NON-TERRITORIAL ACTORS: THE INVISIBLE CONTINENT

Towards a Typology of International Organizations

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1. Territorial and non-territorial actors: a comparison

Geographers may debate how many territorial continents there are in the world; maybe there are five, maybe six, maybe more. Since the Great Discoveries increasingly adequate maps have been made available to create an image of the world in terms of territory. From this elementary school indoctrination generations have been trained to see the world in terms of territorial actors, in conflict and cooperation. What is left out of that image is the forgotten continent, an invisible continent of non-territorial actors, the international organizations. Of course, everybody talks about them today, but still mainly as an adjunct to the territorial system, with insufficient emphasis, in our mind, on the system of non-territorial actors as also being a system in its own right, sui generis, with its own logic, contradictions and structure.¹)

Such actors have been in existence for a very long time,²) in a sense during most of human history, but in a different way from what we are experiencing today, not to mention from what we probably are going to experience tomorrow. Thus, for the first time in human history, we are entering a stage where we may soon see the emergence of an international system with the center of gravity in the political game, so to speak, in the hands of non-territorial rather than territorial actors, particularly in the richer part of the world. This is of course not to say that territorial actors will disappear completely, only that they may gradually recede into the background and that various types of non-territorial actors will be located increasingly at the forefront of the political stage.³) To understand these processes, and particularly to discuss whether any real change is involved, typologies of international organizations are needed.
For the purpose of this discussion we need some definitions. What do we mean by the term actor, and what precise meaning should be given to "non-territorial" and "territorial"?

Both types of actors have in common the ability to mobilize resources in order to pursue their goals. But whereas these resources are usually found within a contiguous territory in _geographical space_ in the case of the territorial actor, they are not located in any easily defined spatial region in the case of the non-territorial actor. The territorial actor has a territory over which he has political control in the sense that he has power over the power-relations inside that territory, to the exclusion of other territorial actors. The non-territorial actor commands no such territory. But this does not mean that his power is not defined in some space, only that in this case the space is not geographical. The power of the non-territorial actor is defined in a _functional space_, or, if one prefers a more general term, in a _social space_. Thus, a UN specialized agency may have a certain political monopoly over certain types of relations defined in a particular region of functional space, e.g. health; to the exclusion of other non-territorial actors.

When defining the two actors so symmetrically we are, of course, not implying in any sense that a state, a nation, a UN specialized agency, an international hobby association and an international business corporation are similar where degree of autonomy or degree of power over resources they can command are concerned. All we are saying is that they exist, so to speak, in their own right, that they can command resources, that they can pursue goals; in short: that they are actors. But the regions over which they have some degree of monopoly and autonomy are very differently defined, as is to be expected given the difference between the simplistic, two-dimensional (or three-dimensional) geographical space that has given rise to our metric concepts, and the complex, many-dimensional, non-metric social spaces.

Most easily defined are the territorial actors, simply because geographical space is so easily defined. One may say that geographical space has a structure, even a metric, that has colored our entire conception of what an actor is. The concept of collective actor is structured so as to fit the possibilities given
by geographical space rather than vice versa. Thus, just to give a very brief list of important characteristics usually attributed to geographical space:

(1) geographical space is constant, i.e. in limited time spans geological and geographical changes are so slow or so small or so limited that they do not in any really significant sense extend or contract the geographical space available - with the exception of major land reclamation schemes (there are, of course, also some islands that disappear and appear or reappear, but these are minor events; and the movement of glaciers are too slow relative to the life span of geographical actors, not to mention the life span of human beings, to have important effects of a more short range nature);

(2) geographical span can be clearly, unambiguously (with minor exceptions) subdivided in such a way that a one-one mapping between actors and regions is possible, meaning that ownership of a region excludes ownership by other actors;

(3) a corresponding one-one mapping is possible between regions and human beings, for instance defining a person's citizenship according to the place where he is born. Since locomotion takes place at restricted speed, it is always possible at any given moment in time to pin down a person to a specific region and use that as a criterion for belongingness, and one such point in time is obviously the point of birth. But, as the theory of citizenship shows, there are also other possibilities - the point here is only that it is meaningful to define it so that to each person there is one and only one citizenship.

(4) Consensual, clearly defined borderlines or demarkations between territorial regions can be obtained, often making use of highly visible lines in the topography such as the coast, rivers, mountain ranges, etc. But even if border lines are drawn as lines in a completely homogeneous desert, consensus may be obtained: not in the sense that there are no disputed territories, but in the sense that all parties concerned know where the disputed borderline runs.

All these properties have been important for the emergence of the territorial state. Let us now compare them with the structure, or lack of structure, in a functional or social space.

In this case one cannot talk about constancy, neither of constant expansion, for societies to develop, new functions are constantly amalgamated into the structure and old functions may die out - the net result being that functional space is changing and shifting, expanding here, contracting there.

Further, in the territorial case, one has generally not accepted joint ownership over the same territory, but has regarded
this as an anomalous situation leading to a type of instability that may even escalate into a war. In functional space one very often has the case that several actors are defined as having competence over the same functional region; sometimes leading to conflict, sometimes forcing them into cooperation because subdivision may be impossible or very harmful.  

Then, it is not true that an individual can belong to one and only one non-territorial actor. The circumstance that he does not have infinite speed of locomotion, enabling him to be in several positions in geographical space at the same time, does not prevent him from occupying several positions in social space at the same time, multiplying memberships in value - and interest - organizations, for instance.

As to borderline between regions: they are usually well defined in geographical space, but highly nebulous in functional space. Thus, where does health end and education start, or education and labor relations start? What about training in hygiene; or the working situation of teachers, and so on, and so forth.

Let us now imagine efforts to make the two spaces more similar, partly because such efforts may be politically highly meaningful, and partly as a heuristic device to develop more insight. Obviously, there may be two kinds of efforts, making social space look more like geographical space, and making geographical space look more like social space.

As to the former it is easily seen what this would mean in principle. One could imagine some high council of theologically, metaphysically, legally, sociologically etc. oriented "high priests" trying to define once and for all which are the functions of the general and total human enterprise. With the clarity of a constitution or a penal/civil code, or a sociology textbook, they would try to describe human society in such a way that all its functions, forever, were clearly listed. Having done this, they would make, once and for all, a list of non-territorial organizations deemed by them to be necessary. These organizations would be given a well-defined existence, and complete monopoly over the function(s) given to them by decree. This can be done in such a way that human beings would also by definition sort under one and only one organization. Just as their place of birth
might be used to define their geographical belongingness and hence their belongingness to a territorial actor, their occupation could be used to define their social belongingness and hence their belongingness to a non-territorial actor. There would be an implicit assumption about uniqueness here, at least in general: just as a person is born in one and only one place, he would be supposed to have one and only one occupation, or at least only one major occupation. 6)

If this assumption is satisfied, then the definition of borderlines should not be too difficult: much work would have to be invested into elaborations of borderline cases so that it is clear on what side of the water-shed each case would fall down. For geographically defined actors this is not only a question of clear patterns of belongingness where geographical points are concerned, but also a question of where human beings belong: if they very often belong to more than one geographical actor, then the borderlines become less sharp because they become too porous. And correspondingly for the non-territorial actor: it is not only a question of clear rules as to where the most minute sub-sub-sub-functions belong, but corresponding rules as to the belongingness of persons charged with the articulation or implementation of these functions.

