MAINSTREAM vs. COUNTERTREND
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

On The Linkage Between Cosmology and Epistemology

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this essay is twofold.

On the one hand I attempt to show that there is a strong linkage between the dominant assumptions made in what I have elsewhere referred to as "occidental cosmology in the expansion mode" and the epistemology, the basic paradigms underlying international relations studies as they are conducted in the very same occident, particularly in mainstream United States research in the field. In other words, what is attempted is not only to outline major assumptions in mainstream IR thinking, an exercise presumably undertaken very often, both by those seeing themselves as protagonists and antagonists to that intellectual enterprise. The task is more ambitious: to try to show that mainstream IR thought is exactly what we would expect it to be given deeper assumptions; that epistemology is a manifestation of cosmology, in general, and in international relations studies in particular.

On the other hand I shall try to show that mainstream thought is not ruling the ground alone; that there is a counter trend, or counter trends, given the general pluralism of occidental society, and more particularly the coexistence in that society of an upper house and a lower house, an overside and an underside, or however one wants to express it. Countertrends are expected. However, these counter trends should to a large extent be predictable from assumptions about the other mode of occidental cosmology, "in
More particularly, there should be a relationship between the two epistemologies just as there are between the two cosmologies: mainstream IR epistemology should be carried by elite universities and more so the higher on the ranking scale they are placed (and the closer to secular power, presumably among other things engaged in IR practice, not only IR theory); be engaged in more by male than by female researchers in the field; more by the middle-aged and somewhat less by the very old and very young; more by the highly schooled, skilled, trained and somewhat less by those less exposed to schooling in the field; more in the countries in the center of the occident than in the periphery; more in the universities in the center of those central countries; and certainly more by those with upper class origins and less by those coming from layers more modestly placed in society. In short: mainstream density should be extremely high at centrally placed universities in central countries catering to upper classes; among middle-aged males and very well schooled researchers. And, correspondingly countertrends should be carried by all possible negations of that rather heady combination, not only by the total and complete negation.

Let me only add that I consider these hypotheses completely trite: if they were not true something very strange would have happened. Added to this would come the recognition that changes in the basic outlook on something as crucial as the nature of the world system will not come easily. It is linked not only to a total framework of intellectual thought; the paradigms are woven together by the assumptions known as "epistemology". But those assumptions, in turn, are nothing but an explanation of the nature of the whole occidental exercise. Challenging mainstream IR theory, hence, is tantamount to challenging the Occident.
2. Occidental Cosmology and (US) International Relations Epistemology

I shall divide the exploration of mainstream and countetrend assumptions in assumptions about the structure of space (meaning world space); of time (meaning historical time); of person-nature relations (actually meaning actor-nature relations, the actor in this case being the individual state, not the individual person); person-person relations (meaning state-state relations); and person-trans-personal relations (meaning state-trans-state relations). And then, at the end comes knowledge (meaning the structure of knowledge, i.e. epistemology) as applied to international relations.

I. SPACE

Mainstream assumptions

The basic occidental assumption about space is that the occident is in the Center, surrounded by a Periphery of countries aspiring to, some of them even qualifying for membership in the Center with an outer fringe of actors that are simply Evil. If there is anywhere this assumption should be expressed it would be in international relations theory, since theories more easily conform to underlying assumptions than practice; practice usually being an imperfect manifestation of theory (and theory a too perfect reflection of practice). As world space is divided into states this would mean not only that the most important or powerful states are seen as being in the Center and hence are occidental, but that the origin of the state system is seen as being predominantly in the occident, other efforts being aberrations. Consequently, both genesis and basic causality in the state system
will be seen as located in the occident as Prime Mover, and as basic mover afterwards. And in the center of the Center there will emerge one particular actor, the United States, with a "leading role", related to its particular status as a Promised Land inhabited by a Chosen People. IR theory would use less biblical terms, such as "hegemon", and see a Western event, the Peace of Westfalia 1698 as ushering in a new system for the whole world.

**Countertrend assumptions**

The countertrend would then emphasize alternative ways of constructing (both theoretically and in practice) the world system, starting with nomadic systems, neither sedentary, nor with clearly recognized geographical borders, leading up to the almost countless non-state actors in the world system today based on any institutionalized link between actors from more than one state, transcending national borders: governmental and non-governmental actors forming international governmental organizations and international peoples organizations, for non-profit and/or profit purposes. Countertrends would pick up alternative origins for a state system in the Middle and Far East, and focus on the power potential of the non-occident. In other words, a much more diverse, less crystallized, more symmetric, less biased image of the world, including volatile and stable people's movements—for peace, development, human rights, environment. This has consequences for the construction of Evil in world space. For mainstream thinking Evil would have to be located outside the Center, possibly in the occident not in the Center (the assumption is not that all of the occident is in the Center, "only" that the Center is in the occident)—such as heretic christians, moslems, the wrong white people such as Russians and Turks; or in the
Periphery located in the non-occident, in pagans and/or colored peoples. The countertrend might reject the assumption that Good and Evil can be located in anything like a precise manner in world space and discover shades of Good and Evil everywhere, possibly tied together in a yin/yang fashion—or else reverse the mapping of the mainstream and locate Evil in the Center itself. One candidate might be the country appointed by mainstream as the center of the Center, the United States, which then becomes a frequent recipient of certificates of Evil, in the "blame America first" tradition. Another counterrtrend view would be to construct the United States as a normal country, playing a normal role with a normal people inhabiting a normal land—like all others are assumed to be or should be (according to the counterrtrend).

One might speculate about the motivation structure underlying such heavily value-loaden images of world space, for mainstream thinkers, is it (over-) acceptance of the Center or (over-) rejection of the Periphery, or both—for counterrtrend thinkers, is it (over-) rejection of the Center, (over-) acceptance of the Periphery, or both? Distribution of power and privilege as well as analysis of interaction patterns give good pointers to a division of the world in Center and Periphery, but from there the transition to a division in Good and Evil is not a logical one. Rather, it is a part of classical occidental dualism, seeing the world in terms of Good or Evil, not Good and Evil.
II. TIME

Mainstream assumptions

The basic assumption in occidental cosmology is, of course, the idea of progress, of the system by and large improving over time, approaching asymptotically its Truth which in world space (see below) is Peace. However, on the way to this catharsis there is crisis; the path to salvation is not only narrow (meaning difficult), but wrought with extreme dangers. Catharsis is not guaranteed: apocalypse, the end of the whole world system, is another possibility if the progress along that narrow, winding path is not well monitored.

More particularly, the progress takes the form of the state system crystallizing which is one way in which Good can be more perfectly separated from Evil by containing it either within well-defined confines of states or blocs of states. In this crystallized system Good can then gradually or suddenly overcome Evil through superiority, with the danger always lurking underneath that it may turn out the other way around. The key to these problems is found in power, particularly in destructive power (force) which has to satisfy the double requirement of providing superiority needed to destroy Evil, and at the same time sufficient retaliatory strength to deter Evil from attacking; the two basic ideas enshrined in mainstream concepts of balance of power. Balance of power is then seen as a means, not as a bene per se; the end or goal is a real peace where Good has finally overcome Evil. But that may still take some time. In the meantime progress is associated with not only crystallization of the state system, but crystallization of the balance of power mechanisms within the state system, essentially seen in terms of bipolar alliance formation with states increasingly rallying to the Good camp.
Countertrend assumptions

Countertrends in the occident will tend to pick up the idea of progress and agree with the mainstream that somewhere in the future there will be Peace. As to the road to catharsis there may also be agreement that the crisis could lead to apocalypse, but a cult of apocalypse is more likely to be denounced as fascist. In non-occidental countertrends, for instance in the buddhist sphere of thought, oscillating time, from eternity to eternity, will prevail with ups and downs, with no final state except in a very remote nirvana.

