"In Bodhgaya in India the heretics are numerous: The connections between the causes and the effects (rten-'brel) which are wholly clear are explained there in the manner of the east (car-lugs)."
1. MICRO- AND MACRO-HISTORY

Good micro-history does not necessarily make for good macro-history; on the other hand, macro-history of any worth necessarily reads as sound micro-history as well, its purpose and merit being the structuring of the minutiae of history within some new, overriding framework. The proof of it, and the meat of it, consists in putting forth precisely a better, more coherent understanding of such minutiae from various fields previously regarded as unconnected. For the second criterion of macro-history is this joining-together of data from a number of specialties, this breaking-into and attempted pooling of preserves (and not necessarily only preserves within history proper).

An inherent danger is that the macro-historian is predisposed, and more than others, to look for and construct patterns where none such exist. He definitely risks meeting himself in the door—or the window-pane through which he is gazing so intently. A macro-historical judgment on why would be this: Two factors may predispose us.

a) Cause-and-effect and time structuring of the Indo-Germanic languages. (An extreme formulation of a theory that our pre-given concepts dictate what we are to see) is the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: If for instance a North American Indian tongue knows of two concepts covering what we know as black, yet only one word covering what we perceive as blue and green, then this American tribe will perforce observe two different blackish colorings, yet no distinction between blue and green, in natural phenomena. In this generally discredited theory language, or the needs of man that once structured it, are cause and perception effect, so to speak. The theory is interesting for being an attempt at getting away from slavishly European ways of seeing and defining reality—while at the same time falling into this very trap itself. For our
Amerindians are not incapable of setting blues apart from greens if asked or in need to do so, nor are they incapable of learning English, inclusive of its distinction between blue and green. Language of course is not frozen, nor does it freeze distinctions, once and for ever; rather it registers, changingly, distinctions of changing importance.

Taking care to bypass the Sapir-Whorf trap, we note that whereas all human tongues probably know of because-therefore and before-after clauses, these modalities are particularly pronounced in the main European and kindred tongues. Thus, it is impossible to form a sentence for us without telling, by inflection of the verb, whether what we are describing fits into past, present or future - a stricture unknown to e.g. Chinese. We also thrall under a psycholinguistic compulsion to explain why so-and-so happens, in a sequence of sentences we expect, or feel we must supply, a reason, an intention, a goal or a result, cause and effect, from A to B. Our verbal system comprises, from of old, a particular conjunctive mood (for wishes, intentions, hypotheses, impossibilities) as well as specialized forms of the verb according to whether it functions as intransitive or as transitive (meaning that the recipient of the effect is and must be mentioned, and that a causal relationship does and must obtain). That these ancient grammatical forms have in many instances been progressively reduced is another matter.

This time-and-cause orientation of Indo-European languages "must have", or so we reason in our Indo-European way, a cause - a reason; and also, we may add, a time of origin and subsequent consolidation. Here we are left to our own conjectural devices; we merely know this arose far back in time. One conjecture though would be that it bespeaks a protacted time of instability and challenges, i.e. of needs to define and order causes versus effects, pasts versus presents, in a setting of many, changing and undependable factors, viz. other humans, climate, and the lay of the land when on the move (and the Indo-Europeans are the peoples of historically known Völkerwanderungen par excellence).

Be this as it may, the historian's metier today is
the refined craft of crafts for time-and-cause orientation, a highly European art. Though other societies have had recorded history of their own, from the Aztecs to the Arabs and Chinese, yet none of these have had that cold obsession (and the output that goes with it) of critically discussing discrepancies in dates, the reasons historical sources are preserved as they are, and all manner of possible causes to all manner of historical effects. Other societies have had court historians in the way of court poets, to the greater recorded glory of the ruler and state, but paying trained professionals, and paying them well, to ascertain just the right hour and day and precisely the causes that a more or less obscure something occurred, perhaps hundreds of years ago or more, with possibly no relevance to contemporary problems whatsoever, must be a quirk of European culture only.

Be this too as it may, just like we believe that an emphasis on (and gradual obsession with\(^3\)) defining time, cause and effect arose because it was functional, because it proved practically useful, so too we must acknowledge that history-writing (though generally a product more of this obsession than of its own proven usefulness) may prove beneficial,\(^4\) inadvertently even, both for showing us parallels and precedents to present-day processes and for showing us alternatives. Yet we must also note its limitations as a European art.

