ON ALPHA AND BETA AND THEIR MANY COMBINATIONS

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1. The Utopian Betrayal

An image of an alternative

In January 1978 a group of people came together in Geneva to discuss a major research project on development theory and practice, and on that occasion met with some of the "local" people for more informal discussions. (1) This being in Geneva the word "local" may take on not only "first world" but also very international connotations, so no doubt the groups that came together were representative of nothing but themselves,

In a sense the concerns that were expressed in the group where I myself was an animator were predictable:

- A good life is impossible without more variation in life, one has to live in a society where one can pursue several and very different professions at the same time, such as a social scientist and a night-club clarinetist;

- a good society is one where it is possible to find some little niche, where one can live one's own existence, not imposing on others one's ideas, neither having the ideas of others imposed on oneself;

- a good life is not to have to go the job, the office always at the same time, it is to have flexible working hours, the possibility of being more together with old people, especially one's own parents, to live with families less separated;

- a good life is to be more able to concentrate on what is near, what is close, on neighbours; perhaps reading less newspapers about distant scenes, not more; caring more for those who are close;
in a good society people have to become less egoistic, less concerned only with themselves, more able to stretch out and care for others, helping and loving each other;

in a good society there has to be more passion, more drama, more love, perhaps also more hatred, not planned, passionless people;

a good society has to be smaller, more self-supporting, not big and so anonymous as the societies that have developed now;

a good life should be more based on small, self-reliant groups, respecting the fact that people cannot meaningfully relate to more than a limited number of others so that the groups have to have limited size;

maybe the good society is not the perfect society, but a society where the search for a good society, both in theory and practice, is more easy.

These are just some samples of ideas that came out. In a sense they add up to the following: a quest for closeness, for care and concern, for emotion; scepticism about present "long-distance" society with its high level of predictability. It should be noted, of course, that most of the participants were people high up one way or the other in precisely that type of society, perhaps taking its fruits for granted, but finding them insufficiently savoury, perhaps too processed, too plastic-coated, too anonymous.

Not inconceivably a group of people living in a very small and rather isolated community, at least in the western sphere of the world, might have come up with exactly the opposite idea: what is needed is a society with less closeness, more chance of withdrawal, of anonymity, of making one's own way into a well-organized society with predictable routines that one can learn, so as to be free in one's leisure hours to "do one's own thing", not constantly supervised by friends and relatives. And from this one can of course draw the conclusion that any group asked to speculate on "desirable societies" will do so according to the old rule wo ich nicht bin, dort ist das Glück, and that human beings are profoundly ungrateful, always wanting something else.
A more sophisticated interpretation would be as follows: both modes of existence exercise attraction on those far away from them, and some measure of repulsion on those who are deeply embedded in them. This could be because human beings are much richer in their potentials, and in their passions, than any social structure can ever hope to be. It could also be because of an inner dialectic: any social structure fulfills some needs, meets some desires and in so doing will meet with approval up to the point where the needs are no longer felt because the satisfaction is taken for granted, and the unsatisfied needs take over. Without invoking any position to the effect that "the sum of perceived unsatisfied needs has to be constant" one might speculate that this leaves subjective perception and imagination free to feel other needs, even to develop them much further, hence a perennial quest for the opposite. As one comes closer to the goals the enthusiasm cools, not only because some expectations were too well met, but also because some expectations were unrealistic. And then, again, it may be objected that all that has been said above is only some fragments of a theory of insatiable western human beings even with nor-satisfaction as one basic need; not a theory of human beings in general.

However that may be, our concern here is with what we shall call "the utopian betrayal": not that the utopias have betrayed us, but that segments of humankind today, particularly those who are supposed to be a little more capable and a little more willing than most others to climb a few steps higher and watch some more years into the landscape of the future, have betrayed the utopians. For where is utopian thinking found today? Almost nowhere. A quick look at ten (eleven) major ideological currents will reveal poverty rather than richness in social thought, and all basic ideas now being somewhat dated rather than fresh. In fact, people are probably far ahead of the ideology-producers!

A quick look at three types of ideologies

First, there are the three major comprehensive ideologies referred to in the West as liberalism, marxism and anarchism (with their economic counterparts, capitalism, socialism and some type of local self-sufficiency). Possibly later generations will agree that liberalism and marxism had more in common than what sets them
apart, and what they have in common is precisely at the root of the problem we try to come to grips with. Thus, they have no stop signal to production, there is no clear idea as to when enough is enough. And this is accompanied by the lack of stop signals to growing in size: not only do they have the nation-state as the basic unit that has to change, grow, be transformed (given certain assumptions about the world context); there is not even the shadow of a theory of limitation to the size of a nation state. In principle it could even be a world-state, and both liberalism and marxism have visions of a future world order that essentially are the liberal or marxist nation-state writ large.

This is reflected in their theories of the internal workings of the nation-state. Although they differ profoundly as to who shall control the surplus of economic production and what shall be the priorities, there is not that much difference as to the structure in which this control is exercised. Both ultimately have visions of huge structures with some type of executive committee on top, accountable to stock-holders (and voters) in one, to party-members (and voters) in the others. The executive committee makes major decisions affecting large quantities of people. It may be objected that there are visions in liberal thought, and also in marxist thought of a more rustic, bucolic future with smaller, more self-governing units - but if such is the case the visions are certainly not reflected in current practices in countries guided by liberalism and marxism as ideologies. They are marginal to the mainstream of thought and practice.

Anarchism serves as a contrast to this in consciously favouring smaller units: self-sufficient or at least self-reliant, to a very large extent self-governing. The unit will itself control and distribute its economic surplus, and liberate its own creativity because people would be closer to the ground, literally speaking, and be interested in producing for their own needs. The weakness here, however, is the opposite of that found in liberalism and marxism: where the latter supplies no information about maxima to production, size, growth and structure the former is very short on information about the corresponding minima. This is not only a question of minimum size of units for human
life to be meaningful; ultimately we know that some people at least for periods of their life can find even the life of the hermit highly meaningful. But the problem inherent in liberalism and marxism, their failure to take sufficiently seriously a number of relations within the units (usually the nation-states) is mirrored in anarchism as a failure to take sufficiently seriously the relations between the units. It is difficult to believe that self-sufficient units will not quickly develop a high measure of inequality ("waps" as it is called to-day), even if they avoid inequity (exploitation). A phenomenon accompanying inequality, sometimes preceding it, sometimes as a consequence, sometimes just simply "accompanying" it, is large-scale violence: anarchism seems to assume that when left to themselves the local units will develop a sufficiently benign attitude to each other to abstain from such malpractices. But even if they should be at peace, they might still be grossly unequal, and not beyond a little exploitation. The image is unrealistic.

Second, there is a class of five (six) ideologies, more concerned with social justice within the existing setting; and for that reason often negatively formulated. There is the fight against agism (today suppression of the young and the old by the middle-aged); against sexism (the suppression of women by men), against a rule by intellectuals and experts; against racism; against ethnic discrimination; and finally the fight against the current pattern of exploitation of the Third world by the first - the latter differs by being among, not within countries.

In all cases we are dealing with what is considered by many an inalienable right: that what one is (young, a woman, uneducated, non-white, non-Protestant, Third World) shall not determine what one has. But social justice is not the same as social equality: the idea is not necessarily that all individuals or all countries in the world shall have the same, say personal income or GNP/per capita; but that what they have shall not depend on whether they are this or that or whether their countries can historically be classified as first, second or third world countries. To take the case of women: the claim is not necessarily that everybody in the world should have the same amount of education, but that, say, the
percentage of Ph. D.s among women and men should be the same. In more recent terms: the New International Economic Order does not challenge the structure of the Old International Economic Order, but certainly broadens the access to the control positions of that structure. (9) A society where 50% of the astronauts/kosmonauts, members of CIA/KGB, security police forces/terrorist groups are women/girls will still have the same structure as their male-dominated counterparts, only the allocation of individuals to the formal or informal positions of that structure would be more in accordance with the norms of social justice. This is no argument against redistribution of wealth and power of various kinds, only an effort to show the limitation of social justice thinking as a vision of a desirable society.

What has been said so far about this second group of ideologies is in general terms; let us then turn more towards the differences among these five(six) ideologies. Thus, which is no six that differs from the others: obviously the struggle against repression of what today is referred to as the Third world; (10) let us call it "Third worldism", for short. Here the unit repressed is not an individual because of some ascribed characteristic (age, sex, etc. - or whatever is held to be a basis for becoming an intellectual/expert - race, ethnicity); the unit is, roughly speaking, the part of the world that was colonized by the West (with Japan), and is currently neo-colonized. But this approach also has individual level manifestations, e.g., when it comes to filling positions in international organizations, governmental and non-governmental. (11) Moreover, Third worldism is not the only one of these with clear collective expressions and goals. The same applies, indeed, to the fight against ethnosm: this is what nationalism has been about, the fight to implement the right of each nation (ethnic group) to a country with a state organization. But just as Third worldism today brings in its wake a more symmetric distribution in the current world structure, the maximum that nationalism can bring would be many more nation states. It can be argued, however, that if the subdivision were into small enough units this might be the way in which a world of smaller units could be brought into being. (12)
Whereas any struggle for ethnical parity carries a new nation state in its womb (or a (con)federation); the struggles against agism, sexism and racism are usually seen as intra-national, except when race and ethnicity are so intertwined that it becomes a struggle to change the political map of the world. No doubt there is an international solidarity based on race, both among whites and non-whites - and in the future a similar solidarity will grow stronger in the fight against sexism (feminism) and will start growing in the fight against agism ("young/old'ism"?). The latter two not only cut into nations but also into families, a reason why some weakening of the classical family structure has been a condition for the growing internationalization of these fights. (13)

But the conclusion remains that all these fights can be brought to a successful conclusion without basic changes in the structures of national or world society. In fact, the fights will even strengthen these structures, partly by depriving them of some fruitful contradiction material out of which something new might be forged, and partly by reinforcing the goals of these structures by having more groups and individuals take them seriously. And this actually also applies to the fight against intellectuals/experts, probably best known as populism; it does not necessarily imply "a new approach", but the old structure headed by other types of people. As a matter of fact, democracy might well be considered a populist movement, of tremendous significance in the fight against absolutism, but hardly capable of bringing about new surprises at the present stage in history. There is a reason, however, why populism may have a potential of a more revolutionary character: if intellectuals are used to run large-scale structures, then non-intellectuals may introduce an element of threat to these structures. And the same applies to all the suppressed groups if their fight takes the form of bringing "a new approach", meaning new structures and culture to the forefront, not only of conquering positions in the dominant structure and mastering the dominant culture.

To summarize the reasoning so far, using the (more or less awkward, but easily understood terms introduced):
Table 1.  

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Thus, each underdog group represents a potential for renewal, bringing a new ethos into leading positions. But the basic structure will not change if the topdogs succeed in-channeling their fight towards social justice only. (14)

Third, ideologies focusing on methods not or goals; such as pacifism and federalism. Pacifism is essentially a doctrine about ways of conducting struggle, from the micro to the macro levels: it should be done non-violently. This can be given a number of interpretations, from a status quo preserving non-military defence (NMD) to a totally transforming non-violent revolution (NVR); but it is quite clearly not a vision of a desirable society. It may be a vision of a process and of an important aspect of that society, of how to conduct political struggle, of how to act when contradictions are transformed into conflicts. As an approach it is too neutral, not sufficiently goal-descriptive. (15) And the same applies to federalism: it can be seen as a general theory of levels of political power with the additional idea of "subsidiarity": as many decisions as possible should be taken as low down in the hierarchy of levels as possible. It is also too blank, like the designs for a multi-storey building that can be used to house, equally well, the security police headquarters (with torturing chambers in the basement) as the salvation army (with storage of clothes for the poor in the basement); a multi-national corporation and a leftist organization to fight against multi-national corporations; a liberal party.
or a marxist party. From some angles this is a strength; but from our point of view it is a weakness: it does not supply us with a vision, at least with a skeleton on which some concrete visionary "meat" and clothes might be pegged.

A feeling of emptiness in major ideologies

A feeling of fatigue might overcome the person who peruses the Western ideological landscape of today.\(^{(16)}\) In liberalism there is not much to find partly because liberal theory never seems to come to grips with contradiction and exploitation (but tries to turn them into problems of redistribution), partly because liberalism historically has proved so compatible with capitalism. But one should not draw the conclusion from the entirely justifiable, marxist and non-marxist, criticism of capitalism and its workings—extra- and inter-nationally—that collectivization of the means of production, in the sense of ministerially run, large-scale corporations, would solve the problems. It may redirect the surplus in the direction of the less privileged. But it also may not: Western history since the Renaissance should not inspire much confidence that this is necessarily the direction in which the state will direct economic surplus, anymore than one would believe feudal lords in the preceding centuries to have been guided by such visions.

One way be amazed by the naivete with which people seem to be willing to exchange a vague promise of economic and social justice for a vast, vertical, marginalizing, fragmenting and segmenting structure encompassing more and more aspects of more and more people.\(^{(17)}\) And it is equally sad to reflect on the insufficiency of the withdrawal into small, local, self-sufficient units as a solution for more than small groups—who can always return to macro-society at least to receive their unemployment pay-check—but for the masses of the population in general. Leaving out economic considerations, there is at least the psychological consideration mentioned above: from the proposition: "society A is bad" it does not follow that "any negation of society A must be good." The only thing that follows is that "a not-bad society will have to be a not-A society." And correspondingly for the other two groups of ideologies: there
is not much inspiration to find if one is searching for alternative visions of desirable societies.

**Combining ideologies in the search for utopia**

It may now be objected that this is a parody of the situation: the ideological map is not that simple. Thus, what has been described above may perhaps be ideological elements, but they combine in various ways. With 11 ideologies there are 55 pairs to consider, most of them well-known from contemporary ideological practice. We shall not discuss all of them, but some combinations merit attention.

Thus, there is the important combination of liberalism and marxism known as social democracy; although the adherents of either component may sneer at the idea that this should somehow constitute a "combination". Northern European welfare state practices do imply a partial collectivization of means of production and under some circumstances a steering of economic surplus in the direction of the least privileged, making it highly likely that they are better off under these conditions than if there had been no nationalization at all. At the same time the relation between the private and public sectors introduces some contradiction in society that may lead to balancing mechanisms of the type that liberals see as essential for the healthy functioning of a society. And of course: private capitalism continues, probably better, not less supported by the state than in societies with a weaker public sector.

However, more interesting are the ways in which anarchism combines with other ideologies, because anarchism is the only one among the 11 that consistently goes in for small, self-governing units. Combined with a liberal ideology it tends to produce something like hippie communes, rich in variety, experimenting to find an adequate compromise between public and private property within the communes, highly diversified individually, often with a solid agricultural base. Combined with marxism it tends to produce something more like anarcho-syndicalism: a more industrial variety with workers firmly in control of the plant, yielding neither to capitalists, nor to trade union bosses. Combined with Third worldism it will yield something like the
Ujamaa movement in Tanzania, the Sarvodaya movement in India and Sri Lanka and the People's Communes in China: a strong measure of collective self-reliance for the Third world as a whole combined with local self-reliance, down to the village level; presumably with the consequence of decreasing relative significance of the state level (a trend now - 1979 - reversed in China).

Combined with feminism anarchism would lead to a phenomenon which so far is not wide-spread but still is of some significance: the woman's commune, rather small units, relatively self-sufficient with a clearly militant function in the struggle against male domination. Its unisex character probably points in the direction of the organization being more a part of a guerilla method than a societal goal. That the small community idea is compatible with populism goes without saying and the same may be the case when anarchism is combined with pacifism. A society organized as loosely tied together, small, relatively self-sufficient units will under certain conditions be much less vulnerable than a centralized society that can be hit lethally in its control center. The members will have a base to which they can withdraw, much more possibility of sustaining themselves where basic material needs are concerned than in a trade dependent society, and possibly also more loyalty and identity giving them more reasons to fight an external enemy.