In this complex process the countertrend will focus on the crystallization of alternative systems, on all kinds of transnational actors and see them as mechanisms through which Good and Evil may mix, Good being the peace forces, Evil being the war forces. Mixing rather than sorting becomes the metaphor for understanding of progress, but for this to happen alternative world space actors have to be crystallized. Much broader power concepts are then introduced into the picture (see below). An oscillating time concept demands a tighter integration between means and ends, meaning that peace has essentially to be built by peaceful means. Force may be necessary but never for offensive, only for defensive purposes leading to doctrines of defensive deterrence, aiming at making a country "indigestible".

Another, also typical, countertrend focus will be on balance of exchange (equity), particularly in economic relations, but not only in those, rather than balance of power in the sense of force. And whereas mainstream thinking sees progress in terms of decreasing entropy through sorting of actors in terms of Good and Evil, countertrend thinking will tend to see progress in terms of increasing entropy, with mixing of actors of all kinds in increasingly complex but by and large equitable patterns of interaction.
IV. ACTOR-NATURE

Mainstream assumptions

Since the predominant actor in world space is seen as the state the general occidental cosmological stance—seeing man as entitled to be above nature and, within limits, to use nature for his purposes—has a clear consequence for mainstream thinking: state-over-nature.

Ultimate decisions about how nature within the national territory shall be used rests with the state as organization within the country, defining the national interests and how nature can be used not "an sich," but "für mich/uns". This also carries over to the relation to nature outside the confines of the nation-state, with nature seen as something over which states may quarrel and eventually fight; nature herself being conceived of as having no views on the matter. Military destructive insults to nature are highly concrete manifestations.

Countertrend assumptions

Since states constitute only one set among all the actors in world space, and since the ultimate actor is seen as man himself, counter-trend thinking will be guided by man-in-nature ideas. Nature will be seen more in its own terms, "an sich," and ecological balance emerges as a major world order value. An important concomitant of this thinking would be the idea of nature as a common heritage of mankind, not exclusively belonging to a state or the people residing on it.

Nature is to be used for human and world interests rather than for national interests. To there is fighting to be done then with nature rather than against nature, for instance using forests for hiding. Mainstream thinking would tend to build on a hostile attitude to forests as the dark abodes of Evil, have that attitude amply confirmed by the successful operation of forest-based guerrillas, and tend to see civilization as desylvanization (deforestation) whereas countertrend thinking would be concerned with reforestation, and how to reverse the desertification trend.
V. ACTOR-ACTOR

Mainstream assumption

The basic emphasis in occidental cosmology in general will be on individualism and verticalism in the set of actors. Actors are seen as carriers of motivations and capabilities, and as basically acting in their own interests. The state of nature for a set of actors, hence, is anarchy. The alternative to anarchy is hierarchy, where verticalism comes in as a regulating principle over individualism. In a system of states these two ideas translate into state sovereignty with states acting in their national self-interest.

State-over-state conflict/competition is not only what is to be expected as the normal and natural state of affairs, but also the best one can hope for precisely given that this is normal and natural. Global darwinism, with the survival of the fittest, will by the law of selection lead to the emergence of super-powers, doomed to be in conflict with each other simply because they are the biggest. The fate of the world will then hinge on their ability to accommodate to each other; it is from them that most problems and also most solutions will have to come. The weak will disappear unless they are protected. Foreign policy decision-making should be in the hands of the elites who fully comprehend mainstream principles, not others—a reason why these issues are not suitable for democratic decision-making because people in general are not capable of understanding the intricacies of the system and might be confused by foggy notions of solidarity (collectivism) and equity (horizontalism). The only alternative to anarchy, which makes US exercise of violence look normal/natural is hierarchy, which makes US violence look necessary, even legitimate.
Countertrend assumptions

Where mainstream stands for verticalism and individualism and statism, the countertrends will tend to pick up horizontalism and interpret it as self-reliance both in the sense of relying on own resources (independence) and on equitable exchange (interdependence), and shun dependency relations. 28 This will then be done within a setting of actor diversity. State sovereignty is seen as limited and limitable to non-aggressive action, and normal state-state relations are seen in terms of cooperation and mutual aid. It is Kropotkin rather than Darwin to put it that way; interlinkages and ties and numerous actors of very different kinds, rather than a focus on super-powers. There is a strong conviction that the weak among these actors will disappear precisely if they are "protected". And decision-making, both inside actors and among actors, is seen as valid and useful only if it is democratic and fully participatory, and with a world policy rather than "foreign policy" focus. Countertrend thinking will tend to have a dim view of the elites carrying mainstream figures of thought in their minds, and will prefer to balance them or even override them with broader sources of legitimacy. Non-state actors are to play a major role; how is less clear. 29

But there is also another countertrend that picks up a reversal of the Good/Evil distribution and also sees the "normal" world as a hierarchy, presumably with the other super-power at the apex of the pyramid. This countertrend is equally based on occidental cosmology in expansion, and differs mainly on this particular point. Non-state actors are again relegated to a very peripheral role, except as intergovernmental actors. Leninist analysis of the role of a strong state based on marxist class analysis would be located here in its ambiguity: countertrend, yet within dominant cosmology.
VI. ACTOR-TRANSACTOR

Mainstream assumptions

Peace is the overriding value, but not at any cost: it has to be understood as the triumph of Good over Evil. Given what has been said about the construction of world space, historical time, relations to nature and relations among actors above, underlying mainstream peace concepts will always be the idea that the super-power or super-system of which the mainstream thinker is a part will ultimately prevail and impose its peace on the world. Today this leads to concepts of pax americana and pax sovietica, depending on the author.

But there is also the possibility of peaceful coexistence, entertained by mainstream thinkers in either camp, hedged around by a perfectly functioning balance of power, if not in the form of balance of terror. Thus mainstream thought would tend towards power monopoly or power duopoly as viable solutions to the peace problem, in either case seeing the super-powers as the source of the solutions. Within this framework of thinking summit meetings bringing the two leaders of the two super-powers together attain something close to theological significance with the "personal chemistry" between those two persons attaining the character of Prime Mover. The super-powers are then seen as carriers of something close to ultimate truth falsehood, in the present situation liberalism/conservatism/capitalism on the one hand and marxism/socialism on the other. This Truth is then, in turn, seen as compatible with true national, human and nature interests.

In another version the focus would be less on the organization of the economy and more on the organization of the polity, positing
against each other democracy and multi-party systems contending for power in free elections on the one hand, and "democratic centralism" within single party systems exercising power without the range of choice given in truly free elections—except, perhaps, within the party. But the result is the same: power monopoly or power duopoly.

