ON FORMAL AND INFORMAL POWER SYSTEMS

And their effects on global planning, management and institutions

by Johan Galtung

Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, UN University, Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Développement, Geneva

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Alfaz del Pi, August 1978
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1. On 'power' in general.

Power is power to move, to move people and things in one direction rather than others, to move their hearts and minds. So power is dynamic: it is that which can bring about change and oppose change - it is the key factor to be understood by those who want to bring about changes, or oppose them. It is to social systems what force is to physical systems - and of forces there are many kinds, mechanical, electric, magnetic, etc. There is force everywhere. When most things nevertheless remain where they are most of the time it is not because there are no forces, but because forces are somehow balanced: there are equal and opposed counter-forces. If something changes it, it is because there is a force excess in one direction, or - which is saying the same - a force deficit in the other direction. (1)

It is usually the power excess that interests us in politological analyses, but a focus on that alone may lead to lack of awareness of all the invisible power there is around simply because it is adequately compensated. Thus, why do not cities exploit the countryside even more than they do, getting even more foodstuffs for even worse terms of trade with city-made goods and services? The countryside is in principle easy to exploit: farmers are fragmented by geographical distance (as opposed to workers who are together not only in the workshops in general and the factories in particular, but in the living quarters, the 'working class districts'), and they are easily made dependent on what cities have to offer: the services and manufactured goods sold on the markets. Moreover, they are tied to the farms by the necessity to care for plants and animals, even one day absent for politics may be catastrophic. So why are they not squeezed even further? Probably partly because people in the cities know that the farmers possess an ultimate weapon, the total delivery strike - and also because there are ties of solidarity, e.g. national ties, uniting the two. (2) For that reason people in cities may prefer to exploit farmers in other countries, far away, farmers unable to articulate their distress directly. In short, we postulate two forms of countervailing power: the delivery strike, and the solidarity - the former restraining the cities for fear of what farmers may do to them, the latter a restraint on the cities by the cities themselves. One might talk about anticipated external and internal negative sanctions.

Power analysis, then, is analysis of social systems in terms of power in balance and imbalance. (3) It presupposes some typologies of power, unfortunately; it is rather impossible to do without if the goal is to be able to say something non-trivial about power and how it can be exercised to promote world order values.
And the simplest typology may be one that takes sanctions as the point of departure and sees social processes as an action dialogue, as an actio-reactio, where actio is, at least to some extent, steered by some anticipation of whether the reaction may be positive or negative. (4) The dialogue may, as all dialogues, be internal in the actor or external between actors, so we get four possibilities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.</th>
<th>Power as sanction: the four basic types</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong> (personal)</td>
<td><strong>Positive Sanctions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Good conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External (social)</td>
<td>Reward</td>
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</table>

These are mutual steering processes at the micro and macro level of social organization. But the terms put inside the table may seem too moralistic, too much derived from religious/theological and legal/juridj-cal languages of discourse. There is nothing wrong about that, however, since these are institutions profoundly concerned with power; with steering people along the road of correct behavior and thought, partly by the carrots of the positive sanctions, mainly by the stick of the negative sanctions: bad conscience in the form of a more or less permanent guilt consciousness, fines and imprisonment, eternal punishment in the afterlife. Whether these forms of power are, in fact, effective is another matter: they have been exercised for a long time and people still seem to engage in both wrong behavior and wrong thoughts. But that, of course, proves very little: one would have to know how people had behaved had these forms of power not been there. Moreover, it could also be that there is some counter-vailing power at work neutralizing the possible effect of these forms of power - but to see that some more concepts are needed.

Let us simplify Table 1 by collapsing the two forms of internal power. Essentially they are moral power, and operate inside the actor. But we shall prefer a broader term than 'moral', a term that also brings in philosophical and political standards according to which an actor may evaluate his and her behavior - not only the religious and legal standards. We can think of no better general term than 'ideological', or, if one will, idea power. For the point is simply this: there is a body of thought, more or less coherent, according to which some behavior/thought is right and some is wrong - and it may serve to steer actors on the assumption that it matters sufficiently to them whether what they do is right or wrong.

Hence, we end up with three types of power or power channels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.</th>
<th>The three basic types of power</th>
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<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL</td>
<td>RENUMERATIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by defining standards</td>
<td>by administering goods</td>
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</table>
Any concrete, empirical situation may, of course, be a mixture of all three, partly as manifest power, partly as latent power not yet released into action - but the knowledge that it may be unleashed, called an expectation, positive or negative, may have considerable effect. There is, incidentally, one particular advantage of Table 2 relative to Table 1: although ideological power works inside the actor when the actor compares standards with perception of own actions, those standards have to come from somewhere. The source of power is where the standards come from; they are only put to work inside the actor. For that reason the power-sender of ideological power is the source of the ideology; the power-receiver is merely carrying out the comparison, in a sense decentralizing the power exercise of the power-sender. But, as will be developed later, he can also become a power-sender, a source of power, viz., by generating his own standards, not just using those of others.

We now assume that the material out of which power is made has three components: standards of right and wrong, goods and bads. The problem to be discussed is how this power material is transmitted, and for this there are, as is usual in social analysis, two perspectives: an actor-oriented and a structure-oriented perspective. It is never a question of choosing between them, they are simply two different modes of operation of social systems in general and power in particular.

According to the actor-oriented perspective the exercise of power is deliberate, intended. Power comes in discrete quanta, in the action dialogue which can be written like a drama with identifiable actors and sequences of action. What is most easily identified as power at the common sense level of analysis is a quantum of bad inflicted on the other, in other words an act of punishment. But the same applies to quantum of good, a reward. And to an act of ideological communication, often known as moralizing: this was correct action, this was incorrect - for I know which is which.

According to the structure-oriented perspective the exercise of power is not deliberate, conscious, premeditated. Power no longer comes in discrete quanta, or at least that is not a fruitful perspective: it is more like a flow, like a water faucet left open - it may be a trickle or flood wave depending on the quantity of power there is. The 'action dialogue' is no longer a good metaphor, for everything is so automatic; it is a structure at work. External sanctions are institutionalized and internal sanctions are internalized (6) - which in less jargon-ridden language means the following. Goods and bads come automatically, according to contract - a quid pro quo, according to the old rule do ut des. And the standards are so built into the mental structure of the actors that a sense of what is correct and what is not also comes automatically; there is no need for any explicit reminder.

