ON THE
CREATION OF
A JUST
WORLD ORDER
Preferred Worlds for the 1990's

SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ
On the Creation of a Just World Order

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edited by Saul H. Mendlovitz

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Johan Galtung

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integrate himself with society. This sacrifice also occurs only in stages, as does the realisation it permits and the happiness this realisation brings. It occurs only with individuals, and perhaps in history.

This self-realisation has been throughout the whole of human history the theme of religion. In concrete historical terms it was the theme of religions in their plurality. The social body of the realisation achieved found its form in the various cultures. Each such culture was the relative peace of a truth of human self-realisation. If it is possible at all, world peace is peace between cultures that meet. The culture compelling it today, western culture, compels it through unharboured progress of knowledge and power and, as it has reached no goal of recognised truth, is essentially nonpeace. This culture in its modern form is an ambivalent secularisation of its own religion. World peace may provisionally be kept as an outward coexistence of cultures. But at its present stage our own culture cannot coexist with itself, let alone with others. Paradoxical as it may seem from purely political or social analysis, I am convinced that our actual task, on whose success the possibility of a true world peace stands or falls, is the realisation of the human Self. One of its forms is the achievement of religion in its truth, to which the meeting of cultures and religions may contribute. The achievement of truth means the realisation of what is actually meant in that truth; it means coming-of-age. Political efforts are a part and a consequence of efforts towards this realisation.

Men very well understand the requirement of a sacrifice of the ego. If we consider political values, it is everywhere central, for the side of these values in which the ego and its needs are confirmed requires no emphasis. The unity of absolutism is the compelled sacrifice of particular interests. The freedom of liberalism is essentially the freedom I grant my fellow citizen. The solidarity of socialism everywhere demands the sacrifice of selfish interests for the interests of the community. The perversion of all these values always occurs when the ego transforms them into demands made on others instead of on itself. The limit of insight of these political valuations lies mostly at the point where they replace individual egoism by a collective egoism in which the undifferentiated values of an I still underlie are merely reproduced.

Such demands are extraordinarily far removed from what is called reality. They are therefore not requirements for current political actions, but represent a criterion. May I be proved wrong in naming this a sceptical contribution.

NONTERRITORIAL ACTORS
AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACE
Johan Galtung

Some Assumptions About Peace

This is an essay dealing with the problem of peace from one particular angle: nonterritorial actors. This important angle merits the attention of the peace analyst, and the following is an approach to the problem of how nonterritorial or transnational actors can influence war and peace.

It is customary today to talk about peace as at least a two-sided concept. It still makes sense to define peace as the absence of violence, but one has to use a sufficiently extended concept of violence. One way to extend it would be through the following two definitions. First, there is what may be referred to as direct violence, the violence committed directly by persons against persons. It takes various forms, depending on whether it attacks the human body anatomically in war, in torture, by piercing, tearing, crushing, burning, and poisoning or physiologically by controlling the inputs to the human body through suffocation, starvation, and dehydration or by controlling the output from the human body through chains, imprisonment, detention, or more modern weapons affecting the higher nerve centres. This kind of violence is well known; it is dramatic and, literally speaking, deadly significant.

Second, there is what could be referred to as structural violence, which is built into the social structure. It may take the form of an exploitative pyramidal or feudal structure, something like the diagram as shown on next page. The arrows in the diagram stand for some kind of exploitation, such as net capital transfers from poor to rich nations. Moreover, the underdogs are fragmented, kept apart; only higher up is there contact, even "integration." Everybody knows this structure from personal experience; it is found within and between countries; it is an embodiment of violence. This structure is reproduced in the agricultural, industrial, commercial, and administrative sectors of society in such a way that surplus is extracted from the lower levels and trans-
ferred upwards, making the higher levels richer and richer at the expense of the lower levels, producing the famous "gaps" in development. The result is often highly differential morbidity and mortality rates between rich and poor countries, districts, and individuals. But the impact is not only in such concrete terms. It also takes more psychological forms—as when all interesting work, problem-solving included, is reserved for those at the top, leaving tedious work to individuals, districts, and countries lower down through what is euphemistically called "division of labor," depriving them of chances of growth and expansion of freedom in a broad sense. This structure persists, because it is difficult for underdogs to organize and overthrow the structure; the low levels are atomized and their interactions mediated by the higher levels.

In short, structural violence is based on a combination of exploitation and fragmentation, often placing those at the bottom below a minimum existence and always at a disadvantage. But sometimes there are confrontations, even revolts, and these display the linkage between direct and structural violence. Imagine a revolt against the higher echelons of a social structure, whether truly feudal, capitalist, state capitalist, or what-not and whether the revolt intends the substitution of present underdogs for topdogs or a truly revolutionary end to the exploitative structure. It is generally assumed that the topdogs will react to defend not only the structure but also their own position in it. Ultimately they may use direct violence, but usually as a response; they do not have to before the underdog throws the first stone. In that case, the underdog can be labelled an aggressor; there are laws and legal institutions that can then utilise all types of direct counter-violence. We get three stages of violence: structural violence benefiting the topdogs; direct violence initiated by the underdogs to change the status quo; and the direct, repressive counterviolence to preserve the status quo. Imagine further that the revolt is very feeble, very easily crushed. It would still be registered by the attentive observer, and even reported as "trouble" by newspapers and on TV. But if one extrapolates further, one may picture the revolts that never come to the take-off simply because they have been crushed in advance, because the underdogs are sufficiently manipulated, apathetic, and fragmented. One then sees how continuous these two types of violence are with each other.

Structural violence is only continuous with direct violence between unequals, in the vertical or asymmetric conflict built into the structure just depicted. Between equals, in a horizontal conflict, the structural violence element is by definition absent or negligible, and if there is violence it is of the direct variety. It may, however, result from structural causes inside the actors. If to work for peace is to work against violence, it means to work for the absence of both types—more concretely, to work not only for the reduction of direct violence but also for egalitarian structures. By that we mean, roughly, structures, where no party is exploiting the other; where no party is dependent on the other but each possesses sufficient autonomy to carry on alone; where parties are not kept apart but may cooperate, in solidarity, with each other. Equity, autonomy, and solidarity would be the necessary characteristics of such structures.

If we now study peace in its more classical sense, simply as absence of personal or direct violence, then there seem through history to have been two major trends in peace thinking: we shall refer to them as the dissociative and associative trends. According to dissociative thinking, actors who may be on a collision course should be kept apart from each other, whether by geographical (oceans, mountain chains, natural borders) or social (prejudices, stereotypes, deterrence) techniques. According to associative thinking, the best plan is exactly the opposite: to keep them together in cooperative relations. A typical example of the first is alliance formation, polarization, and balance-of-power policies; equally typical examples of the second are exchange and cooperation across conflict borders and the creation of supranational organizations.

At this point, it is interesting to introduce the two concepts of violence. It is often held today that dissociative strategies are somewhat old-fashioned, custom-tailored as they were to a world with slow speeds of communication and transportation. But since the middle of the nineteenth century, these speeds have been on an exponential increase, with a corresponding increase in transnational and supranational...
tional bonds. Geographical as well as social barriers between countries are being broken down; consequently the objective situation calls for extensive use of associative rather than dissociative strategies. A good example is the relationship between France and Germany. Three invasions of one by the other in 70 years could have led to a final dissociative answer, but what today is being molded between the two within the framework of the European Community is certainly an associative solution. It is certainly not impossible that large-scale direct violence between the two will be eliminated for the foreseeable future. For the ties between France and Germany within the European Community are very different from the exploitative relation that the community has with African countries: they are nonexploitative, horizontal ties that do not produce deep conflicts.

How does structural violence relate to the distinction between dissociative and associative peace policies? Dissociative policies have the advantage of killing two birds with one stone: they often produce the absence of violence, if only in the short run, and at the same time solve the problem of exploitation and injustice in vacuo. Where there is no interaction, there cannot be any exploitation. With associative strategies exploitation becomes a major problem—not only because exploitation may lead to direct violence and hence is not stable but because it is violence in itself. Clearly the problem is to bring parties together to prevent direct violence without at the same time creating structural violence. This is the general problem of peace politics in our time: how to practice associative policies as a bulwark against direct violence without at the same time getting into the pitfalls of structural violence.