Countertrend assumptions

Countertrend would share the concern with peace as the ultimate value, in a sense as a secular substitute for God, but with a different philosophy as to Good versus Evil. The philosophy of peace typical of countertrend thinking might be based on diversity and symbiosis between these numerous and diverse actors. States will have to become good world citizens, and the same applies to non-states. The production of norms for good world citizenship will have to continue unabated, with the predictable consequence that super-powers and others with aggressive inclinations, seeing themselves as chosen to impose their code on the total system, will challenge the rules, break them, withdraw from jurisdiction. Countertrend thinking might then emphasize broadening circles of world democracy as a basis for a world central authority. In this quest for globalism the building blocs will be non-aggressive states (who will have to play down their national interest in favor of world interest), local communities and organizations. But underpinning it all, as the basic source of legitimacy would be human interest and nature interest, interpreted as basic human needs and ecological balance respectively. The construction of social systems and world systems would derive their legitimacy from the capacity to satisfy basic human needs in a sustainable process of "eco-development," rather than as the embodiment of a Truth propagated by a strong power on the world.
What has been said so far under these five headings, with two sub-headings for each point, is an effort to portray the system as constructed by mainstream and countertrend respectively. The basic assumption is that underlying these constructions are cosmologies, broad, unstated assumptions about reality, with the occidental cosmology in the expansion mode underlying mainstream construction and the occidental cosmology in contraction mode (and in addition to that non-occidental cosmologies) underlying countertrend thinking. I have also listed as countertrend the marxist/Soviet image mirroring liberal/US thought. What then emerges under the headings of mainstream and countertrend assumptions above could rightly be referred to as ideology. As opposed to cosmology it is more specific, and explicit, out in the open for debate so to speak, but clearly related to more basic metaphors, assumptions, beliefs.

But the concern here is not so much with world system ideology as with the epistemology within which that ideology emerges as a consequence. In other words, not only the linkage between unstated assumptions and explicit conclusions, but also the rules for arriving at this linkage, the basic rules for the conduct of inquiry, in other words research. Much of this is implicit in what has been said above; what will now be done is an effort to clarify the linkages further. More particularly, what I shall attempt to show is that given certain epistemological principles mainstream international relations theory almost has to become as indicated. In other words, those constructing that theory, in the name of rationality, are merely reading a code not of their own making into reality, explicating that code to themselves and others. But this also applies to the countertrends only that here there is more variation; based on dominant occidental, recessive occidental and non-occidental cosmologies.
3. **Mainstream vs. Countertrend in International Relations Research: Knowledge/Epistemology**

In the universe of quests for knowledge there is not only one but several epistemologies. Choices have to be made and these choices are--that is our assumption--to a large extent built into the general cosmology of the civilization or the sub-civilizations, the cultures. Of an epistemology one might demand the following: there should be a definition of what kinds of things in the universe are worth looking at (the **units of analysis**); what is worth looking at within these units (the **variables of analysis**); and how one in general goes about solving what could be called two basic problems of knowledge: the **how-problem (description)** and the **why-problem (explanation)**. Put differently: what is generally accepted as valid **data** and as valid **theory**? To this could then be added a third question: what is accepted as valid **value**?

This gives us three major categories for the description of epistemologies: **units of analysis**, **variables of analysis** and **paradigms for analysis**. The latter is more basic, so this is where we start.
I. PARADIGMS FOR ANALYSIS

Mainstream assumptions

The basic mainstream assumptions are the basic assumptions concerning the constitution of knowledge in occidental cosmology in general: atomism, deductivism and empiricism. That which is to be known is to be subdivided into separate, detachable units (atomism, fragmentation). The description of them is to be in terms of separable dimensions or variables (segmentation). Whereas the number of units can be very large, unlimited, the number of variables should be kept relatively small; but the opposite profile is also possible (nomothetic vs ideographic approaches). It is also entirely legitimate to limit oneself to variables defined within a particular universe of discourse called a discipline (pay attention to the double meaning of this word!), in casu the discipline of international relations (IR). Propositions are then established relating the variables and these propositions are linked together in verbal constructions using natural and/or artificial languages (for instance mathematics), connecting the propositions in deductive chains (theory-building). This enterprise is supposed to be "empiricist", meaning that a correspondence between data and theory is the goal of the exercise (all propositions deducted from the theory should be empirically verified; all propositions already verified should be deductible). The enterprise is "value-free": it is about what is, not about what might be desirable or regrettable.

Underlying the exercise is the assumption that propositions may be true or false, and that deductions may be valid or invalid; there is no third alternative (tertium non datur).
Moreover, a proposition cannot be both true and false, nor can a deduction be both valid and invalid (the law of contradiction, or rather of non-contradiction). This gives a sharp dualism in the universe between that which is and that which is not. Reality is seen as essentially stable and the goal is to arrive at stable, unambiguous theories able to reflect that essentially stable reality.36

Countertrend assumptions

Again, the choice has been made in the cosmology itself: knowledge has to refer to total entities in a comprehensive manner meaning that reality should not be subdivided into separate units, and descriptions should either be in terms of a very large number of variables or in terms of extremely rich characterizations. Fragmentation of units and segmentation of descriptions are to be avoided. The approach should be global and wholistic.

On the other hand, these large entities such as "society" or "world" are not without inner life. There is inner tension between what is metaphorically referred to as "forces". There is waxing and waning, in other words dialectics. The answer to the question why? is not "because what I just said can be deduced from more basic/general propositions" but "because of the working of the dialectic in the entity." Since human beings are a part of this dialectic they may influence the dialectic through their consciousness, which is why values enter—although not without limitations. To state what is desirable and regrettable and evaluate reality from those angles is completely legitimate scientifically, as is also to project a potential reality more in conformity with what is desirable
and less with what is regrettable (although dialectics will inform us that total purity of Good or Evil is meaningless). Rather than being "value-free" the scientific enterprise should be "value-explicit". The contradictory nature of empirical reality should be fully realized although it may be unclear whether that also presupposes a contradictory language in order to reflect contradictory reality. At any rate, reality is yin/yang rather than dualist and for that reason essentially unstable, even transcending itself into new entities the dialectical laws of which are unknown (had they been known we would already have been there).

At this point peace research takes off, not only with an explicit value-orientation in favor of peace, but also as an effort to counteract the fragmentation of the units and the segmentation of the variables. Units are tied together in more global perspectives, which in IR research means a preference for world (order) studies to comparative intra-state analysis and inter-state relational analysis. Variables are tied together in more wholistic images, which in IR research would mean a preference for efforts to see configurations of structures and processes, not merely one, two or three variables, all taken from the same social science discipline.
II. UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Mainstream assumptions

Mainstream thought describing the world system will look for units of analysis and not have much difficulty finding them: they will have to be actors. From the point of view of IR research the most obvious actors would be states at the interstate level and potent national decision-makers at the intrastate level, which then yields an agenda for international relation studies. The vocabulary for analysis would be such dichotomies as good vs. evil, strong vs. weak and active vs. passive, with a particular fascination for the strong, evil and passive actor that may become active. Motivation and capability, in other words.

Actors are seen as crystallized, equipped with motivation (good vs. evil) and capability (strong vs. weak). The world then has to be constructed as an interstate system with decisions carried by individual actors, at least. Decision-making is seen as taking place within an explicit language of discourse similar to that enjoyed by the mainstream thinker, making decision-making rational, using cost-benefit analysis as a major conceptual tool. In doing so the focus will naturally be on the most important actors and decision-makers, in other words on super-people within super-powers.