Both systems can stand a certain ambiguity, but there are upper limits. 7)

It is easily seen that a social space of the type described here, structurally similar to geographical space, is of a type one would most easily associate with highly stable social structures where the leading political and scientific hierarchies have tremendous power. In other words, it might be associated with utopias, with preindustrial societies of several types, and with totalitarian states. This is also clearly seen in the directives implicitly given to human beings: you shall have one and only one occupation, you shall belong to one and only one organization. One might perhaps add that there is only one field of organizational behavior where these principles have been really approximated: the field of trade unionism, not to mention the caste system. Here one has a social space corresponding to the list of occupations, changing over time as that list changes but constant at any point in time; there is a clear autonomy of one
trade union over a class of occupations, a clear pattern of belongingness for the individual worker, and clearly defined borderlines. The same seems to some extent to be the case for professional associations, traditionally accustomed to mirror the structure of higher education as it has been crystallized into faculties, departments and institutes in the traditional universities. And much of this is then reflected in the corresponding international organizations, but only partly. In general functional, social or organizational space has a much more complicated structure, most easily appreciated by performing the corresponding experiment of imagining geographically defined actors structured in the same way as socially and functionally defined actors in complex and dynamic societies as we know them today.

If geographical territory should behave in a similar way, it would be changing all the time, expanding in some directions, perhaps contracting in some other directions, making a mockery of any permanent or "final" pattern of subdivision. Some geographical actors would have command over several regions, some over one, and some would have to share their control with several others - in addition there would be unclaimed regions. The limits of space would be unknown, and would defy exploration - in fact, it would change by being explored. Human beings would be the citizens of zero, one, or several territorial actors; very much according to their own decision. For all these reasons borderlines would be highly volatile, regions intermesh and interconnect, and their patterns of interpenetration would change over time, making it very difficult to say where one country ends and the other starts. This is far beyond the problem of a river bed changing with seasonal variations, with excessive precipitations and changing sedimentation, etc. making the river less than suitable as a baseline for a clear definition of the borderline between two nations. Rather, it bears some similarity to many people's image of the world prior to the era of the Great Discoveries and the system of nation states, as it may have appeared to peripatetic intellectuals, to traders, to pilgrims. And - perhaps also an image of a world of tomorrow?)

It may now be a question of personal taste what one prefers: a concept of nation-states patterned according to what today may be said to be the case for social space, or a concept of
non-territorial actors patterned according to what today may be said to be the case for geographical space, or the co-existence we have today of the two types of actors. If our concern is with, for instance, peace theory, it is not easily seen what is more peace productive. According to one such theory messiness, lack of clarity, what in general is referred to as high level of entropy, is conducive to peace because of the difficulty in obtaining the clear borderlines that can serve as a baseline for a major war between two well defined and completely polarized actors. ⁹ But that is only one theory; there are others in the field, such as the idea that messiness may lead to uncertainty which may lead to fear and anxiety and to destructive conflict behavior.

However that may be, let us try to use the parallels between the two systems to see how one can learn from the other in the field of two important problems, one of them related to the potential for direct violence, the other to the potential for structural violence. ¹⁰

First, we mentioned that in functional space there is much more experience with joint authority than in territorial space - except at the local territorial level (port authorities, lake authorities, etc.). Thus, there is a joint ILO-UNESCO Commission precisely to handle the problems of the teacher in his work-situation; but there is not yet a joint Chile-Peru-Bolivia commission to handle the problems of the Arica-Tacna region - presumably because each party would consider this a weakening of their claim to unrestricted sovereignty. From this, it seems that one may draw the conclusion that experiences made in functional space could serve as a good model for territorial space.

Second, we mentioned that in territorial space there is a one-to-one mapping, or pinning down of a person to one place in space; where he is born, where he lives, where he works, etc. There is one obvious advantage to this in any system based on voting: since a person cannot be two places in space at the same time, it is more easy to see to it that he votes only once. If he can vote through his associations his vote will be weighted with a factor that increases with the number of memberships he has. And this experience or pattern is not so easily transferred because one thing is to pin down a person in functional space (e.g. by his
education), quite another to require that he shall be pinned
down to only one point (have only one type of education). The
problem of double voting or multiple influence could, conceiv-
ably, be handled by having a special category for the pluralists,
those with multiple education, multiple career lines, membership
in opposing parties, or what not. There is some similarity here
to the special voting arrangements for those who move much
across borders, e.g., sailors and foreign workers. In other words,
it seems that one may draw the conclusion that experiences made
in geographical space may serve as a good model for functional
space; in other words that both systems may learn from each other.

2. A theory of non-territorial growth; and a first typology

After these excursions into the similarities and differences
between the territorial and the non-territorial system, let us
now look at the phenomenon of non-territorial growth in a more
dynamic perspective. We have mentioned above that the non-
territorial continent is more flexible than the territorial one -
more dimensions, less metricized, not only non-finite but ever-
expanding, ever-contracting and ever-changing. To explore this
imagine a set of territorial actors - they could be countries but
could also be local communities, districts, regions, for the con-
ccepts to be developed are general enough to cover several cases -
and we do not have to make any particular assumption about size
distribution, distances, communication potential and so on. The
only thing we need for the theory is the idea of some kind of
need for interaction, in at least some pairs of actors, that their
geo-political system is not sufficient to contain their soci-
economic needs.11) If there is interaction, then it does not
seem unreasonable to assume that sooner or later the need for
regulation of patterns of interaction will arise. There will
be a need for some kind of coordination, for some kind of
machinery to settle conflicts, for revisions of terms of exchange
in general and terms of trade in particular.