How then should one conceive associative peacemaking? There seem to be five factors or conditions that are at least heuristically very helpful and also seem empirically to play a considerable role:

Symbiosis: a relationship based on needs that lead to real interdependence, so much so that both A and B know that if they destroy each other they hit themselves;

Symmetry: a relationship that is really egalitarian; no party enriches itself at the expense of another. In other words, absence of structural violence is in itself a condition;

Homology: as the two parties are reasonably similar in structure, cooperation is easy because each actor knows where his opposite number is to be found;

Entropy: all interaction channels are used—if not equally, at least in such a way that heavy concentration on one (usually elitist) channel is avoided;

Transcendence: moves in the direction of integration, providing a medium in which conflicts can be articulated and resolution attempted, the medium usually being some kind of nonterritorial actor, governmental or nongovernmental.

A typical example of a region where these conditions exist reasonably well is the Nordic countries. They are among each other’s biggest trading partners, not only of commercial goods but of cultural goods and manpower as well. This exchange and cooperation takes place in a reasonably nonexploitative way, partly because these countries are not very different in size, Iceland excepted. The countries are institutionally very similar and have become increasingly so through processes of harmonization. An impressive number of channels of communication exist and are used; and there is a certain superstructure, the Nordic Council, with its various ramifications. There is peace, by and large, in the double sense of this term. Although one example proves nothing, it serves as an illustration, particularly if it is compared with other regions of the world such as the Western Hemisphere or Eastern Europe where the second condition, symmetry, is typically not satisfied. The Soviet Union dominates the Eastern European countries (except Albania), and the United States the Latin American countries (except Cuba) and Canada. The famous 49th parallel is a border of peace only for him who is satisfied with a very narrow peace concept. With at least two thirds of the Canadian economy in U.S. hands, this is a border of structural violence, so far without any corresponding direct violence in either direction.

What then does one do in the case of an associative structure that satisfies all conditions but symmetry and entropy, in other words a structure without direct violence but embodying structural violence? One simple answer is: in a first phase, one destroys the structure by means of dissociative policies, by severing ties between high and low, by withdrawing cooperation and association—for instance, underdog countries would sever ties with the big power concerned, whether military, political, economic, cultural, or all four—to gain autonomy and independence and build one’s own institutions. In a later second phase there may be a change from fission to fusion policies, from dissociation to association, but this time on a basis of equality. In other words, for horizontal conflicts, associative techniques may be most appropriate; for vertical conflicts, a first phase of dissociation is probably needed before
association can come into play. Association is not ineffective, being probably the most effective bulwark possible against direct violence, but exactly for this reason it may be too much, too effective. Whereas dissociation may buy freedom from structural violence at the expense of isolation, association very often buys freedom from direct violence at the expense of structural violence. A glance at the world today gives ample testimony that this price is too high. Look at all the "law and order" there is, all the "tranquility"—in so many cases it is based on the subordination of many to the big, rich, and powerful.

In political thinking, there are those to the right who say that the human animal can be kept nonviolent only in a structure of law and order, embedded in a basically hierarchical set-up; there are those to the left who hold the view that the human being can set himself free from structural bondage only by means of direct violence. According to these ideologies, freedom from one type of violence can be bought only at the price of accepting the other. According to the present author's ideology these are false dilemmas, which represent a political and intellectual capitulationist view of human affairs: the task is to strengthen those institutions and forms of action that try to maximize both types of peace. One approach lies in the direction of nonviolent forms of revolution and nonmilitary forms of defense. Another approach points towards the use of nonterritorial actors, the approach to be developed in this essay.

What then is the role of such traditional peace strategies as arms control and disarmament in all this? One view is that most conferences and negotiations on disarmament fail not because of ill-will or lack of skill but due to something much more basic. What they try to do is to square the circle, to disarm a highly dissociative structure prepared for the violent cataclysm called war and refer to the result as peace. But a disarmed dissociative structure is still a dissociative structure, only an unprotected one. It has neither the peacebuilding effects of the associative structure that ties parties together in a web of exchanges and cooperation nor the peacekeeping effects of the dissociative structure that keeps opposing parties apart by the threat of the severe punishment called retaliation. One little incident, and the disarmed dissociative structure will crumble; one party will prevail over the other, or there will be a quick arms race up to and even surpassing pre disarmament levels.

Disarmament in a dissociative structure can take place only in an atmosphere of distrust, for the reasons already mentioned. If the parties could fall back upon geographical distance and forget about each other, there would be no problems, but technology has outdated that possibility. In our day the alternative to a dissociative peace structure maintained by the threat of direct violence is an associative structure. It is probably far more likely that such a structure will lead to disarmament than vice versa, for in an associative structure weapons may cease to be targeted on the other party and remain only a capability until they wither away. Strictly speaking, they do not even have to wither away. Norway and Sweden have more than enough weaponry to stage a respectable war: the reason there is no feeling of threat is not disarmament but distargeting. On the other hand, the chance that disarmament by itself will lead to an associative structure seems low or negligible. Disarmament is hardly the road to peace; rather, peace in a real sense seems to be the road to disarmament, by way of distargeting.

Quite another thing is arms control aimed at reducing the chances of war by accident or escalation. One may say that all wars are caused by some escalation and are accidental and, further, that human frailty or madness is usually found not at the level of the soldier, sergeant, or trigger-happy officer but much higher up. The topdogs are the definers of madness and sanity, exempting themselves from accusations; and it is built into the structure that they can make others accept their definitions. Nevertheless, there is some virtue in such measures: they do aim to perfect a dissociative peace structure, even though we would certainly rank them low in effectiveness relative to an associative peace structure.

In short, the problems of attaining peace are manifold and the solutions many, and they may look contradictory at the first glance. But in this regard, peace research does not differ from, say, medical research. Only if illness or peacelessness are seen as unitary phenomena can they be dealt with in a unitary way. What we have indicated is that there are two basic forms of violence, direct and structural, and two basic strategies of peace, dissociative and associative, yielding a total of four possible combinations. Dissociative ways to counteract direct violence—by means of natural borders, balance of power and so on—are waning in significance because they are ineffective and too costly. Dissociative policies to counteract structural violence through some kind of decoupling and associative strategies to counteract direct violence without leading to new forms of structural violence are all on their way up.
Some Assumptions About Nonterritorial Actors

We now turn to the nonterritorial actors. The question is, what role can they play? That role is certainly not necessarily a peace-building one. As these organizations are themselves an important part of the current structure, no simplistic conclusion to the effect that "states make wars, organizations make peace" is warranted. The opposite conclusion, that nonterritorial actors are simply the instruments of states, particularly of the dominant states, is not correct either, as it makes no distinction between the present situation and what these organizations could become.

Which are these nonterritorial actors? This section will present a brief resume of the basic characteristics of nonterritorial actors and particularly of their growth. Their growth is the growth of the world’s sixth continent, the invisible continent of nonterritorial actors. It is a continent that does not show up on any map, yet one of the most significant of them all in world politics.

Underlying any analysis of this sixth continent is one fundamental factor: the variable of communication/transportation speed and capacity. Basically constant for a million or two years of human history, it has increased exponentially since the first successful attempts early last century to install steam engines in ships (Fulton) and in locomotives (Stephenson). The system of territorial actors (Ts) developed in the first phase with spatial contiguity as a basic and undisputed assumption. With slow mobility, contiguity was a necessity. That the ensuing exponential growth of transportation/communication should lead to the emergence of nonterritorial actors (NTs) is hardly strange, but it should be pointed out that we are at just the beginning of this process. Even though the monastic orders were forerunners, and ethnic groups or nations have always been split between states at least to some extent, NTs as we know them today are the result of the speed revolution initiated in the 19th century. Even the colonial empires, noncontiguous as they were (and are) owed their tremendous growth partially to the fact that the means of mobility were quite unevenly distributed.

