KAMPUCHEA, VIET NAM, CHINA:
OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS

Andre Gunder Frank

Department of Development Studies
University of East Anglia
Norwich
United Kingdom
AUTHOR'S NOTE

These observations and reflections were sparked by the debate launched by our Japanese socialist friends in AMPO (Vol. II, No. 1, 1979) and their invitation to continue the discussion. One occasion to pursue the discussion was an evening in March 1980 in New Delhi among a dozen participants and the following day between one of them, my friend Kitazawa Yoko from AMPO and myself. These observations and reflections draw on these discussions to extend them, but the sole responsibility for the present formulations and especially for any errors, rests with the present writer.

This paper by Andre Gunder Frank was first presented at the Expansion/Exploitation and Autonomy/Liberation Processes II Sub-project Meeting, Starnberg, West Germany, June 1980. It can be considered a contribution to that sub-project of the GPID Project.

This paper is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate dialogue on the subject at this stage of the research.
CONTENTS

Introduction 1
I. Kampuchea 3
II. Viet Nam 7
III. China 11
IV. Possible Implications for Marxism and Socialism 16
INTRODUCTION

The events of 1979 in and between Kampuchea, Viet Nam, and China oblige socialists to undertake an agonizing reappraisal. This reappraisal must follow those previously associated with the Soviet Union and occasioned by the events of the 1920s before and after the death of Lenin; Stalin's purges and his pact with Hitler in the 1930s and 1940s as well as the subsequent revelations of Khrushchev's secret speech; and the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.* Indeed, though these reappraisals have been made by previous generations of socialists, there may be occasion now to make them again for the present one — and perhaps also to extend them further back to the theory and praxis of revolutionaries and reformists in the first two decades of the century and maybe even to go back and re-examine the theory of Marx himself. In the present essay, however, I limit myself to some observations and reflections about the most recent challenges to the ideals of socialists and to the socialism of the future, which have been posed in — and between — precisely those countries in which there had been a deliberate and concerted attempt to avoid the errors of the past and to transcend the shortcomings of the previous roads to socialism in the Soviet Union and Europe.

* The present reappraisal may be more difficult, however, for several reasons. The events of the 1920s have then and now been rationalized as the unique exigencies of the unique first break with capitalism in a hostile world. The purges and denunciations by Stalin were often attributed to his partly defensive actions and have also been hopefully regarded as dead and buried with their author. The urgency of the reappraisal of the Hitler-Stalin Pact was removed by the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The recent events in and mutual invasions by socialist states in Asia not only pose a renewed and additional challenge but seem to foreclose further easy rationalisations or escapes from the agony of a real reappraisal — perhaps also of the earlier events.
The obligation of committed socialists to submit the theory and praxis of socialism to an agonizing reappraisal in the light of the experience in and between Kampuchea, Viet Nam, and China is all the more necessary and perhaps all the more painful precisely because much of this experience had been offered and received as a more hopeful new beginning. Moreover, socialists are now faced with the difficult task of charting a course between the Scylla of another failure to draw any lessons from experience and the Charybdis of following in the footsteps toward reactionary anti-communism of those who drew the wrong lessons during the last Cold War — especially now that the threat of another Cold War is upon us. To elude our responsibility as responsible socialists in this reappraisal and to permit the new cold warriors to make it for us would be to do the cause of socialism yet another disservice.

In this spirit, the following lines are an attempt to set out some substantially (and unfortunately) incontrovertible observations about recent events in Kampuchea, Viet Nam, and China and to reflect on some of their major immediate implications for socialist theory and praxis. Although all these events, observations, and reflections are connected to each other, for the sake of simplicity and clarity I shall try to take them ad seriatim, beginning with Kampuchea, going on to Viet Nam, and ending with China. My purpose is in no wise to say any final word on anything but rather to incite to further reflection. For this purpose, perhaps the more provocative the following reflections are the better.
Kampuchean Observations