Countertrend assumptions

For a countertrend the choice is not unambiguous except in the sense that by definition it has to be different from the mainstream
choice. If the unit of analysis has to be an entity, then one possibility is to focus on structures, thus making the analysis structure-oriented rather than actor-oriented. Where mainstream thinking will focus on states in the world space and foreign policy decision-makers in the social space, counter trend analysis might also focus on world space and social space, but then discuss world structure and social structure. The vocabulary for discussion of structures might be in terms of how exploitative they are (enriching parts of the structure at the expense of impoverishing other parts or keeping them at the same level), and how that verticality of the structure is maintained by impeding consciousness-formation through the top dog penetration of the consciousness of the under dog or segmentation of his/her visions of reality; and by impeding organization /mobilization from the top through fragmentation of underdogs away from each other, or marginalization of them from the center of society. Social structuralism, not individual.

However, counter trend thinking also has other possibilities. Reality does not only consist of world space and social space, there is also (inner) human space and nature space. The more wholistic and global orientation typical of counter trend analysis might focus more on human space ("the psychology of international relations") and nature space ("the ecology of international relations"). Where mainstream analysis no doubt will explore the "linkage" between social space and world space, particularly in the form of foreign policy decision-making, counter trend analysis will extend analysis to human space and nature space and in addition take in cultural space to see what codes hidden in culture may be directing what happens in other spaces.
However, other counttrend analysts might focus more on actors, and provide a transition between a purely structure-oriented and a purely actor-oriented perspective by analysing actors in statu nascendi, as they are being born. The key factors in that type of analysis would be the process of consciousness-formation and organization/mobilization as conditions for the struggle to be born as actors, with recognized motivation and capability, not only seen as "parties" in highly vertical structures.

Essentially this would mean that to the counttrender the world is ultimately an inter-people system, and decisions are ultimately carried by people, only some of them being elites. Moreover, a focus on human space would call to the attention the possibilities of irrational decision-making, through distorted cognition (perception), distorted emotions (mental disorders) and directed by hidden codes in cosmology and ideology, personality and nationality. Considerable doubt would be thrown on the cost-benefit analysis paradigm, pointing, for instance, to the role of absolute faith as a basic constituent in human identity, permitting no bargain. Thus, the focus would be more on people's dreams and images than on explicit statements by super-people in super-powers.

In a sense, mainstream analysis remains faithful to the old ideal of establishing IR as a discipline, disciplining themselves with an Occam razor, focussing on the world as an inter-state system. Countertrend thinkers are trying to live up to another ideal, that of general analysis: generalized social science (social system) analysis.
III. VARIABLES OF ANALYSIS

Mainstream assumptions

Mainstream thinking would see the world as an interstate system, and the relational component in the system in terms of power relations. Power, in turn, would be seen as power-over-others, as the capacity to make others do what one wants them to do, even to the point that mainstream thought will neglect other ways of looking at power. Power can then be conveniently divided into four types: military, economic, cultural and political, the latter being conceived of as the power to make decisions as to what types of power (or mix of the three types) is to be used.

Mainstream thinking may perhaps be divided into three schools: realists focusing on military power or force, assuming that this is what the interstate system is about when one cuts down to the bone, to the Realpolitik; marxists focusing on economic power, especially that which derives from ownership over means of production; and liberals who might also focus on economic power but more on how competitive advantages can be used to the advantage of those who have them.

Liberals might be interested in cultural power, however, and would tend to see western culture as world culture (and western history as world history, universalizing western social history as "modernization") and also on political institution-building in the form of democratic institutions, presumably able to control the bureaucratic-corporate-intelligentsia complexes. With this broad range they are, of course, the best prospects for countertrends.

If the tendency to focus on super-people in super-powers
is combined with a focus on military power, then mainstream analysis may almost reduce to an analysis of nuclear power decision-making, at present in two, perhaps five or somewhat more countries in the world. A substantial portion of mainstream work will be in this category, not as a deliberate choice, but as an expression of the inner code.

**Countertrend assumptions**

The basic difference lies in another conceptualization of power, as power-over-self. For military power to work there has to be fear; the antidote is fearlessness. For economic power to work there has to be dependency; the antidote is self-sufficiency. And for cultural power to work alienation is a condition and the antidote is identity.

The combination of fearlessness, self-sufficiency and identity adds up to self-reliance and patterns of non-violence, meaning a power-over-one-self so strong that the only way of getting a handle on such people is through total destruction.

Hence, rather than focus on military power alone, countertrend analysis will focus on all forms of power. Rather than analyzing comparative advantages in terms of production factors, countertrend analysis will focus on potentials for self-reliance (including autarky or self-sufficiency in the production for human needs, in order to avoid dependence). And, far from accepting western culture as world culture, the focus would be on how dignity and identity can evolve through the growth of other cultures. Political decision-making power is assumed to derive from some basic pattern of consent in the people. If that consent is withdrawn, decision-making power can no longer be exercised—and that is the basic formula underlying the countertrend fascination with civil disobedience or "people power."
4. Mainstream vs. Countertrend: A Summary

In the next two pages the reader will find a summary of what has been said in sections 2 and 3 respectively, one page for each. Most of the points made in the text are incorporated in the summaries, but perhaps in a too condensed formulation. Some points can now be made, having put the cards on the table, so to speak.

First, the two small words separating Mainstream and Countertrend on top of the summaries, or and and, are important. Of course, the social function, intended or not, of mainstream IR thinking is to legitimate the transformation of cosmology in this field to explicit ideology, within the scientific enterprise; just as the social function of countertrend research in this field is to do the opposite, legitimize counter-ideology more or less consciously anchored in deeper assumptions, either in alternative occidental cosmology, or non-occidental cosmology, or both. In short, the basic tenor of this paper is a dim view of the "pure rationality" of the scientific enterprise, assuming that researchers in general, and researchers in such a touchy field as international politics in particular, like everybody else, are driven by hidden codes. To be scientific, hence, presupposes a high level of awareness of these linkages, often much better seen in the written or oral production from "the other side" than in oneself. Explicitness rather than a mystical, undefined "objectivity" would be the guide; always willing to ask one more question ("is that really so?", "what makes me think that this is the case?"). Always being willing to probe one level deeper. Easily said, difficult to achieve, rarely done.
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<td>Alternative world systems (nomadic, etc.) alternative origins (Middle, Far East) power potential of non-Occident No focus on Evil, or Evil in the Center, heretic Occident and/or Periphery are Good US to play normal role; like all others</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>Idea of Progress: Crisis-catharsis-apocalypse Good overcoming Evil through system superiority; deterrence Balance through retaliatory deterrence Crystallization of a balance of power sorting system; alliances Low entropy, separation</td>
<td>Oscillating Time/Idea of Progress: Crisis and catharsis, but too much emphasis on apocalypse seen as fascist Good penetrating Evil, mixing, oscillation Crystallization of alternative systems Broader power concepts; defensive deterrence Crystallization of balance of exchange systems High entropy, mixing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTOR-ACTOR</td>
<td>Emphasis on: Verticalism/individualism, statism State sovereignty; national self-interest STATE-over-STATE conflict; competition Global darwinism; super-powers Weak will disappear unless protected Elitist foreign policy decision-making</td>
<td>Emphasis on: Horizontalism=self-reliance; actor diversity Limited state sovereignty, non-aggressiveness STATE-STATE cooperation, mutual aid Inter-linkages; ties; numerous actors Weak will disappear if &quot;protected&quot; Democratic world policy decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTOR-TRANS-ACTOR</td>
<td>Emphasis on: PEACE: triumph of Good over Evil pax americana; pax sovietica peaceful co-existence super-powers as source of solutions summit meetings as ultimate authority super-powers as carriers of truth, compatible with true national, human and nature interests</td>
<td>Emphasis on: PEACE: diversity and symbiosis States as good world citizens, non-aggressive Non-states as good world citizens, linking states Broadening circles of world democracy World Central Authority Globalism cum Localism Downplaying national interest; world interest Human interest &amp; nature interest as basic: survival, well-being, identity and freedom; eco-balance social and world space to serve human/naturespace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE II

**OCCIDENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND MAINSTREAM VS. COUNTERTREND IN US INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>MAINSTREAM</th>
<th>COUNTERTREND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Paradigms for analysis:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>atomistic; fragmented, segmented deductive empiricism-&quot;value-free&quot; tertium non-datur; non-contradiction dualist, stable essentially</td>
<td>Paradigms for analysis: wholistic, global dialectic criticism &amp; constructivism reality filled with contradictions yin-yang, unstable, transcending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Units of analysis:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors (states)</td>
<td>good-evil strong-weak</td>
<td>Structure (cultural) exploitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors (dec. makers)</td>
<td>active-passive</td>
<td>Structure (world) penetration segmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystallized actors: motivation &amp; capability</td>
<td></td>
<td>Structure (social) fragmentation marginalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World as Inter-State System Decisions carried by Elites</td>
<td>--rational decision-making</td>
<td>World as Inter-People System Decisions carried ultimately by People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--cost-benefit analysis</td>
<td>--irrational distorted cognitions distorted emotions hidden codes (cosmology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Super-Powers; Super-People</td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on People's Dreams; Images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Variables of analysis:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-over-others</td>
<td></td>
<td>Power-over-self self-reliance non-violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military: Realpolitik</td>
<td></td>
<td>all forms of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic: ownership of means of production comparative advantages</td>
<td></td>
<td>self-reliance; autarky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural: Western culture as world culture</td>
<td></td>
<td>dignity, identity, other cultures withdrawal of consent, civil disobedience &quot;People Power&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political: Institution-building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The table outlines the paradigms, units of analysis, and variables of analysis for both mainstream and countertrend perspectives in US international relations studies.
However, this does not answer the question of which perspective, mainstream or countertrend, corresponds better to reality. One answer might be: maybe mainstream corresponds better to empirical reality, *being*, today; countertrend to potential reality, *becoming*. The question is which reality is more real to the person who asks the question. But I would draw from this very tentative formulation one simple conclusion: the solution of the mainstream-countertrend antinomy does not lie in choosing one or the other, it is not a question of either-or, but possibly of both-and. They are both prisms through which reality may be comprehended, with some, but not unlimited dissolution power.

The point can be made that mainstream thinking is more crystallized, plays on a more narrow band, whereas countertrend thinking sprawls out in many different directions as mainstream thinking can be negated by negating any one point in its assumptions (and they are many, look at the two sheets summarizing the argument). To take one example: mainstream thinking tends to see hierarchy as the only alternative to anarchy, and to take a dim view of anarchy. In interstate economic relations this broad perspective would lead to a high level of acceptance of economic dependency relations, for instance as legitimized under the ideology of comparative advantages. Clearly, the negation of dependency can be explored in two directions: as independence (self-sufficiency, autarky) and as interdependence (mutual benefit, equity). A typical countertrend favorite in economic relations, self-reliance, picks up both at the same time, and in so doing in a sense represents a third negation. However, needless to say, it would also be possible to portray one countertrend as a narrow band of insight and then display an array of mainstream negations around it.
The position taken in this paper, the eclectic both-and position, in a sense leads to the trivial conclusion that a department of political science in general and international relations in particular, should be pluralistic, presenting all views, attempting to relate them to deeper layers of individual and collective sub-consciousness. A less trite conclusion would be that this pluralism should apply to the very nucleus of IR thinking and writing, and to the periphery--trying to counteract the present high correlation between mainstream thought in the center and countertrend thinking in the periphery--apart from the presence of mainstream thought in periphery places very eager to gain center recognition. But this correlation is not so easily broken down as it relates to something much more important than science as an intellectual enterprise: IR as foreign policy legitimation.

A second comment will then go in the direction of exploring somewhat more systematically what everything said above means in terms of the intellectual styles entertained by mainstream and countertrend respectively. In another context style has been discussed in terms of four activities that intellectuals everywhere seem to engage in, paradigm-exploration, description or data-collection, explanation or theory-formation, and then commentary on how other intellectuals carry out one or more of these three activities. In still another context this has been expanded further to include what intellectuals do not necessarily engage in, criticism (relating data and value), constructivism (relating theory and value), education (meaning of people in general, social education, not only university education of students), and action (meaning in society in general, social politics).
not only university politics). What would be the strength and the weaknesses of mainstream and countetrend, respectively along these eight dimensions?

I think it can be stated that mainstream thought is rather weak on paradigm-exploration, and in general will resist looking into its own assumptions, trying to generate and reproduce the myth of being "objective," totally detached, proceeding from a baseline of tabula rasa, with no assumptions whatsoever. On the other hand they would be very strong on description, both in the form of documentation for more qualitative analysis and operationalization as a prelude to more quantitative analysis. Mainstream would tend to be very good at this point, but then be much weaker when it comes to explanation, to theory-formation.

I could imagine two reasons for this. Theories have a tendency to open for visions of potential reality, whereas data, by definition, stick to empirical reality. If the underlying assumption is that we live in the best of all possible worlds, with some exceptions here and there, now and then, the invitation to engage in extensive and deep theory-formation might tend to be rejected. On the other hand, mainstream would certainly be strong on commentary. But that mainstream would share with any intellectual current in any field: if there is anything intellectuals love to do everywhere, at all times, then it would be precisely to engage in commentary on other intellectuals, issuing certificates that would combine the descriptive (labeling; "which school is this") with criticism. In one sense the present paper is also an exercise in that kind of activity.
When it comes to criticism, constructivism, education and action mainstream thinking would tend to proclaim that these activities lie outside the legitimate scope of intellectual life, and for that reason can only be engaged in outside working hours, as "private citizens". No doubt many mainstream thinkers are extremely strong in all four fields, but "outside working hours", thus withdrawing these four activities from the realm of intellectual discourse and dialogue in general. Their views might appear on Op-Ed pages; their proposals find their ways into the corridors of power where the basic assumptions are the same as that of mainstream thought, growing out of the same cosmologically fertile soil; they might engage in education of the masses having mainstream media (press, broadcasting, television) at their disposal; and they might engage in action or in activity leading up to action, for instance as consultants, advisors to the CIA and similar agencies.54

Of course, countertrend thought would have an other profile. They would gain much of their legitimacy from paradigm-exploration, more particularly by trying to show how mainstream thinkers are the (more or less unwitting) mouth-pieces of deeper-lying assumptions, some of them found in cosmology and ideology, others in nationality and even in personality. Countertrend will be quick to point out how these assumptions vary with space and time; whether countertrend thinkers are equally good to explore their own paradigms is another question. And they might also tend to be somewhat weaker than mainstream thinkers on the purely descriptive task, tending to jump
straight to criticism, seeing data in the stark light of strong and deeply held values, where shades and nuances in the data might also tend to disappear. On the other hand, countertrend thinkers might also become very strong at theory formation precisely because they would be interested in theories capable of covering more cognitive territory than empirical reality alone, and for that reason push theory formation deeper down or higher up (or whatever be the direction) in order to get at variables held to be constant, or within a very limited range of variation in current empirical reality, and capable of producing one or more potential realities when given a wider play of variation. Example: a higher level of world consciousness among people in general and world policy-making elites in particular; a higher level of ecological threat perceived as a threat to human-kind as a whole, would change many relations among states, emphasizing world interest.

