilized and badly staffed hospital facilities, etc. Of course in some instances the programmes have had a not-so-liberal face, their object being no more than to "give the natives soap, outhouses, and minimum health facilities so that they neither defile the beaches nor offend or contaminate the tourists." It is a rare regime, however, that will openly admit this.

According to Kenneth Land, the mechanism which has so far been used to arrive at the components of the social welfare function is the "consensus approach," the object being to identify "broad areas of social interest."[2] But it is a liberal myth that such "broad areas" translated into specific goals and targets still maintain their neutrality as far as specific class interests are concerned. The African experience has shown that since the identifiers of social concerns and the architects of corrective social policies are rarely the so-called beneficiaries, "misfirings" are rather commonplace. Even when the broad areas of concern of the beneficiaries are correctly identified, the specific form and nature of needed policies are invariable misidentified. For example, education but not the appropriate type of education, health facilities that emphasize the curative as opposed to the preventative aspect of medicines, etc.

Without question however, the major weakness of the social indicator movement has been its inability to date to satisfactorily address itself to the factors that condition the selection of various areas of social concern into a limited number of social goals and policies. The refusal of the social indicator movement to consider the socio-economic context, production relations, and class structure of the society, which after all determine the shape of the development process as well as the distribution and allocation of resources, gives the movement a well-earned reputation for being utopian. It must be said once and for all that it is not money and/or "good planning" or "good will" that are required to solve the problems of education, health, urban slums, lack of potable water, etc. What seems to escape the adherents of the movement (but is hardly lost on political leadership) is that the social condition which may be described by social indicators is intimately linked with the structure of society, and that substantial improvement in the social condition (as opposed to a mere reproduction on an enlarged scale) is possible only with a fundamentally different organization of society.

We suggest therefore that if the social indicator movement is not to be prematurely aborted, it must concentrate less and less on identifying more and more social indicators (i.e., the elements of a "community welfare function"), and engaging in pious exhortations for policies to improve the conditions indicated. Rather, effort should be devoted to identifying the conditions that permit individuals, groups, and communities within a society to pursue their goals in an autonomous, self-reliant, and equitable manner (whatever the specific arguments of the various welfare functions).

This is precisely what we intend to do in this brief article. Our focus will be strictly on Africa. Our objective in the first instance will be to analyse the nature and the evolution of the process of underdevelopment with a view to establishing the impact of the process (material, social, and political) at the level of the various African societies as well as at the level of specific social classes within these societies. From the analysis of the impact we hope to isolate the problems of major concern to the socio-economic planning process. These are what we shall term the development goals, social demands, and aspirations of the African countries. It will become obvious in part I of this article that by "goals and aspirations" we do not seek to identify specific material goods and social services that could conceivably advance the "welfare" of the African populace and to set targets for their attainment. Rather the goals deal with the <u>nature</u> of the development process.

In part II we shall attempt to identify the conditions necessary for the attainment of the goals and aspirations. These are what we believe should constitute the indicators of the social condition. In essence these conditions encompass the social organization of production as well as specific strategic targets to be obtained through the socio-economic planning process. The characteristic of these indicators of the social condition is that they permit the pursuance of the development goals (at the level of the society as well as the level of the groups and communities in the societies) in an unequivocal and unwavering manner. Specifically, the conditions permit the goals to be pursued directly through the process of production and the mechanism for distribution and not extraneously as the object of social welfare measures. Further, we discuss ways of measuring and monitoring progress as far as the identified "social indicators" are concerned. Finally in part III we address ourselves to the use of the indicators in development planning.

I. THE PROCESSES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: PROBLEMS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN FOR THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLANNING PROCESS

1. The Socio-economic Situation

For many of the nationalists engaged in the anti-colonial struggles, the anticipation was that political independence would open the way for rapid development and prosperity for the newly independent African countries. For these nationalists, the solution of the "development problem" rested uniquely on the attainment of political independence. For control of political power by nationals would mean the retention of economic surplus (or at least that portion of it which was extracted and transferred through largely political means - taxation, marketing boards, etc.). Further, political independence would mean the removal of obstacles to industrialization (and with the removal of the obstacles, the promise of rapid growth) since under colonialism industrialization had been systematically refused to the colonies. For the leaders of the anti-colonial struggles - the petty-bourgeoisie - the promise of decolonization lay, therefore, in the hope for what we may now characterize as generalized Ivory Coast or Malawi experiences: namely, rapid growth within the context of peripheral capitalism as a prerequisite for the creation of an economic base necessary for the reproduction of an emergent bourgeoisie as a class. Political independence, it was hoped, would enable the bridging of the "development gap" or at the very least enable the bourgeoisie to "catch up with the West" in terms of standard of living, consumption patterns, etc.

Admittedly, there were other nationalists (even if a small minority) who had hoped that decolonization would be only a first step enabling the African countries to embark on the task of creating autonomous self-reliant economies and egalitarian societies. For these nationalists, development and the establishment of egalitarian societies could only come about through the rejection of the context of peripheral capitalism and substituting in its stead development strategies based on the organization of national resources to meet the needs of the direct producers - namely, the rural peasantry and the small (in number) urban proletariat.

It is no revelation that by either of the two nationalists' conceptions of development, the past two or three decades' development experience in Africa has been a total failure. The euphoria that accompanied the granting of formal political independence has given way to bitter disappointments, recriminations, and successive coups d'état. There are few countries in Africa today that cannot boast of a series of socio-economic plans, changes in orientation, etc., but, all these notwithstanding, no ground has been gained even in the rather dubious official policy of "bridging the development gap," not to mention the laying of the foundations for more self-reliant autonomous economies.

What we propose to do in part I is to review the record of the performance of the African economies by the very yardsticks with which most of the nationalists measure socio-economic development: namely, rates of growth, levels of unemployment, the balance of payments, etc. The evaluation is done with a view to analysing why the performance was the way it was as well as to permit us to outline the problems of immediate concern for the socio-economic planning process in Africa.

According to the Economic Commission for Africa:

> In the early 1970s the overall economic performance of the 41 independent developing African countries as measured by the output of goods and services continues to give cause for concern.[3]

This concern is in fact very well founded. In 1972, the overall rate of growth was only 5.4 per cent and an even poorer 4.0 per cent in 1973. In per capita terms, the rate of growth in 1971 - 72 was only 2.6 per cent. What the figure hides, however, is the fact that in fully 16 countries GDP per capita actually fell. These are the 16 countries which according to the Economic Commission for Africa "recorded either negative rates or rates which were less than the average rates of population growth."[4] In fact, most of the growth recorded in the overall figures was accounted for by only ten countries. However, given the rather special circumstances surrounding the performance of these countries - Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Ivory Coast, Gabon, et al. - we can only conclude that the prospects for gradual but sustained improvements in Africa are not particularly good.