This is the normal exercise of power, the famous nine tenths of the iceberg - but much less visible than the preceding type. The actor-initiated exercise of power is dramatic, it is news - and in fact does fill the newspapers; the structurally built-in type is olds, so much a part of the ordinary way society operates that it passes unnoticed by many. This is actually one of the big
differences between liberal and marxist analysis: the latter is much better at using the structure-oriented perspective, although over-emphasizing economic goods and bads at the expense of so many others; the former is much better at using the actor-oriented perspective, but to the point of developing advanced levels of structure blindness. Both the religious and the legal perspectives are much stronger along actor-oriented than structure-oriented lines of thought and action, because of the high level of significance attached to intention, to premeditation.

We shall refer to the power exercised according to the first perspective as resource power, and to the power exercised according to the second perspective as positional power. In the first case what the powerful has an excess of, or at least uses an excess of, are resources: the goods, the bads, and standards - among other things to know what constitutes goods and what constitutes bads. In the second case what the powerful has and others do not have is a certain position in a social structure.

For the analysis of resource power one would obviously make use of the categories of economic and military analysis, the major institutions for the production of goods and bads. Thus, the factors of economic production-capital, labor, raw materials including energy, research, organization (for processing and distribution) - and the factors of military 'production' (i.e. of destruction) - capital (the military budgets), labor (the military forces), raw materials including energy (for the military hardware), research and organization (for processing and distribution) - would be listed. Just as important, however, in an evaluation of power, would be the extent to which the actor can set standards for others - in other words, the extent to which it is a taste-setter, a moulder of culture for itself and others, a model.

For the analysis of positional power one would have to make use of the categories of structural analysis. Actually, there are two dimensions to this analysis: first, an analysis of the total social structure in which individual, group/class or state actors are embedded; second, an analysis of the positions of the various actors within that structure. (Actually, this corresponds to the analysis of resource power: one thing would be to analyze what constitutes a resource, another to identify the world distribution of resources). The analysis of the structure, then, becomes a question of to what extent there is vertical division of labor built into it, conditioning of some actors by others, marginalization, fragmentation and segmentation. (7) In the extreme case, the pure alpha structure, there is a clear center and a clear periphery: the center benefits from the vertical division of labor; it conditions the periphery, the periphery is kept outside, is marginalized; it is fragmented, meaning that the actors in the periphery are kept apart from each other; and the periphery is segmented, meaning that the actors only participate with a part of their selves, that part which is useful to the center (as natural resources, as human resources or 'labor' and so on). Obviously, to be in the center of a pure alpha structure, that is to have positional power.
Let us now summarize. There are three *types* of power, and two *modes* of exercising power:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Types and modes of power</th>
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<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL</td>
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<td>RESOURCE POWER</td>
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<tr>
<td>POSITION POWER</td>
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It should be noted that the type of power is exactly the same in the two modes; the difference being whether it is transmitted *ad hoc* or automatically. To take an example: the case of remunerative power, in international systems. It can be exercised as an ad hoc grant/loan in response to some type of behavior very much wanted - and technical assistance is one mechanism for this. Or, it is simply a part of trade, a flow of something wanted, regulated by contractual relations. At the intranational level: this is the difference between the occasional award or premium or bonus, and the regular salary that a wage-earner may have - and nobody would contest that wage-earners, as countries, are steered through contractual relations, not only through the ad hoc decisions. Incidentally, the examples also indicate how much more significant, in day-to-day relations, the structure-oriented perspective with its focus on positional power would be, and how fallacious an analysis only in terms of the occasional outbursts of ad hoc exercise of power.

One brutal fact about social systems can now be brought into the picture: *power begets power*. This principle actually works in all directions in Table 3. Thus, resource power can be converted to positional power, and vice versa. With resource power channels of communication can be built; moreover, one may become a center of attraction by virtue of having something to offer and this may structure the channels of communication. Conversely, positional power is by definition not only a guarantee that resources will accumulate in the center (this is ensured by the vertical division of labor) but also that the periphery will by and large be unable to prevent this from happening (this is ensured by means of the other four structural factors that can be seen as auxiliary to the major one).

The same applies horizontally in Table 3. Thus, punitive power can be used for conquest and be converted to remunerative power - that was the old story of, for instance, Western imperialism; just as the new story is how remunerative or economic power can be converted to punitive power simply by putting a strong economic machinery at the disposal of the military to turn out an ever increasing, and increasingly sophisticated, array of means of destruction. The conversion of either into ideological power may be deplored but is nevertheless a frequent phenomenon: might is right, he who is powerful commands attention, that attention is already the nucleus around which ideological power can crystallize. (8) Conversely, ideological power may give an edge of superiority that the charismatic but poor actor can utilize, slowly accumulating a reservoir of resources for good and for bad. (9)
This type of analysis could now lead to a very interesting dimension: complete vs. incomplete power configurations, or - expressed differently - equilibrated vs. disequilibrated actors. The equilibrated actors are consistently high on all power dimensions, on all three types and on both modes, or consistently low. (10) In short, they are perfectly powerful, or perfectly powerless; they have all kinds of resources and are in the center of the structure, or they have very little in terms of resources and are in the periphery. We know both types from the world today; these are the haves and the have-nots, and with all the mechanisms of conversion between types and modes of power it is not strange that the world as a system becomes so polarized once some actors have some edge over the others. (10) Nevertheless, the most interesting factor in the international system may be the disequilibrated actors, those who are high on some dimension of power and low on some other, for the simple reason that they are likely to be sources of some dynamism - the equilibrated topdogs being too complacent, too happy about the present state of affairs, too concerned with defending the status quo with all kinds of means, and the equilibrated underdogs often being too incapable, powerless, apathetic to be able to bring about any change.

Obviously, there are many types of disequilibrated actors in any system, using the categories of Table 3. For instance, playing first on the types of power: an actor may be high on ideological, remunerative or punitive power, low on the others (the Vatican, the oil states, the terrorists). The obvious prediction would be that actors will tend to strive for a full configuration, particularly if they are high on two so that there is only one missing (China, strong on ideology and on goods, now obviously also going in for the production of bads, or at least for their acquisition). However, as we shall see later such predictions may be too simplistic for there is also an attrition factor at work: one type of power may counteract the other. Thus, ideological power may be driven out by too much remunerative power (the clouds of doubt over the Vatican if/when she is seen as too rich); and punitive power may drive out remunerative power (if the oil states acquire many more arms, will that not inspire even more the trend to become independent of their major resource?). In short, there may be power in the incomplete configuration.