Our simple theory is now based on a four-fold table in which
this can be discussed.12) We assume that such discussions or
exchanges can take place between two actors only and hence be termed bilateral, or between more than two actors and be referred to as multilateral; and we assume further that these discussions may be ad hoc or institutionalized. And this leads us immediately to the following four-fold table:

Table 1. The IGO machine: phases in organizing governmental interaction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ad hoc</th>
<th>institutionalized</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bilateral</td>
<td>I envoy</td>
<td>II resident diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multilateral</td>
<td>III international conferences</td>
<td>IV international organizations</td>
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In this Table there is an ambiguity with regard to the second axis. Thus, the negation of "ad hoc" is relatively rich in structural alternatives. "Ad hoc" means actually three things: there is no emerging suprastructure to handle these negotiations; there is no permanent session of conference in which the actors participate even without having any superstructure, and there is not even any way of predicting when these non-permanent conferences do take place, like "every second year".

This means that at the extreme of institutionalization one will find the permanent suprastructure, then follow various forms of permanent sessions of countries negotiating with each other but without what today is known as a "secretariat", and at the lowest level of institutionalization there is only the periodical or otherwise predictable, repeatable meeting with nothing happening in-between. It may actually be disputed where the cutting point between "ad hoc" and "institutionalized" is located, but it can hardly be doubted that there is a continuum rather than a dichotomy involved here.

The arrows in the Table indicate an hypothesis as to temporal succession. This should not be taken too seriously: there are many examples where one or even all of the arrows could be turned around. But in general we would assume that the bilateral, ad hoc form is the most frequently found starting point, e.g. the
diplomat visiting the country to which he is accredited at intervals, for instance once a year, and usually from a neighboring country in which he is stationed. From this lowest level it can be developed further into a pattern of resident diplomacy where the embassy is permanently located in the capital, close to the centers of power of the host nation. But one could also extrapolate from this to a third form that does not seem to have become part of contemporary diplomatic practice: a form whereby the embassy of nation X in nation Y would amalgamate so effectively with the nation X desk in the foreign ministry of nation Y that the two would be virtually inseparable and constitute some type of international organization, although only at the bilateral level. That these people know each other, negotiate and meet frequently, and even may share political tastes and practices almost completely (if the countries are not too separated by dissimilarities and disharmonies) is not the same as saying that a new structure has emerged. It should be noted that this kind of superstructure seems to exist in trade and commerce: the existence of joint (bilateral) chambers of commerce between nation X and nation Y testifies to that.

There is something rather trivial about the transition from "ad hoc" to the various levels of "institutionalized". It can be discussed in terms of costs: there is a certain break-off point where permanent contacts become less expensive than often repeated ad hoc contacts. Then there is the question of control: permanent contact increases the predictability and stabilizes patterns of influence. And there is the problem of communication: permanent, close contact makes feedback of information and decisions more rapid and speeds up interaction in general. To this one could then add quite a number of other elements, such as, for instance, the permanence of contacts as a sign of recognition. In fact, the very axis from ad hoc to the highest form of institutionalization, not yet really clarified systematically, is in itself one of the best indicators of the degree of proximity between countries. Countries need some indicator of how distant or close they are to each other; if this one did not exist something else probably had to be invented.13)

Let us then look at the other axis, the transition from bilateral to multilateral forms of interaction; conferences and
organizations. Of course, one can again look at it from the point of view of costs and argue that a multilateral meeting of n countries may be a highly efficient substitute for \( \frac{1}{2} \) bilateral meetings. Or, one can discuss it from the point of view of control and argue that multilateral forms make for a higher degree of mutual visibility than the corresponding number of bilateral forms, and this is undeniable. There is also the point frequently made by big powers that this will increase small power influence since they not only will have a chance to speak for a large auditorium but also to aggregate and pool their voices for joint articulation; and there is the collateral argument, frequently heard from smaller powers, that the multilateral form of organization is a major instrument of big power manipulation. And then there is the argument of communication: no one can deny the rapidity and the efficiency that can be attained with face to face contact, particularly when the services of a loyal and efficient secretariat are available. The arguments for multilateral institutionalization are about the same as at the bilateral level.

However, the matter is not quite that unproblematic. First of all: it does not really explain why multilateral forms of contact come into existence at all. For just as every nation is unique every dyad is also unique. As is painfully obvious in the world today some dyads are further advanced in positive interaction than others; no two dyads seem to be at exactly the same level.\(^{14}\) This means that efforts to break up the interaction monopoly held by bilateral relations and tie it together again in a multilateral form presupposes considerable ability to unify what is already highly diverse. In fact, it presupposes some of the same standardization of international relations that at the level of human interaction is associated with industrial, "modern", Western societies and the capitalist rather than artisan mode of production. For there is a real transcendence implicit in the multilateral form of social existence once this step has been taken. The sum of bilateral agreements, or treaties, is never quite the same as a multilateral agreement, or a convention. And this is a discontinuous transition, completely unlike increasingly frequently held ad hoc, but bilateral, conferences that gradually develop into permanence and end up in bilateral institutionalization. Needless to say, the transition is smoothened by keeping all four
forms at the same time.  

There is no necessary logical connection between movements along the two dimensions; all four forms are completely conceivable, and indeed empirically found. And the Table can now be seen as an X-ray photo of a social mechanism, where the inputs are national actors and the final output is an intergovernmental organization, an IGO. It is like a sausage machine: one puts in countries and gets out an IGO. However, the machine is hardly very efficient: it took something like, say, 500 years to enter into efficient production of this end product, from ad hoc bilateral diplomacy by envoys among Italian city states to the IGO proliferation of today.

But what has been done once can be done twice. So, why not regard the IGO output of this machine as the input to a new machine, with exactly the same structure, but producing super-IGOs and linked together in a coupling that looks something like this:

Figure 1. The super-IGO machine

This is what is quickly taking place today: we are rewriting the last five centuries of human history, but this time with IGOs as the units upon which this superstructure machine works. How this takes place concretely is obvious enough. Two IGOs are in need of some kind of mutual control and communication, very often referred to as "coordination". Misinformation, jealousies and potential conflicts are operating and propelling enterprising individuals into action. The first step is obviously the ad hoc contact: the sending of envoys in either direction for information collection. There may easily be a ranking variable at work here: the smaller IGO has to send an envoy to the bigger IGO before the latter condescends to reciprocate. The institutionalization of this exchange usually takes the form of exchanges of members on councils or executives, after an initial phase where these persons are referred to as "observers", and often only admitted to open sessions, to the general assemblies, or con-
ferences. One can now easily imagine the extrapolation from this: the permanent representatives from other IGOs are given separate offices in the host secretariats, and not only observe and report and give feedback as resident diplomacy in its bilateral form would do, but participate actively in the work of the IGO. In that case a bilateral IGO structure would have emerged, a super-IGO with two members.

Multilateralization could then take the same forms as for country actors. There would be an initial phase with conferences on an ad hoc basis, then these conferences would be institutionalized and held at regular intervals, for instance annually, as "consultations", paving the way to the final step: the erection of a multilateral super-IGO of which the "bilateral super-IGO" mentioned above would be the simplest case.

