DEVELOPMENT THEORIES IN THE SOCIAL LOOKING-GLASS: SOME REFLECTIONS FROM THEORIES TO "DEVELOPMENT"

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Let us first emphasize, as a preliminary remark, that this paper is mainly concerned with proposals of research, viz. guidelines (which can and should be debated!) related to the possibility of investigating the ways in which various authors have imagined to promote "development." Our intention is not to elaborate, at this stage, a definite typology of the different processes of "development," or of the different means by which "development" can be achieved. The limited objective of this paper is rather to suggest how this "object" can be approached.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT

Although generally overlooked, the fact remains that it is impossible to describe the processes of development without paying some attention to the definition of development itself. Even more: A classification of the definitions of development is part and parcel of a typology of the processes of development, and we could well say that this first step is perhaps one of the major difficulties of the task. For the content of the term "development" is widely taken for granted, and a great deal of the literature concerned with this problem starts right away with the exposition of the way(s) to development, assuming that everyone knows what the word means. Yet such a procedure is not too surprising if interpreted as the result of the all-pervasive western ethnocentrism: As a matter of fact, the word "development" can mean either a state of affairs or a process; some countries are "developed," whereas some others are "developing." No doubt, therefore, such a terminology brings about confusion by identifying "development" with the general conditions prevailing in the western part of the world (which includes the so-called socialist countries of Europe and the USSR). The same applies to this other word — evolution — which is often used as a quasi synonym for "development": It gives the impression that the only possible goal of the evolution of the Third World is the reproduction of the western model. The difference between the model and its imitators is then described either as a lack or as a lag; or, to put it another way, the divergencies which appear between the Third World and the western model (e.g., cultural, social, political diversity) are seen as defects (in comparison to the "model") rather than as genuine, specific features of the Third World. This extraordinary confusion between the teleological (related to goals) and the praxeological (related to means) meaning of the word
"development" results first of all in an approach which is an essentially comparative one, insisting on the various gaps which not only divide but also (and much more!) link both entities.

The second consequence of this confusion is that theories of development have a general tendency to over-emphasize one aspect of development, namely economic growth or, to use still another word, production (which, obviously, has a direct influence on the indicators of development: in this case, the GNP is taken as the indicator). Such a one-sidedness is built into the particular circumstances of the so-called consumers' (or affluent) society, which is seen as the reference point. Indeed, there seems to be a general consensus whose main presupposition is that a new "golden age" is in sight, ahead of us (and no longer behind, for this was a distressing hypothesis!), and that its prefiguration consists in the type of society which prevails in the West (industrialization plus a market-oriented economy). One could reasonably argue, on this presupposition, that there is no basic opposition between the "liberal" and the "Marxist" view. This statement, however — which is also an article of faith! — has one major implication: The impression that the present system wishes to give is that the affluent society is a new stage, a better era, compared to the old times of long hours of work, thrift, cyclical unemployment, and direct exploitation of the working class. Everything is nowadays conceived in order to conceal (or minimize) the production side of society, in such a way that consumption is brought to the fore; to be a "good citizen" in this new (great?) society means to enjoy and to consume the goods which are abundantly provided by the civilization of happiness. The other side of the coin is that this level of consumption must be matched by an equal level of production: Just as the European rural populations were trained in order to enter the industrial process (production), they are now trained to consume; but, if the emphasis has changed, the fact nevertheless remains that "production and consumption are nothing but one large and logical process of enlarged reproduction and control of the productive forces." To put it differently, using the words of the same author, consumption is "the mirror of production." Any serious analysis of the mechanisms
leading to the establishment of an affluent society will therefore be constrained to favour one particular factor, which will be called either production or economic growth. There is no other way round: by identifying the goals of "development" with the present type of western society, the focus of attention must be on the unsatisfactory level of growth in the developing countries. In turn, this can be used as a practical device to expose one of the possible hidden assumptions of development theories: Inasmuch as they concentrate their effort on growth, or mere economic development, one can reasonably expect that their authors have in mind — even if this remains unsaid — the reproduction of the western model of development.

Depending on whether or not one agrees with the desirability of imitating this particular model, one will propose different typologies of development theories. For example, if the western paradigm is taken for granted, one could then divide the theories into liberal (development is a natural process which can be hastened by a large transfer of resources into the Third World in the form of private investment, foreign aid, governmental or multilateral loans, etc.) or Marxist ones (development will be brought about by structural or revolutionary changes, considered as a precondition for a rational — planned — allocation of resources). One could also try to draw a line between those theories which emphasize internal changes in the developing countries and those which are particularly concerned with transformation at the international level (trade, monetary policies, financial flows, indebtedness, etc.). This latter procedure would, as a matter of fact, be tantamount to writing an "Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Poverty of Nations"! This very rough and sketchy way of classifying the theories of development could be elaborated and might certainly provide us with some useful indications as to the prerequisites to growth, seen from different angles.

But what happens if the main target of "development" is no longer economic growth but, for example, human growth? What happens if the present western model comes to be seen not only as a form of over-development (which might be morally wrong, but nevertheless enjoyable!)

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but rather as a form of anti-development (i.e., which causes under-development in the Third World and which constitutes no model at all for development)? The consequence is obvious: The typology will reduce all theories previously identified into one single class of "non-development theories," and a new set of theories, based on one (or many) other concept(s) of development, will emerge.

Although it might be difficult, in practice, to draw a clear demarcation line between these different theories (since their emphasis on internal/external factors or economic growth/human needs is always a relative one), this approach has the advantage of opening up the typology to certain positions or ideologies (whether they can really be called "theories" remains sometimes doubtful) which, otherwise, would have been excluded from the initial choice, or simply overlooked.

It might be just as well, at this juncture, to dwell a little more on this fundamental question of definition in order to explain why — in our view — "development" cannot be primarily described in terms of economic growth.

The first reason is that economic growth cannot be considered as a relevant criterion of development as long as the distribution of this increment is not clearly defined in the model. It may be argued that this point is taken care of by the planning demanded by any Marxist-inspired model; yet one should recognize at the same time that planning is largely seen as the rational organization of production rather than as the distribution of produced wealth.

Secondly, let us assume for one moment that all obstacles have been removed from the road to this kind of "development" and that the Third World has eventually become ready for the establishment of a type of society akin to the western one. Two examples will suffice to show the impossibility of realizing this dream: The western model considers full employment as one of its permanent objectives. Now, in order to assure jobs — in trades comparable to those which are common in the western part of the world — the capital investment required has been estimated
at something like 2,000 billion \((2 \times 10^{15})\) Swiss francs for the period 1970-1980. To prove that such an amount is out of proportion with the global investing capacity needs probably no further explanation!

Another way of showing the totally unrealistic side of the western model is to take the famous example of W.W. Rostow, who uses the number of private cars owned in a given country as an indicator of development. If we now assume that a "developed" country is a country where there is one car for every four people, we end up with the necessity of "feeding" a total of one billion cars, which, given the present estimates of "proven resources" of oil, is a totally unrealistic prospect: The feasibility of such a project is indeed beyond the possibilities of the natural resources of our world.

Thirdly (and this is becoming more and more a truism), the western model also has some built-in drawbacks (pollution, increase of heart or mental diseases, etc.) which might — in the mid-term period — call into question its paradigmatic nature, even if these inconveniences can also be viewed as a way of promoting growth, inasmuch as the measures taken against pollution or the salaries of the increased number of doctors required are added up in the GNP (which is considered the indicator of "development"). The question here is no longer whether the imitation of the model is possible but whether it is desirable.