Leaving aside the obvious predilection of any intellectual for intellectual commentary the concern of the countertrend with criticism/constructivism is, of course, the mainstay of countertrend thought. Visions, images, blueprints. I think it can be said that the methodology of constructivism has not been developed nearly so far as the methodology of empiricism, and this is a shortcoming in countertrend approaches—possibly one that can be remedied relatively easily. But at this point a basic weakness of countertrend activity emerges: a countertrend thinker may have explored his constructions to the point that he actually lives with his soul in potential reality, although his body has to remain in empirical reality, often
in close vicinity of the bodies of mainstream thinkers who do not permit themselves to flicker and wander around in such theoretical constructs. The countetrend thinker will immediately proceed to education about the empirical, the potential and the way leading from one to the other (as he sees it), and then to action—in other words engage in strategy. To him these are legitimate parts of intellectual activity, to be engaged in during working hours and to be laid on the academic table, so to speak, for inspection, intersubjective communication and dialogue. In most cases, I assume, this would then bring up the strong point of the countetrend thinker as political animal: he will tend to act in the open, assuming that his audience will be among people in general rather than among the elites. He will appeal to counter-elites and anti-elites, possibly reaching neither.

Thus, the profiles differ, and even very much so. They intersect only at one point, in the commentary, to a large extent on each other. But that commentary is, of course, important: it may open for dialogue, although in general it does not. And one reason it does not should become clear from what has been said: mainstream and countetrend are simply different, even very different. The difference is not only in terms of scientific production, coming up with contradictory images; nor in ideology which, being explicit, can be built into the findings, or at least the theories. It is located at the deeper level of the hidden assumptions as to what is natural and normal, in other words cosmology. Some might also locate differences in personality, in other words in personal character structure
and in nationality, in other words in national character structure. I would doubt that these differences are unambiguous, assuming that much the same kind of people from various nations become intellectuals anyhow, and that they would have more personality traits in common than would discriminate between them. But that may perhaps remain as an interesting, although hardly very fruitful, theme of further research.

Third, there are, of course, the determinants of the content of mainstream thought, and by implication of countertrend thought, that are more structural, less cultural. Let me just shortly touch on such determinants, referring to the U.S. international relations field.

(1) The larger the Department of political science, the more specialized the fields of study of any single political scientist in general, and international relationist in particular. In European universities, not to mention Third World universities where there might be only one professor in the field that single person is supposed to cover more or less the total arena. Specialization makes it very difficult to develop a wholistic perspective, making the specialist on international organizations very weak on international economics and vice versa. This vice may then be turned into a virtue by praising what can be achieved through specialization (more detailed knowledge), not lamenting what is lost (the ability to see interconnections). The deeper the specialization, the more segmented the knowledge in the field. Deeper aspects of culture and structure are lost sight of (e.g., "cosmology"). A segmented knowledge grid captures differences (e.g. between US "administrations") much better than similarities. Essence gets lost.
(2) What specialization does to segmentation, area studies will do to fragmentation—and "area studies" is a very significant trend not only in U.S. studies of world politics. The geography of the world is cut into pieces, on the assumption that there is a certain homogeneity within an heterogeneity between the "areas". This assumption may hold true for culture (particularly religion and languages) which tends to move slowly, for much of the history of the area, and by definition for geographical factors. But it certainly does not hold true for what is international about world politics which tends to span across areas, particularly in the shape of big power politics. Thus, area studies can become an almost diabolic device to impede insight in such rather important international structures as colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and inter-area cooperation and mutual influence of other types.

It becomes difficult to obtain global knowledge this way, one factor responsible for the scarcity of intellectually potent world images in IR research today. A consequence is what could be called the "yearbook" approach with the world arena divided into such sectors as "The East-west conflict", "The Arms race", "The North-south conflict", "The Debt burden", "The Middle-east", "The Third World", "The Rise of the Far East", with no effort to trace the connections between these arenas. The result is easily intellectual mediocrity, just as excessive generalization leads to intellectual poverty. The low number of languages (one, or two) mastered contributes to this fragmentation of the world knowledge. The system breeds area specialists, not world specialists.

(3) Given the power of mainstream thought, according to a transcription of a famous phrase, "the leading paradigm is the paradigm
of the leading universities", there will be high levels of in-breeding at U.S. universities in spite of the well-known mobility of students and faculty (from the place of undergraduate to the place of graduate study; from the place where the Ph.D. was obtained to the place of the first job as junior professor; from the place of junior professorship to the place of senior professorship given that relatively few are promoted at the same university, particularly if it is an Ivy League university). The rotation will tend to keep a number of factors constant, rotating mainstreamers among mainstream universities, accepting only those who have published in mainstream journals with mainstream editors (not to mention mainstream book review editors). The formula for rating US universities in terms of excellence will reinforce mainstream inbreeding; making the periphery more promising as a source of originality.

(4) If there is a correlation between center-periphery and mainstream-countertrend, as would be very reasonable to assume, then one would, at the level of the university department, assume countertrend to be more developed among undergraduates than graduates, more among students than professors, and more among junior professors than senior professors. One would also assume a socialization process whereby students gradually attain more mainstream views and junior professors do the same. More particularly, professing mainstream allegiance and to some extent denouncing thought might become a part of the three important rite de passage in the career of US intellectuals: graduation, Ph.D. and tenure. The number of times I myself have experienced, at a leading U.S. university, people saying "I certainly do not agree with mainstream thought but would have difficulties with my junior paper/senior thesis/Ph.D. proposal/Ph.D. thesis/job application/promotion if I said this too openly" is amazing. The academic freedom is, of course, limited.
if not by overt censorship, at least by self-censorship that in many cases may be based on "pluralistic ignorance" (a strange term from social psychology meaning ignorance about where the plurality stands: the majority may actually have countertrend leanings, but if most of them keep silent how is every single one to know?).

