IS PEACEFUL RESEARCH POSSIBLE?*

On the Methodology of Peace Research

by

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1. Introduction.

The problem to be explored in this paper can be stated very briefly as follows: is peace research necessarily a peaceful activity? More precisely, is there a meaningful distinction between violent and nonviolent methodologies in peace research? And if there is such a distinction, we are immediately led onto more questions: could it be that some methodologies very frequently employed in fact are highly violent?; what would alternative, nonviolent methodologies be like? - and the final, in a sense most fundamental question: does peace research have to be pursued with nonviolent, peaceful methodologies?

To many social scientists a decade or two ago these questions would sound like they were fully absurd. This would also apply to peace research some time ago, including the present author. When Fred Blum some time ago asked the very crucial question of whether one could study nonviolence with violent means of study the question was seen as an irritant, and shrugged off. For the answer seemed so obvious: peace is the absence of violence, violence is seen as direct violence, as typified by shooting, and no social scientist in general, peace researcher in particular, (or the present author even more particularly) had ever included shooting or other forms of direct violence in the typical methodological repertory. True, there was the problem of cooperating with those who do, with the military, but although borderlines were difficult to define, and although the military could permeate the society so profoundly that there was almost no nonmilitary corner left at least the problem was understood, some action could be initiated, alternatives could be found. But besides
that this was seen as rather unproblematic.

Not so any longer. Many social scientists and others, most of them outside the particular field and group of peace research, have reflected profoundly on this question, and come to conclusions similar to those that will be presented here. Why not just refer to those authors? For the simple reason that premises are often as important as conclusions because premises can lead on to new conclusions, open for new vistas - for which reason conclusions arrived at via different ways of reasoning are never identical. Moreover, it is also important to show that within peace research there has developed a form of understanding that also can be turned against itself, that the subject can be the object of comprehension, in an ever deepening effort to arrive at self-understanding. Needless to say: it is at this point that the conceptualizations around the notion of "structural violence" become useful exactly when applied to peace research itself.

Some years ago people at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo started turning the analytical searchlight provided by such elements against their own institute, and it did not look too good. The result was an effort to see peace research not only as an activity resulting in articles, books for elitist or public consumption, even in peace action of various kinds, but also as a way of organizing the activity resulting in that type of peace research product. The result was, concretely, a number of structural changes at the Institute itself. The old formula, peace as absence of direct violence, made the Institute look peaceful since there was no shooting, not even fist fighting during seminars, tea breaks, or on any other occasion - but the extended concept of violence bringing in notions of structural violence made it look completely different. And this article, then, is an effort to carry that concept further and look at peace research itself, not only the peace research institute.
2. Social science research as structural violence

What is "structural violence"? One conceptualization of it we based on the following four components:

exploitation: the extent to which interaction is based on a division of labor that is vertical, meaning that the net benefits of the interaction process are very asymmetrically distributed. The net benefits would refer to the ex-change aspects of the interaction (that which passes between the parties) as well as to the in-change aspects of the interaction (that which is induced inside the actors as a result of the interaction process).

penetration: the extent to which the exploiter produced in the process of exploitation is able to penetrate "under the skin" of the exploited, establishing in the exploited a bridge of a "local bourgeoisie", a center in the Periphery, if the relationship is between countries, or a dominance of the consciousness of the underdogs if the generic term refers to a person.

fragmentation: the extent to which the underdogs generated through exploitation and penetration are separated from each other, having little or no bilateral interaction among themselves.

marginalization: the extent to which the exploiters form their own patterns of multilateral interaction and organization, tying them together, constituting a concept of first class citizens, making of the others second class citizens or countries.

As one illustration of structural violence between countries the example of the nine members of the European Community relative to their "associated states" may be used: the exploitation takes the obvious form of, for instance, colonial type trade relations; penetration takes the form of building bridgeheads to local elites, of the old colonial or the new fellowship generated variety; fragmentation takes the form of highly different bilateral interaction rates at the top and at the bottom of this total structure and marginalization takes the form of constituting a group of first class states, the EC countries themselves, with some second class states, the "associated states," linked to them.
As an example at the interpersonal level work relations in almost any factory in the industrialized world may serve: exploitation has many forms, one of them being the extent to which problem-solving is monopolized by the managers and routine implementation is engaged in by the workers leading to highly differential possibilities for personal development; penetration is closely related to this by providing a structure that produces extreme differentials in development of consciousness; fragmentation is seen in the way managers can much more frequently and easily come together during working hours as a part of their job whereas workers are kept separate at their work place (in most cases); marginalization is the clear separation line between the two leaving no doubt as to who are first class and who are second class.

