NON-TERRITORIAL ACTORS: THE INVISIBLE CONTINENT[*]

Towards a Typology of International Organizations

By Johan Galtung
University of Oslo

1. *Territorial and non-territorial actors: a comparison*

Geographers may debate how many territorial continents there are
in the world; maby there are five, maybe six, maybe more. Since
the Great Discoveries increasingly adequate maps have been made
available to create an image of the world in terms of territory.
From this elementary school indoctrination generations have been
trained to see the world in terms of territorial actors, in con-
flict and cooperation. What is left out of that image is the
forgotten continent, *an invisible continent of non-territorial
actors*, the international organizations. Of course, everybody
talks about them today, but still mainly as an adjunct to the
territorial system, with insufficient emphasis, in our mind, on
the system of non-territorial actors as also being a system in
its own right, *sui generis*, with its own logic, contradictions
and structure.[1]

Such actors have been in existence for a very long time,[2] in
a sense during most of human history, but in a different way
from what we are experiencing today, not to mention from what
we probably are going to experience tomorrow. Thus, for the
first time in human history, we are entering a stage where we
may soon see the emergence of an international system with the
center of gravity in the political game, so to speak, in the
hands of non-territorial rather than territorial actors, par-
ticularly in the richer part of the world. This is of course
not to say that territorial actors will disappear completely,
only that they may gradually recede into the background and
that various types of non-territorial actors will be located
increasingly at the forefront of the political stage.[3] To
understand these processes, and particularly to discuss whether
any real change is involved, typologies of international orga-
nizations are needed.

For the purpose of this discussion we need some definitions.
What do we mean by the term actor, and what precise meaning
should be given to "non-territorial" and "territorial"?

Both types of actors have in common the ability to mobilize
resources in order to pursue their goals. But whereas these
resources are usually found within a contiguous territory in
geographical space in the case of the territorial actor, they are
not located in any easily defined spatial region in the case of
the non-territorial actor. The territorial actor has a territory
over which he has political control in the sense that he has
power over the power-relations inside that territory, to the
exclusion of other territorial actors. The non-territorial actor
commands no such territory. But this does not mean that his
power is not defined in some space, only that in this case the
space is not geographical. The power of the non-territorial
actor is defined in a *functional space*, or, if one prefers a more
general term, in a *social space*. Thus, a UN specialized actor
agency may have a certain political monopoly over certain types
of relations defined in a particular region of functional space,
e.g. health; to the exclusion of other non-territorial actors.

When defining the two actors so symmetrically we are, of
course, not implying in any sense that a state, a nation, a UN
specialized agency, an international hobby association and an
international business corporation are similar where degree of
autonomy or degree of power over resources they can command are
concerned. All we are saying is that they exist, so to speak,
in their own right, that they can command resources, that they
can pursue goals; in short: that they are actors. But the
regions over which they have some degree of monopoly and autonomy
are very differently defined, as is to be expected given the
difference between the simplistic, two-dimensional (or three-
dimensional) geographical space that has given rise to our metric
concepts, and the complex, many-dimensional, non-metric social
spaces.

Most easily defined are the territorial actors, simply because
geographical space is so easily defined. One may say that geo-
graphical space has a structure, even a metric, that has colored
our entire conception of what an actor is. The concept of col-
lective actor is structured so as to fit the possibilities given

by geographical space rather than vice versa. Thus, just to give
a very brief list of important characteristics usually attri-
buted to geographical space:

(1) geographical space is *constant*, i.e. in limited time spans
    geological and geographical changes are so slow or so small
    or so limited that they do not in any really significant
    sense extend or contract the geographical space available
    - with the exception of major land reclamation schemes
    (there are, of course, also some islands that disappear and
    appear or reappear, but these are minor events; and the
    movement of glaciers are too slow relative to the life span
    of geographical actors, not to mention the life span of
    human beings, to have important effects of a more short
    range nature);

(2) geographical span can be clearly, unambiguously (with minor
    exceptions) *subdivided* in such a way that a one-one mapping
    between actors and regions is possible, meaning that owner-
    ship of a region excludes ownership by other actors;

(3) a corresponding *one-one mapping is possible between regions
    and human beings*, for instance defining a person's citizen-
    ship according to the place where he is born. Since loco-
    motion takes place at restricted speed, it is always possible
    at any given moment in time to pin down a person to a
    specific region and use that as a criterion for belongingness,
    and one such point in time is obviously the point of birth.
    But, as the theory of citizenship shows, there are also
    other possibilities - the point here is only that it is
    meaningful to define it so that to each person there is one
    and only one citizenship.

(4) Consensual, *clearly defined borderlines or demarkations between
    territorial regions can be obtained*, often making use of
    highly visible lines in the topography such as the coast,
    rivers, montain ranges, etc. But even if border lines are
    drawn as lines in a completely homogeneous desert, consensus
    may be obtained: not in the sense that there are no disputed
    territories, but in the sense that all parties concerned know
    where the disputed borderline runs.

All these properties have been important for the emergence of
the territorial state. Let us now compare them with the structure,
or lack of structure, in a functional or social space.

In this case one cannot talk about constancy, neither of
constant expansion, for societies to devleop, new functions are
constantly amalgamated into the structure and old functions may
die out - the net result being that functional space is changing
and shifting, expanding here, contracting there.

Further, in the territorial case, one has generally not accep-
ted joint ownership over the same territory, but has regarded

this as an anomalus situation leading to a type of instability
that may even escalate into a war. In functional space one very
often has the case that several actors are defined as having
competence over the same functional region; sometimes leading to
conflict, sometimes forcing them into cooperation because sub-
division may be impossible or very harmful.[4]

Then, it is not true that an individual can belong to one and
only one non-territorial actor. The circumstance that he does
not have infinite speed of locomotion, enabling him to be in
several positions in geographical space at the same time, does
not prevent him from occupying several positions in social space
at the same time, multiplying memberships in value - and interest -
organizations, for instance.

As to borderline between regions: they are usually well
defined in geographical space, but highly nebulous in functional
space. Thus, where does health end and education start, or education
end and labor relations start? What about training in hygiene;
or the working situation of teachers, and so on, and so forth.

Let us now imagine efforts to make the two spaces more similar,
partly because such efforts may be politically highly meaningful,
and partly as a heuristic device to develop more insight.
Obviously, there may be two kinds of efforts, making social space
look more like geographical space, and making geographical space
look more like social space.

As to the former it is easily seen what this would mean in
principle. One could imagine some high council of theologically,
metaphysically, legally, sociologically etc. oriented "high
priests" trying to define once and for all which are the functions
of the general and total human enterprise. With the clarity of
a constitution or a penal/civil code, or a sociology textbook,
they would try to describe human society in such a way that all
its functions, forever, were clearly listed.[5] Having done this,
they would make, once and for all, a list of non-territorial
organizations deemed by them to be necessary. These organizations
would be given a well-defined existence, and complete monopoly
over the function(s) given to them by decree. This can be done
in such a way that human beings would also by definition sort
under one and only one organization. Just as their *place of birth*

might be used to define their geographical belongingness and
hence their belongingness to a territorial actor, their *occupation*
could be used to define their social belongingness and hence
their belongingness to a non-territorial actor. There would be an
implicit assumption about uniqueness here, at least in general:
just as a person is born in one and only one place, he would be
supposed to have one and only one occupation, or at least only
one major occupation. [6]

If this assumption is satisfied, then the definition of
borderlines should not be too difficult: much work would have to
be invested into elaborations of borderline cases so that it is
clear on what side of the water-shed each case would fall down.
For geographically defined actors this is not only a question of
clear patterns of belongingness where geographical points are
concerned, but also a question of where human beings belong: if
they very often belong to more than one geographical actor, then
the borderlines become less sharp because they become too porous.
And correspondingly for the non-territorial actor: it is not only
a question of clear rules as to where the most minute sub-sub-sub-
functions belong, but corresponding rules as to the belongingness
of persons charged with the articulation or implementation of
these functions.

