HUMAN NEEDS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

by

Johan Galtung and Anders Wirak

Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo
Inter-University Centre of Post-graduate Studies, Dubrovnik
Institut d'Etudes du Développement, Genève
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I  Introduction - The need for a needs-oriented development theory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Some characteristics of current theories of development</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III The liberal and marxist development models - some details</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Towards a needs - oriented theory of development</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Towards new indicators of development</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. **Introduction: The need for needs-oriented development theory**

The purpose of this paper is to discuss theories of development, with a particular view to the problem of how development is to be measured. In other words, the goal is somehow to formulate development theory in such a way that it can be tied to a reasonable battery of social indicators.

In order to do this we shall start with one very simple premise: the point of departure will not be existing social, economic and/or political indicators - we shall not permit them to prefigure our thinking about development. Indicators are tools, but they are not innocuous tools. They have built into them assumptions about how development is to be conceived, and the moment one lands on one indicator a number of questions has already been implicitly answered - very often without the knowledge of those who engage in the exercise. Thus, it can probably be argued convincingly today that the Gross National Product is above all a measure of a particular way of organising the production system, based on a high level of processing of raw materials and a high level of circulation of factors and products, including marketing. Thus, the indicator reflects industrialisation and market and mobility oriented economic systems, both of them combined in present-day capitalism, whether the decision-making is primarily made by privately-employed or state-employed managers. But this is one of several ways of organising the system of production and consumption. Another way would be based on a low level of processing in the direction of the satisfaction of basic material needs (food, clothes, shelter, health, education), and relatively limited economic cycles (production primarily for local consumption, consumption primarily of local products).
Obviously, a system of that kind would rank low in terms of degree of processing and degree of circulation, marketing, and might tend to be identified with the traditional economies development is supposed to break away from. Why bring them in?

Because there are some reasons that have come to the foreground in recent political theory and practice. First, there is the experience that even societies undergoing rapid economic growth as measured by G.N.P. per capita often seem incapable of satisfying even the basic material needs at the minimum level for vast proportions of their population. (1) Second, there is the circumstance that economic systems that aim more directly at satisfaction of basic needs at the same time may also satisfy a number of basic non-material needs that often seem to be left unsatisfied, even counteracted by certain factors of societies in rapid economic growth. Needless to say, all this has engendered a fresh debate on development, and a search for some type of new point of departure. A new set of indicators should grow out of that search, and in that set some of the "old" indicators might be included, but then on the basis of a well thought-through rationale.

Second, it is another basic assumption of the present paper that most of our present thinking on development is marred by one particular intellectual fallacy that is committed over and over again. The fallacy is the following: instead of conceiving of development as development of man and woman everywhere, development has been conceived of as the development of things, systems and structures. The view that will be taken here is that these are all means; that the very purpose of the process of development must be somehow concerned with human beings, not to improve the quantity and quality of things.
structures have to be changed, but it is not the goal of development, only the instruments - not the means - cost the means.\(^{(3)}\) And more importantly: the acid test of whether development has taken place or not is not located in the development of things, systems and structures, but in what it does to human beings.

This formulation may sound abstract and even tautological, but when taken seriously is full of implications that will be followed up throughout this paper. First, it follows from this that "no cows are sacred": "economic growth", "Democracy", "socialism", may all represent important approaches in the field of development in the sense of contributing to the accumulation of "human changes of systems and changes of structures" - but they all have to prove themselves. The ultimate test lies in what they, collectively, do to human beings. One might say that from this point of view there would be only one "sacred cow" left: human beings themselves.\(^{(4)}\)

This, then immediately leads to the question of what could possibly be meant by "development of human beings" or, in another terminology, "personal growth".\(^{(6)}\) This will be discussed in a later section, suffice it here only to say that the question opens an area of thinking and research literature related to development studies, in a sense this follows from the basic assumption that the theory and practice of development have concentrated on something else.

As yet some kind of image of overall view of development theory and practice, for the purpose of this paper, let us make use of the simplest possible distinction, between NATURE-SOCIETY-NATURE, and for our purpose distinguish between the three aspects of society mentioned above: the things (in a broad sense, meaning that is produced), the
Thus, we arrive at the following Figure:

**Figure I**

The foci of development theory

![Diagram showing the foci of development theory with concentric circles labeled as follows: Nature, Structures, Systems, Things, Production, Distribution, Utilisation, Transformation, and finally an inner circle labeled Man.]

Some comments on this figure.

One might now summarise what has been said so far in the thesis that the development theories that have been most important in the post-second world war period (to be analysed in more detail in the next section) have focused on the three intermediate circles, to the exclusion of a real study of man, (what his needs are and whether what has taken place under the name of development really has served man well. *) and to the exclusion of nature. The focus has been on

*) We apologise for this "male chauvinist" language - not being responsible for the inability of the English language, and other languages such as French, to express in one word man + woman. "Human beings", "persons", "people", all three have somewhat different connotations.
how one can utilise nature for production, distribute what has been produced, with or without structural transformations. In recent years, however, the idea of outer limits has become more and more prominent: there is a limit to how far we can pollute and deplete. With this a new focus on the development debate has come into play, and much more vigourously than any new concern for the development of human beings as such, or "personal growth".

Having mentioned this about the "outer limits" of Nature it is tempting to introduce the other concept used in the parlance of the United Nations Environmental Programme: the "inner limits". And these limits are supposedly located inside Man: they can be conceived of in terms of satisfaction of human needs. Just as the Nature sets outer limits beyond which man cannot go in his utilisation of Nature without being destructive not only to nature but also to himself, the inner limits are the limits below which human needs cannot be satisfied without fundamental damage being made to Man. And this puts the developmental process relatively neatly: it is a question of conceiving of those processes that pushes human needs satisfaction above the inner limit, without at the same time pushing the utilisation of nature beyond the outer limits.

Having said this it becomes once more important to underline how lopsided the theory of development has tended to become. If one tries to locate development as a process that tries to serve Man in the context of our shared environment, then Man and Nature have to be brought into the centre of theory formulation and developmental practice: not be made peripheral, as constraints or "Randbedingungen". And that is perhaps in one sentence the purpose of this paper.
II. Some characteristics of current theories of development

By and large the position that will be taken in this paper is that there are two classes of theories of development of any importance in the world today, broadly termed the "liberal" and "marxist" approaches. There are differences between them and there are similarities. We shall start with some of the similarities.

Both of them are very concerned with production; with the whole economic cycle from extraction from Nature, via various levels of processing, distribution to consumption - including consideration of the whole superstructure that comes together with these elementary and fundamental aspects of production, such as financing, research and development, administrative structures, and the whole nation-state structure and international superstructure built on top of that again.

Thus, both of them are eminently economic in their focus, and in the conflict between liberal and marxist economists or "productionists" there might well be a hidden underlying alliance in the interests of preserving the predominance of economism-productionism as an approach. It should be pointed out that this so far has had a tendency to leave out the two concerns that were voiced in the introduction: the concern with the outer limits of nature (and here the marxists have "sinned" as much as liberals), and the concern with a deeper theory of man.

The opposite of a deep theory of man is a shallow theory of man, and one way in which apparent antagonists can meet, on relatively shallow ground, is to focus the theory and practice on basic material needs only. Nothing of what follows is in any sense a denial of the fundamental importance of those needs; to the contrary, as will be
clear from the next section they should certainly be seen as focal, basic in any theory of man - but not as the only focus. The basic material needs most often emphasised are the ones mentioned in the preceding section: food, clothes, shelter, health and education. In saying so we are not denying that marxist thinkers and liberal thinkers in general have much richer concepts of man than what can be subsumed under those five simple headings, but when that thinking is narrowed down the way economists do, and more particularly channelled into development theory and practise, the richer connotations tend to get lost.

Of course, liberal and marxist theories of development will tend to differ, very basically, as to the means of satisfying the basic needs. This theme will be developed shortly, let us only here pause for the moment to reflect on why the leading schools of development should be similar as to focus of attention.

One approach to answering that question would be to take as a point of departure the rather obvious circumstance that both schools of thought are developed, essentially, by people who are Western, intellectuals and men, and the schools of thought grew out of a period very much concerned with industrialisation, capitalistic economic growth, nation-state building and empire-building. The schools of thought certainly have different views on these matters, but since they represent different answers to some of the same problems and also are inspired by the same empirical context and the same fundamental paradigms (ideas as to what constitutes the ontological unit) it is not strange that they should come out with great similarities.
Thus, one could imagine that if development theory and practice were not so much in the hands of western intellectual men the following alternative characteristics might have been more prevalent:

(1) More concern with the immediate human situation, with how a person feels, lives and loves, acts and behaves, with such things as happiness, feelings of self-realisation, having a sense of purpose, and so on. It should be pointed out that thinking in terms of things, systems and structures are at a higher level of abstraction, more removed from people in general, and hence something that serves better the interests of intellectuals. It can be done in terms of abstractions, narrowing a complex reality into a set of units and variables, making experts out of people who are able to manipulate symbols of that kind. Hence liberal and marxist intellectuals meet in the concept of planning.

(2) Both schools have tended to take industrialisation for granted, in other words they have not differed essentially when it comes to the idea that much processing is needed to produce things. (The difference lies in the views on system distribution and structural transformation) Since they have tended to take industrialisation for granted they have not been concerned with asking such questions as limits to industrialisation (which is not the same as the more general question of limits to economic growth). The rejection of that type of question has been facilitated by the narrow concept of man, narrowed down to a few lines in the full spectrum of human needs (such as the five basic material ones alluded to above), and it has seemed beyond doubt that some type of industrialisation is needed in order to produce food, clothes, shelter, health hardware (medical equipment etc.) and education hardware (schooling equipment, such as textbooks, buildings.... etc....).
again one might sense something western in the selection of a few physical variables to the exclusion of many others, and in the reduction of extremely complicated nature down to a more manageable set that can be handled somewhat in the same way, as, for instance, a car is managed.

(8) Another fundamental similarity lies in the concern with the nation-state as the unit of development. Characteristically indicators of development are calculated on a country basis, the nation-state being the fundamental focus, that which "develops". For the liberal the state is the scene of economic growth and distribution, for the marxist it is the stage of revolutions. Hence both of them will tend to conceive of the country as the unit of development, the country then being a collection of "things, systems and structures". The problem of development can, correspondingly, be fitted into a paradigm that sees the world as essentially composed of states, in cooperation and conflict, making much of development thinking isomorphic to strategic analysis. (9)

Again, we do not want to deny the relevance of much of what has been alluded to in the three points above, only want to point out that here there are common biases that may unite contending factions and make conflicts between them look like the famous tip of the iceberg. But, there are, of course, also very real differences in how they look at the development of things, systems and structures - in other words production, distribution and transformation.

As a first approximation let us present the difference as follows:

THE LIBERAL VIEW: increase production, then distribute, make the social transformations that are necessary in order to increase production and derive information as to which transformations would be conducive from the societies that so far have been able to achieve the highest level
of production.

**THE MARXIST VIEW:** Fundamental social transformation of the structure first, increase of production and better distribution as parallel processes that would be made possible by the transformation later.

One might say that the liberal view in a sense is optimistic: it is possible to go ahead without any basic transformation of society except that those that are less developed should learn from the more developed. The marxist view would question this, and in the first run would make use of a distinction between countries in the centre and in the periphery of the world capitalist system, the metropoles versus the satellites, the dominant versus the dominated, the autonomous versus the dependent countries. Some words about this since no reflections on development are possible without bringing this aspect of the contemporary world into focus - under the heading of structure, global and domestic.

The particular social economic and geo-political formation known as capitalism has to be brought in in this connection. Needless to say, liberal economists have had a tendency to regard basic assumptions in the capitalist way of organising production and consumption as somehow "natural"; marxists have rejected this assumption and seen capitalism as one among several possibilities, contrasting it with feudal and socialist formations, in the marxist theory of successive stages. Liberals have seen development as something that takes place within, basically speaking, the capitalist formation; marxists have conceived of it as something that is predicated on the assumption of transcending the capitalist formation into "higher" stages. The difference is certainly fundamental, but there is also the similarity that is profoundly western:
the idea of progress in the continuous, accumulative, system-immanent form of liberal theory as well as in the discontinuous, non-accumulative and system-transcending marxist version.

To get at this similarity, an image of what capitalism is about is needed, and the one presented here is an effort to combine some liberal and some marxist perspectives on capitalism. Capitalism is then seen as a way of organizing production (and consumption) with four major characteristics:

(1) Capitalism is capital-centered, meaning that the criteria of whether an economic process is a success or a failure can be measured in capital terms (e.g., increased assets, increased sales, etc.). This should be understood relative to alternative criteria of success, e.g. whether the process enriches and enables those who engage in the work (human factor-centered), or enriches the nature from which the raw materials are extracted (nature factor-centered), or is simply product-centered (focusing on, for instance, to what extent five-year plans or quotas are fulfilled or unfulfilled). Profit-motivation is compatible with this.