But these two examples, formulated in this jargon or in a pure marxian analysis, are in a sense classical. The point here is to apply this to the relationship between researcher and researched - in the following referred to as Rr and Rd respectively. What are the characteristics of this relationship in two of the most frequently used social science methodologies, the survey research and the experiment?

(1) Exploitation

It is exploitative: the researchers use the researched as sources of raw material, in this case referred to as raw data, sneak in on them with a pretext study, later to be followed up by the real "instrument", drill the human mind, mining for responses, withdraw after some words of gratitude, even an occasional token payment, to process the raw data at home, the home being the "institute" where researchers have their factories. The product is then turned out in the form of a speech, an article or a book, for general consumption.

One can now distinguish between better or worse cases of exploitation. In the worst cases the process is paid by those even higher up than the researchers and is intended for contin repression. The researchers get raw material from the research process them and hand them up to the elites above, sometimes
against handsome compensation. A part of that compensation may be the bribe needed for the researchers to break the old norm of open research and classify their findings so that those researched upon will never be able to see what kind of ideas have been developed about them.

This is the extreme model; on the other side is the conventional model whereby the researchers monopolize the processing and send back the processed product, but to nobody in particular. In fact, there may not be any particular addressee, any target audience. The scientific process is concluded with the finished text. It is somehow assumed that this text is absorbed by the world consciousness, even enriching that consciousness - regardless of how many or how few read it and how they react to it. But usually there will be a target audience of fellow social scientists for whom the finished product serves as one of several inputs in a process the output of which is a new finished product, a new text, but with another author's name on it. And then, of course, there is certainly also a highly pragmatic consequence of scientific production: it also serves as one among many inputs into the process the output of which is a scientific career.

When this pattern was taken over from the natural sciences there is little doubt that the object of social science, human beings, was treated in a way very similar to the object of natural science, nature. To process data on nature certainly enriches the consciousness of the natural scientist just like processing of data on human beings enriches the consciousness of the social scientist. But the idea that nature has no consciousness, is object, not subject, was taken over by social science so that no problem of exploitation arose. To enter into an interacting relationship between researcher and researched so that the former is enriched and not the latter was seen as unproblematic, or not seen at all.

In emphasizing consciousness we have tried to reduce the
charge of exploitation to a nucleus which is always present, in any type of traditional social science research, often also in peace research. However, there are certainly other aspects of exploitation in this relationship too, some of them quite material. He who mines others for raw data and converts them into a finished product may also receive considerable material benefit, not only in the form of a salary, but also in the form of honoraria, lecture fees, rewards, power, prestige. He becomes a specialist on "those people," is catapulted into a lectures and conferences orbit with "that problem" at its center, thus converting the spin-off effects from data processing into spill-over effects of a not only material but also political kind, in terms of power. Sometimes he may, like the capitalist (private or state) and imperialist producer proclaim that he does it in order to serve the needs of the people he has mined, that he does it all in order to help them. In proclaiming this he may be honest or dishonest, and what he says may be factually correct or incorrect. The fact still remains that he, not they or he and they together, have decided over how to use the surplus generated through this particular type of production process.

On other occasions he may try to close the cycle by sending the processed product back to the people who delivered the data. This may take the form of letting them in, before anybody else, on the "findings," for instance in the form of marginal distributions, or a specially designed write-up. Or, he may design articles, books, etc. with them as a target audience, making use of all the various techniques of popularization. Such practices may improve the situation somewhat, but not greatly as will be seen more clearly when the alternatives are considered. The basic difference still remains: the difference in consciousness formation by playing highly different roles in the total scientific process.

There is, however, another way in which the social scientist incorporates himself in a superstructure that changes the picture somewhat (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Social science as a transaction cycle

In the Figure we have put the researcher in between: he gets data from the researched, salary from the power structure and produces two kinds of products: a popular version for the researched and a technical one for the power structure. The spin-off effects due to consciousness formation when he gives form to raw data (imprints Culture on Nature) in other words when he processes, analyzes and interprets his data are still there, but the major spill-over effects are taken over by the power structure above him.

