WORLD CONFLICT FORMATION PROCESSES IN THE 1980s: PROLEGOMENON III FOR A GPID WORLD MODEL*

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It is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate dialogue on the subject at this stage of the research.
This paper is in seven points and is an effort to integrate into some holistic pattern, or at least relatively coherent pattern, a high number of processes in the world of today, seeing them, essentially, as the workings of conflict formations. In other words, there are three basic perspectives chosen for viewing the world.¹

1. The process, something that moves and changes, is the essential unit of analysis.

2. A process should be understood dialectically, as the expression of contradictions, and more particularly in many cases as the workings of conflicts with actors or at least parties.

3. All of this should be seen in a global and holistic context, not for particular groups of people or groups of countries only, or for particular concerns or groups of concerns only.

Needless to say, it is impossible to do all this. However, it is important to indicate ways in which one might approach such ideals for discussion and further improvement.

In order to do so a point of departure has to be chosen, and the point of departure that will be developed in the first section is — I would nearly say, "of course" — the key economic process in the world today which for the sake of convenience we may refer to as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). This, then, is seen as the force motrice — but in doing so I am in no sense adopting a linear, causal or economistic view. I only choose to enter the global processes at one point for analytical purposes, and this seems to be a useful one. It is a highly contradictory one, replete with conflicts, and it makes sense to ask who are the winners, and who are the losers. The second section deals with the contradiction between winners and losers in geo-
political terms (the descending North-West world as against the
ascending South-East world); the third section with the winners and the
losers within the third world; the fourth section with a corresponding
problématique in the second, or state-capitalist world; the fifth
section with that problématique for the People's Republic of China;
the sixth section for the first or private-capitalist world; and the
seventh and last section for the conflict between the state-capitalist
and private-capitalist worlds, the so-called East-West conflict.

Still, by word of introduction, a prefatory note on conflict formation.
It is often said that there is an East-West conflict and then there is
a North-South conflict, and, from the end of the 1960s until the end of
the 1970s, the conventional wisdom was that the latter had become more
important than the former. The position taken here is that something
had become more important than the East-West conflict, but something not
very well stated by reading the compass directions in such a simplistic
manner.

Thus, I do not think there is any North-South conflict formation in this
world, meaning a conflict with economic issues and with the more
industrialized North as one actor and the less industrialized South as
the other actor in that conflict formation (conflict formation — as
usual — defined in terms of issues and actors/parties). It is absurd
to assert that the private and state-capitalist countries, the North-
West and the North-East respectively, enter the global economy in the
same way, as the latter cannot be said to have economic investments of
any magnitude in the "South," and also seem to depend much less on the
South for raw materials. Furthermore, although the South or the third
world attains some coherence as a voting block in the United Nations and
other intergovernmental settings, it would be highly misleading to see
it as one economic actor with well-harmonized interests. It is cut
through not only with continental, civilizational (including religious
and linguistic), and major political divisions, but also in purely
economic terms — not only because some are richer and some are poorer,
but because relations of exploitation and dependency usually analysed
as first-world/third-world relations are quickly being reproduced in
the South, with internal cleavages.\textsuperscript{4}

More particularly, the South-East of the world, East and South-east Asia, seems to be so much stronger than the rest of the South, among other reasons because not only China but also Japan belongs to this region. In saying so it is obviously understood that there is a dislocation in the Japanese economic positioning in this world, from the North-West corner where she actually never belonged but gained some membership because of her strength to the South-East corner where she certainly does belong.\textsuperscript{5} The economistic/conventional wisdom, trying to analyse the South in terms of newly industrializing countries (NICs),\textsuperscript{6} is not very helpful here because it lumps together countries in various parts of the South with very different geographical location, civilizational profile, political orientation, and so on. But the NIC metaphor does point to the tremendous differences in the South in terms of economic growth, investment for industrialization, industrial output, and so on, although it misses contradictions, cleavages, and conflicts.

Thus, it is suggested that the conflict is not between North and South, but really between North-West and South-East, with the state-capitalist North-East and the greater part of the third world — the South-West — to a large extent as spectators, marginalized by the North-West/South-East conflict-formation process. The map on the front page of the "Independent Brandt Commission Report" is therefore highly misleading,\textsuperscript{7} and not only because it does not reflect the class cleavages in all parts of the world — but in this they are certainly not the only ones to fail.

What, then, about the East-West conflict? First of all, it is not between East and West but only between the East and West of the Occident, and for that reason should more properly be referred to as the North-East/North-West conflict (it should be noted, through, that this conflict is reproduced in one particular part of the Orient, the Korean peninsula,\textsuperscript{8} and also — in a very special form — around China). But let us stick to the words East and West since they are so often used in this context, and rather ask the question: Is it obvious that
the conflict — for a conflict there is, somewhere — is between East and West? Or, could it be that most of it is a conflict within the East, paralleled by a conflict within the West, and that these two parallel conflicts now take the form of crisis in highly vertical, hierarchical systems, headed by the two superpowers respectively, which to some extent is expressed, even acted out, as if it were a genuine inter-conflict and not two parallel intra-conflicts? So far we merely make the point that metaphors prevalent in the press, etc., are not sufficient for a more serious analysis of global conflict processes. For an analysis the conflict issues have to be identified, as for all conflicts there is an incompatibility hidden somewhere, and it has to be identified and made more explicit, just as there are actual or potential actors (the potential ones have not yet achieved the level of consciousness and organization that characterize actors; they could better be referred to as "parties"), also to be identified. But, as mentioned, there is even the task of trying to say something about the process of these contradictions over time, both in terms of issues and in terms of actors/parties. To this task we now turn, but first some more words about "conflict formation."

Conflict is over-value, something "worthy of being pursued or avoided." There is, however, an actor- and structure-oriented perspective on value. Values held by actors, explicitly, may perhaps best be referred to as goals, or ends. But there are also implicit values (or value-deprivation, value-denials), the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of which is built into the structure. At the individual level they show up as interests, and what these interests are becomes more clear when structures change, whether through deliberate action or not. What then shows up is that some actors/parties gain by the status quo, and lose when it is changed, whereas for others it is the other way round. Under ordinary circumstances this does not show up, because both parties are so used to the way the structure distributes value, respecting the interests of some but not of others, that they take it for granted. But the moment there is consciousness about the workings of the structure, this has already changed, and if this consciousness is translated into organization/mobilization it may lead on to struggle through confron-
tation. Trivial and obvious, but this is some of the material out of which history is made, and the points to follow are essentially variations on this theme. Occasionally, only occasionally, such processes even lead to some type of **transcendence**.\textsuperscript{10} We may be in that kind of period now, in several parts of the world.
1. NIEO AS WORLD CAPITALIST EXPANSION: TWO WINNERS, TWO LOSERS

Let it first be stated unequivocally that in our view the NIEO is a part of the world capitalist expansion process, in no way directed against capitalism as a way of running an economic system, even a world economic system, but directed against the near-monopoly of control that the North-West world has had over the world capitalist system for nearly 500 years, and particularly for the last 200 years. Thus, the two theses 'there is no crisis in the world capitalist system' and 'there is a crisis in the North-West control of the world capitalist system' are not at all incompatible; except in the minds of those who might believe that only the North-West world would be able to control something like the world capitalist system. However, from the fact that the North-West has been able to do so, it does not follow that the North-West will always be able to do so; it does not even follow that they are in the best position to do it. Others might even be better at the capitalist game.

Concretely, the NIEO is seen as a process that started with Japan's emergence in the world economic market from the early days of the Meiji revolution (late 1860s) onwards. Japan was the first country from the non-North-West that "made it," that understood the workings of the world capitalist system sufficiently to be able to use it to its own advantage. As it was the only country in that region to do so, this took place not only at the expense of other countries in the region but also to the immense enrichment of Japan herself up to the point that she today is in a position to treat a former leader of the world economic system, the United States, the way the US has treated other countries: investing in it, marketing her goods there, building factories, using cheap US labour deterred from going on strike through
high unemployment figures, sharing with the dependent country some technological secrets but by no means all, and so on.

Japan was then followed in this process by other countries, most notably by Iran when she, under Mossadegh, tried to nationalize the oil corporations of the North-West in 1953 and had to pay dearly for that. However, that act was watched closely by a young Egyptian by the name of Nasser who three years later seized a canal, an act to be watched very closely by a young Cuban by the name of Castro, who two years later seized a whole country. The resolutions passed at the sixth and seventh special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 and 1975 (with corresponding resolutions in other members of the UN system) should be seen as important verbal acknowledgement that the process such as OPEC 1973 takes place not as actions initiating a process. The UN only rarely initiates a process; it endorses it and sometimes plays an important role in speeding it up. Most important in this connection was the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) by the UN General Assembly in December 1974, building a normative basis for what follows.15

It seems possible today to distinguish between five important phases in the NIE0 as a process.

1. The terms of trade phase requesting higher buying power for raw materials and semi-manufactured commodities in terms of processed goods and services (higher price ratios, not just higher prices).

2. Expropriation/nationalization of productive assets in third-world countries, meaning that these countries will internalize what to the first world was an external sector of the first-world economy, meaning that the third world will control its own natural resources, its own capital resource (and not necessarily recycling it back to banks in the first world), its own labour, for instance, by requesting a tax to be paid to the third-world government for each foreign worker trained abroad, corresponding measures for brain drain, and, of course, nationalization of factories, etc., located in free-trade zones, and so on.16

3. Increased trade and exchange in general between third-world
countries — what in UN jargon is called TCDC and ECDC, or simply South-South trade.

4. **Counter-penetration**, essentially meaning investment by third-world countries in first-world countries, thereby treating the first-world countries as an external sector to their own economy.

5. **Conquest of world economic power positions**, starting with the Bretton-Woods system (the World Bank, IMF, IDA, etc.) and the transnational corporations operating in a region, through national and regional takeovers, possibly also through some type of globalization whereby some of them (pharmaceuticals?) might be run somewhat like the ocean-regime now slowly taking shape.¹⁷

The interesting thing about this type of programme is that what only some years ago would be totally unrealistic is today entirely feasible because of changed power relations. With military intervention in third-world countries a decreasingly available option, and with military regimes that can be maintained not necessarily friendly to the first world, what will be witnessed during the 1980s is probably the unfolding of exactly this scenario. It should be noted that the five points do not enter linearly. Observers of contemporary history much too often start their analysis with the OPEC action in 1973 which would give much emphasis to the first point on the list, but the list should be seen as a circle more than as a line — starting anywhere.

It is difficult to see that this at any point differs from what the first world used to do when it was firmly in control of the system. Thus, to increase the price of oil was merely an exercise in elementary textbook economics: If there is something like an inelastic demand for a commodity over a certain price range it would be stupid not to go to the end of that price range, possibly even somewhat beyond, in order to get the money the market can yield. The OPEC countries played the market and gained, indeed. If the first-world countries did not like this it could not be because the OPEC countries did something wrong, only because the game was less attractive when the other side proved to have the best cards. But unsurprisingly the first world then tried to change the rules of the game by starting talking
about oil as something belonging to humankind in general, while having great reservations about this formula in connection with the ocean floor and its management, and in connection with technology. However, the game is still a predominantly capitalist one, meaning that the market sets the priorities for production, allocates resources and goods/services, and thereby also has a decisive influence over the consumption pattern.

The game is the same, capitalism is stronger than ever, now penetrating into the most remote corners of the world. For reasons to be mentioned later state capitalism is not an antithesis to private capitalism. What is an antithesis is what usually is called a non-market economy, informal economy, or green economy: production for own consumption; production for non-monetary exchange; and production for monetary exchange but in very limited economic cycles. Such economies are by definition more use-oriented and less exchange-oriented; they may also be more need-oriented, less demand-oriented. Often it is referred to as the subsistence economy in third-world countries, an economy which is now actually coming up again in certain first-world countries for reasons to be discussed below.