We are probably today mostly in the first and second phases of this development. But what we have so far seen, seems to indicate one rather obvious thing: this second machine in the superstructure generation works much more effectively than the first one. If we should venture a guess it might be that what the first machine was able to produce in 500 years, the second machine may be able to do in 50. And the reason for this is not only the increased communication and transportation facilities of our age, but also to a large extent that the individuals in command of the end product of the first process, the IGOs, are already trained in this type of superstructure creation. In other words, although we are by no means minimizing the extent to which they may be as jealously safeguarding the functional autonomy of their IGOs as any president, king or prime minister the territorial interests of his country, they may relatively easily engage in super-IGO creation, exactly in order to protect these interests. That structure is already thoroughly imprinted on their minds, they have considerable training in the verbalization and the activities needed, and they have the pleasure of having as their opposite number in other organizations people with the same kind of training.

What now has happened twice can also happen three times: we can easily imagine one more machine of the same kind coupled in series with the others as to produce super-super-IGOs. But we are not quite there yet, this is still for the future. More
important would be to look at the corresponding machines operating in a parallel fashion to what we have described, producing inter-nongovernmental organizations, INGOs and super-INGOs, or producing business INGOs, BINGOs and super-BINGOs. The first one obviously feeds on national non-governmental organizations and amalgamates them into (B)INGOs, and the second one correspondingly feeds on (B)INGOs and produces super-(B)INGOs on that basis.

Let us now complicate this general image of future growth even further by introducing the ideas of parallel coupling and coupling in series of these machines, at the same time:

Figure 2. Parallel coupling between the IGO, INGO and BINGO machines.

The vertical arrows stand for liaison organizations, at all three levels of organization, and in all three pairs. Thus, one of them would be the link between INGOs and IGOs - e.g., as it is found in the institution of the "consultative status" of certain INGOs with certain IGOs - or between two IGOs, e.g., between OPEC and the IEA. To take another example: the possible link between a super-INGO (e.g., a Council of Scientific Associations) and a super-BINGO (e.g., a combine of international business in the oil field). We let this do as examples of how far the complexity can develop: there is no upper limit. Moreover, the more complex the network, the longer the chain of machines coupled in series and the denser the network of parallel coupling, the more power can be obtained from certain positions in the total network. In fact, most heads of governments may look somewhat left behind at the left hand end of the scheme relative to the tremendous power that ultimately develops to the right, although there is a limit to how far one can go in complexity. And this power should not be measured by means of such crude indicators as
the amount of capital they handle, but rather by taking the net-
work context and the amount of information they handle into
account.\textsuperscript{21})

As one moves towards the right in the Figure above, there will
probably also be another significant development: the transition
from the use of permanent organizations with secretariats and
staff to the use of instant ad hoc communication, e.g. via tele-
satellite, as the "logical" solution to the problems of extremely
complex networks of organization.\textsuperscript{22}) The whole system will be so
complex and its needs will change so quickly as to make the
classical response, one new organization and one new office
whenever there is a need, impracticable.

So far, we have looked at growth from the point of view of
integration and meta-integration, etc.\textsuperscript{23}) But growth in the non-
territorial system can also come about by other means. Thus,
there is the tendency for each IGO, INGO and BINGO to foster,
through the usual social dialectics, a counter-IGO, -INGO, -BINGO
in competition with it, vying with each other for political,
socio-cultural and economic markets among the territorial actors
(an example would be international trade unions relative to
transnational corporations). In fact, they may often cancel
each other out, like matter and anti-matter, leaving behind a lot
of noise.\textsuperscript{24})

Then, there is the equally dialectical differentiation in the
non-territorial system along class lines. As it is now, masters
and servants are already emerging in the NT system and although
the smaller, younger and less powerful NTs are badly organized
it will hardly last long before they see the need for some kind of
trade union formation. A stratification system may sooner or
later crystallize into a class system - e.g., pitting the
prestigious IGOs against the less prestigious INGOs - and the
result can easily be gigantic super-IGOs, super-INGOs and super-
BINGOs, pitted against each other, just as for territorial actors.
Thus, the upper class among the IGOs is probably the UN organi-
zations and the IGOs of the most powerful countries - these may
be pitted against each other, or together against all others.

Finally, and most significantly: new non-territorial actors
form in socio-functional space at any time, simply because there
is some kind of need for them. If they are neighbors in that strange space they may perhaps easily fuse together, integrate, like various types of social scientists. Correspondingly, if they are built over too much internal distance in that space, covering too diverse functions, they may undergo fission and disintegrate, like international student unions in the late 1950s. But the tendencies towards disintegration are hardly that important, and the net result would be an increase in the number of NTs anyhow.

One particular source of growth of this type is the principle of *growth by intersection*: if there is union of esperantists and a union of nudists there may be basis for a union of esperanto-speaking nudists. As time goes on one could imagine increasing complexity also along this dimension: organizations based on the intersection not only of two but of three or more organizations. There is no introduction to new functions but of functions of a higher order, once more telling us something about the flexibility and expandability of this socio-functional space. In other words: the invisible continent will grow and continue to grow, and unlike the visible continents there is no upper limit, no limits to growth except, perhaps, by the number of human beings and the time they have available to make their organizations meaningful.

In order now to understand this phenomenon better, the question must be asked that can be asked in connection with all dynamic phenomena: where is the growth most pronounced? One way of answering would be to look at the location of headquarters, in Table 2.

The general conclusion is clear: more than 4/5ths of the non-territorial machinery is controlled from the world North West, making the entire structure relatively similar to the colonial pattern. There is a slight trend towards some redistribution, but a very slow one indeed, and lagging far behind the pattern of political decolonization from World War II onwards. The reason is partly structural - the North West has the monetary and human resources - and partly cultural - the North West combines expansionism with individualism and non-territorial actors are very much based on detachable, mobile individuals and expand very easily by establishing local chapters anywhere once the actor is born. This leads to an hypothesis to be explored in
the next section: non-territorial actors constitute a mechanism for neo-colonialism just as territorial actors did for colonialism.