What the researcher does in this case is to prostitute himself: he sells his own work product, the scientific product, for wages, leaving to others to decide how the work product is to be used (if at all). In a sense he does the same as the researched: they let the researcher mine them for data, sometimes against a more or less token monetary compensation, sometimes against whatever reward they might derive from feeling that they participate in something "scientific". The net result is that insight is transported upwards, through the mediation of the social scientist. Typical cases would be what happens when big powers organize public opinion polls about their "image" around the world using various public opinion agencies; or when big multinational corporations do the same to understand better the images of their own products. In either case knowledge for power accumulates on the top, those at the bottom become objects of power rather than subjects of power, and those in the middle earn a living.
Of course, this process is most well known in connection with natural science research where the power structure (government and/or big corporations) convert findings made by the scientist into "technology" that can be protected through patents and marketed with other powers and corporations in return for political and economic favors. The bigger the favors the bigger in general the compensation to the scientist for foregoing direct participation in these affairs. For instance, in east-west trade today in the old cold war area raw materials from east are exchanged with technology from west, a technology developed through the work of scientists, but somehow expropriated from them, appropriated by the power structure and made use of in the political and economic process.

(2) Penetration

Penetration is the opposite of autonomy and the point here is that the way social science is often practiced it is autonomy reducing rather than autonomy increasing where the researched upon are concerned. In other words, the concern here is not with the differential benefits from participation in the research process, in terms of consciousness formation, as with the way in which the researchers get "under the skin" of the researched.

To clarify this, let us consider an example not taken from social science (except, perhaps, in an indirect sense), but from medical science. Let us compare two images of a standard medical operation such as an appendectomy, under the condition of general anaesthesia and under the condition of acupuncture. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2. Two medical approaches

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\begin{array}{c}
\text{high} \\
\text{Physician} \\
\text{physician} \\
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\text{Physician} \\
\text{Patient} \\
\text{Model I} \\
\text{Model II}
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In the first model the patient is made completely unconscious, and for all practical purposes converted into inanimate nature; no psyche, only soma. The physician is highly conscious, and the last thing he may whisper into the ears of the patient slipping away from consciousness could be "this is all to your best".

In Model II insensitivity in the critical area is produced through acupuncture which makes it possible for the patient to retain consciousness. However, the point is not only that the patient remains conscious and can reflect upon him or herself during the operation; this can also be produced through techniques of local as opposed to general anaesthesia. The point is that this setting can be used for a seminar on the operation prior to its performance with physician as well as patient participating, and for active participation by the patient during the operation, for instance performing many of the tasks a nurse might otherwise have performed.

In either case the appendix may be successfully removed and there is no experience of pain except for the post-operative difficulties experienced under Model I when the narcosis slips away. Yet the two patients are not the same after the operation, for under Model II the patient has grown in consciousness, in understanding of own situation, and the physician may also have gained a much deeper understanding of the patient. In fact, in the former case consciousness deprivation also serves to reduce the patient to a case with no individuality, similar to other cases with the same pathological symptoms; in the second case maintenance of patient consciousness makes this abstraction and reduction if not impossible at least much more difficult.

What, then, does this have to do with social science? This is seen most clearly by a hypothetical comparison of the patients in the two cases. In the first case the patient develops an unquestioning, non-participatory attitude to what happens; in the second case there is a chance to gain some type of parity with the physician and also to define oneself more
as the master of one's own affairs. In the first case there is complete implicit acceptance of the idea that the physician is a master to whom subservience would be the most adequate attitude and behavior, because he knows better than you yourself what is good for you; In the second case this type of attitude would develop to a considerably lesser degree. In the first case the physician penetrates into the consciousness of the patient and takes over that consciousness. He becomes the consciousness of the patient, in the latter case this is no longer necessarily so.

At this point the connection to social science is clear enough: the emergence of a social science methodology generating the idea that the researcher has better insight into the situation of the researched than the researched themselves. Consequently, the researched should abdicate to the researchers when it comes to insight about themselves — It would be "in their own interest" to let others form and be their consciousness.

Thus, there is no doubt today that there are many social scientists, and that they possess a stock of knowledge about some types of regularities in human behavior — unpossessed by those researched upon to yield the data on which much of this insight is based, but that produces a peculiar situation: very much of this knowledge is only valid as long as it is not possessed by the very same people the knowledge is about. For instance, all the famous experiments in psychology and social psychology and small group sociology (except those that can be said to be more physiological in their nature) are only valid under the assumption that the research objects do not know about those "findings". The Asch experiment, for instance, will hardly apply to Asch nor the Sheriff experiment to Sheriff, nor the Bavelsh experiment to Bavelsh, and so on. A certain naivety, freshness of the subject is assumed, as has been argued at length elsewhere, for the findings to be valid.