Most versions of anarchism are more or less explicitly tied to the federal idea: the base would be the local units at the bottom, they are then tied together in as few levels as possible but in such a way that they can withdraw if they prefer. A rather basic problem in this connection is the old problem of what will be handled at what level, with the experiments carried out in China and Yugoslavia in recent years being highly significant in a historical perspective, whatever their shortcomings in current, concrete political practice. (19)

Other combinations could be mentioned. Thus, liberalism/capitalism and Third worldism combine into the NIEO as an international system, leaving open what the internal arrangement of the Third
world country is. Liberalism cum federalism have already been practised for a long time, Switzerland being a good example - the fact that one hears relatively little about it might serve to indicate that it is working relatively well. (20) Marxism combined with Third worldism was a rather important part of the late Lin Piaos strategy of the world village contra world city.

But marxism does not seem to have developed very interesting linkages with young/old'ism feminism, populism, racism and ethnism, pacifism and federalism. The focus is on class relations not on age sex and education relations as such: There is an axiom to the effect that these relations are not antagonistic in the sense that the contradictions are only be overcome by means of violence; once the basic contradiction between work and capital has been overcome the others would follow more easily. Pacifism is considered totally unrealistic, and as to federalism: even when some structure is worked out that may look federal on paper (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia) diversity will tend to be in cultural terms only because of the unitarian character of the socialist alternative to capitalist modes of production. A much more interesting society might arise the moment one socialist country declares that "there may be hundred ways to socialism, let us practice each one of them inside our country". In a sense China came close to this, not only by having a slogan ("Let one hundred flowers bloom"), but by granting so much autonomy to the people's communes in the sense of deciding over their own surplus and also deciding over how to generate that surplus. The result was, of course, unmanangeable from Peking.

It should be mentioned that Third worldism has a most important combination with pacifism in one of the two leading political figures of this century, Mohandas Gandhi (the other one being Mao Tse-tung); that feminism in most cases also is combined with non-violent approaches, particularly of the self-reliance variety (women doing things themselves, with their own approach, that before were being done by men); and that pacifism and federalism very often are combined ideologically (and usually with a strong anarchist tendency). The latter actually leads us to an obvious comment: combinations are not necessarily two at the time, more ideological elements can be joined together into more complex ideology molecules; but we shall not pursue that type of combi-
natorics further. The conclusion, however, is that this looks like a more promising approach than the study of ideologies one at the time - a point to be developed more fully later.

A note on Christianity and democracy.

It should now be mentioned that in a Western context there are two other crucial ideological currents that put their colour on much of what has been mentioned above: Christianity and democracy. As Christians may be adherents of any one of the ill above, singly or combined, the specificity of Christianity in an ideological sense is probably something underlying all of them: an idea of compassion, concern for others. That this is combinable, empirically, (21) with the most abject exploitation, even torture is well known; yet there is something Christian in the idea (by no means monopolized by Christianity) that the fate of my neighbour is not only relevant for me; it also concerns me because of the compassion I feel/should feel for him/her - "neighbour" ultimately extending to the rim of the universe. The degree of pain felt by the suffering of one's neighbour may certainly vary, the depth of compassion being highly flexible - but with no compassion at all all ideologies will remain skeletal and structural, however much they practice institutionalized compassion in the form of welfare statism or other arrangements.

Something of the same can be said about democracy: it is combinable with all ill above, singly or combined, the specificity of democracy probably being something like this: there should be a process by means of which everyone affected by a decision participates in making that decision. In individualizing cultures final decision-making might be made through voting, in more collectivist cultures the process will probably go on till some kind of consensus preserving collective harmony is obtained - but in that process everyone participates. This definition points to two dimensions in which democracy can always be expanded: to "everyone" (not only to old and middle-aged white males with education and/or property) and "all those affected by a decision", which among other things would involve quite a lot of people in any foreign policy decision, certainly not only the citizens of
the country enacting that foreign policy. Thus, democracy like christianity is potentially universalizing, encompassing everybody - in other words typically western. When carried out into their consequences the result would be a world state, where everybody participates in decision-making about everybody and everybody has compassion with everybody else.

The western world-state utopia: neither viable, nor attainable

In a sense this is the western dream, both in its liberal and its marxist varieties, both in the form of a world liberal/capitalist system and as a union of world socialist republics (UWSR). There are things to settle: redistribution of wealth between continents, of power between the age-groups sexes education groups, ethnic and racial groups; one may argue about the method of struggle and the distribution of power between the levels; by and large this is the type of vision that constitutes the implicit western utopia for the world. But, one may ask: is this such a bad utopia? What could be better than a world state where everybody participates and everybody feels some compassion for everybody else? Of course, one can argue, even struggle, whether the liberal or the marxist model should prevail, but one of them, for sure, would not be a bad utopia? Or some workable combination? Norway writ large?

There are problems, however. They can be divided into two kinds: viability and attainability, and the heavy indictment would be that this type of utopia is neither viable nor attainable. It is not viable, for two reasons: a world state brings with it, and even magnifies the wrong assumptions built into the nation-state viz., that the capacity of human beings not only for compassion, but even for feelings of relevance for each other is unlimited, and that the nation-state also can be adequate for alternative ways of life, such as minority cultures. The strength of the small quotations in the beginning of this paper is that they give expression to something profound: the search for closeness. But closeness is eroded and the search for it impeded in a structure that encompasses millions, potentially even billions. Quite possibly some other types of beings than humans, equipped with antennae or something similar that would make it possible to communicate with a much higher number of people in a meaningful way, at the same time, might produce better societies at that
unlimited scale or magnitude. With our limited capacity for interaction, comprehension, compassion, there is an upper limit somewhere. And correspondingly for cultural diversity: in a very tightly woven political unit the dominant culture will tend to prevail and push the minorities into corners and against the walls. In all probability, the dominant world culture today would be western culture/civilization, particularly as it is successfully embedded in most of what passes for "modern" technology, whether it is used in a western or in a non-western country (such as Japan). A world state would hardly offer sufficient protection to alternative structures and cultures if present nation-states can serve as a guide, but would be a setting where the dictatorship of the dominant-world structures/cultures could be more effectively exercised.

As to attainability: this type of utopia is very much in the western tradition. There is a structure but not a process—neither one leading to it, nor one built into it, carrying it further. Actually, a process utopia may in a sense be much more important than the structure utopia: the former defines directions, where to go from here; the latter defines only a distant goal state. It may convincingly be argued that more important than knowing the goal state is to know a process, to be adjusted for sure, believed to lead in the right direction. What to do today is more important than visions of life in the year 2000— but even better is both together. Consequently, it is impossible and impermissible to detach such speculations from realistic views of which are the dominant processes in the world of today. A man in a rowing boat heading for land would be foolish if he were not properly informed about the movement of the tidal waves. Of course, he may be free to row against them, but he might also feel it worthwhile to save his energies till he can land his boat where he wants on the beach, being carried mainly on the tidal wave, only partly by his own forces.

A view of major world processes today.
Here is one image of the major processes in the world today, seen as two processes constrained by two relatively constant factors:
(1) An expansion and exploitation process, emanating explosively from a center in the western world (England, the low countries) some four centuries ago, based today on cooperation between governmental and intergovernmental bureaucracies on the one hand and national and transnational corporate interests, on the other supported by intellectual professionalism; mainly staffed today by middle-aged males with university education, (MANUs) penetrating into the most remote corner of the world's societies, peripherizing them one way or the other;

(2) A liberation and autonomy process, dialectically related to former as an effort to extricate any part peripherized by the former, elevating it into a position of autonomy, by fighting political and military power, economic and social power, cultural power - all of them emanating from the West - and by fighting concrete people and countries that are the carriers of these forms of power;

(3) all of this being conditioned by cultures/civilizations that legitimize expansion/exploitation and/or liberation/autonomy processes; and

(4) all of this being subject to the constraints set by the ecological balances of nature.

The content of the expansion process is relatively well known: military conquest, political colonization, economic and social penetration, cultural dominance - in that order, in the reverse order, or almost in any order. In its wake have followed liberation processes, by workers, by peasants, by the young, by women, by the uneducated, by the non-whites, by the "ethnics" - all of this taken to mean individuals, groups and classes; countries and groups/classes of countries. That this dialectic of processes does not only emanate from western centers need not concern us here; the dominant processes in the world today have a western origin. And the dialectic seems to work in a well-known manner. Expansion and exploitation set into motion liberation processes, creating platforms of autonomy, from which new expansion and exploitation processes can emanate - the "social imperialism" emanating from a Moscow sufficiently
autonomous after having been liberated from its periphery position under western European and American capitalism being an important example. Another would be the power exercised by trade union bosses, still another the power of radical intellectuals who have become experts, some of them cleverly using Marxism as a tool to legitimate their own power, stepping discretely aside when the workers do the dirty revolutionary job, only to reappear after the revolution as ministers of planning etc. Still another would be Third world countries sufficiently rich to command some measure of autonomy and to practice an imperialism unto others they did not like when practised unto them.

Why is this? Is it because during the era of peripherization the values of the center became sufficiently internalized? Or because in the process of fighting the center one had to become sufficiently similar to the center? Both verbal formulas may be valid. In either case it is as if the wave emanating from the center leaves its imprint on those whom it touches, making them capable of emanating first small ripples, later some waves of expansion and exploitation, later even counterwaves back to the center from which it all started. Thus, one may talk about a transmission of a culture of expansion, for all this would not happen if it were only a question of transmitting the capability of expanding and exploiting others. The motivation to do so has to be a part of the bargain, and that motivation comes about through cultural transmission, possibly crafted into compatible local cultural elements. (25)

But if there is anything to this image the different parts of the world are in very different phases, and not only in the narrow sense that has dominated the development debates of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s: at different levels of technical and economic development. They are in different phases where these particular waves are concerned. Thus, relative to the first wave a country may be an old waning center, a seasoned periphery, a rather recent periphery or totally outside the system - the latter being an extreme rarity, the length of time during which the western cultural wave of expansion and exploitation has been overflowing the world taken into consideration. But the second generation of counter-waves stimulated by the first generation, often very
effectively imitating it, also has its waning centers (United States, - which is first generation and a half- Japan, the Soviet Union) as well as its gaining centers (Brazil, Nigeria, Iran, India) its peripheries and large areas of the world so far practically speaking not touched, such as most of the old center. And one may even talk of a third wave, and a very important one, reacting to US and Japanese imperialism: los cuatro japoncitos, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore.

Who would have a world state as a utopia among all of these? Those in the first generation centers that have not yet understood that they are on the way out, those in the second generation centers that think they are on the way in, nobody else. The others may have dreams, but they do not have a process that would land them where they want at their disposal. We are still in an era with more talk about world statism in countries like the United States and the Soviet Union than in Brazil and India - but the interest shown among the latter in large regional formations (presumably spearheaded by themselves) and the tendencies towards withdrawal into less than global concerns evidenced by the former point to certain changes in the distribution of visions. Add to this the fourth aspect mentioned above, nature, and it becomes relatively clear that for the old center (the "old established forces" in the jargon of the late Soekarno) the writing on the wall is CRISIS of a rather basic kind. Having exhausted so much of the natural resources close to the home base and made themselves dependent on natural resources from what is now rapidly becoming new centers entirely capable of emitting counterwaves, much in need of their own resources, the only possible solution, in the longer run, will be for the old center to retract and try to rebuild their own countries rather than trying to build world empires to suit their own interests. In the shorter run, however, they will be interested in globalism as a way of preserving their power but this comes probably too late. The new centers have other views.

The youth of the countries in the waning center of the first wave has expressed this much more clearly than the establishment in their search for small communes, more or less expressing anar-
chist ideals in a liberal or a marxist version. The trouble is that this is being done in a period very different from the age when anarchism developed, which was before, not after an age in which material abundance has been witnessed and to some extent also been enjoyed or at least shared by millions. The anarchist utopia was materially advantageous for the over-exploited, impoverished proletariat of the early Industrial Revolution; it will look materially inferior to the trade union protected worker of a modern welfare state. Thus, the world state with the implicit assumption that the center will remain in the West may perhaps be desirable to the old center, but is no longer attainable; a society based on small units (like the contraction that led from the Roman Empire into the Medieval Ages) may be attainable, but perhaps not desired by so many. And conversely for a country in the new, gaining centers: they may still be in a phase where small, modest, perhaps puritan, but definitely not poor or miserable units are desirable to many, eg. in the countryside, but then they are no longer attainable because that would be against the trend. The trend would be in the direction of giantism, and not only at the nation-state level but also regionally; and it is to be expected that the wishes will follow the trend. The exceptions to all this would be countries, or regions, or districts, or groups that are either marginalized or largely untouched by any generation of waves. In such parts of the world there might still be a struggle to keep the small units, to retain and if possible also create autonomy without being caught by the wave of modernization/development.

The credibility of a Briton having utopian world state visions with pax britannica features today would be low; one generation ago he might be loved or hated, today he will simply look foolish. A Briton who says that "small is beautiful" or withdraws to an eco-commune in Wales is a person with whom one might agree or disagree; but he does look credible, not foolish. An American or a Russian talking in global pax americana or pax sovietica terms will be resented by most because it will be assumed that the person might even believe in it; they are in the middle phase where neither their macro-visions nor their micro-visions sound credible. At a considerably more modest scale: Norwegians
who joined the "small is beautiful" league sounded more credible before the North Sea oil than after (30).

In short, the visions of desirable societies not only are but they should be concrete, be a function of the historical phase in which a country or a region finds itself. They should not be taken out of the thin, however fresh, air. This view of utopias is also found in the marxist tradition, but that does not necessarily mean that one has to share the marxist answer to the basic historical question: où en sommes-nous?, full of self-confident predictions as to what the next phase will be, reciting the slavery-feudalism - capitalism - socialism Stufen gang.

Some consequences for the production of utopias

What, then, would be an alternative view? I would assume that for the countries I know best, the western center of the world, visions of desirable societies will have to accord somehow with two basic points: that the days as the center of the world are counted, and more than that, that these countries are in danger of becoming the peripheries of new centers. It takes a large periphery inside and outside our part of the world to maintain the enormous, materially non-productive, superstructure of a bureaucratic, corporate and professional nature our countries in the western center have developed. When the periphery no longer wants to pay that tribute the superstructure has to contract, leaving behind a number of smaller units, decentralized, relatively self-sufficient, and at the same time with some capacity to defend themselves against peripherization. (31) This can only be done through a formula of self-reliance where local self-reliance will have to be given a much higher weight then before; the local units having been so efficiently absorbed by the all-encompassing national, regional and global structures. Of course, the waning center may prefer to take the big battle with the gaining centers before they become too strong, and in the old way: an all-out war - even nuclear - before the others become sufficiently nuclear to fend for themselves. This possibility, to be avoided at all costs, seems today so likely that it makes the effort to develop other visions far from idle speculation; it becomes a burning necessity. And one argument would, of course, be that the old western center is rapidly becoming isolated: they can
no longer count on their own peripheries, and certainly not on the second generation centers (thus, not only will the Soviet Union hardly support the United States in a war against the Latin American Continent; nor will Japan). A lower posture Western center made less vulnerable through recentralization of internal peripheries, might be a considerably better defence strategy but admittedly difficult to assume given the credible menace from that second generation center known as the Soviet Union (which, in turn, will not be whole-heartedly defended by Eastern Europe).

Thus, the general assumption is not only that visions of desirable societies will vary depending on where one is placed in geographical space, and when in historical time; since there is variation it is also futile to speculate about a universal utopian formula applicable to all parts of the world at all times. Rather, the whole utopian tradition should become more relational, less absolute (not only more processual and less structural). Instead of asking "what is the formula for all of humankind today" one should ask "are the different utopias viable and attainable in different parts of the world today compatible with each other, or at least more compatible than under present social formations"?