But there is also another aspect to this pattern that should be pointed out. In the rich and capitalist North-West there is one group of countries that probably benefits particularly from the development of the invisible continent: the small countries. If we calculate INGO and IGO membership per one million population,
and exclude territories with less than one million inhabitants, the ranking list in 1964 was as follows:

Table 3. The first nations in terms of INGO/capita and IGO/capita, 1964.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>INGO/capita</th>
<th>IGO/capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two lists are quite different and the reason is simple. There are many IGOs in the world today to which a country simply has to belong in order to be a country; hence the countries on top of the list are above all the very small countries regardless of level of development. That does not mean that we do not have the same neo-colonial pattern in the IGO system, even for UN agencies, only one of which (UNEP) has a headquarter in East or South - headquarters are either in the militarily organized West - the NATO countries - or in countries "neutral to West". But it does mean that the whole world is taken in, in a way that is not the case for the INGOs. INGO membership seems to presuppose a certain social structure, above all that the country is "developed" and/or capitalist, and this is clearly reflected in the INGO/capita list, especially when compared with the other list.

It may be argued that the absolute number of memberships is more significant than the relative number per million inhabitants, but they both are. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that with a constant number of memberships the smaller of two countries is more penetrated because proportionately more people are involved: the invisible continent becomes more visible. And this brings us to the important perspective that the invisible continent is
(except for BINGOs) the continent the small, developed and capitalist states try to colonize; particularly since all territorial continents have to some extent been colonized by the big powers, capitalist or socialist.

The significance of this factor, and the validity of this general hypothesis, can be further appreciated by studying

Table 4. *Number of international officials per million inhabitants, 1984*9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of International Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>North America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 86    | 55    |
| 42    | 25    |
| 23    | 22    |
| 19    | 16    |
| 9     | 4     |

Although the site of the organization definitively is an important factor here, it is another important indicator of the extent to which small, rich countries have made use of this resource.

But it is also quite obvious that numbers are not good enough here; it is only an indicator. Thus, the growth in number of cars would not in itself be sufficient as an indicator of how dominant cars are as cultural themes: socio-psychological investigations would also be needed to say something about the grip cars have on people's minds. Correspondingly for the non-territorial actors: we do not know to what extent there is real identification with them. This is probably a function (but not a simple linear one) of the extent to which they satisfy perceived needs, and even can start competing with the territorial system in so doing. And if this competition gets off the ground to the extent that the latter is threatened, how will they, the countries, hit back in efforts to control and possibly stifle non-territorial growth? There is no doubt that they are hitting back at the TNCs, but when will that be generalized to other non-territorial actors?30)

All we can say where this is concerned is the rather trite conclusion that for the Year 2000 there will be three possibilities when it comes to the relative salience of the two systems, NT and T:31)
1. NT weaker than T in salience;
2. NT equal to T in salience;
3. NT stronger than T in salience.

The point here is merely that anyone concerned with images of future worlds would do well to take the invisible continent into account. Nobody would today analyze a country only in terms of its territorial subdivisions - states, prefectures, departments, provinces, counties, etc. - but would bring into the analysis organizations and associations, e.g. business corporations and trade unions, particularly when they are national, spanning across the subdivisions of the geographical space held by the country. The same applies today to the world, and increasingly so - it seems. On the other hand, social systems are dialectic systems, there are movements but also counter-movements. How they will add up in the year 2000 we simply do not know.

3. Relations between territorial and non-territorial actors: a second and third typology

Let us now combine points made in the preceding sections into a scale of increasing non-territoriality depending on what kind of units are members of the "international organization":

- Members are national governments, and the organization is inter-governmental (IGO);
- Members are other national organizations or associations than governments, and the organization is inter-non-governmental (INGO);
- Members are individuals, and the organization is a trans-national (non-governmental) association (TRANGO).

We prefer not to use the term "international" for any one of these, for the term "international", in our view, does not necessarily imply any organization or actor at all. The international system is simply the system of nations (actually, the system of states, or countries), in cooperation and conflict - nothing more, nothing less. For that reason we interpret IGO to mean inter-governmental (and not inter-national, governmental), INGO to mean inter-nongovernmental (and not international non-governmental), and we add to this well-know distinction the transnational (or, really, trans-nongovernmental) organization, the TRANGO, which
related directly to individuals wherever they are found. In the TRANGO there are no "national chapters" or similar arrangements filtering the direct relation between individuals.

Then there is that vitally important special case of the INGO: the business inter-nongovernmental organization (BINGO). It links together non-governmental business organizations in various countries and is better known today as the "multinational corporation". However, the latter may be an unfortunate term for at least three reasons. Firstly, "multi" connotes more than two nations, but often there are only two, and in that case the term "cross-national" may, perhaps, be preferred to "multinational". Further, the term "multinational" conceals how asymmetric these corporations are, usually being dominated from one country. And, finally, "corporation" may not be broad enough, for there may be many other ways of organizing international business than in corporations. (Incidentally, one of these ways would be governmental, as an IGO, which in that case - when it is for business - would be termed a RIGO.)

Let us now try to make this over-used typology more meaningful by exploring two important phenomena located at the interface between the territorial and the non-territorial systems. These two systems are by no means unrelated, particularly since one, the territorial, preceded the other by thousands of years and consequently must have set its stamp on the late-comer, however efficiently the latter uses transportation and communication.

We have found it useful to discuss the relation between the two systems under the headings of isomorphy and homology. The propositions are simple:

**Proposition 1:** The non-territorial actors tend to be isomorphic with the territorial system;

**Proposition 2:** The non-territorial actors tend to induce homology among territorial actors;

**Proposition 3:** The propositions above are most valid for inter-governmental organizations, (usually) less for inter-nongovernmental organizations, and (almost) invalid for transnational organizations. They are also highly valid for transnational corporations.

Let us spell this out.
Characteristic of the two lowest types of non-territorial actors, the IGOs and the INGOs, is that the world territorial structure, the nation-state structure, is still entirely visible. When governments are member this is obvious, but it also applies to the typical "international organization" built as an association of associations (e.g. an association of national associations or dentists, longshoremen, stamp-collectors). An association or organization at the national level becomes a "national chapter" or a "mother, sister, or daughter company", depending on the position in the hierarchy, at the level of the non-territorial actor.

But there is not only a clear relation in the sense that the states of the world are reflected as components of the non-territorial actor. Not only the elements of the territorial system, but also the relations between them can usually be rediscovered; and that is why the stronger term "isomorphy" is used. Relations of power (both resource and structural power) and interaction frequency are often mirrored faithfully. The most powerful chapter comes from the most powerful country - in terms of location of headquarters, recruitment of staff, general perspective on world affairs; frequencies of interaction in the territorial system are mirrored in frequencies of interaction in the organization, and so on. In other words: the territorial system is reproduced inside some non-territorial actors which for that reason are not truly non-territorial.