Obviously, this creates a vested interest among social scientists in rather limited dissemination of their findings, completely consonant with the model of Figure 1. In fact,
for the social scientist to perform services to the public structure he probably has to be able to prove that people behave the way he says they behave. If they consistently behave in an opposite manner of what he predicts his total performance may be less than impressive. One condition for them to behave consistently in the opposite manner would obtain if people not only knew everything the social scientist predicted about them, but also had a sufficient understanding of the structure in Figure 1, and a negative evaluation of the exploitation implied by it. To the extent that these two conditions do not obtain we would say that people have been penetrated by the social scientists, that people have abdicated to the social scientists just as the social scientist often has abdicated to the power structure.

(3) Fragmentation

In the general theory of structural violence fragmentation refers to the condition whereby those below are kept apart, deliberately or not, given little or no chance to develop the type of interaction among themselves out of which new structures, more resistant to exploitation and penetration, may emerge. It is rather obvious that this condition obtains, indeed, in the way social science methodology has structured social science research.

As one example take the frequently recommended technique of simple random sampling. The whole idea in this technique is to detach "the respondents" from the social structure in a way unpredictable to the respondents themselves. When selection happens according to a lottery or a table of random numbers the probability of being selected may be known, but there is no way of knowing a priori whether I will be selected or not, nor is there any way after I have been selected of knowing who else will be selected. It is up to the researcher whether he will make each respondent aware of who the other respondents are; often he does not want to do this lest the data should be "contaminated". Just as for the case of low or no consciousness in connection with social science research
discussed above there is an implicit assumption that people are least contaminated when they are most fragmented. In other words, there is an implicit image of normal society as consisting of fragmented, unconscious people. This is not the place to discuss whether that image is valid or not - it may be quite valid - but it is rather obvious that with such implicit assumptions social science methodology will reinforce rather than weaken a structure of this type.

As another example take the technique of replication. Replication in space is much more frequent than replication in time, exactly because innocence, once lost, is hard to regain: those who have been researched upon once have in a sense been violated forever (unless the purpose of the study is to measure "change"). Replication in space takes the social research projects to new, fresh respondents; separating them from each other. At least the present author is unaware of any case where new respondents have been encouraged to take contact with the old ones, and highly aware of cases where new social scientists have taken contact with the old ones in order to find out how the project was carried out so as to insure "comparability" under replication.

In general, researchers are well organized, researched not. And this point is then carried further in the discussion of marginalization.

(4) Marginalization

The general idea here is that the researchers constitute a well integrated first class of citizens, the researched upon a loosely integrated second class. In a sense this is only a way of reiterating what has been stated under (1), (2) and (3) above, but there is one additional point to be made beyond the obvious fact that researchers have associations, researched upon not.

The point we have in mind is the way in which researchers regard themselves as unalterable, unchangeable, as fixed point
in an ocean of turmoil and change. Thus, in order to study changes in what happens among them—changes in attitudes, in behavior, in social structure or what not—the assumption is that they themselves constitute archimedean points relative to which motion may be detected. And one way of obtaining this type of immutability, very often itself referred to as an important component in the self-image of being "objective", above what happens around them—is the low degree of involvement usually recommended in social science methodology. It is the detached, cool, noncommitted interview where the interviewer at most contributes mildly encouraging utterings like "and then?", "well?" or even only "uh hum". It is assumed that the more emotional the issue may be for the respondent the more needed is this type of detachment for the researcher. And this also applies to such recommended techniques as participant observation: the researcher is a participant but only up to a certain point, from that point on he is detached and if there is a real crisis in the organization he studies and he is asked to take a stand withdrawal might be recommended.