One can not however fully appreciate the dismal record of performance of the African economies until one realizes that 1972 was an exceptionally good year by African standards. For example, with the exception of the East Africa sub-region (which recorded an average growth rate of 6.0 per cent for the decade of the sixties as opposed to 3.9 per cent for 1972), we note that in all other sub-regions (West, North, and Central according to the Economic Commission's classification) the 1971 - 72 rates of growth of expenditure on GDP at constant market prices were definite improvements over the average for the 1960 - 70 decade. Overall, the 5.4 per cent rate of growth for 1971 - 72 compares with an average of only 5.0 per cent for the decade of the sixties. Measured at 1970 constant factor costs, the discrepancy is even larger - 6.1 per cent rate of growth in 1972, as opposed to an average of 4.7 per cent for the 1960 - 70 decade. We further note that the corresponding rates of growth for 1971 and 1973 were inferior still at 3.9 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively.

We shall demonstrate that the extremely uneven economic performance (over time and across countries) and feeble overall growth rates are not simply the results of bad economic management or lack of skilled manpower, etc. (the usual bêtes noires), but the logical consequence of externally oriented, dependent development. We do not wish to suggest at this stage, however, that conventional aggregate economic statistics can be relied upon to tell the full story. While the statistics - feeble recorded rates of growth, perennial deficits in central government budgets increasingly made up by domestic and foreign borrowing or financed through inflation, constant balance-of-payments deficits, etc. - tell part of the story, they fail to identify the true victims of dismal economic performance in Africa. Few, however, would seriously take issue with our assessment that the major victims of the past three decades' development experience have been the rural peasantry (comprising fully 60 per cent or more of the population of most African countries), and the urban-slum lumpenproletariat whose numbers everywhere have been growing with astounding speed.

For obvious reasons statistical information on employment, unemployment, nutrition, mass poverty, income distribution, etc., are most difficult to come by. Still, there are some rudimentary statistics that are at least suggestive of how well the rural peasantry and the urban slum lumpen-proletariat are faring. To use only one example, indices of per capita food production (overall Africa) reveal that food production in 1970 (a year which preceded the so-called drought[5]) was clearly lower than in 1965. Since then there has been a constant and consistent downward trend. Thus on the base of the 1961 - 65 average being 100, the indices of per capita food production were 102, 101, 101, 99, and 97 for 1965, 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973 respectively.

It is clear that African countries are increasingly being obliged to make up this food deficit through imports of food. This notwithstanding, in recent years there have been dramatic rises in food prices in almost all African countries. There is strong evidence in countries most affected by the food crisis (Ghana and Nigeria, for example) that the effects of the crisis on farm-gate prices are marginal despite increasing food production costs. On the other hand, retail and transport margins do absorb most of the price rise. This leads to predictable and ironic results: that the impact of the food crisis is more severely felt in the rural areas where most of the production takes place. In the urban areas where purchasing power is largely concentrated and where there are some who are able to afford the inflated prices, and where imported food makes its first appearance, food is more readily available even if priced out of the reach of the urban lumpenproletariat.

In fact there is no dearth of information to demonstrate that the African situation is becoming more and more alarming with each passing decade. To wit: staggering and increasing external indebtedness, except for a small group of countries producing petroleum and other minerals; scandalous urban unemployment rates even according to the grossly underestimated official rates; increasing inequalities in income distribution; "precarious" (to borrow the terminology of the Economic Commission for Africa) health situations in spite of increasing expenditures on health facilities; and increasing predominance of rural, poverty-stricken masses. We hope to demonstrate that these results are not simply due to a conjuncture of adverse conditions, be they weather, secularly declining terms-of-trade, bad leadership, or even corrupt politicians. Rather they are the logical outcome of externally oriented, dependent development strategies.

2. The Historical Context: the Nature of Underdevelopment in Africa

a. The Nature and Varieties of Colonial Exploitation

It is necessary to recall that capital accumulation since the very inception of capitalism (and in this we include the period just prior to the emergence and consolidation of fully mature, industrial capitalism - the period of mercantilism) has always taken place on a world scale. It has been a process whereby various parts of the globe have been fashioned and assigned specific tasks in producing or making possible the production of surplus for capitalist accumulation. Africa's role in this process is now very well documented. The first phase of it dates from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. It is the phase of primitive accumulation of wealth in what is now the developed centre of the capitalist system. During this phase, in Africa it was man himself - not labour - that became merchandise. Slavery in Africa[6] meant massive depopulation (and typically of the youngest and ablest members of the societies) resulting in, among other things, (i.) the degradation of agricultural and handicraft techniques, and (ii.) accentuation of group and tribal conflicts as slave-raiding became a profitable occupation. This phase clearly set the stage for Africa's loss of autonomy, as henceforth Africa began to be shaped by the needs of metropolitan societies and by the modality of capital accumulation at the centre of the world capitalist system.

The advent of the industrial revolution in Europe meant the eventual end of the European slave trade in Africa. But at the same time we witness the emergence of a new role for the African periphery - that of supplying cheap agricultural produce and raw materials for the industrial machinery of Europe. As was pointed out by Samir Amin[7], however, two developments were essential to permit this role to be intensified and to be carried on efficiently. These developments were a sufficient concentration of capital at the centre to permit its export abroad, and formal colonization. Formal colonization assured that the African would play the role assigned to him - that of a wage labourer in European-owned mines or plantations, or of a direct producer of agricultural exportables. The instruments used were taxation (in money), dispossession of land, forced labour, etc. Of course, in the African periphery, industrialization was systematically refused since it would have been superfluous given the role foreseen for Africa within the international division of labour.

In analysing this phase in the incorporation of Africa into the world capitalist system (and its essential political complement of formal colonization), it is correct not to insist on the differences of experiences based on the nationalities of the colonizers. Rather, the more important determinants of the variants of colonial exploitation were based on differences in the indigenous social structures (for example, whether hierarchical or not), the density of population, the availability of proven mineral deposits, the availability of fertile land for the development of agricultural exports, the "hospitability" of the local environment for settler encroachment, etc. Here again we can do no better than to recall the pioneering analysis by Samir Amin[8] of the varieties and logic of colonial exploitation.