One limitation is the general insistence on (objective) causality, or the way in which causality is generally conceived. Though it bears stressing that history is human history, there is a long tradition of projecting causes and patterns in human history to factors outside (or "behind") the human mind. This is the second element disposing historians, and macro-historians in particular, to reductionism:

b) The belief in the Prime Mover (the single First Cause) and the Master Plan of history. Though of Semitic origin, arising in the minds of a hard-beset people in that thoroughfare of armies called Palestine, this and other basic conceptions of Judaism imprinted themselves forcefully in European thinking. Inculcated through more than a millennium
they could hardly leave the recent secularized challengers to Christianity unaffected; on the contrary, in speaking of secularization one oftentimes forgets to specify: what was it that was secularized? Society, runs one insipid answer. Yet society always was "secular", by clerical definition; it never was or became "the City of God", which ever was invisible to men; though there was a Holy Roman Empire and consecration of princes by Pope and arch-bishops, society - and the princes too - belonged to "the World" of the flesh. What definitely has come about through the last century or couple of centuries is a reduction in the volume of belief among Europeans that they witness the visible intervention of the invisible world in their daily lives - that is, angels and divine omens have plummeted in popularity. This might perhaps be termed secularization: a preserve of the holy, its forward positions here on earth in day-to-day society, has been overrun. (Even here, though, the victory of the secular is partly a sham: The fall of specifically Christian daily superstitions has in part been compensated for by other superstitions, from UFO's to astrology, some new, some retained, such as belief in touchwood and black cats. One specifically Christian political superstition has even arisen lately, viz. belief in the state of Israel as a sign of God's intervention and love of His people or, alternately, as a sign of the End Days.)

Yet secularization of culture is fundamentally something else. It is a translation of religious concepts into non-religious ones, of God-laden structures into "neutral" ones. If one takes out the three-letter label (God) from the picture, the picture is still there - with the same lines, unless these too are expressly and specifically challenged. And the more fundamental a mental structure is to a culture, to its members, the less chance there is that its members will challenge it successfully or vehemently, or that they will even be aware of it as an object of discussion. (One basic notion, or pair of notions, has been changed - because it could be challenged on empirical grounds - to wit that the earth was flat and the centre of the universe.)

The three-letter word having been done away with,
what is left is the Master Plan: History follows a pre-ordained pattern, which may be known to the initiate. Its object is man and his progressive, unilinear evolution through successive stages - from Paradise Lost (or primordial, innocent bliss, Urkommunismus) through Introduction of Sin (selfishness, property) and the stages of its subsequent development, with increasing mobilization and clarification of the forces of light and darkness, progress and reaction, and the emergence of revelation through prophets/luminaries, towards an impending final cataclysm, beyond which beck Paradise Refound.

This is a scheme comprising distant past, more recent developments, present, and future; the true believer is ever at a point where the great battle between progress and reaction, or good and evil, human slavery and liberation, is imminent. Not only the particularities of this scheme (which may be traced in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as well as in Marxism, Fascism and sundry other secular ideologies), but the very existence of a historically dominant scheme of history is a powerful precedent for, and likely to sway, the macro-historian. Indeed, the macro-historian is a distinctly Occidental being, just like (or rather, in a way different from) the micro-historian. Whereas the micro-historian is a by-product of the obsession with the correct ascertaining of time and causality with regard to all phenomena (and a continuation, of course, of more ancient court chroniclers), the macro-historian is the product of a) the disjointed, atomized nature of micro-history and b) the above-mentioned secularization process with regard to fundamental cultural tenets, or if one will, cosmology: This is an on-going process, far from (if ever) finished. "Tenets" is a correct enough plurality, yet the main thing about them is their interrelatedness, the united and uniting pattern in which they are, or have been, bound up. When the old "God-given" unity evaporates, the craving for a new unitarian understanding of history, i.e. of man's existence on earth, arises and persists; which is what makes the disjointed, atomized nature of micro-history felt.