Finally — and this is probably the most radical criticism that can be levelled against the western model — it is fundamentally ethnocentric. Not only is the West considered theoretically normative, but it practically functions as a centre, using up for its "sustained growth" the resources of the periphery. For ethnocentrism is not a mere concept, useful in the field of cultural relations: An ethnocentric system is, essentially, a system based on the exploitation by the centre of the human and natural resources of the periphery. If we suppose now that the periphery wants to develop along the same line as the centre, the whole system collapses into absurdity: The periphery cannot, by mere definition, become the centre! Here is the limit of the "development" proposed (and sometimes imposed) by the West upon the Third World: The western paradigm appears to be a model, but it
must be clear at the same time that this model will never be realized by those who are copying it; or, to put it another way, the mere fact of copying the model is a step towards the destruction of the model as such.

For all these reasons, the definition of development should be approached from a different angle. If we ignore the ethnocentric, universalistic approach of "development" identified with economic growth, the only possibility is to ensure a plurality of developments. This conclusion, however, is not the result of a kind of innocuous logic: Far from being a simple way of playing with words, it entails two fundamental and practical consequences:

1. First of all, a plurality of developments is possible only if the presently prevailing ethnocentric model of development is done away with. It should indeed be obvious that the existence of many different types of developments can be secured, only if no single "unit" has an hegemonic claim over the others. The paradox of pluralism in that case is that room can be made, in the global structure, for almost any model of development, with the exception of the present dominant one. This is undoubtedly one of the major problems of this position, for it precludes, from the outset, any typology which would classify the theories of development according to their congruency (or discrepancy) with the values that are almost universally taken for granted.

2. Secondly, to advocate a plurality of developments means at the same time the end of a quest for a definition of the development. One could therefore question the very purpose of this paper, which is to suggest some possible ways of understanding "development." More than that, one could go as far as to say that there is no answer to the question "What is development?" For the very simple reason that the content of the word has to be defined — all over the world — by the people who are directly concerned (including those in the industrialized countries) and who will have to cope with the task (not only in the Ministries for Planning, but in practice!) of bringing it
about. It might, however, be more accurate to say that there is no simple answer to the question, or that answers are too many. But in either case, this means the end of a theory — viz., some sort of generalization of the "natural" complexity of things.

We therefore shall have to start afresh from this radical methodological doubt. Like Descartes, who, after having called into question all the established "authorities," had nevertheless to live according to a "provisional ethics" (la morale provisoire), we must now take a new look at development theories, assuming, in order to avoid sinking either into melancholy or sheer activism, that a minimal definition of "development" is still possible which could give us some hint as to the possibility of evaluating theories. This is not to say that this methodological doubt is a purely formal one. Its practical importance consists in the fact that, within the plurality which we are advocating, no "development" should be positively valued if it justifies, in one way or another, any of the criticisms made to the present dominant model.
In order to examine a series of "development" theories, it is necessary to approach them with a set of variables which are relevant to them; only meaningful questions are likely to provoke meaningful answers. As was mentioned before, "development" is quite often thought of in terms of organization of the production/distribution of produced wealth; such an approach already contains three different concepts—production, distribution, and structures (organization).

"Development" however, cannot be reduced to "economistic" considerations, for it concerns the whole of society and cannot be isolated, separated from it. This is why it is more and more difficult even to use the word "development." To be sure, it might be found useful in order to describe western society, since it corresponds to the main values enshrined in this civilizational process. But this is only one side of the coin: If "development" can be seen as the goal of western society—i.e., if "development" is achieving, implementing the values of this particular (western) society—it is at the same time destroying the foundation of this very society (as well as of others!). The belief in the primacy, in the all-encompassing power of reason (rationality) is indeed fraught with irrationality (to take but one example). The present "development crisis" is in fact a cultural crisis, as far as the West is concerned, and it is the cause of many cultural ethnocides in the rest of the world. "Underdevelopment is not primarily non-development or a low level of living, but a special kind of total trauma which results from dependence."15 Hence the necessity of looking at "development" from the cultural angle, not only in order to take into account "cultural values" or in order to avoid "cultural biases" (ethnocentrism) but because "development" is, like
Finally, any approach to "development" should deal with ecological balance. Not in order to balance cultural considerations with a specific concern for nature — such a simple dichotomy has, in any case, become obsolete. But the necessity of preserving (restoring, enhancing) a harmonious relationship with environment is something which probably no longer needs to be justified.

In our view, therefore, any definition of "development" should take into account these various elements. At this stage, one could perhaps ask how this definition could be worded. But this is the sort of trap we refuse to fall into! It should be enough to know — at least for our present purpose — what sort of components should be included in a definition, and we can safely leave it to the people themselves to combine them as they wish.

This leaves us, therefore, with five guidelines, which can be considered, for the time being, as a sort of check list for looking into theories of development:
- Production
- Distribution
- Structures
- Culture
- Ecological balance

It should be quite clear, from the outset, that these sectors must be seen as interrelated and taken as a whole. For there might be possible clashes between these variables if they are considered as independent from each other. To take but one example — which, unfortunately, can be daily verified — an increase in production may not automatically result in a better distribution pattern, nor in a more satisfactory ecological balance. Conversely, a change in structures can mean either an increase or a decrease of production, etc.

Finally, some attention should be paid to the "space unit" in which
"development" can be best achieved. Traditionally, theories have been focused on two levels — the national and/or the international one(s). But this classical dichotomy has also, sometimes, proven difficult to maintain. One has argued, for example, that in the case of some small countries (on the western coast of Africa or in the Maghreb) national development was a nonsensical venture and that "development" could only be achieved at the regional (i.e., supra-national) level. In some other instances the emphasis could well be put on the regional (i.e., intra-national) level, either when the country is deemed to be "too big" to ensure centralized decision (e.g., China) and/or — even in smaller countries — in order to safeguard local identities. Thus the national unit is by no means the only thinkable level of development. So far, however, the nation-state has generally been considered the common denominator which could be taken into account in order to build (supra-national) regional entities. It might now be high time to devote some attention to the conditions of development at the local level, for two different reasons. First, all five guidelines which we have identified above are relevant not only at the national level but also at the local one, and it is their combination at one particular place that determines the "welfare" of the people. To concentrate on the national level might open wide the possibility of disparities within (intra-national) regions, whatever emphasis is put on distribution. Secondly, one might (should!) raise doubts about the legitimacy of the monopoly of power vested in the nation-state. Again, if "development" is produced at the local level, one should not discard the possibility that the surplus produced in one particular area could be retained by those who have created it, even if this does not correspond to the usual practice of larger units, nor should one preclude the possibility of local communities communicating (exchanging) with other local communities belonging to another state without the mediation of their respective governments.

It would therefore seem that the usual dichotomy between the national and international levels should be replaced by a more discriminating distribution into international, regional (inter-states), national, and local levels. A global theory of development should therefore take into
account (at least) the five variables mentioned above at these four levels. However, in the subsequent part of this paper, our review of theories of development does not always follow this pattern. This should not be taken as an oversight on our part: it corresponds to the fact that certain theories are blind in respect to some particular 'space levels.'
Let us now turn to theories themselves and see how they can be classified or fitted into this framework. At this stage, we shall only deal with whether or not they are concerned with each of the variables on each level and what their main emphasis is.

We have selected, for this tentative round, theories or processes of development which represent a certain spectrum of approaches to our problem. The following works and documents are used:


Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action, Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) adopted by the UN General Assembly, May 1974


1. The Classical/Marginalist Model (W. Arthur Lewis)²²

In the first paragraph of his introduction, Lewis states clearly that he is essentially concerned with "the growth of output per head of population" (p. 9) and that his main purpose is to analyze "growth and
not distribution." One could almost stop here! Indeed all other variables of "development" (the word is used as a synonym for "growth," "output," and "progress" — p. 10) depend on production, through the mechanism of prices. Man (the main actor!) is rational and reacts, according to the theory, to changes in prices in order to maximize his marginal satisfaction. The fact that this might not always be the case does not disturb the author, for "one has to learn how to respond to market prices just as one learns any part of one's culture" (p. 75).