The thesis, then, is that these processes together are of the same magnitude as the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, and the decline and fall of the Middle Ages, and will have equally profound impacts. More precisely, there will be winners and there will be losers. The structure may not change, but the location of the structure will change, and, since the capitalist system is based on an inequality that generates inequities, those who were in the centre and now become more peripheral will be losers by the criteria of the system, and those who were in the periphery and now are moving more towards the centre will be winners. And there is also a third category: those who before were marginal to the system, running their own informal economies relatively untouched by a colonialism that was like a cat's paw relative to the lion's claw now making itself felt all over the third world; they also become losers, as they are moving from marginality to periphery.
As the process now unfolds itself two losers and two winners seem already relatively clearly defined:

**Loser:** the North-West, the old international economic order directorate, the US-EC-Japan triangle (Trilateral Commission, OECD).

**Winner:** the South-East, the New International Economic Order directorate, the Japan-China-South-east Asia triangle.

**Winner:** the élites in the third world.

**Loser:** the people in general in the third world.

Of course, not all parts of the population will lose equally much in the North-West, nor will all parts gain equally much in the South-East; but that important topic will be taken up in a later paper.
The thesis is very simple: NIEO is a strategy for unsaddling the North-West from its control position; it says nothing about where the new centre is going to be. As a matter of fact, it reads as if the actors behind it think there is going to be no new centre, but that is unrealistic. Whether by design or by the workings of the system, centres — more or less co-ordinated — will tend to emerge. Thus, if the point in the preceding section was that nothing is happening to challenge the imperialist structure of the world capitalist economic system, then the thesis of the present section is that there is going to be a new centre, and that centre is going to be in the South-East world. Five reasons will be given for that assumption.25

First, the triangle described by China-Japan-South-east Asia has almost all the productive assets needed. Roughly speaking one and a half billion people, among them a 600-million-strong Chinese labour force, Japanese technology and capital (with the highest saving ratio in the world: 29 per cent),26 raw materials from all over the area, particularly from South-east Asia, including Indonesian oil (and also Chinese and Japanese offshore oil) — all of this together should satisfy a production function sufficient to meet a substantial portion of world market demands, particularly with Australia/New Zealand added.27

Second, the underlying ethos. China and Japan and the part of South-east Asia influenced by them exhibit that particular characteristic of oriental civilizations: their additive or eclectic nature.28 There is a Confucian/Buddhist combination common to them both, although the tonality is somewhat different when Taoism is added in the Chinese case and Shintoism in the Japanese case. This makes not only for a
considerable cultural communality but also for a spirit of corporate
eendeavour where Confucianism defines the vertical component (respect
for authority, for non-manual work and so on) and Mahayana Buddhism
the more horizontal, organic, solidarity aspect. But in addition to
this both of them are adding, in the usual eclectic manner, western
components: Christianity for sure, liberalism, and, in the Chinese case,
also Marxism.ajan The western component makes for a universalism in space
combined with an idea of progress in time not found in the more Asian
components of these civilizations, and it is difficult to see how all
of this combined could fail to make for an almost perfect ethos, for a
world-encompassing capitalism. Weber has explained the significance of
puritan Protestantism for the rise of capitalism, but at best this is
only a theory giving a rationale for the capitalist entrepreneur
himself; it offers little in terms of comfort to the worker.30 Marx
explained to us what the workers’ situation was and motivated the worker
for revolt and distribution, but had very little to say that could
justify entrepreneurial activity. The net result was, as we know,
entrepreneurial growth without much distribution in the West and
distribution without much entrepreneurial growth in the East.31 The
contention here is that the South-East world might be able to transcend
this apparent incompatibility because of its particular civilizational
amalgam, and run a very effective capitalism.32

Third, and partly as a reflection of the preceding theme: the way
Chinese and Japanese are organized. A Chinese name like Tang, or a
Japanese name like Tanaka, stands for millions of people, and,
significantly in the Chinese case, there is a certain amount of
solidarity among them bordering on crystallizing them into an actor.
To the extent that there are Chinese abroad — and this is a considerable
extent — a Chinese family name may de facto stand for a transnational
corporation already. Where westerners will tend to try to get away from
very common names into names that can better clothe their individualism,34
Chinese and Japanese may prefer just the opposite, to sense the
belongingness in a greater collectivity as expressed in a very common
name. And all of this is, of course, only an expression of the famous
collectivism of the Orient, among other factors probably making for less
alienation in connection with the industrialization process than in the West, because in a factory the collectivity of workers and managers produces for the collectivity of customers and both collectivities make sense in that particular non-western setting. It is only in an individualizing culture that an individual worker producing for an individual customer in a direct individual-product-individual relationship makes so much sense.35

Fourth, the politics of the south-eastern triangle is taking shape. There are weak points or points that have to be played with great delicacy. China and Japan share the history of a terrible imperialist war only 50 years ago, and both of these big powers are looked upon with apprehension in the region. Chinese minorities everywhere may serve as a point of contact but may also be seen as a bridge head for expansionism. The people trained all over South-east Asia by Japan during the Dai-tō-ā exercise learned to some extent to respect Japanese efficiency and patterns of organization in general,36 and, although the feelings of wartime animosity have by and large withered away, a scepticism may still prevail, welling up as incidents of Japanese cars being burnt in Bangkok and Jakarta.37 Nevertheless, it may safely be said that business circles in South-east Asia are heavily rooted in something Chinese and something Japanese in addition to their knowledge of local and US business practices. It should be noted, however, that both the Catholic Philippines and the Muslim Indonesia are occidental where civilizational belongingness is concerned,38 and oriental only geographically, and the same applies to the Malay majority of Malaysia — factors of some importance in the longer run. The countries most easily integrated into this triangle would be the four mini-Japans: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea; in the longer run perhaps also North Korea and the countries of Indochina, and even Thailand. Much highly delicate diplomacy would be needed.39

Crucial, however, is the Tokyo-Beijing axis that the Japanese apparently started forging the moment they discovered that the US and China had discovered each other back in 1971. The match between Chinese labour and Japanese capital and technology within a shared ethos and geo-
political potentiality would seem perfect, but the details nonetheless have to be worked out. It had to take some time before Chinese workers could produce Japanese products, under licence in the usual fashion — but it is now taking place (the case of Sanyo, for instance, "Made in the People's Republic of China").

Fifth, to produce for the world market, and not merely for a national or regional market as would be the case for the other NICs (Brazil and Mexico, for instance, possibly also India), something very persuasive is needed: products that are competitive both in terms of quality and in terms of prices. It is hard to see that relatively inexpensive Chinese labour coupled with Japanese and Chinese ingenuity should not be able to produce exactly this. At this point some particular reasons why Japanese products seem to be so good should be mentioned. There has of course always been an element of truth in the five western standard techniques for debunking Japan and to comfort themselves: the products are imitations of western products only; the quality is "shoddy"; the prices are at the expense of an exploited proletariat; the prices are subsidized one way or the other through dumping practices; and — the 1970s version — it is all done at tremendous cost to nature in terms of depletion and pollution. That element is decreasing, however.

For today's products are often highly ingenious combinations, in an additive, eclectic manner, of components also known elsewhere — as when one of these excellent Japanese watches at the same time is equipped with a computer, or can be converted into a mini-TV just by pushing a little button and raising a small antenna. And they are certainly far from "shoddy," given that the Japanese seem very cleverly to have made use of the tendency of western capitalism towards "planned obsolescence" and make products to last, precisely because others do not. Moreover, the typical Japanese enterprise has a low productivity when everybody engaged is counted because the products in addition to being capital- and research-intensive are also labour-intensive: a thorough, co-operative, no-nonsense, serious craftsmanship with every detail attended to by many people. Westerners may point out that the productivity is
low; the Japanese may point out that the quality is high—but they prefer the customers to do it for them. And the customers oblige: Japan having conquered the camera market to a large extent, the TV, radio, and music-machine market and watch market are now coming—just as in the sector of transportation the motorcycle market was the first one to be Japanized, now followed by personal cars, trucks, and so on.\(^2\) Integrated circuits, computers—everything in that field is next in line.\(^3\) Again, there is no reason to believe that these products will be inferior if they bear the stamp "Made in the People's Republic of China."

To the extent that all of this is becoming the case through the 1980s, obviously the economic conflict formation is not a North/South one but an NW/SE formation. It is, moreover, already perceived as such: the complaints about the penetration into the classical triangle of the old economic order, US-EC-Japan (the OECD countries, the Trilateral Commission countries) are numerous. There is the usual admonition to "exercise restraint."\(^4\) Why should the Japanese or anybody else in the SE do that when the NW never exercised restraint? Of course, the interesting thing about Japan is that she is a member of both triangles and this is used to communicate, forcefully, the apprehensions of the NW.\(^5\) Sooner or later Japan will probably have to leave the first triangle in favour of the second one, apart from continuing to keep it as a listening post, but the initiative for this would come from the NW, not from Japan herself. When "exercising restraint" still fails to work (among other reasons simply because customers prefer Japanese products), the NW response will have to be tariff and non-tariff barriers (psychological preparation for the latter takes the form of statistics about more heavy accidents with small Japanese cars than with big American cars, albeit probably because they are small rather than because they are Japanese).

To get into the question of what the South-East world will do in case of a trade war one has to ask the question why they are doing this entire exercise at all. And the answer is probably very simple: they know from experience how the North-West has been operating, that there
are gains to be made if you can dominate the market. You can simply become rich that way! Ultimately that has to do with one's own security, although they also perfectly well know that this road to security may become a road to insecurity. Raw material sources and markets may be closed to them, hence one has to secure a minimum base of both, and the South-East triangle is already such a base. Even for the Japanese it will take time to saturate the Chinese market with Japanese goods made in China. Should everything else fail there is always the Dai-tō-ā.

About the rest of the world the two are probably relatively detached. They do not have the western view of themselves in the centre with the rest of the world as a periphery to be converted into a second-rate copy of the centre. On the contrary, to the Chinese what is outside their own centre are the Barbarians of the northern (Soviet), eastern (Japanese), southern (South-east Asia), and western (the Occident) varieties. Of all of these the northern Barbarians are dangerous and one should protect oneself against them by having as allies their enemies in the rest of Barbaria. The east Barbarians are a nouveau riche, slightly vulgarized variety of themselves; the south Barbarians are a mixed lot, but many of them extensions of themselves; whereas the west Barbarians are more like a lost cause, infantile but clever in their onesidedness. Like children playing with matchboxes one has to know how childlike they are, how dangerous are the matches, and how close the two are to each other. About Barbaria one has to be informed; to convert them is a hopeless and even meaningless task, however much they might need it.

And for the Japanese the world image is not that different: themselves in the centre, then outside that there is an East Asian zone of the countries mentioned, and outside that again the world as a resource. To evaluate the world purely in utilitarian terms, positively and negatively, for oneself is by no means unknown to western theories of state: after all this is what the concept of "state interest" is about. But the Orient might go farther than the Occident in not abiding by universal norms of justice or whatever, if it should interfere with their own interests, not seeing the world in universalist terms of
Christian compassion or Roman-inspired law, or pretending to do so as western powers often do. This has the advantage for the non-SE countries of the world that there will be no attempts to convert them into talking Japanese or Chinese, into adopting cultural patterns of either or both, or anything else of the kind for that matter. All they are asked to do is to pay for the goods offered in terms of natural resources, capital, or technology. SE capitalism, at the world level, will be much more specific, more contractual than the diffuse, all-embracing western imperialism was. The latter left peoples all over the world with languages not their own, with rootedness in a political and spiritual capital not their own. China and Japan will neither attempt nor want to do anything of that kind. They want a distance, and they will get it.48 As opposed to American and French people, who feel flattered and confirmed when somebody far away speaks their own languages perfectly, the Japanese and the Chinese feel uneasy when somebody is getting under their skin that way, like being spied upon, like having nowhere to retreat.49 It may be added that they have little reason to worry: theirs are tremendously difficult languages taking at least five years of concentrated study to learn, five years that preferably should be at a very early stage in life — but in that case one is a Chinese or Japanese. As the two understand each other up to 80 per cent and can easily acquire the remaining 20 per cent — in writing that is — they have for all practical purposes a quite effective secret language among themselves with which to conduct their operations — an asset to be added to the others mentioned above.