The standard typology that breaks NTs into international governmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and business international nongovernmental organizations (BINGOs), usually called multinational corporations, will be used in the following exposition. It should be pointed out that this general system of NT actors now seems to have gained sufficient momentum to have reached a stage of self-sustained growth. By this is simply meant that the NT system has its own dialectic, its own sources of growth; it is much less dependent on what happens in the system of states than before.

In the first phase of the development of NTs, powerful governments come together — first bilaterally and ad hoc, later multilaterally and in an institutionalized form — and the result is an IGO, such as the postal union or the League of Nations. Correspondingly, nongovernmental organizations come together — also first bilaterally and ad hoc, later multilaterally and in an institutionalized form — and the result is an INGO, such as the international professional association. Corporations expand, establishing or using local companies — which result in BINGOs. In the second phase IGOs and INGOs and BINGOs start directly and develop immediately into the multilateral, institutionalized form, often using a strong base developed in one nation. Instead of using existing elements in other countries, they create these elements. Intergovernmental organizations lead to new offices in national governments (for instance, in the field of environment); new associations, even professions, are created to serve as a local base for an INGO (Rotary Clubs being an example); and multinational corporations build daughter companies everywhere. But then comes the third phase, when the system has become more autonomous, more detached from its territorial base. Thus, there is the formation of super-IGOs, super INGOs and super-BINGOs, organizations comprised of IGOs, INGOs, or BINGOs, because of the need for coordination, articulation, and conflict solution. There is also the formation of links among the three types at any level of complexity. Examples are the coordination of UN Specialized Agencies, unions of international scientific associations, and organizations of multinational corporations in the field of oil. Very often this cooperation takes the form of contact and cooperation rather than a new organization: we are still in the early phase of second-order nonterritorial organizations.

Each IGO, INGO, and BINGO tends to foster, through the usual social dialectic, a competitive counter group, vying for political, sociocultural, and economic markets among the territorial actors. Economic cooperation leads to cooperation in the field of environment; if radical political parties internationalize, so do conservative parties. In fact, they may often cancel each other out like matter and antimatter, leaving behind only a lot of noise, as in the dialectics of international student activity in the cold-war period. Above all, there is the equally dialectical differentiation inside the NT system along its own class lines. As it is now, masters and servants are emerging, and although the
smaller, younger, and less powerful NTs are badly organized, they will soon see the need for some kind of trade union. All international youth organizations, for instance, might join together. A stratification may sooner or later crystallize into a class system, and the result may be gigantic super-IGOs, super-INGOs and super-BINGOs pitted against each other. It is not at all inconceivable that a conflict may emerge between the IGOs within and those without the UN system, between INGOs representing professions and all the others, and between BINGOs using technologies harmful to the environment and all the others. Modern transportation and communication facilitate many kinds of alliance-formation, not only between organizations within countries, but also between nonterritorial actors, regardless of the locations of their headquarters. As we shall see, location usually represents no obstacle: most NTs have headquarters in a limited part of the world, relatively close to each other.

Finally, within each NT there is formal equality between members from rich and poor countries. Dominating and dominated are found side by side. But in most instances the world territorial structure is simply reproduced. Not only are NTs usually organized with national chapters, but dominant countries outside tend also to dominate inside the international organization. Hence revolutions inside NTs are to be expected, and they will produce new NTs. Dominated countries will find it increasingly in their interest to have their own international organizations rather than being manipulated inside "universal" organizations, but this tendency will, of course, vary from field to field.

In other words, the invisible continent will grow, and unlike the visible continents it has no fixed border. One cannot postulate any upper limit if communication/transportation speed and capacity continue to develop as they have, except perhaps a limit resulting from the number of human beings involved and the time they can spend to make the organizations meaningful.

Let us turn to some data to illustrate this discussion. Fortunately, one specialist on nonterritorial actors, Chadwick Alger, has recently synthesized much of the information available (in a paper at the International Political Science Association, Montreal, 1973). We shall draw on his material in what follows, starting with figures showing the growth of IGOs and INGOs, as displayed in Table 1.1

| Number of IGOs and INGOs, 1860–1970 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| IGOs            | 1               | 2               | 5               | 10              | 11              | 13              | 9               | 31              | 38              | 81              | 142             | 242             |
| INGOs           | 5               | 9               | 21              | 37              | 69              | 135             | 214             | 375             | 477             | 795             | 1321            | 2296            |


don done so for most of this century. The "private" sector has about ten times as strong an internationalizing capacity as the "public" sector, which is not strange, taking into consideration how little of social life is in fact made governmental in most of the world. Of course, in the socialist countries the distinction between IGOs and INGOs may become meaningless, unless it is interpreted to mean something like "direct or indirect governmental control".

However that may be, the growth rate is high, well above 50 percent for both categories for many decades. What would this mean if we extrapolate to the year 2000? It might mean more than 1,000 IGOs and 10,000 INGOs, if the growth rates do not show any pronounced downward or upward trend in this century. The finding is important not so much in itself as in comparisons with the number of territorial actors, the states. In the territorial system there will appear some new states, other states may integrate into one, and some—perhaps not so few—may disintegrate into two or more; but it is highly unlikely that the change in number will be of the order of magnitude indicated by a straight-line extrapolation.

Of the many simple reasons, one is particularly important. Territorial space is finite and clearcut; if a new territorial actor is to be carved out, it will be at the expense of somebody else's power over that slice of territory. But nonterritorial space is without limitation: a new actor can usually be created just by proclaiming itself. What rules of recognition exist—for IGOs (for instance, ratification by member states) and for BINGOs (which have to be incorporated somewhere) —are not nearly so dramatic as for the state system, where new actors usually have to shoot themselves into recognition. This is one of the great strengths of the whole nonterritorial system, leading to growth that is still exponential. Sooner or later, it will have to taper off, however.

What, then, about the BINGOs, the multinational corporations, whose growth is by and large also exponential? Distinctions must be made—first, among industrial corporations, banks, and insurance companies; second, between the number of corporations or "parent systems" and the number of foreign subsidiaries. Thus, of the 185 most
important U.S. industrial corporations in 1967, all were active in Europe, 182 in Latin America, 174 in Canada, 117 in Japan, and 62 in Black Africa. This high level of penetration around the world becomes much more impressive when the total number of foreign subsidiaries is considered: 3401 in Europe, 1924 in Latin America, 1048 in Canada, but only 233 in Japan (the main office in Tokyo and one more?) and 166 in Black Africa. Seen over time, since 1900, both trends in most parts of the world show exponential characteristics, but more so for the number of subsidiaries than for the parent systems. In other words, it may be that international corporations from now on will grow much more in depth and breadth than in number.

The number of banks with foreign branches and the number of these branches, as well as the size of the deposits, also show signs of exponential growth. In 1968, for instance, some 27 major banks had 450 branches abroad, a rise from 2 banks with some 90 branches in less than a decade. Moreover, their activity abroad is a significant part of their total activity, foreign deposits making from 26 percent to 46 percent of all deposits. Whether there will be the same tendency for banks—that the increase in the number of banks will tend to slow while subsidiaries continue exponential growth—remains to be seen, but it is likely.

We should now have presented some information about the total number of multinational corporations of all kinds operating in at least three countries, but that is not so easy. Numerical estimates tend to vary between two and five thousand, depending on definitions. What is quite clear, however, is that their number far outstrips the number of states and that there is an increasing gap between the number of states and the number of nonstates—of nonterritorial actors—leaving the former behind.

It may be objected that numbers are not the same as power and that the significance of nonterritorial actors will depend on their power more than on their numbers. Where do the nonterritorial actors stand in power relative to the states? One could compare the total number of members of INGOs (with national chapters) with the population of states and the economic strength of industrial corporations (sales), banks, and insurance companies (assets) with the economic strength of states as measured by GNP. Although it is far from obvious that these factors are comparable, if we rank these four entities on the basis of economic strength, the top 50 include 31 states, 11 banks, 4 industrial corporations, and 4 insurance companies, according to the research carried out by Arosalo and Väyrynen at Tampere Peace Research In-

stitute. An earlier report, reproduced among other places in War/Peace Report (October 1968), compares states with corporations only and finds that among the 40 biggest economic entities 8 are corporations.