And the same applies to the types of disequilibria that relate to the mode of power. Countries very high on resources but low on positional power (China), like countries high on positional power but low on resources (Switzerland) will always represent an element of deviance, of the atypical; and in their strivings to convert at least some of their advantages on one mode of power into some upward mobility along the other dimension(s) some dynamism will be created. More particularly, the former can be expected to create structures around themselves so that they get high positional power, if they cannot or do not want to move into high positions in existing structures, that is. (11) And the latter will slowly but safely accumulate the resources that accrue, almost with certainty to the actor in a central position in a structure, not the least because of the information control (not only having more information than others have, but also to some extent deciding what they should have).
Finally, some words about the distinction made in the title of this paper: formal vs. informal systems. It is not a very important distinction except if it is made in such a way that the informal systems in fact are the systems of ultimate power, and for that reason often steering the formal systems. We shall identify the formal power system with the non-territorial system of (multilateral) organizations in which actors (in our case, above all, countries) relate to each other, and the informal power system with the territorial system of (bilateral) relations among countries. (12) The organizations, particularly the United Nations, then stand out as a formal system on top or in front of the system of states relating directly to each other with their ideologies and ways of distributing goods and bads. Let us only add to this that everything else said above applies to both systems: there are all three types and both modes of power in both systems, as a moment's reflection will show. Thus, international organizations certainly also have their structure in which power flows unabated but also largely unnoticed, between the splashes of ad hoc decisions — which, incidentally, may be made at regular intervals. (13) In short, the structure of the secretariat vs. the decisions made by the general assemblies!

2. On countervailing power.

Our concern is with change in the present world system; for that to happen some countervailing power has to come into the picture. And how is that at all possible: the powerful, especially those with a complete power configuration, look so powerful, so equipped with all kinds of resources, so in command of the structures by virtue of the positions they have — and the powerless so totally, absolutely powerless. Actually, the situation is not that bad — if it had been so bad the underdogs would always remain underdogs and the topdogs always topdogs; yet history teaches us that quite a lot of changes do take place. Consequently, there must be ample opportunity for changes in the power configuration to take place, otherwise history would not be so dynamic as it is. What we need to understand this is a theory of how the powerless can become more powerful, a theory of countervailing power at least as rich as the one-way theory of power so far presented. Actually, they both belong, equally, to any fully fledged theory of power.

The point of departure would be a distinction so far not made use of, between power-over-others, and power-over-onself as the two major types of countervailing power. (14) In the field of remunerative power, or economic power to use a more evocative term, it is quite clear what this means: the first stands for counter-penetration, the second for self-reliance, even for self-sufficiency (autarchy). In the field of punitive power, or military power, the first stands for the famous balance of power, the second for — what? What is it that corresponds to self-reliance in the field of military power, and in the field of ideological power?
Let us first handle power-over-others as an approach to countervailing power: what it means is simply that the underdog builds himself up on the same types and modes of power as the topdog has, until balance is achieved. As the reader will have noticed this is never completely possible: in this approach there will always be an element of imitation, of using the topdog as a power model; which is tantamount to saying that the topdog retains his ideological power. The underdog is moulded by him even if he should manage to pass him both in the ability to deliver goods and bads, both in resource power and position power. Of course, the underdog may sincerely wish this to happen, but in that wish he should already embedded the internalization of standards set by the topdog. And then there is, of course, the problem of whether it is possible thus to "catch up", to "bridge the gap"; leaving alone whether it is desirable.

We shall return to either issue, but first have to explore the other type of countervailing power: power-over-oneself. The point of departure is a more subtle aspect of power than has been touched so far although it is implicit in the concept of a power-receiver. Power has to be received to work; in the effective exercise of power there is always an element of underdog cooperation with the topdog. The physical analogy may be of some value here. A nail is made so that the force of a hammer can have an impact. The hammer is helpless relative to many other shapes and sizes - for instance cotton - from which it does not follow these other things may destroy the hammer; they simply render it ineffective. Similarly, the force of lightning, an electric discharge, is rendered rather powerless against rubber. So, which are the social equivalents of cotton and rubber? (15)

To explore this the types of power in Table 2 can be made use of, and the reasoning now to follow is the same for resource power and for positional power. For ideological power to be effective there has to be an element of submissiveness in the power receiver, an admission that the power-sender is somehow superior. For remunerative power to be effective there has to be a corresponding element of dependency, an admission that one needs what the topdog has to offer. And for the punitive power to be effective there has to be an element of fear. And is this not precisely the 'portrait of the underdog' (16) - submissive, dependent and fearful - in other words not only a question of the lack of resources and the peripheral position but also of an attitude, a psychological make-up that goes with these deficits and make them bite.

Having said this it is obvious what the conditions for a less receptive attitude to power exercises would be: self-respect, self-sufficiency and fearlessness. If one respects sufficiently one's own standards and ability to define what is correct and right, what is incorrect and wrong (17); further, if one is no longer dependent on what the topdog has to offer and no longer fears his arms - well, then one is no longer a power-receiver, an underdog, one is autonomous because one has power-over-oneself. And the beautiful thing about that type of power is that it can be developed by anybody even under the most adverse circumstances.
It may not work under all circumstances, at least not equally effectively, but the process away from being a power-receiver towards a more autonomous status can always be initiated. (18) Incidentally, this process is what puberty is about, with all three elements; and it is identifiable in the history of many countries that simply refuse to submit, to depend and to fear (Albania relative to Yugoslavia, to Soviet Union, and ultimately to China; almost all countries that in some period or another have been exposed to economic sanctions). (19) To the topdog it looks like defiance, like some kind of adolescent that the country has to get through, and the parallel to puberty is actually meaningful. (20) But to the country itself, or at least to those who are the carriers of this kind of policy, it may belong to the Sternstunden of that country, to the periods of transcendence when people feel they are born anew. (21)

So much for the attitudes that are seen as crucial, with their psycho-manifestations. In the concrete world of behavior and action, what would be the concomitants of a declaration of autonomy? Above all it would be to pay less attention to the topdogs. (22) There are two ways of being authoritarian, one is to be systematically submissive, the other to be equally systematically unplaceable -- both of them are indicators of the same: that the topdog has a profound influence on one's own behavior. To be autonomous is to develop one's own personality - be that for individuals or for countries - not to be steered in everything, positively or negatively, by some model. Consequently, it does not mean splendid isolation, that would be an expression of fear. He who is fearless does not fear contact with others, interaction, but retains a capacity for self-sufficiency that would make him independent if he wanted to, i.e. if the topdog tries to make use of any dependency for ulterior purposes. (23)