A number of factual observations may be made over and above the acrimonious debate about the merits and demerits of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. The country suffered the highest concentration of physically destructive bombing and socially destructive dislocation—including particularly that of the rural population to the capital city, Phnom Penh—during the war from 1970 to 1975. The new Kampuchean Communist Party later headed by Pol Pot had been founded or redirected as recently as 1960 and was built in an extremely nationalistic and culturally self-conscious milieu of Kampuchean society. Until the Lon Nol coup in 1970, the Kampuchean Communist Party combated an indigenous and nationalist regime, which under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk subjected the party to severe oppression and terror. Accordingly, the Kampuchean Communist Party—unlike the Vietnamese one, which collaborated with Sihanouk—adopted a strongly anti-ruling-class line. For this and other reasons, the Kampuchean party was independent from and in many respects even in opposition to other Communist parties, especially those of the Soviet Union, China, and particularly Viet Nam, all of which had already sacrificed the Kampuchean party's interests to their own before 1975. Kampuchean national and socialist interests had been particularly sacrificed by the Vietnamese Communist Party in the Paris Agreement of 1954-1955 and in connection with the 1968 Tet offensive. Upon achieving victory substantially through its own efforts and sacrifices (although of course in the context of the war elsewhere in Indo-China) the young party faced unprecedented tasks of assuring the economic survival of the population in the face of imminent starvation and the political survival of the revolution in the face of
hostility from its internal and external enemies and to some extent
even from its external allies. The evacuation of Phnom Penh, the
dispersal of politically unreliable elements into the countryside, and
the reorganization of an agricultural society were attempts to face and
solve all these economic, political, social, and cultural problems in
one fell swoop in 1975, although according to Heder this move was
already planned in 1971 or 1973 and foreshadowed in the areas liberated
before 1975.

Socialists, and increasingly others as well, have called for self-
reliance and independence, particularly in agrarian third-world
societies. The Kampucheans practised what others preached to a degree
hitherto unknown - going so far as to abolish money - in an attempt to
build a new self-reliant society that went beyond anything tried in
Tanzania, North Korea, or China. A radically independent social
programme of popular mobilization seemed appropriate in a poor and
sparsely settled but fertile country in which foreign entanglements
had brought little local advantage in the past and promised less for
the future.

Moreover, the attempt seemed at first to succeed: the population was
fed against all odds, and the circumstantially perhaps inevitable
initial political repression soon subsided after the evacuation of the
capital city in 1975. (The hostile anti-Cambodian propaganda about
mass exterminations in 1975-1976, based on hand-me-down false eye-
witnes accounts, was soon shown to be mostly that for all those who
honestly wished to see. However, Stephen Heder has documented some
then still selective liquidation of cadres by the Pol Pot group.) In
a word, Kampuchea seemed to have taken a giant radical step towards
the construction of a juster, socialist, and one day communist society
for a poor but proud people.

Subsequent developments and revelations have, however, destroyed and
disqualified this Kampuchean experiment on the road to socialism and
communism. This most independent grassroots Communist Party of Kampuchea
turned out in 1977 and 1978 to have constructed an extremely stratified
society with high degrees of privilege for "good" Kampucheans and extreme forms of sacrifice for "bad" ones. Apparently to make this distinction and division possible, there was a resurgence or renewal of repression in 1977-1978 far in excess of the previous one in 1975, and the new repression was an expression of intra-party and inter-regional conflicts which the Pol Pot group resolved through the physical elimination of its rivals and their followers. Moreover, the Kampuchean regime launched increasingly aggressive attacks against the Vietnamese, in part to recover the Parrot's Beak and other territory from which the Vietnamese had refused to be dislodged since they occupied it along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In part these attacks also emerged from its domestic policies in Kampuchea, which also required a nationalist cover or at least credential. Additionally, Kampuchea became a cat's-paw for China's anti-Viet Nam policy (which we shall examine below). After the Vietnamese ousted the Pol Pot regime, its spokesmen such as Ieng Sary offered to ally themselves with any Kampuchean and foreign political forces, no matter how reactionary or imperialist, as long as they were anti-Vietnamese. In the meantime, this apparently most determined socialist and supposedly most sanguinary repressive Kampuchean government has suddenly gained the diplomatic support of the United States, Western Europe, and Thailand for its anti-Vietnamese — and by extension anti-Soviet — credentials.