(5) The correlation mentioned in the preceding point becomes, of course, even more important when stretched outside academia, into U.S. society (or the society of any big power, or any country client to a big power, in general). The power center of that kind of society will only take into confidence people who share basic assumptions, and those assumptions coincide rather well with what has been spelled out as mainstream thought above. There are material conditions involved: foundation grants from the more prestigious foundations, governmental and non-governmental; positions in the limelight of the media (except for some very few "hostage" counterriders, provided they do not deviate too far from the mainstream paradigm); positions in the power establishment where the incentive perhaps might be more in terms of power, prestige and privilege than concrete salary, and so on. Working for the "national interests", even when mainly left undefined or very poorly defined, presuppose some alignment between individual ideology and collective cosmology, perhaps also between personal character and national character. Deviations will have to be cut off, like sharp edges, on the way up. The net result is a preponderance of mainstreamers the closer one comes to the top, and enactment of the cosmology, unimpeded by any counterright thought. The premise is in the conclusion.
Finally, there is a point which perhaps is more obvious to outsiders than to the inhabitants of the United States: the high level of collectivism of the U.S. population, the intense we-feeling that may easily impede an open debate, particularly on such fundamental issues as those highlighted in any exploration of differences between mainstream and countertrend thought. To raise questions of this type might throw some doubts on whether the person doing so is a good "team-player" or perhaps simply a trouble-maker, whether he is "part of the problem, or part of the solution". I am not thinking so much of the points made in the preceding two paragraphs, the implicit challenge to established intellectual authority (point 4 above) and to established political authority (point 5 above). The point here is rather that there is an implicit challenge to the whole social body, the U.S. collectivity, the imperial We. Consequently, I would assume basic discussions to be infrequent and seemingly inconsequential. The social body cannot take them and still "keep smiling".

However, if the present analysis is valid the assumption that such issues are somehow decided in debates between mainstreamers and countertexters is invalid anyhow. These are public displays of pluralism, often of a self-congratulatory nature ("look at how tolerant we are"). If mainstream/countertrend are essentially ways of explicating different cosmologies (a) with regard to their assumptions about space, time, person-nature, person-person and person-transperson aspects of reality and (b) with regard to epistemology, how to get valid knowledge about (a), then mainstream/countertrend are too epiphenomenal. The issues are decided when the cosmology is enacted, not when it is reflected upon--not denying that there may be a tiny causal flicker in the opposite direction. Dialogues, to be consequential, have to be at the level of the deeper assumptions; and the philosophical awareness needed is a scarce commodity.
5. Some Remarks on Peace Studies and World Order Studies

Peace studies emerged in the late 1950s, world order studies some years later. They are both examples of counterevangel thinking, and no clear line could be or should be drawn between them. Possibly peace studies emerged more among psychologists and sociologists, world order studies more among political scientists and international relationists including international lawyers. Possibly the former were more concerned with intra-personal and intra-societal conditions for peace, the latter more with inter-societal and world organization approaches and conditions. But peace studies also look into these, and world order studies will not come very far without examining psychological and sociological factors.

In terms of the five spaces alluded to above—nature, human, social, world and culture spaces—both of them will have to cover all five. But the point may be made that peace studies have focused more on the human and social spaces, and world order studies more on world space, using nature space as an illustration and an argument in favor of international regimes—and that both have been somewhat neglectful, so far, in exploring culture space. Young as these approaches are, however, such asymmetries are easily corrected. Since the traditions are not firmly set, the people tend to be the same or at least to overlap greatly. Both demand and supply for their products are substantial, particularly given the sterility of mainstream thought in producing viable and desirable alternatives to the present disorder, replete as it is with direct and structural violence.
Which are the themes picked up by peace studies and world order studies from the rich palette given above of countertrend concerns? I think the answer to this is very simple: all of them, plus many more not mentioned here. And this coincidence is of course not by chance: the present author, having been active both in peace studies and world order studies, has of course been colored in his presentation of the mainstream/countertrend antinomy by his experiences.

More particularly, there is in both the fascination with non-state actors, and perhaps a tendency to attribute too much significance to them as peace building factors, underplaying the way in which they reflect the world as an inter-state system, and the way in which non-state actors themselves may promote direct and structural violence even if they do not carry them out themselves (an example: the Catholic Church, but not in all periods, and not in all places). Whereas mainstream can be said to construct a house of peace with only bricks (states), peace and world order studies go in for cement only.

Moreover, peace studies and world order studies have their origin in the occident, and very little has been produced that can be said to be clearly non-occidental. One reason for this is relatively simple: I think it can be said that only the occident stands for universalism in the sense of producing images for the world as a whole, world architectonics so to speak. The ambition of countertrend thought has been to be every bit as universal as mainstream thought, only dropping the assumption that the occident has to be in
the center, and even more particularly the western part of the occident (and even most particularly, the U.S. part of the west). Thus, in peace studies, as in world order studies, some type of equity/equality as negation both of anarchy and hierarchy is built into the images. A disintegrated world of disjointed parts is intolerable, to countertrend and mainstream alike—only that the former substitute equality for the hierarchy of the latter. Problematic, given the enormous differences in power.

I think it can also be said that peace studies as well as world order studies, children of occidental thought as they are, have a tendency to build an idea of progress into their thinking, culminating in a final state of affairs where war has been abolished as a social institution and peace dominates the picture. Without saying that this is totally impossible (after all slavery was abolished, colonialism was abolished) there is a tendency to be unaware of the basic assumptions within which such thinking emerges. Moreover, needless to say, the nature of that final stage of affairs is very different in countertrend thinking, being based also on non-state actors, broader power concepts, and usually some kind of world central authority.

To some regionalism is held out as an answer of which I would be very doubtful: the relation among regions may be as problematic, both in terms of direct and structural violence, as between countries, perhaps even more so. And within the region there will be a tendency for a hegemonial power to emerge making a travesty of the idea that regions can more easily organize themselves than the world as a whole, with the exception of some fortunate regions such as, for instance, the Nordic countries, the European Community countries and, perhaps, the ASEAN countries and some parts of Latin America and Africa (Andean countries; West Africa).
I think world order studies, perhaps more than peace studies, have been good in bringing nature into world politics as a major concern, a point which is also carried by development studies under the evocative slogan of "eco-development". But the basic contribution of peace studies and world order studies will always be in the focus on horizontal linkages; in its political form of democratic world institutions—organizations; its economic form of equitable exchange relations; its cultural form of cultural dialogue and its military form of decoupling from super-power dependence, and defensive, non-provocative defense, questioning basic assumptions of economics, religious and strategic studies not only political science.

And this invariably leads to concepts of states as good world citizens, becoming less aggressive while tied together in links of interdependence rather than in paternalistic patterns of "protection" of the weak by the strong. At this point there may be some divergence between peace studies and world order studies. The former will perhaps focus more on a highly entropic, highly disordered world with all kinds of actors in equitable, criss-crossing patterns of interaction, weaving a web of symbiotic links between diverse actors. And the latter will emphasize a world central authority capable of enforcing the rules of regimes voluntarily entered into, thereby recreating some kind of hierarchy, only not with the strongest actor, but with a super-actor, the world space homologue of government in social space, on top. Are the two images incompatible?

Needless to say, the underlying epistemology is different. There is the peace research effort to be more wholistic and global, or
“interdisciplinary” and “international” as this was referred to in the earlier stages of peace research (later on “transdisciplinary” and “transnational” played a bridging role between these concepts). World order studies are perhaps somewhat less interdisciplinary, focussing more on political and institutional variables, but any bit as global as peace studies.