The great mineral wealth of South Africa, Zambia, and Rhodesia and potential settler colonies in Mozambique, Kenya, and Angola (requiring cheap and abundant labour) called forth a violent policy of proletarization. Here it is the policy of "Bantustans" and its variants that ruled the day. In essence the policy was the dispossessing of the African peasantry, organizing them within the poorest isolated islands with no means of subsistence, thus forcing them to sell their labour cheaply to the mines and settler plantations. If this area of Africa (referred to as the Africa of the labour reserves by Samir Amin)[8] is currently the area where we witness the most violent conflicts, it is precisely because there exploitation took the most naked form. In this area of Africa, the national liberation demands can be formulated in unambiguous terms: the return of alienated lands to Africans, the expulsion of all "alien" elements (specifically the "Asians," meaning Indians first brought to eastern and southern Africa as indentured labour only to establish themselves later as a dependent commercial bourgeoisie serving as an intermediate link in an export-import exchange economy). This is in fact the basic content of the demands for "majority rule" in Rhodesia and the end of "internal colonialization" in South Africa. But precisely because the liberation struggle can be (and often is) justifiably formulated along racial lines, it is here that the struggle runs the greatest risk of being totally coopted by an emergent African bourgeoisie. The experiences of Kenya and Uganda are the most obvious examples.

In West Africa, where (a.) the environment was particularly hostile to settler encroachment, (b.) at the time of colonization there were few known important mineral deposits demanding large-scale direct foreign exploitation, (c.) there were satisfactory labour densities, and (d.) there were complex centralized social structures (that is, the existence of social strata which with the support of the colonial offices could de facto appropriate respectable tracts of tribal lands), the colonial policy was quite different. This region was to be organized into an area of relatively large-scale native production of agricultural products for export. The organization of colonial trading monopolies assured that the colonial government would reap the lion's share of the surplus produced, while taxation of the peasantry in money or, when not effective, forced labour assured that the peasantry would produce exportable crops.

It is scarcely surprising that, relatively speaking, it is in this region that the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie (dependent, to be sure) was given its fullest scope. The system was tailor-made for the larger land-owners, and the middlemen who played the crucial role of gathering produce from dispersed farmers and centralizing it for purchase by the colonial trading firms. Nor should we forget the role of this group in advancing credit (almost always at usurious terms) to the poorer peasants.

We note here the contrast with the eastern African region, where this role was almost exclusively played by Asians. In the western African region the development of an African bureaucratic/technocratic elite also had a headstart. By the bureaucratic/technocratic elite we mean the social groups now in the civil service bureaucracy, university professors, the directors and professionals in the various banks, marketing boards, and nationalized and pseudo-nationalized companies, as well as various other parasites.

In colonial times they (or more likely their predecessors) were clergymen, catechists, and occasionally lawyers and doctors. An overwhelming majority of them, however, were called upon to fulfil roles which were indispensable for the smooth functioning of the colonial administration, namely those of native administrators, district commissioners, primary-school teachers, police inspectors, clerks in the colonial governments, etc. Here again we note that these roles were largely played by Asians and settlers in east and southern Africa. In the post-colonial period and with the first wave of "nationalization" and Africanization decrees, it is this group that has moved to control the civil service bureaucracy and comprises the technocrats in the nationalized industries.

b. The Consequences

The eastern and southern African cases and the west African form of colonial exploitation do not, of course, exhaust all the variants of colonial exploitation; central Africa and north Africa, for example, have their own specificities. Regardless of the forms which colonial exploitation took, however, all African countries were united by one overwhelming feature. The target was everywhere the same: to obtain cheap exports. It was this end that the economic structures of all the African countries were systematically fashioned to serve.

In the African periphery, the pattern of the international division of labour which required (and still requires) the export of cheap primary products in exchange for manufactured products as well as food has had dramatic consequences. For a start, it has meant African loss of control (in any meaningful sense) over their own raw materials. Mining, for example, is totally controlled by trans-national corporations, and in any case is almost totally dependent on foreign markets to justify its exploitation. The result being that the countries are powerless to dictate the conditions for the exploitation of the mines as well as the rate of their exploitation. Secondly, the structure of production within any particular African country typically has no correspondence with the structure of domestic consumption. This leads to the rather anomalous situation that, in spite of the African countries being predominantly "agricultural," they are food-deficit areas - the best lands, resources, credit, etc., being available mainly for the cultivation of agricultural exportables. Further, it has meant massive surplus transfers, both "open" (for example, the repatriated profits of the colonial and post-colonial trading firms as well as the mining and manufacturing establishments) and "hidden" (that is, through transfer pricing by trans-national corporations and unequal exchange). It has also meant unequal growth and development not just at the level of the continent (the landlocked countries being practically neglected), but at the level of regions within the same country (the coastal regions and the regions with good potential for agricultural and mineral exports being obviously favoured). If we add to this the unstable but secularly declining terms of trade for Africa's main agricultural exports, then the record of the economic performance of the African countries during the past three decades or so becomes easily explicable.

c. Political Independence and Its Aftermath: Varieties of "False Starts" to Development

The colonial period was far from being characterized by a conquered people submitting docilely to foreign domination. Peasant revolts (both passive resistance and armed revolts) and numerous strikes initiated and led by the urban proletariat were the order of the day. In all cases, however, the national bourgeoisies (fragmented, to be sure, and usually consisting of the intellectuals and professionals, the better-to-do farmers, and various traders and middlemen) were able to capture the leadership of the independence struggles. Since then it has been the rivalries and struggles within this group that have largely shaped the course of the post-colonial era.

At the risk of over-generalization, we may argue that the post-colonial era in Africa has followed two broad but discernible patterns: countries content to follow colonial or neo-colonial policies, and the so-called "radical," or "progressive," or "intermediate" regimes. The key to understanding which country takes what option to development is to be found in the class nature of the state as well as the historical conditions for the emergence of the class alliance that controls state power.

A neo-colonial state by our definition is a state which is unable, for whatever reason, to attempt to challenge the basis of the import-export exchange economy. We would include in this category all African countries with the possible exceptions of Algeria, Tanzania, and Guinea.[9] For countries in this category the internal political struggle is hardly developed; thus the question of disengagement from the world capitalist system is not even put on the agenda. In a preponderant number of countries there is also the fact that the indigenous bourgeoisie which controls state power is decidedly too weak (internationally) to question its position within the international division of labour. There are however important exceptions, specifically Nigeria and possibly Egypt, on which we will comment later.