There is no reason for interfering with distribution, except for one reason: when wealth accumulated through production is hoarded, sterilized, and diverted from productive investment. Although it is obvious that growth may not be evenly distributed, this should not be a matter of concern: Inequality breeds a desire for an increased remuneration and hence stimulates new talents (innovation, as Schumpeter would have it) which, in turn, will entail growth and a possible redistribution of wealth.

Social structures must be compatible with growth (and not the reverse!): They must favour the propensity to invest by granting to each individual a "right to reward"; "traditional" structures, based on status, must give way to social mobility (this runs parallel to mobility and substitutability) and thus give rise to a new "elite." In this respect again, differences should be taken as an enticement for promotion. The freedom of the individual (the economic subject) is therefore the main condition which has to be ensured.

Culture is taken by Lewis in a narrow sense (= Bildung, see pp. 29-30), and there are no fundamental differences between societies: All men are essentially the same ("From the studies made by anthropologists and by sociologists we have to try to decide what is universal, in the sense of what is common to human behaviour in different social contexts" p. 14).

Ecological balance is not taken into consideration. Nature is reduced to a series of available resources and has to be dominated.
The value of these resources is determined by their utility.

All these remarks are relevant at the national level. As far as the international level is concerned, production again is the decisive factor. It leads to trade and international division of labour. Lewis, like Adam Smith, considers specialization an essential condition for the growth of production; yet international questions are not given special consideration: They are taken as a mere continuation, or prolongation, of the national system. Thus, nine pages only are devoted to the concept of imperialism (pp. 365-374), considered as "an enormous problem, only marginally related to economic analysis!"

One might say that this short summary of Lewis's position is unfair in the sense that the author touches upon a variety of fields (religion, migrations, population, family, etc.) which can be taken as a sign of his all-embracing concern: Is "development," then, really limited to "growth"? There is no doubt that Lewis lists numerous "non-economic factors," but they are not taken seriously (i.e., the diversity of human attitudes must eventually be reduced to a compatibility with growth), or they become mere tautologies (e.g., "There is not much more to be said about sentiment than that peoples who are used to moving move more than those who are not" — p. 49). The internal coherence of the model is only due to a generalization of the classical principles of economics to underdeveloped countries and takes no account of the historical situation of the Third World. Everything rests on the presupposition that the market (capital plus labour) reacts to the theory of prices, that profit is reinvested, which in turn increases marginal productivity and employment.

If we now undertake to fill the cells, we get table 1.

2. The Evolutionist Model (Walt W. Rostow)

Although it does not radically differ from the previous one, the Rostowian model proposes a dynamic theory of production, in opposition
TABLE 1. Lewis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Ecological balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Growth is development is natural (Freedom)</td>
<td>All men are the same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Natural international division of labour</td>
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</tbody>
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to the succession of equilibrium points which characterizes classical economics. Growth should be understood in analogy with the system of compound interest, and a serious effort is made to identify the leading sectors of the economy (contrary to a theory built on aggregate data). Another difference from the classical model is that structures not only have to adapt themselves to increased production but have to be changed in order to make growth possible by ensuring, among other things, a rational distribution of capital (I/S). At the international level, structures also play an important role (struggle against colonialism may bring about new institutions promoting a "take-off"), and the existence of a difference between developed and developing countries is explicitly stated (which was not the case in the classical theory). Thus, like Marxist-inspired theories, Rostow's model insists on structures and sees the ultimate goal of "development" in generalized affluence. It should, however, be considered as a liberal alternative to Marxism, rejecting the determinant role played by economical factors and the theory of class struggle. The only presupposition that Rowtow shares with Marx might well be, in the final analysis, their common evolutionistic outlook.²⁴

Even if the historical accuracy of the facts selected by Rostow to explain "the stages of economic growth" can be (and indeed has been!) questioned, a serious effort has been made to envisage "development"
as a global social process. Nevertheless, the determinant criterion for the identification of the different stages (traditional society → the preconditions for take-off → the take-off → the drive to maturity → the age of mass-consumption) is still an economic one — viz., an increase in the investment rate (> 10 per cent of the GNP) and in demand for goods and services produced by the leading sectors (both phenomena being closely linked). Growth becomes the "normal condition" (p. 7), and production is therefore a decisive component of "development." Strangely enough, the author who introduces himself as an "economic historian" overlooks the specific and historic circumstances of colonialism which made the take-off of western nations possible. While recognizing a privilege of geographic nature to insular Britain, he envisages the history of economic development of individual states, without taking into account the unequal relations of the "mother countries" to their colonies. This is why — on the basis of western experiences! — the integration of a country into the international market is considered a positive step, often favourable to take-off (development of exports).

Distribution is not a primary concern for Rostow. This is not to say that he would oppose some redistribution of wealth: In the early stages institutional structures should see to it that the surplus gained by agriculture should be transferred to the industrial sector (as Adam Smith already recommended), and, later, a progressive income tax should be welcomed. On the whole, however, distribution of wealth is the normal result of growth, even if there is no levelling of the income per head. In a sense the increase in production is taken as a substitute for planned distribution: The more there is, in general, the more there will be for each one. This might be true of the physics of liquids, but not in economics.

As has been mentioned before, Rostow's emphasis on structures is one of the interesting novelties of his theory. Production and structures are in a reciprocal relation, and to each stage of growth there corresponds a "stage of structure"; if changes in production may bring about new social structures, the reverse is also true as the stage of
decolonization shows (national struggle, centralized state, etc.).

With regard to culture, Rostow's position should be understood in the light of his underlying unilinear evolutionism: Culture is undergoing a constant process of modernization, which, at all stages, is made necessary by economic growth but which in turn makes growth possible (importance of the role of the 'elite' demonstration effect, etc.). In the traditional stage, cultural/technological lack and lag are the main causes of stagnation, but Rostow does not explain why, suddenly, man starts discovering "modern (post-Newtonian) science."

Finally, no attention is paid by Rostow to the question of ecological balance. On the contrary, "physical environment . . . if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive change" (p. 19).

Needless to say, the main weakness of this model lies in its western evolutionistic perspective. How is it possible to hold that there is but one model for all nations? Yet it is this oversimplification which makes the whole theory possible: Development is viewed as a global/national process, but not as a global/international one. Moreover, out of the fourteen nations taken as "case studies" by Rostow, eight are western or "white" ones; Japan and China should be considered as sui generis cases, and very little is said about Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, and India to "prove" anything. This evolutionism is therefore closely linked to an ahistoric ethnocentrism, \(^{28}\) that imposes one single model upon all countries, which, consequently, forces peripheries to become even more peripheral.