The upshot of all this is that self-reliance, so often discussed narrowly in an economic context alone, merely as a question of using better one's own economic factors, should be seen as a power strategy. Its three pillars, self-respect, self-sufficiency and fearlessness point much beyond economics towards politics and psychology, and the key to it all is to gain more power over oneself. In this the mental declaration of independence is indispensable, but in saying so we are not proclaiming that the key to countervailing power is psychological/ideological - only that this is an indispensable element. Prior to that declaration of independence there is probably also a history of power abuse, of exploitation of the middle range, sufficient to stimulate counter-reactions, not so strong as to lead to total subjugation, to a state of perennial submissiveness, dependency and fear. The problem is whether the total pattern of power exercise leaves us with that kind of open window, with a pressure sufficient to stimulate but not to subjugate. In short, it is a question of that fruitful range that turns a challenge into a creative response. (24)

At this point another crucial aspect of general power theory has to be brought into the picture: the theory of power bridgesheads.
It has been alluded to above: it is a question of whether and how the topdog is built into the underdog, capable of exercising all types of power through both modes, so to speak. In psychoanalytical theory, at the individual level, this is the famous super-Ego, the internalized presence of the source of standards, of morals (we would say ideology) - sometimes personalized as the mental image of a stern god, a father, an easily-saddened mother. In the theory of imperialism, among states, the bridgehead takes very concrete forms: the colonial forces, above all foreign troops, administrators, businessmen of various kinds, missionaries; the neo-colonial forces, usually the same categories with the same values and trades, but with local skin.

In a sense the neo-colonial situation is to the colonial situation what the more mature child is to the smaller one: for the latter the super-Ego is still very concrete, even the concrete presence of parental authority; for the former it is already a part of the person's self, gradually being rooted in the personality, moulded with other forces. (25)

Thus, to attain autonomy from colonialism one has to fight others; to attain autonomy from neo-colonialism (which is not only found in the Third World, but in the First and Second Worlds as well) part of the fight has to be against oneself. The borderlines between self and other are never clear - not even in the colonial case for that reason; the power always being a little bit rooted, institutionalized, internalized (for that reason the borderline between pure, ad hoc resource power and positional power is not too clear either in practice; these are analytical categories).

Needless to say, this does not make the struggle for autonomy any easier. Incidentally, it also serves to explain why people alienated from their societies often are important in revolutions: they have less to fight against inside themselves.

Translated into the politics of today, what has been said so far is simply the following: countervailing power, relative to the colossal power structure in today's world, would have dissociation, delinking from that structure as a major component. In this type of struggle elites in the underdog countries (the 'centers in the periphery') may fall on either side; most likely they will split, one part joining the center in the world power structure (26), another part joining the newly forged autonomy, trying to work out a viable future. As we all know this is very far from any abstract kind of reasoning, it is exactly what has happened in the world a number of times in this century - sometimes identified with the word 'revolution'. However, that word may block for innovative theory and practice rather than stimulate it, so let us try to continue with the problem of countervailing power as such, and expose what has been said so far to some obvious criticism.

**Critic**: So, some countries undergo this process after the first seeds have been sown by what I guess you would call progressive groups within the country. They become autonomous - they develop self-respect, self-sufficiency and fearless- ness. I grant you that this happens to nations and coun- tries; there are these instances of euphoria, 'trans- cendence' you would probably call it. But is it viable, can it last?
Author: Nothing lasts forever, yet, it is almost incredible how long the euphoria accompanying what happens in Cuba has lasted, in spite of elements of repression. However, it should be pointed out that this is not something a country would have to do alone - collective self-reliance (as opposed to the major falsification of that concept, collective bargaining with the power structure) is an effort to become autonomous together.

Critic: I grant you that. However, if the power structure in the world is that strong, what will prevent it from doing what is in its power to do: unleash all the bads at its disposal, from economic blockade to more or less open support of its own bridgeheads to right-out invasion? The local people may declare themselves imbued with self-respect, enjoy their self-sufficiency and be fearless - yet, with an economic blockade biting, with internal and external military in the streets a dead man is a dead man whether fearless or not.

Author: Right, and for that reason what has been said so far is too simplistic. Delinking is not enough; it is also too crude as a category. As is said, it should only be regarded as one component. At the same time there could be another component of more conventional countervailing power: counter-ideology, counter-penetration, counter-force. The basic point with the present power theory is only that this is never sufficient, regardless of how necessary it may be.

Let us then try to summarize in a more complete and systematic fashion some of the obvious possibilities of the underdog. In doing so we have to make use of Table 3; if these are the basic forms of power then the basic forms of countervailing power should be responses to them, to all six of them. With one autonomy and one balance approach for each one that should give a total of twelve forms of countervailing power:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Types and modes of countervailing power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESOURCE POWER, Autonomy approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESOURCE POWER, Balance approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITION POWER, Autonomy approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITION POWER, Balance approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this tabular presentation there is also some hint or hypothesis as to strategy, that term being used not only in the sense of defining the goals, but also of laying down the rough time order of some of the major steps on the way. Of course, that time order can never be linear, there is always a back-and-forth movement in any political process - but *grosso modo* the table may nevertheless be indicative.

Thus, a basic point is to start with the recognition that the fundamental assets, the basic resources are with oneself. Consequently, to gain control over them is where everything starts. Part of this is a psycho-political process of building autonomy in one's own mind, part of it a question of gaining control over the economic cycles - both nature (raw materials, energy), production facilities and the distribution machineries. All this should primarily be for own uses as long as there is a need, particularly as long as basic human needs are left unsatisfied. But this has to be accompanied with an ideological build-up, and a truly endogenous one. Here it should be remembered that marxism is a product of the West, perhaps indispensable to understand how western capitalism works; but it is not the same as an endogenous ideology. (28) No culture, to our knowledge, preaches submission to a world power structure; consequently there are elements on which to build in any culture. But this task, obviously, cannot be done from the outside. And the same applies to fearlessness: in the table there is an indication of a structure that might be conducive to the state of fearlessness - a decentralization of the country to the point that it becomes less vulnerable to an outside attack. (29) Possibly, this may be combined with preparations for guerilla and non-military types of defense.

Imagine now that this is carried out, that there is more control over one's own resources - cultural, economic and military resources. In that case one can start playing the other party's game, penetrating the topdog. Today this is best known in the economic field and in the form of investment and buying of property. So far little is done by the world periphery in terms of counter-missionary activities, and by that is not so much meant the creation of buddhist, hindu and islam centers - more or less proselytizing - around the world, but a much broader approach. The Third World does not seem to be aware that one of its major assets has to do with its way of life; itself more integrated, more based on togetherness than the extremely segmented and fragmented life styles that have been developed in the West. Playing the western game in the reverse would mean not only to develop faith and pride in one's own way of life - to the extent it is still there - but also to define the West as underdeveloped (which in many regards it is) and start propagating for changes.