(2) Capitalism is based on division of labor between those who own the means of production and those who do not (the labour buyers and the labour sellers), and between those who define and solve problems (decision-making, research etc.) and those who implement the solutions (the clerics, the workers). In earlier stages of capitalism, this dividing line was linked to caste-like dividing lines in feudal society, in later (present) stages it is correlated with education levels that in turn may be correlated with residual caste aspects of "modern" societies.

(3) Capitalism is mobility-oriented, meaning that the system is based on a very high level of mobility of the factors of production to the points where they are processed, and from which they are marketed.
In this process raw factors are taken from districts of a country, or from countries in the world, in the form of raw materials, raw capital (e.g. savings) and raw labour (unskilled workers and untrained "talents") and brought to points where these raw materials are processed into products, the raw capital into finance capital and raw labour is made use of and/or is processed into more skilled types of labour. This mobility creates very steep centre-periphery gradients within and between countries, between the centres of processing where the factories, the finance institutions and the educational institutions are located, and the peripheries from which these raw factors are taken.

(4) Capitalism is expansionist, meaning that the mobility described in the preceding point knows no political borders but at every time will try to transgress whatever borders there are, thus constituting a pattern characterised by its "global reach". The epitomy of all this would be the current transnational corporations for economic activities, tying together as vast parts of the world as possible and as many segments of the economic cycle as possible under one administrative, integrated leadership.

It should be pointed out that these four characteristics very often are seen as closely related to the development process itself which is then described in terms of capital formation, the growth of a social formation that corresponds to this particular way of organising production with an upper class that commands the various types of processing as described above and middle and working classes that carry out their decisions, with a high level of processing of raw materials, raw capital and "raw" human beings by means of factories, finance institutions and schools at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, in absolute and relative terms. It should also be pointed out that social-economic "growth" has had as its correlate, partly as
a cause, partly as a consequence, a corresponding process of political
growth in the formation of the modern state. A modern state is in
administrative/political terms the same as capitalism is in social
economic terms: a centre-periphery gradient built into geography,
with its centre in the capital, its periphery elsewhere and particularly
towards the borders (generally speaking), and with a high level of
division of labour between what happens in the centre and what happens
in the periphery. Above we have mainly mentioned what the periphery
sends to the centre (raw production factors), but the periphery also
receives something from the centre: finished products for consumption,
capital for investment, and human labour in processed form, particularly
in the shape of functionaries. When this system creates a spillover
across political borders peripherising other countries it is known as
colonialism; the corresponding spillover in economic terms is known as
(capitalist) imperialism.

This is not the place to treat the development of western political
colonialism and economic imperialism for the last five hundred years,
roughly speaking, since Columbus travelled west and Vasco da Gama
travelled east from the Iberian peninsula. What is important here are
only the consequences for development theory, and they are many, of
which we shall mention some.

First, the western expansion has been so thorough that it up to re-
cently has been taken for a normal process, and "westernisation" has been
confused with "modernisation" and "development". Of course, western expansion
ism did not necessarily have to lead to westernisation. It is also
possible to extract raw materials, raw capital (by the very practical
method of taxation) and raw labour (by means of deportation) without
creating homologous countries in the periphery. Occupation with well-
integrated women is not sufficient for recovery and industrial...
But somehow it seems to be embedded in western expansion, perhaps as opposed to expansionism engaged in by other cultures, that this is not enough, that the western social economic and geo-political formations somehow constitute model patterns making it not only the right, but also the duty of the West to engage in westernisation. Somehow the assumption seems to have been for a long time, that the West not only possesses model societies, but also model creeds, model ways of doing science, model ways of producing, etc. Thus, a concept of development came into being whereby development was, *grosso modo*, the degree of proximity to the standard western model and underdevelopment was measured in terms of distance from it - unidimensionally in the more simplistic cases (the G.N.P. per capital or simplistic economic growth school being one example), multi-dimensionally in the more sophisticated cases.

Second, this then led to the unilinear school of development thinking, with the western society as model society and in the post-second world war period with the United States playing the role as the "best" model. Development indicators tended to become those indicators on which the U.S. would come out as number one; taking its model quality as axiomatic. Ideas of "catching up", "narrowing the gap", "process of development" caught hold, all of them relating to the unilinear idea. What was not questioned, or has only been questioned recently were such items as:

- would not imitation of the model country also lead to the growth of less desirable aspects of the model country?

- in order to imitate the model country would one not have to engage in some of the same methods, and would that not presuppose that one would have to make use of other countries as a periphery?

- was it obvious that the western model could hold transculturally, or might there be cultural differences of different kinds that would make the western model untransferable?
In other words, it was not only the question of whether it was possible to transfer the western model, but also the question of whether it was desirable that had a tendency to be overlooked.

Third, curiously enough this also led to an important weakness in marxist thinking. The first country to break away from the capitalist mode of production was the Soviet Union after the October revolution in 1917. The breakaway took place in the periphery of western capitalism, not in its centre as predicted and expected. This seems to have had two major implications: the marxist theory of development has above all become a theory of development of periphery societies of the capitalist system, which roughly corresponds with what liberal thinking would identify as "developing societies" (in terms of such absolute properties as G.N.P. per capita, level of industrialisation and level of schooling rather than such relational properties as how the country enters in the international division of labour, level of dependence etc; that marxist thinking would focus on). And as importantly: out of the Russian periphery to western capitalism came the mighty power of the Soviet Union, also a western country, - it seems - to some extent dominated by the idea that it is a model country, establishing its own unilinear track of development for its own periphery; formerly in the capitalist periphery.

Thus it came that the period after the second world war has been characterised by two unilinear tracks of development: one based on a Rostowian theory of stages of economic growth and with the U.S. as model country, the other based on a marxist theory of stages of social formation, and with the Soviet Union as model country. The two tracks would seem to be at cross purposes with each other, and so they are or have been in some countries, but they also are remarkably parallel. In both cases it can be and has been proved rather convincingly that it also serves the interest of the model country if their periphery accepts this theory of development. In other words, a periphery that tries to become as much like the model country as possible will also be planted
in the sense that the centre not only can establish a
division of labour with it with more ease (making use of the bridge-
head established in the centre of the periphery countries), but also
in the sense that the centre countries, in the striving of the periphery
countries to do their best and progress along the tracks of development
find a validation of their own systems and structures, a re-confirmation.

We have gone into this at some length because theories of
development, like any other social theory, have to be understood in their
social context. What we have said can be summarised as follows: out
of the richness of liberal and Marxist thinking there has been a
tendency to crystallise theories of development that have created a
development thinking and practice which leads to results not only
compatible but sometimes identical with the basic structure of power
relations in the world today. This is also important in understanding
the material out of which alternative theories of development might
grow: they will also have to be seen in a general social context. This
might serve partly to explain the importance of the position held by China
today as the model of development for many in many countries; it is the
only country of significance that has rejected both unilinear tracks.
In doing so one might even say that they have been rejecting not only
the idea of U.S. as a model and the Soviet Union as a model, but the
more general idea of the western world as constituting a legitimate model
area for general imitation. It would then be in line with what has been
said above if the net outcome is the establishment of a third unilinear
track with China as the model country, although one hypothesis might
be that China, like her Asian neighbour Japan, is not bent on being
imitated - rather, there may be other countries that have been under
western influence that are bent on being imitators. (15)
III. The liberal and marxist development models: some details

Let us now start, against the backdrop of what has been said in the two preceding sections, to look in somewhat more detail at the basic differences in liberal and marxist development theories, given the similarities in the emphasis on industrial production, and the weakly-developed concern with Man and Nature.

One way of approaching the differences is embedded in Figure II:

Figure II

Liberal vs. marxist development theory: two axes of development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collectivist</th>
<th>Individualist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model I: Conservative/Feudal</td>
<td>Model II: Liberal/Capitalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&quot;Traditional&quot;)</td>
<td>(&quot;Modern&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model III</td>
<td>Model IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal/Socialist</td>
<td>Pluralist/Communist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some words about the definition of the two axes.

The horizontal axis, the "liberal axis" is a dimension of increasing individualism, both in the sense of inter-individual diversity and in the sense of individual mobility. What the axis purports to harbour, translated into European history, would be something like the transition from medieval society into the early modern period, with the Renaissance as the transition period. Imagine we agree with the idea that this transition period signified some kind of release of the individual from the captive cocoon of medieval/feudal
collectivism, both in the sense of cultivating diversity (and under that heading also creative originality), and in the sense of a much higher level of individual mobility. There is, however, another factor that should also be emphasised (and has been alluded to above): this mobility among other things expressed itself in the travels from Europe to the West and to the East, and hence in a new geographical scope to western latent expansionism. Individualism and expansionism coincided in time.

The other axis, the "marxist axis" is concerned with a completely different emphasis in the whole conceptualisation of development. The dimension has to do with increasing horizontalisation in society, both in the sense of decreasing differences in power and privilege, and in the (deeper) sense of a more horizontal division of labour—meaning a division of labour where the benefits, including the psychological benefits in terms of challenge, access to stimulating work, are more evenly distributed between the partners in a production process. Production should then be taken in a broad sense; it might for instance include the production of art, and the question of how readers/viewers can participate in the production process as co-producers with the artist. Again there is a possible image of two types of societies, one being more vertical, the other more horizontal with a transition period initiated by the Russian October revolution of 1917. One might here imagine that marxists, except those who are more of the dogmatic variety, would talk about transition periods rather than the short span of a couple of years or one generation in, for instance, Soviet history: a period at least of the same duration as the Renaissance, including a variety of phenomena—like for instance the individualization of the religious experience, protestantism, which can be said to be a part of the Renaissance process as conceived of above. However, many marxists
have had a tendency to conceive of horizontalisation in an extremely narrow manner, in terms of something happening to the ownership of the means of production - in line with the general inclination towards economism mentioned above - compatible with thinking in terms of transition points, "revolutions"; rather than periods, "evolution".

It is now our thesis that development theory in general gains from the inclusion of both axes, and that the liberal and marxist schools have had a tendency to over-emphasise one of them at the expense of the other. This point will now be elaborated.

We assume that the basic tenet underlying the entire liberal exercise is the faith in the individual. The entire view is profoundly actor-oriented, viewing development to a large extent as the creation of particularly capable and active individuals. The individuals are the entrepreneurs, in any field: economic production, politics, military matters, culture. They are the engines to a large extent pulling the train. For them to function two conditions have to obtain: they have to be given sufficient freedom of movement to act out their initiative, and they have to be sufficiently motivated through the expectation of a reasonable reward. That reward system has to be differential, otherwise it would not distinguish between individuals where talent is concerned. And that differential reward is the social verticality, which then stands out as one of the conditions for development.

In other words, the liberal theory of development would essentially be concerned with the transition from Model I to Model II in Figure II, from what is there called conservative/feudal to liberal/capitalist societies, but in development theory of the 1950s and 1960s to a large extent was referred to as a transition from "traditional" to "modern". Verticality being taken for granted, in general terms, does not mean
that its mechanisms do not change. From rewards being roughly speaking proportionate to one's station at birth ("like father like son") the idea of rewards that are commensurate to innate talent appears, leading to the need for the measure of such talent (this is where Binet and Simon enter the stage with the idea of I.Q. tests), and the institutionalisation of the correlation between ability and reward. This institutionalisation is a system of cumulative schooling through stages of primary, secondary and tertiary education whereby the new elite is formed and legitimised. This system is then purified under the slogan of "equal opportunity", meaning that there should be no carry over from Model I society as to who shall be given the highest level of educational legitimacy; that shall be decided on the basis of ability alone. That idea more or less captures the nature of the debate between conservatives, liberals and social democrats within Model II society, the debate is not concerned with verticality as such.

So much for the first aspects of individualisation: the detection (through a grid of schools) and cultivation (through processing of individuals by means of successive levels of schooling) of the capable and active. The second aspect was the idea of individual mobility, which also has played a fundamental role in the liberal theory of development.

When for instance the leading U.S. sociologist and the post-second world war period, Talcott Parsons tries to capture development in terms of a transition from a pattern characterised as particularistic/diffuse/ascribed to Universalistic/specific/achieved, he manages to say in admirably few words something very basic about at least the non-elite aspect of the transition from "traditional" to "modern." This transition period has also been characterised by the growth of capitalism as a mode of production, characterised by a high level of mobility of factors, including human labour. In the very idea, so clearly expressed in
economic thinking, of treating human beings as a "factor" (that can be handled analytically in the same way as raw material and capital) what Parsons expresses is already embedded. Mobility is facilitated by substitutability, with modern physics/chemistry/geology/biology establishing a level of abstraction whereby minerals, animals, plants etc, can be seen as belonging to the same class and hence be interchangeable because they share basic characteristics.