However, what would happen if the NW went to harsher measures? In the first run this would be a question of a boycott, meaning a tariff/non-tariff wall that is infinitely high. The Japanese probably have no illusions that this would not be a possibility and for that reason are doing everything to create the best allies possible within the framework of a liberal economy: the consumers. Any such wall, low or high, would mean that the consumers will have to subsidize employment for the workers and profit for the managers and stockholders by buying more expensive cars than they otherwise could get; a dubious proposition from the point of view of a market economy. The Japanese may then call the
bluff by its right name, but that would not decrease the agony of the dilemma.\textsuperscript{50} In the meantime, the South-East will have to secure markets for their goods all over the third world and possibly also in the North-East world in the state-capitalist countries that are still under the spell of NW colonialism, oriented towards US, French, German, Italian, and even British products.\textsuperscript{51} Needless to say, any such measure would be a blow to the SE as the NW is by far the best-paying customer, although the third-world bourgeoisie is also coming up quite quickly.\textsuperscript{52} The question is whether the NW governments are prepared to pay the price of having their citizens subsidize jobs in factories unable to stand up to SE competition, with such obvious effects as large-scale smuggling of SE goods. It should also be noted that Japan may organize a consumers' boycott of NW goods if Japan really should lower tariff/non-tariff barriers; it is doubtful whether the NW governments have a corresponding leverage on their own peoples.\textsuperscript{53}

But what if this tension should aggravate further and even lead to war-like measures? Let us analyse two possible scenarios: in the first scenario the major loser in the expansion of the South-East, the US, possibly followed by some Western European allies, initiates warlike measures against the South-East. Today this may sound not only a hypothetical but even a crazy scenario, but one should remember that there are very real interests at stake. And it is also useful to comprehend what the Japanese would immediately do: establish closer ties with the Soviet Union, and try to persuade the Chinese to do the same.\textsuperscript{54} It is important that Japan and the Soviet Union have a bargaining chip that they can push back and forth between the two of them — the Northern Islands occupied by the Soviet Union after the Second World War: the Soviet Union might on some occasion hand them back, Japan might on some occasion recognize that they form part of Soviet territory, in either case at a considerable price. Anyhow, the mere prospect of this type of triple alliance is not one that would make the US move far in this direction — again one instance of how powerless "the most powerful nation on earth"\textsuperscript{55} actually has become.

Then, the second scenario: the US and the Soviet Union one day together
define the world in Occident/Orient or even white/yellow terms, finding that there is more to unite them than to divide them in face of the "yellow peril." This scenario has more equal balance; demographically the Orient would be superior, economically they might be more even, militarily the Occident would be superior. Against this may certainly be argued that all the Soviet Union now has to do is to sit by the sidelines and wait for the South-East to outcompete the North-West sufficiently economically so as to weaken it also politically and militarily. But it is not so obvious that the Soviet Union wants to do this: they may fear a militarily strong North-West on its way down economically for the desperate action that might come out of a crumbling empire (and with good reasons); they might want the North-West to remain strong, partly to scare its own population, partly to have a scapegoat, partly to have something to "catch up" and "surpass" as usual, and partly because they admire it as a source of technology and have not yet overcome the anti-Japanese prejudices referred to above. For such reasons the scenario is not at all that unlikely, and with disastrous implications because of the civilizational and racial cleavages involved.  

The obvious Japanese/Chinese counter-strategy would be to see to it that the cold war between East and West is kept alive. As there is such a heavy ideological and political investment on either side this should not be too difficult; in fact, what is needed would be only something like one Afghanistan every three to five years. The Russian theories of Chinese provocation in this particular conflict may therefore not be far-fetched. And there is also another perspective which could be interesting: that whereas the Chinese may produce an enormous amount of economic goods they may prefer to use the Japanese as their economic agents abroad, their salesmen, turning Japan into a macro-Hong Kong for their purposes. The Japanese may prefer to let the Chinese do the political work for the South-East triangle. Thereby the Chinese remain economically pure and more free to pursue their internal zigzag course (section V below), and the Japanese more free to look politically neutral, solely engaged in economic pursuits. This does not exclude the use of the Chinese abroad as a general network, but much more
important, in this perspective, is Japan as a macro-Hong Kong.

One may now ask: if the SE triangle is that strong, why did not all of this come about earlier? For a very simple set of reasons:

1. **China was down**, weakened by internal processes and external imperialism, a worn-out country; Japan came out of Tokugawa isolation as the modern and leading country in the Orient, tempted by this into military adventurism, now facing a choice between a symbiotic or subservient relation to China, obviously preferring the former — as dominance over China is out.

2. **The occidentalization process** (in the sense of adding occidental elements in the civilization) had not yet gone far enough to provide that forward and outward thrust so characteristic of the Occident.

3. The **opportunity** had not yet come: an Occident weakened by decolonization and NIEO.

As a conclusion: the particular historical occasion did not yet present itself. Today it does; the 1980s will show to what extent it is made use of. Let me only add that this is not a "Japanese twenty-first century hypothesis" — it is not Japan only, it will not last that long, and it is a fact rather than a hypothesis, foreseeable for a long time.
In the first run most of the third-world countries (at least one hundred of them) will be marked by aggravated internal gaps, class contradictions and open class conflicts due to the factors mentioned above: the NIEO puts the premium on trade and consequently channels economic resources in that direction which, given the structure of third-world countries in general, will tend to enrich the élites and impoverish peoples who have productive assets taken away from them.\(^5^9\)

There are exceptions to this but they would be less than a dozen countries: the socialist third-world countries, some countries in the SE corner such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (and this is exactly one major reason why they can be referred to as "mini-Japans"),\(^6^0\) and a few others. In these exceptional countries a new _intranational_ economic order (accompanied or not by dictatorial repression) preceded the new _international_ economic order, and in that case the latter does not have such detrimental consequences. But for the others it is safe to predict that much of the NIEO dollars will be converted into police and military technology for surveillance of the population and suppression of revolts at any stage, as _international_ change precedes _intranational_ change.\(^6^1\)

These are the obvious processes; the question is what the counter-processes would be. Again Iran might serve as a pilot country: The revolt came from an unexpected corner. It had a clear economic deprivation/class character according to the Marxist scheme of analysis, even formulated in Marxist idiom and some Marxist leadership. But it also had another dimension: religious, fundamentalist, anti-western, not in the sense of anti-imperialist but in the sense of anti-materialist.\(^6^2\) It was the political genius of the Ayatollah Khomeini
that was needed to weld these two into a working political coalition, and then later on use the latter to turn against the former. Translated into other third-world countries this would mean a search for fundamental, non- and anti-western values on which to stand, a search to the roots, to an endogenous platform.

The basis for a more generalized anti-western platform, not only anti-capitalist but perhaps also anti-socialist and anti-Marxist as well as anti-liberal, would not be difficult to find. All over the third world after the Second World War, but particularly after decolonization really took place in the early 1960s, two basic hypotheses have been tested: the road to growth and happiness through liberal capitalism, and the road to growth and happiness through Marxist socialism, gambling on entrepreneurial activity in the former and revolutionary distribution in the latter. The only places where these experiments can be said to have had a positive result would be for some of the countries in the South-East, for the reasons mentioned — but in these cases there are so many special conditions that it is difficult to copy the example elsewhere. A generalized anti-western attitude, hence, might also be a call no longer to listen to the false prophets. And here it should be noted that in the Khomeini scheme of thinking there is the Great Satan — the United States, of course — and he is surrounded by four lesser satans of which the first one is the Soviet Union (and the United Kingdom, Israel, and South Africa — in that order). Thus, there is no respect paid to the conception of the United States and the Soviet Union as heading two different ideologies, two different worlds for that matter (the "free" and the "unfree") between which you have to choose. Khomeini wraps them together — and in my view more or less correctly — by seeing one as subordinate to the other, and rejects the whole package as "satanic" (his terminology has not caught on yet).

For the rejection of materialism there would through the 1980s be another factor of some importance: if the scenario hinted at in the preceding section is anything like correct the third world will by the end of the 1980s more than ever look like a Japanese trade fair (although "Made in the People's Republic of China" will be stamped on
many of the products). It is our contention that these products by and large will be preferred to the western ones, and not only because they are cheaper and better but also because of the halo effect of Japan as somehow being a third-world country. Given this it is hard to believe that any but the most servile third-world country will join a US-led economic boycott against the South-East. But that does not rule out the possibility of an anti-materialist revolt that might also hit Japanese products, although there seems to be a strange factor operating here: somehow an American Ford, not to mention a German Mercedes, looks more materialistic than a Japanese Toyota, even if it should be one of the bigger models. And the reason is perhaps not so difficult to find. It lies precisely in the specific character of Japanese capitalism abroad: product only, none of the connotations of a lifestyle that are always exported together with the American counterpart product. The Japanese remain anonymous and prefer that.64

It is to be expected that these revolts will be unexpected; it is to be predicted that they will be unpredictable. The only continuity one can see would be as a set of discontinuities. But there would be one common element if this is correct: a revival of fundamentalist, non-western religion, a purified Islam (and here the distinction between "fundamentalist" and "institutional" is probably much more important than the Sunni-Shia distinction some people try to make the most of), fundamentalist Hinduism, purified Buddhism, and also, incidentally, a return to basic values of Confucianism and Shintoism.65 In other parts of the third world this may take the form of animism and animatism,66 and in the Christian countries the form of fundamentalist Christianity.67 Which all adds up to saying that he who wants to understand the world, and not only the third world of the 1980s, had better start learning something about the religious faiths of the world, and what they mean to the people who hold them, as soon as possible. Power will be as important as ever, but the power basis in the third world will be not only carrot and stick, economic (commodities), and military (weapons they got in return for the commodities), but also normative, cultural power. More than ever this will be the decade of the "minorities" — a terrible misnomer, as singly, and definitely combined, they usually are
the majorities. As a consequence disintegration of some of the nation-state constructions is also to be expected, opening for the necessity of new institutional frameworks after the nation-state.\textsuperscript{68}
IV. THE SECOND WORLD: PROCESSES AND COUNTER-PROCESSES

In a sense the second world is in a different situation: it is less entangled economically with the third world as it does not have major investments abroad or depend on it for markets or raw materials to anywhere like the same level as the first world. But the state-capitalist countries are so entangled with the private-capitalist countries that any economic decline in the latter will have a contagion effect in the former: unemployment and inflation will be exported to the extent economic interdependence provides for conductivity of these phenomena (which means that they will be particularly predominant in Yugoslavia as that is the most "interdependent" country).69

However, there are other processes more endogenous to the state-capitalist countries that should be pointed out in this connection, and they also seem to have an economic basis. The decline in production and productivity growth during recent years is important in this connection. It does to a state-capitalist economy what decline or profit does to a private-capitalist economy: sooner or later there is a crisis because these economies have to move all the time. The crisis is not least one of the spirit, a lack of faith in the system. But the mechanisms are different. In the state-capitalist countries it is probably more a question of an over-mobilization of productive resources in the capital, at the top of ministries, and in certain industries at the expense of an under-mobilization of productive assets for the rest of the countries, outside the ministries, and in less prominent industries — for instance, agriculture. This is often seen also in terms of party power: whereas the party at the centre often has considerable talent at its disposal, the lower ranks and the party outside the capital are less flexible, more dogmatic, more afraid of the
reactions of the centre and hence less inclined to engage in anything like the entrepreneurial activity that will have to characterize not only private but also state capitalism (risk-taking, hard work, ability to see opportunities others do not see, detection of new combinations in the production system, and so on). This may be so, but it might also be a misleading theory because it might see revamping the party as the cure instead of a total revamping of the steep centre/periphery gradients in general that seem to characterize these countries, giving much too little opportunity, freedom, and initiative to the periphery, concentrating much too much power of any kind in the centre.

Thus, as long as this is the case the dominant process as far as one can see will be for the production and productivity increases to decline towards zero, even towards negative levels. At the same time the nature of East-West trade has been, roughly speaking, goods at low levels of processing (including energy raw material) from East to West and goods and services at high levels of processing from West to East. Thus, the terms of trade have by and large been in the disfavour of the East, except for oil and when they have been able to export some industrial goods, like ships. The gaps created could have been filled by productivity and production increases, but — this not being the case — had to be filled with loans that then become increasingly difficult to service. The result is a situation where productivity simply has to be increased, or the West gains too much power.