Let us now take this model and apply it the way it has been applied in studies of imperialism: as a relationship between two collectivities, in this case two countries, not only as something that happens within one of them. It will then be seen immediately that the relation between researcher and researched is not only a reproduction of general topdog/underdog relations in society, but also, at the international level, a reproduction of general imperialistic relations:

Figure 3. International social science as imperialism

![Diagram showing international social science as imperialism with Center and Periphery with interacting nodes labeled Rr and Rd.]
The rectangle in the figure constitutes a link between researchers in four countries, two of them in the world Center, two of them in the world Periphery. This link is known as a team, and takes the form of a transnational research group, often organized by international social science organizations, non-governmental or governmental. They have structures very similar to multinational corporations with mother companies and daughter companies and with a division of labor between the two: the mother companies specializing more in processing, the daughter companies more in extraction of raw data. The underdog, the researched, the scientific proletariat are found in all countries. In so being the international social science structure reproduces and reinforces general imperialistic structures. And just as with economic imperialism: at this scale fragmentation becomes even more successful for it is virtually impossible for a Chilean, Nigerian and Pakistani worker to see themselves as belonging to the same group of researched - only at the very top of the project is it possible to understand the total structure. And at this top there may not even be any researchers present, the top may consist of pure power structures with very clear ideas as to how the research findings are to be utilized.

3. Nonviolent social science: an alternative model.

After this presentation of an image of what contemporary social science is like, to a considerable extent, let us proceed exactly as one would have done in an analysis of capitalistic imperialism or social imperialism, asking the two crucial and related questions: what would be our vision of an alternative, and what would be plausible strategies leading to its realization? The latter will be the subject of the next section, the former will be explored here, using the conceptualization of structural violence in terms of the components that have been made use of above.

(1) As to exploitation:

It is quite clear what the general rule would be here: not to do research on people, but together with people; not to act as a stimulus and registrar of responses, but to enter dialectically,
in a dialogue with the "researched". In that case they would, in fact, no longer be researched people but be part of a team, of an effort to explore some aspect of the social condition of humankind together.

Concretely, this would mean an abolition of vertical division of labor. If there is a social problem to be explored those who are personally involved in it would be taken into the research team from the very beginning, or would explore the problem together, formulate its dimensions and analyze their relation, and there would be no such thing as regarding others as the sources of data and oneself as a source of insight in understanding these data. The finished product, the article or the book would be more of a joint affair, and would above all be available to those who are concerned, rather than to the power structure on top. Or at least: it would be equally available to all. (20)

The basic point in this would be an understanding of research as one way in which consciousness formation takes place, and an understanding of equity (the opposite of exploitation) as a structure whereby such an important benefit as consciousness formation is not too asymmetrically distributed. Moreover, there would be the idea that the surplus from scientific production, the product itself, would be decided over by those concerned, by those who have really contributed to it - and here the researched and the researchers would enter more equally.

This is very far from the situation today, even so far as to sound utopian. To clothe it with more meaning let us look at the other three aspects.

(2) As to penetration:

The basic point here is to avoid any situation whereby researchers penetrate into the researched and are able to manipulate them simply because they possess more knowledge about the researched than the researched do about themselves, leaving alone
than the researched do about the researchers. The key to this penetration lies in differential insight about each other, and this again is predicated on the assumption that the researched shall be willing to open themselves, lay themselves bare so to speak, whereas the researcher shall remain closed, unapproachable, secretive, even mysterious.

Hence, horizontality would not only involve more equality when it comes to what the two parties actually do in a research process, it would also imply a different attitude on the side of the researcher: a willingness to see oneself as a participant in the research process, not merely an observer registering it from the outside. In practice this would mean moving into concrete situations, experiencing the dynamism of social reality together with those formally regarded as researched upon, internalizing it in oneself and joining together reporting about what took place.\(^{(21)}\)

(3) As to fragmentation:

At this point it is quite clear that certain techniques very much favored by social science researchers would have to be used much less frequently. Random sampling that fragments individuals and presents an atomized image of reality that not only introduces a bias, but also increases the power of the researchers over the researched, should be seen not only as methodologically invalid, but also as morally illegitimate unless the researched have been properly informed and have agreed to it. The same applies to sequential testing of people in social psychological experiments, one other way of handling them one by one, but in time, since the hardware used in experiments is more expensive than the software used in an interviewing study where the fragmentation takes place in space.

Talking about experiments: the one-way screen is a good illustration of the vertical division of labor involved. A material factor, the one-way mirror, is used to amplify further the consciousness differential between the researcher and the researched: the researcher sees both parties, the researched only themselves. Combine this with sequential testing and the verticality
and fragmentation of liberal societies are almost perfectly reproduced (we say "almost" because reality is not that bad) in the laboratory.