This way of thinking carries us quite far analytically. Non-territorial actors with national components - governmental or non-governmental - can be seen as governed primarily by the principle of isomorphy. This is the baseline, as implemented in the United Nations, when the major victors among the "united nations", the Allies fighting against the Axis power, appointed themselves to permanent Security Council seats, even with a veto. Isomorphy is called "realism" in the plain language of power; and it means that to those who have power in the territorial system, power shall also be given in the non-territorial system. And it may also be partially true that the more an inter-governmental organization departs from this isomorphy, the less attention will be paid to it, because its decisions will be seen as not reflecting the "real world" - meaning the territorial system with its bilateral relations - to which decisions will then be referred.
But it is only a partial truth. A non-territorial actor that is 100% isomorphic with the territorial system is in a sense only a replication of that system, except that it makes multilateral interaction possible. But small deviations from strict isomorphy will take place when countries are represented by persons, making these organizations a medium in which the smaller powers can more easily express themselves, can be listened to, and perhaps can make some impact on the territorial system. It is not merely a medium in which they can be more easily bossed.

But then, again, the opposite view: that this is precisely the medium in which the territorial system is kept alive and even reinforced. For instance, Nationalist China had for a long time a power excess because if its position in the UN Security Council. The argument would be, however, that this was not because of too much isomorphy, but because of lack of isomorphy, that UN was not up-to-date, but served to freeze the past. One might also extend that argument to the case of the UK and France, and even to the United States, for all practical purposes defeated by what was often referred to as a "fifth rate power", Vietnam. So, imagine the UN brought up-to-date, in an effort to mirror the territorial system. The argument would then be that any distinction between veto and non-veto is too sharp, too absolute relative to the power distinctions in an increasingly subtle and complicated territorial system. Moreover, if war is used to decide who has veto, then the US and Vietnam should at least be on par, viewing Vietnam as an effective challenger of a former heavyweight champion.

Of course, over time the internal workings of a non-territorial actor will acquire complex facets never contemplated by its social architects, the lawyers. There will be informal structures in addition to the formal ones. But the power differentials may actually be magnified rather than reduced in an intergovernmental organization.

In the INGO, all of this becomes much less important, except for the BINGO, of course. Non-governmental may feel less obliged to act in the name of the national interest, and more free to find the pattern of action and interaction that fits the values of the organization. Thus, one would assume in general that INGOs have national elements - by definition - but that the relations between
them are different, for instance much more egalitarian. The world has come to accept the idea of a big power veto in the UN, whether this reflects adequately or even exaggerates territorial power - but it would hardly accept it in an international philatelic association. Needless to say, however, all shades and gradations can be imagined here.

When it comes to trans-national organizations isomorphy would break down completely: there would be neither the national elements, nor the relations of the territorial system. Transnational ties uniting individuals across territorial borders might even be stronger than common citizenship. The classical example here is, of course, nation membership as opposed to state citizenship. The nation, defined as a group of human beings having in common some characteristics, referred to as ethnical, is the most important of all trans-national organization. (Here the unfortunate consequences of the double meaning of "nation" becomes particularly obvious!) Time and again it proves to be more important than territorially defined state citizenship, but the two are often confused because the nation-state is taken as a norm, and sometimes also is a fact in our world. Thus, Jews form such a transnational group, although a much better expression would be "transgovernmental" - a TRANGO - since they are found under the protection (or abuse) of various governments. The extent to which Jews would identify themselves as "Soviet" Jews, "US" Jews, and so on would then be a test of the extent to which this is an INGO or a TRANGO.

More recent examples would be international scientific unions where the dissolution of national organization has gone quite far. Of course, people in the same discipline from the same country may know each other better, and their interaction is usually facilitated by speaking the same language, but the search for significant colleagues, for meaningful persons with whom to work, to converse, to exchange ideas will not be restricted by such borders. Only few and particularly repressive countries would imagine organizing their citizens so as to act as a bloc in a transnational organization.

Then there are, of course, the political parties and pressure-groups that are transnational, such as the World New Left and the Vietnam solidarity movement. The fact that there may also be cooperation at sub-national and national levels does not detract
from the transnational character of such world movements, for national identities are usually successfully washed out. Good cases in point are the world hippie movement - or any movement for new life styles in defiance of the various versions of vertical success-oriented, power-oriented societal orders.

For these reasons we see the transnational organizations as the real non-territorial actors of the future. Only they can deserve the epithet global actors, since only they (like states) are based on individuals as their unit, and are global in their scope.

To summarize: the idea of isomorphy splits into two: are the territorial elements, the countries, present in the "non-territorial" actor? and are the territorial relations present? Answer:

Table 4. Three types of non-territorial actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial elements</th>
<th>Territorial relations</th>
<th>Non-territoriality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>present</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>low (IGOs, most BINGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present</td>
<td>absent</td>
<td>medium (INGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absent</td>
<td>absent</td>
<td>high (TRANGOs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us then turn to the problem of homology; in other words, a focus on the non-territorial organizations as giant mechanisms for making all states as similar to each other as possible. Just as a state tries to find its appropriate place (often called its "natural" position) in a non-territorial organization, so a non-territorial organization is a vehicle facilitating the search for an opposite number inside any state. Whether members are governments, non-governmental associations, organizations, or simply individuals, any non-territorial actor will look for like-minded or like-positioned elements in all states around the world. For that is their task: to organize all of their kind, wherever they be found. And if they do not exist they can be created, for instance by inviting observers to international conferences who then return to their country with the message imprinted on their minds: solch ein Ding müssen wir auch haben. But this means that non-territorial actors become giant mechanisms through which the
stronger states, the states that started these organizations, can imprint a message on weaker states: you must have this profession and that profession, this hobby and sports association and that ideological movement, you must produce this and that - in order to be full-fledged members of the World. Active membership in IGOs, INGOs, etc. is taken as an indicator of how deeply embedded the country is in the world system - without questioning who started all these organizations, on what social basis, for what purpose, in what image. Having said this it becomes obvious that the reasoning also applies to regions: the weaker regions will tend to imitate the stronger regions and import the IGO/INGO machinery they have.

Thus, international conferences become giant markets where isomorphy and homology can be checked; the former for inter-state, the latter for intra-state relations. They become giant reproduction mechanisms. Power relations in the non-territorial organization will be compared to power relations in the territorial system, to see to what extent T is reflected in NT. And individuals from any country will compare notes to find to what extent that particular NT is reflected in their part of T - whether it is present at all, and whether their government pays as much attention to it in terms of subsidy and deference as other governments are reported to pay to sister chapters, and so on.