Both systems can stand a certain ambiguity, but there are
upper limits. [7]

It is easily seen that a social space of the type described
here, structurally similar to geographical space, is of a type
one would most easily associate with highly stable social struc-
tures where the leading political and scientific hierarchies
have tremendous power. In other words, it might be associated
with utopias, with preindustrial societies of several types, and
with totalitarian states. This is also clearly seen in the
directives implicitly given to human beings: you shall have one
and only one occupation, you shall belong to one and only one
organization. One might perhaps add that there is only one field
of organizational behavior where these principles have been really
approximated: the field of trade unionism, not to mention the
caste system. Here one has a social space corresponding to the
list of occupations, changing over time as that list changes but
constant at any point in time; there is a clear autonomy of one

trade union over a class of occupations, a clear pattern of
belongingness for the individual worker, and clearly defined
borderlines. The same seems to some extent to be the case for
professional associations, traditionally accustomed to mirror the
structure of higher education as it has been crystallized into
faculties, departments and institutes in the traditional univer-
sities. And much of this is then reflected in the corresponding
international organizations, but only partly. In general
functional, social or organizational space has a much more com-
plicated structure, most easily appreciated by performing the
corresponding experiment of imagining geographically defined
actors structured in the same way as socially and functionally
defined actors in complex and dynamic societies as we know them
today.

If geographical territory should behave in a similar way, it
would be changing all the time, expanding in some directions,
perhaps contracting in some other directions, making a mockery
of any permanent or "final" pattern of subdivision. Some geo-
graphical actors would have command over several regions, some
over one, and some would have to share their control with several
others - in addition there would be unclaimed regions. The limits
of space would be unknown, and would defy exploration - in fact,
it would change by being explored. Human beings would be the
citizens of zero, one, or several territorial actors; very much
according to their own decision. For all these reasons border-
lines would be highly volatile, regions intermesh and inter-
connect, and their patterns of interpenetration would change over
time, making it very difficult to say where one country ends and
the other starts. This is far beyond the problem of a river bed
changing with seasonal variations, with excessive precipitations
and changing sedimentation, etc. making the river less than
suitable as a baseline for a clear definition of the borderline
between two nations. Rather, it bears some similarity to many
people's image of the world prior to the era of the Great
Discoveries and the system of nation states, as it may have
appeared to peripatetic intellectuals, to traders, to pilgrims.
And - perhaps also an image of a world of tomorrow?[8]

It may now be a question of personal taste what one prefers:
a concept of nation-states patterned according to what today
may be said to be the case for social space, or a concept of

non-territorial actors patterned according to what today may be
said to be the case for geographical space, or the co-existence
we have today of the two types of actors. If our concern is
with, for instance, peace theory, it is not easily seen what is
more peace productive. According to one such theory messiness,
lack of clarity, what in general is referred to as high level of
entropy, is conducive to peace because of the difficulty in
obtaining the clear borderlines that can serve as a baseline for
a major war between two well defined and completely polarized
actors.[9] But that is only one theory; there are others in the
field, such as the idea that messiness may lead to uncertainty
which may lead to fear and anxiety and to destructive conflict
behavior.

However that may be, let us try to use the parallels between
the two systems to see how one can learn from the other in the
field of two important problems, one of them related to the
potential for direct violence, the other to the potential for
structural violence.[10]

First, we mentioned that in functional space there is much
more experience with joint authority than in territorial space -
except at the local territorial level (port authorities, lake
authorities, etc.). Thus, there is a joint ILO-UNESCO Commission
precisely to handle the problems of the teacher in his work-
situation; but there is not yet a joint Chile-Peru-Bolivia commission
to handle the problems of the Arica-Tacna region - presumably
because each party would consider this a weakening of their claim
to unrestricted sovereignty. From this, it seems that one may
draw the conclusion that experiences made in functional space
could serve as a good model for territorial space.

Second, we mentioned that in territorial space there is a
one-to-one mapping, or pinning down of a person to one place in
space; where he is born, where he lives, where he works, etc.
There is one obvious advantage to this in any system based on
voting: since a person cannot be two places in space at the same
time, it is more easy to see to it that he votes only once. If
he can vote through his associations his vote will be weighted
with a factor that increases with the number of memberships he has.
And this experience or pattern is not so easily transferred because
one thing is to pin down a person in functional space (e.g. by his

education), quite another to require that he shall be pinned
down to only one point (have only one type of education). The
problem of double voting or multiple influence could, conceiv-
ably, be handled by having a special category for the *pluralists*,
those with multiple education, multiple career lines, membership
in opposing parties, or what not. There is some similarity here
to the special voting arrangements for those who move much
across borders, e.g., sailors and foreign workers. In other words,
it seems that one may draw the conclusion that experiences made
in geographical space may serve as a good model for functional
space; in other words that both systems may learn from each other.

2.   *A theory of non-territorial growth; and a first typology*

After these excursions into the similarities and differences
between the territorial and the non-territorial system, let us
now look at the phenomenon of non-territorial growth in a more
dynamic perspective. We have mentioned above that the non-
territorial continent is more flexible than the territorial one -
more dimensions, less metricized, not only non-finite but ever-
expanding, ever-contracting and ever-changing. To explore this
imagine a set of territorial actors - they could be countries but
could also be local communities, districts, regions, for the con-
cepts to be developed are general enough to cover several cases -
and we do not have to make any particular assumption about size
distribution, distances, communication potential and so on. The
only thing we need for the theory is the idea of some kind of
need for interaction, in at least some pairs of actors, that their
geo-political system is not sufficient to contain their soci-
economic needs.[11] If there is interaction, then it does not
seem unreasonable to assume that sooner or later the need for
regulation of patterns of interaction will arise. There will
be a need for some kind of coordination, for some kind of
machinery to settle conflicts, for revisions of terms of exchange
in general and terms of trade in particular.

Our simple theory is now based on a four-fold table in which
this can be discussed.[12] We assume that such discussions or

exchanges can take place between two actors only and hence be
termed *bilateral*, or between more than two actors and be referred
to as *multilateral*; and we assume further that these discussions
may be *ad hoc* or *institutionalized*. And this leads us immediately
to the following four-fold table:

Table 1.   *The IGO machine: phases in organizing governmental
           interaction.*

	ad hoc	*institutionalized*
bilateral	I envoy	II resident diplomacy
multilateral	III international conferences	IV international organizations

     In this Table there is an ambiguity with regard to the second
axis. Thus, the negation of "ad hoc" is relatively rich in
structural alternatives. "Ad hoc" means actually three things:
there is no *emerging suprastructure* to handle these negotiations;
there is no *permanent session* of conference in which the actors
participate even without having any superstructure, and there is
not even any way of *predicting* when these non-permanent conferences
do take place, like "every second year".