If what today is called the First world decentralizes its countless internal peripheries there might still be some kind of transition from "capitalism" to "socialism", as envisaged by Marx. However, it would definitely not be the centralizing state-socialism built by Lenin and his successors, but rather some kind of commune-socialism as envisaged by Lenin's contemporary, Kropotkin - if socialism it should be, that is - if for no other reason because of lack of resources to support an overpowering superstructure. This First world utopia would be compatible with a Third world regional utopia, for the Third world as a whole, for the three continents one at a time, or at sub-continental levels (which today are the formations most likely to crystallize - such as the Grupo Andino, the Caricom, the Asean, etc.). But if the new centers should take over the world state ambitions of the old center - and it is more than likely that they will if western civilization values are sufficiently internalized in the new Third world elites - then there is clearly a case of in-
compatibility. How to resolve it? By pleading with young Third world generations in advance, in favor of peaceful co-existence formulas - or by giving up a western small scale utopia in favour of further centralization to withstand successfully future "barbarian" attacks? (32) Assuming they will treat us as badly as we them?

Three rules for utopia production

I do not know the answer to this, but I do think that these are rather important questions. So once again, what is the utopian betrayal? It is the failure of the major ideologies of today to take utopian thinking seriously, which is not an other way of saying that it should be boring - and boring is the only adequate way of describing most of the "scenario" thinking that is produced today in great numbers by First world (and increasingly also Second and Third world) non-governmental, governmental and intergovernmental think-tanks and bureaucracies.

Serious concern for visions of desirable societies should at least take these three largely neglected aspects into consideration:

- that a good society should always have contradictions built into it, be a mixture of elements often thought incompatible if it is to reflect the complexities of human beings;

- that more important than utopian structures may be utopian processes, knowing what to work for today so as to be somehow on the right track tomorrow - it being understood that it should be possible to change the direction;

- that it is not enough to speculate about one universal formula for all of humankind because humankind is not responding to the same objective conditions - the question being whether these utopias are compatible or not, a relational rather than absolute perspective on utopias. (33)

In one sense the conclusion of all this is that it is futile to speculate about visions of desirable societies detached from visions of desirable worlds and vice versa - and about either without some images of dominant processes in the world today. (34) And it is even more futile to speculate about a world state/government of units fabricated according to a standard pattern
when the parts of the world are so unequal in power and so differently placed on all the center-periphery gradients criss-crossing the world as is the case today.

So, what is to be done if present dominant ideologies, at least in the West, are found wanting; if present trends, when extrapolated, lead to dystopias rather than utopias; and if what remains of the utopian tradition is absolutist, structural and contradiction free? Well, one somehow has to start from scratch although — as will soon be seen, we are neither able to liberate ourselves from these ideologies nor should we: when reinterpreted they are still terribly useful.

2. The building blocks of societies
On the choice of tools

There are many ways of "starting from scratch" and one may be as good as the other, depending on the purpose. One might start with a theory of human nature or of current social processes — but the former often tends to be too abstract and the latter too concrete for social imagination to unfold. So we shall start with social structure, returning to the other two. Thus, the point of departure is sociological and there is considerable tradition in sociology — presumably the social science more than others dealing with all aspects of the human condition at the societal level — to use dichotomies like the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft (Toennies), folk/urban (Redfield), familistic/contractual (Sorokin), particularistic-diffuse/universalistic specific (Weber, Parsons) primary/secondary (Cooley), or traditional/modern (a variety of authors). The following exercise is in that tradition, but I hope to improve on it in some regards.

Thus, there will be at least three types, not only two. And verticality, so absent from the dichotomies above, will play a major role. Moreover, the types will not be conceived of as mutually exclusive in any empirical sense; although they exclude each other logically they will be seen as coexisting empirically in societies in the lives of people, in the minds of people. In fact, the dialectics of their coexistence will be a major topic
to be explored. Further, there will be no assumption of an over-
riding movement in history, eg., "development", that with con-
siderable inevitability and irreversibility transforms societies
from being (predominantly) one to being (predominantly) the
other of the types. Finally, it will not be assumed that one
horn of the social dilemma is good or at least better than the
other.

Rather, the assumption will be that all types define modes of
social existence, social grammars or types of social logic;
that human beings are capable not only of being multilingual
but also of being multisocietal (which is not the same as being
multinational, or having two or more passports/citizenships).
If there is any evaluation in what follows then it would tend
to be between "poor" vs. "rich" social formations meaning by
the former societies where one mode dominates to the exclusion
of others, thus making simple rather than complex, and conse-
quently impoverishing rather than enriching social contexts
available to that marvel of potential complexity and richness
which is the human being.

On learning from children.

One little point, very familiar to all readers with children
or sufficiently clear memories of their own childhood, can now
be made to complement the introductory remarks just made. Evi-
dently we are going to try to describe some building blocks out
of which societies can be made. Essentially this is a utopian
exercise; at least on paper. I know some people who engage in
that type of exercise as often as they can: children, at "play",
"playing" being what adults call it, creating distance to what
we adults do, presumably something more serious. Some observa-
tions in this connection.

First, when children play, even when they play alone, they are
essentially constructing what for them are social realities:
"you shall be this, I shall be that; and after that we do it the
other way round". How much richer than adult society where our
roles are given for long stretches of time and where doing it
"the other way round" would be against almost all rules of the
adult game! Thus, the utopian exercise enacted by the children
does not consist in finding one utopia with fixed social rules and role-allocation. No child would survive socially very well in a gang if he tried to impose "we shall play cop-and-robbers throughout the vacation from 9am to 5 pm and I'll be the cop every day - weekdays that is". In order to do anything like that an adult, meaning external and considerable power, would be needed. The children utopia seems to consist exactly in its flexibility where choice of social games and who shall play which part is concerned. There may be favorite games, but unless the choice is unimposed on them fatigue will easily enter, or apathy, withdrawal - the problem schools, and to some extent also kindergartens, are wrestling with and less able to solve the more rigid the structures.

Second, this longing for the unfinished, for that which is rich in unexpected possibilities, the unexplored combinations, is found not only in predominantly social games played by children, but also in games with things "toys". It is typical of adults to make toys for children so that there is only one way of using them - most mechanical toys are of that type. Adults get worried when children do not use them "properly", and start doubting the intelligence of their offspring when they (often) should have celebrated their imagination and ability to transcend rules handed down to them. Somewhere on the road of "maturation" adults lost the capacity to see in a book a potential boat - which is not necessarily harmful to the book because the child is also capable of seeing in a floor a potential lake. Anyhow, toys that can only be used one way, whose possibilities are rapidly exhausted, will only keep the child's attention for a short while. The more closed the range of uses, the more expensive is usually the toy for the simple reason that more processing has gone into it to make it so unambiguous. The bits and pieces with a totally open range of possibilities are more likely to capture a lasting attention for the simple reason that the child can grow with the number of permutations of the components. (35) This is also a reason why children decompose ("destroy") expensive toys to see if there is anything that can be used in some new way inside them. The ingenious Danish toy LEGO is such a toy, it comes already "destroyed", but with some suggestions as to what it might have looked like before it was dismantled.
Third, as often pointed out: children not only love changing games and toys that are used according to some rules, switching to other games and other toys; they also enjoy changing the rules, retaining some, but not all, features of the game/toy. This seems very rarely to be done by adults: football, or chess, are played this way, not some other way. Is this because of increasing desire for predictability? because of the skill invested and not gladly given up, even unlearnt because of some new rules? because of a general increase in rigidity of mind and body? However that is, it may be argued that adults have other ways of satisfying their needs for new experience, by learning/developing new games and toys rather than changing the old ones, thus conforming to bureaucratic needs for stable rules, and corporate needs for demands for new products.

The assumption in the following is that children know something about good societies that comes out in their play as long as the play is reasonably unimpeded by adults or other bullies (and they indeed exist, among children). Further, it will be assumed that there is a (necessary?) relationship between poverty of social empirical reality — the society in which we live — and the poverty of potential reality — the social imagination. The less free we are to play social games, as adults, the less imaginative our thinking, leading to a vicious circle of social impoverishment. Most unfortunate are those who live in a society trying to embody one relatively clear and detailed blueprint supposed to define utopia — not only because many will be sacrificed on its altar, but also because once completed those living in that utopia will quickly lose interest in it and search for something new, unfinished. Those who plan for a surprise-free society are in for great surprises: their product is not wanted. (36) The finished and determined becomes like the toy for the children: by programming the toy the adult also tries to program the child playing with the toy — and people may not like being programmed.

Two basic structural dimensions
So, given all this, which are the basic dimensions we need at least to be able to reason about societies? First, let us argue that they should be structural, meaning by this that they should
define how human beings relate to each other in relatively general terms. Thus, they should not be institutional, meaning by that ideas about how economic life is organized, how health, education and family are built - partly because these institutions already represent dramatic choices, partly because the structures are more general and will help define the institutions. The problem, then, becomes which dimensions to choose to define structures?

One of them will have to be something like vertical vs. horizontal; missing in the dichotomies mentioned above, taken as they are from the liberal positivist Western social science tradition, weak on understanding verticality and empiricist, less concerned with the utopian search for the good society. To many some element of equity or equality (not the same), or horizontality, to use a very generic term, is a condition sine qua non of a utopia. I do not completely share that belief, it is probably also a part of the Western tradition but certainly accept the dimension as a major component of any social analysis, future-oriented or not.

In an earlier exercise I used in addition to vertical vs. horizontal as a second variable uniformity-collectivist vs. diversity-individualist. \(^{(38)}\) To my mind the two, when combined into four social models (referred to as conservative-liberal-communal-pluralist), yield rich insights, especially when processes connecting the models are explored. But the second dimension may be said to be more a question of ethos, of social cosmology, than of structure - although it certainly has structural implications. Moreover, the conceptual cake for analyzing the human condition at a social level can be sliced many ways (otherwise there would not be so many social analysts around); so I shall keep the former but not the latter in the present effort.

The second dimension that will be used here is a much simpler one, at least at its face value: big vs. small. Essentially this introduces one of the most elementary structural properties, the (cardinal) number of members, into social analysis. If a structure is defined as a set of humans with the structural relations governing their behavior, then the number of "elements" in that
set should certainly not be neglected. As mentioned above, one accusation that can be raised against much of contemporary social analysis, liberal as well as marxist, is that the idea of growth is built into the analysis by making the analysis number-blind, or number-invariant, supposedly equally valid for societies at the order of magnitude $10^2$, $10^4$, $10^6$ and $10^8$ (as examples may serve a village, a town, a city/country, a country/region)\(^{(35)}\). There is no sense of any transition from quantity to quality as size increases; in itself a major reason for making this dimension a pillar of analysis.

The definition of alpha and beta.

With two dimensions the fourfold-table is around the corner (as any reader might suspect) - so let it only be said that I know perfectly well that there are other variables crying for inclusion. But let us see how far we come with these two, refining them and adding more as we go along. So far we are led to the following combinations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertical</th>
<th>Big (unlimited)</th>
<th>Small (limited)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha,</td>
<td>Gamma,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>horizontal</td>
<td>impossible</td>
<td>Beta,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rather than four types we get three, and we use very neutral terms for them to avoid any built-in evaluation. One combination is ruled out: it is assumed that a social structure cannot be both horizontal and big. This is a basic thesis in the present approach, and we shall try to show it to be true given very reasonable assumptions about human beings, and definitions of the two dimensions spanning the social typology.

To start with vertical/horizontal; here is a list of five word-pairs that reflect different aspects of this dimension:\(^{(40)}\)
Table 3. Aspects of verticality/horizontality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The relation is</th>
<th>Vertical</th>
<th>Horizontal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>when it is</td>
<td>(1) Inequity</td>
<td>(1) Equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>characterized by</td>
<td>(2) Penetration</td>
<td>(2) Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or</td>
<td>(3) Marginalization</td>
<td>(3) Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or</td>
<td>(4) Fragmentation</td>
<td>(4) Togetherness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or</td>
<td>(5) Segmentation</td>
<td>(5) Integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the word "inequality" does not occur, nor does "social injustice". The five aspects above define structures whereas these two important ideas stand for distribution within a structure. Thus, "inequality" is what exists when some people have more of something than others, including access to something (e.g., medical services, schooling); "social injustice" - as mentioned in the first section - is what obtains when some groups (defined by age, sex, race, ethnicity, etc.) have more than other groups. Obviously equality implies social justice, but not vice versa; there may be as many female as male PhDs, yet the total distribution of formal education may be highly inequalitarian.

Inequity is seen as a structural characteristic: relations are built in such a way that they generate more value in one of the parties (or in some segments of the total interaction cycle) than in others. Capitalist/landowners harvest more profit than workers/peasants. Intellectuals usually have not only more interesting (meaning less routinized) work than most others; they also have higher income. The income distribution may be made more egalitarian through progressive taxation and other means; to make the challenge distribution more egalitarian is considerably more difficult. Equity, obtains with egalitarian distribution of the net benefits from participation in the structure; it is structural.

Penetration is seen as a built-in conditioning of the other party which then becomes dependent exactly in the sense of being a "dependent variable". Some of the relations are clearly causal in the sense that the actor on top is the cause of effects in the actor at the bottom (another way of saying the same would
be that they stand in a subject-object relation to each other. Conceivably this can happen without exploitation (a more direct word for inequity), at least not in the material sense. The opposite of penetration is autonomy.

Marginalization is seen as a division of the social structure into an inside and an outside where explicit and implicit decision-making are concerned. It defines sets within sets, and of course the relation between these sets; indeed, the very opposite of participation.

Fragmentation is an arrangement whereby the structure keeps people apart from each other, e.g. in production and consumption processes. Ultimately it may take the form of individual fragmentation where people may be producing and consuming in the same room, yet be totally irrelevant to each other. The opposite is togetherness.

Segmentation carries this process further, working inside, not between human beings. Human activities are subdivided and allocated to different segments in space (places of residence, places of work), time (hours of leisure, hours of work) and social space (family and friends for one, colleagues for the other)(41) The opposite would be integration, a structure where all of these essential activities (and others) are somehow put together or at least not kept so much apart.

A completely vertical relation, now, would be one where those at the bottom, or in the periphery of the structure,(42) would be exploited, dependent on the center, marginalized away from them, mutually fragmented and internally segmented. In the center they would not only enjoy the fruits of inequitable relations, but also condition the periphery (e.g. through taste-setting), be on the inside of the structure, be less fragmented (more together), and given more chance at integrated activity. This is the completely vertical relation, however: the items in Table 3 are connected with the term "and/or", indicating that verticality presupposes at least one of them. All kinds of combinations are meaningful, and there are also mixed forms with some elements of verticality and some elements of
horizontality. We shall not enter into this types of combinato-
ries, however - suffice it only to say that an index of verti-
cality from +5 to -5 could be constructed if one is willing
to give equal weights to the components. It should only be
added that this system can also be used for relations between
countries, in other words for international structures; in that
case verticality is often referred to as "imperialism".  

How, then, should one conceive of big/small? What is this
"limitation" referred to? One suggestion would be to introduce
the notion of "interactive capacity"; asking with how many
people a person can interact meaningfully. It may be objected
that there is no limit: a head of state may address the nation
over TV. But this is action, not interaction: the audience may
act, but not to, with him or her. In fact, the structure in which
this takes place is very much a vertical structure. If the head
of state has written at least some of the speech himself or her-
self then there has been an element of creativity as opposed to
the receptivity expected in the audience; there is little doubt,
in general, where the net causal mass is located (although the
image of the audience also will condition the speaker to some
extent); inside/outside is well defined socially and reproduced
in the structure of the TV system; the viewers are in need of
no interaction with each other to watch the box; and that very
activity is usually segmented away from other activities (although
not necessarily). In short, all five criteria are satisfied.

The point is now, simply, that if the interaction is to have
the opposite characteristics, in other words be fully horizont-
tal, then there is a limit to how many can participate in it.
If all shall have approximately equal inputs and outputs, or at
least if great discrepancies are to be avoided, then all have
to be given a chance. This may happen in many ways. Thus, as
anyone organizing a conference knows: if there are very few
people one session will do, but if there are more people there
have to be several sessions, break-down into working groups,
etc. The point is that interaction, to be meaning ful, presup-
poses time. Of course, there can be highly participatory events
with great masses being parts of it, and equally much so: the
shouting at the end of a sports event, a demonstration, etc.;
but these are rare events. It is not given to human beings to interact with more than a limited number at the same time (about seven?)\(^{(45)}\) to find meaning in verbal or non-verbal dialogue if the time-span is too short; to keep interaction going endlessly without a fatigue effect; to be at the top in emotional pitch forever; to relate meaningfully to more than a limited number of people in the longer run. Possibly there might be some other beings somewhere capable of some or all of this; but we are not those beings. We are just us, *homo sapiens*.