Nor has the Third World so far really started opening a Pandora's box that sooner or later will have to be opened: the question of a credible counter-deterrence. Of course, today the capitalist West would like to see parts of the Third World organize itself militarily against military penetration organized by the socialist part of the West, and that socialist part might well like to organize similar alliances against interventionist operations from the capitalist part of the West. What will probably come,
if only after painful years of attachment to either camp, would be a credible Third world deterrent against any kind of penetration (30) - but it is quite possible that this cannot take place before a process of autonomy relative to neo-colonialism and the vestiges of colonialism has progressed further. It is of course not to be ruled out that this deterrent also will have a nuclear component, and any attempt by the status quo powers in nuclear affairs to delegitimize Third world nuclear power more than their own will, of course, be counterproductive. (31)

With this autonomy basis, preparatory work is done for attacks on the structure of power itself. Whether those attacks will be successful depends very much on whether the autonomy approach work of phase 1 above has been sufficiently well done. If all that is done is to get rich quickly through improved terms of trade on some commodities and investing or wasting excess accumulated capital (32), then it is more likely than not that the world power structure at present will be able to reabsorb, for instance by upping the prices on manufactured goods, on licenses and royalties, etc., all the time claiming that they refer to new products, not to last year's product. But if own resources are believed in, particularly own human beings (not accepting outsiders' definition of what a 'developed', skilled, educated human 'resource' means) then a necessary condition for some dissociation or decoupling from the world power structure is present. But there are two clarifying remarks to be made here: the point about decoupling is not so much leaving the world structure of bilateral and multilateral relations as to focus more on one's own situation, and those in the same situation objectively speaking, paying less attention to those above and more to others in the same position as oneself. It means acting and thinking more in horizontal terms, less in vertical terms, so to speak. From the topdog point of view, however, this is already delinking since they ask for almost undivided attention, being highly jealous of others. And in a sense it is: given that any country's or any actor's potential for interaction is limited, interaction resources have to be taken from somewhere. A real emphasis on horizontal solidarity will have to be combined with some decrease in attention to those on the top, at least relatively speaking. It does mean redirection of trade, for instance.

The second clarifying remark is this: decoupling does not have to apply to all fields of interaction. There are fields that are more critical than others. Again, the parallel to adolescent autonomy building activities can be made use of: it is more important, at least in western culture, for the young boy or girl to find their own way in the world of ideology than in the world of commensalism and convivialism - to be independent ideologically is completely compatible, in many families, with continued living together. How partial or complete a decoupling has to be will depend very much on what kind of 'family', there are world top-dogs who may learn to let go even in essential relations; there are others who will try to keep whatever vertical link there is. (33)

Imagining now that this phase 3 has been carried out with some success - what would then be the basic point of phase 4, the balance approach within the position approach?
The point, as the two words 'balance' and 'position' indicate, is to obtain some parity in the world structures. The formal approach to this, in organizations, is well known: much attention paid to the national origin of the officers of the organization, parity obtained through quotas and rotation, occasionally also to the location of headquarters, or at least to conferences and assemblies. One should not belittle this: changes in the formal structure toward parity may not only mystify the gross asymmetries in the informal structures by throwing a veil of equality over them; they may also contribute to some change in these informal structures. However, the basic thesis here is that a much better approach is to build up one's own structure first, gaining autonomous experience, and then recouple or relink on the basis of a parity that already exists in the informal structure.

In short, the order in which things are done is important. The strategy of countervailing power recommended here is this:

1 — 2 — 3 — 4

ending up with a world where both resources and positions are more equally distributed than in the present world. However, there are also many other more or less articulated strategies in this field, such as

2b

In other words, simply engage in counter-investment. Or, for that matter:

3c

the strategy of non-alignment. Or, an example often found in more pious, small groups in the First world (and also in the Third):

1

forgetting how easily such tiny structure can be overrun by the roller-coaster of the world power structure.

Let us then confront a critic again, with a rather important objection:

Critic: But what is in Table 4 looks so much like what is already being done! I have heard the verbiage of phase 1 for ages, and much of it is in the resolutions and charters of the New International Economic Order. Moreover, OPEC countries are already engaged in counter-penetration; and as to building own structures for ideological transmission, I guess this is what the new international information order (34) is about, just as there has been non-alignment around for a long time, since Belgrade in 1961 or Bandung in 1955 if you will. There has also been joining, relinking, recoupling - particularly of the so-called socialist countries. Even that champion of decoupling, China, now seems to be relinking with world capitalism at full speed!
Author: Right, I agree with this analysis. But some points are missing. First, the countervailing strategies of the underprivileged of this world have so far been very fragmented: sometimes this, then a little bit of that - some countries specializing in phase 2 approaches, others in phase 3 approaches, and so on. What is contained in Table 4 is a more complete set of strategies, with efforts to see how they combine into something quite meaningful if more actors were practising all of them. Second, the order has not been right. Much of what passes for countervailing power is actually a way of playing up to the existing power structure, e.g. by supplying it with capital in the form of recycled petrodollars. And then, third: why should it be different? I actually want to show that what the underprivileged countries have been doing does make sense or can make sense provided it is pursued with a more total strategy in mind. What has been done is part of a historical process that has already changed this world and is going to change it further - the present paper merely tries to point to some of the pieces that may still be missing in the puzzle.

Critic: But then another point: do all that, and where would we be? Definitely in the world where today's underprivileged countries have a more fair share of the total world product. But that is a rather mixed bag. It contains very big and powerful countries and small and powerless; it contains elites perhaps more privileged than almost anybody in the First world and masses worse off than anyone else. Even if one redistributes between the First, Second and Third worlds one does not necessarily make for any redistribution within the Third world.

Author: With this I agree entirely, and that is the reason why so much of the general theory is in terms of 'actors', not in terms of countries. Also, Table 4 is prefaced with some remarks about 'the obvious possibilities of the underdog' - again leaving it open who the underdog is. Thus, I take it that all that has been said so far in a sense applied to at least three levels: between the regions in the world conveniently referred to by counting 'worlds', within these regions as a way in which the weaker states can stand up against the stronger ones, and within these states as a way in which the masses can stand up against the elites. Power works like a set of Chinese boxes: there is power within power within power; and within the most powerless there are again the powerful and the powerless. These three levels correspond to regional, national and local levels of self-reliance, respectively.

In fact, all of what has been said so far can be summarized in that term: self-reliance - which we would like to interpret as a process, not as a state of affairs, at least these three levels and with something like the content that is given in Table 4. In other words, self-reliance as a concept should comprise both autonomy, decoupling and recoupling strategies.
3. Some consequences for global planning, management and institutions.