     This means that at the extreme of institutionalization one
will find the permanent suprastructure, then follow various
forms of permanent sessions of countries negotiating with each
other but without what today is known as a "secretariat", and at
the lowest level of institutionalization there is only the
periodical or otherwise predictable, repeatable meeting with
nothing happening in-between. It may actually be disputed where
the cutting point between "ad hoc" and "institutionalized" is
located, but it can hardly be doubted that there is a continuum
rather than a dichotomy involved here.

     The arrows in the Table indicate an hypothesis as to temporal
succession. This should not be taken too seriously: there are
many examples where one or even all of the arrows could be turned
around. But in general we would assume that the bilateral, ad
hoc form is the most frequently found starting point, e.g. the

diplomat visiting the country to which he is accredited at inter-
vals, for instance once a year, and usually from a neighboring
country in which he is stationed. From this lowest level it can
be developed further into a pattern of resident diplomacy where
the embassy is permanently located in the capital, close to the
centers of power of the host nation. But one could also extra-
polate from this to a third form that does not seem to have
become part of contemporary diplomatic practice: a form whereby
the embassy of nation X in nation Y would amalgamate so effectively
with the nation X desk in the foreign ministry of nation Y that
the two would be virtually inseparable and constitute some type
of international organization, although only at the bilateral level.
That these people know each other, negotiate and meet frequently,
and even may share political tastes and practices almost comple-
tely (if the countries are not too separated by dissimilarities
and disharmonies) is not the same as saying that a new structure
has emerged. It should be noted that this kind of superstructure
seems to exist in trade and commerce: the existence of joint
(bilateral) chambers of commerce beween nation X and nation Y
testifies to that.

There is something rather trivial about the transition from
"ad hoc" to the various levels of "institutionalized". It can be
discussed in terms of *costs*: there is a certain break-off point
where permanent contacts become less expensive than often
repeated ad hoc contacts. Then there is the question of *control*:
permanent contact increases the predictability and stabilizes
patterns of influence. And there is the problem of *communication*:
permanent, close contact makes feedback of information and
decisions more rapid and speeds up interaction in general. To
this one could then add quite a number of other elements, such
as, for instance, the permanence of contacts as a sign of
recognition. In fact, the very axis from ad hoc to the highest
form of institutionalization, not yet really clarified systema-
tically, is in itself one of the best indicators of the degree
of proximity between countries. Countries need some indicator of
how distant or close they are to each other; if this one did not
exist something else probably had to be invented.[13]

Let us then look at the other axis, the transition from
bilateral to *multilateral* forms of interaction; conferences and

organizations. Of course, one can again look at it from the point
of view of *costs* and argue that a multilateral meeting of n coun-
ties may be a highly efficient substitute for $\binom{n}{2}$ bilateral
meetings. Or, one can discuss it from the point of view of
control and argue that multilateral forms make for a higher
degree of mutual visibility than the corresponding number of
bilateral forms, and this is undeniable. There is also the point
frequently made by big powers that this will increase small power
influence since they not only will have a chance to speak for
a large auditorium but also to aggregate and pool their vocies
for joint articulation; and there is the collateral argument,
frequently heard from smaller powers, that the multilateral form
of organization is a major instrument of *big power manipulation*.
And then there is the argument of *communication*: no one can deny
the rapidity and the efficiency that can be attained with face to
face contact, particularly when the services of a loyal and
efficient secretariat are available. The arguments for multi-
lateral institutionalization are about the same as at the
bilateral level.

However, the matter is not quite that unproblematic. First of
all: it does not really explain why multilateral forms of contact
come into existence at all. For just as every nation is unique
every dyad is also unique. As is painfully obvious in the world
today some dyads are further advanced in positive interaction
than others; no two dyads seem to be at exactly the same level.[14]
This means that efforts to break up the interaction monopoly held
by bilateral relations and tie it together again in a multilateral
form presupposes considerable ability to unify what is already
highly diverse. In fact, it presupposes some of the same
standardization of international relations that at the level of
human interaction is associated with industrial, "modern",
Western societies and the capitalist rather than artisan mode
of production. For there is a real transcendence implicit in the
multilateral form of social existence once this step has been
taken. The sum of bilateral agreements, or treaties, is never
quite the same as a multilateral agreement, or a convention. And
this is a discontinuous transition, completely unlike increasingly
frequently held ad hoc, but bilateral, conferences that gradually
develop into permanence and end up in bilateral institutionalization.
Needless to say, the transition is smoothened by keeping all four

forms at the same time.[15]

There is no necessary logical connection between movements
along the two dimensions; all four forms are completely con-
ceivable, and indeed empirically found. And the Table can now
be seen as an X-ray photo of a social mechanism, *where the inputs
are national actors and the final output is an intergovernmental
organization*, an IGO.[16] It is like a sausage machine: one puts
in countries and gets out an IGO. However, the machine is hardly
very efficient: it took something like, say, 500 years to enter
into efficient production of this end product, from ad hoc
bilateral diplomacy by envoys among Italian city states to the
IGO proliferation of today.[17]

But what has been done once can be done twice. So, why not
regard the IGO output of this machine as the input to a new
machine, with exactly the same structure, but producing super-IGOs
and linked together in a coupling that looks something like this:

Figure 1. *The super-IGO machine*

This is what is quickly taking place today: we are rewriting
the last five centuries of human history, but this time with IGOs
as the units upon which this superstructure machine works. How
this takes place concretely is obvious enough. Two IGOs are in
need of some kind of mutual control and communication, very often
referred to as "coordination". Misinformation, jealousies and
potential conflicts are operating and propelling enterprising
individuals into action. The first step is obviously the ad hoc
contact: the sending of envoys in either direction for informa-
tion collection. There may easily be a ranking variable at work
here: the smaller IGO has to send an envoy to the bigger IGO
before the latter condescends to reciprocate.[18] The institu-
tionalization of this exchange usually takes the form of exchanges
of members on councils or executives, after an initial phase where
these persons are referred to as "observers", and often only
admitted to open sessions, to the general assemblies, or con-

ferences. One can now easily imagine the extrapolation from this:
the permanent respresentatives from other IGOs are given separate
offices in the host secretariats, and not only observe and report
and give feedback as resident diplomacy in its bilateral form
would do, but participate actively in the work of the IGO.[19] In
that case a bilateral IGO structure would have emerged, a super-
IGO with two members.

Multilateralization could then take the same forms as for
country actors. There would be an initial phase with conferences
on an ad hoc basis, then these conferences would be institutio-
nalized and held at regular intervals, for instance annually, as
"consultations", paving the way to the final step: the erection
of a multilateral super-IGO of which the "bilateral super-IGO"
mentioned above would be the simplest case.

We are probably today mostly in the first and second phases of
this development. But what we have so far seen, seems to indicate
one rather obvious thing: this second machine in the super-
structure generation works much more effectively than the first
one. If we should venture a guess it might be that what the
first machine was able to produce in 500 years, the second machine
may be able to do in 50.[20] And the reason for this is not only
the increased communication and transportation facilities of our
age, but also to a large extent that the individuals in command
of the end product of the *first* process, the IGOs, are already
trained in this type of superstructure creation. In other words,
although we are by no means minimizing the extent to which they
may be as jealously safeguarding the functional autonomy of their
IGOs as any president, king or prime minister the territorial
interests of his country, they may relatively easily engage in
super-IGO creation, exactly in order to protect these interests.
That structure is already thoroughly imprinted on their minds,
they have considerable training in the verbalization and the
activities needed, and they have the pleasure of having as their
opposite number in other organizations people with the same kind
of training.