What happened in the period of transition characterized by the pattern variables employed by Parsons (actually taken from the work of Sorokin, in his monumental *Social and Cultural Dynamics*) was that institutions emerged so as to make human beings also more interchangeable. What "universalism" stands for is the idea of inter-subjectively communicable and accepted criteria of evaluation of another person - and in "modern" society this is the input of schooling to society in the form of diploma, constituting a universally accepted basis for evaluation as opposed to, for instance, kinship relations (not universal, the person is my nephew, not everybody nephew), personal sympathy (not a universal relation either).

Correspondingly, under the heading of "specificity" there is the important idea that the evaluation shall be relatively uni-dimensional, otherwise it becomes so complicated that universalism is threatened.

In "modern" societies schooling provides for this also through a system of evaluation of a particular type of intellectual ability, with a high component of memory and a special type of behaviour fostered in schools in general, and on examination days in particular. Then finally, under the heading of "achieved rather than ascribed" comes the whole idea that the individual has to prove himself; what is given to him at birth, such as the position of the father shall wash out and the individual shall emerge. Schooling also plays a role here in organising achievement exams where by individuals are sorted and ranked vertically, but this is also
done in most other institutions in liberal society. Hence, what Parsons has done is to put in sociological terms what had already happened for a long period (way back into the history of Model I society too): the easy substitutability of one individual for another so that one knows where to look for the substitute if a position is empty due to social or biological decease. The breakdown of the extended and even of the nuclear family is another aspect of the same general phenomenon.

Thus, liberal development theory has above all been concerned with the "irrationalities" of "traditional society, and how to overcome them. The present critique of what we have referred to as Model II society might perhaps have changed our focus somewhat and perhaps made us more able to see that what is "irrational" from the point of view of a particular economic formation may be highly "rational" if the point of departure is a richer view of human beings. Thus, when a chemist/mineralogist tells us that a mineral has the formula CuSC₄, copper sulphate, everything that when exposed to certain tests shows the same characteristics becomes equivalent; a chemical formula establishes an equivalence/class of mutually interchangeable objects. But it so happens that one unit in that class may have tremendous beauty, another may (be said to) possess magic qualities, still another may relate to a person due to some kind of emotional experience etc. "Traditional" societies may institutionalise the particularities that disappear in the light of western science, and reappear as "obstacles to development" seen from a point of view that takes "modern" society for granted, even for "normal". Similarly with money: it is well known that economists have been able to build a mathematical theory where cost, price, capital value play a fundamental role as a variable. The mathematics made use of is powerful, for instance because it can be based on such properties of certain
The commutative and associative laws:

Commutative law: \( a + b = b + a \)

Associative law: \( a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c \)

The western "modern" mind has been trained in such a way that not only are these two principles recognised and taken for granted by most who have been through the schooling process, but their applicability to money is also taken for granted. But the implication of the commutative law, for instance, when applied to money is that the order of payment given and payment received does not matter, it all adds up anyhow.

If two people, A and B, owe me money, it does not matter to me whether A or B pays first. But that is a social cultural dictum, and certainly not generally valid, for instance in most - one might assume - "traditional" societies. In accepting such mathematical principles as valid for money the social decorum, embroidery so to speak of many "traditional" societies is cut off and the rest is very plain cloth - albeit very much of it produced by modern methods.

The most dramatic implication of this comes with the human factors: inter-human substitutability. It is trivial today that this has been brought about in the production process through the transition from artisanship to industrial mass production. The point is not that this was also a transition from labour-intensive to capital-and research-intensive methods of production; away from such methods of production, as building a dam with picks and shovels, baskets and naked body power alone. The point is that this was also a transition towards a much higher level of substitutability, meaning that the individual worker had much less of a chance to imprint the finished product with his own personality. The intellectual has this possibility, the present author is in instance relatively convinced of his own
insubstitutability in the sense that nobody else would produce exactly the paper the reader has in front of him or herself right now. But for most people in "modern" society this direct relation between worker and product is washed out. The worker is detachable from his or her product, **substitutability has been institutionalised**. Needless to say, this is related to the marxist concept of "alienation" - without any pretence that it captures the richness of that concept. More particularly, it should also be pointed out that here alienation and substitutability are seen as objective categories, built into the social structure. How it may or may not be reflected in the individual psyche as unhappiness, boredom, stress, possibly neuroses and psychosis, including schizophrenia, or delight at being so detached from work that one can concentrate fully on leisure-time activity is another matter.

Thus, one may say in general that liberal theory has built into it the verticality of liberal society: it deals very differently with elites and masses. Elites, duly legitimised through education and/or other achievements are granted full individuality in the sense that they can make themselves insubstitutable. They then become model individuals to be emulated, admired and envied, loved and hated. The masses are not given this chance, "theirs is but to do and die" - for them maximum substitutability is prepared institutionally. Universalism, specificity and achievement are for them - at the top of society particularism (who knows whom), diffuseness (multiple relationships, not only in business, also in politics, in leisure-time activities, in committees and boards) and ascription are the order of the day (he who has achieved in one field and surfaced on the top of Model II society as an individual is made use of in other fields and higher up, often totally beyond his or her competence).
All this is then correlated with division of labour as described above in such a way that it is given to the elite not only to try to solve problems but also to define what is an acceptable problem, and to the masses, in a substitutable manner, to implement the blueprints emanating from the problem-solving activities of the elite. Thus, the masses become the backstage people with the elite on the front stage (one stage being the mass media), and the spectators of elite activity. The elite legitimises its position through the "trickling down" hypothesis: in the shorter or longer run the benefits from elite activity will accrue to the masses, for instance in the form of economic growth well-distributed, or general, mass education.

There seems to be little or no doubt that a society of the Model II variety as here described can engage in economic growth, often for a sustained period of time. Much of development studies in the 1950s and 1960s went into showing the correlations between the various aspects of Model II society mentioned above and economic growth, the correlations all tending to be positive, some of them very high. This holds both for synchronic and diachronic relations, both when tested for many societies at one point in time, and for one society over a time period. But, as any methodologist would warn, any correlation can be spurious. Economic growth may be due to "something else" at the same time as the type of change described above also takes place in Model II society, and that "something else" may also be underlying that other type of change. What could that "something else" possibly be?

One possibility would be the increasing domain and scope of the centre periphery gradient that come with capitalistic modes of production. Thus, the argument would be (and this is of course central to modern theories of imperialism,) that economic growth in a centre,
Model II type country has been made possible only because it has extracted factors from a vast periphery, and succeeded in putting most of the periphery outside itself, in the patterns known as colonialism and neo-colonialism. At the same time the transition from Model I to Model II has taken place but this is hardly crucial; what is crucial may be the availability of a malleable, penetrable periphery. Thus, Japan cannot be characterised as a Model II society even today. It still has strong Model I features given the way in which level and type of schooling are used ascriptively, and given the way promotion is correlated with seniority (another ascribed characteristic, although universalistic), rather than with achievements. But Japan certainly established a periphery starting with the Sino-Shinese war from 1894-95, continuing after the 1945 defeat with more neo-colonial methods. Besides, it may also be argued that the real function, intended or not, of liberalisation of society, of equal opportunity, of mobility in and out of classes destroying the castesystem of Model I society has been to create societies in the centre where the classes have a shared interest in maintaining the control of the periphery. If there is something to this type of reasoning periphery resistance should be highly consequential. More concretely, decreased availability of a periphery for the extraction of factors, and as markets for products should reduce economic growth considerably, and at the same time mobilise all segments of society in its struggle to preserve the centre-periphery gradient, because of the joint interest in "sharing the spoils", to express it bluntly. Recent events, after the "oil crisis", point in this direction.

In saying this we have in a sense already proceeded to the third circle of development thinking: the distribution within the systems.
There is no doubt that liberal theory, particularly in its social democratic variety as it is expressed in North Western Europe, is strong in its emphasis both on social justice and on equality. One example of social justice has already been considered above: the idea of equal opportunity. This should not be confused with equality, it only means an equal chance to participate in the competition for positions in a vertical society. Liberal theory would, however, also be strong on other types of social justice that can all be summarised under one general formula: there should be little or no correlation between ascribed and achieved status. Thus, whether you are male or female should not influence your level of education or position in the power system at the micro or macro level; whether you are born in the city or in the countryside shall also be irrelevant, not to mention the axiomatic irrelevance of race and ethnic factors. According to liberal theory a society would hardly be considered developed on the basis of economic growth alone if gross social injustices of the type indicated above are still prevalent.

However, the formula for social justice just given is an open-ended one. One has been concerned with racism but only very recently with sexism, and still practically speaking not at all with "agism" - defined here as the institutionalisation of the rule of the middle-aged over the very young and the very old, relegating either to ghettos (kindergartens and schools; old-age homes and retirement in general), fragmenting them away from each other. And if it is true as some liberal theory may have it, that there is such a thing as relatively steep differentials in innate ability, for instance in that which is attempted measured through I.Q. tests, then this would also be seen as an ascribed characteristic and hence lead to a movement for the
abolition of discrimination against the less talented. These points are made here precisely because of the open-ended nature of the social justice idea, and also to indicate that the idea is very rich in its implications and will keep Model II society busy both with theory formation and with political practise for some time to come.

The issue of equality is a different one. It is a question of abolishing differentials in power and privilege, very often approached in terms of income distributions. One could also approach it in terms of other dimensions of "having", such as the distribution of all kinds of consumer goods, food, clothes, shelter, access to health and education facilities, to transportation and communication, etc.

The trouble with this approach is, of course, that it locates the equality problem in the consumption part of the economic cycle rather than the production part, and within the economic frame of thinking. The latter, however, has certainly been transcended in liberal thinking: there is the old tradition of seeing development in terms of institution-building for better control of the periphery (that is also included), but in terms of power-sharing, starting with the citizen concept and expansions of the right to vote at the macro level, proceeding to some type of decision sharing inside enterprises, today known as "industrial democracy". We mention all this because it would be totally wrong to assume that liberal development theory is only concerned with economic aspects although the point of gravity has been in the economic growth field. Stability based on balance of economic power (anti-monopoly), political power (party-formation), military power and cultural power (pluralism) also belongs to the theory.

However, although trade union formation and in general organisations of the under-privileged are important in overcoming fragmentation,
based on solidarity as they are; and although voting rights etc. are im-
portant in overcoming marginalisation, creating a more generally partic-
ipatory society, the basic verticality relating to the production
aspect of the economic cycle still remains untouched.

And this is, of course, the point where the marxist onslaught
starts. Like liberalism marxism is a set of theories, and like for
liberalism one can find almost any statement if one looks at a
sufficient number of texts sufficiently exegetically. Our presentation
will also here be critical, not in any sense doing full justice to the
richness and depth of marxist thought, which in its fundamentals is very
different from liberal thinking (the difference partly being absorbed
in the word pair dialectics vs. positivism), focussing more on its
expressions in development practice today.

The strength of marxist thinking from the point of view of
development theory is in its analysis of the structure of economic
production. The marxist critique operates on at least three structural
levels: inside the production unit (the firm), domestically, inside
the country; and at the global level. In general terms it may be said
that the marxist criticism takes up in considerable depth the last
three of the four characteristics of capitalism mentioned in the pre-
ceding section: the division of labour between human beings inside the
production unit (the firm), between those who are problem-solvers and
decision-makers and those who implement solutions and decisions; the
division of labour between territories within and between countries,
leading to steep centre periphery gradients; and the expansionist nature
of capitalism in space, controlling more and more of economic
cycles, by means of monopolies, in general. The important first character-
istic, capital as measure, is also taken up implicitly but since marxism
is relatively weak on alternative measures marxists, like liberals, came
to behave like book-keepers, calculating costs and benefits in monetary
terms, only that they differ as to the entries and how they should be
calculated — leading to different conclusions.

Where liberalism is action-oriented marxism is structure-oriented,
corresponding to the basic development strategies: where the liberal
development school argues in favour of letting individuals loose (the
strong towards the top, the less strong being made more mobile hori-
zontally), marxist schools would argue in favour of basic structural
change first, taken in the reverse order of the above: first on the
programme comes the idea of detaching the periphery from the centre so
that it can constitute a centre in its own right, in the sense of doing
its own processing of all local factors, raw materials, capital and human
beings. This, however, is only a first phase and entirely compatible
with local, national capitalism — to be followed by a second phase with
internal centre periphery gradients reduced through collectivisation of
means of production, the use of the social surplus for the satisfaction
of fundamental needs and social planning in general; and then a possible
third stage where basic changes take place in the division of labour
structure inside the production unit. To many people this probably
sounds like "politics" and not like "development theory" — just like
liberal development theory sounds like apologetics and rationalisation,
not to say gross mystification, to those whose inclination is in a more
marxist direction. We prefer to see both of them as theories of
development with accompanying practices, and then turn to a more critical
appraisal of the marxist approach.