The basic consequence of what has been said in the preceding section can be formulated in one simple thesis: if change is wanted it is very limited what can be obtained through negotiation with the power-holders. Think of what they possess: the positions of command in most structures that matter, formal or informal; overwhelming resources to throw into any bargain that may be struck as a result of the negotiation. Look at the way the structures are made, particularly the informal structures in the territorial system: there is already built into them a fragmentation that makes it so easy to deal with the powerless one at the time through the capacities of the foreign ministry machineries in the capitals of the powerful countries - just calling in the ambassador, offering his country something special, the understanding being that he will not look too much in any horizontal direction, informing his equals. And there is built into the formal system, the international organizations, a very high level of segmentation: the organizations are so specific, so turned to a small spectrum of the total world situation, so hedged around by rules as to what constitutes relevant matters. And think of the marginalization built into the formal system: the powerful countries have so many more organizations with secretariats well endowed both in capital, research and organization; the powerless are not members and more often than not have nothing corresponding in terms of organizations. In short, by using the existing system or rather, by relying only on them, the results are already given. The agendas are built into the structure of the system, the results are an almost foregone conclusion. The cards are too well stacked in favor of the haves.

It should be pointed out that this does not necessarily depend on any bad will or intention on the side of the powerful. Of course, they may have their tricks: they may feign a resistance in the direction they want the agreement to be located to give the powerless an impression of victory. But much more basic than the whole ritual of negotiations throughout the night, a dramatic breakdown and then a breakthrough with the champagne bottles taken out of the coolers (where they have been all the time), and the resident press corps called into attention, is the automatic working of the structures. Thus, if there is negotiation about economic relations between non-industrialized and industrialized countries, the negotiations almost have to be about terms of trade; how much of the commodities for how much of the manufactures. Just the very fact of meeting together will bring up this topic one way or the other because their relationship is structured around that theme. And in doing so, energy of all kinds is taken away from the other possibilities: processing at home for own use (import substitution), and trade along horizontal lines. But for the former a meeting with oneself, ad hoc, is sufficient; for the latter there is no need to devote too much time to discussions with the overprivileged. Hence, less time should be devoted to the North-South conferences (like the Paris dialogue) (35) - rather wait till time is ripe.

To define 'development' in such a way that it is spearheaded by rich countries is structurally similar to defining 'disarmament' in such a way that it is spearheaded by the superpowers. (36)
It is a good indicator of the extent to which those powerful countries have been able to impress their standards on others that there are many people, some of them of considerable prominence, who still—after so much evidence to the contrary—manage to believe that this is the only 'realistic' approach. To the contrary, this is the approach that the rich countries, wanting it or not, will make use of to increase the wealth gap further, and the superpowers to increase the force gap further—the former by making development dependent on trade with rich countries, the latter by imposing conditions on others that they do not live up to themselves. It is realistic in the sense that it is feasible; the powerful want it and the powerless think they have no alternative and are often flattered simply because they are within talking distance of their structural masters, rewarded by some mini-concessions. Some of them may even feel flattered by being offered the opportunity to serve as an 'engine of growth', helping the rich countries out of their current crisis by placing a sufficient number of orders in order to provide jobs for the unemployed in countries used to produce for the entire world market without other competition than what they can muster among themselves. (37)

So, if the 'realistic' approach is unrealistic, what is then the 'unrealistic' approach that may prove to be realistic? How does the adage, 'pay less attention to the powerful', translate into concrete politics in the field of global planning, management and institutions?

To start with the formal system, the system of organizations: by creating many more autonomous Third World organizations, at least in all fields of any significance for the distribution of ideology (including news!), goods and bads. This does not mean leaving any world organization in the same field; the struggle within that organization should continue— but it should be strengthened by autonomous organizational experience.

To take the United Nations as an example: an organization encompassing all types of power, an organization for the disbursement of resource power and the flow of structural power, an organization where all types of countervailing power can to some extent be promoted, and counteracted—the latter mainly through co-optation, absorption. The system of Afro-Asian or Third World caucuses are good cases of effective use of the dialectic between fission and fusion: withdrawal to discuss and form a position, then a thrust forward inside the organization. Bloc voting is another and related expression and indispensable, in spite of the obvious that the motivations behind a certain vote may differ considerably inside the highly heterogeneous Third World bloc.

But this is not enough, for whereas the First world have their views well prepared not only by their governments but also by their powerful intergovernmental secretariats (particularly OECD and the EC), the Third World is not in a similar position. It may perhaps be said that they have been able to some extent to make use of UNCTAD as a secretariat—as a minor compensation for the way in which GATT, WIPO and so many other UN organizations have served predominantly First world interests.
But even this is to play into the hands of the powerful because of the functional specificity of UNCTAD, its economism and not negligible intellectual rigidity and conservatism.

What is needed is obviously a Third World Secretariat, maybe brought about by some fusion between the machineries for the non-aligned countries and for the Group of 77 in order not to disperse energies too much. The difficulties are of course exactly the same as those witnessed by the OECD and EC secretariats (the latter has the somewhat pretentious name the 'commission'): nationals of some countries may have a too dominant position (we are not even mentioning such organizations as the NATO or OEA, the WTO or CMEA; here superpower dominance is built in from the very beginning).

More precisely, in the case of a Third World Secretariat: at least some time ago it might be feared that the production of development intellectuals was so much higher in Latin America and India that there would be space for little else, and particularly not for Africans. (38) But, not the least due to the UN, a high number of qualified people with a not-too-bad dispersion in the world geography exists as a reservoir for staffing a secretariat of that type. Incidentally, that secretariat would of course add greatly to its power and influence by doing the same as the OECD and the EC do: by having some First world stagiaires and resident researchers; and by having studies also made of the problems of the countries of the First world, not only to understand them better, but also with a view to helping them one way or the other with fresh views.

Obviously, a secretariat of that type would be located in a Third World country and it would be concerned with relations within and among Third world countries (autonomy-building!) as well as with relations with the First and Second worlds (balance-building!). It would prepare background and position papers, and not only for the formal system of organizations, but also as advice in connection with bilateral relations - as does the First world (and indeed the Second). There would be a UN section with sub-sections for UN organizations. All this is obvious. But if one might be permitted one little piece of advice then it would be to have a maximum of exchange between the secretariat and positions of theory and practice, universities and research institutes on the one hand, and concrete work on the other, even practising Chinese patterns of rotation in and out of villages and industries (but on a more voluntary basis).