More important, the biggest corporation, General Motors Corporation according to all lists, had only 17 states ahead of it on the list. Then follow Ford, Standard Oil, Royal Dutch/Shell, General Electric, Chrysler, Unilever, and Mobil—almost all of them involved in the nonterritorial sine qua non, transportation and communication.

Thus, the NTs increase in number, they proliferate, they grow economically, and they eat themselves upwards on the list of states. They are not only comparable with states, they are on the same footing in many regards and above them in one very important respect: They show more dynamism. All this, however, does not show that they constitute a system alternative to, or even opposed to, the territorial system. For it might well be that the nonterritorial system is to a large extent a reproduction of the territorial system at another level and that all these IGOs, INGOs, and BINGOs mainly are the conveyor belts that carry the political, military, cultural (in a broad sense), and economic power of some states over others.

To explore the nature of the NTs, let us look at some other aspects of the nonterritorial system. The crucial question is simple: Are they really nonterritorial? To be nonterritorial they should be universal or at least symmetric. The territorial system should not be reflected too much in the members; in the organizations' locations, for instance, in terms of headquarters; and the home states of their most important officials. But from the data it immediately becomes clear that these organizations as we know them today, however impressive their numbers, their power, and their growth, are at best potentially nonterritorial actors.

Have a look at the membership pattern. Essentially it is a question of comparing the world Northwest,—Northern America and Western Europe,—with the rest of the world. Among the IGOs, the Northwest predominance in the membership of the total number is decreasing—from 100 percent at the very beginning, through 61.4 percent in 1900, 49 percent in 1925, 47 percent in 1950, 39 percent in 1960, and down to 36 percent in 1966. But this is more than equitable, for that part of the world has only 16 percent of the world population. The trend tells us one thing, above all: other states are joining the system. But the picture is immediately less symmetric if one looks at the INGOs: From 1959 to 1966 there was a decline in Northwest membership of the
total INGO system from 66 percent to 54 percent, but that is a slow decline and still far above any proportionate representation. What this tells us is, of course, that the whole idea of formal organization and international association is a Northwestern one.

The predominance of the Northwest becomes much more pronounced in the location of the headquarters of the international organizations. In 1906, 97 percent of them were located in the Northwest, in 1962 still more than 90 percent (90.8 percent to be precise), and in 1968 down to 87.1 percent. As to headquarters, the center of power is Western Europe rather than North America, although North America has by far the highest number of multinational corporation headquarters, with only a scatter of headquarters located elsewhere.

As to the nationality of the people on the executive organs: in 1960 88.4 percent of them were from the Northwest for the INGOs, 80.5 percent for the IGOs. Although they could in fact hold most of their meetings elsewhere, in 1966 still as much as 76 percent of the meetings were held in the Northwest (down from 87 percent in 1951). Secondary offices were also predominantly located in the Northwest (58 percent of them in 1968, as against 77 percent in 1958). In short, there are trends toward greater symmetry, but these trends are usually weak and have far to go.

It is very difficult to escape the conclusion that the structure of the nonterritorial system is very similar to the colonial pattern, with a centre located in the world Northwest, so richly endowed with superiority complexes, spreading out to the world periphery and capable of exploiting and fragmenting it.

Not only is the centre of gravity of power located in the Northwest, but the invisible continent is also anchored there in other ways. The whole conception underlying nonterritoriality will have a northwest colour or imprint. Dominant personnel will be taken from that region, sources of finance will have to be found there, and so on. But this should not be seen as a deliberate, Machiavellian plot to engulf the rest of the world, using nonterritoriality as the machinery of neocolonialism just as territoriality was used for colonialism, with a chain of bases and supply points reaching out to the colonized periphery. One should rather see it structurally, in terms of the postindustrial Northwest having to expand to make the neomodern socioeconomic system meaningful at all. In this need to expand lies the reason for the net of structural violence thrown over the world, not in the stated intentions. The intentions are usually benevolent, like "bringing the fruits of Western civilization" and "technical assistance."

Another aspect to this pattern should be pointed out. In the rich and capitalist Northwest, one group of nations probably benefits particularly from the development of the invisible continent: the small nations. If we calculate the number of INGO memberships per capita by country, excluding territories with less than one million population, the ranking list is as shown in Table 2.

The two lists are quite different, and the reason is simple. As already mentioned, there are many IGOs in the world today to which a state simply has to belong in order to be a state; hence the states topping the list are the smaller ones. That does not mean that we do not have the same postcolonial pattern in the IGO system. Even for UN agencies, only one has headquarters in the east or the south, the UN Environment Program in Nairobi. Other UN headquarters are either in the militarily organized West or in nations "neutral to the West." But as the INGOs do not mobilize all states, the INGO membership reproduces a well-known structure, this time with the small, rich, and capitalist on the top. Both the absolute number of members and the relative number per capita are significant. It is not unreasonable to assume that for the same number of memberships the smaller of two nations is more penetrated, more people are affected, and the invisible continent is more visible.

The invisible continent is the continent that the small, developed, and capitalist nations try to colonize, particularly as all other continents have to some extent been colonized by the big powers, capitalist or socialist. The importance of this factor, and the validity of this general hypothesis, can be further appreciated by studying Table 3.2

2-Who's Who in International Organizations" by E. S. Tew, "International Associations-Associations Internationales," Union of International Associations, 1 rue aux Laines, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.
The site of an organization is definitely an important factor in determining the nationality of its officials. The small, rich nations have made use of this resource.

**Nonterritorial Actors and Peace**

Having seen the present state of affairs, we face the question of what potential there is in the nonterritorial system, how it can be transformed to serve peace, in both senses, as the absence of direct violence and as the absence of structural violence. But, many will object, we still live fundamentally in a world of states. True, but what has happened inside countries may also happen between them: organizations (e.g., parties) may become more salient, more powerful than territorial units such as districts. Hence, in discussing this general problem we shall consider three different assumptions: the nonterritorial system is (1) lower, (2) equal to or (3) higher than the territorial system in salience. Varying this factor will permit us to discuss increasingly radical strategies, starting from the situation today. For there are also possibilities within the existing system; what matters is to make use of them to prepare the ground for more progressive, more peaceful structures.

**1) Nonterritorial System Lower than Territorial System in Salience**

Today the nonterritorial system is lower in salience, and the question is how it can be improved from the point of view of peace theory—assuming that the territorial actors will still be the foci of decision-making and that the NTs will to a large extent still depend on Ts for their existence. Although they may be granted some extraterritorial rights, NTs will be controlled by Ts and be financially dependent on national organizations, governmental or nongovernmental. In this general setting NTs will continue to grow and have ample opportunities for growth, but as we have seen undirected growth will not in itself change the world structure in a direction that automatically favors peace. New NT organizations must be created with more relevance in this particular field of peace, old and new NTs penetrate more deeply into the territorial system, and this entire nonterritorial system be more symmetrically distributed over the territorial system. We shall look into these three points in more detail, starting with the INGOs, proceeding to the IGOs, and ending with the BINGOs.

**New, More Peace-Related NTs**

As to new INGOs, one suitable point of departure may be the already existing international organizations of parliamentarians and of international civil servants. These INGOs unite people who have a particularly direct concern with peace problems; and although the participation usually is very asymmetric in terms of the T system, the first group is undoubtedly an efficient channel of communication and the second an instrument for the internationalization of a real world administration. They should be made more representative, more active, seeing themselves as progress-oriented pressure groups and not as trade unions for high-status privileges. It is particularly important that they develop world perspectives, that they all think in terms of world food budgets, world ecology, and the like.

World perspectives will be the cause as well as the effect of world movements and world political parties; they are not the sum of well-articulated national or regional perspectives. World political parties will be a much more powerful factor than the two organizations mentioned. National political movements find each other and create an international organization, as conservative, liberal, socialist, and communist parties to a large extent already have done. But this is still mainly a nonterritorial coordination for territorial action: The parties are active in an institutionalized form only at the national level. The perspective changes completely when such INGOs can act in an IGO setting, as to some extent they do in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe.