And it is at that point that the recent events in Poland become so significant. One may perhaps see them as an effort to arrive at a bargain between the workers in periphery Gdansk (now the workers all over Poland due to the rapid spread of the Solidarity trade union) and the party and government authorities in the centre, Warsaw: higher productivity but only in return for higher levels of freedom. The 21 articles that came out of the dialogues among workers in Gdansk this summer essentially can be reduced to two components: more workers' control over the productive process including free trade unions, and more attention given to basic needs for the whole population. As these two constitute a rather reasonable definition of socialism the process
may be referred to as "a socialist revolt in a state-capitalist country," and it is as such a rather important counter-process that also has as its goal to reduce the tremendous gap between decision-making élites and the working class that produces the surplus on which they live. It should be added that in these countries there is no question of converting NIEO dollars into military and police capability: the élites have this capability at their disposal already, which may be a source of strength but also a source of weakness as the population has nothing new to fear. They are used to it already.

But this is only a part of the picture. These countries are also cut through by other contradictions of no lesser magnitude, as can be seen from the following list of seven sources of opposition confronting the Soviet leadership:

1. The farmers/peasants, who want larger plots of their own and an opportunity to market their products in return for making more and better quality products available.

2. The workers, who want free trade unions in order to protect themselves against exploitation by the apparat in return for increasing production through increases in productivity.

3. The intellectuals, who want both freedom of expression and freedom of impression in return for contributing a higher level of production of ideas and creativity in general.

4. The socialist bourgeoisie, who want consumer goods, less homespun, more at the same level as available to the bourgeoisie in the first- and second-world countries and increasingly even in the People's Republic of China. The answer to this is probably a capitalist sector in small-scale production of luxury goods and its marketing.

5. The minorities, who want autonomy; recently demonstrated even in Estonia, inside the Soviet Union (perhaps also outside).

6. The periphery state-capitalist countries, who want autonomy, recently demonstrated in many of them but practised by Romania.

7. The Communist parties, who want autonomy, recently demonstrated in the phenomenon of Eurocommunism (it should actually be called Latin Communism as central and northern parts of Western Europe do not seem to have followed this lead).
With seven sources of contradiction and open conflict such as these, what keeps the system going is not so much the ability to control every one of the contradictions as the ability to fragment them, keep them apart, split, and rule. Disturbing in the Polish case must have been the extent to which workers and intellectuals came together (although the latter to a large extent as the artisans and helpers for the former), even with substantial links to the farmers/peasants. There was also support from Latin Communist parties, but not open support from corresponding groups inside the Soviet Union, for instance. In short, there are very many political ties still to be established and to be counteracted by the ruling élites, all of this making the whole second world a region of not only contradictions but convulsion in the coming decade. 74

Imagine that all these seven contradictions became manifest conflicts, working their way as processes — what kind of impact would it have on the second world in the end? The net result might be some kind of state-controlled capitalism according to more social democratic formulas, with authoritarian elements, and with many of the same problems as the north-western countries, except that it would be less dependent on the South. The major positions in the economy would remain state-controlled, but farming, small-scale production, construction work, and above all distribution would to a much larger extent be run by a private-capitalist sector that might include elements of Yugoslav self-management (i.e., socialism in the sense of co-decision at the micro-level within capitalism at the market or macro-level). The controlling position of the Soviet Union centre in the formal sense would be considerably reduced, which might well mean that Soviet control would be enhanced, as it would be more informal, more based on achievement than naked carrot/stick power. 75

Why did nothing like this happen earlier? Again, the historical situation was not there: under Stalinism, for instance, none of the seven contradictions had the slightest chance of emerging into anything like visibility. For sure, from the point of view of Soviet leadership Stalinism had its advantages! Of course they were there, as contra-
dictions, latent conflict, but buried under terror. The system had to work its way through excessive optimism about the functioning of a centrally planned economy into a _credo quia absurdum_ phase – from which it may now be emerging. We shall see.\textsuperscript{76}
It is as wrong to assume that China will follow the same social logic as western countries as it is to assume that the state-capitalist countries should have the same contradictions as private-capitalist countries—or even more so! For one thing the historical situation is different, for another the cosmology underlying Chinese civilization is different with the peculiar additive nature alluded to above. More particularly, there is no reason to assume that China should pursue her two goals—a modern, socialist country in the year 2000—in the same way as countries in the Occident might try to do so. The instruments of modernity, economic growth through an ever higher production, and productivity of both goods and services at even higher levels of processing and marketing, at ever larger distances geographically and socially, might be about the same—with an emphasis on the import of artefacts from the "modern" world so that China should no longer be in splendid isolation, on an island all by itself with the flood of history passing by on either side. And the instruments of socialism might also be about the same: mechanisms whereby farmers and workers would keep more of the surplus through control at the bottom level, redistribution through welfare state mechanisms, better terms of trade between city and countryside and between the secondary and tertiary sectors on the one hand and the primary sector on the other, all of this under the leadership of the party.

The difference seems to come in the way they go about combining these two goals. One hypothesis would be that the emphasis varies from period to period. From 1949 to 1958 the focus was on distribution in the countryside, from 1958 to 1966-69 the focus was on the first leap forward and economic growth, from 1966 to 1969 and onwards to 1976 the
focus was on distribution in the political system, the Cultural Revolution with all its shortcomings, and after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 the focus has obviously been on the second great leap forward, the Four Modernizations (of agriculture, of industry, of science and technology, and of the military). This zigzag in political emphasis shows up as a much more complex curve in economic production and trading patterns, with considerable lags as should be expected. But what we are concerned with here is politics more than economics; the political developmental ethos, emphasis of any given period.\footnote{79}

From this it should follow that there may be a second turn, a second cultural revolution for that matter, but possibly without the stupid effects to cut China off from her cultural heritage\footnote{80} and deprive the population of essential freedoms as well as the decrease in productivity and, it seems, also in production. Since each phase seems to last about nine years this turnabout might come sometime in the middle of the 1980s, and be accompanied by a return to fundamental Chinese virtues as enshrined in Confucianism and Buddhism, and also Taoism. It may have an anti-material tinge about it, and also be combined with the notion of reciprocal responsibility enshrined in Confucianism, and organic solidarity enshrined in Mahayana Buddhism.\footnote{81} It should be noted that Confucianism and Buddhism legitimize growth and distribution respectively, as do liberalism and Marxism, meaning that both segments of the zigzag course receive legitimization from both ancient and more occidental components of present Chinese civilization. It belongs to the picture that Taoism legitimates the very notion of zigzag itself through its highly dialectical view of life in general and social life in particular.

Thus, one conclusion that might follow from this would be that China makes use of its present situation to acquire the technologies needed for continued growth inside and then switches once more to the distributive phase. China would, however, still need Japan just as Japan would need China, so it is difficult to see that this in any sense should impair their working relationship. But it would mean that the period for non-Japanese partners to the Chinese developmental exercise would come to a close — hence, they had better make their profits quickly
if this scenario is correct! It would also mean that Japan would have to tolerate a new wave of socialist rhetoric, but Japan has great talent for not letting such rhetoric interfere with business. For Japan, China is the ultimate reserve, the final buffer if the Japanese economy becomes too sluggish; the Chinese know this, and can strike good bargains with the Japanese if they want.

Conclusion: China is on a dialectic of her own, and will continue to be so. It is more complex than ours because Chinese civilization is more complex than ours and so is her history. The same might have applied to Japan, had Japan not been so small and vulnerable; it certainly would have applied to Japan had Japan been a part of China. China will continue having a dim view of the Occident, both private and state-capitalist varieties, and will continue limiting her geopolitical control to the Chinese space, roughly speaking bordered by the tundra to the north, the Gobi to the west, the Himalayas to the south and then the China Sea. The former Indochina may be a grey zone in this connection, so may Mongolia, so may Korea. However, the hypothesis entertained here is that China would encroach on neither and might also give much more autonomy to Tibet, focusing on the genuine Han peoples. What China would request, however, would be that the Soviet Union should not step up her level of influence in bordering territories, and China will always work for the reduction of Soviet influence in these areas, meaning North Viet Nam, North Korea, Mongolia, and also — more significantly — the central Asian republics of the Soviet Union (where China will probably work in her way for more local autonomy; see the corresponding point in the preceding section). It should be added, though, that the demarcation of border lines between Soviet and Chinese influence in Asia is only a part of the Sino-Soviet conflict, other parts of the total issue having such headings as "history of Soviet dominance from early 1920s till late 1950s," "different conceptions of Marxism/socialism" and "collision course in the search for allies in the third, second, and first worlds."

What would be the net consequence of all this if the dialectic continues to unfold itself as indicated here? Probably something like the goal
stated, but more "socialist" than "modern," more distribution than growth, and more so than second-world countries because of China's collectivist heritage, not her assimilation of occidental socialism. And again the same can be said: the historical situation for all of this was not ripe before; only now have all these factors come together in that particular way — where the Chinese ability to control for its own purpose the Japanese economic invasion becomes the key factor.
As a whole the first world is now a region in decline; one does not emerge unpunished from living off the rest of the world for such a long period when that rest of the world gets sufficient power to do something about it. Two good non-economic examples can actually be given of this: the reversal of the drug trade, where it is no longer Chinese youth and their parents who are poisoned after the British "opened" China for the opium trade in the last century, but the youth of the western countries; and the Sun Moon Unification Church, where it is no longer children and adolescents in the missionary fields in South America and Africa and Asia that are having their ties with their parents and their culture severed, perhaps forever, but the youngsters in the United States itself and in some of the other countries. In the colonies cultural defence was not that easy.

All of this must now be seen in the light of what has been the basis of western economy: exploitation of the internal proletariat (the working classes); exploitation of the external proletariat (the third world); exploitation of nature; and an incredibly high productivity which ultimately amounts to exploitation of the centre of the first world itself. This has been done in order to ensure the bourgeois way of life (BWL), with its emphasis on non-manual work, material comfort, privacy whether in the nuclear or the extended family, and a predictable security. And the mode of production that has ensured all of this has been the growth of bureaucracy, the growth of corporations, and the growth of intelligentsia, all of this principally staffed by MAMUs (middle-aged men with university education).

It is easily seen what the strategy of crisis will be. There is the
"brown," more or less fascist, scenario that will emphasize keeping the pillars of western supremacy from crumbling by supporting them almost at all costs. Concretely this would mean increased exploitation of the working classes through interference with trade union practices (a reversal of the process that at present may be going on in the state-capitalist countries); continued exploitation of the third world by fragmenting it; propping up military dictatorships of various political colours — intervening militarily by means of rapid deployment task forces, if necessary; continued exploitation of nature, by not heeding the warning signals and also by banning, more or less, ecological movements; and above all by stepping up productivity. The latter would be a minimum policy that could be agreed upon within the old triangle, the OECD countries, unifying the less imperialist, non-fascist social democratic North with other countries.

But in so doing it is easily forgotten that increased productivity, meaning more output of goods/bads and services/disservices per human working hour always will have to be obtained at a certain price. More particularly, the price can probably be seen in five terms:

1. A more top-heavy society, with a higher proportion of bureaucrats, capitalists (private or state), and intelligentsia as research, capital, and administration will have to substitute for labour in the production process.

2. A much higher level of unemployment, possibly disguised as compulsory leisure time through the introduction of shorter working days, shorter working weeks, shorter working months, shorter working years, and shorter working lives (the latter obtained by prolonging schooling and prolonging retirement, ultimately having the two meet in the so-called Danish solution where people are kept in universities and high schools till they are 45 and then retired). What is forgotten is that to take jobs away from human beings is to take away from them, at the same time, the possibility of self-realization through some type of participation in the productive process, even a relatively alienating one, and by making people socially useless since they do not enter the economic cycle except as the recipients of welfare and spenders of what they have
3. **Civilization disease no. 1**: mental disorders, particularly among the unemployed because of the linkage between work and mental health.

4. **Civilization disease no. 2**: cardio-vascular diseases, probably heavily stress-connected and also closely related to the kind of products that people would get in touch with, e.g., in their diets, in a society of high productivity.