To repeat: if one really wants equity, autonomy, participation togetherness and integration then there is an upper limit to the number of members in the structure. If that limit is not respected the various aspects of verticality will tend to appear. Small group studies seem to indicate that there will easily appear distinctions where degree of centrality in the communication structure is concerned: some will interact with more than others, those who interact with most will tend to constitute an "inner circle" (not necessarily harmonious), excluding the interaction poor who, then, by definition are marginalized and fragmented.\(^{(46)}\) With that interaction structure established the division of labor will tend to become more vertical, if for no other reasons because the center possesses more information. But it will also tend to become more segmented because it will be considered "practical" that "you do this, and I do that", which later on easily leads to spatial, temporal and social segmentation. With this established the conditioning or dependency-formation expressed by the term "penetration" above enters the picture, and relationships become subject-object, not subject-subject. And alpha is there, again.

**The dynamics of alpha and beta processes**

The relationship between these factors might look as follows in a flow-chart:
Figure 1. A dynamic relation between aspects of alpha structures

- high center-periphery formation;
- unlimited size of structure
- high division of labor:
  - penetration:
    - normative,
    - utilitarian,
    - coercive

(The arrow can be translated as "is conducive to").

The division of labor gives to the interaction center the tools by means of which they can penetrate or condition the periphery further: the three channels of power, normative/ideological power, utilitarian or contractual or remunerative power, and coercive/punishment power. Once that is established it is easy to expand further in size. Actually, the cycle above may start at any point, and other arrows could also be drawn, for instance in the opposite direction. The basic point is simply that the "things" mentioned in the Figure somehow belong to the same "family of things", they are mutually reinforcing. The name of that family of things, in the terminology of the present paper, is alpha.

As pointed out above it is not merely a structure, but also a process, at least potentially. Conceivably it might be brought to a halt at some point, but if inspired by an ethos of cosmology of competition and expansion (two characteristics of Western civilization) there seems to be no built-in stop signal. The two key examples of alpha structures today, the state and the corporate structures headed, respectively, by bureaucrats and capitalists (private and state, the latter case representing
a fusion of the two structures) can be checked in their growth by the limits to territorial expansion (world surface share) and economic expansion (world market share), because others are also trying to expand. When left unchecked, however, there seem to be no built-in brake – the comparison would be with brake-less cars only prevented from racing on by bouncing into walls.

If an expansionism ethos is what keeps this "family of things" together, then one would expect the opposite structure, the horizontal, and consequently size-limited beta structure, to depend for its implementation on some kind of counter-ethos. A beta structure can easily be brought into existence and seems to be some sort of natural defense mechanism in times of crises, during wars and natural catastrophes. (In more regular periods it is known as circles of friends, as consumer, etc.) To persevere, even prevail and become a more permanent feature of society existence is not enough, however. The beta structure must be wanted; and not only ideologically, even at the level of cosmology, seen as deep ideology. I would venture the guess that a substantial proportion of the failures and frustrations in connection with experiments in participation (Mitbestimmung, cogestion, or even autogestion, samo upravlenje-selfmanagement) stems from the failure to take cosmology relating to limitations in size sufficiently seriously. Ideologically horizontality may be wanted; but at a deeper level expansion/growth and verticality are still seen as natural, normal – even unavoidable, and ultimately desirable.

Take an institute, for instance. It is small, relatively horizontal, functions well. The staff is mutually stimulating, brings out creativity in each other – a condition probably being that they are more or less at the same level in research maturity, or at least not too discrepant. For these reasons the institute attracts more people; it expands.(49) As a consequence small tendencies in the direction of verticality are strengthened because there is no longer any horizontal way of handling the total interaction in the structure – no way to which human beings can easily adopt. With increasing verticality the periphery becomes
increasingly substitutable, and as a consequence alienated. Creativity drops along the edges of the structure and the quality tapers off. It becomes first a victim of its own success, then unable to recreate the roots of its success because the periphery, although alienated, may prefer hanging on to being kicked out or simply leaving - trying, together with the center, to square the circle, i.e., to create horizontality even though the size is forbidding. This is where all the praiseworthy efforts to modify the alpha structure enter, such as general assemblies (Volksversammlungen), rotating leadership, a proliferation of beta-sized committees. However, the center will tend to dominate the assemblies, rotation will be among center members, and committees will aggravate the segmentation process. Size is too powerful a factor to be compensated for that easily. There has to be a strong desire, a need to keep it limited.

Another way of stating the problem, then, would be as follows: what would make a beta structure self-sustaining? Or, differently put: how could a beta structure also become a self-sustaining process? The answer is probably found by asking where in the structure the process could be located. By definition it is not in the growth of the number of members, but possibly in the growth of other aspects of the structure. If increasing horizontalization is recognized as "growth", or as a desirable process - as it is in commune movements then much is gained. But in addition to that the ideology that serves to give soul to the structure would have to be sensitive to notions of inner, personal, highly non-material growth. A basic point here is that this would probably require a less materialistic and externally oriented cosmology than the West is dominated by, for instance - with much talk about personal enrichment, but with the crucial indicators not being internal to human beings, but external, for instance in territorial, economic and size growth.

The relationship between the factors constituting a beta process might look as follows in a flow-chart:
Figure 2. A dynamic relation between aspects of beta structures.

- low center-periphery formation:
  - participation,
  - togetherness

- low division of labor:
  - equity,
  - integration

- limited size of structure
  - autonomy:
    - self-respect
    - self-reliance
    - fearlessness

(The arrow can be translated as "is conducive to").

The logic of this Figure is different, for it is not cyclical (50). It simply says that given some conditions the size will be limited (the other chart says that if the size nevertheless grows - as in the institute example given above - these conditions will tend to be eroded). The chart above may be seen as the social logic of friendship: there is little division of labor, much participation, togetherness and autonomy, but then the number of true friends any given person can have is limited. It should also be noticed that in contemporary society the low division of labor between friends is brought about artificially, by doing no labor at all, as a leisure time mode of existence; and often even by keeping work and friendship separate (so that the alpha work structure does not mix with the beta friendship structure). Hence, once more we land on the idea of a counter-ethos - to be elaborated later. Beta structures in an alpha setting would require almost artificial conditions to be viable.

In Figure 2 autonomy is spelt out as the antidotes against the power pressure (penetration) in the three channels of power given in Figure 1 (51). Normative power from the Center becomes important if there is self-respect rather than submissiveness, and correspondingly for utilitarian power if there is self-reliance rather than dependence and for coercive power if there is fearlessness rather than fear. It should be noticed, however, that
"limited size of structure" is seen as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for this (and for participation/togetherness) to happen. It is very possible to have a small structure and yet be totally vertical; indeed, that is what has been referred to as the gamma structure above. The family may be a good example, but then it should also be noted that with decreasing size of families (both the contraction of relevant family, from the extended to the nuclear family, as well as the decreasing size of the nuclear family through family planning) a transformation from gamma towards beta type family structures also seems to take place, at least between the adults. What is cause and what is effect is another matter — maybe it should be seen as one more case of phenomena belonging to the same "family of things". With smaller families the relationship can be more horizontal, more like it is between friends in spite of sex and generation borders. On the other hand, the argument might also be that the family is too small and too packed with emotions, positive and negative — an issue to return to later.\(^{52}\)

**Alpha, beta and the marxist tradition.**

Historically it is probably correct, as the marxist tradition has emphasized, that there is a material basis for the dominant structure in a society. With technology limited to rather direct extraction from nature (hunter-gatherer societies) the unit of social togetherness ("society") will have to be small, limited in size. It may be horizontal, it does not have to become vertical; beta is possible (primitive communism), alpha not yet a necessity. Whether in practice it becomes beta or gamma depends on circumstances not discussed in this paper. Alpha comes later, whether as the cause or as the effect, or both of technologies that permit setting up economic cycles that involve many more in patterns of vertical division of labor. In Western history, however, this has not been a clear trend from small to big. Rather, there have been tremendous oscillations from the alpha structures of Antiquity via the gamma structures of the Middle Ages to the alpha structures of the Modern Period again.\(^{54}\) Of beta there was little, only on the fringes of society it seems (although there was always much talk about it). Verticality had its extreme expression in the institution of slavery and serfs,
the former when society was expansive (Antiquity, the Modern Period) and there was much mobility and trade (including of human beings), the latter when society was contractive (the Middle Ages) with little mobility and trade, with the bottom of society tied to the soil. (The most recent form of slavery is, of course, the highly mobile labor supply known as foreign workers, Gastarbeiter). One reason for this oscillation may be, precisely, the lack of built-in stop signal in alpha and, consequently, its self-destructive tendencies or tendency to die unless it can continue growing. If it does not stop by itself, something else will stop it.

However, the marxist paradigm is only one element among many in the present analysis. With the marxist idea that there is such a thing as inequity or exploitation there is certainly no quarrel; gross structure-induced inequalities even where natural and historical conditions are similar are only too evident in human geography and history. But the roots are not to be found in the structure of production alone; that is but one in a family of structures with inequity built into them, sanctified by an ethos that defines not only expansion but also exploitation as natural and normal. There are other verticalities than between labor-sellers and labor-buyers, as indicated in Table 1, for instance, and they do not disappear "after the revolution". A certain economic determinism, however, is not the only difficulty with the marxist paradigm. The lack of attention to the factor of size is another, and a basic reason why socialism in practice becomes so similar to capitalism: the alpha structure predominates with its logic, and overshadows whatever differences might follow in the wake of collectivization of the means of production unless this takes the form of (small scale) commune-ism rather than (big scale) state-ism. In this, incidentally, is also a reason why small, private kitchen-gardens play such an important role in the agriculture of socialist countries: maybe not because they are private, but simply because they are small.
3. **From building-blocs to social formations.**

**The pure alpha and pure beta dystopias**

After this presentation of alpha and beta and gamma, the next step is to try to use them to build complete social formations. In order to do that a goal has to be formulated, some kind of base line against which these mental exercises in social formation production can be evaluated. As a guide-line the basic human needs approach to developmental goal formulation, dividing these needs into four classes: security needs, welfare needs, identity needs and freedom needs,(55) will be made use of.

But, why as building blocs, could they not be social formations by themselves? To give perspective to this exercise let us start in extremis, maybe even ad absurdum, with that question, imagining a social formation that is pure alpha, and another that is pure beta. The former would, in fact, not be so entirely different from what we already have in the "first world", the industrialized countries; only that the last vestiges of beta and gamma structures would still have to be "alphaized". Most of economic life is already brought on that form, what little is left of small farms, small industries and small shops/firms etc. can be brought on the same form under the heading of "structural rationalization". Medical services and schooling are "alphaized"; so are transportation and communication; what little is left or is created is usually quickly incorporated. Politics and the regulation of conflict have been increasingly "alphaized" with the advent of the modern state; what today is called "decentralization" should be seen as a way of strengthening the middle-level between the alpha and the individual or basic level members; certainly not as "betaization". A replication at the county/departement/provincia level of the state kernel in the capital is not a step away from alpha, for the bottom unit is still so large that no beta-formation is possible (besides, these middle level centers will usually serve as conveyor belts of decisions from rather than to the top level center).
What remains are essentially family life and leisure. The road to an alpha structure here goes via such measures as stripping the family of one function after the other, organizing infant care, child rearing, communal eating according to fixed plans and regulations. Family planning, ultimately also sexual activity, may be seen as a part of that routine. No one living in modern society will have any difficulty imagining a ministry for each of these, a sharp division of labor between those who define the "standard operating procedures" and those whose task it is to follow them, conditioning others, marginalizing and fragmenting them, and splitting human activities even more apart, allocating them to well-defined points in space, time and social context. Prior to all this, however, comes the penetration of the family gamma structure by the state, establishing the priority of state laws over family (usually meaning pater familias) rules, thereby buying more freedom for wives and children at the expense of less family autonomy.

In the field of leisure it has usually been corporations rather than the governments that have shown the way, by "offering" pre-packaged leisure time activities, such as the mass travel industry. Voluntary organizations also tend in the same direction, however: sport, for instance, becomes so standardized and regulated that the alpha structure is very easily recognized. What remains is friendship, but then it must be added that if all the time intervals already occupied by various mutually segmented activities are added up not much time remains for such activities. Pressed against the wall in this manner, is it strange if people resort to alcohol, drugs and narcotics, partly to make themselves too unpredictable for alpha life, partly to fortify themselves for that life?

It is interesting to see that alpha in extremis has been the theme around which the most famous dystopias of our century have been written, whether in authoritarian (Czannek, Toye, Orwell) or benign (Huxley) versions. In all versions identity is eroded by turning people into clients and objects, and freedom is usually seriously curtailed, partly by limiting choice, partly by destroying the consciousness that would make choice meaningful. What is provided are the objects to satisfy the most basic
material needs, such as food, shelter, clothes, medical services and schooling (+ transportation/communication), and what the authors show so convincingly is precisely how compatible this satisfaction of material needs is with a hell on earth where the structure in general and the center of society (the alpha apex in our terms) in particular has become a threat to its own members.

The dystopian tradition brings out very clearly the negative side of the doublefaced nature of the alpha structure in general and the modern state corporation alliance in particular: it can provide internal and external security but also be a major threat to either; it can provide what is needed to meet the basic needs for all but can also, through its concern over surplus, deprive citizens of their means of subsistence; it offers identity at the macro level, with the nation state, but usually at the expense of erosion of all the micro identities of which the state tends to be very jealous; and it can serve as a protector of freedoms of choice but also as the most effective agent of repression, e.g., in its torture chambers. In short, its record is ambiguous, to express it mildly. And the dystopians show us not only that the negative aspects may prevail, but also how this is tied to the penetration and dissolution of the last beta and gamma structures. The thought of expanding this to its logical conclusion, a world state run by a world bureaucracy, a world chamber of transnational corporations and a world think tank, is hardly edifying. But dominant world processes today point to this.

From the proposition "pure alpha is bad" it does not follow that "pure beta is good", however (all that follows would be "if a society is not-bad it cannot be pure alpha"). A society consisting only of beta or gamma units would at least have the following problems:

- the units would be so small that they would either be easily penetrated from the outside (a security problem), or have to be geographically and/or socially isolated (like monasteries) which would curtail their freedoms considerably.

- although the doctrine of "economies of scale" to a large extent should be seen as an ideology justifying alpha, some things one might deem necessary can only be made by alpha structures (such
as telecommunication hardware, e.g., for use between beta units).

- although the beta social logic excludes vertical relations within and between the units in general, and exploitation and dependency in particular, there may still be considerable dependency on nature, due to asymmetries in economic geography, seasonal variations and various types of natural hazards. Alpha can even this out, can compensate the victims, at the (considerable) expense of dependency on the alpha center; beta cannot.

- due to these variations, and for other reasons, a society based on beta units will develop gross inequalities between the units, even if not within the units, whether these inequalities are bigger than those caused by heavy center-periphery gradients in alpha structures is difficult to say in general.

- isolated beta units will tend to become very static, which is not an objection if it is an expression of a choice made in freedom, but otherwise possibly objectionable.

- a beta unit demands a high level of concern for and with others, of togetherness, integration and participation and does, when practiced in extremis, not offer the opportunity for withdrawal found in alpha in general, and cities in particular. (62)

Taken singly these objections may perhaps not be so important, taken together they add up to another type of dystopia, although not one celebrated in the literature because western society has not in modern times been heading in that direction. It is hinted at in implicit dystopias, however, in expression like the "dark Middle Ages" and the "Stone Age". (63) It is also often pointed out that when communes and many monasteries etc. look attractive to many, then it is because they are not pure beta units but are attached to some kind of alpha structure in a symbiosis that sometimes may border on the parasitical. (64)

The alpha/beta mix: five formulas explored.