3. A Liberal View: Development for Man (François Perroux)

Equally dissatisfied with both classical (capitalist) and socialist (Marxist) theories and practices, Perroux's desire is to go beyond these two apparently opposed systems and to suggest a "generalized economics" (pp. 50 ff.) where, beyond the dialectics of class and of
### TABLE 2. Rostow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Stages</th>
<th>Distribution Structures</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Ecological balance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common criteria</td>
<td>Influence modern state</td>
<td>Modernization is universal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading sectors</td>
<td>Trickle-down effect</td>
<td>Modern production + &quot;modern state&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International division of labour, integration, are positive</td>
<td>Struggle against colonialism</td>
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nations, "human concern would prevail over a mechanistic equilibrium which almost excludes man" (p. 11). Development is no longer reduced to growth alone (development of things) but is geared towards development of man (i.e., it must include human costs which have to be met in order to ensure to all a reasonable life expectancy, decent health conditions, access to knowledge, taking into account the given circumstances of time and place — p. 157). "There is but one economic ideology, and only one: the full employment, at world level, of all material and human resources in order to grant to all men the material conditions (as determined by sciences) of their full achievement" (p. 163). Written fifteen years ago, such a sentence sounds very much like the most "progressive" statements of the present Director of the World Bank!29

The works of Perroux are so numerous that it is difficult to present them briefly; an additional difficulty arises from the fact that his definition of some concepts varies in time. In spite of this, one could perhaps venture to fit his main lines of thought into our framework in the following manner.
Perroux starts by rejecting the classical equilibrium model ("a world of contract without struggle" — p. 11) which rests on the assumption that a nation is comparable to a firm. The aim, therefore, is no longer to suppress disequilibrium but to make use of it in order to achieve a balanced, or rather harmonized, growth. Secondly, one should take into account that, unlike a firm, a state can manipulate the rules of the game (by tariffs, rate of exchange, etc.) and that it is not subjected — even in a capitalistic structure — to the "laws" of the market (the classical school sees international economics as a series of exchanges between different nationals, not between nations). The classical theory is an idealistic system combining only "happy circumstances" (des chances heureuses), whereas economic reality presents mainly disequilibria which, in developing countries, are not "automatically" adjusted: thus the phrase "unarticulated economies."

On the international level, this means that Third World countries are in fact dominated economies: The world market is an institution composed of unequal partners of different economic size, different bargaining power, etc. Economic growth in the western nations is the consequence of "successively dominant economies."

The same concept also applies to distribution: At the national level, asymmetry and inequality characterize the economic agents; some regions are active and others are passive, whereas the aim should be to promote the creation of economic goods for the benefit of all. At the international level there is a centre and a periphery (p. 21), the latter being dominated by the former (effet de domination).

Social structures are therefore of considerable importance, not only (as the Rostowian theory would have it) in order to stimulate production as such but in order to ensure that the initial disequilibrium is properly used, intra-nationally, to disseminate harmonious growth (hence the notion of pôle de croissance/"growth point") and, at the international level, to offset the external disequilibrium (when possible by arbitration), which may mean going beyond national boundaries. This could also lead to decoupling the new decentralized economies from the capitalist market. Above all,
structures are established to make sure that production covers human costs and that industrialization maintains a human dimension (creativity) in the different jobs offered on the market.

On culture, Perroux is innovating: He emphasizes that the encounter of western with traditional cultures is destructuring both, preventing any new restructuration as far as the "ancient" culture is concerned. He also considers culture as a totality and stresses the fact that the introduction of any new technology is bound to change the prevalent cultural harmony; nevertheless, he hopes for a coherent blending of western rationality and traditional cultures.

Finally nature and natural energies must be rationally used for the benefit of man; however, no mention is made of possible "outer limits" of nature.

Even such a sketchy summary clearly shows the originality of Perroux's approach to development, which could be characterized as active pessimism or voluntarism. Its main novelty — compared to classical models — comes from an explanation of the actual economic circumstances (particularly in the "developing" countries) away from the ideal models whose basic (and too often implicit) assumptions were far too removed from "reality." His insistence on disequilibrium, domination effects, unarticulated economies, human costs, etc. is a clear indication of the divergencies between Perroux and the classical and neo-marginalist schools. A question remains however: What is Perroux's global aim, if not a way of promoting "industrialization without pains"?

Whatever its humanistic content, the theory of harmonized growth must also be considered as a "project of civilization" (p. 21), and one should ask whether this "new" civilization is fundamentally different from what is now taking place in the most social democracies of the West. How can such a voluntaristic position practically amend both capitalism and Marxism and help realize, here and now, their humanistic content (always postponed to the "final stage")? In the final analysis, one could say that Perroux has clearly demonstrated the hidden hypothesis of the classical school, but he has not really
clarified his concept of man, assuming that his implicit definition would be universally valid. But this is precisely the question!

### TABLE 3. Perroux

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<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Ecological balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harmonized growth vs. inarticulated economics</td>
<td>Asymmetry vs. human costs</td>
<td>Planning Voluntarism</td>
<td>Traditional cultures vs. universalistic synthesis</td>
<td>(Rational use of nature)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### National

- "Pôles de développement" vs. national economies

#### Regional

- Trans-national structures of cooperation vs. pluri-national planning

#### International

- Centre vs. periphery
- Dis-sociation?
- Growth of dominant economy

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4. The Marxist-Leninist Critique³⁴ (Samir Amin)

The main difference between the position of Samir Amin and those which have been summarized so far is not only the use of a Marxist method but also the fact that Amin starts by describing how development originates (rather than by proposing what "development" should be). The bulk of Amin's work is therefore oriented towards a critique of capitalistic penetration in the Third World. This historical dimension (totally overlooked by Rostow) of underdevelopment is certainly a major step forward in the theories of development.³⁵ The corollary of this position is that development should be "self-centred"
(développement auto-centré), rather than conceived in view of integration into a wider, international market.

In a sense, Amin radicalizes Perroux's point concerning the "unarticulated economy" of Third World countries by showing first that all sectors of the economy are contaminated by capitalism (and not only the "modern" one) and secondly that a better "articulation" of the traditional sector to the modern one could lead to underdevelopment rather than to development. Growth, therefore, becomes an ambiguous concept: It is no longer a synonym for development (Lewis; Rostow), nor does it need a "human complement" to become "real development" (Perroux). In the economy of the centre growth is development, but in the economies of the periphery growth is underdevelopment. Such a total (and not only sectorial) disarticulation of national economies in the Third World is to be explained (in line with Perroux) by external domination, exemplified by the international division of labour. One also remembers that Perroux tried to identify (often supra-national) homogeneous areas (les espaces homogènes) where large enough points of growth could compensate for the domination effect of the leading economic powers by making a de-linking strategy feasible. Here again Amin radicalizes this point of view by advocating — "as a preliminary condition for development" (p. 43) — a voluntary withdrawal from the international market. This fundamental break, away from the classical theory (which considered international division of labour as a means for development) is rooted in a redefinition of the role played by distribution.

The key to Amin's position is his concept of capital accumulation at world level. Classical economists put their main emphasis on an increase of internal output: Here the problem is shifted from national production to international distribution, which, in turn, explains the national inequality of distribution of outputs (and of wealth) per capita.

Consequently, structural changes are necessary not only to offset the effects of "wild capitalism" (le capitalisme sauvage) but to achieve
development. Since a self-centred version of capitalism (similar to the one which exists in industrial countries among which interdependence makes sense) cannot be expected in peripheral countries dominated by capitalism, alternative choices have to be made leading to a socialist perspective.\(^3\) Hence planning becomes a necessary (and not only a complementary) tool of development in order, first, to liberate the economy from dependence arising out of international specialization, the international monetary system, etc., and then to bring about some form of equality of income per capita, which implies the overthrow of the "centre of the periphery" as a social formation. Strong emphasis is put on national and regional self-reliance: industrialization must be reoriented towards the internal market and must produce for the masses (in line with a special concern for agricultural revolution); collective self-reliance should entail "mutual aid" between Third World countries in order to short-circuit control by the centre (and not in order to promote sub-imperialism through the establishment of "common markets"). Finally in the long run, national boundaries, "micronationalisms," should be overcome in order to "organize the world as a unified whole without inequality."\(^3\)

This complete reversal of previous models, made by Amin, does not really throw new light on the questions of culture and ecological balance (although Amin advocates a reduction of the flow of raw material exports to the centre, but not for ecological reasons). To suggest, for example, that the "natural" vocation of Africa is to specialize in modern heavy industry (aluminium, special steels, etc. p. 45) means that the western process of industrialization (which is clearly value-loaded and brings about new problems concerning employment) is taken for granted.\(^3\)

Such a short description does not do justice to Amin's extremely thorough analysis. It is, however, sufficient to expose the differences between this approach to development and the more classical models (whose insufficiencies he has, in our opinion, clearly demonstrated). Our limited purpose indeed is not to summarize theories but rather to examine their relevance to the different components or
processes of development.