It should be mentioned at the outset that the bulk of marxist
writing and practice takes the form of criticism of capitalist society
and theoretically guided action inside those societies. It is as if
most of liberal thinking were concerned with a critique of medieval
and early modern social formation rather than with the building of the
post-industrial revolution society in the west. Much of this asymmetry
between the two schools of thought is simply due to the circumstance
that the liberal school is relevant for a considerably larger time
slot in human history, not to mention for vast parts of the world,
whereas the marxist school (as a development theory in the positive
sense, concerned with post-capitalist social formations,) has only half
a century's experience to draw upon, only from a limited part of the world,
and only from societies that were formerly periphery countries in the
world capitalist system (and may now even to some extent become re-integra-
ted again). There is no experience with what socialism in a society in
the capitalist centre might look like.

The basic criticism of the marxist theory of development, in our
view, would not be that it represents too radical a break with the present
world structure, but that it is not radical enough in its conception, and
for that reason not in its practice either - with one possible exception.
Moreover, the criticism would also be that there is a pronounced tendency
to neglect some fundamental insights from the liberal school, indeed
raising the question of whether some type of synthesis of the two might
one day become a good component of a much richer theory of development.
(It would be typically western to believe that a synthesis of liberal
and marxist approaches, if at all possible, would exhaust the whole uni-
verse of development thinking - more about that in the next section).

The basic point that marxism has not come to grips with is the
circumstance that post-capitalist formations found in eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union, and also in some of the Third World socialist
countries (Cuba, Mongolia, perhaps also North Korea) are entirely
compatible with Model II social formations. In fact, they can be seen as variations within that formation, but on a state capitalist rather than a private capitalist variety. We would base that on the idea that the four characteristics of capitalism mentioned above are still prevalent in those societies: capital as measure, division of labour in terms of decision-making and problem-solving (only that the top level is recruited in a different manner), a high level of mobility of factors from the periphery to national and district centres, of products in the opposite direction; and an element of expansionism although (in many cases) only within the geo-political borders set by the state itself.

Thus, individuals are still detachable and substitutable, highly mobile horizontally and vertically, only the advancement criteria are different with proletarian background, formal education and partly loyalty being important factors. (24)

Given this experience seems to indicate that such societies in a surprisingly short span of time are able to satisfy the basic material needs of the masses of their population; in other words to eradicate poverty. This is a major achievement and sets the socialist Third World countries by and large against the peripheral capitalist Third World countries in a contrast which is not complementary to the liberal school of development thinking in general. The liberal school solves this problem, decreasingly seen to its own satisfaction, by measuring development in terms of averages, such as growth per capita, whereby some very quickly growing or expanding classes, or segments, or sectors of the population of the countries can compensate for a little, zero or
even negative growth at the bottom, or even for the majority. This circumstance alone would today count very significantly in favour of the marxist approach.(26)

Some may now argue that this is already convincing enough, that the task was to lift the material level of the masses through collectivisation of the means of production, not to depart from the fundamental social grammar of Model II society. This may be so, but two problems still remain, two reasons why the practice and the theory may be said not to be radical enough: what happens after the basic material needs have been satisfied? and is Model II society an acceptable developmental goal? These two questions are heavily related since there may be some incompatibility between Model II society and some of the less material, but nevertheless basic needs. What these needs are will to some extent be discussed in the next section, suffice it here to say that they may perhaps be conveniently divided into two classes, one that roughly coincided with "human rights", and another class that for lack of a better term we shall refer to as "non-material needs". Needless to say, all these classes of needs and rights are over-envisaged and merely suggestive, but equally needless to say: anybody's entire body of development thinking and practice is coloured by what the person or the "school" explicitly or implicitly admits into these lists.

And this is where the strong point of the marxist approach after some time is converted into a weak point: the emphasis on the satisfaction of basic material needs for everybody, even starting with those most in distress. It gives food for thought to consider that such basic needs are also satisfied for animals in a well-organised zoological garden: animals get on a regular basis the needed physiological input in the
form of food, air and water and sleep, and output in the form of movement and excretion; they are usually adequately sheltered in cages exhibiting an astounding variety in the more famous zoos; clothing offers no problem since as opposed to the "naked ape" they are usually adequately equipped with fur; there are veterinarians who see to their health conditions, usually on a much more regular basis than in the periphery of world capitalism; and in the most advanced zoos, and for the most "intelligent" animals such as dolphins there is even some institutionalised arrangement for some type of education.

Thus, societies releasing productive creativity by means of fundamental structural transformation, getting control over the social surplus in favour of the satisfaction of basic needs for everybody (thereby also taking care of distribution) may easily exhibit similarities with zoological gardens unless other developmental goals, usually not associated with zoological gardens are also brought into the picture. The liberal answer, disposable income so that the individual may plan his own market behaviour and trade-offs, is only a very partial one.

This kind of critique, however, would not only apply to marxist schools of development; it applies equally well to liberal schools that have progressed on the idea of economic growth per capita to the idea of satisfaction of basic needs for everybody. The entire approach casts the economist in the role of the zookeeper or game-warden. He becomes the subject, the population becomes the object, the clients- and he satisfies some of his non-material needs (e.g. for activity, creativity, even self-realisation) in contributing to the satisfaction of their material needs. No doubt there is a problem here, the problem belongs to the development problématique and has something to do with Model II society, regardless of ownership of means of production.
And this is of course where the second critique against marxism sets in: the cognitive framework fails to capture new types of class formation, partly because the very term "class" has been given such a narrow interpretation (related to the relations vis-à-vis the means of production) in marxist thinking. The concern has been with abolition of class formation in that particular sense, and this has then led to a view of development that can be characterised as "development of structures" — using, for instance, as indicator the proportion of the economy that has been collectivised one way or the other.

What would be at the root of class formation in societies that have undergone this capitalist-socialist transition? Foremost and most basically: if the point of departure is a Model I or Model II society, or a mixture of the two (a society with some late feudal and early capitalist characteristics), verticality is already built into most social relations at the social macro and micro level, e.g. in the family, at school, in work relations). There has been a tendency, perhaps in marxist practice rather than in marxist thinking, to believe that with horizontalisation relative to the ownership of the means of production, other social relations will also tend to horizontalise. They do not, and among the reasons we can mention the following:

- according to the general theory somebody has to lead the revolt in order to transform the structure, somebody has to be entrepreneur in other words, viz the most advanced elements in the proletariat and certain non-proletariat elements that have internalised the doctrine and developed loyalty to the entrepreneurial organisation, the Party. Although this is not said explicitly it is tempting to add that for these entrepreneurs there must also be a reward — like in liberal thinking — and that differential reward is already part of the verticality.

- the idea of societies/coupled in such a manner that a general horizontalisation will follow with a certain automaticity from a basic change where ownership of means of production etc, is concerned pre-supposes a view of society as strongly and relatively uni-linearly coupled, where consequences follow upon the cause like in a game of dominoes. This amounts to a prophecy, and the question
becomes what to do when prophecy fails. If the theory is to be saved other circumstances have to be called upon to explain the failure: foreign intervention, adverse climatic conditions, saboteurs, or that the initial conditions were not yet satisfied. There is also the possibility of proceeding by tautology: anything in a society that has socialised the means of production is by definition socialist. Our point, however, is that to administer all this an upper class is needed that controls the means of image-formation in society as well as the reactions to external and internal, real and imagined enemies. In that there is also a basic source of verticalisation.

Finally, there is the point alluded to above: in order to administer the social surplus and steer it in the direction of fundamental need satisfaction, given the nature and size of a modern state a group of managers, administrators and bureaucrats will tend to emerge, perhaps of a size more than proportionate to the size of the country.

Thus, the basis is laid for the crystallisation of new layers at the top of society, following the three directions just given: a group of former proletarians and other revolutionaries from the preceding social formation, a group of power wielders in a more traditional sense being tied to the machineries of propaganda, police and the military, and a group of managers, economists, bureaucrats. It is well known that the latter two will tend to turn against the first group as time proceeds, so that the organisation for revolutionary transformation, the Party, will gradually change its composition from being worker-dominated to being intelligentsia, or white collar, in a broad sense, dominated. Since all this also requires a considerable change of personnel, in other words a very high level of mobility, the process will in itself facilitate individualisation, detachability and mobility of individuals on the basis of achievement, education and loyalty, and the net result is a Model II society with satisfaction of basic material needs and certain repressive features.

It is at this point that the Chinese contribution to development thinking enters, whether classified as inside or outside marxism. The basic point seems exactly to be that the Chinese do not want the Model II
society, but went to proceed to a Model III social formation - in the
figure referred to as "communal", a term taken from the major institution
in China, the Peoples Commune. This was the fifth stage in the development
of the rural part of China after the liberation in 1949 (e.g., land reform, mutual aid institutions, elementary cooperatives and
advanced cooperatives). It may be pointed out that the Chinese tradition
already carries a very heavy component of collectivism, partly especially
related to the Buddhist element, a component which is absent in the western
civilisation, particularly in the protestant countries. It must also be
added that dialectic thinking, the idea of ever recurring contradictions,
that nothing is perfect and worthy of being consolidated for everything
has contradictions built into it (yin-yang principle) must have made
it relatively easy for the Chinese to conceive of new contradictions,
emerging in the system brought about by the transcendence of the contra-
dictions prior to 1949. Consequently the Chinese had a better point of
departure when it comes to the possibility of seeing horizontisation
as an open-ended agenda; after the collectivisation of means of production
what new type of dominance relations may emerge? The answer given in
1966 was clearly, for instance, "in the field of education, in China's case"
and in the relation between people in general and the Party. The
Chinese may have overdone the idea that these elements were trusted upon
them by the Soviet penetration, and perhaps not seen sufficiently clearly
that they might have developed nevertheless, without Soviet presence, and
perhaps due to the shortcomings in Marxian thinking pointed to some
shortcomings that the Chinese tradition already to some extent compensates
for, particularly when coupled to the structural insight provided through
Marxism.

Be that as it may, it is at least clear that the Chinese have seen
development in terms of collectivisation of means of production and use
of the social surplus, within a context of social planning, for baths
needs satisfaction. That was only the first phase, 1949 - 1966, roughly speaking, and the cultural revolution shall not be credited with that. What the Chinese started doing during the cultural revolution seems to be very closely related to the three reasons for new class formation given above.

First, there was the idea that nobody was "born red" - everybody had somehow to prove himself or herself. This notion is in itself individualist, and achievement oriented - hence the Chinese problem was how to combine this with a collectivist and horizontal society and the mechanisms are well-known: rotation of leadership at the local level, cadre schools, "remolding of the personality" and so on.

Second, there was a certain de-dogmatisation, expressed in the formula that after "two-into-one" there will always be a "one into two" - a highly shortened version of the basic principle of dialectics as something on-going, never-ending. This was then combined with the idea that the liberation was not only necessary, but was a sufficient condition, that the cultural revolution went one step further, and that there will be many corresponding processes in the future.

Third, there was the idea of avoiding professionalism and managerialism from the top. This was done through a high level of decentralisation of the economy, through commune-ism rather than state-ism, not only in the field of agriculture but also in industrial production since much of that is carried out inside the People's Communes. In doing so some of the centre-periphery gradient of the modern state is broken down, there is an emphasis on local self-reliance rather than on getting directives and aid from the centre. Moreover, the Chinese also went further in order to try to break down the division of labour within the production unit in efforts to merge workers and engineers into one, the famous "worker-engineer",
thus narrowing the gap between the problem-solvers and the doers.
This was done partly through rotation within the production unit,
partly through the creation of entirely new types of social positions.

Thus, the Chinese contribution is considerable since it goes much
deeper in its development practice, constituting a more fundamental
attack on capitalism (all four aspects of it, the Chinese also largely
refuse to use monetary evaluation of the production process, preferring
measures of yield, and conversion into needs-satisfaction).

* * * * *

This, in our view, is more or less the landscape of development
thinking and practice today. There are two broad traditions, and within
them, there are more conservative and more radical variants. Unless
to say the schools are conditioned by present power relations and
social relations in general, and by historical processes: "tell me
which group in which country you belong to, and I shall tell you
which development theory you have." But from this it does not follow
that in order to predict the future development of development thinking
one should simply try to predict the future of international relations,
postulating that "the leading theories are the theories of the leading
countries" (and the leading indicators those that put them on top).
There is a dialectic at work here: development theories also influence
power relations to some extent. Hence, let us try to indicate some
possibilities for further development of the theories of development.
I'. Towards a needs-oriented theory of development.