However, only stupid social analysis or political debate would be contented with only two alternatives, mutually exclusive: "pure alpha" and "pure beta". A more informed debate would look for ways of combining them and not confuse, in a manichaeian manner, logical with empirical incompatibility. And the possibilities of combination are legion once one starts looking for
them, so this is where the analogy with children at play enters. The task is not to arrive at the vision of a good society, nor even to arrive at visions in plural, but perhaps to point at directions in which a multiplicity of such visions may be located. So, what combination possibilities seem relatively viable and attainable? If we assume that today, *grosso modo*, the first (and second) worlds are too much alpha and the third world still too much gamma (of beta there is little in either); how can better balances be achieved? How to give alpha to alpha's, and to beta beta's? Five such formulas will be explored in what follows.

**Alpha and beta dividing space and time**

The **first** and **second** combination formulas are well known and to some extent practised in modern societies: combination in space and combination in time. A society commands a certain territory, some parts are set aside for alpha, some for beta (gamma); the latter being the residential districts, parks, natural reserves like game parks and recreation areas. Next to a metropolis there would be a kibbutz, a monastery (zen for beta!), a hippie colony - to make it more utopian. And as to time: the present version is that people are born into a gamma unit, the family (with beta aspirations), are handed over to alpha more and more and at ever younger age, live in alpha most of their lives except for evening and nights when they come back to gamma/beta to be put humanly together again, and then end their lives in the family, the gamma. In a more utopian version we would spend much more of our life between childhood and retirement in beta units, e.g. by having child years or pension years (sabbaticals) more spread out during the life cycle.

The space and time combinations can themselves be combined; trajectories can be chosen permitting people to spin their life lines through different points in geographical and social space, maybe until a point is found where the social traveller may declare, contented, *j'y suis, j'y reste.*

Much worse societies than the one just indicated can be imagined. However, there are some rather important problems to be discussed; the vision certainly has to be enriched. For one thing, the vision underestimates alpha appetites. In the world in which we
live the experience is that alpha tends to expand in geographical space and invade areas set aside for activities that unfold in beta and gamma structures: residential areas are used for offices, natural reserves for factories and highways, etc. And as to time: birth and infancy and early childhood, as well as old age, senility and death, are all increasingly subjected to professional care in and by alpha, and taken out of beta/gamma contexts. People protest: there is fighting along the border lines in space and time; citizen guerrillas against massive alpha onslaughts. (68)

Secondly, in these visions alpha remains the serious mode of social life in the total formation; beta is if not frivolous at least more marginal. Alpha will not fail to capitalize on this and use times of crises, themselves to a large extent alpha produced, to back up alpha claims on lost provinces in space and time. A natural reserve can be protected against oil drilling till alpha has worked the total system into massive unemployment or has depleted other sources of energy; a time reserve, such as the weekends, can be defended in quiet periods, not in times of crises when governments and corporations call up the reserves. In short, space and time may not be crucial enough as the media in which alpha/beta balances, not only combinations, can be found.

Alpha and beta dividing functions of production.
A third possibility would be to explore social (as opposed to geographical) space more systematically, and simply ask: of all these needs or functions, which ones could best be taken care of by alpha, and which ones by beta (or gamma)? For which needs do we need closeness, for which needs would long distance society do? - and perhaps even do better? It should be noted at once that this is a typical alpha way of stating the problem. It presupposes that segmentation is not only possible but even desirable, that some things should be done in some settings, others in other contexts. (69) Should houses be constructed by alpha companies, but with sufficient space around to permit some highly local, beta type agriculture, or at least with good facilities for bread baking in each house, small or big? Maybe, or maybe the other way round with people constructing their own houses and bread baked
centrally. The beauty of this third formula is that it permits so many different answers and hence a very high number of visions. However, we need some guiding principles in the search, for viable formulas. Four such sub-formulas will now be studied.

Alpha for material production, beta for non-material production.

Imagine we see alpha and beta/gamma as two sectors of society and consider the exchange pattern between them. By and large the old marxist formula holds: alpha for production, beta/gamma for reproduction; including emotional, non-material reproduction, healing, putting people together after the wounds they receive from alpha participation. By and large the alpha apex is staffed by MAMUs (middle-aged men with university education), beta/gamma by women, particularly the older and less educated. Alpha is stage, beta/gamma is back stage in present society, whether it is because of the functions or because of the current social ranking of the personnel - or both. Alpha delivers "goods and services", beta/gamma delivers human beings - which means that human or even anti-human perspectives are needed to see alpha as the more important of the two. But thus it is, and it is not likely to change simply by declaratory statements to the effect that reproduction should be considered more important than production. Actually, what happens is that alpha like an octopus puts its tentacles into each beta unit and sucks out the juices needed for alpha growth, and at the same time manages to make it look as if it is serving all these beta units. Less metaphorically expressed: if what beta/gamma offers were monetized and alpha had to pay for it the way beta has to pay for alpha goods and services it would be more clearly seen how beta, as a sector, is the exploited and losing party. Alpha would not even afford it.

And this is the third and perhaps most important objection to the space and time combinations discussed above: alpha will not only encroach on beta because of its ever increasing appetites and push back the beta borders in space and time; it will also prey on beta/gamma. It may be objected that these structures are to a large extent populated by the same people. A person lives in a family setting from 7pm to 7am and spends the rest of the time working and traveling to work - in what sense is his day life preying on his night life? In the sense that it makes
his beta/gamma mode inferior, second to the alpha mode of his existence; and the only way of rectifying this, it seems, would be for the beta/gamma unit to reconquer some of the production. But what part?

**Alpha for processing, beta for raw materials production.**

The history of the West from the late Middle Ages is the history of the dwindling of the productive role of the small units, essentially down to food supplies (but those small farms are also disappearing), some small units that deliver semi-manufactures for industry, and some small shops (also disappearing). If in addition to their reproductive role all these small units should be used to deliver raw materials and semi-manufacturers and do some small-scale business that would permit alpha to go ever higher on the ladder of processing, and the beta/gamma second class status would continue unchanged. As a consequence, and that is the major point: the setting in which human beings can best unfold themselves is relegated into the background. The chance of doing meaningful, important work in an integrated way together with those one wants to work with is lost, or at best reduced to hobbyism.

**Alpha for non-basic, beta for basic needs production.**

Thus, the formula cannot be to divide productive life between alpha and beta/gamma according to the formula "complicated vs. simple processes". Nor is it necessary, for there is another very simple formula worth exploring: give to the beta unit production, material and non-material, for basic needs; give to alpha the rest. What this means is, in practice, that the beta/gamma unit can become self-reliant: it will generate its own security (by means of a structure that produces less violence, by becoming less vulnerable, and through its, own measures of basic defense - violent and nonviolent); it will produce its own food, clothing, shelter, medical services, schools by old and new small-scale technologies (including for the production of energy); it will generate all forms of identity through conviviality and co-production and closeness to nature; and it will produce freedom particularly by stimulating diversity among these small-scale units and the possibility of moving from one to the
The criteria of success of a beta unit should not be its longevity, nor the life-long allegiance of its members—these are probably criteria inherited unconsciously from alpha (the nation-state?) and gamma (the classical family?) units. Like for children's toys the criterion could be joy, challenge, creativity;[73] in some cases derived from permanence, in others from dismantling and reassembling, in still others from total reconstruction, and in some cases by letting die what should, as a social form, simply die; because its time has passed.

Let us now criticize this type of vision. One may agree that the beta/gamma units should be capable of meeting the basic needs, which would have important implications for human habitats—they would at least have to be sufficiently close to land or other media supporting the growing of food-stuffs, and possess means of processing raw materials into something edible. The old model was, of course, the farm and the village as micro and macro habitats respectively; recent experience might point in the direction of building food production into cities.[74]

In this vision what would happen to those who want the alpha way of doing things? Should one complain that they suffer from false consciousness when they want to purchase corporation/factory made food, shelter and clothes and participate in industrialized, mass medication and schooling like pieces on an assembly line, including long-distance, computerized diagnoses? Not to mention when they want segmented, alienated jobs on the grounds that by 7 pm they are home, free from any concerns with work, free to be totally non-productive for twelve hours? Is the vision above not rather puritan: why should the leisure brackets in the time budgets contract again after so much social work has been invested, during the last generations particularly, to expand them? Moreover, the type of work recommended to meet basic needs is so basic, so unsophisticated — - -

To the latter it can immediately be responded that production for basic needs, even in small units, can also be done with much ingenuity and creativity, if that is the goal. The rediscovery of the basic production unit to meet basic needs, perhaps by
upper middle class, and middle class, well educated urban youths, has already brought in its wake many new ways of doing agriculture; beta ways as opposed to the alpha ways developed by agricultural colleges and universities.\(^{(75)}\). A cycle consisting of some conventional agriculture coupled to a biogas converter and an algae pond is one example of this type; there are and will be many others.\(^{(76)}\) Marxists insist that the introduction of new means of production will lead to changes in the mode of production, no doubt correctly; but why should not a desire for another mode of production also lead to the innovation of new means of production (and not only to rediscovery of the old means?)

Or course, there are modes of doing things, eg. production with slavery that should not belong to the options available, under a doctrine of free choice, within a social formation. Those modes should be excluded that seriously curtail the freedom of participants in it to opt for other modes; that rules out slavery and also monopoly capitalism, private or state. But it does not rule out an alpha component of reasonable size. To take an example from schooling (the production of education, presumably): the objection might be to a centralized, unlimited in size, highly vertical schoolsystem with literally speaking monopoly on education for sizeable time intervals in the life of everyone, not to the use of such schools, say, two days a week, or one week a month or two months a year for some years as a supplement to beta organized neighborhood types of education, tied to work and other forms of togetherness. A society using only alpha or only beta modes of education will be poorer than a society placing both at the disposal of its members, with ample freedom of choice - provided beta diversity is the same in either case. And the same could apply to food production, shelter clothes and so on.

However, would this not merely invite alpha growth?\(^{(77)}\) That might happen, but then there would be an organic, not artificial barrier: beta capacity to handle basic needs themselves in a viable manner, on a sustained basis. The production for use in beta would limit the production for exchange in alpha provided the beta units offer a sufficiently attractive mode of life. But this also shows the limitation of the "basic needs to basic units,
the rest to alpha" formula. Alpha will continue producing the extras in life, and the only way people in beta would be able to get color TV, or a solar energy converter for that matter, would be through exchange with a surplus of basic goods. What to do about that?

**Alpha self-reliant, beta self-reliant.**

One formula would be for beta units to develop capacity for production for other than basic needs, and many of the experiences now gained with something close to beta units performing total production processes within alpha enterprises may become useful here. (78) As a matter of fact, there is no reason why units should not specialize in parts of a more complicated production process and cooperate with other beta units in the assembly of the total product, for the benefit of all - doing away with the age-old structure of the factory as a contiguous complex of buildings in favor of a scatter of small-scale work-shops with none doing much more complicated and challenging work than the others. Provided communication/transportation is good and things do not disappear on the way this is an obvious way of permitting people to work in more human settings.

As a consequence of this, however, alpha would have to become more self-sufficient too, which among other things would mean that the cities would have to produce much more of their own food. (which, in turn, could force the countryside into more self-reliance, through loss of bargaining power) Concretely, if in the First world more and more farmers give up farming to become blue and white collar workers in cities, and get more of the things advertising tells them is available in the market; and if at the same time more and more city-dwellers move into the countryside because they find the cities unliveable (crowded, all kinds of pollution, crime, terrorism and the prevailing alpha structure), (79) but not to make foodstuffs for exchange in the market but in order to enjoy a beta mode of life fully - well, then the cities have to do something about it. Most likely they will do what cities have done throughout history: force those in the countryside to deliver the goods, one way or the other (e.g.,
by making market participation a condition for tilling the soil). Hopefully more creative responses might be found; but this might well become a major political battle-line of the future.

what is the conclusion so far? that a good social formation may contain both alpha and beta/gamma modes, both of them capable of producing both for both basic and non-basic needs, but with alpha better on the latter and beta/gamma better on the former. That the staying power of beta depends on its potential for offering a more humanly satisfactory existence (80) and at the same time to provide for basic needs so that alpha cannot blackmail beta out of existence - correspondingly, alpha should not depend on beta for supplies either. That it should be possible for people to combine both modes of existence in a high number of ways, making their own combinations through time, in geographical space and in functional space. And that one of these "combinations" would be to stay, to remain, to be in one such unit or mode - with no pressure to move on, nor to stay on.

Alpha and beta dividing levels of social organization

Let us then move on to the fourth combination, in terms of levels of social organization. This is the problem of relation between the units: what kind of formulas can be envisaged? The alpha logic is clear: alpha units can grow below by adding more layers, but they can also grow above, into the heavens so to speak, by federating ("uniting") alpha under a new top superstructure. The result would be an alpha structure of alpha structures. Correspondingly, beta logic would ask for a beta structure of beta structures, the difference being something like this:

Figure 3. Multi-level structures

\[ \text{An alpha structure of alpha structures} \quad \text{A beta structure of beta structures} \]
Again the problem is the same: second level alpha permits unlimited size, second level beta does not. If one would assume that beta does not function well with more than 500 members, then a beta-based society of beta units would not have more than 250,000 members. (If three levels are used we reach 125 million, but then the relations from top to bottom and bottom to bottom become vertical and thin). It should be noted that the number 250,000 is not too different from city states and other units that played a considerable role in past European history, and the number 500 is a very typical village size, eg., in India. They were not beta structures, however—what is envisaged here would be something like 500 communes constituting a federation of communes, presumably with an assembly regulating their relations— with 500 members, which is quite typical as the size of a national assembly. (81)

Figure 3 above gives two structures that both can be referred to as "federal", although they are totally different and only have in common the notion of levels. In the alpha case top power has been given implicitly by the structure to one of the units, not to a superunit; but this would be entirely in the alpha logic (like the position of USSR in the USSR—both the USA, Switzerland and Yugoslavia are less alpha in this regard). In the beta case this would have been impossible, alien to the beta logic. The second level structure would have to treat first level units equally. (82) The lines relating the basic alpha and beta units in the figure do not necessarily stand for power relations; they could also represent airline and road maps, telecommunications, trade links, etc. and this also points to the limitation in beta size: the topology of the world geographical space sets very low limits for the number of geographical units that in practice can have direct road connections with each other—without passing through the territory of some other unit (unless they are organized in very special ways, eg. radiating from a central point or a federal territory). But why, then, should countries not be limited in size, when biological organisms are (and cancer is not)? (83)
It is now tempting to ask what an alpha structure of beta units, and a beta structure of alpha units would look like; not just for reasons of combinatorics, but because there might be something to learn, positively or negatively. The former would be the beta person's nightmare, the latter the alpha person's dream. The former would link together a high number of beta units under a central leadership (the Society of Jesus and the Guarani villages in the Sacred Experiment, the Peking elites and the Peoples Communists under that experiment?) and would even be the only link between them; the latter would be like a directorate, very equitable, on top of highly inequitable units (the European Community?) The former would probably sooner or later destroy the beta units because of the tendency to homogenize, streamline, "coordinate"; (84) the latter might well give new life to the alpha units by providing for a maximum of diversity in the flow of information and interaction in general. The former might look strong because of capacity to act in unison; the latter weak because of indecisiveness - it may turn out to be exactly the opposite. As a matter of fact, the most important alpha structures, governmental and corporate, today usually have directorates, collegiate structures, at the top with the primus inter pares not being very much different from the others. (85)

Although the reasoning so far would favor beta structures of beta units, with not more than two levels a formula like that would close rather than open for social imagination. For one thing, we have argued above for the inclusion of some alpha units among the basic units provided they do not encroach on the beta units. And we have argued that there are certain functions alpha can perform better than beta. Some of them (production of certain things, provision of anonymity/substitutability) can be taken care of by including alpha units in the total repertory of the social formation. Others (protection, less dependency on nature, reduction of inequalities, general dynamism) have often been provided, more or less well, by alpha structures, but could also be provided by a beta structure of beta units. When beta units come together in a beta structure there will certainly be some long geographical distances in the total structure, but given the respect for size limitations the distances would be much smaller than in an alpha structure with the same number of mem-
More social energy and resources in general will have been invested in the saturation of the structure to permit horizontal interaction, and the hypothesis would be that this in itself will serve as a measure of protection (because of the internal cohesiveness), to dampen dependencies on nature because of the ease with which one beta unit might come to the aid of another (assuming that a beta structure is conducive to more true solidarity than an alpha structure), to reduce inequalities because of the possibility of migration from one unit to the other which might then work as a disincentive to become too materially attractive relative to others because too much inflow would kill the beta structure, and to generate dynamism — the latter precisely because the interaction structure would not be in the hands of one particular center.