TABLE 4. Amin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Ecological balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Centre: growth vs. development</td>
<td>Unequal distribution</td>
<td>Planning for self-centred development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periphery: growth is under-development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Collective self-reliance = mutual aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Withdrawal from the international market</td>
<td>Capital accumulation</td>
<td>Unequal exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. An Accepted Strategy: The New International Economic Order

One could have doubts as to whether or not the two UN resolutions can be considered "theories of development." A theory needs to be clearly formulated, disclosing its basic assumptions, and requires, above all, a certain form of coherence. But, for obvious reasons, it would be overly optimistic to expect such qualities from UN texts. On the other hand, there is no question about the fact that statements of this kind have an impact on the general approach to "development" at least as important as that of any theory produced by a distinguished expert. Moreover, unlike many other UN resolutions, these two texts related to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) have been widely echoed in the mass media and in specialized journals and reflect a sort of general official consensus as to the ways in which "development" should be brought about. Indeed, the NIEO is par excellence a collection of
devices and processes recommended by the Special Session of the General Assembly for the eradication of underdevelopment.

As a preliminary remark, one should note that the NIE0 is blind with respect to national/local questions. It works on the sacred principle of equality of sovereign states and wishes to promote international co-operation "irrespective of the economic and social system" prevailing in each nation-state. However, even if one accepts the view that the historical cause of underdevelopment is rooted in the inequality of international exchanges, it would be a form of wishful thinking to believe that a transformation at that level only will automatically create "development." Be that as it may, let us now turn to the different processes of "development" as envisaged by the NIE0.

The main concern of the developing countries is to increase their production and, thus, to earn more. To this end, their integration into the international market (reduction of import tariffs on the part of the industrialized countries, increased exploitation of natural resources rather than synthetic substitutes, increased foreign aid) is considered beneficial. Industrialization (and particularly production for exports) and transfer of modern techniques are also listed as important means to achieve some form of welfare in the Third World. This entails growth in the Third World being closely likened to general economic expansion or, in other words, the global system being organized in such a way that all partners will gain. Thus, international division of labour is not called into question as such (as in Amin's theory) but must become "rational, just and equitable."

Taken in isolation from their context, these measures are not far from the main proposals of the classical model. But the NIE0 also takes strongly into consideration the unequal distribution of wealth at the world level. Thus, a great many measures are suggested to reduce the growing gap between "developed" and "developing" countries: Full participation of Third World countries in the settlement of world economic problems, the negotiation of special agreements on raw materials to better the terms of trade, some form of supervision of
the MNCs operating in Third World countries, an increase of foreign aid, the establishment of SDR with the IMF, etc. The question then arises as to the compatibility of this desire to reduce the inequality of the exchanges and the other set of proposals leading to a greater integration into the international market. The only apparent attempts to solve this dilemma are, first, the assertion of a will for "collective self-reliance," which, in fact, means the promotion of larger regional markets within the Third World, and, secondly, the desire to promote "producers' associations" (built on the model of OPEC), which might induce a redistribution of the wealth created by the exploitation of natural resources. No measures are proposed, however, to reduce, for example, the dependency on food-imports of the developing countries (e.g., by reducing the production of export-oriented agricultural products).

As mentioned earlier, the NIEO is rather weak on structures and leaves it to national states to implement its wishes. Hence its moralism, which is a substitute for a set of clear rules binding upon all nations. "All efforts should be made . . ." is the refrain repeated throughout the Programme of Action. One talks about "just and equitable" prices, agreements, measures, "satisfactory terms of trade, etc., but what else could be done in an international decentralized order?

The NIEO, ignoring the intra-national side of questions, also leaves aside the cultural aspects, as if "development" could be promoted independently of existing "ways of life" or modes of production. In fact, the implicit assumption is that the proposed model of "development" is the western one: At least no section of these two resolutions is in contradiction with it.

There is undoubtedly a strong emphasis in the NIEO on the question of natural resources, but its main concern is to stress the "full permanent sovereignty" of each state over them. Again, the idea is to make sure that developing countries will gain more by exploiting and selling their natural resources themselves in conformity with their
Nevertheless, here and there the question of the "outer limits" of nature creeps up: The resolutions call upon all states "to put an end to the waste of natural resources," to prevent pollution, and to protect and reconstitute these resources.

If "all efforts" suggested by these two resolutions were really made, there is not doubt that the international economic "order" would be better, but not necessarily new! The NIEO is geared towards giving all developing countries a better share of the "international cake," but it assumes that this will happen without real changes of structures. But is it not old fashioned to believe that economics is independent of politics? By stressing the necessity of economic growth in the "developed" countries in order to induce growth in the "developing" countries, it runs against one of its stated objectives: to reduce the gap between the two groups. A fair distribution is better than unequal distribution, but it is far from a redistribution.

TABLE 5. The NIEO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Ecological balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Produce more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Sovereignty of each state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earn more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Collective self-reliance</td>
<td>Producers' associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Better integration into the international market</td>
<td>Improve what already exists</td>
<td>Exploitation vs.? conservation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28

Prepared on the occasion of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly, this Report of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation is comparable to some other documents, such as the Cocoyoc Declaration (1974) or the Third World Forum (1975), in the sense that they are produced by independent experts coming mainly from the Third World. Unlike UN resolutions, which sometimes are nothing but a hotch-potch of various (and often conflicting) ideologies, *What Now?* is ideologically consistent and starts from the hypothesis — stated in its subtitle — that time has come to imagine "another development" which must be considered as "a whole," as "an integral, value-loaded, cultural process" encompassing "natural environment, social relations, education, production, consumption and well-being." There must be a plurality of developments, geared to the development of the whole man and woman "and not just the growth of things" (p. 7). The mere fact that *What Now?* clearly defines the objectives of development indicates a radical difference from the other models.

Of course, *production* is an important means for development, but not for any sort of development: Its primary concern is to satisfy human needs (material and non-material ones, not only material ones as in the objectives of the World Bank), which presupposes a form of *self-reliance* and implies the rejection of the western model, whose human costs (and built-in persistent alienation) have been minimized in other theories (p. 34). At the same time, alternative patterns of development must be elaborated in the industrialized countries. The concept of self-reliance also entails a critique of the integration of the Third World into the international market (p. 10); the structure of international flows must be not only amended but *radically changed* in order to make it compatible with a self-centred (rather than export-oriented) development.

*Redistribution* of wealth is also one of the main objectives of *What Now?*; inequalities at the national and international levels have "been aggravated by an indiscriminate imitation of the patterns of the
industrialized societies" (p. 29), and this trend, again, should be reversed. Yet it would be foolish to expect these changes to be automatic: Structural changes are a fundamental prerequisite to this reorientation towards another development. Agrarian and urban reforms, decentralization, democratization of the decision-making power, self-management are just a few among many reforms (which actually are real revolutions!) which have to be undertaken at the national level, since the local "elite" are more than often accomplices in this exploitation of the poor (p. 5). On the international scene, the state will have to surrender some of its traditional privileges and, in contradiction to the NIEO, a world authority should be established "to manage mankind's common heritage" (particularly the sea bed), to levy a tax in kind on fertilizer consumption in industrialized countries, to reorganize food reserves, to reallocate part of military expenditures, etc. Finally, since human needs are not only material ones, "countries which do not respect human rights should not benefit from financial transfers" (p. 18). The list of measures suggested in What Now? is not limited to those which have been mentioned here, but this should give an indication of the general perspective of the Report.