**Reflections on Kampuchea**

Why did the dream of small-can-be-beautiful socialism in an agrarian society turn rapidly into the nightmare of the abuse of power, especially during the Pol Pot regime's last year? Why did an apparently or supposedly grassroots peasant Communist Party desire or have to resort to the physical liquidation of its dissidents in intra-party disputes or power struggles, and why did the dominant and domineering party group resort to mass extermination of the population in the regions where party and other opponents had some strength? Why did an independent and nationalist party exaggerate these qualities to the point of refusing all consultation with its neighbours and then turning on one of them through armed action? Why did the defence of supposedly
national and popular Kampuchean interests require the negation and combating of all proposals of regional economic, social, and political co-operation? In short, what are the implications of the Kampuchean experience for widely espoused small-is-beautiful self-reliance and for (or combined with) militant socialist mass mobilization against class enemies and for economic and social reconstruction?
II. VIET NAM

Viet Nam Observations

The Vietnamese fought a long and heroic war of liberation that was widely regarded as a battle of David against Goliath. The embattled Vietnamese aroused world-wide sympathy and often active support for Viet Nam, national liberation, and socialism (in that order of popularity). Indeed, much of the wave of "third worldism" and of a whole new generation's sympathy for socialism and interest in Marxism in both developed and underdeveloped capitalist countries around the world may be attributed to the force of the Vietnamese example. The Vietnamese overcame the most incredible odds in combating the most powerful enemy on earth; they resisted repeated pressures from both of their principal allies and arms suppliers to compromise with their enemies on terms other than their own. Yet at the same time the Vietnamese demanded several times that the Kampuchean Communists compromise with their own government. The Vietnamese sought good relations especially with Prince Sihanouk to further their own struggle by using what the Americans called the Ho Chi Minh trail and Cambodian sanctuary for the Tet offensive in 1968, but have refused to be dislodged from some of this territory since then. After their victory in 1975, the Vietnamese proceeded to reunify their country as they had promised.

As soon as the Vietnamese had driven the Americans out militarily in April 1975, they pleaded with the Americans to return diplomatically and economically with aid and trade as well as investment in offshore oil. As quid pro quo to the Americans and also for their own regional purposes, the Vietnamese assiduously toured South-East Asia to assure
their neighbours' governments of Viet Nam's friendly intentions for peace and trade. Accordingly, the same Vietnamese who had benefited from so many foreign arms in their own liberation struggle now denied any of their huge stock of arms to other liberation movements, whom the Vietnamese effectively abandoned to their fate. On the other hand, the Vietnamese have been intent on creating an "Indo-chinese Federation" under their own tutelage; and they have interpreted their own and others economic interests to be served by a regional collaboration and division of labour, including eventually an international Mekong River basin scheme, which would impose economic sacrifices on the Khmer and others that these peoples apparently do not regard as equally beneficial to themselves. Only after — and probably because of — the steadfast refusal of the Americans to respond to Vietnamese overtures and to support these plans did the Vietnamese turn in desperation to the Soviet Union in search of help for economic reconstruction and political protection against China. Also, only then did the Vietnamese throw further fuel on their long-burning disputes with their now Chinese-supported neighbours in Kampuchea.

Domestically, in the meantime, the Vietnamese first proceeded to reunify their country as they had promised. Despite the inheritance of countless active collaborators from the Thieu regime in the south of the country, the new government proved to be extremely lenient and generous in treating even its most implacable internal enemies. The worst fate anybody met was a re-education camp, which never gave Viet Nam's enemies any occasion for serious complaint or denunciation. After three years of severe shortages, due in part to two successive years of the worst climatological conditions in a long time, the Vietnamese went on to nationalize the network of food wholesalers in Ho Chi Minh City who had been using their monopoly power to speculate with food prices. The measure was a logical and necessary step in the socialization of the economy and the society, but its negative effects were concentrated in the Cholon area of the city among the middlemen of predominantly Chinese origin. These people reacted, and made up some 80 per cent of the "boat people," many of whom had amassed the wherewithal to pay the equivalent of US$3,000 in gold to pay for their
passage. Simultaneously, however, ethnic Chinese peasants and fishermen from the north began a mass exodus across the border into China. The Vietnamese Communist Party and the army also purged their militants of ethnic Chinese origin from the base through the middle ranks and all the way up to the central committee of the party and the senior officers of the army. A member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Viet Nam defected to China and denounced the Vietnamese for racial discrimination and persecution. In the south of the country, the NLF cadres who had fought against the Americans and Thieu to reunite their country with the north seem to have been systematically removed from almost all place and authority in the new civil and political administration and have been replaced by party functionaries who were brought from the north, wherever they may have been born.