What is being said in this section is in no way an alternative to the liberal and marxist approaches, it is rather intended to be complementary. The basic point is the reintroduction of man as the focus of development, the purpose and measure of the whole "exercise". It may certainly be said that this is also underlying the liberal and marxist approaches, but the point has to be made again and again if one accepts our basic criticism, that liberal thinking tends to become too enthused with the development of things and systems, and marxism too enthused with the development of structures, in order to develop things and systems after new creative, or productive forces have been released. Hence, in terms of Figure I: the present section is an effort to shift the point of gravity towards the inner circle, and to some extent also towards the outer circle, towards Man and Nature. Our major concern will be the former, however.

To do so an image of Man is needed, not only empirical man but potential man if the purpose of development is some kind of "personal growth". This puts Man in the centre of the enterprise, and also brings in the whole tradition of philosophical, not to mention theological thinking that the social sciences to some extent were a reaction against, even an over-reaction since development theory became too tied to the development of society in the sense of things plus systems plus structures. (29)

One way of creating an image of man is through an image of the needs of man. This immediately brings in a vision of short or long lists of needs, possibly divided into material and non-material, basic and less basic - and what shall be done here is in that tradition.
One shortcoming of the tradition should immediately be pointed out: it is analytical, fragmentary, chopping Man into a set of needs rather than trying to develop a holistic conception of Man. In doing so it is certainly in the western analytical tradition rather than in the eastern more comprehensive, perhaps intuitive tradition of understanding Man, a shortcoming readily admitted. It is also well-known what this easily leads to: an institution-building around each "need", both at national and international levels (ministries of health nationally, a world health organisation internationally, built around the need for health), converting analytical fragmentation into institutional fragmentation, with well-known harmful consequences. This is also clearly related to the size of the political units in our period of history, the nation-states and the quest for some kind of global institutionalisation, and is related to analytical abstractionism, the emergence of intellectuals and professionals to handle human affairs already referred to in the first section. As one of the (non-material, but basic) needs we are going to emphasise, is the need to be active, to be subject, to be autonomous, this process is counterproductive, since the only place where more holistic conceptions and processes aiming at needs satisfaction can emerge seems to be at a more local level, in a "Decentralised" setting, and perhaps even in non-Western cultures, at present, or less male-dominated societies.

We have mentioned all this by way of introduction since we do not believe more in a development process that fragments Man according to needs in a set of global institutions, some type of world government, than in the current fragmentation of Man into geo-political units known as states. There are other possibilities, but it may very well be that they are seen most clearly if we try to enrich our conceptualisation of Man, and that would be the answer so far to our own critique.
The next problem we have to tackle, again by way of introduction, is the problem of universality versus geographical and historical specificity of needs. The difficulty is clear enough. On the one hand there is a need to get a rich concept of Man, with many connotations, here translated into relatively comprehensive lists of needs. On the other hand the variations in time and space are tremendous and any imposition of such lists from anywhere as directives for development processes would constitute some kind of neo-imperialism. It is also obvious that one way in which this contradiction has been transcended in the past and in the present is to arrive at short lists, focusing on the basic material needs so as to obtain something close to a universal consensus. The difficulties with that consensus have been spelt out in the preceding section; it does not constitute a solution either.

In fact, we do not think there is any solution in the sense of a stable, universally agreed-upon list. The list of needs is in itself a part of the development process, in constant need of revision as the general process moves on, and sensitive to all kinds of differences in space. How this revision is carried out, by experts or by people themselves — according to Model I, Model II or Model III — social formations is also in itself a part of the developmental process. But one approach that might be interesting would be to think in terms of maximum lists and not minimum lists, with the idea that such lists constitute a frame of reference, not to be taken literally in all details but to be looked into when a development process is to be initiated or evaluated, since a minimum list provides insufficient guidance and a maximum list may lead to oversteering, to frustrations due to incompatibilities and to unfortunate trade-offs, what we have argued here, is some kind of flexible, indicative long list might be more suitable.
The problem, then, obviously is what to include in such lists. What are the criteria that something has to satisfy in order to be classified as a human need? and what is the meta-criterion according to which such criteria are selected. The answer to that is at a higher level of abstraction, but we will try it none the less: the 
\[ \text{conditio sine qua non criterion, the idea of a necessary condition.} \]
But of what? — of some kind of "system maintenance"; in the first run of the human body, in the second run of the society itself.

In other words, we would conceive of the following two criteria to designate something as a need:

1. **If it is a necessary condition for a human being to exist, it is a need**, in other words, if the non-satisfaction leads to the disintegration, destruction, non-existence of the human being.

2. **If it is a necessary condition for a society to exist over longer time, then it is a need**, in other words, if the non-satisfaction leads to disruption, disintegration, non-existence of the society, for instance through revolt or non-participation, apathy, anomie.

This means that we are operating at two levels where the criteria are concerned, but both of them are fundamentally linked to human beings as such, not to the things-systems-structure abstraction. At the first level one would simply be concerned with the existence of the human being as such, at the second level one would try to derive the needs from observations of what human beings fight for, what makes them withdraw, what makes them try to disrupt the social "order" in which they are embedded. There is no doubt that this criterion is problematic, and some of the problems will be discussed later on — but it is better than no criterion at all, at least to start with. Take a need, or a class of needs, like the need for freedom; however it is conceived of it is obvious that man continues to exist even when he is deprived of
freedom in very many senses of that term; but it is also well-known that he sometimes stands up and fights in order to achieve it.

Both criteria mentioned are empirical in the sense that they give us some possibility of deriving needs from empirical observations. Being empirical they also have the advantage of being sensitive to the variations in space and time: human beings and social orders may persist or succumb under different conditions depending on where in space and when in time one is located. Physical disintegration may be brought about by different conditions depending on where one is located; what people stand up and fight for may vary very much through history.

These criteria also aim at solving another problem: limiting the freedom of experts to impose their own conceptions of needs. As formulated the burden of proof lies in men's behaviour, not in elite postulation. On the other hand, as already mentioned: elites rather than people in general think in terms of such lists, although we are relatively convinced that such lists are closer to the way in which people, when left to themselves would think about development than most economic indicator lists developed by specialists in abstract economics.

The following, then, is an effort to establish such a flexible maxi-list. As the reader will see it has many elements, and they are divided into four categories, in the usual tradition: from the more to the less fundamental. By that is meant the following: needs at a lower level have to be satisfied at least to some extent for need-satisfaction at a higher level to take place. (33) One has to be alive for feeding to be meaningful; one has to be fed for politics to be meaningful; some kind of politics are needed for the last ten needs, etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Needs and/or rights</th>
<th>Goods/Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>(Individual: against accident, homicide)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Collective: against attack, war)</td>
<td>SECURITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physiological</td>
<td>(Input: nutrition, air, water, sleep)</td>
<td>FOOD, WATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Output: movement, excretion)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td>(Climatic: protection, privacy)</td>
<td>CLOTHES, SHELTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Somatic: protection against disease, health)</td>
<td>MEDICAL TREATMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>Culture: self-expression, dialogue, education</td>
<td>SCHOOLING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>(Right to travel and be travelled to)</td>
<td>TRANSPORTATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rights to expression and impression)</td>
<td>COMMUNICATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rights of consciousness-formation)</td>
<td>MEETINGS, MEDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>(Rights of mobilization)</td>
<td>PARTIES, ELECTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Rights of due process of law</td>
<td>COURTS, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Right to work</td>
<td>JOBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice</td>
<td>(Right to choose occupation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Right to choose spouse)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Right to choose place to live)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to self</td>
<td>(Need of self-expression, praxis, creativity)</td>
<td>HOBBIES, LEISURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(individual needs)</td>
<td>(Need for self-actuation, realizing potentials syn- and diachronically)</td>
<td>LEISURE, VACATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Need for well-being, happiness, joy)</td>
<td>VACATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Need for a sense of purpose, a sense of meaning with life)</td>
<td>RELIGION, IDEOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to others</td>
<td>(Need for affection, love, sex, spouse, offspring)</td>
<td>PRIMARY GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(collective needs)</td>
<td>(Need for roots, belongingness, support, association with similar humans)</td>
<td>SECONDARY GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to society</td>
<td>(Need to be active, to be subject, not passive, client, object)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(social needs)</td>
<td>(Need to understand what conditions one's life, for social transparence)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Need for challenge, new experience - also intellectual and aesthetic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to nature</td>
<td>(Need of some kind of partnership)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(with nature)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A few words of commentary may be in order.

First, there is an effort in this list to bring in the human rights tradition, in addition to the human needs tradition; thus bringing into the field of development not only biologists/physiologists (they were already there in connection with nutrition), but also psychologists, social psychologists, and lawyers. There is a purpose in this: if development concerns all men and all of man it should at least concern all the social sciences and natural sciences and as much of the humanities as we are able to get in—it cannot possibly be the concern of one discipline only. And of course the human rights tradition belongs: it has built into it an image of the good society, as so many other images. Indicators of development, hence, should also include indicators of the human rights situation in a country. But having said that it should also be added that the human rights tradition has had a tendency to ignore the more fundamental needs, perhaps relegating them to more residual categories like "economic and social rights". They are concerned more with the rights of elites in liberal, Model II societies than with the rights of people in general everywhere—a point we shall not elaborate further here. (35)

Second, we have added, to the right, some indication of the "services" or "goods" (sometimes material, sometimes institutional) that have to be provided one way or the other in order for the needs to be satisfied. Some of them are put in parenthesis because the relation is far from obvious, e.g., it may be that the case mentioned is meaningful only with a special socio-cultural context, e.g. rich Western countries. The list nevertheless gives some indication of what has to be produced, as a minimum, for need-satisfaction at a basic level to take place.

For the last needs on the list goods/services are less institutionalized, if at all available— they may even be counteracted,
Third, we have started with the "most fundamental right", the right to life, to survival – pointing to such obvious factors that the need for including the probability of ending one's life in an accident, a war and at a murderer's hand in the concept of development. (37)

Then, we proceed to the conditions, given a good chance of survival, under which human beings emerge. Some of them are physiological, some have to do with protection against the natural environment, and some are social. If the latter category is not satisfied there may be biological survival of the individual, but togetherness and self-expression, including dialogue – based on mastery of some language, not necessarily only verbal – is a condition for human beings to grow. We have doubts as to the need for offspring, that is perhaps a societal need more than a human need (and perhaps even an elite need, it is usually elites that argue in favor of more population) – but some form of togetherness is postulated as a need, and in the close form hinted at through such words as "love" (not necessarily Western, "romantic" love – may be that was a part of the transition from Model I to Model II society, individual choice and mobility), and sex.

Then we proceed to the human rights knowing that the list could be made longer. Like the foregoing list there are the kinds of things that people stand up and fight for, not necessarily for the particular institutions that have emerged around the rights in Western societies, but for the underlying rights. (38) It should be pointed out that in saying so politics, for instance, is not seen merely as an instrument towards wise decisions and social cohesion but as something important for personal growth: as a form of self-assertion and self-expression, of the individual self as well as the collective self.
Finally, there is a list of ten more "ephemeral" needs. A distinction has been made between relations to self, to others, to society and to nature - and many of the elements in the list are taken from the Maslowian tradition, which again to some extent is based on on-Western cultures. The list is certainly much less definitive, which is no shortcoming according to what has been said above, for two obvious reasons. These are the kinds of needs that are not well satisfied in societies that are based, to a large extent, on vertical division of labor with consequences in terms of alienation (sometimes also exploitation in the sense of pushing or keeping people below any acceptable poverty line) - and since these are the societies that set the goals of development because they are Centre, Western societies such needs are usually seen as "intangible", "non-measurable", "philosophical", etc. In addition there is less consensus about them because it is not obvious that the two criteria mentioned early in this section are satisfied. Human beings continue to exist even with little new experience, and they do not stand up and fight for it, either. However, we also included the criterion of non-participation, and we have also mentioned apathy: less socially-culturally biased (by the conditions of Model II societies) research might have much insight to add on this.

By and large it follows from what has been said in the two preceding sections of this paper that whereas the problem of direct violence may affect all social formations, the problem of poverty is particularly important in the periphery of world capitalism (the "Third World" countries), the problem of human rights particularly important in those societies but also in some of the socialist countries, and the problem of the more advanced needs perhaps most important in industrial societies in general. Perhaps - these are exactly the types of insights that richer concepts of development and better indicators
might make it possible to explore systematically.

So much for the needs and their satisfaction, in other words for the goal, the purpose of development. What about the means to achieve these ends? A development theory is not only a theory which accounts empirically and theoretically for the present and projects an image of the future; it also has to say something about the strategies.