Hence a basic problem is to find institutional settings within which world organizations in general and and world political parties in particular can act. One general formula would be to build on the system of consultative status, tying professional INGOs to the UN specialized agencies and ideological INGOs to the UN itself. But this system will become effective only when INGOs are called upon to do some real decision-making, in later phases of increased salience. In this phase it
is more a question of expanding the system of consultative status, in a
sense legitimizing politics in the form of political parties at the world
level rather than leaving all politics to governmental delegations. Then
there are the more informal political movements that have not (as yet?)
crystallized into political parties—not even into NTs. Informal world
movements may, however, prove to be much more important than the
formalized movements, including world political parties, because they
serve as vehicles for new ideas, new conceptions. The hippie move-
ment, for instance, has been setting a cultural tone, a style, defining
values all over the world, for a long time, and it will have its successors.
The anti-Vietnam war movement was an example of loosely coordinated
efforts to resist an imperialist war at a world level. In many parts of the
world a New Left, less bent on socialist nationalism and planning
ideas and more on decentralization, alternative technologies, a sense
of ecology, self-reliance and similar values, has been taking shape for
some time, challenging bigness and exploitation of man and nature, re-
gardless of whether it passes under the name of capitalism or socialism.

It should be emphasized that these movements are to a large extent
youth movements, based on persons who are transnationally mobile
and highly explicit in their ideological orientation precisely because
they are low on occupational and family identification. But they are
preparing for occupations and for permanent family life, and the prob-
lem is that statuses such as youth or student often do not command
lasting attention and organizational potential because they are trans-
itory. The ideological turnover is often very high. But this may change:
youth may start working earlier and people may study at later stages
in their lives, making larger sections of the population more mobile
geographically and attitudinally, more able to cope quickly with new
contingencies, less rigid than present power structures make them. In
the first phase, however, this type of organizational growth must be
seen as a preparation for a later stage when such informal movements
can act as direct pressure groups in relevant global decision-making
institutions, for instance, gradually taking the form of world political
parties.

Turning back to the examples of parliamentarians and international
civil servants: there are many untapped possibilities in this world for
tyi...
easily find each other because this type of highly mobile interaction is the *sine qua non* of their existence. In the near future the world will probably see the first clear signs of general secretaries pitted against prime ministers, almost forcing a tighter coordination among the latter. They will have common interests in their relations with the system of NTs, perhaps even in fighting it in the first phase, after they wake up to discover that the baby created to serve territorial interests has outgrown many of its parents. But if heads of governments come together to discuss how to cope with transnational bureaucracies, such as the UN and the European Community, they themselves will form a transnational actor. The adequate response to the NT challenge will hence be continued growth of the NT system, one more indication that this system is invincible because it is the only one compatible with the technological infrastructure in communication and transportation. Of course, countries may isolate themselves and withdraw, as China did for a long period. That is probably a very wise strategy in a certain phase of development, but if you want to change the system you have to become part of it, one way or the other.

Of equal significance would be institutionalized cooperation among military people and among diplomats in all countries. The World Veterans Association is an approximation to military cooperation, the Quaker seminars held around the world for diplomats a very informal but significant start for the second type of association. But much more can be done, and in all probability will be, to give an organizational basis to the articulation of common concerns.

Military people all over the world can meet on a basis of a shared resentment against civilians. They can define civilians and politicians as ignorant and develop a certain professionalism around a nucleus of arms control (not disarmament) ideology: "If it only were left to us there would be no problem; we know how military systems work." Our experiences are not too good with this type of cooperation, but the nucleus is there for thinking and even acting in a more transnational way than before. Moreover, in a world that somehow will have to head for some form of disarmament, including heavy reduction in the number of military personnel, military people will have extremely difficult and also often humiliating transition problems, which will probably also drive them together. There will be a premium on military from countries with experience in demilitarizing armies, giving to the military increasingly civilian functions. No doubt much of that transfer of experience will be in the theory and practice of military coups d'etat and in how to thwart efforts to move towards some real form of disarmament. But some can also be used in international peacekeeping forces. Some transnational organization must absorb much of the military know-how, and international peacekeeping forces are almost a necessary consequence of steps towards disarmament.

Diplomats will have corresponding problems. As the system of NTs grows at the expense of Ts, bilateral diplomacy will recede into the background and multilateral diplomacy will constantly increase in salience. Many of these problems will be handled by foreign ministries, which will gradually have to transfer personnel from the bilateral to the multilateral sector, reducing the size and number of embassies and increasing the size and number of delegations to IGOs. This will mean that an increasing number of diplomats will have their horizons extended from a bilateral to a multilateral view, and some of them may de facto, if not de jure, become rather like international civil servants. Thus they will have trade union problems in common and a gradually increasing communality in their views on world affairs. Their views will tend to be correlated less with national background and more with other factors such as personality, experience, and ideology.

With military and diplomats organized in a more transnational manner the idea of national interest will recede more into the background and global interest will be better articulated. This process is to some extent already going on: you take the zero-sum people and put them into a cooperative context. Some of their old roles as defenders of national interests will then be seen as outmoded or ridiculous, even be resented. But as the seabed issue shows: there is still a long way to go.

What is the possibility of creating more IGOs with direct relevance to peace and war? We shall not go into much detail here but only mention that the following organizations seem to our mind particularly relevant:

- a system of regional security commissions, parallel to the system of regional economic commissions, under the UN;
- a UN arms control and disarmament agency;
- a UN space agency;
- a UN space communication agency;
- a UN seabed agency;
- a UN food agency;
- a UN energy agency.
The rationale of these agencies would be partly to see to it that space, space communication, and the seabed are demilitarized, at least below an acceptable threshold, partly to see that benefits from these activities accrue to all mankind, partly to secure for the UN independent sources of income to be spent in accordance with standard UN procedures, and above all to start globalizing what has so far been the monopoly of the big powers, particularly the superpowers, and what are two of the basic economic concerns of all of us: food and energy.

All this is envisaged within the UN system and will probably come sooner rather than later. But the UN, with its Security Council and generally strong big-power dominance not only reflects but also to a large extent maintains a status quo in the international system of stratification of nations. Hence there is a need for an organization of nonaligned countries to challenge the bloc system; an organization of poor, often formerly colonial, countries to challenge world distribution; and an organization of small countries to challenge the system of big-power dominance.

These three types of organizations would not be universal or regional in a geographic sense, and consequently cannot be accommodated in the UN system. There is also the important argument that this system tends to gloss over and usurp the three important contradictions: the UN becomes to a large extent an instrument of bloc politics, of the rich nations, and of the big powers. This argument is certainly not made against the UN but rather in favour of organizations to supplement the UN for efficient articulation of basic conflict, for new power groups to emerge unimpeded by the status quo orientation of the present system.

Of course, these groups are already emerging to some extent: the Bandung, Belgrade, Cairo, Lusaka, Georgetown, and Algiers Conferences are examples of an organization of nonaligned countries gradually involving also European nonaligned countries. The Havana-based Tricontinental and the Algiers Group of 77—but certainly not the entire UNCTAD system—are examples of organizations of poor countries. Organizations of small countries, as such, do not as yet exist. In this type of organization, countries like the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia would join each other side by side, in a shared interest, to be protected against protection from certain big powers. The very circumstance that their situation is handled by the respective big powers inside a regional framework dominated by those big powers (the Organization of American States and the Warsaw Treaty Organization) to the exclusion of the UN is a solid indication of the need to develop new instruments in this sphere.

In short, we are arguing both for associative and dissociative policies, both for integrating the international system by strengthening the UN so that it can offer more services and enter more effectively into the security field and for disintegrating the international system by new organization of the uncommitted, the poor, and the weak. Although we do not see any contradiction here, we are aware that most people probably do. Most people tend to be either integrationists favouring the first course of action or disintegrationists favouring the second because they do not make any distinction between horizontal integration of equals and hegemonic vertical integration.

But, to take a nation-level parallel, in certain stages of social development there is value both in trade unions for workers only, pitted against employers' unions and governmental organizations where the two parties meet. It may well be that this course of development leads to the elimination of one or other of the groups (socially, not necessarily biologically), but that is another dimension of the total problem. The basic point here is that a necessary condition for the poor and the weak to attain autonomy and identity is to do it alone, to be without strings, without crutches, without aid, and later on the basis of equity re-establish ties with the rich and the strong, who are then less rich and strong, as these terms express structural relations of exploitation, not only absolute resources. Solidarity and autonomy among the poor and the weak are negations of the old structure and the beginning of a new one.