For countries of the neo-colonial type, "development" follows the classical pattern of unequal international division of labour characterized by the export of raw materials (agricultural and mineral) in exchange for manufactured goods. While this pattern does not exclude light manufacturing under import-substitution schemes, manufacturing is typically under the total control of trans-national corporations with all the open and hidden surplus transfers implied by this control. By "control" we of course do not mean simply ownership. We include also control through the supply of intermediate and capital goods, technology as well as management agreements that may be signed with trans-nationals.

For the most part, the neo-colonial model leads only to a limited development of privileged local strata (almost entirely of an administrative or military type) whose power and prosperity (and very modest at that) depend to a great extent on their control of the state machinery, their management of external trade, foreign aid, and foreign political support and military assistance. Economic stagnation punctuated by periods of crisis - usually to be explained by sharp drops in the prices of their major export commodities, and/or a drying up of foreign aid - seem to be characteristic of countries opting for this path. As far as the political process is concerned, apathy among the masses seems to be the general rule. Also characteristic is political instability as different personalities within the privileged strata struggle to gain control over state power. In times of crisis, repression is the preferred antidote to mass unrest while political instability (characterized by assassination attempts or attempted coups d'état) becomes accentuated.

It must be underlined, however, that this model does not always necessarily spell economic stagnation. Economic "miracles" are not only possible but are often predictable during periods of sustained favourable prices for the major export commodities and even more so during the initial phase of intensive and systematic exploitation of newly discovered primary resources for an externally oriented development. These miracles are even more spectacular when they coincide with an expansionary phase of the world economy. Under such circumstances the petty bourgeoisie which typically controls state power may even begin to show signs of transforming itself (through the use of state power, of course) into a true bourgeoisie; transplanting itself in agriculture as well as challenging the weaker sections of foreign capital. The experiences of Kenya, Zaire, and Ivory Coast are instructive in this regard. Such miracles by their very nature, however, are short-lived. In this connection it is useful to recall what Samir Amin refers to as "the dual structural crisis in public finance and in the balance of payments"[10] that seems to obligatorily follow the initial development euphoria created by such spectacular performances.

The post-colonial period in Africa has in fact been characterized by many attempts at "non-capitalist" options to development. These attempts however were for the most part short-lived; the obvious examples are Ghana under Nkrumah, Mali under Modibo Keita, Egypt under Nasser. The "intermediate" options of Tanzania and Algeria which are still ongoing are, however, the only ones that permit an initial assessment. Recent developments in Somalia, Congo Brazzaville, Benin, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Madagascar, Angola, and Ethiopia would seem to suggest that they are opting for this path, through the experiences are much too new for even an initial assessment.

As contrasted to countries opting for the colonial and neo-colonial options to development, it can be said that the "intermediate" states are characterized by a relatively advanced politicization of the worker-peasant masses. Often this politicization owes its origin to the active armed role played by this group in the independence struggle. Other times, politicization may be deliberately promoted (or at least left unhindered) by those who control state power. Usually, in such cases, students play an active role in the politicization process. Regardless of the origin of the politicization of the worker-peasant masses, however, the very fact of it obliges that whoever controls state power has to put "non-alignment," or "non-capitalist" options to development, on the agenda. It bears pointing out, however, that in the African case state power has always been controlled by the petty bourgeoisie. Note that we include the officer corps of the armed forces in this group.

In practice, however, the "non-capitalist" option in Africa has simply meant a petty-bourgeois directed development, or industrialization schemes with the state sector occupying a preponderant position, thanks in part to nationalizations (often partial) of foreign-owned assets. These industrialization schemes often open fantastic avenues for the petty bourgeoisie as they become the directors of the nationalized companies and banks, the deputy directors, engineers, inspectors, etc. Unquestionably, this tends to consolidate the dominant position of this stratum. Production relations, even in the public sector, and in spite of numerous experiments with "worker-participation" and "worker-self-management" schemes, remain basically indistinguishable from production relations in purely capitalist enterprises. More important, however, is the fact that the "non-capitalist" option to development in Africa has never meant disengagement from the world capitalist system. For one thing, the development of industrialization schemes often means massive imports of foreign technology (witness the Algerian case).

In no way therefore is reliance on the external sector as a motor for economic development fundamentally altered; the result has always been more and more export-orientation and not less. Basically the only modification that might be made in the export orientation is a diversification of trading partners from the traditional pattern of African countries - ex-colonial power to a larger number of trading partners, with developed socialist countries playing a more significant role both in economic and military aid as well as in absorbing exports from the African country in question. In fact, it may be argued that the major distinction between the "intermediate" regimes and the neo-colonial ones is that in the former there is a more conscious attempt at limiting the possibilities for using state power for the acquisition of personal wealth. The same, however, does not apply with respect to the use of state power for the creation of conditions that consolidate the dominance of the petty bourgeoisie as a group within the social structure.

In the agricultural sector, in spite of agrarian reforms (which may be quite radical) and in spite of attempts at "the modernization of agriculture" (or perhaps because of them), the problems of food sufficiency, unemployment, and under-employment never seem to be solved. The main reason is that agricultural modernization is typically viewed by the "intermediate regime" as a problem of increasing mechanization, the use of fertilizers, and reliance on irrigation schemes. Usually, individual or family cultivation remains the dominant form of production, and in such conditions "modernization" simply leads to increasing unemployment and inequalities in the countryside with highly subsidized "modern farmers" being the most favoured. Often enough the "intermediate" regime may require the formation of co-operatives (usually of the marketing or credit type; rarely for the purposes of production) as a condition for the provision of state subsidies, credit, and other forms of aid. Regardless of the nature of the production units however, the accent is usually on the production of agricultural exportables, either as a deliberate state policy to promote exports in order to finance externally oriented industrialization schemes, or as the result of the spontaneous adjustment of the production units to the relative prices for food and agricultural exportables. In the latter case, it is important to note that the politicization of the worker-peasant masses obliged (as a condition of political survival) that domestic prices (and especially those of food items) remain relatively stable.

A singular feature of agricultural modernization schemes as practised by intermediate regimes (one which has not received as much critical attention as it deserves) is that such schemes almost invariably lead to a drastic reduction of autonomous decision-making power at the level of rural communities. Instead, regimentation, increasing bureaucratic red tape, as well as total dependency on the agricultural extension services of the central government, become the general rule. The very fact that the provision of mechanized services is centrally organized does enable the mechanization units of the agricultural ministries to de facto dictate the organization of work in the production units. This is separate and apart from the fact that the services of these units are rarely reliable. Further, the conditions for making credit and extension facilities available to the production units usually give the state powerful instruments for orienting agricultural production, instruments which are very often used against the rural communities. It is these features of intermediate regimes, therefore, that lead us to seriously question whether a petty-bourgeois directed state (no matter how radical and professedly anti-imperialist) will be able to carry the national liberation struggle to its very end by setting the stage for a genuine socialist transformation of the society.