(4) As to marginalization:

A key factor here is the way in which the researchers define themselves as first class citizens in the sense of constituting fixed points in the social universe from which changes in the second class, the researched, can be observed. A fundamental aspect of nonviolent social science, hence, would be to give up this type of asymmetry and have social scientists regard themselves as live and dynamic partners in social reality together with others, not as observers and commentators standing above it. For in so doing they are only, consciously or unconsciously, acting out a role which is some kind of peculiar mixture of teacher and judge, regarding the researched as incumbents of some type of pupil/defendant role. The social science investigation is a process whereby the latter, not the former is tested - characteristically enough, even the word "test" is made use of, particularly in psychological research.

In short, the alternative would consist of researchers who immerse themselves in social reality and together with others act out their hypotheses. To take an example: imagine the power structure is interested in having people live in X rather than Y, and buy product A rather than B - and engage a social science team to identify the conditions that facilitate and impede this desired change. Typically, social scientists might design "instruments" for this purpose, approach the researched with more or less realistically simulated experiments, and hand back to the power structure a report with the major findings. In so doing they would be instruments of the power structure, regardless of whether they define themselves as politically left or right.

The alternative would be, with or without power structure participation, to present the problem squarely to the population concerned and have it openly and freely discussed. Having done this one might decide together to create some experimental con-
ditions and see what that would imply; one might simply start living in X and buying A to understand what this involves. The social scientists would themselves be parts of the experiment, and together with the others make a report. In so doing not only would the spin-off effects from the research process be more evenly distributed; one would also avoid the use of social science for manipulative purposes - as described above under the various headings of structural violence.

But would this at all be science, or would it only be some type of political action, perhaps dignified by the term "action research"? But then, what is the difference? All human activities are politics one way or the other - we have tried in the preceding section to analyze in what way conventional social science is politics in the sense of reproducing and reinforcing structural violence. No doubt, by means of that method one is able to obtain a snapshot of static, individualized social reality - but not very able to obtain a live image of dynamic, more collectively experienced social reality. Neither of these two can claim to be "real" reality - which world is more real is for us to decide. But in doing so one at least has to be conscious about the relationship between social science methodology chosen and the image of reality rendered, not to mention about the non-scientific social functions of a given methodology. Even if one would not be willing to change completely to the alternative indicated here one should at least be willing to see how scientifically biased and politically loaded conventional methodology is.

And this leads one straight into a non-reducible minimum where science is concerned. Whatever refers to itself as science should, to our mind, at least satisfy these two criteria:

I. explicitness, honesty about the value basis on which one stands, what kind of social reality one wants to promote with the social science tools chosen - and
II. a questioning attitude, an ever-present willingness to question any assumption.
There is nothing in what has been suggested here which would be incompatible with these two requirements. Nor are they incompatible with a social science methodology systematically based on structural violence - it is only that the moment the proponent of that methodology stands forth and makes explicit his own assumptions that something appears which does not quite stand the test of clear daylight. However, he would certainly not say that "my four basic values are: exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization." Rather, he would talk in terms of objectivity (where replicability would play an important role), and in terms of the goals that he hopes the research findings (rather than the research methodology) will promote. And that leads us straight into the old problem of whether ends can justify the means, for instance whether such macro-societal goals as equity, autonomy, solidarity and participation (the antonyms of the four evils listed above) can be promoted by resorting to their negation at the micro-social level of social science research. It is hardly possible to have any firm stand in either direction on this question, but one thing is certain: the question merits the deepest attention, and no leftist social scientist should feel that he has a carte blanche because of his lofty goals that entitle him to make use of dubious means.


To fight against structural violence is to fight for liberation, and it is usually assumed in the theory of liberation that this has to be the task of the underdog. And we would generally make the same assumption here: we would imagine that the real political force that might lead to fundamental change in social science methodology, in a nonviolent direction, would have to come from the researched. The researchers have much too much of a vested interest in the status quo, enjoying their positions sandwiched in between the power structure and the researched.