This entire presentation may now gain in depth if we tie it to a simple four-country model of the world with two Center and two Periphery countries:

Figure 3. Non-territoriality as an elite concept

![Diagram](image)

We have added a little dot on top of each circle for the governments, the nuclei of the centers. Obviously, the IGOs connect
these dots in various ways. The INGOs do not necessarily connect only the center of countries - they may also tie periphery elements together. But chances are they do not: chances are that the masses are tied to their territorial units because they do not have the resources, that the whole concept of non-territoriality is fundamentally an elite concept. Even such grandiose concepts as "Europe", yes, even the nation-state is very much of an elite concept because of the way in which such means for developing consciousness as literacy, reading beyond primary school, knowledge of foreign languages are badly distributed, not to mention all the other inequalities and inequities, access to transportation and communication. Hence, even though we do not have good data on national participation in the type of associations and organizations that also are multinationally organized, we can safely say that those individuals who participate internationally, in conferences and in secretariats etc., generally belong to the center of their countries. They are the individuals who serve as links between countries, not the non-participant member and the even less participant non-members, hidden behind the national screen.

Thus, if non-territorial actors (and this includes the transnational ones) essentially link governments and other elite groups together, then there are, in principle, and referring to the Figure, four types of international organizations:

(1) connecting Center countries (horizontal lines, top);
(2) connecting Center and Periphery countries in the same bloc (vertical lines);
(3) connecting Periphery countries (horizontal lines, bottom)
   - in same bloc,
   - in different blocs;
(4) universal organizations (the whole rectangle).

The first three may be referred to as "regional" organizations as long as we keep in mind the distinction between horizontal and vertical regions, and are not really non-territorial actors. In the real world, however, a particular organization is often too complex to permit classification in any single one of these types of classes.
Thus, the secretariat of an organization may often be different
from the rest of the organization and be trans-national even when
the rest is inter-governmental or intra-governmental. Much of
the history of the big intergovernmental organizations is the
story of how the secretariat has tried to transnationalize the
national delegates (meeting in conferences/assemblies, in councils
or in executive boards), teaching them "to think in terms of the
world as a whole" (the "world" usually meaning the organization,
meaning the secretariat) - and of how the national delegates try
to inter-nationalize the secretariat by such methods as secondment,
short tenure, return to governmental posts rather than a career
in another transnational secretariat, and so on.

The net conclusion of all this is that the two systems, T and
NT, are not independent of each other - nor is there any reason
why one should expect them to be. The NTs of today are instruments
in the hands of the territorial units who know how to use them,
and that, as mentioned, is not only the big powers. But this
is less true for the trans-national organizations, since they are
not organized in national chapters, and since the loyalty is to
the world level and the individual level, not to the intermediate
nation-state level. Their members become less concerned with
"organizing something similar at home" after they have been
exposed to patterns in other nations through the medium of
transnational conferences. For them an institution found or
founded in one country is already a world institution - not
something to be used by that country alone and copied elsewhere.

4. Conclusion

We have tried to conceive of international organizations as a
modern, post-nomadic, form of non-territorial actors. They have
their own peculiarities, particularly emphasized in the first
section of the article; and they are conditioned by the still more
important territorial system, particularly emphasized in the
third section of the article. In short, the international orga-
nizations are ambiguous phenomena, capable of being analyzed from
several and partially contradictory angles, giving rise to several
different typologies, using as raw material the basic distinction between the inter-governmental, inter-nongovernmental and transnational organizations (IGOs, INGOs, TRANGOs).

The first typology offered was based on the idea of the international organization as a super-actor, and a distinction was made according to the level of organization depending on how many steps it was removed from the territorially based unit (a governmental organization, a nongovernmental organization or an individual - all of them non-profit or profit). Thus, there is the first order organization, the second order or super-organization, the third order or super-super organization, and so on. On the other hand there is also the possibility of mixed liaison types, creating new actors out of different types of international organizations, and liaisons between territorial and non-territorial actors.

The second typology takes as its point of departure the degree of isomorphism an international organization has with the territorial system, making a distinction between three types depending on whether both territorial elements and relations are reproduced inside the international organization, only the elements, or none of them. It is postulated that the IGOs are more of the first type (together with the BINGOs), the INGOs more of the second type and the TRANGOs (with individuals as members) more of the third type.

The third typology takes as its point of departure the obvious circumstance, today, that most international organizations connect elites, governmental or nongovernmental, profit or non-profit, oriented around the world. The question is what kind of countries are brought together, and a first distinction would be between horizontal organizations (Center-Center, or Periphery-Periphery) and vertical organizations (Center-Periphery). A second distinction would be between universal (open to all of the same kind) and regional (restricted to a geographical region) organizations.

In addition to this, all kinds of distinctions could be made depending on the purpose of the organization - but we have been more interested in characteristics that relate to structure and process so as to see better which role these organizations play in the total world system, which in turn is a combination of the
territorial and the non-territorial systems. For this purpose it may be useful to make a distinction between the "least non-territorial" and the "most non-territorial" within the present typology, positing against each other a first order IGO that reflects faithfully the territorial system and essentially brings together Center countries, and an n-th order TRANGO bringing together individuals from all over the world. Do they have enough in common to be referred to as international organizations? By definition, yes. But in terms of non-territoriality the former is so little removed from the territorial level as to make little difference, and the latter so much removed from the territorial level that it probably also has little impact.

This might indicate that it is the in-between types that are the carriers of the most dynamic and interesting aspects of the processes of change in the non-territorial - and thereby the world - system. One may even talk about processes of penetration into the deeper recesses of the non-territorial continent, creating higher levels, less isomorphic, less centristic and more universal organizations, all the time trying to liberate the non-territorial system from constraints placed upon it not by the territorial system as such, but by the particular territorial system that was shaped by Western expansionism during the last five centuries. And that places the international organizations in today's political context in the struggle for a new international economic, political, military, cultural and social order.
NOTES

Paper prepared for "The Concept of International Organizations" within the framework of the UNESCO study on international organizations. I am indebted to Kjell Skjelsbæk for stimulating discussions and comments on this and related topics. All the data in the article, unless otherwise indicated, have been made available by him. For more data, see his Peace and the structure of international organizations, thesis, Oslo 1970.

1. Of course, the two views do not exclude each other - as we hope to show. The international organizations, or non-territorial actors as they are referred to here, can be both adjuncts of the territorial system of states and a system in their own right - at the same time. Any good analysis has to reflect this doubleness and not fall into the trap of either form of singlemindedness.

2. Nomads should, with some hesitation, be included into this category: they constitute actors, yet do not have a definite territorial base. But our usual metaphors, such as "international", "inter-governmental", "inter-nongovernmental", "transnational" etc. do not apply. They presuppose a first phase where-by mankind, or a part of mankind, is divided into territorially based groups and then a second phase where some kind of linkage is established again - or for the first time. Nomads constitute a more primordial type of non-territorial actor, also indicating that this concept is broader than the concept of "international organization". That metaphor is probably not very good either, for if we count the monastic orders as non-territorial actors (and we should), they are clearly "transnational" more than "international" - and have been so from the earliest orders (in the West often dated from St. Benedict, fifth century).