What now has happened twice can also happen three times: we
can easily imagine one more machine of the same kind coupled in
series with the others as to produce super-super-IGOs. But we
are not quite there yet, this is still for the future. More

important would be to look at the corresponding machines operating
in a *parallel* fashion to what we have described, producing
inter-nongovernmental organizations, INGOs and super-INGOs, or
producing business INGOs, BINGOs and super-BINGOs. The first one
obviously feeds on national non-governmental organizations and
amalgamates them into (B)INGOs, and the second one correspondingly
feeds on (B)INGOs and produces super-(B)INGOs on that basis.

   Let us now complicate this general image of future growth
even further by introducing the ideas of parallel coupling and
coupling in series of these machines, at the same time:

Figure 2. *Parallel coupling between the IGO, INGO and
           BINGO machines.*

The vertical arrows stand for liaison organizations, at all three
levels of organization, and in all three pairs. Thus, one of
them would be the link between INGOs and IGOs - e.g., as it is
found in the institution of the "consultative status" of certain
INGOs with certain IGOs - or between two IGOs, e.g., between
OPEC and the IEA. To take another example: the possible link
between a super-INGO (e.g., a Council of Scientific Associations)
and a super-BINGO (e.g., a combine of international business in
the oil field). We let this do as examples of how far the com-
plexity can develop: there is no upper limit. Moreover, the
more complex the network, the longer the chain of machines coupled
in series and the denser the network of parallel coupling, the
more power can be obtained from certain positions in the total
network. In fact, most heads of governments may look somewhat
left behind at the left hand end of the scheme relative to the
tremendous power that ultimately develops to the right, although
there is a limit to how far one can go in complexity. And this
power should not be measured by means of such crude indicators as

the amount of *capital* they handle, but rather by taking the net-
work context and the amount of *information* they handle into
account.[21]

As one moves towards the right in the Figure above, there will
probably also be another significant development: the transition
from the use of permanent organizations with secretariats and
staff to the use of instant ad hoc communication, e.g. via tele-
satellite, as the "logical" solution to the problems of extremely
complex networks of organization.[22] The whole system will be so
complex and its needs will change so quickly as to make the
classical response, one new organization and one new office
whenever there is a need, impracticable.

So far, we have looked at growth from the point of view of
integration and meta-integration, etc.[23] But growth in the non-
territorial system can also come about by other means. Thus,
there is the tendency for each IGO, INGO and BINGO to foster,
through the usual social dialectics, a counter-IGO, -INGO, -BINGO
in competition with it, vying with each other for political,
socio-cultural and economic markets among the territorial actors
(an example would be international trade unions relative to
transnational corporations). In fact, they may often cancel
each other out, like matter and anti-matter, leaving behind a lot
of noise.[24]

Then, there is the equally dialectical *differentiation in the*
non-territorial system along class lines. As it is now, masters
and servants are already emerging in the NT system and although
the smaller, younger and less powerful NTs are badly organized
it will hardly last long before they see the need for some kind of
trade union formation. A stratification system may sooner or
later crystallize into a class system - e.g., pitting the
prestigious IGOs against the less prestigious INGOs - and the
result can easily be gigantic super-IGOs, super-INGOs and super-
BINGOs, pitted against each other, just as for territorial actors.
Thus, the upper class among the IGOs is probably the UN organi-
zations and the IGOs of the most powerful countries - these may
be pitted against each other, or together against all others.

Finally, and most significantly: *new non-territorial actors*
form in socio-functional space at any time, simply because there

is some kind of need for them. If they are neighbors in that
strange space they may perhaps easily fuse together, integrate,
like various types of social scientists. Correspondingly, if
they are built over too much internal distance in that space,
covering too diverse functions, they may undergo fission and
disintegrate, like international student unions in the late 1950s.
But the tendencies towards disintegration are hardly that
important, and the net result would be an increase in the number
of NTs anyhow.

One particular source of growth of this type is the principle
of *growth by intersection*: if there is union of esperantists and
a union of nudists there may be basis for a union of esperanto-
speaking nudists.[26] As time goes on one could imagine increasing
complexity also along this dimension: organizations based on the
intersection not only of two but of three or more organizations.[27]
There is no introduction to new functions but of functions of a
higher order, once more telling us something about the flexibility
and expandability of this socio-functional space. In other words:
the invisble continent will grow and continue to grow, and unlike
the visible continents there is no upper limit, no limits to
growth except, perhaps, by the number of human beings and the
time they have available to make their organizations meaningful.[28]

In order now to understand this phenomenon better, the question
must be asked that can be asked in connection with all dynamic
phenomena: where is the growth most pronounced? One way of
answering would be to look at the location of headquarters, in
Table 2.

The general conclusion is clear: more than 4/5ths of the
non-territorial machinery is controlled from the world North
West, making the entire structure relatively similar to the
colonial pattern. There is a slight trend towards some redistri-
bution, but a very slow one indeed, and lagging far behind the
pattern of political decolonization from World War II onwards.
The reason is partly structural - the North West has the monetary
and human resources - and partly cultural - the North West com-
bines expansionism with individualism and non-territorial actors
are very much based on detachable, mobile individuals and
expand very easily by establishing local chapters anywhere once
the actor is born. This leads to an hypothesis to be explored in

Table 2. *Location of headquarters of international organizations, 1906-1968*[*]

Year	North West	Latin America	Arab countries	Western Asia	Socialist Asia	Eastern Europe	Black Africa	Rest	Total	N
1906	97.0	.6	0	0	0	2.4	0	0	100.0	169
1912	97.3	.7	.2	.2	0	1.6	0	0	100.0	437
1921	98.4	.6	.3	.3	.3	0	0	0	99.9	321
1926	98.2	.7	0	0	.3	.7	0	0	99.9	397
1929-31	97.9	.6		0	0	1.6	0	0	100.1	524
1938	96.1	.7	.1	.4	0	2.7	0	0	100.1	705
1950	95.1	2.6	.5	.2	0	1.4	1	0	99.9	804
1954	93.2	3.1	.4	1.3	0	1.3	.5	.3	100.1	1198
1958	92.0	3.7	.5	1.5	0	1.6	1.6	.1	100.0	1257
1962	90.8	3.7	.5	1.8	0	1.8	1.2	.1	99.9	1549
1964	89.4	4.4	1.1	1.7	0	1.8	1.4	.1	99.9	1758
1966	88.7	4.8	.9	1.7	0	2.1	1.5	.1	99.8	2207
1968	87.1	5.4	1.1	2.1	0	2.1	1.9	.2	99.9	2663
1972	87.8	4.8	1.3	2.3	0	2.1	1.7	.1	100.1	3185
1974	86.6	5.1	1.4	2.6	0	2.1	2.2	0	100.0	2904

[*] Sources: *International Associations,* 1954, no. 11, pp. 548-49; 1954, no. 11, pp. 548-49; 1959, no. 6, p. 446; 1965, no. 2, pp. 86-89; 1976, no. 2, pp. 166-69.

Yearbook of International Organizations, 12th edition, 14th edition.

the next section: non-territorial actors constitute a mechanism for neo-colonialism just as territorial actors did for colonialism.