This then leaves us with the exceptions; specifically Nigeria and Egypt which could in the very near future follow a path which is substantially different from the two broad strategies outlined above. This is because they are two countries which (to us) have either developed, or are in the process of developing, the conditions for an upgraded role in the international division of labour. These conditions are (1.) advanced proletarianization; (2.) political, ideological, and economic domination by a well-developed local bourgeoisie which is powerful enough to negotiate with imperialism and challenge its role within the international division of labour; and (3.) the availability of local sources of capital to finance industrialization schemes. To the extent that the last condition is important (and we believe it is), Egypt's potential will be realized only to the extent that Arab oil money is willing to finance industrialization schemes there. Nigeria, however, is clearly in a much stronger position.

In any case what these countries could conceivably ask for would be a restructuring of the international capitalist system and not for a break with it. In this situation the type of development that could take place (under a nationalist, liberal-capitalist label) would in fact be new in relation to the classical neo-colonial model. A feature might very well be rapid industrialization for export, under the aegis of and in alliance with the trans-national corporations and the national bourgeoisies; that is, a re-enactment of the "run-away" industries of Taiwan and Hong Kong with the modification that the industrialization schemes must be locally financed. In this particular aspect, therefore, this path would resemble the Brazilian way.

We note here the critical importance of advanced proletarianization in this option, since it is the only condition that will ensure the international competitiveness of the manufactures produced by these schemes. Local sources of finance not only absolve trans-national co-operation from the need to commit substantial funds to a potentially risky venture while at the same time permitting substantial profits (and thus making them more inclined to co-operate) but also enhance the bargaining power of the national bourgeoisie in their demand for such a role. Unlike the case with Hong Kong and Taiwan, the obvious markets for Egypt and Nigeria would be the Middle East and North Africa, and African south of the Sahara respectively, and only very marginally the markets of the advanced countries since there the markets for light manufactures are largely saturated and could in any case be supplied much more cheaply from other sources. It also must be noted that the fact of limited markets dictates that such a role can be played by only a very limited number of African countries.

It can already be seen that important first steps for the fulfilment of this role are being undertaken in Nigeria. It is in this context that the indigenization decree (which reserves certain activities as the exclusive preserve of Nigerian capital and at the same encourages national/trans-national co-operation in large scale enterprises) must be seen. Further, if this role is to be played by Nigeria, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which Nigeria is currently actively promoting will clearly be an indispensable asset.

We are convinced, however, that this path to development will amount to no more than another false start. For, again, this model will be dependent on massive imports of foreign technology and can be sustained for only so long as the necessary foreign exchange remains available. Further, the problems of equitable development (both spatial and between social classes - witness the case of Brazil) and the problem of realigning the production structure to meet the needs of the bulk of direct producers would be beyond solution within the context of such a path to development.

3. Social Demands and Aspirations towards a New Set of Development Goals and Tasks for the Socio-economic Planning Process

The analysis of the nature of under-development in Africa (in particular our perception of the basic demands of the national liberation struggles in Africa) leads us to the conclusion that the task of the socio-economic planning process should ultimately be to promote a set of goals which we put under two broad headings: (1.) the promotion of national autonomy, and (2.) the alleviation of the human condition. We note that these two goals are intimately linked. By national autonomy, we mean autonomous self-reliant development, and such a goal will be said to be promoted whenever external economic, social, cultural, and political relations are submitted to the needs of internal socio-economic transformation. The analysis of the historical origins of under-development in Africa underlined the fact that up till now socio-economic evolution in Africa has been dictated by the nature of Africa's external economic relations. Further, the analysis revealed the pernicious consequences that this feature of African socio-economic transformation has led to. At this stage therefore it will be simply repetitious for us to justify our conviction that autonomous self-reliant development must be an ultimate goal for the socio-economic planning process.

Drawing on the previous analysis, it should also be clear why autonomous self-reliant development should necessarily help to alleviate the human conditions. At the very least, it should limit the extent of surplus transfers and it should ensure that national resources will be organized to meet national needs. In particular, it would lead progressively to a convergence to the pattern of domestic production and the structure of domestic consumption. But while autonomous self-reliant development is a necessary condition for the alleviation of the human condition, it is obviously not a sufficient condition to ensure that the alleviation of the human condition will be pursued in an equitable manner. The other precondition for the alleviation of the human condition is that the needs and aspirations of the bulk of direct producers must manifest themselves as effective demand and not, as already pointed out, as needs to be met by social welfare measures.

In part II we shall attempt to identify the conditions that will ensure that the two identified ultimate goals will be pursued in an unwavering manner. We are convinced that it is these conditions (and not, for example, the goods and services necessary for the alleviation of the human condition) that should be the object of the social movement.

II. THE IDENTIFICATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS RELEVANT TO THE GOALS OF SELF-RELIANT DEVELOPMENT AND THE ALLEVIATION OF THE HUMAN CONDITION

As pointed out in the Introduction, the search for conventional socio-economic indicators (concentrating as it has to date on the identification of the arguments of "the social welfare function") has led to rather unsatisfactory results. It needs to be repeated that what constitutes a relevant socio-economic indicator is not neutral to the socio-economic and political structure of the society in question. Neglect of this fact only leads to mindless utopianism. Further, the arguments of the social welfare function (the variables) and the parameters are bound to be very sensitive to socio-economic evolution and thus time; and this is aside from the fact that, even for specific points in time, the search for the social welfare function is bound to be a rather futile one.

The non-neutrality of socio-economic indicators implies that in identifying social goals, the identifier necessarily takes a political/ideological position. This being the case, it is incumbent on him to identify the socio-economic and political organization of society as well as development strategies that will most favour the attainment of that goal. The intractability of social welfare functions also dictates that effort is much better expended on identifying the structural conditions that equip a given populace for the self-pursuance of their objectives (whatever the arguments of the social welfare function happen to be at that particular point in time). What these all mean, then, is that it is the socio-economic and political organization of society and strategic development targets that should be the object of the socio-indicator movement.