Imagine that the researched selected for a public opinion survey made use of the press, wall posters all over the city,
local broadcasting and other means of communication to identify each other and to gather together in the City Hall the day the team of researchers were supposed to descend upon the town. The researchers, imagine they are ten in number, would then be called in one by one to be questioned by a collectivity of 200 candidates for the role as researched, taking the place of defendants who are accused of consciousness molding, even consciousness feeding and manipulation—— In other words, imagine that the roles are inverted, that the researched appear as a collectivity and the researchers are fragmented. Of course, the really strong researcher could make use of this situation to stand up against the collectivity and address them jointly, he might even get some kind of group interview out of the situation. If he does that, however, he would already be in a much more symmetric situation than the one he had planned, and the protest movement would already have been a success — although a limited one.

But let us go one step further: imagine that the researched really come together and start systematic courses in how to mess up social science investigations. Yes, they could even go so far as to write a little red handbook for researched people in how to guess underlying hypotheses, how to answer so as to disconfirm crucial hypotheses (or even worse, react in such a way so that hypotheses are neither confirmed nor disconfirmed!), what embarrassing questions to ask of social scientists, etc.

In other words, it is our contention that social scientists are by and large living on borrowed time. Many have seen this recently, and turned away from what is largely a US inspired social science technology today increasingly taken over by Eastern European countries after it has probably seen its heyday in Western Europe. With increasing awareness of social structure one would imagine that people would be able not only to see what happens to themselves when they enter such roles as that of a child, a pupil, a student, a worker, a patient — and also the role as researched. They would be able to see that these are all specimens of the generalized underdog role and,
consequently, reinforce and reproduce each other. More particularly, they would be able to see that the social scientists are drawing on a reservoir of role training as pupil and defendant - the latter not so much in public court as in the court of everyday life where everybody is a little bit tested and a little bit grilled; the former above all in schools.

On the other hand, one would also imagine that social scientists themselves would have such a high level of social consciousness that they would see the handwriting on the wall and act accordingly. One way of doing this would be to turn away from direct mining of people for data, turn one's back to interviews and questionnaires, to observation and participation where one remains an observer, and towards the use of secondary data. But this will usually be a grandiose way of deluding oneself, engaging in indirect exploitation rather than direct one, like the people in some countries where internal exploitation has been greatly reduced but the population nevertheless gladly enjoys the fruits of exploitation carried out far away from home. For the kind of statistics found in handbooks and yearbooks are very often based on countless operations whereby raw data have been extracted, only that it has been done by bureaucrats and functionaries who have this as their task or part of their task, rather than by social scientists for a specific purpose.

Another tendency would be to turn to historical data, leaving to philosophers the question of whether it is possible or meaningful to exploit the dead. This might be more acceptable, and there are also structural data available on which social scientists can develop their analytical skills and bring them to bear on knotty problems without any justification being accused of data mining of people. Another solution is structural research.

However, in a sense this is the easy way out, not very innovative. More innovative would be to find ways in which political participation could be the object of scientific investigation, self-analysis, in an open non-manipulative manner. In fact, this is often done by politicians whose autobiographies may
be fundamental contributions to insight in social reality, provided the author is able to abide by the two criteria stated above (the author usually is not). But for the time being the action research paradigm with a collective research report seems to be the best example of the type of alternative which, when enacted sufficiently often, would by itself pave the way for other, new approaches to social science research.

5. Conclusion.

Peace research is about violence, a major form of violence is structural violence, the fight against structural violence is called liberation, and a good place for peace researchers in particular and social scientists in general to start is to start with oneself. In saying so we also make it clear that the target of liberation is not anything like "capitalist society"; the category of "structural violence" is much broader than the category of capitalism. Capitalism is an obstinate, often very nasty way of implementing all four aspects of structural violence through the economic sector of society, but is not the only way. Experience has shown us very clearly that it is quite possible for society to change its economic basis, yet have some violent social science structures survive in a highly unquestioned way.

And that immediately leads to one important point: has it not been a little bit too easy for left-wing social scientists to assume that the fundamental evil of society is economic in its essence, and that the basic enemy is the capitalist? Has there not been a tendency to assume that other evils are epiphenomenal and will disappear once the fundamental evil has been transcended? Has that ideology not served as some type of rationale for the continuation of a pattern that gives obvious advantages to the researcher and very few to the researched?

In other words: it seems to be high time that social scientists in general and peace researchers in particular train themselves better to see the circumstances under which the question "who is the enemy?" has the very simple answer: ourselves.
NOTES

* This paper was originally conceived when the author was a Visiting Professor at the Universidad de la Habana, Cuba. One of the factors stimulating this particular essay was the contrast between the egalitarianism underlying Cuban socialism in general, and the carry-over of conventional social science methodology in spite of the socialist ideas and structures in contemporary Cuba. The paper can be identified as publication M-25 from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

1. In a background paper for the inaugural conference of a World Peace Brigade in Beirut, Lebanon, 1961.

2. Most of this discussion, for instance the Positivismusstreit in Germany has been more concerned with fundamental problems in the foundations of social sciences than with efforts to indicate alternative methodologies.