But there is also another aspect to this pattern that should be pointed out. In the rich and capitalist North-West there is one group of countries that probably benefits particularly from the development of the invisible continent: the *small* countries. If we calculate INGO and IGO membership per one million population,

and exclude territories with less than one million inhabitants,
the ranking list in 1964 was as follows:

Table 3. *The first nations in terms of INGO/capita and
          IGO/capita, 1964.*

Rank	INGO/capita	IGO/capita
1	Israel	Panama
2	Norway	Costa Rica
3	Switzerland	Nicaragua
4	Denmark	Mauritania
5	Finland	Liberia
6	New Zealand	Paraguya
7	Panama	Central African Rep.
8	Ireland	Israel
9	Uruguay	Norway
10	Austria	Honduras

The two lists are quite different and the reason is simple. There
are many IGOs in the world today to which a country simply has to
belong in order to be a country; hence the countries on top of
the list are above all the very small countries regardless of
level of development. That does not mean that we do not have the
same neo-colonial pattern in the IGO system, even for UN agencies,
only one of which (UNEP) has a headquarter in East or South -
headquarters are either in the militarily organized West - the
NATO countries - or in countries "neutral to West". But it does
mean   that the whole world is taken in,in a way that is not
the case for the INGOs. INGO membership seems to presuppose a
certain social structure, above all that the country is "developed"
and/or capitalist, and this is clearly reflected in the INGO/capita
list, especially when compared with the other list.

It may be argued that the absolute number of memberships is
more significant than the relative number per million inhabitants,
but they both are. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that
with a constant number of memberships the smaller of two countries
is more penetrated because proportionately more people are involved:
the invisible continent becomes more visible. And this brings us
to the important perspective that *the invisible continent is*

*(except for BINGOs) the continent the small, developed and
capitalist states try to colonize; particularly since all
territorial continents have to some extent been colonized by
the big powers, capitalist or socialist.*

The significance of this factor, and the validity of this
general hypothesis, can be further appreciated by studying

Table 4.   *Number of international officials per million
            inhabitants, 1954*[29]

1.	Switerland	86	6.	France	22
2.	Belgium	55	7.	Norway	19
3.	Netherlands	42	8.	United Kingdom	16
4.	Denmark	25	9.	Italy	9
5.	Sweden	23	10.	North America	4

Although the *site* of the organization definitely is an important
factor here, it is another important indicator of the extent to
which small, rich countries have made use of this resource.

But it is also quite obvious that numbers are not good enough
here; it is only an indicator. Thus, the growth in *number* of cars
would not in itself be sufficient as an indicator of how dominant
cars are as cultural themes: socio-psychological investigations
would also be needed to say something about the grip cars have on
people's minds. Correspondingly for the non-territorial actors:
we do not know to what extent there is real identification with
them. This is probably a function (but not a simple linear one)
of the extent to which they satisfy perceived needs, and even can
start competing with the territorial system in so doing. And if
this competition gets off the ground to the extent that the latter
is threatened, how will they, the countries, hit back in efforts
to control and possibly stifle non-territorial growth? There is
no doubt that they are hitting back at the TNCs, but when will
that be generalized to other non-territorial actors?[30]

All we can say where this is concerned is the rather trite
conclusion that for the Year 2000 there will be three possibili-
ties when it comes to the relative salience of the two systems,
NT and T:[31]

1. NT weaker than T in salience;
2. NT equal to T in salience;
3. NT stronger than T in salience.

The point here is merely that anyone concerned with images of
future worlds would do well to take the invisible continent into
account. Nobody would today analyze a country only in terms of
its territorial sub-divisions - states, prefectures, departments,
provinces, counties, etc. - but would bring into the analysis
organizations and associations, e.g. business corporations and
trade unions, particularly when they are national, spanning
across the subdivisions of the geographical space held by the
country. The same applies today to the world, and increasingly
so - it seems. On the other hand, social systems are dialectic
systems, there are movements but also counter-movements. How they
will add up in the year 2000 we simply do not know.

3. *Relations between territorial and non-territorial actors:*
    a second and third typology

Let us now combine points made in the preceding sections into a
scale of increasing non-territoriality depending on what kind of
units are members of the "international organization":

-   Members are national governments, and the organization is
    inter-governmental (IGO);

-   Members are other national organizations or associations
    than governments, and the organization is *inter-non-*
    governmental (INGO);

-   Members are individuals, and the organization is a
    trans-national (non-governmental) association (TRANGO).

We prefer not to use the term "international" for any one of these,
for the term "international", in our view, does not necessarily
imply any organization or actor at all. The international system
is simply the system of nations (actually, the system of states,
or countries), in cooperation and conflict - nothing more,
nothing less. For that reason we interpret IGO to mean inter-
governmental (and not inter-national, governmental), INGO to mean
inter-nongovernmental (and not international non-governmental),
and we add to this well-know distinction the transnational (or,
really, trans-nongovernmental) organization, the TRANGO, which

relates directly to individuals whereover they are found. In the
TRANGO there are no "national chapters" or similar arrangements
filtering the direct relation between individuals.

Then there is that vitally important special case of the INGO:
the *business* inter-nongovernmental organization (BINGO). It
links together non-governmental business organizations in various
countries and is better known today as the "multinational cor-
poration". However, the latter may be an unfortunate term for at
least three reasons. Firstly, "multi" connotes more than two
nations, but often there are only two, and in that case the term
"cross-national" may, perhaps, be preferred to "multinational".
Further, the term "multinational" conceals how asymmetric these
corporations are, usually being dominated from one country. And,
finally, "corporation" may not be broad enough, for there may be
many other ways of organizing international business than in
corporations. (Incidentally, one of these ways would be govern-
mental, as an IGO, which in that case - when it is for business -
would be termed a BIGO.)

Let us now try to make this over-used typology more meaning-
ful by exploring two important phenomena located at the interface
between the territorial and the non-territorial systems. These
two systems are by no means unrelated, particularly since one,
the territorial, preceded the other by thosands of years and
consequently must have set its stamp on the late-comer, however
efficiently the latter uses transportation and communication.

We have found it useful to discuss the relation between the two
systems under the headings of *isomorphy* and *homology*. The pro-
positions are simple:

> *Proposition 1:*   The non-territorial actors tend to be
>   isomorphic with the territorial system;
>
> *Proposition 2:*   The non-territorial actors tend to induce
>   homology among territorial actors;
>
> *Proposition 3:*   The propositions above are most valid for
>   inter-governmental organizations, (usually)
>   less for inter-nongovernmental organizations,
>   and (almost) invalid for transnational orga-
>   nizations. They are also highly valid for
>   transnational corporations.

Let us spell this out.

Characteristic of the two lowest types of non-territorial
actors, the IGOs and the INGOs, is that the *world territorial
structure, the nation-state structure, is still entirely visible.*
When governments are member this is obvious, but it also applies
to the typical "international organization" built as an associa-
tion of associations (e.g. an association of national associations
or dentists, longshoremen, stamp-collectors). An association or
organization at the national level becomes a "national chapter"
or a "mother, sister, or daughter company", depending on the
position in the hierarchy, at the level of the non-territorial
actor.