However, this question throws us back to the very point of departure in this entire exercise. As long as the unilinear tracks of development were accepted the answer to the question was simplified: the image of the future did not have to be described in value terms, one could read off empirically some basic characteristics of the goal state countries, the "developed" countries, particularly the United States and/or the Soviet Union. The strategies were also relatively clear: imitate these countries as far as possible. In short, development theory and practice became to a large extent an empirical discipline studying very difficult problems of applicability and transfer, but fundamentally tying development studies to the empiricist, even positivist tradition in the social sciences. The critique of unilinear perspectives on development is at the same time a critique of that tradition, not rejecting it, but seeing it as incomplete.

A needs-oriented theory of development leaves the field more open since we know very little about under what class of conditions a large sub-set from this list of needs would be satisfied. Concretely this means that every society, big and small, would and should feel free to formulate their own policy of development, to build the path towards a higher level of satisfaction of needs. A theory of development would indicate some steps on that path. Since the points of
departure are rather different around the world it might be easy to think in terms of conditions, "steps", close to the realisation of the goal, and particularly in terms of necessary conditions. These conditions, then, would be located in the things-systems-structure circles, and the question becomes: what is the minimum that can be said about these three, and also about Nature in a theory of development?

The minimum that can be said about things is that there certainly has to be some socio-economic production, or socio-economic growth for that matter, for material needs to be satisfied – taking "production" in a material sense. Priority should be given to food, clothes, shelter, health hardware and education hardware; we might also go on to say transportation/communication hardware as a condition for freedom in our period of history, so based on mobility, and other services.

The minimum that can be said about systems, the distributive aspect of development, would be that there has to be a high level diversity, within the society, for the simple reason – derived from general ecological thinking – that if societies gamble on only one approach (e.g. for the solution of health problems or education problems) then vulnerability increases. When contradictions pile up within the system the society may even be paralysed, whereas gambling on a variety of systems makes it possible to benefit from a variety of approaches and to let the contradictions unfold themselves in all of them, thereby leading to much richer societies.

Added to this, again from the systems angle: there is the problem of equality and social justice – in the senses defined above. The assumption behind needs satisfaction is that it is for all, in the first run regardless of ascribed characteristics, in the second run
if not exactly at the same level, at least without too much disparity.
In fact, both from a liberal and from a marxist point of view one might today argue that the development process starts at the bottom, with those most in need — thereby building higher levels of social justice and equality into the process from the very beginning.

These four points: socio-economic production, diversity, equality and social justice are held to be necessary conditions. Their inclusion in the development theory is of a tautological nature. Nevertheless they should not be confused with the goals of development: even if all four criteria are met in a given society it may very well be that something has gone wrong somewhere in such a way that the purpose of development is still not met. They are not sufficient conditions.

But what is the minimum that can be said about structures? This is more problematic; if it had not been there would have been no liberal — marxist controversy. The reader will already have understood that whereas what has been said so far (goals, things, systems) is, if not within, at least, compatible with a liberal tradition, what is not coming would be more in the marxist tradition. By and large we would feel that the marxist structural analysis is correct although it has pointed to necessary rather than to sufficient conditions, and is too limited in its economism and its determinism, at least in some versions of marxism.

In general we would feel that the necessary condition for development to take place is a reduction if not outright abolition of centre periphery gradients. These gradients seem to have at least four aspects built into them: exploitation in the sense of vertical division of labour between centre and periphery (economic division of labour
brought about by capitalism, political division of labour by state formation - the two going hand in hand; penetration in the sense of the centre framing and moulding the mind and the action of the periphery, partly through local bridgeheads (the centre in the periphery); fragmentation of the periphery (of Third World countries, of districts inside countries, of sectors of the economy that are not linked to each other locally but tied to well-integrated sectors in the centre economies - Samir Amin's important thesis) and marginalisation, the definition of internal and external peripheries as second-class, only partly participant in the development process, mainly being kept as a reserve (for instance as the reserve army of workers under capitalism).

The antonyms of these four structural formations, and hence the developmental instruments, would be equity (or horizontal division of labour), autonomy (or autarchy - which now tends to be the most important economic expression of that idea), solidarity (e.g. in the form of trade unions of exploited workers, exploited districts, exploited countries in order to improve their terms of exchange and terms of trade, and in order to change the structure in general), and participation of everybody on an equal footing, people, districts and countries. All this is rather antithetical to capitalism as described above (the four characteristics, particularly the last three); the acceptance of equity, autonomy, solidarity and participation as developmental instruments is antithetical to at least large scale capitalism, private or state, as we know it today. It may not be antithetical to small-scale local capitalism on a self-reliant, community basis, however - but then it may be argued that such an animal does not exist, that it is in the nature of capitalism to try to grow big, in the first run filling the space provided for it geo-politically by the nation states, in the second run seeing that as a straitjacket and engage in spillovers of an international nature.
However, the structural dimensions made use of here are by no means limited to an analysis of economic relations. There is also vertical division of labour between the leaders and the led, between rulers and ruled, between teachers and pupils, between vendors and receivers of communications and so on. In the work of the present author the four dimensions of exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalisation constitute the mechanisms of structural violence, and when operating transnationally, the structural mechanisms of imperialism, whether that imperialism is primarily economic, military, political, cultural, social or communicative. Particularly important in the present world is social imperialism, a term much employed by the Chinese, which might be conceived of as the imposition by one country on another of its own vertical structure, using those at the top of the local vertical structure as bridgeheads for some of their own designs—not necessarily for economic benefits.

The verticality of this relationship is the verticality between the centre of a total social configuration, for instance a model of post-capitalist society, and the receiver of that model. The imperialist nature (implicit in the word "imposition" used above) shows up when the periphery tries to change this structure. The extension of the concept of structural violence and structural imperialism to non-economic fields automatically sensitises the researcher to other types of exploitation than economic ones, and expands the concept of development from essentially an effort to become less poor, via an effort to become less dependent economically to an effort to become less dependent in general, to become autonomous, self-reliant, the master of one's own social dialectic not the consequence of a cause located in one or more centre countries outside oneself.
Finally there is the outer circle - Nature. It obviously has to enter in any seriously designed and practised theory of development. If the goal and purpose of development is the development of Man, then production of things, at least some things, is one necessary condition, another necessary condition being the distribution of these things. Then there are the constraints; the man-made constraints in the form of domestic and global structures just mentioned, and the non-man-made, natural constraints, today customarily referred to under the heading of the "finiteness" of Nature. Instead of that one might perhaps rather approach the problem in terms of a theory of ecological balance, Man being a part, not a master of that generalised concept of ecology. When the ecological balance breaks down, it shows up, among other things, in the form of depletion of resources and pollution of Nature and Man alike. This is not a new phenomenon in human history but it goes without saying that nowadays expansionist production processes based on economic cycles so world-encompassing that spontaneous control processes that should operate at the more local level (because the producer will sense the impact of his depletion, and producer and consumer alike will sense the impact of that pollution) disintegrate leading to many ecological breakdowns. Hence, a basic aspect of the entire development process is to what extent this ecological balance is maintained, not only on a general global level, or a regional or national level, but also on local levels - particularly if one feels that developmental goals can be best promoted by stimulating local self-reliance.

This type of thinking has introduced a new and extremely important dimension in development theory and practice: the concept of a maximum, a ceiling on development - for instance as exemplified in the title
of the first study of the Club of Rome, Limits To Growth. Production
is needed in order to provide a minimum material need-satisfaction,
a floor level below which nobody should be located when it comes to
consumption of feed, medication, schooling, transportation and commu-
nication. But it also goes without saying that there is a limit to
how much can be produced given the finiteness of nature and the
vulnerability of ecological balances: and, since Man is a part of Nature:
given the increasing size of the human population. May be one day that
maximum can even be calculated, although in a dynamic manner, for new
knowledge will make it a non-static concept. The question then becomes
where the maximum is located relative to the minimum, whether there is
a positive window or a negative window with the maximum below the
minimum - indicative of impending catastrophe. So called experts differ
on this, (our own intuition being that the window is positive still for
some time to come) but it does raise the question of whether one should
not think in terms of social maxima already now, i.e. of limits to the
consumption of food, clothes and shelter etc. by the rich, not only
conceiving of development in terms of how to raise the floor level for
the poor.

There are of course also two other reasons for arriving at this
conclusion: the rate of consumption in the rich countries (and the rich
pockets in the poor countries) threatens not only the limitations set by
Nature, but also the limitations set by Man - both have a limited
capacity. Too much food, clothes, shelter, medication, schooling,
transportation, communication, etc. obviously become counter-productive
at the individual level. At the same time too much disparity in terms
of what people have, and what countries have on the average, also
constitute an important power differential: inequality may be converted
to abuse of power and hence to the creation of a new centre-periphery gradient. To some extent this brings new perspectives on the old debate on equality, equality being conceived of not as a point, but as a range of variation between social minima and social maxima that should be set not by experts but, somehow, by the population in general. Needless to say we are not anywhere near any kind of institutionalisation in that regard.

To conclude: we have tried to present an image of a relatively rich development theory, perhaps drawing on western thinking in liberal and marxist varieties when it comes to how to conceive society, the production of things, the distribution of things inside systems, the transformation of structures; perhaps, implicitly rather than explicitly, drawing on more eastern thinking when it comes to how to conceive of Man, particularly "inner man" (the last ten in the list of needs, for instance), and how to conceive man's relation to Nature. At the same time the theory opens for a broader thinking on development, not only in terms of underdevelopment where social minima are not satisfied, but also in terms of over-development where social maxima are overstepped. Thus, there may be said to be two forms of mal-development, an under-development where too little is produced in order to satisfy the needs, and an over-development where too much is produced and in such a way that some needs are over-satisfied and other needs, particularly the more ephemeral ones towards the end of the list, are left entirely unsatisfied. And with that conclusion the basis exists for the idea that all societies are mal developed, only in different ways, that we are all parts of the same global dialectic and that the time has come to transcend the centre-periphery idea implicit in the "developed/developing" dichotomy, in favour of the idea that we are all maldeveloped one way or the other.
Appendix: TOWARDS NEW INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT

The changes in development theory and practice currently taking place have to be accompanied by corresponding changes in the indicators of development. The conventional indicators, GNP per capita and related measures, only served the purpose as long as development was identified with economic growth, and the latter was above all identified with processing and trading. If development is to be identified with such components as:

- satisfaction of human needs, for all,
- equality and social justice,
- level of autonomy of self-reliance, with participation of all, and
- ecological balance,

then development indicators will have to reflect exactly this, as directly as possible.

In addition to being misleading as an indicator, the GNP per capita tradition also suffered from some other serious shortcomings. Thus, it was a measure developed by experts and for experts, with no popular involvement whatsoever, and based on a calculation process beyond the comprehension of most people. An indicator supposed to reflect something as basic as the level of development should at least be easy to calculate and easy to understand for everybody with a minimum of education—in other words for those whom it concerns most. It should not be permitted to constitute part of a class barrier between those who understand and those who do not. Ideally, it should also be the object of continuing debate and reappraisal, and not only among experts. Indicators of development should be at least as dynamic as the development process itself and not like the GNP (per capita) remain basically unchanged in spite of tremendous
changes in the theory and practice of development.

Development, however conceived of, is a complex process and will have to be reflected through a set of indicators rather than by means of one indicator. To arrive at such a set there are at least two lines to pursue, by defining

- areas of human needs
- aspects of satisfaction of human needs.

The following are some suggestions along these lines of thinking about development indicators.

Some areas of human needs that probably will be on most of such lists are (not necessarily in order of priority):

- food and water
- shelter and clothing
- health
- education.

These are usually referred to as basic or fundamental needs, but the development process does not stop with their satisfaction. There are other needs, such as:

- work
- freedom of impression and expression (of ideas)
- freedom of movement (of persons)
- politics

and many others could be mentioned (e.g. togetherness, friendship, love; need for respect; need for joy and to be a source of joy for others; happiness; self-realization, the need for a sense of meaning of life). Incidentally, no reference will be made to such conventional distinctions as between economic, political and social indicators, for human beings do not live in compartments that reflect unfortunate
division of labour among social scientists more than anything else.

Both lists are problematic. For each item there is usually a narrow, sometimes even perverted concept that only very partially reflects a much richer, more deeply human, underlying concept.