5. **Civilization disease no. 3**: malignant tumours, cancers, now killing 20 per cent and being a disease for 25 per cent of the population in a country like Norway, including its position as killer no. 2 among children (no. 1 being accidents). As to the aetiology: probably also in the stress/pollution complex.

These are considerable costs, and these are prices already being paid. The relationship between them and still higher levels of productivity is probably exponential rather than linear, meaning that the higher productivity can only be recommended by people sufficiently blind to "negative externalities" of this type — in other words, economists. Consequently the process of human decline as a result of pressing for continued economic growth will probably be roughly proportionate to the access to power of economists with their particular blindness to structure, culture, history, international politics, nature, and human beings. It belongs to the picture that they might like to learn from the South-East world how to do it, a rather vain enterprise since they will not understand the civilization background anyhow and even if they did understand it would not be able to stimulate a Confucian/Buddhist/occidental ethos. Besides, SE labour productivity is low.

It is for these and similar reasons that we would classify increased productivity among the brown alternatives; but it attains, of course, a more human colour when it is unaccompanied by the other three. More interesting, however, is a counter-process in terms of the green wave. This can be seen as a complete and partial negation of the $3 \times 4 = 12$ structural elements considered above basic to the north-western construction:
1. A higher level of co-operative, communal production patterns with no distinction between labour-buyers and labour-sellers.

2. A pattern of complete coexistence with the third world, possibly combined with less interest in the third world as so much of the western interest is linked to domineering one way or the other, for instance through technical assistance practices.

3. The whole ecological movement, from which the green wave derives its name, coexistence with nature, man as a part of nature.

4. A lower level of productivity, limiting high productivity to certain well-defined sectors of society, otherwise cultivating more artisanal, highly labour- and creativity-productive forms of production. This is neither a return to the Middle Ages nor a return to the Stone Age, as it probably in many cases would go together with research intensity, for instance in the third agricultural revolution now taking place with highly sophisticated utilization of bio-energy, biomass in general, sun collectors, wind collectors, local economic cycles of a new type, and so on.

5. More manual work for the class that now has practically speaking only non-manual work.

6. Less material comfort, meaning more exposure to nature, more use of the body.

7. Less privatism, more collective life.

8. A less predictable pattern of security, for instance with changing of jobs, spouses, and places to live much more frequently.

9. Less dependency on the State, more devolution, decentralization, autonomy to local units.

10. Less dependency on capitalist production patterns, more green economy (by democracy and co-operation called the black or brown economy), more production for own consumption, for exchange, but on a non-monetary basis, or for exchange on a monetary basis but in that case in very local economic cycles.

11. Less dependence on intellectuals, more tendency to engage in self-reliant production for the understanding of one's own situation (for instance, women who prefer themselves to understand the condition of women rather than having this defined for them by men).

12. A general fight against MAMUs, the feminist movement against the
repression of women, corresponding movements for the very young and the very old and for the non-intellectuals.

Roughly speaking the green wave has such components, ranging from a fully-fledged combination of all of this in an autarchic commune to the very passive form of alternative way of life that can be found in people who actually lead a bourgeois type of life, but only with their body, not with their soul. Such people are today probably extremely many in the first world, and will possibly increase. Gradually some of them will detach themselves from BWL and enter wholly or partly into other patterns.

Will the brown or the green alternatives be stronger? An answer to a question like this cannot even be attempted unless one is willing to divide the first world into parts, and here it will be divided into southern Europe, central Europe, northern Europe with Canada, and the United States.

For southern Europe one likely scenario might be that the problem would not materialize, as this is the part of Europe that most easily could enter into co-operation with a part of the third world: the Maghrib countries stretching into west Asia. Actually this was once what the Roman Empire was about, and the Mediterranean is still there. Then, the economies are quite complementary, and all those countries might have a shared interest in keeping the superpowers out.

In central Europe (England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria) the economic crisis may certainly bite very hard, and the possibility that the brown movements will be stronger than the green cannot at all be ruled out. One horrible indicator is already there: the tendency of Christianity, when it is in economic crisis, to start burning the synagogues of the Jews — probably one of the safest indicators of economic crisis there is. An England under the Labour Party would, however, be less eager on this possibility than an England under the Conservative Party — or so it seems.
As to the northern European countries and Canada: here it looks as if there is little social basis for a really strong brown movement and also as if the green movements or wave would be so much in line with the ethos of the population that it might gain the upper hand. This would be particularly the case in the northern Scandinavian countries, perhaps a little less so in Denmark where people seem somehow not so attached to nature (but prefer to view it from a restaurant window); Canada should also be very strong in this connection.

Finally there is the United States, of which, it is felt, nothing can be said. There are very strong brown tendencies, perhaps particularly rooted in USA I (the New York/Washington/Houston/Los Angeles/San Francisco/Chicago complex) when it comes to external affairs and in USA II (the rest of the country) when it comes to internal affairs. But then there is also a very strong green wave inclination, and which one will win out seems hazardous to try to predict. It may be that Carter was the tool of USA I and Reagen the leader of USA II — we shall see.
In this case at least the actors are very clearly defined, the two pyramids headed by the two superpowers with a military alliance headed by each and some periphery countries in addition:

(North-) West
- US
- NATO
- Periphery

(North-) East
- SU
- WTO
- Periphery

The structure of the two systems has been described ad nauseam, the economic, political, and military capabilities likewise (although it would probably be wise not to believe any of the figures so frequently publicized as it would be strange if at this particular point in human history they should be unable to keep something secret from the data-gatherers); the question is what the motivations might be. And that, of course, relates to the definition of the conflict issue.

To say that the conflict issue is like the old European saying, "My brother and I agree completely, we both want Milano," is probably to misstate the issue. Each of them might like world domination in the sense of seeing their own system, let us here call them capitalism vs. socialism, prevail all over the world, but not so much that they would be willing to fight an all-out war. On the contrary, they might even believe that the wisdom of their own system is such that it will prevail by its own rationality and the progress built into the historical process. All that is needed would be to wait and see. However, this perspective would be more tenable for the Soviet Union than for the
United States as world history in recent decades shows socialism, or rather state capitalism, to be on the rise and private capitalism to be declining.  

Hence, a more correct reading of the issue would probably be something like this: the Soviet Union will intervene militarily (a) when a society is about to go socialist but needs some "outside help," and (b) to keep the process irreversible, in other words stabilize "socialism" and fight efforts to destabilize it. Analysis of Soviet behaviour after the Second World War seems to confirm this broad notion, including analysis of the places from which the Soviet Union withdrew after occupation (northern Norway, Finland, Austria, northern Iran).  

Correspondingly for the United States: if there is a chance that a country could turn "capitalist" they would do their best to help, and they would try to stabilize "capitalism," and fight its destabilization. However, given the basic trend referred to above, the Soviet Union would be on the offensive (task (a) as defined above) and the United States more on the defensive (task (b)). This might change, but so far there is nothing pointing in that direction, presumably mainly because private capitalism, advanced by western colonialism and neo-colonialism, has been such a dominant force in the world as a whole.  

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the conflict issue is located in societies in the grey zone between a clear articulation in one or the other of the two directions. An in-between society is also a society between the two pyramids, possibly to be lost by one, possibly to be gained by the other, or, equally importantly: possibly believed to be lost by one, possibly believed to be gained by the other.  

Thus, the East-West conflict is located firmly inside the development problématique, for what is this transformation about if it is not about development? One may argue what constitutes a higher level of development, but it is unarguable that this is the issue. The conflict is about type of development in third parties — which of two narrow branches of human history to take. That there should be "development"
The issue is not about a piece of land such as who should exercise authority on this or that island between Alaska and Siberia; in a sense not even over who shall exercise authority in Berlin. The issue is about what kind of socio-economic formation there should be in all these places. It is also recognized in the Final Act of Helsinki that the geographical border issue is off the agenda, but the second and third "baskets" of those negotiations were exactly about the nature of the system (under what conditions can private capitalism from the West penetrate, under what conditions can human rights conceptions from the West penetrate – two concessions to be given in return for the first "basket" concession about the status quo over the borders).

This, then, immediately raises an important problem: what if countries opt for neither private capitalism nor state capitalism, but for something else (e.g., an undefined mixture agreeable to neither, or a greater focus on green economies); and what if countries simply want to stay outside the two power blocks or pyramids? What happens if they want to have their development issues defined and their strategies developed autonomously, for their own sake, and not be treated as a pawn seen as "gained by one" and "lost by another" power block? These are the questions posed by the non-aligned movement, also showing the clear connection between non-alignment and development. But the answer to the question is found within the framework of theories of imperialism: most of these countries would have élites or counter-élites firmly tied to either of the two superpowers and in their struggle for internal change will invoke external "assistance," if for no other reason because they expect that the other side will make use of such "assistance."

But the analysis already points to what probably historically will become the major, perhaps even the only, way of ever resolving the East-West conflict: to extend the sphere of the countries who credibly declare themselves to be non-members to it. This means more than non-membership of a military alliance. It even means more than non-membership of an economic block of countries reasonably similar in economic system – just
as OECD includes the NATO countries but also some others, CMEA includes the WTO countries but also some others. What it actually means is to make it clear and credible that a society is going to choose its socio-economic formation independently of what either superpower might think of it, and defend its right to do so against any intervention of either of them. The problem with this position is that any such country would be tempted to accept superpower assistance if it is in the direction the country wants, but to reject it when it is opposed to its own will. (Let us for the sake of the argument simply assume that there is elite/masses harmony in these matters, a usually highly unlikely assumption.) But the other superpower will be present in one form or the other the moment the first superpower is, even before it appears on the scene—lest it should appear. Consequently, only very strong or big non-aligned countries, such as Yugoslavia and India, have so far managed to make their non-alignment relatively credible.

That brings us back to the real world again, where the fact is that a number of countries are tied to systems that are neither military alliances nor economic power blocks but the type of structures referred to as "capitalist imperialism" and "social imperialism" respectively. The net conclusion of what has been said in the preceding sections is that both of these systems today are in crisis; this is spelt out for the capitalist system in the sense of the old international economic order as headed by the US-EC-Japan triangle in sections I, II, and VI, and for the "socialist" system in section IV. If this is correct we are now in the interesting situation that both superpowers may be losing at the same time, simply because there is disenchantment with both systems, still seen as mutually exclusive in the sense that you cannot have them both at the same place but no longer seen as exhausting the universe of possible socio-economic formations. Third-world capitalism, for instance, with a strong public sector, will become increasingly important, if not as a world economic power.

One point in this connection might be a hypothesis about the increase of the "socialist" or state-capitalist socio-economic formation: it might have reached or be reaching its climax. It seems very difficult
today to find political leaders or groupings willing to proclaim that the Soviet socio-economic formation is the model they want to imitate. That does not mean that the US socio-economic formation stands up as a model either, except at the more private level where many people still for a long time to come will see the US as a stage that can offer them personally a better part in life (extremely few seem to perceive the Soviet Union that way). And this may be exactly what happened in Afghanistan: an effort to create some type of socialism without inclusion in the Soviet power system, a very difficult option to entertain for a small country bordering on the Soviet Union (China indeed has a border in common with the Soviet Union but is not small; Yugoslavia is small but is not bordering on the Soviet Union). The situation is not quite symmetric, however, as it is almost meaningless for a country to run its own independent capitalism. Capitalism as defined today means participation in the world capitalist system, and the country has to be an advanced capitalist power in order to do this entirely on its own premises.

To recapitulate: the assumption is not that the two superpowers are striving at all costs for world domination; the assumption might be that they are striving at all costs to retain what they have and—if possible without heavy costs incurred to themselves—to expand a little. In other words, in a socio-economic sense they are here both conceived of as defensive powers, no longer really hoping to expand their organic sphere of influence very much. At the same time the assumption is that they have great difficulties: they are "losing" countries on their own doorsteps, such as Nicaragua for the US (not quite on the doorstep, but on the other hand almost entirely lost) and Poland for the Soviet Union (not quite lost, but on the other hand entirely on the doorstep). Both of them will try to destabilize the destabilization by all methods short of intervention, and possibly even resort to military intervention. Both of them have scenarios for doing so: the destabilization of the Allende regime in Chile for the US (possibly practised successfully in Jamaica), and 30 years of experience in handling opposition in Eastern Europe for the Soviet Union, in addition to the 1956 Hungary, 1968 Czechoslovakia, and 1979
Afghanistan interventions.