But there is not only a clear relation in the sense that the
states of the world are reflected as components of the non-
territorial actor. Not only the *elements* of the territorial
system, but also the *relations* between them can usually be redis-
covered; and that is why the stronger term "isomorphy" is used.
Relations of power (both resource and structural power) and inter-
action frequency are often mirrored faithfully. The most power-
ful chapter comes from the most powerful country - in terms of
location of headquarters, recruitment of staff, general perspec-
tive on world affairs; frequencies of interaction in the terri-
torial system are mirrored in frequencies of interaction in the
organization, and so on.[31] In other words: the territorial
system is reproduced inside some non-territorial actors *which
for that reason are not truly non-territorial.*

This way of thinking carries us quite far analytically. Non-
territorial actors with national components - governmental or non-
governmental - can be seen as governed primarily by the principle
of isomorphy. This is the baseline, as implemented in the United
Nations, when the major victors among the "united nations", the
Allies fighting against the Axis power, appointed themselves to
permanent Security Council seats, even with a veto. Isomorphy is
called "realism" in the plain language of power; and it means that
to those who have power in the territorial system, power shall
also be given in the non-territorial system. And it may also be
partially true that the more an inter-governmental organization
departs from this isomorphy, the less attention will be paid to it,
because its decisions will be seen as not reflecting the "real
world" - meaning the territorial system with its bilateral rela-
tions - to which decisions will then be referred.

But it is only a partial truth. A non-territorial actor that is 100% isomorphic with the territorial system is in a sense only a replicaiton of that system, except that it makes multilateral interaction possible. But small deviations from strict isomorphy will take place when countries are represented by persons, making these organizations a medium in which the smaller powers *can* more easily express themselves, can be listened to, and perhaps can make some impact on the territorial system. It is not merely a medium in which they can be more easily bossed.

But then, again, the opposite view: that this is precisely the medium in which the territorial system is kept alive and even reinforced. For instance, Nationalist China had for a long time a power excess because if its position in the UN Security Council. The argument would be, however, that this was not because of too much isomorphy, but because of lack of isomorphy, that UN was not up-to-date, but served to freeze the *past*. One might also extend that argument to the case of the UK and France, and even to the United States, for all practical purposes defeated by what was often referred to as a "fifth rate power", Vietnam. So, imagine the UN brought up-to-date, in an effort to mirror the territorial system. The argument would then be that any dis-tinction between veto and non-veto is too sharp, too absolute relative to the power distinctions in an increasingly subtle and complicated territorial system. Moreover, if war is used to decide who has veto, then the US and Vietnam should at least be on par, viewing Vietnam as an effective challenger of a former heavyweight champion.

Of course, over time the internal workings of a non-territorial actor will acquire complex facets never contemplated by its social architects, the lawyers. There will be informal structures in addition to the formal ones. But the power differentials *may* actually be magnified rather than reduced in an intergovernmental organization.

In the INGO, all of this becomes much less important, except for the BINGO, of course. Non-governments may feel less *obliged* to act in the name of the national interest, and more free to find the pattern of action and interaction that fits the values of the organization. Thus, one would assume in general that INGOs have national elements - by definition - but that the relations between

them are different, for instance much more egalitarian. The world has come to accept the idea of a big power veto in the UN, whether this reflects adequately or even exaggerates territorial power - but it would hardly accept it in an international philatelic association. Needless to say, however, all shades and gradations can be imagined here.

When it comes to trans-national organizations isomorphy would break down completely: there would be neither the national elements, nor the relations of the territorial system. Transnational ties uniting individuals across territorial borders might even be stronger than common citizenship. The classical example here is, of course, *nation membership* as opposed to *state citizenship*. The nation, defined as a group of human beings having in common some characteristics, referred to as ethnical, is the most important of all trans-national organization. (Here the unfortunate conse-quences of the double meaning of "nation" becomes particularly obvious!) Time and again it proves to be more important than territorially defined state citizenship, but the two are often confused because the nation-state is taken as a norm, and sometimes also is a fact in our world. Thus, Jews form such a transnational group, although a much better expression would be "transgovern-mental" - a TRAGO - since they are found under the protection (or abuse) of various governments. The extent to which Jews would identify themselves as "Soviet" Jews, "US" Jews, and so on would then be a test of the extent to which this is an INGO or a TRANGO.

More recent examples would be international scientific unions where the dissolution of national organization has gone quite far.[18] Of course, people in the same discipline from the same country may know each other better, and their interaction is usually facilitated by speaking the same language, but the search for significant colleagues, for meaningful persons with whom to work, to converse, to exchange ideas will not be restricted by such borders. Only few and particularly repressive countries would imagine organizing their citizens so as to act as a bloc in a transnational organization.

Then there are, of course, the political parties and pressure-groups that are transnational, such as the World New Left and the Vietnam solidarity movement. The fact that there may also be cooperation at sub-national and national levels does not detract

from the transnational character of such world movements, for
national identities are usually successfully washed out. Good
cases in point are the world hippie movement - or any movement for
new life styles in defiance of the various versions of vertical
success-oriented, power-oriented societal orders.

*For these reasons we see the trans-national organizations as
the real non-territorial actors of the future.* Only they can
deserve the epithet *global* actors, since only they (like states)
are based on individuals as their unit, *and* are global in their
scope.

To summarize: the idea of isomorphy splits into two: are the
territorial *elements*, the countries, present in the "non-terri-
torial" actor? and are the territorial *relations* present?
Answer:

Table 4. *Three types of non-territorial actors*

| Territorial elements	Territorial relations	Non-territoriality
present	present	low (IGOs, most BINGOs)
present	absent	medium (INGOs)
absent	absent	high (TRANGOs)

Let us then turn to the problem of *homology*; in other words,
a focus on   the non-territorial organizations as giant mechanisms
for making all states as *similar* to each other as possible. Just
as a state tries to find its appropriate place (often called its
"natural" position) in a non-territorial organization, so a non-
territorial organization is a vehicle facilitating the search for
an *opposite number* inside any state. Whether members are govern-
ments, non-governmental associations, organizations, or simply
individuals, any non-territorial actor will look for like-minded
or like-positioned elements in all states around the world. For
that is their task: *to organize all of their kind*, wherever they
be found. And if they do not exist they can be created, for
instance by inviting observers to international conferences who
then return to their country with the message imprinted on their
minds: *solch ein Ding müssen wir auch haben.* But this means that
non-territorial actors become giant mechanisms through which the

stronger states, the states that started these organizations, can imprint a message on weaker states: you must have this profession and that profession, this hobby and sports association and that ideological movement, you must produce this and that - in order to be full-fledged members of the World. Active membership in IGOs, INGOs, etc. is taken as an indicator of how deeply embedded the country is in the world system - without questioning who started all these organizations, on what social basis, for what purpose, in what image. Having said this it becomes obvious that the reasoning also applies to regions: the weaker regions will tend to imitate the stronger regions and import the IGO/INGO machinery they have.

Thus, international conferences become giant markets where isomorphy and homology can be checked; the former for inter-state, the latter for intra-state relations. They become giant reproduction mechanisms. Power relations in the non-territorial organization will be compared to power relations in the territorial system, to see to what extent T is reflected in NT. And individuals from any country will compare notes to find to what extent that particular NT is reflected in their part of T - whether it is present at all, and whether their government pays as much attention to it in terms of subsidy and deference as other governments are reported to pay to sister chapters, and so on.