Thus there is little grounds for hope that micro- and macro-historians make good (or should we say frictionless)
bedfellows: They possess all the advantages and disadvantages, ideally, of being both complementary and (as all complementary phenomena are) different, in the way of yin-yang, man-woman—yet with the stress, for the time being, on their differentness. For the micro-historian is, through the training of his craft, concerned with nuance, diversification, with exploring all possible, and contradictory as well as complementary, factors shaping some singular, singled-out event; while the macro-historian is concerned with unity, regularity, submerging the nuances and details. There is good grounds for hope, however, that the friction (and the attraction of macro-historians to micro-historical themes and of micro-historians to macro-historical ones) will prove continually productive, as will the continued lack of any one single, all-dominant macro-historical sesame-sesame explanation.

Yet there is also the possibility that one is chasing mirages, that macro-history is the product of a historical, mental need, imposing or rather struggling to impose more or less rigid order and unity upon a web of events that have known no such order. There is the possibility, indeed, not merely that the patterns we posit are false (which might imply that others, yet unfound, are correct), but also that there is no single pattern in history; or even that there are no patterns in history whatsoever, only similarities.

Now "similarities" smacks of subjective judgment, of observations as against facts, and that is the point of this expression: The similarities "in" history are not objective phenomena, with a per se existence, but extracted from history, or read into history, ascribed to the events of history, by the workings of human brains—be they those of dégagé, non-partisan historians or of engage, partisan participants in the rough-and-tumble of events themselves. (Another matter is that fictions of the mind, imagined "patterns", can be fruitful, in other contexts than those intended too.)

What can safely be said of any historical theory is that it is a product and reflection of the time and place in which it arises. "History is a constant dialogue with the past" one opinion runs. This may be so, but not in the sense
intended, viz. that historiography consists in the historian (representing the present) conversing and discussing with preserved historical sources (representing the past). If we by "history" mean not history-writing but the process of history, life itself, then true enough: life (of every person and, by extension, every society or organization) consists in precisely a succession of meetings between our accumulated experience, i.e. our subjective past, and ever new impressions which we must interpret and react to on the basis of this subjective past. And our subjective (already interpreted) past of course is not static, it is reinterpreted, rewritten, in the light of our new experiences. Thus we may say that history-writing too is a dialogue with the past, with the proviso that roles are swapped: The historian represents the "past", being the sum of all he has read and experienced, the source or sources represent the present challenge to him.

This is no mere quibbling with words. The insistence on this "subjectivist" understanding of history-writing and of history is important in that it also directly concerns the basic logical unit of history-writing, the causal nexus.

2. CAUSALITY

Common to micro- and macro-historians of our times is belief in, and the search for, objective or more precisely extra-subjective causes. It is in the Judeo-Christian and not in the Greek-Roman heritage that what may be termed the concept of absolute and dynamic causality is found. In the Greek-Roman world, as with other peoples on earth, of course causality of the type "X killed Y because he wanted his riches" was well established. In addition, the Greeks came up with ideas on the laws of nature. Yet these have little or nothing to do with causality as such. To take a well-known example, the Law of Archimedes: Its point is not that if and when you lie down in your bathtub you
cause the level of the water to rise (etc). It is the static, correlative observation that a body placed in a liquid in equilibrium has a buoyancy equal to the weight of the liquid mass which has been replaced. In Greek thinking, as in Roman, there is remarkably little speculation on the creation of the universe, a First Cause etc, and no ideas of an inexorable, rigid plan of cosmic history from alpha to omega; instead of the unilinear conception a cyclical one prevails yet (significantly) without people caring very much about it, or writing lengthy tomes on its score.

The Greek Laws of nature were observed regularities, regardless of time; frozen in time we might say, static. The Judaic culture, on the other hand, saw the world as a dynamic process: a unilinear progression from its well-defined beginning to its equally well-defined end, chain in chain. Moreover, the whole gist of Mosaic teaching might be summed up as the uncompromising belief in absolute, extra-human causation in human history: God is the First Cause, the Creator. Man is driven out of Paradise because he sins. God tests man (cf the Book of Job), and man fails (because of the lures of the heathens, or because of man’s innate frailty and God’s demanding strictness). When man sins and fails, however strong a position he thinks he has, however safe and secure he thinks he is, God causes him to fall and perish, inexorably. Man is the object of history; he does not create history himself - except in the perverse sense that his own subjective whims, born out of causes he himself does not master and cannot manage to discipline, bring down upon his head quite other, harsh, objective results than he had envisaged.