Given the goals of autonomous self-reliant development and the alleviation of the human condition in Africa, we are therefore led to identify as social indicators: (1.) Disengagement from the world capitalist system;

(2.) democratization of the process of production (that is, social control over the process of social production); and (3.) increasing the productivity of labour as a major concern of the socio-economic planning process. Our analysis of the nature of under-development in Africa would also suggest that these three indicators are intimately linked.

1. The Scope of, and the Rationale for, the Indicators

a. Disengagement from the World Capitalist System

Disengagement from the world capitalist system does not mean autarchy, and as such it can not, strictly speaking, be measured by such "conventional" indicators as the size of the external sector in relation to the gross domestic product. In scope, disengagement deals with transforming and restructuring the export sector; it does not mean eliminating it. Among the questions that one has to pose in trying to determine the extent of a country's disengagement are the following: (1.) Is the export sector an extension of domestic demand or does it lead to an independent existence? (2.) How articulated or complete is domestic production? For example, is the domestic production structure capable of providing capital and intermediate inputs for the mass-consumption goods sector? Another way of formulating the same question is to ask whether imports are determinants in terms of their being the sine qua non for domestic production.

Far from being academic, these two questions have important implications for a society's capacity for self-generated and self-sustained growth. The African case amply demonstrates that, in the absence of an export sector which is an extension of domestic demand, domestic economic activity becomes critically and unacceptably dependent on the vagaries of the world market. This is further accentuated by the fact that international economic conditions are totally outside of the control of any particular African country nor can they even successfully predict the evolution of the international market. The inability to alter domestic production to meet domestic demand has therefore meant that sharp drops in the prices of major exports lead to either increasing indebtedness or to starvation.

It is important to note at this stage that the solution for externally induced economic instability is not "diversification of exports," especially when this means (as it often has meant in the African case) the identification of more export products lacking a domestic base. In the first place, world commodity prices, being dependent on whether the world economy is in an expansionary or deflationary phase, are likely to move with considerable sympathy to each other. Diversification therefore is not likely to lead to significantly greater stability in the total export earnings. Even in the case where, due to supply conditions (say adverse or favourable weather conditions), prices of particular commodities move in the opposite direction from the general trend in prices, it is important to note that stability in total export earnings is not necessarily achieved. For this to be the case, earnings (not just prices) from the sale of these commodities must move in the opposite direction from earnings from the commodities whose prices follow the general trend. In the case of a supply short-fall, for example, leading to higher prices, unless the conditions responsible for the short-fall do not also apply to the country in question, the output sold will clearly be in the opposite direction from the price rise, thus compensating (more or less depending on the elasticity of demand) for the effect of the price rise on the earnings of the commodity in question. Specifically, if the elasticity of demand for the commodity in question is unity, earnings for that commodity will be unaffected; thus total export earnings will exhibit the same instability as before. In fact if the elasticity of demand is greater than unity, total export earning will exhibit <u>greater</u> instability since the effect of the supply short-fall will be reduced earnings for that commodity. It is only in the case of inelastic demand that the effect of the supply short-fall will serve to stabilize total export earnings. Symmetric arguments apply to the case of favourable supply conditions.

We have already had occasion to analyse the effects of the dependence on imports as a critical input for domestic production on economic evolution in Ghana.[12] Here therefore we only summarize the conclusions with the conviction that they are of general applicability. The heavy import content of domestic production (especially as far as manufacturing is concerned) means that not only are imports of consumer goods dependent on the export sector but all domestic production becomes dependent as well. More important, however, is the fact that the instability of the export sector's earnings obliges all productive enterprises to adopt a conservative posture. The easing of import restrictions and the increasing availability of foreign exchange, for example, do not necessarily and automatically lead to an expansion of domestic productive activity. Rather, the general rule is that inventories of intermediate and semi-finished imported inputs are over-stocked in anticipation of the reintroduction of strict import controls. Productive activity, therefore, develops a built-in aversion to expansion and growth.

The existence of an export sector without a domestic base, coupled with a domestic production structure which is critically dependent on imported inputs for its smooth functioning, thus reduces the socio-economic planning process to, at best, "crisis management." It deprives a society of the capacity to alter the pace and nature of domestic economic activity in response to exchanges in domestic demand. But these two questions do not exhaust the number of questions to be posed in trying to determine the extent of a country's dependence on the world capitalist system. Other questions concern: the role of international prices in determining domestic resource allocation; the extent of trans-national control and domination over the largest and most dynamic sectors of the economy; in countries with oil and other non-renewable resources, how the generation of foreign reserves relates to the absorptive capacity of the domestic economy.

In the case of the role of international prices in the determination of domestic resource allocation, what we propose is an anti-Little and Mirrtees doctrine.[13] Aside from the fact that the doctrine is an open invitation to greater integration into the world capitalist system, even the conventional neo-classical critique of static comparative advantage (within the context of perfect competition in international markets, no less!) should be sufficient to put the doctrine into permanent cold storage. The extent of trans-national domination of the dynamic sectors of an economy not only affects the extent of surplus transfer (open as well as hidden) but, more critically, determines whether or not the activities in those sectors will respond to the needs of the domestic economy, or rather to the global profit calculus of the trans-national in question.[14] Finally, the relation of the generation of foreign reserves to domestic absorptive capacity is an indication of how sensitive the exploitation of non-renewable resources is to the needs of domestic economic transformation.

The scope and rationale for the objective of disengagement from the world capitalist system are, therefore, to eliminate dependency and limit the possibilities of holding to ransom. The effect should be to correct the asymmetry between the structure of domestic production and the pattern of domestic consumption. It should minimize externally induced economic instability and stagnation of domestic productive activity in general. It should also minimize externally induced spatial inequality, since the downgrading of the external sector as a motor for economic development should necessarily reduce the importance of export enclaves (in their drawing power for social infrastructure, for example) in relation to the other regions of the country.

b. Democratization of the Process of Production

It is easy to demonstrate that political democratization is impossible without the democratization of the process of production. In essence the objective of democratization should be to ensure social control over the process of social production. It does not, however, just mean the nationalization of the means of production. The African case has often enough demonstrated that while nationalization (of either foreign or national private assets) may settle the issue of legal ownership, it does not by itself settle that of social control - the key factor in the determination of the structure of production as well as in the distribution of income. Put simply, democratization of the process of social production should ensure that the direct producers have a preponderant role in the determination of <u>what</u> will be produced and how the fruits of productive activity will be distributed.