Thus - can food be reduced to proteins and calories etc., or is there also a quality to food, even as an act of social communication?

can shelter be reduced to square meters of covered space per person, or does one have to take into consideration the entire habitat of the individual?

can health be reduced to longevity and access to medication, or does one have to take into account quality of living and capacity for curing oneself and others?

can education be reduced to schooling, to number of years (and levels) passed at school, or does one have to take into account capacity for critical and constructive dialogue, for understanding the human and non-human environment so as to engage in development process together with others?

can work be reduced to alienating jobs, and employment, or does one have to take into account the level of challenge and opportunity for creativity and self-expression built into the work? And what about time lost in commuting to jobs far away from home, should that not somehow enter the picture?

can freedom of impression and expression be reduced to access to mass media and communication in general, or does one also have to take into account the quality, the truth in a broad sense of the culture being communicated? At any rate, it has to include cultural creativity,
not only consumption.

can freedom of movement be reduced to access to transportation, which may simply lead to moving around, according to job requirements, or does one have to take into account quality of experience?

can politics be reduced to parliamentarism, or is it a deeper process involving consciousness-formation - which in turn would be based on education and communication - mobilization - which probably would have to be based on communication and transportation - and some element of confrontation and struggle, hedged around by certain rules?

The idea is not to reject the more simplistic answers for proteins, calories, square meters per person, longevity, level of schooling, level of employment, access to communication, access to transportation and some institutionalization of political struggle are all important. They should, however, be seen as approaches rather than as the answers to the problems raised by the more general need for formulation. Behind the whole idea of diversity of development lies the idea of several roads to satisfaction of human needs, not only those most commonly found in national and international statistics.

Among the aspects of satisfaction of human needs current development theory and practice would lead one to focus on:

- level of satisfaction
- distribution of satisfaction
- structure of satisfaction
- ecology of satisfaction

For each area of human needs all these aspects (that correspond to the four components" mentioned under (1) above) should be considered. The following are some suggestions as to how that might be done.
As to **level of need-satisfaction**: the conventional method of calculating averages should be abandoned in favor of simply finding the percentage of the population above an agreed upon social minimum. This social minimum should not be identified with a poverty or subsistence line; one should aim higher than that. Needless to say, such minima will vary from place to place and over time — and may also vary with age and sex and other characteristics. To impose a standard universal criterion would constitute violence. By this method one avoids the old pitfall of having the overfed compensate statistically for the underfed, the oversheltered for the under-sheltered etc.

Also, the concept and the procedure are very easily communicated, but the data are not easily available — for obvious reasons: they are too politically revealing. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that the concept of satisfaction used here is "objective" relative to a social minimum, and does not necessarily reflect the subjective perception of satisfaction.

As to **distribution of need-satisfaction**: the conventional method of arriving at equality indicators by calculating variances and gini-indices should be abandoned both because they are too complicated and because they do not give enough information about the absolute distance between high and low in society. Instead one might simply find the percentage of the population above a social minimum mentioned above and below a well-defined (if not necessarily agreed upon) social maximum. Together with information on the location of minima and maxima this would give a good idea about the social distribution of, e.g., housing, access to medication and access to schooling and the rest. Thus, the idea of equality would not be that everybody has exactly the same, but that the range of variation between floor and ceiling, or minimum and maximum is limited.
There is another aspect to distribution: social justice. One way of conceiving of social justice is simply as follows: the level of need-satisfaction should not depend on sex, race, age, whether one lives in a city, town or village, whether one is employer or employee, who one's parents were etc. The measure is again very simple: find the percentage of men above minimum in, say, schooling, and the percentage of women, and compare the two percentages. If there is social justice they should be equal, which may mean that they are equally under-schooled, or adequately schooled — and may be compatible with equality or inequality. Social justice does not reflect level of satisfaction or equality in the population, but is nevertheless a very important dimension because it may express the degree of racism, sexism and "agism" (discrimination of the young and the old by the middle-aged) in the population. What equality is to the difference between individuals, social justice is to the difference between groups.

As to structure of need-satisfaction: indicators in this field are more problematic, but in general they should reflect the level of self-reliance. Depending on the area the unit of self-reliance will sometimes be local, sometimes national, and sometimes regional, meaning sub-regional or regional. In some cases it will also make very good sense to talk about the individual human being as the unit of self-reliance: e.g. in connection with the capacity for self-care and for self-education. In general the question to be asked would be: to what extent is the unit capable of being self-sufficient, meaning capable of being its own producer, of what is needed of foodstuffs, housing, for health and education purposes, work-creation, culture, mobility and politics, and to what extent does it depend on other units? Essentially this would be a measure of the extent to which
a part of the world is a periphery dependent on some center elsewhere: a center dependent on a periphery or a center in its own right. Many such measures exist already; some in terms of institutional location, others in the form of budgetary allocation. In the field of mass-media, translations etc. information is available about how much of the culture and ideas communicated are produced locally.

It should be noted that the idea of self-reliance is not that of self-sufficiency but capability of self-sufficiency - reliance on one's own forces so that in a crisis, an emergency, one is in fact self-sufficient. In ordinary periods self-reliance does not exclude trade and exchange in general, but it does exclude the dependency on such exchanges that would make the unit vulnerable to black-mail. It should also be noted that the antonym of self-reliance is not only dependence on a center, but also exploitation of a periphery. A self-reliant unit neither exploits, nor is it exploited.

There is another aspect to the structure of need-satisfaction: mass participation. Development is to be for the people, and the extent to which that is true is measured by the indicators mentioned above. But it is also to be by the people, and for that to happen; national or even local self-reliance are only necessary, not sufficient conditions for it may still be in the hands of local owners of means of production, of knowledge, of expertise. Participation means that not only decision-making, but also production processes are organized in such a way that everybody has a say; not only in meetings where decisions are made; and not only over conditions of production process; over the technology and the means of production in general. The antonym of participation is not only centralized and/or autocratic rule, but also the
rule by experts and professionals in general. For the time being no known indicator exists in this important field.

As to ecology of need-satisfaction: the key here is to what extent our "only one world" will be able to sustain not only the present generation, but also future generations of a reasonable size. Indicators would reflect, within the level of the unit of self-reliance (which is generally not the world as a whole), the extent to which the processes generating renewable resources are intact, and non-renewable resources are either left untouched, or adequate renewable substitutes are found. Sooner or later thinking about such indicators will probably have to approach the extremely difficult problem of what would constitute minimum, optimum and maximum population for the various units of self-reliance.

Participation in indicator-formation. What has been said above is nothing more than a sketch of possibilities that would bring indicators more in line with new trends in the theory and practice of development. According to the ideas of self-reliance and mass participation ideally, one should, and indeed might, have mass discussions all over the world on at least the following themes that are basic to the whole concept:

- which are, in fact, the "human needs"
- which are the priorities in case of conflict
- which are the trade-offs
- where are the cutting points;
  for the floor, the social minimum
  for the ceiling, the social maximum
- what would constitute a reasonable level of equality, of social justice -along which dimensions.
- which are the units of self-reliance for the various human needs
- what is the meaning of participation
- what are the minimum and maximum limits for our responsibility
to future generation.

Again, the answers will vary profoundly from place to place and over
time, this would serve as a safeguard against the use of need-based
indicators to standardize, to make uniform patterns of development
for experts, being trained the same way, are usually more similar to
each other than people in general. People who make indicators should
therefore be prepared to calculate several versions, depending on
variable cutting points and "units of accounting" (which in this
context is what the units of self-reliance are).

The need for new statistics. One basic point about the indicators
suggested above would be that they are goal-oriented in the sense that
they measure level of attainment of developmental goals. Thus, there
is no indicator of "industrialization" or "urbanization" for it is
not clear that these constitute developmental goals; at most they are
means, and they may not even be that. To assess how a country, or a
district within a country or a region of countries is doing data is
needed, and they should be presented so as to reflect directly how many
(or few) are above which minimum; how many are within which minimum-
maximum range; what is the level of social justice; what is the level of
self-reliance and how are the ecological parameters. The United Nations
her agencies and the statistical bureau of member states should be
called upon to collect and present data in a way that clearly reflects
new thinking about development - and if this is considered too
expensive, sample surveys should be used, and/or ways and means should
be found whereby people themselves might collect and present the data.
At any rate, more attention should be given to the definition of development indicators. In the past the leading indicators were the indicators that ranked the leading nations highest, such as those on top of the international division of labour (which is what GNP really measures). In the future the indicators should measure the level of living for the common man and woman everywhere, in a social setting, and mindful of the outer limits set by our finite nature—being a mirror in which people can see themselves and judge how that society is doing locally, nationally, collectively, relative to itself some time ago and relative to other societies when that is appropriate. And here we would even reintroduce the idea of growth; not as the accumulation of machineries, of production and of marketable goods, but in the sense of dynamism of progress, along the many dimensions of true development: the development of human beings.
This paper has been inspired by discussions of many groups.

First, there was the Working Group on Human Resources Indicators, convened by the (then) Methods and Analysis Division of the Department of Social Sciences, Unesco, which led to a number of meetings during the years from 1967 to 1973, and to some extent continued by a series of Expert Meetings on indicators of Social and Economic Change. The present study was commissioned by Serge Fanchette who, like Erwin Solomon and R. Iyer, has provided the participants at these meetings with very stimulating input and ideas.

Second, there was the World Indicators Program at the Centre in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, of which this paper is an outcome. Some of the ideas are a continuation of those developed in the basic programme paper of that project. Measuring World Development (published in the journal Alternatives, Vol. 1, 1975, nos. 1 and 4).

Third, there were the many discussions at the courses of the Inter University Centre of Postgraduate Studies, Dubrovnik - particularly the course World Future Models that took place January 1975.

Fourth, there were the stimulating discussions at the Institut d'études du développement, Geneva. And finally, the conference organized by the Government of Algeria and the International Development Center in Paris - in Algiers, 24-27 June 1975 - when the Appendix to this paper was presented for the first time.

The basic problem to be explored in this paper, posed by Fanchette, was also suggested by Michel Debeauvais: can we have indicators without a theory of social change? Our answer - as will be seen from the text - is "yes, but not without a theory of human fulfilment", given here as the elements of a theory of human needs. If development is to be defined as development of human beings, then it is at the level of human beings that development has to be measured - if it has to be measured.

(1) A good example here would be Venezuela. Thus, the Venezuelan Government's income from oil increased from Bol. 3 billion in 1972 to Bol. 13 billion in 1973 and to Bol. 45 billion (after the OPEC action) in 1974, while the percentage of the population gainfully employed in agriculture decreased; the percentage employed in the oil industry and in mining also decreased (down to 1.3 per cent in 1974 from 2.8 per cent in 1950 presumably due to high productivity); the percentage in the tertiary industries increased (to 48 per cent in 1974 from 37.8 per cent in 1950); with the percentage of unemployed increasing (from 6.3 per cent to 7.73 per cent). Data from Latin American and Venezuelan sources, in special issue of Kontakt, no. 6, 1975/76, Copenhagen.
(2) The case here is, of course, the People's Republic of China - seemingly ranking very high on non-material values in the "identity" cluster (see Section 4 in the text), but low in the "freedom" cluster.

(3) In the history of philosophy there seems to be a periodic "rediscovery of man" as goal. The authors of this paper are of the opinion that the indicator movement in general will have much more to desire from philosophy than from the social sciences, once more an indication of the inter- and transdisciplinary character of the indicator movement.

Aristotle in his Politica gives examples of how the politicians of his time were only aiming at what was "most useful" and profitable. They were also confusing the means - economic welfare - with the goal: human well-being (Works of Aristotle, II, 9 1269 a 34-35).

For a very recent formulation of the Protagoras homo mensura principle, see the Cocoyoc declaration - circulated as a document of the General Assembly under the symbol A/C.2/292.

(4) Today this problem is discussed in many fora, sometimes with other answers than "human beings" to the question of what is the goal. In Norway, for instance, the philosopher Arne Naess argues in his book Økologi, samfunn og livsstil (Oslo, 1974) that nature as a whole should be the goal for all activity, and in this general picture man plays an important but not superior role. When we in this paper put human beings in the centre, it is for many reasons, and we shall here underline two of them. First, we want to emphasize a positive view of humanity, we see human beings as basically "good". Implicit in this is the belief that the human being, permitted to be human, also will develop in a way that does not hurt nature. Second, we feel that placing man in the centre opens for a much more democratic approach since most people have some kind of view of themselves and their needs and how they can best be satisfied, whether their consciousness is "false" or not. This feeling of all human beings serves as a point of departure, not dogmas from the point of view of economic and/or social theory. More problematic, however, is how to characterize the ideal state of nature, because, among other reasons, we cannot consult nature and therefore would be inclined to impose upon nature our own conception of what nature should be like. Hence, anchoring developmental concepts in development of nature seems problematic. In a sense we are more in the tradition of Durkheim when he placed as a primary goal the maximum cohesion and conviviality between members of society, a higher goal than economic growth and development in general. This was one reason why he rejected both liberalism and marxism (reform socialism). In his opinion both of them had material growth as the ultimate goal, and differed only as to the means.