The growing dispute with Kampuchea and the latter's incursions in territories belonging to or claimed by Viet Nam threatened this process of economic, social, and political transformation in the south. In part for this reason, the Vietnamese availed themselves of Kampucheans who had been in Viet Nam since the days of the Indochinese Communist Party (before the organization of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia itself) and invaded Kampuchea in order to force a change in its government. The Vietnamese army and these Kampuchean contingents were able in a lightning campaign to drive the Pol Pot government out of Phnom Penh and to replace it with a client government of their own. The Vietnamese and their Kampuchean allies have, however, been unable to eliminate the Khmer Rouge forces from Kampuchea despite more than a year's efforts by 100,000 to 200,000 Vietnamese occupation troops, and the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh is still regarded as completely unviable without the Vietnamese presence and support.

Reflections on Viet Nam

What kind of international socialism or socialist internationalism in Viet Nam, which received widespread international support for its avowedly socialist programme, is it that pursues its national interests
under the guise of constructing an Indochinese Federation at the economic and political cost of the Kampucheans and even of non-ethnic Vietnamese in Viet Nam and in the Vietnamese Communist Party itself? Why should socialist expansion in the south and socialist construction throughout Viet Nam require discriminatory if not arbitrary measures against non-ethnic Vietnamese and especially Hoa people at home? How does the construction of socialism also permit or require attempts to reconstitute the most far-reaching economic ties with international capitalism in general and – albeit unsuccessfully – with the United States in particular? Why should these ties include World Bank and IMF membership, 100 per cent foreign equity foreign investment codes, and the low-wage, labour-intensive manufacturing and agribusiness export drives that are usually associated with the most dependent capitalist underdevelopment? In short, what is the long-term socialist programme and perspective now offered by Viet Nam's national liberation, or is the long armed struggle for national liberation in Viet Nam no more than the national liberation from political imperialism to pursue nationalism in a capitalist world?
III. CHINA

China Observations

The Chinese socialist revolution appeared as a world-shaking event of the greatest historical significance if only because it occurred in the oldest millennial civilization among the world's most populous people. Moreover, the Chinese revolution was carried through in and by a predominantly peasant people by methods that differed in significant respects from those taught by Marx and Marxists and in direct contravention to the desires and counsels of the world's first socialist state in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Chinese revolutionary leadership deliberately and explicitly sought to avoid and overcome the mistakes and shortcomings of the first socialist revolution in the Soviet Union, which therefore soon abandoned China to its own designs. Organized oppression and terror by a privileged party and/or a bureaucratic state were to be avoided, while the mass line and self-reliance were enshrined as the guiding mottoes of the society. The Cultural Revolution was supposed to safeguard the gains of the revolution and the new generation and to prevent China from deviating back onto the capitalist road.

However, the Cultural Revolution — and therewith the continued advance to higher forms of socialism — was roundly defeated (or called off by the People's Liberation Army with the possible approval of Chairman Mao himself) at the latest by September 1971, when Lin Biao went to his death on his flight to Mongolia. Since then, the direction of domestic and foreign policy has become increasingly reactionary, the survival of Mao and the supposed continuation of the Maoist line by the "Gang of Four" until 1976 notwithstanding. Zhou Enlai's and Mao's invitation
to President Nixon and his friendly reception in Peking in 1972 while the United States was escalating its bombing offensive against Viet Nam set the tone for a uniformly reactionary Chinese foreign policy. This policy went from unswerving support for Pakistan in the war against Bangladesh and India and opposition to the JVP rebellion in Ceylon in 1971 through continuing support for Mobutu in Zaire, Holden Roberto in Angola, Pinochet in Chile, etc. Chinese policy involved ostentatious well-wishing to the most reactionary dictators and statesmen around the world, from President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda in the Philippines to Tory prime ministers Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher in Britain and the anti-Soviet hawks Franz Joseph Strauss in Germany and James Schlesinger in the USA. Everywhere the Chinese policy has been that the enemy of my (Soviet) enemy is my friend or at least, as a Chinese friend readily admitted, my ally and associate. China began doing all it could to help the United States maintain a political and military presence in the Pacific Asian area, and China ended up de facto with an outright alliance with Washington and Tokyo. This same foreign policy line has remained unaltered, except for its reinforcement, all the way through the 1970s, irrespective of the apparent zigzags in domestic policy and independently of Mao's or anybody else's presence or absence at the helm.