Culture is considered an integral part of the development process; the problem, therefore, is not only to innovate but to build on existing elements, for technology is a political issue (p. 17). New lifestyles have to be imagined in the industrialized countries, and "developing" nations are warned against a mere imitation of western "solutions"; ethnocentric prejudices have to be eradicated (p. 18) so as to restore each one's confidence in one's own culture.

The notion of "outer limits" of nature is another way of taking into account the ecological balance and getting away from the irresponsible notion of exploitation of resources. Once more, this should lead to a common management of "mankind's heritage," a task which could be performed by a "new" UN structure.

Can What Now? be considered a panacea for development? Certainly not. Nevertheless, one should recognize that it differs widely from previous
theories and constitutes a real breakthrough towards new alternatives of development(s) which are badly needed in view of the general failure of those that have been implemented so far. Of course, What Now? can be seen as a Utopia, as a dream of intellectuals, which may vanish if confronted with the "dire law of realities." One can smile at sentences like "the international community... has the responsibility of guaranteeing the conditions for the self-reliant development of each society" (p. 7); and, while it is true that "it is in the interests of all peoples to curb the existing power structures" (p. 8), one wonders how such a plan could be actually implemented, given the present power structures at both the national and international levels. In spite of these criticisms, What Now? is not just another theory but a signpost on the road towards another development.

TABLE 6. What Now?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Ecological balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only for &quot;human needs&quot;</td>
<td>Priority to the under-privileged</td>
<td>Self management</td>
<td>Quality of life</td>
<td>Use of local resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority to food production</td>
<td></td>
<td>Popular power</td>
<td>Change of life-styles</td>
<td>Eco-development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reliance</td>
<td>Necessity of offsetting centre-periphery relations</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>Use of existing culture</td>
<td>Outer limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic independence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural and urban reforms</td>
<td>Cultural diversity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No isolationism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective self-reliance</td>
<td>Third World syndicates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International division of labour is a danger</td>
<td>Selective redistribution to countries promoting &quot;basic-needs&quot; satisfaction</td>
<td>New UN</td>
<td>End of ethnocentrism</td>
<td>Common management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY

If we now compare all the different charts corresponding to the theories of development which we have examined, it will be easy to see not only their differences and similarities but also — and this is fundamental — their weak points or their "holes." Indeed, this way of considering "development" is not limited to an analysis of the merits or shortcomings — of each theory per se (e.g., a "purely" economic debate about the validity of the application of classical "laws" of economics to developing countries) but puts them into the broader context of a more general definition of "development." To be sure, it would be easy to show that our conclusions reflect the different "inputs" of our hypothesis, but there is no reason for being ashamed about it: That conclusions are dependent upon premisses is nothing new! . . . . The real danger appears only when underlying values are not clearly defined.

Our rapid survey of six very different approaches to development can lead us now to some conclusions and suggestions concerning the ways in which proposed processes of development can be approached:

1. Whatever the risk of being repetitive, it should be strongly emphasized that it is impossible to even think of a typology of development theories without defining one's own concept of development. This should normally go without saying, yet one cannot but be surprised that so many development theories either forget about any sort of development altogether, or use the concept as a synonym for other notions such as evolution, growth, and the like. By doing so, not only do they lack conceptual precision, but they are confusing two issues: the goal (development) and the means (growth). And this
confusion is not innocent: It is deeply rooted in the western paradigm, which — at least until recently — has assumed that the development of things was the way to the development of man, and that scarcity had to be overcome in order to ensure man's self-fulfilment. This, undoubtedly, has something to do with the vertical structure of western society, divided into those who have (and who are considered to be happy because of their wealth, or their capacity to consume) and those who desire to have. This division into classes or estates has for a long time been considered to be natural (or corresponding to a divine order) and has been in more recent times filled with a new content: The artificial creation of differences has become the main incentive to consumption and, as a corollary, to production. Thus, the de facto hierarchical structure of society, combined with its de jure democratization (the theoretical "equality of opportunities," not only in the acquisition of knowledge through schooling but also in career and consumption capacity: the ideology of the "self-made man") leads to and reinforces the typically western confusion between development and economic growth.

2. Hence it must be emphasized that development has to be defined by the people concerned and not by "experts," who always have the tendency to generalize what they consider to be "vital."

3. Theories of development are therefore on another level: They are concerned with means (to achieve goals) and not with goals themselves. They are, properly speaking theories of processes of development. If there is a difference between goals and means, there is also an obvious link between both, since means have to be congruent with goals (thus growth per se can be counter-productive, depending on the definition of development).

4. If, according to our provisional definition of development, it is accepted that production, distribution, structures, culture, and, in the long run, ecological balance have to be combined (at local, national, regional, and international levels) in order to achieve development — and that the absence of one or many of these components
may prevent the achievement of 'development'—then some sort of typology becomes possible.

The earliest procedure consists first in analysing (as we have sketched out in our six case-studies) each theory with respect to these different variables in order to see how these necessary conditions have been either taken into account or overlooked, and to identify, in each case, what is the centre of gravity of each theory. Some oversimplification is, at that stage, unavoidable for clarification's sake. To go back to our six examples, we could reduce them to the following main points:

a. The classical model (Lewis) emphasizes production at the national and international levels and considers the other means to development as dependent variables of production. This is not to say that they are unimportant, but they are supposed to be almost automatically adjusted to economic growth. Cultural specificity and ecological balance are ignored.

b. The Rostowian model mainly deals with the dialectics between production, or economic growth, and structural changes (they help each other). The international environment is of secondary importance; the inequality of distribution reinforces production and structural changes. Cultural specificity and ecological balance are ignored.

c. The liberal model of Perroux is concerned with production and distribution. National, regional, and international structures are also introduced in order to reduce inequalities of distribution and to ensure a form of harmonious, balanced growth. The objective of development (for man and of the whole man) is clearly stated. Cultural specificity will be replaced by a synthesis of different values, rooted in various contexts; ecological balance is ignored.

d. The Marxist-Leninist model (Amin) starts with unequal distribution and the necessity of altering structures in order to bring about some form of equality. This has consequences for production (at the national level, insistence on self-reliance; at the international level, rejection of international division of labour, and withdrawal from the capitalistic market).
e. The "unosian" model (NIEO) wants to maximize earnings on and production for the international market and to improve distribution at the international level through inter-regional co-operation and producers' associations. International structures do not necessarily have to be changed. Local circumstances are ignored, as well as cultural specificity; ecological balance is slightly touched upon.

f. The "self-reliance" model (What Now?) clearly defines its goals (satisfaction of "human needs") and submits (almost) all variables (at local, national, regional, and international levels) to it in such a way that it is difficult to isolate one of them (ecological balance?) and consider it as the decisive factor.

Thus, with the exception of the last one, all the models have considerable lacunae in view of our choice of means considered to be relevant for the achievement of development. The most "partial" theory is certainly the classical one, and all others have some kind of internal coherence which depends on their starting point.