But if they should prove unsuccessful they might also find it in their interest to define a second line of defence behind the socio-economic formation line: even if the other side penetrates socio-economically, it shall at least not be able to penetrate militarily. In other words: no opening to the other military block; more particularly, no weapons or prepositioning schemes; and, even more particularly, no launching sites for nuclear missiles. Thus, a new code of international behaviour might be coming up along such lines, and should probably be worked out in more detail as soon as possible.

However, there is still a considerable distance to go before the struggle over socio-economic formation inside countries, in other words the struggle for social development, becomes detached from the two power systems headed by the superpowers. The superpowers will still for a long time assume that they have not only the right, but also the duty to intervene, although it may matter to them that the number of countries in general and people in particular who think they have a mandate of that type seems to be decreasing. But, having now defined the East-West conflict as essentially a conflict over development, we are in a position to move one step further: something can be said about the extent to which the East-West conflict is an inter-conflict, or two parallel intra-conflicts. Essentially this is a question of the extent to which the two superpowers (and some of their trusted instruments) try to change the system of a society on the other side or in societies clearly committed to neither side vs. the extent to which they are mainly concerned with preventing societies in their own sphere of influence from changing. As pointed out, the two are related to each other: the "superversion" by one superpower may be a response to the subversive activity of the other; but it may also be that this way of seeing what happens is a carry-over from the inter-phase of the conflict to its present more predominantly intra-phase nature.

We are strongly suggesting that this inter/intra dimension should be seen as a continuum, not as a dichotomy, and that it might be worth an
effort at operationalization combined with some empirical studies over time to get some grasp of the process. And we are equally strongly not suggesting that this means that the conflict is less dangerous, or more amenable to solution. Particularly untractable may be a conflict that is more on the intra-side but is treated like an inter-conflict, for reasons to be spelt out below.

Let us now turn to the capability aspect of the East-West conflict: the horrendous arsenals of weapons including 60,000 nuclear bombs with an explosive power corresponding to four tons of TNT for each human being on earth.116 There are many ways of analysing this, and the call for disarmament, for a reduction of the destruction potential on either side, is more than understandable. However, it is the firm conviction of the present author that disarmament — when there is an underlying conflict, even with sporadic confrontations — will only lead to rearmament, even to an overshoot beyond the level from which disarmament was initiated; whereas, on the other hand, when there is no underlying conflict issue to speak of armament in and by itself is not that dangerous — granted that there is the possibility of technical and human error.117 On the other hand it seems equally clear that if there is an underlying confrontation then arms races tend to lead to wars,118 so from the proposition that disarmament does not necessarily lead to peace it certainly does not follow that armament leads to peace either. What follows is simply that a confrontation in a setting saturated with means of destruction is a most dangerous thing, and — more dangerous — the more arms there are that can be employed destructively. Consequently, something has to be done about it, but this something, in our view, is more on the conflict/issue side than on the armament side. This also gives some reasons for scepticism about the effectiveness of the two key arguments used against the arms race: (a) that it is tremendously costly and that the costs can be calculated as opportunity costs, for instance, reconverted to satisfaction of basic needs units (BNUs),119 the number of hospital beds, schools, human beings fed and clad and adequately sheltered, etc., and (b) that wars are tremendously destructive in terms of lives lost and destruction to man-made and non-man-made environments.120
It is felt that it is not for lack of knowledge of these relatively trivial and well-documented and deadly important facts that arms races and dangerous conflict articulation processes are a part of the contemporary scene. It may simply be that these two arguments scratch the surface and have about as much impact on the process leading to war as the argument about the opportunity costs of alcohol — not to mention detailed descriptions of the evils of alcoholism — has to the alcoholic. This is not to deny, however, that such warnings might prevent others from embarking on similar courses.

There is a third argument in this connection that should also be mentioned. It actually goes beyond the opportunity costs argument, imagining that all the natural resources, capital, human labour, and research today spent on the military systems were used for development purposes. It would take the form of an effort to spell out positive peace, an attractive alternative, so appealing that it will create a motivation to divert human and social energy from the field of potential destruction to the field of potential development.\footnote{121} The difficulty with the argument, however, is that most of those productive assets are located in the North of the world whereas the development problems are seen as located in the South. If this programme really were to be implemented, consequently, it would mean (a) a higher-than-ever penetration of North into South as it is very difficult to imagine that all of this should simply be given away, and (b) a type of development that would be highly capital- and research-intensive.\footnote{122} As this is the type of development wanted by the élites in most third-world countries the conversion argument will carry some weight with them and will be pressed in the form of UN resolutions, and also be picked up by opposition to the armament process in the North.\footnote{123} However, from the point of view of human and social development this is not necessarily an advisable course of action.\footnote{124}

More important would be to look into the processes behind the armament process, and here again it looks as if the 'arms race' metaphor is unfortunate because it is too much derived from an inter-conflict image of the situation. Again this should be seen as a continuum and not as
a dichotomy, but the important distinction made in armament theory between *actio-reactio* processes and *Eigendynamik* or *autistic* processes certainly enters the picture.\textsuperscript{125} In a sense the hypothesis was formulated by Eisenhower in 1960: the hypothesis of the military-industrial complexes (MICs). Related to this is the idea that new weapon systems do not develop so much because politicians are watching the world scene — including the armaments on the other side, ordering their military people to develop counter-strategies while they, in turn, put the research people to work — as just the opposite: the researchers in the military laboratories around the world develop new weapon systems and ask the military people to develop a strategy that can put them to use, and they in turn demand from the politicians the necessary action, including appropriations, to go ahead.\textsuperscript{126} Again, there is some truth to both causal chains here, at the same time; the problem is how the relative significance is changing over time.

Thus, we are concerned with two processes of internalizing the East-West conflict, one relating to the conflict issue itself, one relating to the capability of destruction. And this also points to two possible approaches to conflict resolution: one relating to putting brakes on the superpower tendency to intervene, both inside and outside their "sphere of influence" (but not by menacing with retaliation from the other superpower, rather through an increasingly powerful solidarity among third-block countries, the non-aligned against interventionism); the other by putting a brake on the production of weapon systems at the only place where that brake really could be meaningful, in the military laboratories.

There are three reasons why this seems more urgent now than ever before in post-Second World War history.

*First*, the changing character of the conflict issue, from inter-conflict towards intra-conflict, makes most efforts to bring the two parties to the negotiation table to regulate issues or arms races irrelevant, since that table is a part of the inter-conflict model. But old patterns of conflict behaviour persist and will continue to produce irrelevant action.
such as, for instance, bilateral disarmament conferences, even presided over by the two superpowers. In general, it might perhaps be said that the inter-conflict pattern is used to conceal and mystify the intra-conflict nature of the present situation, even to the point of making the parties less able to discover what is going on.

Second, through the current emphasis on intermediate range ballistic missiles, "theatre missiles" (SS-18 and SS-20 on the Soviet side and CRUISE and PERSHING II on the US side), Europe herself more than the two superpowers has become the most likely nuclear battlefield. Moreover, these arms are located in the grey zone between the SALT system of negotiations regulating the intercontinental ballistic missiles and the MBFR system of negotiations of regulating conventional forces. Whether deterrence in the sense of superpower disinclination to launch a war when the result could be the annihilation of its own population really worked before, or a nuclear war was avoided for some other reason, we do not know. But it seems clear that at present a much higher proportion than before of nuclear missiles would be spent on the European theatre of war, thereby cutting down on one barrier to a nuclear war between the superpowers.

Third, and related to this: presidential directives 58 and 59 (from the Carter administration last year) both seem to indicate the codification of transition in strategic thinking from use of nuclear arms to deter to use of nuclear arms to win a war, whether through first strike or not. The targeting of the weapon system of the other side and the administrative centres and points of gravity in the economic system indicated in PD 59 corresponds well to the emphasis on bunkers for the decision-making élites in PD 58; evidently one expects the other side to develop the same kind of strategy.

And at that point all we can do is to end with the following words: Should all this break loose then there is no reason to worry about the preceding six sections in this paper.
NOTES

This paper is intended to serve a double purpose in the GPID project. On the one hand, it is an input to the Militarization/Demilitarization sub-project on the topic of "Conflict Formations." This sub-project at present also deals with such additional topics as armament/disarmament, militarization/demilitarization in a more limited sense, military outcomes of present conflict, and non-military forms of conflict resolution. On the other hand, this is also an input to Working Group C, one of the three integrative efforts of the GPID project at present, as an effort to write up a set of dominant trends or processes in the present world in a reasonably coherent way.

The paper was given as a talk at several places during the fall of 1980, such as Fr. Nansen Institute Oslo; University of Tromsø; student associations in Oslo and Bergen; the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; the Development Studies Seminar at the University of Oslo, Oppland District College, Lillehammer; the Peace Research Centre, Uppsala University; Trade Union, Gothenburg; the Defence College, Oslo; Peace Research Centre, Catholic University, Nijmegen; Università di Pavia; Shell International; Nordic Industrial Design Association, Denmark; Norwegian Trade Union School; Danish Management Centre (Odense, Egelund, Copenhagen); Aula de cultura, Alicante; Centro de Estudios Superiores, Alicante; Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw; Vitakivi Centre, Tampere; Finnish Broadcasting Corporation, Helsinki; International University, Lugano; the University of the West Indies, Trinidad; and Tech. Universität, Graz. I am indebted to discussants in all these places, but the responsibility for the conclusions rests with me alone.


1. For the role of these perspectives inside the GPID Project, see Johan Galtung, "Towards Synergy in Networks of People with Networks of Problems: a Note on GPID Methodology," GPID papers, Geneva 1979.

2. A "conflict formation" is actually the same as a conflict, if the latter is defined as actors pursuing goals (or parties with interests) that are incompatible. The word "formation," however, draws more attention to the social organization of the conflict,
and particularly how it is embedded in the structural context. The "issue" is the incompatibility; a more diplomatic expression often used is "situation."

3. This, of course, has to do with the magnitude of the Soviet Union as a territory. One might also say, however, that Tsarist Russia incorporated parts of what otherwise would have been considered as the third world in a territory that later was expanded and consolidated as the Soviet Union, thereby making the relationship different because of contiguity.

4. For more on this, see "Prolegomenon II," 1981.


6. This terminology is particularly used by OECD and draws attention to certain economistic similarities in line with Rostowian thinking, but that perspective is inadequate from the vantage point chosen here.


10. For a more complete description of this type of political process, see The True Worlds, ch. 43; also see the excellent analysis by George Lakey, Strategy for a Living Revolution, Grossman, New York, 1973.


12. This is a key thesis currently developed inside the GPID Project by Herb Addo of the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad — his exploration of Eurocentrism in the thinking about imperialism. For details about how this was done see the Japanese Experience Project of the Human and Social Development Programme of the United Nations University.

13. In this connection, Japanese, in my experience, have one important characteristic in common with Jews: a tendency to denigrate their own abilities, their own achievements, lest they loom too large. This should be taken into account in evaluating Japanese self-analyses.
14. Indeed, the Sino-Japanese war over Formosa 1894-95, the attack on Korea 1910-11, the Manchurian "incident" 1931, not to mention the war in the Pacific — certainly not unprovoked — from 1941 onwards, and before that the war against Tsarist Russia 1904-05.

15. A book on GID approaches to the New International Economic Order is currently being edited by Herb Addo of the Caribbean GID Unit.


18. In short, it is definitely not an informal, "green," subsistence-type economy that the OPEC countries are interested in!

19. And this is where the real battlefront is. This is the type of system that is up against the wall in all parts of the world, as described and explored in more detail in "Prolegomenon I" and "Prolegomenon II."


21. The basic point here is that the Middle Ages should also be seen as something that declined and fell. It was a social formation in its own right — the medieval social formation (with its manorial and feudal phases) — and it declined and fell in the period, say, 1250-1350 (ending dismally with the Black Death).