Nonterritorial Penetration of the Territorial System

Let us then look at the possibility of more penetration of the T system by the NT system. An immediate proposal that comes to mind is:

- establishment of UN embassies in all member-states with sections for the various UN and Specialized agencies' programmes, and a UN ambassador from a different region;
- internationalizing the moribund bilateral corps diplomatique (CD) by making the UN ambassador doyen of the CD, ex officio, and using the CD gradually as an instrument for articulating UN agenda points concerning the host nation in a multilateral form, a local general assembly in miniature;
- penetration into the local executive and legislative branches by UN personnel as observers on foreign relations committees, as personnel in bilateral technical assistance agencies and even in foreign ministries, gradually internationalizing the foreign affairs of a country,
transforming classical foreign ministries slowly into local branches of a (so far not existing) world internal affairs ministry.

The rationale behind this kind of proposal is simple. In past centuries, with a relatively low degree of mutual interpenetration of nations and a low level of interaction or coupling in general, foreign affairs were perhaps more bilateral in their consequences and less significant, affecting peoples' lives less than today. Today we are faced with the anomaly that decision-makers in a democratic country discussing domestic affairs would have the representatives of all parties built into the decision-making machinery. A parliament discussing communication and transport programmes would do so with due weight to the districts affected or not affected by the programme. It is a travesty of democracy to believe that a decision to bomb Indochina taken by a national assembly, or even through a plebiscite, was somehow more democratic than when taken by an executive authority alone. Democracy means that all concerned participate in the decision-making — and Indochinese peasants had some concern in that connection. Hence, to extend foreign policy decision-making intranationally only serves as a camouflage, a way of making others co-responsible.

To many the idea of having the receiver-countries permanently represented on the boards of the bilateral technical assistance agencies with the right not only to listen but to speak and vote might seem somewhat utopian. But it is not. The United Nations Development Programme Resident Representative acts de facto very much as a UN ambassador would in some countries, and his staff has important reporting functions both ways. However, the corps diplomatique is not directly built into this relationship and we feel there should be some possibilities along these lines, particularly because of the factors mentioned. Structures of this kind may start developing any year, and there is no reason that all member states should embrace the total package at once. Some countries might go further than others along this scale of UN penetration, and although this would introduce certain asymmetries it might still be a highly valuable contribution to the internationalization of foreign policy.

But the nonterritorial system does not consist only of IGOs; there are also INGOs to consider. How can they become more international? One way of doing this is structural, another is more attitudinal, and they can easily be brought to work hand-in-hand. The classical way was to make an INGO a weak coordination centre for national associations. If all nations were not represented there was, as mentioned, a second phase of looking for organizational bridgeheads into non-member nations. In this case the initiative would come from the international centre, but it could also come from interested persons in non-member states or from groups in any number of member-states. Throughout this phase the idea however is still to have national associations, although they may be more chapters than associations because of increasing strength of the international centre.

One can imagine a third phase, of direct individual membership of the INGO, which then becomes an association of individuals and not of national associations. Obviously such an INGO may easily find itself operating in a vacuum when there is no other organization at the international level, for instance, no IGO with which it can have institutionalized interaction, or at the national level, where such organizations may have no local chapters and only consist of individuals connected internationally. This type of INGO is ahead of its time: it is an actor in search of a counterpart at the right level of operation, which is the world level and not the international level, but its transcendence. Of course, INGOs will always find some roots in the NT system but will generally be too weak to convert organizational investment into real social action.

It is important that this type of structure with direct affiliation, or affiliation mediated through very weak national chapters only, should be combined with a global pattern of identification, for if the basic identification is still at the national level the incongruence between structure and attitude will lead to basic friction. As an example, take scientists, in both the natural and social sciences. With war becoming increasingly technical, these sciences become increasingly important and relevant to the national cause, and there is a very basic contradiction today between the international nature of scientific research and the national application of scientific research. In times of crises, scientists employed by national universities and academies of science are supposed to rally to the national cause and may even be pledged to do so by oaths of loyalty. It is therefore important to work for new loyalty patterns that do not tie scientific loyalty to supposedly value-free science (such a thing never existed and will never exist) but to a more global identification, that the benefits of scientific activity should accrue to all mankind. Organizational structures that would correspond to this conception might be the UN university, or a UNESCO university, or a proliferation of nongovernmental, transnational world universities, perhaps even defining national universities as national chapters. The Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik is an example of this.
The Pugwash Conferences and the International Peace Research Association are examples of efforts to internationalize the scientist community in war and peace. Such conferences may or may not have national chapters, but they are international by nature. Scientists from different countries have joined these organizations as individuals, not as representatives of their countries. This is a general principle that is also true for the BINGO conferences.

The third point of our discussion is how to guarantee the success of the BINGO conferences. This is a general problem of the new power structures of the world. We need to find ways to make the conferences successful and to identify the needs of the participating nations.

The fourth point is the role of the international community in the solution of the world's problems. We need to find ways to involve the international community in the decision-making process.

In conclusion, the BINGO conferences are a step towards international peace, but we need to continue to work towards a world where peace is the norm.
symmetry than the distribution at the lower level. According to the second basic approach to the problem of symmetry, location is a super-
official aspect and does not imply control: Control itself is the essence.
If one wants symmetric control of IGOs, INGOs, and BINGOs the last solution is not symmetric territorial distribution but symmetric power distribution. This is rather similar to the problem of land reform: the old model was equality by means of territorial distribution according to the one-family, one-farm principle; the more modern approach is to distribute power to decide on large farms, in other words industrial farming with industrial democracy. The People’s Commune in China may be one example, being democratic and autonomous.

In the field of BINGOs such power distribution is referred to as coproduction, whereby two countries agree to coproduce something. “Co” stands for symmetry, although often more in theory than in practice. Often an ad hoc organization is created to manage coproduction in order to start from scratch with something that is sufficiently symmetrical. Thus one form is a bilateral ad hoc IGO, a joint commission, managing BINGOs between the same countries, although we should use these terms only for multilateral relationships.

But our point here is rather the possibilities of generalization implicit in this scheme. The general principle would be to concentrate ultimate power over the NT system in the most representative, most symmetric NTs. This is probably the way it will have to develop anyhow: so why not get started, in a modest way, as soon as possible?

There are many possibilities. In the first phase there will probably be many instances of BINGOs being put under IGO control. The multinational corporations are globalized just as the national corporations were nationalized before them. Exactly what forms this will take are not easily predicted. But one beginning could be a tax levied on all BINGOs by and for the UN, by the rationale that these BINGOs operate on the international level. The basic point is that the operation of a BINGO concerns not only the nations in which mother, daughter, or sister companies (are these feminine terms used in order to appear more innocent?) are located but is of basic interest to the whole international system, to all of humankind.

In the second phase there will probably be many instances of IGOs being put under INGO control, and there will also be instances of the opposite. All nine combinations of IGOs, INGOs, and BINGOs controlled by similar organizations could be explored. But we focus on the pattern of INGOs controlling IGOs for the simple reason that this is our model of democracy: People must control government and not vice versa, at least ultimately, and so associations of people should control associations of governments. Thus one is led gradually towards a model of a world central authority with worldwide elections based on worldwide parties—all of them INGOs—to a worldwide parliament tied in with a worldwide executive, perhaps an improved version of the UN Secretariat and specialized agencies. Clearly, however, much of this would belong to the second and third phases of NT growth. There is a considerable distance to go. For instead of INGOs controlling IGOs controlling BINGOs it seems descriptive of our situation today to say that we have BINGOs controlling IGOs controlling INGOs. But much of this belongs in a sense to the second and third phases of the growth of nonterritorial actors. All we can say here is that this first phase will, and to our mind should, witness, the first efforts to control the asymmetries in the system of nonterritorial actors—sometimes by breaking them up, sometimes by making them more symmetric, less violent in their structure, and sometimes by making them penetrate more deeply into the states themselves. This should apply not only to IGOs and INGOs but above all to the BINGOs, as soon as possible.