A significant Chinese effort has been to isolate Viet Nam. China made territorial claims to offshore islands against Viet Nam. China presented the United States with the choice of a rapprochement with itself or a settlement with Viet Nam. China supported and encouraged Kampuchea, not because it liked Khmer Rouge domestic policies (it did not) but only because China wanted to use Kampuchea for the pursuit of its policy against Viet Nam and the Soviet Union. China suddenly cut off its aid to Viet Nam as the Soviet Union had to China 20 years before. China engaged in anti-Vietnamese propaganda outside and inside Viet Nam. China supported the ethnic Chinese in Viet Nam in the name of nationalism and against all principles of socialism. Finally, China invaded Viet Nam "to teach it a lesson."

At first sight this invariability of Chinese foreign policy seemed to
be at variance with the frequent changes in the direction of domestic policy. Upon further inspection, however, all the changes in direction have invariably had a major characteristic in common: they have all been decided at the top, from the beginning and end of the Great Leap and the hundred flowers in 1956, through the beginning and end of the Cultural Revolution, to the displacement of Deng Xiaoping by the Gang of Four and the elimination in turn of the latter by Hua Guofeng and the second return of Deng. However widespread mass participation may be in day-to-day decision making at the base of Chinese society, the mass line has never been implemented to and at — as distinct from by — the top of the Chinese political system. None of the major decisions about and changes in political line seems ever to have been made with, let alone through, mass participation. To the extent that the masses have been mobilized in recent years in support of major political options, this mobilization in Beijing's Tien An Men Square or in Shanghai seem to have occurred as readily for Deng Xiaoping and his policies as against them, as quickly for the Gang of Four as against them. The Gang of Four may have been the inheritors and executors of Mao and his revolutionary Left line or they may now be unduly maligned as objective capitalist roaders along with Lin Biao, but none of these seems to have been any more the incarnation of a more democratically socialist force than any other. Deng Xiaoping's dictum that the ideological colour of a cat does not matter so long as it can catch mice seems in retrospect to have been the ideological praxis of Chinese domestic and foreign policy no matter who has given it direction. If it is possible that Mao Zedong was a partial exception, it is certain that this praxis was carried to a refined art by Premier Zhou Enlai, who was a past master of diplomatically skinning cats.

China is now implementing under the stewardship of Deng Xiaoping the plan for modernization, which was originally devised under the authority of Zhou Enlai, supposedly with the blessings of Mao Zedong. According to Chairman Hua Guofeng, the four modernizations — of industry, agriculture, technology, and the military — are designed to make China the world's third industrial power by the year 2000. The means to do so are supposed to be in part the import of foreign, and especially
American and Japanese, technology with the encouragement of foreign investment with 100 per cent foreign equity in anything from Coca Cola to military jets. As an exporter in turn to pay for these imports, China threatens to swamp the world market with labour-intensive, cheap-wage goods produced in export factories and zones designed to out-compete the modern sweatshops in South-East Asia and other parts of the third world. The political counterpart of these Chinese economic ties with the West seems to be the attempt to establish sufficient American and Japanese vested interests in China to assure their political and perhaps military support in any further conflict with the Soviet Union. The modernization programme of the domestic economy involves the accelerated increase of private incentives and social differentiation in agriculture, factories, and education (where the examination system has been reintroduced), etc. Politically, the "capitalist roader" Liu Shaoqi has been posthumously rehabilitated and as far as possible all cadres who had been marginalized since the Great Leap Forward in 1957 have been reinstated in positions of influence and authority. In a word, modernization in socialist China now means wiping two decades of Maoism off the slate and starting all over again with 1957 when China still pursued the Soviet growth model that Mao then tried to replace — except that now the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as the principal enemy of the construction of socialism in China and the Americans have become the principal allies!

Reflections on China

What has happened to the world's biggest, most important, and (perhaps excepting Kampuchea and North Korea) most advanced model of socialist development based on the self-reliant mass line — if China itself never practised the mass line in its major decision making at the top and has now decided to abandon self-reliance as well? Why has socialist egalitarianism been reversed to pursue modernization through increasing stratification and bureaucratization.