This entire presentation may now gain in depth if we tie it to a simple four-country model of the world with two Center and two Periphery countries:

Figure 3. *Non-territoriality as an elite concept*

We have added a little dot on top of each circle for the governments, the nuclei of the centers. Obviously, the IGOs connect

these dots in various ways. The INGOs do not necessarily connect
only the center of countries - they *may* also tie periphery elements
together. But chances are they do not: chances are that the masses
are tied to their territorial units because they do not have the
resources, *that the whole concept of non-territoriality is
fundamentally an elite concept.* Even such grandiose concepts as
"Europe", yes, even the nation-state is very much of an elite
concept because of the way in which such means for developing
consciousness as literacy, reading beyond primary school, know-
ledge of foreign languages are badly distributed, not to mention
all the other inequalities and inequities, access to transportation
and communication. Hence, even though we do not have good data
on national participation in the type of associations and
organizations that also are multinationally organized, we can
safely say that those individuals who participate internationally,
in conferences and in secretariats etc., generally belong to the
center of their countries. They are the individuals who serve
as links between countries, not the non-participant member and the
even less participant non-members, hidden behind the national
screen.

Thus, if non-territorial actors (and this includes the trans-
national ones) essentially link governments and other elite groups
together, then there are, in principle, and referring to the
Figure, four types of international organizations:

(1) connecting Center countries (horizontal lines, top);

(2) connecting Center and Periphery countries in the same
    bloc (vertical lines);

(3) connecting Periphery countries (horizontal lines, bottom)
    - in same bloc,
    - in different blocs;

(4) universal organizations (the whole rectangle).

The first three may be referred to as "regional" organizations
as long as we keep in mind the distinction between horisontal and
vertical regions, and are not really non-territorial actors. In
the real world, however, a particular organization is often too
complex to permit classification in any single one of these types
of classes.

Thus, the secretariat of an organization may often be different
from the rest of the organization and be trans-national even when
the rest is inter-governmental or intra-governmental. Much of
the history of the big intergovernmental organizations is the
story of how the secretariat has tried to transnationalize the
national delegates (meeting in conferences/assemblies, in councils
or in executive boards), teaching them "to think in terms of the
world as a whole" (the "world" usually meaning the organization,
meaning the secretariat) - *and* of how the national delegates try
to inter-nationalize the secretariat by such methods as secondment,
short tenure, return to governmental posts rather than a career
in another transnational secretariat, and so on.

The net conclusion of all this is that the two systems, T and
NT, are not independent of each other - nor is there any reason
why one should expect them to be. The NTs of today are instruments
in the hands of the territorial units who know how to use them,
and that, as mentioned, is not only the big powers. But this
is less true for the trans-national organizations, since they are
not organized in national chapters, and since the loyalty is to
the world level and the individual level, not to the intermediate
nation-state level. Their members become less concerned with
"organizing something similar at home" after they have been
exposed to patterns in other nations through the medium of
transnational conferences. For them an institution found or
founded in one country is already a world institution - not
something to be used by that country alone and copied elsewhere.

4. *Conclusion*

We have tried to conceive of international organizations as a
modern, post-nomadic, form of non-territorial actors. They have
their own peculiarities, particularly emphasized in the first
section of the article; and they are conditioned by the still more
important territorial system, particularly emphasized in the
third section of the article. In short, the international orga-
nizations are ambiguous phenomena, capable of being analyzed from
several and partially contradictory angles, giving rise to several

different typologies, using as raw material the basic distinction
between the inter-governmental, inter-nongovernmental and trans-
national organizations (IGOs, INGOs, TRANGOs).

The first typology offered was based on *the idea of the inter-
national organization as a super-actor*, and a distinction was
made according to the level of organization depending on how many
steps it was removed from the territorially based unit (a govern-
mental organization, a nongovernmental organization or an
individual - all of them non-profit or profit). Thus, there is
the first order organization, the second order or super-organiza-
tion, the third order or super-super organization, and so on. On
the other hand there is also the possibility of mixed liaison
types, creating new actors out of different types of international
organizations, and liaisons between territorial and non-territorial
actors.

The second typology takes as its point of departure *the degree
of isomorphism an international organization has with the
territorial system*, making a distinction between three types
depending on whether both territorial elements and relations are
reproduced inside the international organization, only the elements,
or none of them. It is postulated that the IGOs are more of the
first type (together with the BINGOs), the INGOs more of the
second type and the TRANGOs (with individuals as members) more of
the third type.

The third typology takes as its point of departure the
obvious circumstance, today, that most international organizations
connect elites, governmental or nongovernmental, profit or non-
profit, oriented around the world. The question is *what kind of
countries are brought together*, and a first distinction would be
between horizontal organizations (Center-Center, or Periphery-
Periphery) and vertical organizations (Center-Periphery). A
second distinction would be between universal (open to all of
the same kind) and regional (restricted to a geographical region)
organizations.

In addition to this, all kinds of distinctions could be made
depending on the purpose of the organization - but we have been
more interested in characteristics that relate to structure and
process so as to see better which role these organizations play
in the total world system, which in turn is a combination of the

territorial and the non-territorial systems. For this purpose
it may be useful to make a distinction between the "least non-
territorial" and the "most non-territorial" within the present
typology, positing against each other a first order IGO that
reflects faithfully the territorial system and essentially brings
together Center countries, and an nth order TRANGO bringing
together individuals from all over the world. Do they have enough
in common to be referred to as international organizations? By
definition, yes. But in terms of non-territoriality the former is
so little removed from the territorial level as to make little
difference, and the latter so much removed from the territorial
level that it probably also has little impact.

This might indicate that it is the in-between types that are
the carriers of the most dynamic and interesting aspects of the
processes of change in the non-territorial - and thereby the
world - system. One may even talk about processes of penetration
into the deeper recesses of the non-territorial continent,
creating higher levels, less isomorphic, less centristic and more
universal organizations, all the time trying to liberate the non-
territorial system from constraints placed upon it not by the
territorial system as such, but by the particular territorial
system that was shaped by Western expansionism during the last
five centuries. And that places the international organizations
in today's political context in the struggle for a new inter-
national economic, political, military, cultural and social
order.

NOTES

* Paper prepared for "The Concept of International Organizations" within the framework of the UNESCO study on international organizations. I am indebted to Kjell Skjelsbæk for stimulating discussions and comments on this and related topics. All the data in the article, unless otherwise indicated, have been made available by him. For more data, see his *Peace and the structure of international organizations*, thesis, Oslo 1970.

1. Of course, the two views do not exclude each other - as we hope to show. The international organizations, or non-territorial actors as they are referred to here, can be both adjuncts of the territorial system of states and a system in their own right - at the same time. Any good analysis has to reflect this doubleness and not fall into the trap of either form of singlemindedness.

2. Nomads should, with some hesitation, be included into this category: they constitute actors, yet do not have a definite territorial base. But our usual metaphors, such as "international", "inter-governmental", "inter-nongovernmental", "trans-national" etc. do not apply. They presuppose a first phase whereby mankind, or a part of mankind, is divided into territorially based groups and then a second phase where some kind of linkage is established again - or for the first time. Nomads constitute a more primordial type of non-territorial actor, also indicating that this concept is broader than the concept of "international organization". That metaphor is probably not very good either, for if we count the monastic orders as non-territorial actors (and we should), they are clearly "transnational" more than "international" - and have been so from the earliest orders (in the West often dated from St. Benedict, fifth century).