(2) Nonterritorial System Equal to the Territorial System in Salience

When the nonterritorial system equals the territorial system in salience, the three basic patterns of influence are about equalized:

NT commands about as much loyalty (normative power) as T;

NT renders about at much service (remunerative power) as T; and

NT has about as much force (coercive power) as T.

Obviously this condition of equality will not come into being simultaneously all over the world, nor is that essential. Moreover, these three aspects of power will not be equalized simultaneously. For instance, as most T-oriented people probably are prone to believe that ultimate power is coercive power, they will not surrender this kind of power monopoly easily, especially not when they see that NT actors command more and more loyalty and render more and more services to increasing fractions of the world population, thus threatening regional and class privileges. They will not understand that the ultimo ratio regis is not necessarily the ultimo ratio of the secretaries-general, or they will understand this too late, when the NTs have taken over with their softer power—like it has happened inside the nation-state before.

Hence we proceed on the assumption that there is some kind of equal balance between T and NT where loyalty is concerned, and that this
loyalty is not merely an attitude but is tied in with services of all kinds. The individual exchanges loyalty for services in both directions, and there will be intermediate phases in which he will be overrewarded by T and underrewarded by NT. What does all this mean to the prospects for peace?

Theoretical approaches to the problem can lead to rather different results. In this future world, for instance, a man's loyalty will be shared between his own government and people with whom he identifies in some other country because they belong to the same race, ethnic group, class, profession, or general association. The problem arises when his brethren in the other country are suppressed by their own government. To this man nonintervention now becomes meaningless. Whether his own government joins him in his effort to help or not is not so important. Whether the response takes the form of governmental intervention or rank-and-file infiltration is of less significance: he cannot refrain from doing something. The whole doctrine of nonintervention is based on the assumption that territorality dominates in salience so that governments can hold their people at bay with soft, normative strings. It also presupposes bad means of communication and a generally low level of political consciousness and information. In this phase the doctrine of nonintervention will have to go or take on new forms; it cannot survive when patterns of loyalties work completely against it. It will be interesting to see how international lawyers tackle this problem. For instance, when will international law become as sensitive to structural violence as it has been to direct violence? When will structural violence be defined as aggression—structural aggression—and a revolution as an act of defense? A balanced crisiscross of loyalties may in some instances break down the impediments of the past against intervention and infiltration. But it may also lead to a higher potential for communication, mediation, and arbitration for neutrals who can withdraw and serve as bridges between the belligerents than when the NT system has very low salience. Just as wars to help brothers abroad may increase, wars against whole countries will probably decrease for the simple reason that they would also be wars against people with whom there is solid identification because of nonterritorial bonds. The conclusion is that this phase will be dominated by other types of wars. We are there already: international relations are characterized by internationalized wars of liberation rather than by national wars of conquest. The old territorial system fails to come to grips with the realities of this world. It is still dominated by the idea that a regime can only be recognized when it has territorial control, not because it represents the legitimate interests of the people. It is still dominated by the idea of governmental power monopoly inside the country in defiance of all the transnational forces and concerns.

But there are many other aspects to this world of equal salience. First, most of the trends we have mentioned in the preceding section will continue, most of them at an increasing rate. Sooner or later this will lead to a stronger crystallization of relations between IGOs, INGOs, and BINGOs. More particularly, we assume that in this phase BINGOs will be controlled by IGOs much more than in the first phase and that IGOs will be controlled by INGOs increasingly. One way of achieving this could be as follows.

There are many ways of conceiving a future UN, particularly the General Assembly and the Security Council. To us it does not seem unreasonable to assume that in this phase the trade unions of the poor, the nonaligned, and the small powers will be able to reduce considerably the power of the rich, the aligned, and the big, particularly that of the superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Today we have some kind of upper-house, lower-house system in the UN: the Security Council based on ascription and the General Assembly more on representation. The Security Council is modernizing itself a little, but it is still based on the concept of the victorious great, Allied powers of the Second World War. To make the Security Council reflect present-day realities better, by exchanging the present five permanent members for the frequently mentioned pentagon consisting of the U.S., the European Community, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan would clearly be a step backwards, not forwards. To make the UN isomorphic with the present world order is to strengthen that order, and that is not what the present order needs most. It needs defeudalization, democratization. Give or take a decade or two: the Security Council and the veto system will have to go. The year 1789 will ultimately come to the international system.

But there is need for a two-chamber system in a new UN because the world is complicated; it is certainly not unidimensional. In this phase one might therefore think in terms of a General Assembly with two chambers, one representing nations more or less as now and one representing international organizations. In other words one chamber for T and the other for NT. This idea contrasts with the most current proposal at present, to have one chamber as now and another corresponding to the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress representing people more directly in proportion to their number, for example, with one representative for every million inhabitants. This proposal is more
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and no votes to those who do not belong to any organization. But the world has had a tremendous capacity so far for accepting unequal de facto voting distributions, the UN itself being a major example, and voting could also be weighted according to the size of an organization, and there could be direct election of delegates. There is no reason why only the territorial system should be democratically represented.

Nothing has been said about the relative power of the two chambers, and here a host of possibilities are open to us. We are inclined to think that in this phase the NT chamber should perhaps have more than a consultative, deliberative role, but less power than the T chamber. The major function of the nonterritorial chamber would be to serve as an additional forum of articulation, of grievances, conflicts, and problems—as a reservoir of human and other resources and as a network for the implementation of decisions.

A third aspect of this world is the real power some of the NTs will now acquire. We are not thinking so much of the IGOs but of some INGOs. The point is simply this: just as a national trade union organizing workers in some key occupation such as communications or energy can paralyze a modern nation and throw it back to a preindustrial stage of development in a well-organized strike, an international organization will in time be able to do the same to the international system. And this applies not only to such IGOs as OPEC. More effective than international associations of longshoremen will probably be such organizations as the international pilots' associations. Their effort to strike against the Algerian government over the capture in 1968 of an El Al plane is a telling foreboding of things to come. The question is to what extent these strikes will be for peace and not only for higher salaries or in the interests of certain nations dominating the INGOs, which latter point underscores again the importance of equalizing power over the NT system.

What would be the impact of a worldwide strike by the future INGOs heads of states, heads of government, foreign ministers, and defence ministers, not to mention the organizations of diplomats and the military? This type of strike seems to be related to the prospects for peace, but how? If all military went on strike all over the world—but that is perhaps a too utopian hope for the near future! More likely would be the emergence of other forms of defence, e.g., nonmilitary forms based on multinational noncooperation and civilian defence. In this second phase they would not be organized on a national basis alone but transnationally, as popular movements against the repressive use of military force, nationally and across borders. It is one thing to

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argue in favor of, say, the Norwegian nonmilitary defence against the German attack in 1940; quite another to argue in favor of both that and antimilitary mobilization in the attacking country. For that, high NT salience is needed, and forms that were ineffective in earlier phases of world development may gain considerably in efficiency.

(3) Nonterritorial System Higher Than the Territorial System in Salience

A world in which the nonterritorial system is higher in salience is hard to imagine for many, but it should not be hard to imagine for people living in nation-states where local district identification is quickly decreasing, where territorial mobility is high, and where identification with nationwide organizations and associations, e.g., parties and trade unions, is correspondingly high. This world is that nation-state writ large. Actually we already have a system in the world that can serve as an illustration: India. As a nation-state this continent is badly integrated; but as an international system, it is really an international system, it is very successful. Of course, there are national protests against super-system, Delhi, penetration, and these protests might conceivably one day accumulate and lead to a new and looser India more reflective of the world as a whole. But India today is somewhere between the second and the third of our phases—the separate states are highly visible, but there are overriding concerns and loyalties crisscrossing with them. Hence this is no unrealistic utopia—it exists.

Identification with the local district will seldom decrease to zero, partly because local life is a form of life that will remain dear to many for a long time or forever and partly because exploitation across territorial borders will appear and reappear and call for some kind of territorial organization to counteract it. But a world of small social units, self-reliant and nonexploitative, with high mobility between them, is also perfectly conceivable and would be an ideal version of our world in the third phase.