5. Eclecticism might appear, at this stage, the easiest way out. Why not combine the "strongest point" of each theory with the strongest points of all others, under the assumption that each theory is not "wrong" but only incomplete? But this would lead nowhere for the simple reason that each theory is coherent in itself: The classical theory of growth, for example, cannot include "non-economic factors" since that would be a major change in its assumptions. All variables which we have identified form a system — i.e., "an assemblage of objects united by some form of regular interaction of interdependence"50 — and the task is then to discover what kind of reciprocal influences exist within the system and what impact each combination of this cluster of variables has on human beings and on social formations. Thus, if we take into account as decisive factors only production and distribution, it might be difficult to choose between model c and model e. But when ecological balance is brought into the model, both theories become irrelevant (and not only incomplete) since both patterns of development assume that growth can last for ever.
6. The next question which naturally arises is to know how the model can actually be constructed so that each theory of development can be checked against the model (compatibility test). The difficulty is threefold: First — at a very general level — it is very hard to imagine (because of our limited knowledge) what the influence of different factors upon each other is; secondly, the emphasis laid on each variable may vary in time (what is the most urgent: equality in distribution of wealth or ecological balance? cultural identity or increased production, leading — it is hoped — to fairer distribution?); thirdly, the indicators (i.e., something — usually measurable — that points out something else) needed for the establishment of the model should have to take into account something which is rather difficult to evaluate, i.e., the totality of elements which are necessary for any social formation to give a meaning to its way of life. This probably prevents the construction of a global model (world model) and suggests that local models should first be worked out and then brought together in order to see whether they are mutually compatible or not.

7. Finally, one may wonder why, having started with a typology of theories of development — which aim at encompassing global problems — we end up by putting the emphasis on the local level! Such a conclusion actually depends on two of our starting premisses: (a) the necessity of safeguarding cultural diversity, and (b) the assumption that "development" must take people/social formations, and not only material wealth — seriously. The traditional belief that "development" is mainly the result of growth of production rests upon the presupposed superiority of the western model. Needless to say, production is a universal necessity. This is why the debate should rather revolve around three other questions: Is the growth of production a necessity? How are things produced (mode of production)? And for whom are they produced? Obviously, these questions can only be answered at the local level. Similarly, nobody would question the fact that there should be, in any society, some form of distribution (at least in order to ensure social reproduction), but the procedures may vary from one social formation to the other, depending on the various channels used for the circulation of wealth. Total equality between members of a
given society belongs to the realm of utopia — i.e., to those political theories which are produced by inequalitarian societies, where wealth is siphoned from the bottom to the top and stays there: hence the necessity of establishing countervailing structures to this one-way flow. But other societies may like to solve the problem differently — i.e., by distributing wealth among its members over time, by devising a rotation (circulation) of the accumulated "surplus."

These are only a few examples of the various possible ways of handling our variables. They show both the difficulty of any theory of development (since any change of any variable is likely to alter the global symbolic relations) and the quasi impossibility of devising one single "development" theory.

This having been said, what should be expected from theories of development, if anything? In our opinion, their main object should be to work out a coherent body of hypotheses, the combination of which would lead to a reduction of inequalities at all levels (local, national, regional, international) which preserving the possibility of a diversity of "cultural patterns" (= symbolic relations, cosmologies). Such a definition excludes the possibility of establishing a "world government" (even democratically elected!) which would "solve the problems" by imposing common standards on the whole of mankind. To be sure, this is technically (technocratically) feasible, but it would lead to ethnocide, i.e., to the levelling of any cultural diversity. Such a definition also entails the impossibility of starting from the western model of development, which emphasizes growth at the national level, as if each nation-state could constantly seek (and realize) an increase of its wealth without inflicting any loss either to other competitors or to natural resources.52

The main failure of the present thinking, it would seem, comes from the fact that "development" has become a sort of autonomous variable identified with ("purely")!53 economic concerns. Such a perspective was indeed legitimate in order to describe the transformations that took place in western societies following the Industrial Revolution;
it gave the possibility of listing a series of cumulative achievements which were consistent with this particular point of view, but it was also a blinding device, preventing a more global approach which should have exposed the destructuration of western society that was taking place as a result of this autonomization of economics. This, in a sense, it not new. But what has generally been overlooked is that this destructuration of the network of symbolic social relations was in fact the condition of economic growth. The recent introduction of "new" variables in the definition of "development" (culture, ecological balance, etc.) can be seen as a sign of wisdom, as an insight into the fact that under-development is not only the lack of certain goods or the absence of certain goods or the absence of certain social structures but also a loss of individual and social meaning in life. Whether such a restructuration can be expressed by imagining new sets of variables\(^5\) is a totally different question. It might well be that new theories should be forged, using other tools and other hypotheses than those which the dominant "science" has imposed so far. Indeed, it has become obvious that classical methods have failed both to promote "development" in the periphery and to control (i.e., to maintain) sustained growth in central countries: The crisis of the system is also the crisis of the theories of the system. By the same token, theoretical arrogance has become out of date and out of order, even if it is not likely to vanish overnight.

In consequence, our conclusion should be fraught with modesty. We have tried, in this paper, to propose a few guidelines which might be helpful as "screening devices" in order to examine theories of development. But our attention cannot remain focused on theories; it has to go one step further and deal with "development." At this stage one question must be raised: Are classical concepts still relevant in order to fulfil such a task, or has it become necessary to look for new ones? In our view, the second possibility is more likely to produce truly alternative results. How this should be done is another matter. One thing, however, is certain: It requires preliminary political choices; in other words, it presupposes an (at least relatively) coherent "world view," a firm decision concerning the social classes which are going to
support and to implement it, and a clear understanding of the particular social meaning which underlies the whole. That this cannot be done on an individual basis should hardly be mentioned. To stress the necessity of getting involved in these problems does not necessarily entail a disinterest in theories; but to play with theories without taking such questions seriously would lead nowhere, except, perhaps, into irrelevance.
1. Although this paper is limited to published theories of development, it should be noted that theories are not, by any means, the only safe path to follow in order to promote "development" (whatever the word may mean). Clearly, the researcher would be well advised to leave for a while his ivory tower and find out, from the mouth of the so-called ordinary people, what they understand by the term "development." However, for practical reasons (i.e., the time needed for such interviews) we have decided not to take into account, here, what the man-in-the-street might say (and indeed has to say) in this respect.


3. The classical example of this evolutionistic perspective can be found in the famous book of W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge University Press, 1960). It might be appropriate, at this juncture, to point out that this western ideology of progress presupposes a total absence of limits to growth. Progress cannot be stopped, because this would lead to its very negation: The optimum is always assimilated with the maximum.

4. One should not only remember the optimism of Marx himself, but also recall that one of the stated objectives of the USSR is to keep up with the USA (by 1980? 1985?).

5. "A mesure qu'une société s'approche de la maturité et la dépasse, elle s'intéresse moins à l'offre qu'à la demande et moins aux problèmes de la production qu'aux problèmes de la consommation et du bien-être" (Rostow, op. cit. [French translation, Le Seuil, Paris, 1962], p. 96).


8. This phrase "human growth" should be carefully defined: First, it should not be taken in a narrowly anthropocentric perspective but should also include the relation of human beings to nature. Secondly, it should not be understood in an individualistic way; human beings do not exist alone but as part of social formations where "meaning" is produced.
9. Cf. Rudolf H. Strahm, Ueberentwicklung — Unterentwicklung (Laetare, Nuremberg/Freiburg, 1975), p. 87. Furthermore, it becomes more and more doubtful that full employment (as presently defined) can be maintained in industrialized countries: Rationalization of production coupled with the new international division of labour seems to lead to a decrease of the absolute number of jobs. Cf. Folker Froebel, Jürgen Heinrichs, Otto Kreye, Die neue internationale Arbeitssteilung: Strukturelle Arbeitslosigkeit in den Industrieländern und die Industrialisierung der Entwicklungsländern (Rowohlt Taschenbubh Verlag, Reinbeck b. Hamburg, 1977).