In no way does this preclude work in the UN and contact with the First world - as a matter of fact, it would probably even increase it. But it does mean that the Third world would have a chance, on a continuous basis and large scale, to be much better prepared. Very soon that would pay off not only for the Third world in the sense that they would be more able to take care of their own interests, but for the whole world because the Third world would see itself more, not less, in a world role. Why? Because of the significance of being autonomous relative to being at the bottom of the world table - in some cases even in the position of Lazarus, down at the floor, hoping for some crumbs to 'trickle down'.
Thus, after some years the Third World Secretariat would be surprised to see how many readers they would get among the disenchanted in the First world just as the Third world business and power elites in general have been avid customers to the documents churned out by the First world machineries - because they speak to their bridgehead interests.

In general this pattern could be repeated in many, even most, of the international organizations of any significance. It will only serve to enrich our world in addition to building autonomy for the underprivileged - just like separate organizations for women are not only a necessity for their liberation, but also something from which everybody will ultimately benefit.

But will the First world benefit from this? Even with a growing world pie - to use that economistic language - the rate of change of redistribution may be higher than the rate of growth of the pie so that the First world actually does lose. The argument would then be that the First world already has enough, even more than enough, and that it should worry much more about its internal redistribution and its many symptoms of overdevelopment, and less about continued power balance in its favor relative to the Third world. (38) As it is not very likely that the arrogant power elite of the First world will see matters this way, they will probably have to learn it the hard way: by the Third world gradually unleashing all its potentials for countervailing power. An intelligent First world elite, however, would have a deeper understanding of power and would understand how much latent power there is in the Third world, how much power then can and probably will be unleashed - and be more accommodating and encouraging.

Then, the informal power system, the territorial system, where rules are less explicit in spite of all the codification in international law, and where power is more extreme, both in terms of rewards and in terms of punishment, than it can ever be in an organization (where maximum reward is to become president and maximum punishment is to be excluded - compare that to a lasting trade surplus and a military invasion!). The basic rule would be the same: a sign of health would be a preponderance (and a growing one) of horizontal, bilateral relations over the vertical ones generated by the period of five hundred years of colonialism in one form or the other. This has to be a gradual process, and some care has to be exercised to stake a good course between the Scylla of accommodating too much to the status quo, and the Charybdis of provoking too much of the ire of the power-holders. (40) Again it is felt that the Third world is not necessarily doing too badly in this regard: those who go fast do provoke that ire, and either have to be gambling on the other super-powerholder (Yugoslavia, Cuba) or will suffer intervention in one form or the other (Czechoslovakia, Chile); unless they have the power resources of a China, that is). And those who go too slow will suffer from continued exploitation by the world power structure and its bridgeheads. But those who go quickly will pave the way for others, in the longer run (and will have to pay for that heroic contribution) and those who go too slowly will pay by not moving at all but benefit from the moves by others in the longer run. (41)
In all of this it may very well be that the conservative regimes moving slowly or not at all are rather grateful to the progressive regimes for the task they carry out, on behalf of so many - only that the local bridgehead elites would like to reap the last benefits before their regimes crumble into socialist, populist or whatever the future will bring regimes. (42)

What is the correct approach, to start with the informal or with the formal system, using the twelve approaches of countervailing power? The answer seems to have to be in terms of both-and: the informal system is more important, the formal system more feasible. Small steps in the former, big steps in the latter! For instance, why not already now establish the Law of the Sea section of the Third World Secretariat, having it ready, working out what cannot be worked out except in a very watered-down form at the world level? After all, the Third world borders on a considerable portion of the world oceans. And then the small steps, an occasional warning against one of the superpower warships, not accepting the idea that they should somehow be treated like sacred cows.

As mentioned many times, the system offers many opportunities - it is not so monolithic as it may look, there are cracks, there are points of attack, there are leverages --- for those who want to make use of them.
NOTES

*Paper prepared for the project RIO - A 'Second Round' of the Reshaping the International Order (RIO) Foundation, Rotterdam, as one of six 'position papers designed to strengthen the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of the global planning and management package'. The responsibility for the views presented is mine, and do not necessarily correspond to those of the institutions with which I am affiliated.

1. Thus, I am deliberately using Newton's three laws as a heuristic for thinking about power. When things remain the same it is not because there is no power but because power is balanced; when they change it is because there is imbalance, and that actio provokes a reactio. Maybe even some good social interpretation could be given to the concept of 'mass' in mechanics, the level of inertia, meaning that for a given force (F) the rate of change (a) is inversely proportionate to the mass (m) - F = ma?

2. To what extent these ties are operative is another matter. Many Third world elites seem to be very callous about the plight of their compatriots in the countryside, and people in the First world at least equally callous about Third world peasantry - far away, in geographical and social terms; unable to exercise political pressure through the national institutions, and hardly even through the international organizations.

3. This type of analysis is almost totally absent from the 'world models', the Limits to Growth, the Mankind at a Turning Point and also from the Reshaping the International Order and Partners in Tomorrow (the latter is edited by A.J.Dolman and Jan van Ettinger, A Sunrise Book, New York, 1978) of the RIO Foundation. It is actually also absent from the Bariloche Report Catastrophe or New Society. One may speculate on why: perhaps the expertise made use of is that of the economist, unaccustomed to think in terms of manifest and latent power systems - although the economic system is both conditioned by, and itself a way of generating, power at work. The other explanation is, of course, some kind of gentleman's agreement: 'we know there are power differentials and that power matters but let us try to get around it by working towards an understanding and a consensus on other matters, perhaps more technical, including images of future world orders. Let us then hope that there is something like the power of conviction, that out of this may grow a commitment that will move the (power) mountains'. There are those who see this as pious thinking and remain sceptical of the intention and also capability of a power structure to dissolve itself at the instigation of such gentle pushes. I am rather inclined to share that view.


5. For more on these perspectives, see Johan Galtung, The True Worlds, New York, MacMillan, 1978, chapter 2, particularly 2.1.
6. Institutionalization and internalization processes are major subject matters of sociology and psychology respectively, as are the opposite processes: de-institutionalization and externalization.


8. But this also works the other way: the powerful on the way down is despised by his acolytes, and wakes up to discover that his friends have become scarce.

9. This, of course, is some of the power basis of the smaller Western countries in Northern Europe, including Canada.

10. For more details see the work referred to in footnote 4, or 'A structural Theory of Aggression', ibid., pp. 105-132.


11. One may think of the socialist powers: both the Soviet Union and China have tried to create their own systems; in the case of the former with the same structure as the Aeroflot world map - subtracting some obvious routes to Western capitals.

12. This is explored in detail in the work referred to in footnote 5 above, in chapters 6, 'The Territorial System' and 7, 'The Non-territorial System'.