In this system, to stick to our image of a two-chamber UN, the chamber representing the territorial subunits would recede into the background, as it has in many countries. That would leave us with two possibilities: to develop that chamber into a world parliament based on world political parties and movements and the chamber of organizations. But it is not a question of either/or. Inside the nation-states of today the need will probably arise to give the organizational-associational system a better opportunity to articulate itself, instead of only the old territorial system based on district representation. One might think in terms of retaining two chambers but using countries in the first chamber only as administrative subunits to organize worldwide elections locally. Another possibility would be to proceed as under the second phase just outlined but giving all real power to the NT chamber and using the T chamber, which we then assume to be of the one-nation, one-vote variety with appointed delegations, as an ornament, something like the House of Lords.

In this system territorial war as it is known today will be considerably less probable simply because it will be less feasible. There is a very simple reason for this: people live together in such a way that friends and enemies are too spatially mixed to permit the free, unimpeded use of explosives. Explosives, from the smallest dum-dum bullet to the fusion bomb, are effective means in warfare. But they presuppose low entropy in the spatial distribution of people: a bomb is to be placed at points of maximum enemy density and minimum friend density. If such points do not exist or are not satisfactory because of the mixing of friend and foe resulting from general NT growth, bombs simply cannot be used.

It may be objected, however, that people fought religious wars under such conditions using cloak-and-dagger techniques, selective poisoning and the like, and that therefore there is the possibility of such tactics as placing homing devices for mini-missiles on the backs of enemies. We are in no doubt that military techniques and ingenuity, to which large numbers of scientists and technicians always seem to be willing to prostitute themselves, will be able to overcome this setback to the bigger bang for the buck enthusiasts. More kill for the buck will simply have to be obtained without so much bang.

The question is, however, whether this condition will not offer a relatively good basis for nonmilitary defence, as that type of defence by its very nature is social rather than spatial. It is not a question of keeping territory clean from enemies but of retaining values and forms of life and organization. As mentioned, this type of defence can best be organized on a transnational basis, the people against the military, and the third phase should be good for that purpose.

Our general conclusion is that in this world both loyalty entropy and geographical entropy will be so high that we very much doubt major world wars will be feasible. There will be local violence, and it may well be that this world will be so complicated and so taxing on individuals because the simplicity of spatial organization is lost and functional organization is much more abstract that there will be more micro-level violence than before. In other words it may well be that what we have
gained at the macro-level will to some extent be lost at the micro-level. Nevertheless, if a major world war leading to total elimination or major setbacks of human civilization were the result of any system with low entropy, the price may not be too high to pay for high entropy, for more mixing in the world. Correspondingly, if continued structural violence is the price to pay for the present centralized territorial and nonterritorial systems, they will have to be decentralized into smaller, more self-reliant units one way or the other—and in that case symmetric NTs will have to be the integrative force.

In this world there will sooner or later be a transfer of many kinds of power towards a single centre. There will be some kind of world central authority, not necessarily a world government, based perhaps on the development of the UN we have traced in various phases. According to this model some world centre could also serve as a repository of the means of coercive power, of arms of all kinds; and a number of transfer models could be imagined in this field.

For example, nonterritorial actors may get arms themselves for wars among themselves or with territorial actors. This may possibly provide a crisscrossing balance as indicated in our analysis of the second phase, but it is also possible that it means only that future disarmament will have to comprise nonterritorial as well as territorial actors. In short, the acquisition of arms by world political parties as well as by states is not the model we would favor.

Also, arms could be transferred from territorial to nonterritorial actors. This is not inconceivable if the point of gravity of decision-making in general is moving from territorial to nonterritorial actors, for then it would not be strange if weapons followed the same power gradient. There are two subcases:

Transfer to several nonterritorial actors. In this case everything would be set for armed conflict between non-territorial actors and one is back to religious wars in Europe, for instance. It is difficult to believe that such weapons possessed by NTs would not be either the cause or the consequence of conflict.

Transfer to one nonterritorial actor. In this case the NT would have the power monopoly so often aspired to by nations. The transfer, according to classical thinking, would not have to be complete before it would be sufficient to overpower any conceivable coalition of territorial actors.

But then we would, in a certain sense, be back to the beginning: Instead of a set of nation-states we would get a world organized as one giant nation-state, a world state. Many others have arrived at this conclusion, but the standard scenario is to see this process in terms of city-states that coalesce to form nation-states, nation-states that coalesce into superstates (regions), and superstates that coalesce to form a world state. Our point is that that scenario is not very probable because there will also be disintegration and secession; and NT growth, which does not respect territorial contiguity, will occur much more quickly than territorial coalescence into superstates. Nor is it very desirable because the last step towards the world state is very dangerous, as the superstates will have important grievances against each other and will have a tendency to fight superwars; and it is not very desirable because a highly centralized and strong world government may be one more instrument of structural violence and of extreme direct violence out of power and self-righteousness.

Some international peacekeeping is in order, but in general the road to peace consists in making arms less necessary, not in transferring them to a world center. We feel that the present scenario, gradually playing up NTs rather than building on ever-bigger Ts, is just as likely or more likely. And for that reason we feel one should from the very beginning stop thinking in terms of an international system, because the term itself has a territorial connotation, and talk about a world system embracing both Ts and NTs.

**Conclusion**

Characteristic of this scenario is that it does not see the coming world as a nation-state writ large, for every nation-state today has built into it some porcupinelike defense against other nation-states, which we would not like to see carried over into higher levels of organization. Rather the idea is set forth in terms of a complex world with nonterritorial organizations crosscutting self-sufficient territorial units; nonterritorial units so strong they can serve as a base for a world central authority with the capacity not only to articulate problems and conflicts transcending these territorial units but also to solve them.

This organization would not be one big worldwide pyramid but would permit all kinds of looser associations in all directions—T with NT, T with T, NT with NT—all of this combined with a high level of individual mobility and a high level of diversity among the basic units. Phrased in the terms of this analysis, the ideal phase is probably not the third phase. In that phase the structure would too easily play into the hands of those who can make use of the nonterritorial organizations;
and the total structure would too easily crystallize into some kind of centralised world state, even with tremendous means of destructive power at the disposal of the center. Nor is it the first phase, in which the system of states with their impenetrability, their relations of direct and structural violence, and their utilization of the nonterritorial actors for their own purposes is much too dominant.

Hence, our preferred world, where this dimension of nonterritoriality is concerned, would be more similar to the second phase: a balance between the two ways of looking at and organizing the world; a balance between association and dissociation, to conquer the evils of structural and direct violence.

TOWARD GLOBAL IDENTITY*
Yoshikazu Sakamoto

The future has a twofold implication for human beings. On the one hand, the element of indeterminacy enables man to make free choices. As the future does not exist independently of the orientation of human beings to it, it may be more precise to say that the very fact that man has a capacity to choose and a range of choice makes the future indeterminate. On the other hand, there is an element of uncertainty that makes human beings uneasy and insecure, stemming from the fact that the future involves factors and conditions beyond man's capacity to foresee. Or to put it more precisely, the shortage of information on the range of possible developments that go beyond the range of deliberate choice makes the future uncertain. This uncertainty will become terribly wide when, as today, society undergoes a rapid change giving rise to developments that defy cognizance based on precedents.

In light of the existential ambivalence towards the future rooted in the human condition, the cardinal objective of our future-oriented intellectual exercise is to minimize the uncertainties and to maximize the range of positive choice.

It is as a consequence of our positive choice in a rapidly changing world that we explicitly presuppose world-order values. We take a world perspective for two reasons. First, we believe that world interests and universal concerns should precede national or parochial interests. We do not see why a baby who happens to be born in Vietnam should be exposed to the danger of warfare while an American baby sleeps in comfort. We do not see why a black African peasant should lead a poverty-stricken life while an Australian farmer enjoys a living standard of the well-to-do. We believe that the gap between human beings' essential equality at birth and the actual inequalities into which people are born should be minimized and that this can be done only by view-

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