3. We are, of course, thinking particularly of the transnational corporations.

4. Theoretically territorial space is subdivisible to the extent that matter is subdivisible, but in the politics of states there is usually a limit to subdivisions defined in terms of viability - roughly defined as some minimal kind of self-sufficiency. Correspondingly there is a limit to subdivision in functional or social space: meaning. One might subdivide the area of the World Health Organization in social space, "health" into many sub-fields, but although not well-defined there is somewhere a limit, e.g. to how far the human body can be subdivided into subfields while still retaining the concept of health (which has certain holistic implications).

5. A model here might be Roman law with its high level of formalism, expressed in the Twelve Tables, and the principle of legis actio. The idea was to express all possible forms of human action, in a system of mutually exclusive and exhaustive typologies.

6. At least at a given point in time - the person may change later in life. Even the Chinese, who go further than most others in organizing social life so that each person is exposed to a variety of occupational tasks by more traditional standards, make a distinction between being all-round, and having a speciality. Nevertheless, Western type occupational categories, used in a census
for instance, would easily break down when confronted with Chinese occupational structure.

7. Thu-, how many people with multiple citizenship and multiple passports can the territorial system take? Countries differ as to how one gets citizenship, e.g. by the citizenship of one or both of the parents or by the place of birth, already making it possible for one child to have three different nationalities. When called upon for civic duties, such as voting or military services, interesting problems arise that can be handled when the order of magnitude of such people is low \((10^3, \text{maybe} \ 10^4)\), not so easily when it is high \((10^4-6)\). Given the level of international travel, interaction and intercourse (no pun intended) in the world today, this is the direction in which the world will be moving where this factor is concerned.

8. Of course, there is also the scenario that social space may be forced into the relatively rigid regimentation of today's geographical space; not only the scenario just indicated of geographical space becoming as flexible as social space (to some extent) is today, at least in some countries. Much of this can be expressed in terms of entropy (see, for instance, Johan Galtung, "Entropy and the General Theory of Peace", Essays in Peace Research, Vol. I, ch. 2, pp. 47-75, Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1975). Given the close contact between the two systems it is hardly to be expected that the entropy level of the two can remain very different for a long time, however - one will have to adjust to the other.


13. The same applies to marriage: the institutional aspects constitute a signal to the outside world that the contracting parties intend to continue their relation, that it is not merely an ad hoc liaison.

14. In fact, international relations are probably better understood by analyzing dyads than analyzing the units, the states. But there are two obvious difficulties: there are many more dyads since the number increases by the second power of the number of states; and a focus on the dyads leaves out higher level relations such as triads and the \(m\)-tuples - which is another expression for an international organization (or even conference) with \(m\) participants. Thus, the dyadic approach does not solve the problem.

15. Thus, among the Nordic countries it is fair to say that the embassies have mainly ceremonial functions, most problems being handled multilaterally. But they are not abolished: the Nordic
political scene is a dense network of all four forms, of civil servants contacting their opposite numbers directly, bypassing embassies that are then used for other purposes (e.g., cultural), of countless conferences and organizations. When there are arrows in Figures 1 and 2 it is not to suggest that the lower phases are emptied, only that the process, and perhaps also the point of gravity, moves on.

16. We shall use the commonly used terms IGO, INGO etc. For an explanation related to the type of theory developed here, see section 3. For the particular term BINGO (business inter-nongovernmental organization) I am indebted to Tord Høivik.

17. For a good summary of statistics in this field, see Werner Feld, *A Study of Business, Labor and Political Groups* (New York: Praeger, 1972), especially p. 177 where the growth of IGOs and INGOs from 1860 to 1970 is given as from 1 to 242 and 5 to 2,996 respectively. These numbers differ from one study to another depending on criteria - but the substantial growth rate is always clearly demonstrated.

18. Thus, organizations will send representatives to the UNESCO Secretariat for negotiations before UNESCO sends an observer to their meetings.

19. A typical example would be all the resident diplomacy among the UN agencies. It is also necessary, not to streamline and "coordinate" in the sense of eliminating differences or overlaps, but in order to be informed about other approaches. For an example of totally different perspectives on the same international issue, that of transfer of technology, see the article "The Technology that can Alienate", *Development Forum*, July-August 1976, p. 8, by the present author, on WHO and UNCTAD.

20. There are already some data available on the process. Thus, Skjelsbæk reports, on the basis of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* from 1968, 93 super-INGOs - such as the International Social Science Council with the various international social science associations as members - or 5% of the total of INGOs. But the major form of growth is, of course, new organizations and growth within the organizations. Thus, in a questionnaire study from 1967 to general secretaries of international organizations, 55% reports expansion in the past, only 4% loss; and 61% predicted expansion for the future, only 2% loss (it should be added that organizations in crisis may be less inclined to answer such questionnaires). The work was carried out by Jorge Schnitman and Luis Stuhlman from Buenos Aires under the supervision of Kjell Skjelsbæk and the author (not yet published).

21) We do not yet have the appropriate indicators here, maybe because indicators of power tend to be developed by intellectuals fascinated by the power they do not have (capital assets, military power, etc.) and less inclined to explore the distribution of the power they/we do have, such as information.

22. I am indebted to Tony Judge for this observation.

23. For a further discussion of the theoretical basis of this perspective, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Integration", 

24. This may not be true inside the countries because opposing organizations are tied into an institutional framework in some kind of balance, usually in favor of the strong. Since that institutional network is largely missing at the world level, the net result may be words cancelling each other.

25. Thus, relatively soon the Third World may organize their own secretariat, to some extent to counter the expertise possessed by such "trade unions of rich countries" as the European Community and the OECD.

26. We are here talking about an empirically existing organization.

27. One way of obtaining this would be to cross-classify one ascriptive dimension (women, young), one occupational dimension (particularly the professions) and one value-dimension (Socialist, Christian).

28. This is one more example of the principle indicated in note 4 above: meaning is the limiting principle in socio-functional space.

29. From International Associations, 1955, no. 2. The data are old, but from the crucial period of rapid post-war expansion.

30. There are interesting indications, particularly in New York where the INGOs surrounding the UN perhaps tend to be more Western than is the case elsewhere - thus adding to the "Westernness" of UN organizations. The question is to what extent this attitude is anti-Western, anti-imperialist, anti-NT or anti-NGO (from the UN Secretariat; the major IGO).


Also see Kurt Jacobsen, "Some Behavioral Characteristics of the United Nations as a Function of Rank", IPRA Proceedings (Aasen: van Gorcum, 1969), where the distinction is made between the power inside and outside the organization.