More than any of the other indicators, democratization deals with the nature of production relations in the various sectors of the economy. This objective suggests that in rural communities, land, the critical factor of production, should be collectively owned <u>and</u> collectively and/or individually cultivated. As a goal, the aim should be to discourage private appropriation of large tracts of land. Furthermore, in order to advance the objective of democratization, the socio-economic planning process should serve to enhance the mastering of all the technological stages necessary for agricultural production at the level of identifiable rural communities. The target of productive activity in the rural communities should be above all else self-sufficiency, not just in agricultural products but in other spheres as well (supportive village industries and artisans, etc.). Production targets, technology, and the need for exchange with other sectors should be democratically determined at the level of rural communities themselves.

In industry, there should be real as opposed to formal worker participation in all major decisions affecting the enterprise. This would include worker participation in the determination of the wage bill, the choice of techniques and technical innovations to be researched, import content and choice of outputs to be produced, production targets, ways of monitoring productivity, etc. In addition, industry as a whole should play a supportive role to agriculture both in the provision of critical inputs that may only be efficiently produced on a large scale and in the production of consumption goods for mass demand. As the African case amply demonstrates, a symbiotic relationship between industry and agriculture can not be taken for granted. In a normal autonomous and integrated development, one would expect to observe an interrelationship between agriculture and industry on at least three levels: (1.) as industrial expansion makes available critical inputs (fertilizers, agricultural implements, machinery) it thus alters the material conditions of production in the countryside and advances the productivity of labour in agriculture; (2.) to the extent that industrialization makes increasing demands on the output of agriculture (for example as in food-processing), it provides an outlet for expanded agricultural output; (3.) as industrialization makes available increasing volumes of manufactured products (preferably at decreasing real prices) it thus provides an outlet for rural incomes as well as the material incentives for increasing agricultural productivity.

The general case in Africa, however, has been that while industrialization feeds on agriculture (through the latter's provision of foreign exchange), the contribution of industry to agriculture is for the most part negligible. The highly protected and subsidized industrialization schemes are for the most part oriented to the provision of consumer goods for the higher-income urban dwellers. The effect of the nature of industrialization in Africa in accentuating inequalities between the town and the countryside can therefore not be ignored if democratization of the processes of production is to reinforce a worker-peasant alliance designed to surmount underdevelopment.

Democratization of the process of production is, therefore, a necessary condition for approaching equality in income distribution and political power, and it is the only context within which political democratization can be given a meaningful content. It is understood, of course, that we do not limit ourselves to intra-rural and intra-urban equality but to urban-rural equality as well. Coupled with disengagement from the world capitalist system, democratization must necessarily alter the class nature of African societies as currently constituted. For one thing, the role of the comprador bourgeoisie, whose raison d'être consists of serving as the intermediary between foreign capital and the economy of the underdeveloped African state, would necessarily be diminished. Even the very role of the cities (which we have elsewhere characterized as being the conveyor belt between the centre and the periphery[15] or the key link in an export-import economy) will be altered. More importantly, however, democratization of the process of production will undoubtedly ensure that social needs and goals will be identified at the level where the needed information is within easy reach. This should serve to end the dichotomy between the identifiers of social goals and the beneficiaries of social projects designed to advance those goals.

c. Increasing the Productivity of Labour in the Process of Production

Increasing the productivity of labour in the process of production is the easiest goal to specify. The rationale is simply to ensure that the society will increasingly be in a position to provide for the growing needs of the population.

Under democratization, we outlined the interrelationship that must exist between industry and agriculture if a dichotomy or inequality between town and countryside is to be minimized. This point takes on even more significance when one notes that such a relationship necessarily enhances agricultural productivity.

As a target, increasing the productivity of labour implies that the socio-economic planning process must aim at ensuring that all potentially active members of the society are usefully employed, since unemployment implies zero productivity. Thus, the target also ensures that access to employment will be viewed as a right of every individual. Further, increasing the productivity of labour implies that, to the best ability of the society, a continuing target should be the raising of the level of development of productive forces through modernization, while relying as much as possible on the creative energies of the indigenous population.

2. The Measurement of the Indicators: Ways of Monitoring Progress

What follows should be viewed more in the nature of suggestions as to how the indicators outlined above may be measured. It is clear, however, that further research and refinements are called for; thus in no way should this be treated as a definitive proposal.

a. Disengagement from the World Capitalist System

The very definition of the scope of disengagement suggests three indices (or some synthetic index encompassing these three) which are the following:

1. A measure of the degree of foreign (trans-national) control over the domestic production process. The measure being the value of production of trans-nationally controlled enterprises as a percentage of total production. In deriving this measure it is important to note that control may be exercised through ownership as well as through management contracts, marketing arrangements, and through the provision of technology (patent rights, licensing agreements, as well as the supply of machinery). What must be isolated, therefore, are the industries (enterprises) that require trans-national or foreign co-operation in order to be viable. This would include, in the African case, all import-substitution industrialization ventures. Other examples are copper in Zaire, aluminium in Ghana, tourism in the Gambia, rubber in Liberia, etc. This is to say that it would include practically all the extractive industries in Africa.

The weakness of this measure, however, is that it will fail to discriminate between cases where the control is strategic for the national economy and the case where the control is of a peripheral activity.

Where a distinction between "strategic" and "non-strategic" sectors of activity can be unambiguously made, differential weights must obviously be attached to the outputs originating from these sectors. Further, in cases where transfer-pricing is widely practised (that is, almost everywhere) adjustments must be made in the prices for evaluating the outputs originating from the trans-nationally controlled enterprises.

2. The value of exports without a domestic base as a percentage of total exports. The designation of such exports, though straightforward in principle, is likely to be problematic in practice. For one, the question of a cut-off point immediately crops up. The assessment (of what constitutes a non-domestically based export) is therefore more likely to be qualitative than quantitative. A number of rules of thumb may however be devised; for example, the classification of export products of which less than 15 per cent in volume of production is retained for domestic absorption as being non-domestically based. In Africa, we note that such a rule of thumb would lead to the classification of almost all agricultural and mineral exports as being without a domestic base.

3. Domestic manufacturing value added as a percentage of the gross output of the manufacturing sector. This is meant to be a measure of the import content in domestic production. Import content is likely, in the African case, to be more important in the manufacturing sector. Where possible, however, it is clear that it would be preferable to have an index which applies to all areas of economic activity.

b. Democratization of the Process of Production

More than any of the three indicators just discussed, democratization requires a qualitative rather than a quantitative measurement. As a first approximation, however, we may suggest that in agriculture a measure such as the total wage-labour force and unemployment as a percentage of total agricultural population may be a useful guide to the degree of democratization in the rural areas. This index would be a measure of the extent of agrarian capitalism, and the degree of proletarization of concentration in the land ownership pattern. Indirectly, it can also be viewed as a measure of the skewness of the distribution of agricultural incomes, and thus of the extent of real political democracy.