22. In a sense this is nothing but the famous analogy with a card game: the game that is played is the same, or almost the same; but the distribution of the cards is different. The best cards are where they usually were not. Or, cards formerly not considered so good are now among the best!

23. That is the famous Leninist principle: the law of uneven development.

24. Probably this is to a large extent the story of the fourth world, the "minorities," the indigenous peoples, now gradually being incorporated. The GID project is searching for ways of better coming to grips with this phenomenon.

25. The reasons given below are good reasons why the South-East triangle is a strong one. But there is a deeper underlying assumption: that the world economic system organized in a capitalistic way will have to have some kind of centre: it cannot be really polycentric. This is explored to some extent in the author's "A Structural Theory of Imperialism Ten Years Later," the Millennium Lecture, London School of Economics, January 1981. Thousands, millions, of facts and acts congregate into appointing a centre which is based on the law of uneven development: by and large it has more of what is needed than is found at other places. At the same time, there is probably also a mental Gestalt at work:
a notion among sufficiently many people around the world that this type of activity is of a kind that begs the question where the centre is, and then consciously and unconsciously looks for the indicators as to where that centre is. It's a little bit like a sports competition: given the patterns of individualism and competition it would be very difficult for most people raised in that mental configuration not to feel dissatisfied, incomplete unless a clear answer is given to the question, "Who won?"

26. Corresponding saving ratios in the western world might be between 3 and 7 per cent.

27. These two countries would of course enter as rich dependencies, to be maintained adequately by the centre, the South-East triangle. Historically and culturally, racially and ethnically, they are different. I am indebted to Reginald Little, an Australian diplomat with much experience of Tokyo and Beijing, for informing me about how China and Japan may look from Australia and New Zealand, and vice versa — see his unpublished thesis, Institut universitaire d'hautes études internationales, Geneva, 1978, "Economics, Civilization and World Order."


29. One cannot say that Marxism has been absorbed into Japanese civilization.

30. In fact, it is almost surprising how little Weber has to say about workers in his famous book on the spirit of capitalism — it is as if they simply do not exist. Weber's work was a rebuttal of Marxism, or intended as one — certainly not an adequate one when the problems Marx points to are left uncovered.

31. This is explored, to some extent, in Johan Galtung, "On Human-Centred Development," paper for the G PID Human Development Study Group, Bariloche, December 1980.

32. And yet Max Weber, in his book The Religion of China, predicts towards the end of the book that capitalism will not have much of a possibility in Japan!

33. I am indebted to Professor Ungku Aziz for pointing out so clearly the importance of this particular factor during a seminar in Kuala Lumpur, September 1979.

34. Of course, a westerner with a very uncommon name might find protection, a source of solidarity, and a focus of identity in the group of people with that name. But this is hardly the case for the Smiths and the Joneses in the Anglo Saxon world, for the Hansens and Jensens in the Nordic countries, and so on.

35. It should be noted that it is in that context that the theory of alienation is developed; one more example of how culture-bound a theory may be.

36. It is very difficult to ascertain how many people in South-east
Asia in fact were collaborators with the Japanese during the occupation, but the number must be considerable. Today one can still find South-east Asians in their late middle ages singing Japanese military songs and praising the efficiency of the Japanese war machine. And what one finds above all would be the sprawling growth of the Japanese economic machine, no doubt making use of the groundwork done during the occupation. For some impressions about this, see N.I. Low, When Singapore Was Syonan-To, Singapore, 1973.

37. Both Thai and Indonesian students seem to be good at organizing ritualistic burning of Japanese cars and flags; the question is: how much real resistance to Japanese consumer goods (better than others, cheaper than others) there really is in the population. At any rate, the Japanese fear such incidents.

38. One more example of the cultural expansionism of the Occident!

39. Needless to say, this will have to be a process; it is not the kind of thing that comes about from one year to the other.

40. There is some feeling of déjà vu that might emerge when discovering that type of gadget in Mongolia, for instance (1980)!

41. It should be pointed out that this is not the same as trade between Japan and China, nor is it exactly the same as the Japanese building a factory in China, under a limited-time contract. It should rather be seen as a long-lasting partnership, as a type of transnational corporation with all kinds of transfers within the corporation and a high level of co-ordination when it comes to relationship to the outside.

42. As an example, see the article "Welche Autos kaufen die Deutschen?", Die Welt, 30 January 1981, with the following table giving in percent which brands of cars were doing better than the year before, and which were the losers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The winners (in %)</th>
<th>The losers (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mitsubishi</td>
<td>+100.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Toyota</td>
<td>+ 81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Datsun</td>
<td>+ 61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Honda</td>
<td>+ 50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mazda</td>
<td>+ 44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mercedes</td>
<td>+ 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Lada</td>
<td>-43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Leyland</td>
<td>-42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Alfa Romeo</td>
<td>-35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Volvo</td>
<td>-31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Talbot</td>
<td>-20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ford</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43. For an excellent article on that particular subject, see "Integrated Circuits Industry: How Japan Bred a Winner," by the Financial Times Far East editor in Tokyo, Charles Smith, Financial Times, 29 January 1981. The article as usual points to the excellent bureaucracy-corporation-intelligentsia-corporation in the Japanese system, and the Japanese genius for "improving on the original."

44. Just some quotes from recent articles in the western press: "Japan must alter its trade role, disillusioned US advisors agree — Japanese leaders will find that to try to continue upward mobility of their people through excessive penetration of others' markets is risky" (International Herald Tribune, 5 January 1981), and

45. It would be interesting to have a more clear view of what the Japanese role in the Trilateral Commission has been; some of that has now been analysed in Trilateralism, Holly Sklar, ed., Black Rose, Montreal, 1980. Among the Japanese members of the Executive Committee of the Trilateral was the Vice-Rector of the Human and Social Development Programme of the United Nations University, Kinhide Mushakoji, in the period 1973 to 1978.

46. The question, of course, is how well they know that. A personal experience: Giving a talk about international political economics in general and the Japanese situation in particular to the editors of a leading Japanese newspaper early in the 1970s, I concluded that there would be considerable tension in South-east Asia, and rightly so, because of the relationship that was emerging. The conclusion of the editors, and they were not right-wing, was the following: This is probably correct; Japan should for that reason rather move to Africa! But nothing lasts forever, and the south-eastern expansionism will be no exception to that rule.

47. See the paper referred to in footnote 28 above. It should be pointed out very clearly that the Japanese attitude to East and South-east Asia is very different from the attitude to the rest of the world, however — in a sense a more occidental attitude. It is not my impression that the Chinese have a corresponding trichotomy; the concept of barbarian seems to start right outside the doorsteps although there are barbarians of various shades and degrees.

48. What is being said here is that the distance between the internal sector and the external sector is greater than for the West — for these two concepts, see "Prolegomenon II" and the paper referred to in footnote 16 above. The external sector is even more remote, even less the object of empathy; and the internal sector is even more consolidated, at least potentially more an object of internal solidarity — although more in the Japanese case (Shintoism!) than in the Chinese case.

49. The paradigmatic example is the western room provided in so many Japanese homes: a room with western furniture in which westerners are received — so far, but no further!

50. In this there is something corresponding to another famous case in US history: the contradiction between norms of equality and mobility and the practice of prejudice and discrimination against non-whites. Gunnar Myrdal referred to this as an American Dilemma; this is likely to become an American Dilemma II. One may also recall the history of the famous Navigation Act in British history.

51. It should be remembered that for the state-capitalist countries the Marxist blind spot still applies: the enemy is private capitalism in its international formations, capitalist imperialism; it has its centre in the north Atlantic area; this is the one to be beaten, not something emerging from a non-white, non-occidental
corner at the other end of the world. The model for the North-East is in the North-West, not in the South-East! It's with the North-West one has to "catch up," even overtake. That this job may become considerably more easy because of the way in which the North-West is being shaken by the emerging South-East will create tremendous problems ideologically, politically, psychologically. The radical/ethnic dimension of these problems should not be underestimated either.

52. Trade figures are under collection, but it is not always easy to get the information from Japanese organizations due to the fact I mentioned in footnote 13 above.

53. It is possible that the US government might have that type of leverage on their own peoples: in times of crisis that particular country has a tremendous ability to respond collectively. The same might apply to the British. But will it apply to the French, to the Italians? Will they forego some individual advantage just because the government tries to persuade them to buy home-made cars?

54. Thus, it is my contention that what today looks like some kind of working triangle, the US-China-Japan connection, in fact is a very weak one. The US would do well not to underestimate the kind of wound left on the Japanese soul by the war, what happened before it, and its aftermath—and particularly the nuclear genocides in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the racial overtone of that particular act.

55. Of course, it is not wise of a country to use such expressions about itself, nor to refer to the US President as "the most powerful person on earth." The contradiction between such expressions and the reality during, for instance, the hostage crisis with Iran, becomes only too tangible.

56. See the article referred to in footnote 5 above, and The True Worlds, ch. 64, particularly page 292.

57. Actually, much less than this is needed. There is the famous joke about the telephone number in Moscow to call if intervention is needed: 56-68-79 (for Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan interventions respectively). The intervals are actually 12 and 11 years respectively, and they have been highly sufficient to maintain the East-West conflict. Of course, that conflict also has other roots!


59. This is discussed in some detail in Johan Galtung, "Poor Countries versus Rich; Poor People versus Rich — Whom Will the NIEO Benefit?" part 2 of Towards Self-reliance and Global Interdependence, Canadian International Development Agency, Ottawa, 1978.

60. This type of analysis is particularly developed by Irma Adelman; see her contribution to George Aseniero, ed., Alternative Strategies for Development, GPID/UNU, 1981: "Redistribution
Before Growth.'

61. This inclination to call general attention to the time order of development strategies is a key point in Irma Adelman's analysis (see the preceding footnote); also developed in Johan Galtung, "Weakening the Strong and Strengthening the Weak," in George Aseniero, ed., Alternative Strategies for Development.


63. The cosmology approach adopted in the paper referred to in footnote 28 above is precisely an effort to try to trace systematically relations between religious conceptualizations and highly concrete politics.

64. Strictly speaking this is not quite correct. In a setting of western imperialisms, combining economic penetration with political, military, cultural, and structural aspects, the Japanese penetration stands out precisely because it is so single-mindedly economic. It is "one-legged imperialism" as opposed to "five-legged imperialism," and in a company of five-legged entities the one-legged one becomes highly conspicuous in spite of the fact that its imperialism is so curtailed. Thus, the Japanese will never forget, it seems, the expressions so popular in the 1960s referring to Japan as an "economic animal" and to the Prime Minister as a "transistor salesman" (attributed to de Gaulle).

65. The last two points, of course, may have some significance for the future of China and Japan.

66. In the Caribbean this is already relatively clear: the Shango cult, the interest in Macumba, Voodoo, etc., and in a certain sense also the Rastafarian movement.


68. This is a key point to be explored within the GPID project: the search for new institutions at both the intra-state and the inter-state levels more capable of handling the problems of our poor world.

69. However, looking at the data in footnote 42 it is quite clear that the Soviet Fiat, Lada, is loser no. 1, and certainly for the same reason located in the south-eastern triangle. The explanation given in the article is "Qualitätsprobleme."

70. See the chapter by Silviu Brucan in the book by George Aseniero, ed., referred to above, "A Strategy for Eastern Europe."

71. For something more about this see Johan Galtung, "On the Future of the Eastern European Social Formation," paper prepared for the Visions of Desirable Societies sub-project, Mexico, April 1981.

72. On the other hand, if productivity is increased it is probably because of more capital- and research-intensive forms of production; and that technology is, in turn, likely to come from
the West. In other words, it looks like these countries will lose either way as long as that particular game is being played. It is also interesting to note how this type of thinking drives a wedge between the technocratic and partocratic élites in these parties and the people in general who do not reason in terms of servicing national debts, increasing productivity, and so on, but in terms of their own level of living.

73. For more on this see Johan Galtung, "Is a Socialist Revolution under State Capitalism Possible?" Journal of Peace Research, 1980, pp. 281-290. Also, see the collection of documents made available by Jan Danecki from the GPID Polish Unit on the Polish situation.