In what has just been said the weakest point is probably the problem of inequalities. What happens if a very well endowed, rich beta unit declares "this is all due to our own efforts; we followed the beta logic to the end, exploited nobody within or without, that is ours is ours and if somebody else is less clever or fortunate, that is their problem — we have a right to enjoy the fruits of our hard labor. Besides, nobody helped us when we were less successful; due to that we had to struggle, through the struggle we won, like us, like others!" One possibility would be the emergence of an alpha super-structure, strong enough to make that unit comply — in the name of solidarity and equality — and much strength may be needed for it may be easier to tax those who have become rich by exploiting others than those who have become rich only through their own efforts. Another possibility would be to exclude that unit from the federation, something which would require a more flexible view of what constitutes a society than is usually the case today. But exclusion of a unit that does not comply from a federation should, in principle, not be very different from excluding a member who does not pay his dues from an association.

The Fifth formula: a combination of the other four.

We have actually been hinting at this formula several times above already, but will try to spell it out in somewhat more detail. It becomes a quite complex society, so complex that participants and
and analysts alike might have difficulty discerning clearly the components. But there would be some very basic points on which the eyes could be trained, such as a high number of small units, cohesive, self-reliant in terms of production to meet the most basic needs; but also producing lots of other things, often in cooperation with others. They would not all be equally horizontal, but they would be tight, dense — and they would be linked together in structures with the same beta characteristics. But there would also be occasional alpha units in the total formation, maybe more frequent in cities; only that they also have to be self-reliant — among other things providing for their own basic needs. Thus, there would be some kind of spatial division between the two modes, but not too strict — and much care would have to be exercised to provide for new territory that can be used for new types of units.

People would move in and out of the units according to their own will and the readiness of other units to receive them (thus, successful beta units would have the right to protect themselves against destruction through overflooding). People would be in a position to spin their own life lines through his complex web of units, not being forced by an over-arching alpha structure to design their life cycle in a standardized manner -- one of the choices, being the possibility of living a "regular" alpha life, but the superstructure of all of this would be soft. Societies would be small, assemblies with representatives from all of a low number of units, most of them beta units should be able to handle coordination if these smaller units have been sufficiently vitalized through decentralization - each unit being its own little center. In short: some kind of Swiss federal structure, without the corporate power of the "gnomes of Zürich, with more and smaller cantons, many of them organized more according to the Chinese formula, and — I would add — with some element of British, even French, decadence thrown into the bargain.

Let me try to give a personal image of this society by asking how would I, in retrospect, have liked to have lived my life up till now? Not that different from what I have done, given my privileged situation in a privileged country, or set of countries. However, I would definitely have liked to have lived much more of
my life in small, self-contained units. The answer so often given, "why not live on a farm for some time and you will see how it is" is not the answer. Farm life may be as or much more alienating than city life because it is the other side of an alpha-induced division of labor, essentially being alpha periphery. I would definitely have liked my school education to be much less con-
secutive, much more interrupted by other forms of existence, particularly by work experience from early childhood on. I would have liked to practice much more of what I learnt in school and to learn much more from practice; and I would have enjoyed learning more crafts and trades as I enjoy
switching my research point of gravity from one social science to the other, under such com-
prehensive umbrellas as peace, development and future studies.
I think every second year of my school time could have been used much better for such purposes. It is also sad to reflect on the years lost without the delights of love because our society prescribes a number of difficult years between sexual maturation and mature love relations.

And one could add to this: the time lost in pursuit of positions and room at the alpha too, especially positions of some power. Why? Simply because experience has told at least me that things of quality are only made in the small; that what alpha produces of "goods and services" may look glittering and taste sweet to start with - and then becomes stale and bland. It is the dif-
terence between mass university industrial, almost assembly-line production of PhDs and a solid product of intellectual artisanry, between supermarket cookies and mother's cakes for Christmas, between national and municipal political participation in mass voting and elections and a group discussing a problem till a decision is made with consensus, between a record-player and playing oneself, in a group or alone, and so on and so forth. All that is required to see this - but that is actually quite a lot - is a shift of focus from domain to scope, from extension to intension, perhaps from power-over-others to power-over-one-
self. Somewhere along the line of future history a transition toward more beta will presuppose some change in the ethos of these societies in this type of direction. In all probability that can only happen when exaggerated alpha has revealed its short-
comings even further and produced massive crises.
And at this point we choose to stop this effort to put building
brick together. Alpha and beta formations have been defined, not
very precisely, but sufficiently. The role of size as a factor,
even a decisive factor, has been mentioned; the simplest of all
variables and (for that reason?) one of the most neglected ones.
We have then tried to argue in favor of combinations of alpha
and beta, and have discussed combinations in space and in time,
division of labor in functional space with material production
for alpha and non-material reproduction for beta, with simple
processes to beta and the complicated ones to alpha, then for
basic needs to beta and for non-basic needs to alpha and actual-
ly come to the conclusion that they both have to be relatively
complete social formations in order to coexist, but with a very
flexible type of division of labor. The important point is prob-
able that beta has to be recreated and reinforced and alpha
has somehow to be pushed back again from its present position of
overpowering dominance in the rich, industrialized countries and
then the rest has to be left to experience. As humankind has
never been exposed to a social existence so rapidly leaving every-
thing to alpha, on a massive scale, potentially even at a world
level, there is small wonder that we have little or no experi-
ence in pushing alpha back and in striving for formulas of coexis-
tence between alpha and beta. This is a new field, there is
much to draw upon, but the situation has never been quite like
this before.

So, in conclusion, as they wrote on the walls of Paris during
les événements de mai ten years ago, in 1968: imagination au
pouvoir! And, as a reminder lest people should develop excessive
faith in democratized, benign alpha (observed in a Paris metro
ten years after les événements): élections, c'est chaîne maître.
4. From vision to program: three criteria explored

Let us now have a look at this type of vision of a desirable society and expose it to the three criteria developed in the first section: is it a vision with contradictions? is it compatible with ongoing trends? will it lead to mutually compatible social formations? Or - as is usually the case with utopia production, is it one more case of a contradiction-free vision, an island in time and space, detached from social processes (from history), detached from the global context?

We shall first argue that this type of vision is filled with contradictions, at least very soon, precisely because alpha and beta themselves are so contradictory to each other. The attempt has been not to fail for the obvious temptation of creating visions that eliminate these contradictions simply by coming out in favor of either horn of the dilemma: the technocratic alpha vision of the romantic beta vision both of which have many adherents today. These extreme visions actually reinforce each other as either can be seen as a response to the one-sidedness of the other. Our position would be that one may argue the ratio of alpha to beta, but not that they constitute two modes of human existence, and that the task is to try to get the best from both -- not the worst from both which is also quite easy. In the process of combining numerous problems and solutions will emerge. Thus, both alpha and beta will have to modify from the pure versions depicted here: alpha might become more democratic, instituting mechanisms of democratic election and recall; beta more open, less afraid of contact with the outside, etc. But basically the relation is a contradictory one, with no steady solution found in practice, not even on paper for that matter.\(^{(91)}\)

Second, the argument would be that what has been said so far are process utopias in the sense of being indicative and in the sense of being compatible with existing trends. That what has been said is a pointer rather than a blueprint should be obvious; that it is compatible with trends is less obvious. It would fall outside the scope of this paper to try to demonstrate so in detail, but some indications must be given.
In the author's view, the assumption is certainly not that the dominant trend in the world today is away from alphas; to the contrary. State-formation and corporation-building, as well as mass-production of intellectuals, professionals, experts, technocrats of various kind as staffs for the top echelons of alpha structures continue unabated, both at the national and international levels - perhaps also at the local level. But exactly because of this the negative aspects of alphas will become more and more evident, and they can, speaking, be classified in two groups:

(1) **International pathologies**: Alpha expansionism, imperialism, beyond nation-state borders has taken the form of placing the alpha periphery outside the national borders, the center inside, making other nations the objects of political, economic and cultural exploitation. That is the first pathology, the second is the extent to which the oppressed have internalized alpha values, in turn peripheralizing others. And the third is how it hits back at the origin of inter-national imperialism by gradually depriving them both of raw materials and markets and investment opportunities. The best expression of that today is the new international economic order that sooner or later is bound to force First world alphas back because of the limits to alphas growth in a finite world. One consequence, already visible at a moderate level, is unemployment and various other anomalies in the working of the economic system (inflation, monetary crises etc.) and ecological breakdowns in the First world countries.

(2) **Intra-national pathologies**: Alpha incorporation of most sectors of human life in First world societies must have profound impacts. As these countries by and large are in the center of the world alpha material poverty is infrequent. The inequality, or vertical division of labor takes the form of non-material poverty, particularly at the bottom through boring, spiritually impoverishing, contracting work - one aspect of which is the substitutability of everybody but a few at the top of society. The consequence is alienation, from work, self, from others and society at large, from nature. Add to this the conditioning of people from the alpha top, the marginalization, fragmentation and
segmentation — and there is more than enough of an explanatory basis for such phenomena as mental disorders, criminality, the somatic civilization diseases (cancer, cardio-vascular diseases), alcoholism, drug- and narcotics-addiction, and suicide, provided one adds to the picture to the consistent weakening of the beta and gamma structures that used to protect people against such phenomena. (95) However, it is important not to accept as social pathologies only those that are already on everybody's list. At the individual level one might also add the changes in personality structure needed to function well in alpha structures, (94) and at the social level the various phenomena referred to by some authors as "mass society". (95)

The thesis, then, would be that the accumulated effect of the inter- and intra-national pathologies will be such as to force changes in the general trend, and since the first world countries have come furthest on the alpha road these changes will occur there before they come to the second world, and in the second world before they emerge in the third world. In most places in the third world it is the negative impact of an overweight of beta/gamma units that is the most deeply felt problem — in fact, the list of problems in connection with the pure beta utopia (section 3 above) is a list of well known third world problems. But this means that the "alpha/beta mix" is also a way of formulating a set of visions of third world desirable societies. In very schematic terms, one may perhaps say that the countries in the first and the third worlds would be approaching the problem of an optimum alpha/beta mix from different sides:

**Figure 4. The alpha/beta mix spectrum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100% beta</th>
<th>100% alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third world: too little alpha</td>
<td>First world: too much alpha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But there is also, indeed, the possibility that at least important parts of the third world (the capitals, for instance), will overshoot and quickly find themselves in situations very similar to the first world countries, particularly when the fourth wave imperialism (the reaction from the countries hit by third world imperialism) starts hitting them.\(^{96}\)

In all this we have been hiding the important distinction between the beta and gamma ways of trying to make small beautiful. But this is where it enters for full: if beta with all its horizontality betrays a Western bias, what about gamma? Or some modified gamma, with much integration, togetherness, participation, but at the same time a clear position for the (village) chief, for the master with tasks very different from the rest and in a position to condition others who wanted to be conditioned by him ("her" being a rather rare case)? The Western answer: "let him/her serve for some time, then somebody else may have that position" vests verticality with the positions, not with the person - an expression of Western tendency/ability to abstract away from the concrete person towards the contractual.\(^{97}\) One may then interpret gamma in two ways: as opposed to alpha because it is small, or as similar to, even a preparation for alpha because she is vertical. This doubleness is among the contradictions with which we have to live - the important point is that the frame of reference is rich enough conceptually to transcend at least some Western limitations.

Thus, the conclusion is that these visions are compatible with important trends even if some of them are more for the future. The fascination with alpha consolidation and expansion, in the third world almost synonymous with modernization/development, will still be with us for some time to come.\(^{98}\) But there will be countercurrents and great uncertainties, an "age of liminality" \(^{99}\) and this is where these visions can become socially important.

So, imagine that they take root in several parts of the world. What about the compatibility? How will they relate to each other? Imagine this question were asked when the nation-states first emerged on the drawing boards in, say, the sixteenth century, to
be crystallized as an international system (still the dominant system) through the peace of Westphalia in 1648. To each nation her state consolidating power in the center, caring for her citizens in exchange for loyalty: no size limitations considered. No doubt a process utopia, but was it also valid as a relational utopia? would not a moment's reflection have shown that this vision of a desirable society might be highly incompatible with most visions of a desirable world? That the alpha logic, both in state and corporate manifestations, would set nation-states on collision courses that could not but lead to heavy increases in the levels of direct and structural violence in the world?(100)

We are certainly not suggesting that there were no warning voices, nor that warnings are very effective. What we are suggesting is that to the extent that visions become social forces the responsibility to explore such problems increases. And it seems obvious that de-alphabetization, an increase of the beta/omega components with a nonexpansionist ethos could at least reduce the danger of direct and structural violence between the units. During the last centuries more threats to security and welfare have come from the states and corporations than from the millions of villages around the world. It is not unreasonable to assume that a better balance will decrease this threat; that de-alphabetization, in fact, can also be described as some kind of structural disarmament.

But that metaphor also brings to the foreground a major objection: what if the structural disarmament is unilateral? That if the first world should be pressed by its external and internal contradictions in the beta direction while at the same time the third world continues its alphabetization process unabated? Does that not land us solidly in the midst of a well known curvilinear: nobody cares take the first step and for that reason everybody is worse off than they would have been even under the condition of unilateral structural disarmament? The answer, it seems, would have to be affirmative. At the same time, we would certainly risk the hypothesis that without what is here termed structural disarmament conventional military disarmament is worse than difficult: it is meaningless.(101) Hence, we should prepare ourselves for the new cold war, for the debate of the 1980s: "should we become
a defenseless collection of small communes at the same time as
our former colonies become rich, strong, equipped with (our)
arms, well organized for attacks:"

There is hardly any simple answer to this question. The world
is asynchronous; an asynchrony, incidentally, above all produced
by the West herself, but there are some positive elements on
which to build. Thus, a first world undergoing structural disarm-
mament would also be a first world more bent on contributing to
an equitable world order, thereby instilling less hostility. Sec-
ond, a recentralized first world may be easier to occupy, but
also much more easy to defend once occupied; she may be less ca-
able of territorial defense, more capable of social defense.(102)
And third: is it so obvious that the third world wants to destroy
the former center, so much admired? Look at how London and Paris
remain capitals of their former empires, precisely because they
behave in a much less imperial way - in the case of Paris one
may even talk of the capital de la raza latina, among other rea-
sions because the present center of domination, New York-Washing-
ton, does not exercise the same power of attraction, but even
some repulsion. To be a former imperial power, retiring in style
and grace, may not be all that bad—

Conclusion: contradictions there are, compatible trends there
are or will be, a potential for mutual compatibility is also pre-
sent. There is material with which to work.

5. A utopian revival:

In the first section of this paper we have tried to show that
present ideologies, especially when taken one at the time, have
little to offer a humankind in search of something new - one
simple reason being that all these ideologies are now somewhat
dated. In this final section we shall try the opposite exercise,
emphasizing what there is to learn from these ideologies when
they are no longer seen as mutually exclusive, but as partial
visions of something more holistic, more difficult to grasp and
express. But we shall also try to indicate that even if they can
be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive, they
are certainly not exhaustive of this holistic entity we are trying
to come to grips with.
It is easy to see the major contributions from the three most comprehensive of the ten or eleven ideologies, liberalism, marxism and anarchism, to this totality. Anarchism militates against the verticality of states run by bureaucrats, marxism against corporations run by capitalists; both of them argue their overthrow, anarchism in favor of smaller units, marxism in favor of (in the first run) a worker take-over of both state and corporations. Liberalism has no problems with states and corporations as such, but has a general approach to the relations among states and among corporations: balance, countervailing forces. In a sense liberalism has a theory of how to organize horizontality: through balance; marxism as theory of how to deal with verticality: through consciousness, mobilisation, confrontation, struggle, transcendence. Both are weak where the other is strong, as one might expect from two ideologies so dialectically related.