The measurement of the degree of democratization is even less tractable as concerns industry. Merely setting up worker-management committees does not guarantee effective worker participation in decision-making. Merely counting the number of enterprises under so-called worker-management therefore misses the point. Clearly only a qualitative assessment will enable us to determine whether in a given enterprise labour constitutes merely hired hands or whether it plays a role in the determination of the size of the wage bill, the utilization of the excess of output over the wage bill in terms of investments, innovation, etc.

We would, however, like to advance the following hypothesis (which as yet needs to be proved): whenever the size of the wage-bill varies directly with the net output of the enterprise, labour will more likely have a decision-making role than not. We hasten, of course, to say that every effort should be made to isolate increases in both output and the wage-bill due simply to the employment of more labour at fixed hourly rates. The measure is whether or not there is a correlation between remuneration per man-year of labour and the productivity of labour. We repeat that the hypothesis needs to be verified.

c. Increasing the Productivity of Labour in the Process of Production

In principle measurement of the productivity of labour should pose no problems. In order to capture the two aspects of the measurement - the percentage of unemployment and, among the employees, the evolution of output-per-man corrected for price changes - we propose the following index: The measure of the evolution of output-per-man with the total potentially active population as the denominator.

III. THE USE OF THE INDICATORS IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

The very nature of our socio-economic indicators precludes a narrow definition of development planning. Therefore, of necessity we can not restrict the meaning of development planning to the task of preparing a plan for the national (government) development and capital expenditures - a task restricted largely to the planning ministries. Rather our definition of development planning includes the whole array of government services (including those under both recurrent and development expenditures), as well as policies (monetary and fiscal, to be sure, but also social, cultural, and foreign policies). These should be weighed or evaluated on the basis of whether or not they advance the attainment of the social objectives. In this regard, the importance of the legal basis of society as well as the very nature of the legal institutions can not be minimized.

Nevertheless, even within a narrow definition of development planning, certain objectives and tasks to be performed readily reveal themselves. At a macro-level, the objective of development policies will be two-fold: (1.) to reconcile and promote the attainment of community development and social targets; and (2.) to establish urban-rural terms of trade with a view in mind of ensuring that industry plays a supportive role to agriculture.

Still within the narrow definition of development planning, it is clear that the socio-economic objectives identified above (and the associated indices) may be made <u>explicit</u> objectives in project analysis and project choice. What we would suggest is that in addition to the aggregate consumption benefits attributable to projects, projects be ranked on the basis of their <u>net</u> effects on such indices as (1.) the degree of external control; (2.) the index of the non-domestically based exports; (3.) the import content of domestic production; (4.) the proletarianization index; and

(5.) direct and indirect effects on the productivity of labour.

There are a number of questions which may of course be raised; for example, whether it is necessary to include all the indices for the disengagement from the world capitalist system as separate indices or whether it might not be better to have a synthesized index encompassing elements of all three, etc. Further, even the process of isolating the net effects of a project on the indices may not be as straightforward as it may appear in principle, especially since the project's effect may be external to the project itself (for example, the case where the implementation of a given project increases the import content of other already existing projects). But in any case the techniques of project evaluation with multiple objectives, the procedure for the identification of a project's effects, as well as even the critique of the current procedures for project evaluation, are well known. This is therefore hardly the place for a debate on project evaluation. We feel, however, that a comment on the relative importance of the different socio-economic indicators (the question of weighting) is clearly in order at this juncture.

We are of the opinion that while the question of the relative ranking of the indices is of interest, it is probably not determinant nor critical for the effective use of the indicators in project choice. Progress made in the area marked by one of the socio-economic indicators can not help but have a positive impact on the other indicated areas. Nevertheless, we would single out the central position of the democratization of the process of production in the struggle to overcome underdevelopment. Without democratization, the target of disengagement from the world capitalist system is doomed to be unattainable. To the extent that income and power inequalities of substantial magnitudes do exist, the link to the external markets can be the only means by which the demand of the higher income groups can be satisfied. Further, as argued above, because democratization of the process of production provides the material and moral incentives for production as well as releasing the creative energies of the direct producers, it can not help but have a positive effect on the productivity of labour.

REFERENCES

1. Wolfgang Zapf, "Systems of Social Indicators. Current Approaches Problems," International Social Science Journal, vol. XXVII, 3, 1975, p. 490.

2. Kenneth Land, "Theories, Models and Indicators of Social Change," International Social Science Journal, vol. XXVII, 1, 1975, p. 19.

3. All statistical information used in this essay is based on the Economic Commission for Africa's Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1973, part 1 (New York: United Nations, 1974).

4. Ibid., p. 16.

5. It is generally accepted that in 1973 - 1975 there was a substantial short-fall in rains which affected the Sahel region in Africa, and Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and many other countries as well. The response of the international community was mainly to provide immediate and medium-term relief aid by setting up agencies such as CILSS (Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel). There have been numerous articles analysing whether the devastating impact was man-induced or simply "nature."

6. It is conventional to point out (especially among apologists for the West) that "slavery" existed in Africa before the advent of European slavery. Clearly, however, the two phenomena are in no way comparable.

7. See Samir Amin, "Development and Structural Changes: African Experience," IDEP/REPRODUCTION/373 (Dakar, 1974).

8. See Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa; Their Historical Origins and Contemporary Forms," IDEP/REPRODUCTION/277 (Dakar, 1971).

9. We argue later for the exclusion of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Ethiopia, and other countries from the analysis because an initial assessment of their experiences is not now possible.

10. See, for example, Slimane Bedrani, "Quelques éléments de la politique agraire algérienne de l'indépendance à aujourd'hui," IDEP/CS/2592-33 (Dakar, 1975).

11. See Samir Amin's "Underdevelopment and Dependence" cited above.

12. See author's "A Note on Dependent Industrialization and Income Distribution in Ghana," IDEP/REPRODUCTION/2770 (Dakar, 1976).

13. Simply summarized, the Little and Mirrtees doctrine calls for the valuation of all goods and resources (in project-evaluation) at "international prices," the latter being the "true opportunity costs" of resources utilized (for goods produced).

14. See author's "Transnational Corporations, Transfer of Technology and Prospects for a 'Fair Deal' for the Third World," *Africa Development*, 1977.

15. See author's "Régions et Problèmes de Planification Régionale dans le Contexte des Économies Africaines," *L'espace et société*, 1973.