(5) The term is used by the senior author in The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective, New York, 1977, and is the autotelic value in the World Indicators Program at the University of Oslo.
(6) "Damage" stands for a number of things in a theory of needs. We are thinking of the discussion concerning the hierarchy of needs, and the idea that some needs are more fundamental than others. Among the criteria that are suggested in the literature of needs one might mention:

(a) necessary conditions for survival in a purely physiological sense;

(b) necessary conditions for preservation of mental health - as this is explored by Maslow, Motivation and Personality, New York, Harper & Row, 1970;

(c) "Basic Needs" for Roos (Welfare Theory and Social Policy, Helsinki, 1973, p. 65) means "the imperative for people to be able to live and develop themselves";

(d) Ahnavaara bases his list of basic needs on unconditional reflexes (Ahnavaara, Yhteiskuntatieteen kybernetiikan metodologia ja metodologiseb positivismin kritiikki, Helsinki, 1970, pp. 134-36;

(e) for Amitai Etzioni basic human needs are those specific to man - The Active Society, a Theory of Societal and Political Processes, New York, Free Press, 1968, pp. 624-26.

(7) In this connection it is interesting to note how easily basic ideas and notions in liberal production theories have been assimilated in marxist theory and vice versa - at least as far as these ideas relate to how production and profit can be increased (instead of "profit" other terms such as "economic way of production" are used in Eastern Marxist).

(8) The alternative would be more holistic ways of dealing with the human condition - possibly leading to forms of understanding so complex that the action consequences may be negligible. The Western form of understanding gives power to the professional competent in the handling of a limited range of variables and not to the contemplative person who by intuition feels his way in very complex webs of units and variables. Marxism takes an in-between position: very simplistic in terms of the basic causal variables, but very complex in its perception of the totality affected by that variable.

(9) In either perspective the inner limits of man and the outer limits of nature are easily neglected or at least not given primacy. More prominent is the role played by economic competition (by private or collective entrepreneurs) and by class conflicts (classes of individual and collective actors).
A well-known example of this - and one which has had an great significance in theory as in practice as it was written at about the beginning of the last century, can be found in Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London, 1776, ch.vi, p. 22.

This leads to the peculiar idea that capitalism is a kind of society that have to go through - in spite of all its anti-human characteristics. See Miklos Molnar, Marx, Engels et la politique internationale, Paris, Gallimard, 1975, pp. 192, 193, 197, 198, 205, 263.

See, for instance, R. Barnett and R. E. Muller, Global Reach, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 1974. In this excellent study the authors show in detail how the multinational corporations work in order to create needs for their products in developing countries. In order to do this "on a high profitable basis" ethnographers and psychologists participate in the task. Barnett and Muller refer, for instance, to the development process in the Latin-American countries (ch. 9, pp. 213-54).


This is a basic thesis in the Trends in Western Civilisation Program of the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.

Today the ranks of the imitators are rapidly dwindling not only in the capitalist camp: the meeting of Communist parties in Bucharest in 1976 also dethroned the Soviet Union as model country.

The first systematic presentation appeared in 1951, under the title System, Glencoe, The Free Press. For a discussion, see Johan Galtung, Members of Two Worlds, Oslo 1971, Chapter 1.2.

Substitutability is in line with the general tendency towards increasing compartmentalization of the individual person. In practice this shows up in the way in which each individual can be seen a set of roles, with corresponding role expectations, and the system of production is only interested in one of these roles. This pattern is seen particularly clearly in connexion with imported foreign workers in rich western countries: one is mainly interested in the "productive part" of these workers, and adjusts conditions to meet the requirements in that connexion. The individual foreign worker develops a feeling of living in a vacuum and a sense of hopelessness when he attempts to use parts of oneself other than those directly related to conditions of production.

Marx is of the opinion that these are among the factors that distinguish human beings from animals - the difference between the most skilful master builder and the best bee is that the former has built the cell inside his head before it is built in wax - Capital, ch. ii, first part.

One reason why all these studies were and are still being carried out is no doubt the ease with which it can be done - as in Russell et al., Handbook of Social and Political Indicators, reducing analysis to a mechanical job once the data are there.


(24) Czechoslovakia could be cited here as a case in point. Formally part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was neither in the center nor on the periphery. Of all the East European countries, it was the one from which the Soviet experience was least relevant as well as being the country which, left to develop its own socialism, could also serve as a model for the Soviet Union in some major respects. The events in August 1968 eliminated this possibility. What happened then was probably not entirely unwelcome in the capitalist West because "communism with a human face" would constitute a threat to these countries with the terror which it was often portrayed by Western media removed. Some of the same applies to Italy and France. What the other Western countries fear is not a terror terrorism but a basic change in economic structure combined with respect for human rights and freedom.

(25) The usual pairings for comparison would be North vs. South Korea, North vs. South Vietnam up to 30 April 1975 - now, perhaps Cuba or the former Indo-China in general as against the ASHAN empires, China vs. India and Cuba vs. Venezuela or the Dominican Republic.

(26) It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that there is a very basic choice involved here: whether one identifies development with what happens at the top, at the middle, or at the bottom of society. The ambivalent focus on averages is a statistical concession to the general population, a step forward relative to the idea of measuring welfare by the standards of a royal court or the upper classes in general. But the point here is not merely the statistically obvious that averages do not reflect dispersions, but the humanly crucial point that it is at the bottom of society that the threshold between well-being and misery is located. Hence the argument should be made that to lift people above this threshold is the key point in development.
(27) One might say that the point of departure for Marx' social criticism and analysis was precisely the idea of putting human beings in the centre. He found a gap between the nature of human beings and their existence. The natural essence of man was for Marx the ideal which was suppressed due to structural conditions. Empirical Man, as formed by the capitalist system represents only human existence, prevented from realizing his true human nature. See, for instance, Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 24 in Marx' pagination Paris 1844, in Marx/Engels Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin, Moskva 1927-35.

(28) One could also imagine a tripartition of these different ways of viewing human beings: ideas about human beings as they really are—based on notions of human nature; ideas about human beings as they appear in a given situation in a given society, the empirical human being; and ideas about human beings as they ought to be, the imperative image of man. To illustrate these three aspects let us make use of the concept of alienation which in traditional Marxism usually is based on a positive view of man, the true human nature, and man as man ought to be. Empirical man, however, is alienated: Freud had a different view: if human beings could really develop as human beings, it would be impossible to build the good society with a corresponding high level of culture. Freud's view is more negative, pessimistic, as opposed to the view held by, e.g., human beings not only can but must satisfy all their needs, and this is a necessary condition for the good society, (Reich, The Sexual Revolution, London, 1969). Needless to say, ideologies and viewpoints with a negative view of man can easily be used in order to promote an authoritarian social system in order to domesticate, control and repress what is held to be the true but, at the same time, a threatening human nature.

(29) Different views of man are expressed in the various suggestions as to how to characterize man as a genus: homo faber, homo sapiens, homo ludens, homo negans, homo desperans - as explored by Fromm in The Sane Society of Hope, New York 1968, World Perspectives No. 38, Part 4 - What does it mean to be human?

(30) Thinking of the psychologists who some years ago were exploring "human instincts" and finally thought they could locate no less than 6000 of them with each theoretician adding his own suggestions, many would be in favour of very short lists of needs, focussing on the most basic ones. We are, however, of the opinion that it might also be interesting to focus attention on suggested instincts about which there was a certain consensus, in other words, on the degree of overlap in answers. In addition, there is the advantage to a relatively long list of needs that it runs a better chance of covering more of the total personality. About instincts and the development towards several thousands of them, see, for instance, E. Fromm, Motivation and Emotion, New York, Englewood Cliffs, 1961.
(31) The idea that human needs vary over time should be qualified by making a clear distinction between quantitative changes (people need more of the same to be satisfied) and qualitative changes (people need new types of satisfaction, not only new levels). Incidentally, another aspect of time would be how the needs vary with age. The infant, the child, the adolescent, the adult and the old may all be said to emphasize different types of needs. One interesting thesis in this connection would be: if one could make a list of the relatively specific needs characteristic of the age interval from 20 to 60 years, then one could also make a survey of the processes leading to the satisfaction of precisely these needs. One hypothesis would then be that in the over-industrialized societies precisely these processes are given high priority because they lead to the satisfaction of needs for the age group in power - particularly the male part of the middle aged.

(32) In the literature on needs different criteria are emphasized, some of these are mentioned in note 6.

(33) We would stress "at least to some extent" as it is unacceptable to insist on a specific hierarchical arrangement of needs in all cases as Maslow could be said to do - in Towards a Psychology of Being, New York, D. van Nostrand, 1968.

(34) The only set of needs about which there seems to be a consensus that they are more basic than others are those that constitute necessary conditions, physiologically speaking, for remaining alive.

(35) We find the basis for this assertion in the current world situation, characterized by lack of satisfaction of the most basic material needs in so many parts of the world. Do the various declarations on human rights mirror this particular aspect of the world situation? We think they do not, or at least only insufficiently, even though one might say that the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights has certain paragraphs that are related to basic material needs:

para. 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

para. 23.3: Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

In addition, one might also mention paras. 24, 25 and 26.1. What is missing, however, is explicitness with regard to the material aspects of these needs: "human dignity" being a different kind of concept than food, clothes, shelter, health and education.

(36) It is sufficient to recall the French declaration of 1789. But then again it seems easier to point to the weaknesses in the declarations of the past than in the declaration of the present, hardly because the latter necessarily are better, but because we do not see their weaknesses so clearly.
As George Lefebvre points out in his *Quatre-vingt-neuf*, Paris, 1939, it was a declaration stipulating a set of norms for the most powerful society - in sharp contrast with the reality of French society at that time, with hundreds of thousands living on, or below, the starvation line, certainly not satisfying their most vital and basic needs and rights. "Needs and rights": the general idea would be that needs should become institutionalized as rights, and only those rights that correspond to needs should be recognized.

Indeed in times of war, human rights are violated almost every day in the world. As to accidents: it should be unnecessary to emphasize that in developed and over-developed societies the right of life is not at all satisfactorily protected - particularly in the field of transportation where in many countries the children are overrepresented as victims.

Clearly, this criterion - that people have been fighting for these rights - cannot cover everything. The most suppressed will not have the necessary material, spiritual and human resources in general to fight for what others might conceive of as an evident human right - they may, for instance, be too short on information.

Maslow's hierarchical needs are as follows:

First, the somatic needs, such as

1. Physiological needs
2. Security needs, and then
3. Needs for solidarity, context and acceptance
4. Need for self-respect and status
5. Need for self-realization
6. Need to know, learn, discover
7. Need to symmetry, beauty, esthetical qualities

(here quoted from Roos, *op. cit.*, p. 68). It should be pointed out that the "need for symmetry" may be culturally very specific: as in contrasting a Western and a Japanese garden, the former is often symmetric (Versailles), while the latter is often organized around a central point, which may not be located inside the garden.

Many might add that it is exactly in the unfinished, where there remain many important things to do. Individually or collectively, a necessary condition can be found for human well-being. In his preface to the second edition of *Motivation and Personality* Maslow emphasizes precisely this need for the unfinished and the imperfect. He says, for instance: "The demand for 'Nirvana Now!' is itself a major source for evil, I am finding" (page XXII - Harper & Row, 1970).
(41) Can capitalism be non-expansionist? Can it just lock in at a point of stable equilibrium and stay there? Or, will it always be driven onwards through the combined ideology provided by comparative advantages and economies of scale, into ever-expanding systems? One important consideration here would be that this does not only depend on "laws" of economics, in case of capitalist economics, but also on cultural, even civilizational variables. Thus, in a less expansionist civilization than the West, capitalist social and economic formations might perhaps stay within certain borders, e.g., within the confines of a local or a national economy, and in stable equilibrium. Stability may become institutionalized just as expansion may; it is difficult to see how one or the other is the necessary consequence of a capitalist economy. It may even be that those who have so argued have committed a major mistake in disregarding civilizational variables.

(42) See footnote 13.

(43) See footnote 24.

(44) In the general theory of needs one might refer to the distinction between the need subject - the individual human being - and the need object, nonmaterial or material conditions that can be utilized for the satisfaction of needs. A concrete tool can from this point of view be regarded in at least two different ways: as a tool to produce need objects, for instance food, or the tool can in and by itself be a need object, e.g. because a need to be creative, active, to work is satisfied when the tool is made use of. For the distinction between need subject and need object, see J. P. Roos (op. cit., p. 65) or Anders Birak, "Human Needs as a Basis for Indicator Formation", Papers, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, 1976.

(45) These problems have recently been analyzed in many good studies, and also in exhibitions, such as the "Ararat" exhibition in Stockholm, summer 1976 (at the Modern Museum) where the theory has been put into practice in the sense that concrete products (need objects) more in harmony with nature have been created - from forms of human habitat, to human and nature friendly energy and production systems.