3. We are, of course, thinking particularly of the transnational corporations.

4. Theoretically territorial space is subdivisible to the extent that matter is subdivisible, but in the politics of states there is usually a limit to subdivisions defined in terms of *viability* - roughly defined as some minimal kind of self-sufficiency. Correspondingly there is a limit to subdivision in functional or social space: *meaning*. One might subdivide the area of the World Health Organization in social space, "health" into many sub-fields, but although not well-defined there is somewhere a limit, e.g. to how far the human body can be subdivided into subfields while still retaining the concept of health (which has certain holistic implications).

5. A model here might be Roman law with its high level of formalism, expressed in the *Twelve Tables*, and the principle of *legis actio*. The idea was to express all possible forms of human action, in a system of mutually exclusive and exhaustive typologies.

6. At least at a given point in time - the person may change later in life. Even the Chinese, who go further than most others in organizing social life so that each person is exposed to a variety of occupational tasks by more traditional standards, make a distinction between being all-round, and having a speciality. Nvertheless, Western type occupationa categories, used in a census

for instance, would easily break down when confronted with Chinese occupational structure.

7.   Thu-, how many people with multiple citizenship and multiple passports can the territorial system take? Countries differ as to how one gets citizenship, e.g. by the citizenship of one or both of the parents or by the place of birth, already making it possible for one child to have three different nationalities. When called upon for civic duties, such as voting or military services, interesting problems arise that can be handled when the order of magnitude of such people is low (10^3, maybe 10^4), not so easily when it is high (10^{4-6}). Given the level of international travel, interaction and intercourse (no pun intended) in the world today, this is the direction in which the world will be moving where this factor is concerned.

8.   Of course, there is also the scenario that social space may be forced into the relatively rigid regimentation of today's geographical space; not only the scenario just indicated of geographical space becoming as flexible as social space (to some extent) is today, at least in some countries. Much of this can be expressed in terms of entropy (see, for instance, Johan Galtung, "Entropy and the General Theory of Peace", *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. I, ch. 2, pp. 47-75, Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1975). Given the close contact between the two systems it is hardly to be expected that the entropy level of the two can remain very different for a long time, however - one will have to adjust to the other.

9.   Loc.cit., pp. 51 ff.

10.   For the distinction between direct and structural violence, see Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", op.cit., pp. 109-134.

11.   For an exploration of the dialectic between the geo-political pocket in which a country is embedded and the socio-economic system, see Johan Galtung, "On the Future of the International System", *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. IV, ch. 18, Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1977).

12.   For another use of this fourfold table, see Johan Galtung, "Patterns of Diplomacy", *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. IV, ch. 3, Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1977.

13.   The same applies to marriage: the institutional aspects constitute a signal to the outside world that the contracting parties intend to continue their relation, that it is not merely an ad hoc liaison.

14.   In fact, international relations are probably better under- stood by analyzing dyads than analyzing the units, the states. But there are two obvious difficulties: there are many more dyads since the number increases by the second power of the number of states; and a focus on the dyads leves out higher level relations such as triads and the m-tuples - which is another expression for an international organization (or even conference) with m parti- cipants. Thus, the dyadic approach does not solve the problem.

15.   Thus, among the Nordic countries it is fair to say that the embassies have mainly ceremonial functions, most problems being handled multilaterally. But they are not abolished: the Nordic

political scene is a dense network of all four forms, of civil
servants contacting their opposite numbers directly, bypassing
embassies that are then used for other purposes (e.g., cultural),
of countless conferences and organizations. When there are
arrows in Figures 1 and 2 it is not to suggest that the lower
phases are emptied, only that the process, and perhaps also the
point of gravity, moves on.

16. We shall use the commonly used terms IGO, INGO etc. For an
explanation related to the type of theory developed here, see
section 3. For the particular term BINGO (business inter-
nongovernmental organization) I am indebted to Tord Høivik.

17. For a good summary of statistics in this field, see Werner
Feld, *A Study of Business, Labor and Political Groups* (New
York: Praeger, 1972), especially p. 177 where the growth of IGOs
and INGOs from 1860 to 1970 is given as from 1 to 242 and 5 to
2,296 respectively. These numbers differ from one study to
another depending on criteria - but the substantial growth rate
is always clearly demonstrated.

18. Thus, organizations will send representatives to the UNESCO
Secretariat for negotiations before UNESCO sends an observer to
their meetings.

19. A typical example would be all the resident diplomacy among
the UN agencies. It is also necessary, not to streamline and
"coordinate" in the sense of eliminating differences or overlaps,
but in order to be informed about other approaches. For an
example of totally different perspectives on the same inter-
national issue, that of transfer of technology, see the article
"The Technology that can Alienate", *Development Forum*, July-
August 1976, p. 8, by the present author, on WHO and UNCTAD.

20. There are already some data available on the process. Thus,
Skjelsbæk reports, on the basis of the *Yearbook of International
Organizations* from 1968, 93 super-INGOs - such as the Inter-
national Social Science Council with the various international
social science associations as members - or 5% of the total of
INGOs. But the major form of growth is, of course, new organi-
zations and growth within the organizations. Thus, in a
questionnaire study from 1967 to general secretaries of inter-
national organizations, 55% reports expansion in the past, only
4% loss; and 61% predicted expansion for the future, only 2%
loss (it should be added that organizations in crisis may be less
inclined to answer such questionnaires). The work was carried
out by Jorge Schnitman and Luis Stuhlman from Buenos Aires under
the supervision of Kjell Skjelsbæk and the author (not yet
published).

21) We do not yet have the appropriate indicators here, maybe
because indicators of power tend to be developed by intellectuals
fascinated by the power they do not have (capital assets, military
power, etc.) and less inclined to explore the distribution of
the power they/we do have, such as information.

22. I am indebted to Tony Judge for this observation.

23. For a further discussion of the theoretical basis of this
perceptive, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Integration",

Essays in Peace Research, Vol. IV, ch. 11 (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1977).

24.   This may not be true inside the countries because opposing organizations are tied into an institutional framework in some kind of balance, usually in favor of the strong. Since that institutional network is largely missing at the world level, the net result may be words cancelling each other.

25.   Thus, relatively soon the Third World may organize their own secretariat, to some extent to counter the expertise prossessed by such "trade unions of rich countries" as the European Community and the OECD.

26.   We are here talking about an empirically existing organization.

27.   One way of obtaining this would be to cross-classify one ascriptive dimension (women, young), one occupational dimension (particularly the professions) and one value-dimension (Socialist, Christian).

28.   This is one more example of the principle indicated in note 4 above: *meaning* is the limiting principle in socio-functional space.

29.   From *International Associations*, 1955, no. 2. The data are old, but from the crucial period of rapid post-war expansion.

30.   There are interesting indications, particularly in New York where the INGOs surrounding the UN perhaps tend to be more Western than is the case elsewhere - thus adding to the "Western-ness" of UN organizations. The question is to what extent this attitude is anti-Western, anti-imperialist, anti-NT or anti-INGO (from the UN Secretariat; the major IGO).

31.   A classic in this field is Chad Alger, "Non-resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 1961, pp. 128-45.

Also see Kurt Jacobsen, "Some Behavioral Characteristics of the United Nations as a Function of Rank", IPRA Proceedings (Aasen: van Gorcum, 1969), where the distinction is made between the power inside and outside the organization.