11. Which is a rather "conservative" (or "backward") estimate. In most "developed" countries the ratio (for private cars only) is now around 2.5 (Switzerland).

12. In its Report for the Club of Rome (The Limits to Growth, pp. 57-59) the MIT team envisages that the reserves of oil can last for another 20 years (or 50 years if new sources are discovered). These estimates are made out of the projection of the present growth rate of the demand for oil. In our hypothesis, the demand would make a considerable jump, which might lead to a much quicker depletion of oil resources. There would be cars, but no petrol! Similarly, Jacques Attali has calculated that, if all countries were presently at the same level of consumption as the United States, this would multiply by 25 the present demand for raw materials ("Économie en liberté," La parole et l'outil [PUF, Paris, 1976], p. 108).

13. It is however possible that some countries (Iran, Brazil, etc.) might become "sub-centres"; but this "development" cannot but create new peripheries. To become a "centre" can obviously not become a general objective.

14. The "liberal school" will of course deny that the economic development it advocates has any hegemonic character and will try to "prove" that all economic "laws" (the "law" of comparative advantage — the fundamental justification for international division of labour — or the simple "law" of perfect competition on the "free" market) are equally beneficial for all partners. But the ideological character of this presupposition of a universal harmony has been clearly exposed by Samir Amin in L'accumulation du capital, (Anthropos, Paris; Ifan, Dakar, 1971), p. 14.


16. Indeed, it is impossible to consider "culture" as an independent variable. It should, in fact, be considered as coextensive with "development." Our "isolation" of culture from other factors, in this paper, should be seen as a mere analytical device.

18. This is why the second Report to the Club of Rome (Stratégie pour demain) divides the world into ten different regions, which are globally analysed; this tendency is also verified, in practice, by the establishment of numerous "common markets" ("zone franc," Andean Pact, etc.).


20. I am thankful to Professor Chadwick Alger for having drawn my attention to this particular point. In his paper "People in the Future Global Order" (Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, Report no. 22, March 1978) Alger opens new perspectives of transnational co-operation at the local level, in an attempt to depart from the attention traditionally paid by political science to the powerful ones.

21. I am aware that the method which I have chosen in order to review these various theories of development is by no means the only possible one. Let me immediately suggest an alternative to it: instead of starting by stating a certain number of requirements that should be met by a "good" theory, one could look at the praxis entailed by each theory in order to evaluate its impact on people (individuals and social formations). Such an approach would certainly have the advantage of testing development hypotheses in concrete, but the main difficulty would then be to identify the actual praxis (consequences) which depends on one single theory. "Pure cases" of an implementation of the classical approach might already be difficult to circumscribe, to say nothing about contemporary trends which are still waiting to be practised!

22. "... un des modèles les plus célèbres: celui de A. Lewis" (Philippe Ayyalot, Essai sur la théorie du développement [Gujas, Paris, 1972], p. 13); "L'ouvrage classique le plus caractéristique de cette tendance dominante est celui d'Arthur Lewis ... ." (Samir Amin, op. cit., p. 23, n. 22).

23. Nobody would question the fact that the works of the liberal/classical economists are haunted with notions like "equilibrium," "balance," etc. Yet it is interesting (because it reveals the magnitude of the dichotomy between culture and nature) that they have never thought that the "ecological equilibrium point" could be included in their "laws."

24. However, in the classical view, progress is an accumulative notion, whereas, in Marxist theory, it is brought about by a succession of revolutions (mutations).


26. In chapter 8, on colonialism, Rostow goes so far as to say that colonies have not been established in order to promote national interest or to exclude a rival economic power but "to fill a vacuum" and "to organize a traditional society incapable of self-organization for modern import and export activity" (p. 109).
27. Jean Baudrillard, *La société de consommation*, p. 64. This is nothing but another way of defining the "trickle-down effect."

28. "Anhistoricism" refers to the fact that growth, measured in the countries surveyed by Rostow, might have been the consequence of other factors which are not accounted for in his model (colonial accumulation).

29. It is however significant that Perroux is presently emphasizing essential goods, rather than fundamental needs. He defines essential goods as those "which, in a given society, put the individual in a state of liberation" and goes on to say that these goods are symbolic ones (in a lecture given at ILO in Geneva, 22 May 1978). There is therefore a world of difference between François Perroux and Robert S. McNamara!

30. *L'économie du XXème siècle* is, in fact, a collection of lectures and articles.


32. Ibid., p. 179.

33. "... promouvoir une culture nouvelle et vraiment synthétique, une assimilation créatrice de l'universalisme occidental; une négriﬁcation de ses valeurs et une communication des expériences et des valeurs de la négritude à l'Occident" (ibid., p. 208).

34. "Marxist-Leninist" should not be taken as a label of orthodoxy but applies to an analysis which uses Marxist concepts in a Leninist approach (concept of imperialism — world system rather than "only" capitalism — national capitalism). Moreover, Amin's theory differs more from the classical model than the "classical Marxist" one (which is also predominantly productivist).

35. This was not "discovered" by Amin but by the Latin American school (initiated by Raoul Prebisch) of dependency (Celso Furtado, Andre Gunder Frank, etc.) and continued by Paul A. Baran, Paul M. Sweezy, etc. This historical factor is "new" with regard to this description of theories of development.

36. Strangely enough, Amin makes almost no reference to Perroux's works.


38. This remark should, however, be modified in light of the fact that Amin clearly differentiates between a "dependent" and a "self-centred" form of industrialization. Hence his critique of the "new" international division of labour enshrined in the NIEO; although it reveals a real rebellion of the local bourgeoisies against the capitalist centre, it does not call into question the existence of unequal exchange.

39. 3201 (S-VI), Preamble.

40. 3202 (S-VI), IIIb.
41. 3202 (S-VI), 111d; and 3201/3.
42. 3202 (S-VI), 1, 3, a), vii.
43. 3201 (S-VI), Preamble.
44. 3202 (S-VI), VII/1.
45. The fact which is constantly ignored is that, as it stands, the NIE0 will constitute a tremendous interference in the domestic affairs of many states. It is perfectly illusory to believe that its implementation will not bring about considerable changes in internal economic and social structures. Once more, the unsaid is more important than what is plainly stated!
46. 3201 (S-VI), 4, e).
47. 3202 (S-VI), I/1, b).
48. 3201 (S-VI), 4, q).
49. 3202 (S-VI), I/2, d).
51. To introduce here the concept of meaning is nothing but another way of stressing the fact that "development" has to be defined by the people concerned; a society constitutes a symbolic whole in which all elements (which are much more numerous than our five main variables!) become meaningful through their integration in a system of relations (cf. Marc Guillaume, Claude Levi-Strauss). According to this definition, "development" appears to be far beyond the mere questions of production, distribution, structures, etc. In fact, it is totally impossible to equate development with any such variable without considering its relations to the other ones.
52. This does not mean that "development" is a zero-sum game. But "results" should not be measured at the national level only (GNP): what happens at the local and global levels is also important ("profit" made by one country might not be of internal but of external origin). Moreover, if we question the idea that all partners can gain at the same time (as stated in the preamble to the NIE0), we should also leave open the possibility that they could all simultaneously lose!
53. The exclamation mark is necessary since it is highly doubtful that economics can exist independently from other social relations (particularly political ones); such a view reduces "economic" transactions to monetary exchange; it maintains the illusion that the field of economics is concerned with the allocation of "scarce" goods.
54. We particularly think, at this point, of the extremely detailed models elaborated by the Bariloche Foundation; cf. Carlos A. Mallmann, Research Priorities and Holistic Knowledge (Research and Human Needs Programme), paper prepared for Unesco, May 1977.