In our terms anarchism and marxism deliver very strong arguments against alpha, but in the marxist case only against some types of alpha; whereas liberalism has important things to say about organization in complex structures that want some element of horizontality. Anarchism gives the most detailed advice about beta life.

It is also easy to see how the social justice ideologies enter. The first three, "young/old-ism", feminism and populism, can be seen as directed against the alpha, the middle-aged men with university education found in the alpha centers (and observable every weekday morning at any airport in the world, flying to the periphery to inspect or to the center to be instructed, with their attaché cases). These three ideologies partialize the issue by each one attacking one aspect of the alpha; much would be gained if the ideologies could fuse better, and in many parts of the world race and ethnicity should be added to that picture to make it even more complete, for it is the total constellation of these topdog statuses rather than any one of them at the time that is so powerful. A struggle against alpha is today also a struggle against that cluster; but the opposite is not necessarily true. Alpha can be run by others.

How does third world-ism enter the picture? Mainly, it seems, as a struggle to gain access to the command positions in global alphas and to be in a position to built their own alphas. It should
be seen as a major progressive force to the extent that it can push some of the third world out of the pure beta/gamma dystopia with all its extreme nature-dependence; it should be seen as a major regressive force to the extent that it overshoots. Who are to judge? - the people served or hit by these structures. In this process the ambivalence of the gamma will come into full play: as training for smallness, or as training for verticality.

Finally the method ideologies. Federalism is so obviously relevant in this picture because it is the only approach attempting to take the relation between levels seriously. And pacifism has much to say about the relationship between structures and security/defence issues - problems that become particularly significant to the very nature of this enterprise the moment the question of compatibility between these visions is raised.

Thus, the position would be that these in very such to find in these rich depositories of human insight and feeling - and particularly much if they are not seen as mutually exclusive, and yet there is something basic missing, particularly because - or to the extent that - all these ideologies are Western: an ethos, a counter-ethos to pure gamma. Another much deeper than a list of excellent structural principles accompanied by ideas about social processes. Where to find it:

It is easy to outline the contours of that ethos, in general terms. It is not simply the opposite of the alpha-ethos; it is not anti-tri-archist instead of centrifugal, inner-directed instead of outer-directed, in short the other horn of any dilemma often used to characterize contemporary Western cosmology. Rather, it would incorporate either horn of such dilemma, both alpha concerns with vast domains, and beta concerns with depth in the small. One thing is concern and compassion at the global level, however - and possibly with the entire global household, not only with the human part of it - quite another seeing it as a right and duty to push one's own form over on others. In short, the ethos needed would not be missionary but tolerant and dialogical. (107) These are not Western specialities - consequently, it may very well be that this type of ethos would come more from the non-West, inspired by non-
western cultures, possibly carried by the non-dominant parts of the West: the young and the old, the women, the non-experts, the members of non-dominant races and ethnic groups, the workers.

And that brings in a major source of utopian revival barely touched upon in section 1: when the struggle of the suppressed groups in Figure 1. takes the form of something more than recovering positions in dominance dominated alpha structures, when these groups see themselves as carriers of alternative visions of desirable societies. To go into detail would go far outside the scope of this paper. In almost everything said about the culture lived and created by these groups beta/gamma structures and ethos are readily discernible; a reservoir of energy for renewal, a counter-ethos already there, possibly ready to blend with the dominant ethos into something new, without a new ethos nothing of value will emerge - without something new emerging a new ethos will only remain a paper construction. And in all of this the major difficulty will be those who persist with the faith in partial ideologies and visions and false dichotomies, demanding a purity unknown in the real world.
NOTES

Paper presented at the first workshop of the "Visions of Desirable Societies" subproject of the GPID project, UN University, organized by the World Future Studies Federation, Roma by Eleonora Wasini and Bart van Steenbergen and hosted at CESTEEM, the Centro de Estudios Economicos y Sociales del Tercer Mundo, Mexico City, Mexico D.F., April 5-8 1978, by Orlando Tafall. I am indebted to the participants for an excellent discussion.

1. This was the second network meeting of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project of the United Nations University, held in Geneva 9-14 January 1978. As a part of an effort to get away from the regular schedule of meetings with presentations of papers and discussion the participants one afternoon split into four dialogues groups together with specially invited people from the area, essentially discussing three themes:

**Goals**: What is a good society - a good life?

**Processes**: How do we get there - and what stands in the way?

**Indicators**: How do we know we are heading in the right direction?

What is given here is a very abbreviated report from one of the groups where the present author participated.

2. The reader is strongly recommended to try this type of dialogue with his/her own friends and colleagues, and will be surprised to see how easily people talk about such "deep" matters, how there is an untapped reservoir of excellent theory and practice for development of social life everywhere.

3. This is a basic theme in Johan Galtung, Dag Poleszynski and Anders Wirak, *Indicators for Development*, Oslo, 1980 (forthcoming): any satisfier (means) has a range relative to a need (goal); beyond that range there is first a phase of diminishing returns, then increasing disutility. Too much food or too much bureaucracy may serve as examples, but so may also too much closeness, too much mutual relevance. A life dominated by accumulated disutilities will necessarily lead to the quest for another life where the needs-satisfiers relation is held to be less problematic.
4. The idea, then, would be that Westerners have little sense of limitation and restraint and will tend to go on with more and more means and satisfiers without sensing what is quantum satis, until they are deeply embedded in a dissatisfaction not entirely unwanted since it gives a motivation to search for something new.

5. This is analyzed to some extent in Johan Galtung, "Two Ways of Being Western: Some Similarities Between Liberalism and Marxism", Papers, Chair i. Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, 1979.

6. Thus, in liberalism the nation-state is the unit of economic growth, in marxism it is the unit that may undergo revolution. "Economic growth" and "revolution" applied to sub-units, eg. to counties, are at best seen as metaphors, at worst as nothing but an appeal to one's sense of humor (the "gross village product," the "revolution in Alfa del Pi").

7. In spite of Leopold Kohr's excellent The Breakdown of Nations; but then that book is written within a tradition that clearly can be identified as anarchist.

8. A useful, very elementary and easily read introduction to anarchism is the book by James D. Forman, Anarchism, Dell, New York, 1975 (the author also has similar books on Capitalism, Communism, Fascism and Socialism). For a reader, see The Essential Work of Anarchism, edited by Marshall S. Shatz, Bantam, New York, 1971. A remarkable quarterly research journal, Interrogations (with articles in Italian, French, English and Spanish) is also strongly recommended, as also the review Rivista Anarchista (Milano).


10. Of the many interpretations of the term "Third World" we are picking up the vision of the third world as an exploited group of countries. In other words, we are not thinking in terms of the Chinese perspective dividing the world into super powers, industrialized countries and the third world, nor in terms of
the idea that the "third world comprises everybody suppressed anywhere". The latter would make everybody in the third column of Table 1 a member of the Third world, which is an important perspective because it points to new sources of solidarity and struggle - but the metaphor also blurs rather important distinctions.

11. Thus, many UN officials from the West who have been fighting for years for the Third world suddenly find themselves threatened by increasing Third world quotas in the UN hierarchy, including top positions. The emotional problems in this connection are obvious.

12. However, by this criterion the Soviet Union and India would be broken into smaller parts, possibly also the United States; but not much would happen to China (about 95% of which is Han), to Japan; and England and France would probably be able to do as Spain does, contain the ethnic minorities within a framework of regional autonomy.

13. Another condition is the internationalization of the suppressor, as when/if all OECD countries go in for pre-pensioning schemes for the old, thereby producing social uselessness at earlier stages in the life cycle.

14. It goes without saying that in this there is no belittling of the significance of these struggles, nor any doubt of the justice of their cause. The whole point would be that in these ideologies as such there is no hidden treasure for those not hit by the inequities of the present order and in search of something basically new.

15. This, of course, is not true of the gandhian approach since to Gandhi the struggle itself has to be goal-revealing: "there is no way to peace, peace is the way".

16. In this supproject of the GPID project the search for non-Western visions of desirable societies will constitute a major part.
17. In general, the liberal criticism of state capitalist (socialist) society is probably about equally valid as the marxist criticism of private capitalist society - and as their joint criticism of the type of social order anarchists want. The present author finds it liberating to assume that there is validity to all these positions, liberal/anti-liberal and marxist/anti-marxist - as opposed to assuming that one has to make a choice among them.

18. This movement originated in France in the 1890s around the review Les Temps Nouveaux, but the Spanish expression is better known because it became the platform of the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, and of the Barcelona stand during the Civil War. "Workers ran the streetcars, kept the power plants and factories in operation, protected the cathedral and its art treasures. Fashionable young women vanished from the Ramblas, Barcelona's Fifth Avenue, and militia girls in uniform, a sign of women's liberation formerly unthinkable in Spain, took their place" (Forman, op.cit., pp.55-6).

19. Thus, in Yugoslavia the local units are gaining in autonomy. The system of self-management, samoupravljene is highly participatory within and competitive without, giving rise to a system of micro-socialism combined with macro-capitalism - worker run factories competing for their share in the total market. In China the local units may be losing in autonomy after the death of Mao, particularly because of the increased emphasis on centralizing, capital-intensive technology. The recent pattern of cooperation between the two countries may be the result of a meeting of two trends in the opposite direction.

20. Of course, it was the incompatibility with rather elementary feminism that used to attract international attention, till Swiss women (not yet Lichtenstein) gained the right to vote.


23. For more on this, see Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad and Erik Rudeng, "On the Decline and Fall of Empires : The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared", Papers No 75, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, 1979.


25. In a sense this would also be a replay of imperialism as we know it historically, usually based on bridgehead building, finding local actual or potential elites who would benefit from a coupling to the center in the Center.

26. One example would be the role of these countries in connection with the regional centers for the transfer of technology - these are countries that should be watched closely in connection with the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development, UMCS-D, Vienna, August 1979.

27. An example would be the US withdrawal from ILO, another the Soviet Union disinclination to participate fully in the UN machinery.

28. Thus, the UN agencies are now becoming important battlefields between different conceptions of the world order, in the interests of the old and the new centers, respectively. For an analysis of this phenomenon in UNESCO, relating to the issue of mass communication (including news media), see Fumiko Nishimura, The United States and the Concept of ILO Politicization, IHEI, Geneva, 1978.

29. For a comparison with the end of the Roman Empire, see the paper referred to in footnote 23 above.

30. To those who know how many problems that oil has created for Norway (but they are few outside the country) they will sound increasingly credible, however.

31. See footnote 29.
32. Thus, there is the famous saying of the late US president Lyndon B. Johnson: "There are three billion people in the world and we have only 200 million of them. We are outnumbered 15 to one. If might did make right they would sweep over the United States and take what we have. We have what they want" (November 1966). He is probably not right, at least not for the foreseeable future. The former periphery, now heading the second and particularly the third wave of expansionism, may be less bent on destroying the center of the first wave (and the first and a half wave) than on living comfortably within it.(see footnote 31). The first world elites, however, mentally programmed to hedge against the worst possible alternative (reinforced by the game theoretical approach of their military strategists) will probably act as if the Johnson prediction carries a high probability, thereby contributing to making it self-fulfilling in the longer run.

33. Perhaps it should be pointed out that this goes beyond the trite point that visions have to be specific to the historical conditions obtaining at a certain point in space and time, to the exploration of compatibilities. The old formula seems to be that compatibility would obtain if all societies in the world practised the same utopian formula, clearly a totally abstract, ahistorical position - somewhat reminiscent of the idea that social justice is to give shoes of size 40 to everybody.

34. From the point of view of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project of the United Nations University this becomes a problem of a high level of integration between the subprojects called "visions of desirable societies", visions of desirable worlds", "expansion and exploitation processes" and "autonomy and liberation processes".

35. Thus, one might talk about the level of entropy in the toy, meaning the level of uncertainty as to its possible use or apparition. One hypothesis: the more expensive, generally speaking, the lower the entropy, because much is needed to shape the toy in such a way that the range of possible uses narrows.

36. For an effort to apply this idea to the societies in Eastern Europe, see Johan Galtung, "On the Eastern European Social Formation", Papers No 67, CCRP, University of Oslo, 1979.
37. Thus, in non-Western cultures the role of the master is perhaps often as important as it was in Medieval Europe, and the master-disciple relation is definitely not horizontal. "The road to autonomy in non-Western cultures is often via masters - sufi = mystical leader". (Majid Rahnema in the Mexico discussion). Maybe the Western emphasis on equality (liberal tradition) and equity (marxist tradition) has as a precondition the deification of the Master (Jesus Christ), circumventing the problem by making the master non-human? This stands in sharp contrast to Buddhism, for instance:

" -- Though a human being, he became an extraordinary Man (Acchariya Magusa), but he never arrogated to Himself divinity. The Buddha laid stress on this important point and left no room whatever for anyone to fall into the error of thinking that He was an immortal divine being. Fortunately, there is no deification in the case of the Buddha" (From The Buddha and what Buddhists Believe, Colombo, 1977, pp. 2-3).

Buddha attained enlightenment, and this is accessible to everybody ("In one sense all are potential Buddhas", ibid., p.4); there is no clear borderline between ordinary humans and the extraordinary Buddha. The master-disciple verticality is in this world, it is a basic part of our existence, and we somehow have to come to grips with it. To deny its reality to people in that culture is to deny that culture.


39. But the orders of magnitude may also refer to countries of different size, and the point would be that liberalism and marxism, using countries as their units of analysis (see footnote 6 above) will tend to be insensitive to the role of size, with the possible exception of the extreme lower end of the scale (both of them using "division of labor" as basic dimensions, liberalism picking up the horizontal aspect - specialization - and marxism the vertical aspect - exploitation).
40. This is developed in some detail in the author's *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*, New York, MacMillan, 1979 and *Development, Environment and Technology*, Geneva, UNCTAD, 1979 - chapters 2 (4) and 1 (4) respectively. One basic point in this set of variables (sub-dimensions of the verticality vs. horizontality complex) is the effort to yield a frame of analysis that can capture essential aspects of marxist thought, yet being more general, not so tied to the economic sector.


42. For elaboration of center-periphery concepts, see the book referred to in the preceding footnote, chapters 1-3.


44. See "Structural Analysis and Chemical Models", ch. 6 in *Methodology and Ideology*, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1977, particularly pp. 173f.

45. Yona Friedman is probably the researcher in the world at present who has elaborated this theme most into depth. See his "About Critical Group Size"; paper presented at GPID II, Geneva 9-14 January 1978.

46. We are thinking of the Bavelas and Bales traditions in US small group research; see, for instance,

48. See Johan Galtung, "Social Cosmology and Western Civilization", Papers, CCR, University of Oslo, 1979. The competitiveness puts each alpha structure on a collision course with other alpha structures of the same kind; growth is seen as necessary partly for defense against competitors, partly to expand. But even when there are no competitors the cosmology would define growth as a hench purpose.

49. Thus, it would be interesting to know how many highly successful beta type communes/institutes/villages or what not have been destroyed because they have attracted too many visitors, on a permanent or more temporary basis. Can an ujamaa or servoodays village function with more than half the inhabitants being visitors, among them social scientists?

50. One reason for this being the factor "limited size of structure" which is so weak: under certain conditions it may lead to low levels of verticality; but it is also compatible with high levels - that is the idea of the gamma structure.

51. See the second reference in footnote 47 above.

52. Thus, although the women are gradually winning positions as independent bread-winners, the young (children) and the old (the retired) are not given this opportunity in the "modern" family system.