13. That decisions are made at regular intervals means that decision-making is institutionalized, not that the decisions (e.g. the distribution of sanctions) are institutionalized. For more on that, see 'Patterns of Diplomacy', Essays in Peace Research, Vol. IV, ch. 3; Ejlers, Copenhagen 1979. In the same volume there is also an article 'Non-Territorial Actors: The Invisible Continent' (ch. 12) with much more detail about the non-territorial system. Also, see 'Non-territorial Actors and the Problem of Peace', in Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed. In the Search of Peace, New York, 1974.


15. Cotton and rubber may remind us of another and more human parallel in the Japanese concept of zyu-zyutu (jiu-jitsu) - there the analogy with 'the bamboo yielding to the wind, not breaking, is often used.

16. The title of the famous article by Geneviève Knupfer.
17. This concept, of course, includes cognitive standards, in other words research, science. A critical attitude to Western science has so far mainly come to the social sciences, for an example see Ikenna Nzimirio, The Crisis in the Social Sciences, The Nigerian Situation, Third World Forum Occasional Paper No. 2, Mexico, 1977.

18. History abounds with cases of how people even when condemned to death, awaiting their execution, refuse to submit to the power-wielder.

19. For more on the use of economic sanctions as a form of power, and why it usually does not work (because it stimulates so much countervailing power), see 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions', Essays in Peace Research, Vol. V, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1979, ch. 4.

20. The present author will never forget a remark made to him in 1966, after having given a lecture at an institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, asking for views on the Chinese Cultural Revolution: 'You see, China has been that little yellow child on the road to socialism, and it was our task to show them that road. That child has now come to puberty, a very difficult phase indeed - and the best we parents can do is to withdraw, stand by and wait ...'.

21. For a list of Sternstunden, please study the world calendar of national independence days, etc. - bearing in mind that these may be Sternstunden of elites, not of the masses whose plight often is about the same before and after.

22. Yona Friedman has suggested (in a dialogue on future societies at the GPID meeting in Geneva, 9-13 January 1978) that one way of doing that would be to read newspapers less, particularly newspapers that are centered on the power machinations by the topdogs. But then reading them might also give some useful insight into countervailing power.


24. Toynbee's formula - only that he applied it to the topdogs, to those in the center of a civilization, not to the underdogs, to the barbarians 'knocking on the door ten times' (Braudel) for instance.

25. The Freudian Super-Ego/Id/Ego relationship, a rather complex one.

26. They often do so very literally, ending up in Miami (Florida) and the sanatoria on the Crimean peninsula.


29. 'The government of Cambodia, which now calls itself Kam- 
puchea, consists of nine people at the top; no regional or- 
ganization that is discernible, and a communal structure "in 
the style of the 14th century" in villages throughout the land', 
Mr. Pike (a Foreign Service Office, Washington) said. "An in- 
vading force would have to take control of every village'; he 
added, 'and such an enterprise of uncertain prospects would be 
"stepping deeper into the swamp".' McGovern Suggests Raid to 
Oust Cambodia Rulers', IHT, 23 August, 1978. Maybe 14th cen-
tury was not all that bad?

30. The French-Belgian-US action against the Kolwezi attack 
of 1978 has stimulated work towards an African force - a force 
capitalist and socialist West no doubt will try to twist to 
its own purpose.

31. The talks betweeln Morarji Desai and Jimmy Carter are classical 
expressions of this contradiction.

32. These are the most visible aspects of the New International 
Economic Order so far; although it would be unfair to judge it 
all by the spending patterns of the ruling sheikhs in feudal 
social formations, evidently enjoying total control of the 
surplus generated.

33. Intuitively it looks as if Britain (no longer 'Great') is 
more able to adjust than France - but then the latter still 
sings la Marseillaise whereas the former seems to prefer the 
Beatle song 'Love is All You Need' to 'Rule, Britannia, 
Britannia Rule the Waves' - much to the credit of the British.

34. For an excellent presentation, see Juan Somavia, 'Can We 
Understand Each Other? The Need for a New International 
Information Order', in Dolman, Ettinger eds. pp. 228-235 
(see footnote 3).

35. The fruitful conference is the one that is neither frag-
mented (the Third World can appear together), nor segmented 
(there is a chance to deal with the total relationship, not 
only with specific issues like 'energy'), nor marginalized 
(there is parity in all parts of the conference organization). 
UNCTAD comes closest to this in the present flora of inter-
national organizations.

36. Thus, we agree entirely with Silviu Brucan in his excellent 
The Dissolution of Power, Knopf, New York, 1971: 'In the author's 
own view, the UN's ineffectiveness stems from two major fallacies: 
(a) peace and security must be safeguarded primarily by the big 
powers; and (b) development, the name of peace today, is to be 
promoted chiefly by the rich and advanced nations'. (p. 354)

37. A typical example is given in 'Can the Rich Prosper Witi- 
out the Progress of the Poor?', by John W. Sewell, Overseas Develop-
ment Council, for the Society for International Development 
North-South Round-table, Rome, 18-20 May 1978: 'A simple cal-
culation indicates that if developed countries were to grow in 
the next decade at roughly the same rate as in the 1960s --
and if the U.S. share of the developing country imports were to remain the same as in the last decade -- the developing countries might be expected to import an additional $27 billion of goods from the United States per year by 1985. Using standard projections, this increase might mean as many as two million additional jobs in American export industries (p. 6). Noticing in passing that the author does not know the proper use of the term 'American' (he interprets it to mean the United States), this is almost incredible: maintenance of status quo, with the rationale that the poor countries shall help providing jobs for the rich countries, and even maintain 'the U.S. share of the developing country imports!'

38. I am indebted to Peter O'Brien for pointing this out to me.

39. As an example see a report from the Alternative Ways of Life sub-project meeting of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, UN University (Cartigny, April 1978) by Johan Galtung and Monica Wemegah, 'Overdevelopment and Alternative Ways of Life in Rich Countries'.

40. And they are concerned with the same: to proceed softly so as not to stimulate too much the powerful batteries of countervailing power.

41. Gracias, Fidel! was the headline in an important Latin American paper after the concessions made by the U.S. in the famous Punta del Este OEA meeting in 1961. How well they used those concessions is another, and important, matter.

42. And here one should not underestimate the demoralizing effect of countervailing power: it may look as if everything is the same - goods and bads flow more or less as before - but the power-holders/wielders/senders no longer believe in the legitimacy of what they do. They still issue standards in the form of moral and cognitive ideologies, they proclaim what is right, but they no longer say/think/feel that their standards for saying what is right are themselves necessarily right.