3. The concept of "structural violence" is generally defined as a structure whereby values are generated and distributed asymmetrically so that some kind of verticality arises due to the operation of the structure (as opposed to the deliberate actions of actors within the structure). Four ways in which this can happen are exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization. For one exploration of these concepts, see Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), Chapter 3.

4. Particularly important in this connection was the division of labor pattern between researchers, assistants and administrative staff and the salary distribution. In both cases measures were initiated to make the structure less vertical, such as a certain job reconstruction (researchers doing more of their own typing, assistants and staff being more integrated into the creative aspects of research projects), and a salary equalization scheme. How lasting such structural changes are remains to be seen. For an orientation about this see article by Nils Petter Gleditsch in the Annual Report from the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, 1970-72.

5. This is the basic theme of the book referred to in footnote 3 above.


7. The power component of the spin-off effects from being a researcher rather than researched i.e. of course, best expressed in one word: "expert". As an expert one is consulted, and permitted to a certain extent to participate in forming the consciousness of the power structure.

8. In using the term "surplus" we are of course hinting at the need for a broader conceptualization than ordinarily found in marxist thinking where the focus is on economic surplus only.

10. Here, however, it should be pointed out that one of the major decisions taken by the power structure may be not to make use of the research product, and the honorarium paid to the researcher could be interpreted as a bribe not to publish it rather than compensation for useful work. The reason why the power structure may decide not to publish is not necessarily that the findings are in any sense inconvenient, but rather that the purpose of ordering research done at all was to give the impression that "something is being done about the problem". That impression was already generated the day the research project was decided and researchers hired, what happened later is of minor importance or none at all, including the findings. It is interesting that researchers are prepared to accept this kind of arrangement, probably often because they are fragmented by the power structure and because the rewards already received both in remuneration and the pleasure of being close to the power structure are high enough to keep them silent.

11. The United States and Japan seem to be particularly active in using public opinion polls for this purpose.

12. For an elaboration of this point see Galtung, The European Community, Chapter 7.

13. It should be pointed out that acupuncture serves a triple function: purely curative, as an anaesthetic, and as a diagnostic method. In other words, it is a relatively simple operation with a multiplicity of functions.

14. For a further analysis of this point see Johan Galtung, Science as Invariance-Seeking and Invariance-Breaking Activity", University of Oslo, 1972, mimeo.

15. Loc. cit. The basic point here is the way in which social scientists have a vested interest in the naivity of the subjects in order for their conventional methodologies to work.


17. This point is elaborated in the article on the Camelot project quoted in footnote 6 above.

18. Actually, in recent years international social science associations have not been so much dominated by the United States alone as by the superpower condominium, very clearly seen in the programs of the International Sociological Association, International Political Science Association and so on where the idea somehow seems to be that for science to be "objective" there has to be one American and one Russian on each panel and committee.
19. This was a fundamental point in connection with the Project Comitet. At the very top of the organization of that enterprise social scientists had practically speaking vanished and what remained were fifteen people. The basic point was, of course, that the top was visible to very few.

20. This raises the important problem of whether it really should be equally available or rather restricted, turning the formula around: having social scientists do research together with the researched and keeping the findings secret for the power structure. Our own inclination, within the liberal tradition, would be to favor public social science as much as possible, without disregarding the possibility of keeping some research secret from the power structure. In other words, the idea would be that if research is to be used as a secret political weapon then it should be on the side of the underdog, not on the side of any type of repressive structure.

21. We are, of course, thinking here to a large extent of the type of methods elaborated by P. Freire in his path-breaking Pedagogy of the Oppressed. What we essentially are saying is that it is important to blur the borderlines between science, pedagogy and politics - that all three of them should somehow be horizontalized and brought together.

22. This was the nature of the social science project in Cuba that served as a stimulus for the present essay.

23. But what about doing research on present elites - assuming that most historical research is done on elites anyhow? We would say that "elites" are also people, and to do research on them rather than with them is as alienating as to do research on people lower down the social structure.