If Mao was right that transition to socialism, let alone communism, requires continuous or repeated cultural revolutions, what are the
implications of the failure and reversal of the first such cultural revolution?

If Mao sought to avoid the errors and transcend the shortcomings of socialism in the Soviet Union, and if China appeared to many at home and abroad to offer a new alternative and farther-reaching departure to socialism and communism, how must we revise our expectations now that — in the words of Charles Bettelheim as he resigned his chairmanship of the Sino-French Friendship Association — China has made a great leap backward? Indeed, what is left of our model — or even of our conception for those who reject models and the idea of models — of progressive transition to egalitarian, non-authoritarian, participatory, non-alienating, self-reliant, non-dependent "socialist" society? Is there something wrong with the Chinese, or with our conceptions, or both? Or is there something wrong with us?

What are we to make of the idea — advanced especially by Mao and China — of putting politics in command and having ideology supersede economicism to alter if not break the bounds of economic determinism after China has demonstrated the pragmatic equality of ideologically white and black cats to chase mice around the economic maze in pursuit of the national interest?

Does the pursuit of the Chinese national interest against the Soviet Union and Viet Nam but in a marriage of convenience with bourgeois national interest in the United States promote the transition to socialism (let alone to communism)? To what kind of socialism?
IV. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR MARXISM AND SOCIALISM

Whatever the disagreements and disputes among socialists and Marxists about these and other questions, until recently there was agreement among them on at least one proposition: that war between socialist states is "impossible." This "self-evident" proposition was derived from the very core of Marxism and from the very essence of socialism as the negation of capitalism. (It is true that war had existed for a long time, but since the rise of capitalism and imperialism war was supposed to be part of the political economy of capitalism.) War between two socialist states (allies only a few years before) eliminates the credibility of this perhaps last remaining agreed-upon truth among Marxists and revolutionary socialists. Moreover, some of the apparent attitudes about these wars and some aspects of troop behaviour in them seem to have been tinged with racist chauvinism. Where ethnicity, nation, and race coincide, do nationalism and racism become indistinguishable, all socialism notwithstanding?

What went wrong? Was the Marxist thesis about war between socialist states (and the prior but related thesis about the withering away of the state) wrong from the beginning? Or is it that these states are not socialist (and there is no reason to expect them to wither away in the foreseeable future)? The answer is perhaps implicit in or to be derived from some further reflections about all three of these (as well as other) socialist countries.

What then are the implications of this entire experience for socialism and socialists? One country fought for its liberation under the banner of socialism for a generation and then treats the collaborators of the previous genocidal regime with kid gloves, seeks the maximum
reintegration in world capitalism but fails to achieve it only because of capitalist recalcitrance (and the opposition of its socialist neighbour to the north), but then invades its socialist neighbour and expels cadres of long standing from its own Communist Party and Liberation Army in the name of nationalism in the guise of socialism. The Communist Party of another socialist country initiates the most far-reaching, self-reliant, mass-based social transformation in an agrarian society but then stratifies the same to an extreme degree and has recourse to the most brutal repression before being displaced by neighbouring socialists, after which the former offer to make pacts with the devil — any devil — to oppose the invading socialists. The world's most populous country and most self-conscious socialist society pursues a steady course of policy zigzags which violate all tenets of its supposed mass line and pursues the haughtiest nationalist foreign policy and even military adventures against a socialist neighbour in the supposed defence of socialism.

Should all these observations of the evidence not lead us to suspect that the banner of "socialism" is little more than a fig leaf for naked nationalism, perhaps combined with racism? And should we not regard this national assertion to be the attempt by a ruling class to promote its own interests where possible and to accommodate them to the limitations of reality in a capitalist world system where necessary? Is it possible that often the emphasis on and utilization of socialist ideology are really non-ideological attempts by pragmatically striped nationalist cats in socialist disguise to gain access to the super- or at least relatively-privileged core positions and benefits in this world capitalist and capitalist world system and its still continuing development? Are appeals to socialism sometimes more effective to this non-socialist end in the third world than appeals to outright reactionary ideology or to a supposedly technocratic end of ideology would be? If so, or even if any of the above is partially so, how many further reflections and how far backwards a rethinking of socialism and Marxism are now necessary by those of us who still wish to profess one or the other or both as a real alternative to de-humanizing, capitalist reality?