Another important point is the effort, not always successful, for both of them to become dialectic in their thinking, assuming that wherever in the world—because it is a relatively integrated system—a force appears a counter-force—sometimes of the same nature sometimes very different—will sooner or later appear. To counter-trend thinking the emergence of terrorism as a response, not only to terrorism as institutionalized maintenance of status quo but also to nuclearism is expected whereas mainstream thinkers seem to have great difficulties catching this point, which then catches them by surprise. But counter-trend is not good at exploring the counter-forces that will be activated should the world move in the direction they advocate.

What has not been explored very well in peace studies and world order studies is the dialectic between values they profess and their own position in time, space not to mention social space of the researchers themselves. In both of them this leads to considerable debate between male and female researchers and researchers from the first, second and third worlds with particular the latter doubting not so much the values as the priorities among the values of the former. World order studies have been very explicit at this point, focussing on four world order values (material well-being, social justice, peace and eco-balance, with identity/participation; but not including freedom) and this listing was
the result of extensive debate. Peace studies have preferred to remain more open, more flexible, focusing on reduction of violence, splitting the latter into direct and structural violence so as to be able to reflect many of the concerns of development studies and to make the famous statement "hunger is the name for war in the Third World" a statement within the language of discourse of peace studies. Personally I would see a strength in this flexibility, particularly because it opens for the whole richness of all world cultures when it comes to understanding "peace".

Again, needless to say: both peace studies and world order studies would tend to have a rather dim view of the inter-state system, and opt for a much broader analysis, bringing in all the other types of actors and other types of relations, particularly broadening the analysis of power in the direction of self-reliance and non-violence, and by emphasizing economic, cultural, and political power more and military power somewhat less than is done in mainstream analysis.

At this point the danger of over-emphasizing the differences between mainstream and countertrend should be pointed out. Obviously, any mainstream thinker who has not become too dogmatic would more than willingly admit that there are other actors than states in the world and particularly other states than super-powers; he would also readily admit that there are other types of power than military power and particularly nuclear power. The difference can easily become one
of emphasis rather than an absolute polarity. Similarly the counter-
trend analyst can easily include the world as seen by the main-
streamers as a special case, only dislike it so much that he would be
disinclined to elaborate in much detail what he sees. In other words,
peace studies and world order studies may easily be broadened to
include more conventional international relations, just as the latter
may also relatively easily take on many, even most of the concerns
of peace studies and world order studies.

But there is nevertheless a difference where conclusions are
concerned, and this difference should not be lost sight of. Deeper
down, sometimes even unknown to himself, the mainstream analyst re-
mains a conservative, a traditionalist which is not same as saying
that he is necessarily content with the world as it is. He is only
skeptical of the alternatives and becomes confirmed in his skepticism
by watching and listening to countertrenders, within and without
academia. And deeper down the countertextender remains a radical who
wants to go to the roots of the problem-- hence his concerns with
paradigms and basic assumptions in general--and a progressive who
wants change, deeply convinced that the present system is so bad that
an alternative, and particularly the alternative he suggests, will
almost have to be better.

At that point I could inject two small pieces, not of informa-
tion, but of insight gleaned from something like thirty years ex-
perience in the field in general, and with this debate in particular.
They may both be seen as an expression of countertrend chauvinism and I doubt that many mainstreamers will agree.

First, it is my general experience that countertrend thinkers have a different experiential basis than mainstream thinkers. I do not mean that countertrenders are more knowledgeable of data, I think they have lived the world from more angles, perhaps having traveled more widely in the geography and more significantly: in social space. They may simply have been exposed to more suffering than the mainstayer, been more in low places where the mainstreamer has been in high places, either because he was born in those places or has successfully moved into them. Thus, what is needed for the mainstreamer to become more of a countertrender is more often than not simply some travel in geographical and social space. And the concomitant of this is, of course, that a countertrender is easily corrupted into mainstream compliance with empirical reality, in the name of "realism". In short, personal transformation as a key to basic change. 74

Second, maybe the countertrender also has more ability to travel in time, meaning in psychological time, imagining, visioning futures different from empirical reality. One word for this particular ability is, of course, "imagination" since the activity will have to be supported by values and the type of theories that open for potential reality; not only by data and the type of theories that only reflect empirical reality. Without in any way belittling the intellectual significance of mainstream endeavors, nor the hard work, nor the (sometimes) intellectual brilliance displayed, there is a quality of
imaginative creativity which, unfortunately, often goes together with a certain lack of theoretical vigor, that is more often encountered in the countertrender. And this would, in turn underscore a certain dissimilarity between them where one particular aspect of personal character is concerned: intellectual character. Some of that is summarized under the heading of intellectual style above; no doubt that can be conceptualized much further. The student of sociology of religion or sociology of ideology in general will no doubt find in the difference between mainstream and countertrend something reminiscent of the church-sect dichotomy and dialectic.

And that leads to the final reflection: sooner or later countertrend will become mainstream, and mainstream will become countertrend. For this to happen countertrend will probably have to solidify, become less diverse, more equipped with a nucleus of theoretical vigor, protected by a high level of consensus among countertrenders on their way towards the center. And at that point mainstream will start dissolving into different components, yielding to the massive onslaught of the countertrend. In the concrete case of the United States it is hard to imagine that this can happen without a certain dissolution of the current display of power politics of the administration voted into power in 1980 and 1984; a display of power either directly compatible or certainly not incompatible, with mainstream thinking. At that point the time will come for the mainstreamers of today to start complaining about the mainstreamers of tomorrow, with the roles properly reversed. And with recessive ideology/epistemology/cosmology becoming dominant and vice versa.
NOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 360-361.

3. What is thought of here is the traditional ranking scale of U.S. universities, typically with Harvard University, Yale University, Princeton University, University of California, Stanford University in top positions; a ranking order that of course does not hold for all departments or schools of those universities. Reference to this scale by no means implies acceptance of the scale: by definition there will be a heavy loading of mainstream thinking at the top of such scales, and the scale would tend to reflect past achievements of universities and individual scholars rather than what is truly innovative. One may even doubt whether truly innovative thinking in the social sciences will take place at universities at all, or will not rather have to emerge from the outside.

4. The dominant cosmology will tend to be the cosmology of the dominant group or center in society; a proposition with which it might be easy to agree. More problematic is what consti-
tutes the Center. Refusing to use class theory only I would
prefer to make use of more generalized social position theory,
as elaborated in Essays in Peace Research, Volume III, Copen-
hagen, Ejlers 1978, Chapters 1, 2, and 3. In this type of
thinking age, gender, education and income, geographical
location enter together with position in the occupational
structure (in terms of class and sector of economic activity).
To what extent these background variables really correlate
with cosmological stances, that are difficult to get at with
public opinion studies anyhow, is an empirical matter, by no
means sufficiently well explored. More particularly, rank
disequilibrium theory would sensitize us to the possibility
of people with very high positions, but perhaps with a rank
deficit on one or two crucial variables (such as class, age
and gender) would tend to develop countertrend theories and
more or less be carriers of alternative cosmologies. The
emphasis here would be on "more or less": if the rank deficit
is eliminated and the person moves into the center of the
Center the general prediction would be that he/she would
develop more mainstream positions. For an elaboration of rank
disequilibrium theory see Chapters 4, 5 and 6, op. cit.

5. The last of these six dimensions of cosmology exploration has
been added after the paper quoted in footnote 1 above was
written. I am currently working on a seventh dimension con-
cerned with the images of human space, of inner man in various
civilizations, possibly in the direction indicated by F. R.