74. But not necessarily for the reasons indicated by the late Amalrik in his famous book Will the Soviet Union Survive 1984?, Harper and Row, 1970. Relations with China are key factors: the direction of analysis taken here is more internal, based on characteristics of the system itself.


76. It should be pointed out that this is not the convergency thesis. That thesis has as its major point that the countries in East and West, state capitalist and private capitalist, will become increasingly similar. While I do believe that countries having the bourgeois way of life as the major goal for the citizens and technocracy (with more or less developed elements of partocracy) as the major structural elements in obtaining these goals (see "Prolegomenon II") will tend to develop the same kinds of phenomena in general and problems in particular, the countries in East and West are so out of phase with each other that exactly for this reason they may sometimes converge, sometimes diverge. Thus, the problems with overdeveloped countries have only just about started biting in the East, whereas in the West the youth are already working for basic change — making for divergence, rather than convergence.

77. This factor, simply to be in it, be with it, should not be underestimated, and it is hardly ever taken into account in development theory.

78. For more details of this, see Johan Galtung, "Is There a Chinese Strategy of Development?" in George Aseniero, ed., op. cit.

79. The concrete manifestation of that ethos may actually come in the next period which might even have the opposite ethos: the results of the economism of the Great Leap Forward may be showing up in the Cultural Revolution period when the dominant theme is "Politics in Command"; the result of that might well show up in the second great leap forward, the period China is currently in, with people pressing demands more strongly.

80. What happened here was evidently a very non-Chinese, even anti-Chinese thing: a disrespect for the additivity of civilizational
elements! Mao himself was a much better Chinese than his wife, or so it seems: his writings are filled with references to the old masters, to the Chinese tradition.

81. It should be noted that this is in line with the predictions for the third world in general: a revival of fundamentalist orientations (the word "religion" cannot be used about Confucianism and Shintoism; it may also be doubtful whether it can be used about Taoism and Buddhism).

82. While racially related to China (the "Mongolian race") they are culturally different. All five republics, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizia, and Kazakhstan, are Muslim. Today every fifth Soviet citizen, almost, is Muslim; with the population growth they may amount to 100 million by the year 2000.

83. This is developed to some extent in Johan Galtung and Fumiko Nishimura, Learning from the Chinese People, Oslo, 1975 (in Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and German editions), ch. 6.

84. When discussing this with Chinese officials the response is usually the same as in Eastern Europe: that time we were weak; now we are strong, and we can control such factors. This may prove to be an underestimation of the penetrating power of the capitalist system.

85. The first opium war was Britain-China (1839-42), the second Britain and France against China (1856-60). The British had started smuggling opium grown in India into China already at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

86. I am indebted to Ali Mazrui for pointing this out during the Lisbon meeting (July 1980) of the World Order Models Project.

87. An excellent book in this connection is How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, by the late (political murder 1980) Walter Rodney (Bogle L'OUverture, London, 1972); because it also develops the cultural aspects.

88. This theme is developed in some detail in "Prolegomenon II," and in the paper by Johan Galtung, "Expansion/Exploitation Processes: A Multi-dimensional View," GPIID Expansion/Exploitation and Autonomy/Liberation sub-project meeting, Trinidad, January 1981. Also see "Prolegomenon I," 1981.

89. See "Prolegomenon II" for more about this.

90. In a sense we are already in the process depicted by John Maynard Keynes in his famous essay "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren," from Essays in Persuasion, Macmillan, London, 1931, pp. 358-373. The only problem is that Keynes failed to take into account the negative aspects of the future he depicted so brightly!

91. Thus, all of these five points are already on the top of the list of social concerns, if not of governments, at least of broad popular movements in the most "advanced" industrialized countries.

92. A statement like this might sound hostile to economists, and that is also the intention. But it should be pointed out that this
refers not necessarily to economics as an academic discipline: a
certain one-sidedness may be necessary for the type of scientific
approach pursued in the Occident (itself a subject of critique,
though). It is when such people have political power that they
become dangerous. On the other hand, economists who have realized
this and gotten out of their predicament can become extremely
valuable social critics in their position as "former economists."

93. It should be noted how this particular list of blind spots covers
the four types of exploitation and the five problems with high
productivity.

94. See the paper by Monica Wemegah and Dag Poleszynski, "The Green
Wave," in Sicinski/Wemegah, eds., Alternative Ways of Life in
Contemporary Europe, spring 1981.

95. The inclusion of Austria and Switzerland in this category can be
criticized. The reason for their inclusion is the high level of
involvement in the central European economy, making them vulnerable.
On the other hand, these are smaller countries and even the
Austrian vision of grandeur now seems to be something of the past;
they are also countries with strong democratic traditions when not
interfered with. It should also be noted that both of them are
parties to the economic organization for the periphery of Western
Europe, EFTA, with headquarters in Geneva. A dormant organization
that might become more relevant in case of a deepening of an
economic crisis?

96. Such actions took place, conspicuously, in France and Germany at
the end of 1980.

97. I am thinking of the publications from the International Institute
of Strategic Studies in London, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency in Washington, the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute in Stockholm, and so on.

98. See the paper by Mihai Botez and Mariana Celac, "Global Modelling
... without Models? Theory, Methodology, and Rhetoric in World
Modelling" (HSDRGP1D-51/UNUP-258), 1981.

99. This, of course, in no sense means that Soviet pressure on
neighbouring countries and direct intervention should not be seen
as expressions of social imperialism. In the days right after
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia I had the occasion to
discuss precisely this with the late Hungarian Marxist philosopher,
G. Lukács, who was deeply upset by the invasion. To him this was
a profoundly anti-Marxist approach because it was anti-dialectical.
Contradictions within a given unit, in this case Czech society,
would have to work themselves out and be solved or surpassed within
that unit itself — and this is precisely the Chinese argument in
connection with social imperialism.

100. "The idea of progress" is among the many themes shared by Marxism
and liberalism. See Johan Galtung, "Two Ways of Being Western:
Some Similarities between Marxism and Liberalism," Papers, Chair
in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.

101. See "Europe: Bi-solar, Bi-centric, or Co-operative?" and "European

102. See, for instance, the book by Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana, Frances Pinter, London, 1980. The book deals with "how demands are aggregated in the world's largest, most comprehensive diplomatic organization outside the United Nations" — in other words a rather important organization!

103. And that is world history after the Second World War: one side calls in one superpower as governmental advisers, to establish bases, to have forces permanently stationed in the country; the political opposition calls on the second superpower to bring in weapons and agents, secret services, large-scale smuggling of arms and subversive know-how in general, and so on. The consequences are the "local wars" of István Kende (see "Prolegomenon I").

104. The others are either very weak, or not very non-aligned! It should also be noted that the third founding country, Egypt under Nasser, now seems to interpret non-alignment as an oscillation between alignment now to one, now to the other side.


106. This point is only true if expansionism is seen as inherent in capitalism. The problem of whether capitalism makes sense without an expansionist ethos and process is being explored in the GPID project.

107. Taghi Farvar has been exploring Nicaraguan development strategies within the GPID project on Strategies.

108. See the collection of papers made available by Jan Danecki to the GPID project.

109. This is the major topic of the article referred to in footnote 73 above. It gives some reasons why the Soviet Union would be tempted to intervene, and a number of reasons why it should/would not. By the time of writing the latter seemed by and large to outweigh the former.

110. That there was US intervention in Jamaica in the usual form of economic sticks to Manley and economic carrots to Seaga before the elections of 30 October 1980 is obvious. Whether it went beyond that is less obvious. The consensus in the region among political observers seems also to be that Manley would have lost anyhow because he never was able to get on top of the Jamaican pattern of violence, and also was less than successful in economic management (GPID meeting no. 48, Trinidad, 16-19 January 1981).

111. This is the system currently being developed for Norway and Denmark, the northern flank of the NATO system.

112. One is thinking of the "modernization," the TNF, the 572 missiles
for Italy, Germany, and Britain, and — with hesitation — Netherlands and Belgium.

113. The Monroe and the Brezhnev doctrines for the western hemisphere and the "socialist countries" respectively have exactly this point built into them. See the comparison between the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 by the United States and that of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet Union in Johan Galtung, "Big Powers and the World Feudal Structure," Essays in Peace Research, vol. 4, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1980.

114. I apologise for this neologism in English, but if there is a word — subversion — for what is done from below in order to manipulate a structure, then there should also be a word for what is done from above, and "superversion" might be just as good as any. Or could it be that the English language is biased in favour of the status quo?

115. In other words, if a conflict formation presupposes actors and an issue, then it might simply be that one just has the actors and no longer a real issue! One way of looking at the last 15 years or so of East-West system history would be to say that in the period from when de Gaulle really launched détente in the mid-sixties till the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975, there was not much of an issue left — see the articles referred to in footnote 101 above. But after that something happened — in my analysis, very serious strains inside the two pyramids started developing. As if this were an inter-actor conflict issues had to be found, and they were found. We are in that phase now. For the sake of systematics let it only be added that there is also such a thing as a conflict formation only with issues, not with actors: this is a contradiction, or a latent conflict where the actors have not yet crystallized with their goals. (Hence, one should rather talk about parties with interests.)

116. Figures given by the director of SIPRI, Frank Barnaby, at a hearing in Copenhagen, September 1980.

117. This is developed in some detail in The True Worlds, ch. 5, particularly 5.4.


119. As an example of this type of analysis consider the following from Women and Technology in the Industrialized Countries, by Maria Bergom-Larsson, UNITAR, New York, 1979, p. 19:

With only 5 percent of the world's annual military budget:
- all the children in the underdeveloped countries could be vaccinated against the most common diseases;
- 700 million people could get instruction in writing and reading;
- great portions of the third world could get preventive health care;
- 500 million people could get enough land to support them-
selves;
- 300 million people living in the slums today could get new housing;
- 200 million under- and malnourished children could get extra food ratios;
- 60 million pregnant women suffering from undernourishment could be helped;
- 100 million more children could be sent to school;
- everybody could have pure water by 1990.
All this for only 5 percent of the world's annual military appropriation. In order to make the problem even more concrete, Thorsson demonstrates that one nuclear submarine costs as much as it costs to keep alive 16 million children under one year of age.

120. This destruction, incidentally, lasts long after the war is over. Thus, UNITAR in co-operation with Institut universitaire d'hautes études internationales in Geneva and Institut diplomatique in Tripoli is organizing a conference in Libya on war residues: "Alors que les pays européens sont parvenus à débarrasser leur territoire de ces reliquats, des pays en voie de développement d'Afrique et d'Asie sont encore affectés par ce problème. Les mines, les bombes et autres explosifs encombrent toujours leur sol et, partant, constituent un grave danger pour les êtres humains, gênent le développement du pays et entravent l'utilisation des ressources naturelles. Ce phénomène s'est largement manifesté en Afrique du Nord. La Libye a été choisie comme exemple pour étudier ce problème" (memo, January 1981).

121. Peace research has not been good at this, at least not so far. One reason may be that this type of thinking has been developed further in development studies for the low-income countries and future studies for the high-income countries, thereby creating a division in three transdisciplinary research activities (peace, development, future) that actually should go hand in hand.

122. Exactly why and how is developed in some detail in Johan Galtung, Development, Environment and Technology, UNCTAD, Geneva, 1979 - an effort to analyse impacts of different technological styles.

123. In short, this will on the world scene look like a progressive movement.

124. But these arguments will tend not to be forthcoming, partly because it takes some time before these implications become clear, and mainly because they will be used, or be seen as usable, by the proponents of continued military growth.

125. This way of thinking, of course, is associated with the excellent work by the leading German peace researcher, Dieter Senghaas.

126. In short: weapons in search of strategy rather than strategy in search of weapons. This puts a major source of the dynamism of the arms races in the research laboratories, with the researchers and the think tanks.

127. Hence, one obvious strategy would be simply to cut the super-
powers out of such conferences, even more so as they seem to do it themselves anyhow in their bilateral SALT negotiations and other processes. To have them in, even as co-presidents, is the joke of the century; unfortunately a rather bad one (Silviu Brucan in the hearing referred to in footnote 116 above).