53. This does not necessarily point in the direction of bigger families, but in the direction of more families living together - or any other form of cohabitation and commensalism involving more people.
54. For a presentation of Western history in that type of perspective see Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad and Erik Rudeng, "On the last 2500 Years of Western History, And Some Remarks on the Coming 500", The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XIII, Ch. 12, Cambridge, 1979


56. Thus, the type of feminism that goes in for regulating homework so that it becomes closer to industrial work, with norms, overtime (eg. for changing diapers night of Sundays) will clearly transform a gamma pocket (for it is certainly not a beta pocket) into an alpha system. One might argue that the task for society today, in the "first world", should not be to make the family more like industry, but to make the industry more like family - but beta versions thereof. In this there is no denial that the woman is cheated, as a part of general subjugation, in our society: that the costs of keeping a cook, a nurse, a general housekeeper, a call girl and a companion, each of them paid by current tariffs would be more than most males could afford.

57. In China that has gone fairly far, not only asking of each couple to declare in advance their plans as to number and spacing of children, but also their contraceptive practices, for discussion and comments.

58. And, as is standard in alpha structures: there is a bottom layer that does what originally was done, but in other structures (often beta - boys playing football on empty sites in cities): the sports people themselves. On top of that an overlayer of administrators, capitalists (investing in all kinds of sports hardware, not to mention the competitions themselves) and lately also researchers (under what conditions can the human body be pressed towards more achievements in terms of the classical physical dimensions of length, time and mass ?), emerges rapidly, at the local, national and global levels.

59. One prediction here would be that the repertory of signals and signs that "I am no longer fully available for alpha life" will expand. If in illness there is also a message that "I want to be cared for", or "I prefer to make myself unavailable to you", then why should there not be solid signals to the effect that "I am only with you in this with a small portion of myself" (standing by the door when working time is over, with faces reflecting anticipated non-work pleasures?) - and so on? In some cases the person will say this and do it, in other cases he/she will leave that to external agents, precisely the way narcotics do.

60. I am thinking particularly of the play R.U.R. by Karel Capek, Kallocaín, by Karin Boye, and both Animal Farm and 1984 by George Orwell.

61. The force of Brave New World (eg. in the inexpensive paperback edition by Harper & Row, New York, 1969) by Aldous Huxley lies exactly in its benign character: these people have some kind of fun, and yet they are no longer humans! Moreover, the alpha management of the production of human beings is here carried not further than one could easily imagine extrapolating from current trends, only that it took a genius like Huxley to do so in 1932 (presumably much ahead of social scientists).

62. In Western history this is where the famous slogan Stadluft macht frei enters the picture.


64. We are thinking of the famous unemployment checks, or twelve people sharing a job at the post office on a rotation basis. But then why not? What is actually
so bad about being parasitical? Much of nature is based on that, only the parasitism should have some symbiotic symmetry to it. Those who work for smaller social units should not necessarily accept the idea that the unit has to be self-sufficient in all regards.


66. In the article referred to in the preceding footnote this is seen in terms of four modes of human existence: childhood, education, work and retirement - C-E-W-R - and the question posed is why they should come in such big time chunks and in that order? Why not see them exactly as that, as modes of existence, and spread them more along the life-cycle, with education years all through, only not necessarily in an unbroken chain, with work extending far into childhood and retirement, with childhood extending into adulthood (as a mode of irresponsible, playful behavior), and so on? But, as Roger Carkany pointed out in the Mexico conference, Faustian man is redeemed through hard work, not through play and love...

67. It should be pointed out that people do that already now, retiring early in some of the beauty spots of this world. It should also be pointed out, however, that this is not quite it: first, it is only for the few, for people with money; second it is usually non-productive and parasitical in an asymmetric manner (which is the reason why such people are so concerned with parasitism); third, there is often a rather conventional nature estheticism involved in picking the spot.

68. Recently, the attacks on efforts to make nuclear power plants would be most clear examples: they will in all probability increase in the future. The German term Bürgerinitiative, excellently analyzed by Hans-Eckehard Bahr and his colleagues in various books more or less with that title, is a phenomenon that should be seen in this light. But not what is usually called terrorism: terrorists do not seem to have any beta or gamma ideology, but to work for the downfall of the present alpha structure and the creation of their own.

69. This is the distinction between the segmented and the integrated modes of needs satisfaction, elaborated in the paper referred to in footnote 55 above, section 5 (10).

70. Central bakeries supplying large portions of the country are today found in the US, UK and Sweden (and others, no doubt). Invariably the quality of the bread seem to become lamentable.

71. The best example of this totally antihuman perspective is the reasoning offered in defense of the neutron bomb: that it destroys "only" human lives, not buildings, factories, etc.

72. No doubt there is a contradiction somewhere here: the more movement there is, the more will there be, at least potentially, a carry-over from one unit to the other. On the other hand, one might speculate that units would cater to people in different phases of their personal development (not necessarily the same as the more public and administrative concept "phase in their life-cycle") and that this would serve to generate quite a lot of heterogeneity among units.

73. But, to what extent can Faustian man learn this? The Malawian ethnologist Chisiza in an article about African folk character published in Journal of Modern African Studies 1969 (here quoted indirectly from Thorkild Hansen, Slavernes Skibe, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 196 , p.192) depicts a totally different mentality from either the Eastern meditative or the Western investigative form. While in the West people live in order to work in Africa they work in order to live, searching for happiness rather than beauty or truth (abstractions), and engaging in forms of production that typically are group activities. Abilities that foster communality, such as generosity, helpfulness, a generally conciliatory attitude are encouraged; ambitiousness and revengefulness are controlled. A sense of humor rather than melancholy prevails. In this description it is easily seen how well the African personality is fitted for beta/gamma structures and the Western personality for alpha-structures — or, rather, how the alpha structure is shaping Western personality.
74. There are at least four ways of doing this: by having a concentric circle of farmland around the cities - as it used to be around villages - with people being part-time farmers, part-time workers; by having spots of farmland inside the cities, like cultivating parks; through vertical agriculture using high rise buildings and their walls for new types of plants; and by micro-agriculture, extremely intensive, in small pots and pans and vessels, on balconies, inside apartments, etc. Obviously, none of these excludes the others.


77. In Capitalism and Material Life 1400 - 1800, Fontana/Collins, London, 1974, Fernand Braudel in his most stimulating chapter 8 on Towns describes in much detail how easily cities prey on the countryside. Of course, alpha/beta is not identical with city/countryside, but the latter distinction has to be carried into any alpha/beta analysis.

78. In a sense, the entire Chinese experience with people's communes, and inside the people's communes is exactly about this. For a fine review see the FAO document Learning From China, FAO, 1978.

79. This trend is probably most pronounced in the US, the UK and Italy - see also footnote 70. In Italy city terrorism would also tend to speed up such processes.

80. This is actually the theory of vacation - it is not only "to do something different", but to do it with other people, presumably the people one likes most to be together with (or people unknown, taking the chance that one might get to like them).

81. It should be pointed out that sizes such as these are the normal ones in human history and in human habitats: the megalopolis, metropolis, even many of the cities being exceptional (but being so big cities now absorb more than half of humankind).

82. The classical formula, of course, is to have a chamber in the national assembly where all first level units are equally represented (eg. two from each state, as in the US Senate), and another chamber where all human individuals are, in principle equally represented. Maybe it is hard to beat the wisdom of such formulas?

83. The demagogical reference made to cancer can be made even more demagogical: it is particularly Western countries in the last centuries that have grown and added empires without much sense of limitation. Should one, hence, go one step further than Roger Garaudy's formula, occident est accident, and say that there is something cancerous about the occident?

84. Thus, a "Ministry for small-scale experiments" would be entirely within the logic of the present system, prescribing even detailed norms for their operation.


86. This becomes less true, however, if one includes - as one should - among the possible beta structures the non-territorial ones. There are many cases, such as circles of friends or colleagues scattered around the world, engaged in symbolic and long-distance communication, yet as important to each other as any set of close neighbours.

"One typical European family of the year 2000 - .. - live in a converted eighteenth century farmhouse on the edge of a hill area between 70 and 150 kilometers from a major city .. Built in an energy conscious age, this farmhouse has properties of insulation which makes it very apposite to a new age of conservation... They have installed a windmill for electric power, though they can still draw from the electric grid (note from JW: right after that book was published private windmills in Denmark are used to feed into the electric grid in addition, thus making it possible to use the electric grid - alpha - as a cushion between all the windmills - beta). They recycle farm refuse for fuel. And in summer they can draw on solar energy. The farm is one of a group forming a small rural hamlet, it is occupied by a number of families that moved into them and reoccupied them after they were abandoned in the late 1950s, during the great age of European agricultural depopulation. Lower down the valley are other such family groups, forming a loose cluster of about fifty nuclear families or about two hundred people. Together with other such clusters and the nearest village they form a sufficiently large group to support a village primary school and community centre. To speak of families, though, gives a wrong impression"(pp.257-58). We let that do as a taste, noticing the attention given to the numerical factor.

88. A shift of attention, that is, from a focus on expansion to one on depth.


90. All that has happened recently in the rich, industrialized, western countries that can be grouped under the heading of "commune movements" are efforts to do exactly that: to push alpha back, to recreate beta. For a first summary on these attempts, see the proceedings from the meeting of the sub-project Alternative Ways of Life (of the GPID Project), Cartigny, 21-24 April 1978, edited by Monica Wemegah.
91. Nor does there have to be any solution - that is the intellectual trap.

92. This ability to export the periphery, to push it outside one's own border, gives rise to much confusion. Thus, many make the observation that center countries are rich and educated whereas periphery countries are poor and uneducated, and draw either of two conclusions: that one causes the other, that education gives rise to wealth, or vice versa. A more valid formulation would be to say they are the top and bottom of the same (alpha) pyramid(s) with division of labor so that education flows upwards (brain-drain) and so does wealth (exploitation).


94. Riaz Hasser, in "The Urban Environment and Mental Health", in Nancy Ching, ed., Questioning Development in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia Study Group, Singapore, 1977, pp. 31-50 makes an excellent observation:

"Bureaucratic organizations exert a strong attraction for compulsive neurotic types. While it is true that normal, well integrated individuals, because of their flexibility and adaptability, can compete successfully for top posts in an hierarchy, this alone does not prevent the bureaucratic organizations from ultimate domination by deviant types. Normal personalities are sufficiently adaptable to be able to work well with non-typical colleagues, and they may recruit into the upper echelons as successors men who are compulsive or rigidly formalistic. This recruitment is not likely to be reciprocated. Once lodged at the power centers of an organization, neurotics tend to surround themselves with similar personalities. Neurotics create or select others in their own image. Such a selective phenomenon serves, in the end, to neurotize and entire organization, and may stamp its collective character on vast numbers of people". (p.41)

The point is, of course, that the compatibility of alpha with what is here referred to as neurotic or compulsive personality structures is so high that this type of mental disorder passes unnoticed:
it is even functional for the system.

For an excellent development of this theme, see Lewis Yablonsky, Robopaths, People or Machines, Baltimore, Penguin, 1972, with a wealth of evocative examples, starting with the Automated Battleground. The robopath is the human robot, which Yablonsky sees as the opposite of a humanistic personality type, eg., as defined by Maslow in his image of the self-actualized person. Yablonsky uses the characteristics developed in A. Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory", in New Knowledge in Human Values (Maslow, ed.), Harper, New York, 1966, p. 127: efficient perception of reality; openness to experience; integration, wholeness and unity of person; spontaneity, aliveness; a real self with firm identity; objectivity, transcendence of self; creativeness; ability to fuse concreteness and abstractness; democratic character structure; ability to love. It may be pointed out that all these characteristics would be very compatible with a beta structure.

95. Bernt Hagtvet, University of Oslo (and associated with the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research), makes a fine summary of these theories in The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A re-examination, Third Nordic Conference on Macro-Analysis, Sandebjerg, 22-24 September, 1978:

"Close to twenty years after its appearance, William Kornhauser's The Politics of Mass Society (1959) remains one of the most comprehensive statements of the genesis and functions of modern authoritarian movements. The nomenclature of the book—concepts like "mass", "mass society", "atomization", "alienation" and more colourful phrases used by other representatives of the mass theory tradition, like "the lonely crowd", "mass man" and his "fear of freedom"—have become part of popular discourse. These concepts come in vogue as convenient catch-words crystallizing various ills in contemporary society: rootlessness, feelings in impotence and meaninglessness, impersonal human relations, lack of control because of size and complexity, etc."

(pp. 5-6)

Hagtvet contrasts mass theory with class theory and comes to the conclusion that the latter nevertheless is better in explaining the collapse of the Weimar republic and the rise of nazism. Maybe both. The alpha structure engenders mass society through its marginalization, fragmentation and segmentation. Class formation is
one of the possible periphery defense mechanism; it is an alpha structure because of the way in which parties and trade unions are organized. Organization of the periphery will lead to organization of the center over and above its command of the alpha structure. In the struggle the social alpha structure gives a tremendous edge to the center - a major reason why there are so few revolutions (for this point, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Revolutions", Peace and Social Structure, essays in Peace Research, Vol. III, Møller, CopenHagen, 1973, pp. 262-314). Both classes can draw upon people perverted by the alpha structure for extreme acts of violence, because of the incapacity of alpha to build compassion/shame. It should be noted that another mechanism of defense against the alpha structure is (re)creation of beta structures and encapsulation in them - clubs, associations of all kinds, the bar, the pub, withdrawal into the family.

96. Thus, what will happen to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore when the People's Republic of China, and the other four ASEAN countries start exporting? The book by Nancy Ching, ed. mentioned in the beginning of footnote 94 above, gives more than enough indication to the effect that Singapore already is tasting the bitter fruits of the intra-national pathologies relatively well known in the first world. Add to this the effects when the results of the inter-national pathology of drawing a circle around the regional headquarters of so and so many transnational organizations, calling it a country, retransforms on that country!

97. Also see footnote 96 above.

98. Needless to say, third world elites expecting to benefit from the alpinization of their countries will see this type of critique and effort to propagate alternative visions as an effort to deprive them of what is rightfully theirs, after years of suffering. They are right, and they are wrong - at any rate, all these are experiences third world countries will have to make themselves and react to themselves. The world is better served by a third world that finds its own answers than a third world imitating not only first world alpinization but also turning away from it, in the same imitative way.
103. See the introduction by Eleanor Masini in this volume.

104. For the best exploration of this known to the present author, see A. Krippendorff, The Human Costs of the International System, Johns Hopkins Center, Baltimore, 1974, unpublished manuscript.

105. The reason is simple: alpha structures expand, in a finite world, and hence are on collision courses. There are mechanisms to regulate the potential and actual conflicts; experience seems to indicate that they may not be sufficient. Military organizations are alpha structures whose task it is to protect and promote the interests of the alpha structures that gives rise to them - the state, the corporations.

106. This is non-military defense aimed at protecting the social form rather than the national territory - a supreme example being Gandhi.

107. To the extent that marxism contracts, in vulgar versions, to a doctrine about how workers are cheated economically, marxists in power will tend to blame the institutions of large-scale justice, meticulously calculating new forms of justice and implementing them. The result is structural, one-dimensional, unemotional, and incapable of sustaining lasting enthusiasm because it is quickly taken for granted. The lack of dynamism in the socialism of Western European countries after the worst injustices of the late feudal, early capitalist formations that preceded the present regimes is one indicator in this connection: there seems to be insufficient basis to generate new ideas, visions, goals and hopes; except, of course, through the adoption of liberal and capitalist practices, hitching the countries onto that type of dynamism.

108. Liberalism may be good as a theory of macro horizontality - for instance in the form of balance of power between the three branches of government (Montesquieu) - but weak when it comes to detecting verticality both at the micro and macro levels.

109. The classic is Peter Kropotkin, Fields, Factories and Workshops, London, 1899. For a vivid description of the difference between Lenin and Kropotkin and what they stood for, see Emma Goldman, Living My Life, Knopf, New York, 1931 - including her
description of the Kronstadt mutiny in 1921.

106. The position that only men, only whites etc. are capable of creating and running such institutions as imperialism should be seen as sexist and racist respectively.

107. As it is said in the beautiful words of Francisco d'Assisi's Preghiera Semplice:

"Oh - Maestro, fa ch'io non cerchi tanto;
Ad essere consolato, quanto a consolare.
Ad essere compreso, quanto a comprendere.
Ad essere amato, quanto ad amare."