Whereas the dichotomy of subjective-objective is common to many cultures, including the Greek (cf. the Platonic "pure ideas" versus real life), the idea of an objective meaning, pattern and purpose of history and of objective causality along the unilinear time axis, both wholly independent of our subjective consciousness, yet at the same time defining, shaping and ruling this
consciousness, is a Judeo-Christian characteristic. It is quite as pronounced in that offshoot of this tradition, Islam. (What has been described with more felicity than accuracy as the "atomistic", disjointed, causally unconnected nature of Arab/Islamic culture, from poetry and prose to urban planning or the extreme lack of it, traditionally, should rather be seen in conjunction with the all-pervading belief in God as the Sole Cause of everything, whom humans and their subjective acts are at the objective mercy of.)

These same conceptions are deepseated in later Occidental thinking too, i.e. in the secularized continuations and successors of medieval and renaissance European culture. They are patent in as disparate ideologies as Marxism, Liberalism and Fascism (and probably will come to the fore in Ecologism as well, if it is hammered out as a new rival ideology). Now Marxism and Fascism (plus Ecologism in the making) may be viewed as ideological and social reactions to a combined ideological and social crisis: the bankruptcy, irrelevancy and hypocrisy of the traditional "Christian" establishment in the face of the challenges of Capitalism to the social fabric. Being reactions, it is but natural that they should, in the face of something new and fundamentally disruptive, reach back into the arsenal of ideas to find and refurbish adequate tools for meeting and overcoming this challenge. The more fundamentally new and elusive of traditional understanding a challenge is, the greater the urge and need to mobilize, define and redefine fundamentals. Liberalism however (as defined here) is not a reaction against, but the ideological companion of Capitalist development. Thus it has not had the same actionist/reactionist need to redefine everything in a stringent, totalitarian wise (i.e. as a reaction to a total challenge); the less so in that it can coexist with, and even sport as a feather in its hat, the emasculated Christianity which conceived Capitalism in its womb and nurtured it (which is why and how Christianity became emasculated). Nevertheless all these ideologies have certain basic traits in common:

They are unilinear-developmental: History has a
beginning and a goal, and these are related. Thus the monotheist religions have Paradise as their beginning, and the re-entry of man into Paradise through knowledge of the divine as their goal. Marxism has Urkommunismus (the state of Primitive Communism), and a final Kommunismus. Fascism has the Pure Race as its historical beginning, and also as its goal. Ecologism has Harmony (with nature) as its beginning, and also as its goal (other words are sure to come up, such as Cosmic Interdependence, Integration). Liberalism speaks incessantly of Growth and of Freedom — in the beginning was Growth (in nature and in human consciousness and mastery of nature), and, if one will, Freedom (of small roving family groups, no restrictive society), and the goal of history, and of free Capitalist development, is of course Growth (of capital, of consumption, of human energies and possibilities) and human Freedom (meaning human energies and possibilities, free of restrictive society). In all these instances, commencement and goal are not, be it noted, identical: The goal (purpose) is = the commencement but on a higher level; the difference being that at the beginning stage man simply exists, in a state of innocence (i.e. non-knowledge), while at the end man is re-integrated into the Truth in a state of knowledge (of the Truth), after dire conflicts (with Evil, or Reaction).

This scheme of history was first secularized by some of the Enlightenment thinkers, and in the beginning of the 19th century by Hegel — accounting (I believe) for no small measure of their immense popularity. Even in a cyclical macro-historian like Toynbee, this unilinear scheme surfaces — fittingly at the very end of his tomes in universal history — paying tribute to its own strength.

The ultimate materialization of this Occidental impulse to leave and transcend the present for some distant goal in the future, indeed to use and translate the present into a means for reaching the future, is the obsession with space travels: While the majority of the world's population suffers from starvation and deprivation, a goodly portion of the creative means which might wrench them out
of this state is spent on literal and massive escapism: on a gigantic effort to escape from the present, from this very planet - to some other planet, or galaxy even, where paradisiacal technical solutions to the emigrants' problems and needs shall arise (characterizing the spaceships bringing them there as well). For all its poker-faced scientific gravity of business, for all the expertise and billions of dollars allotted to it, this whole enterprise, envisaging the eventual emigration from this wretched, troubled earth of some elect few thousands or tens of thousands, is a convincing copy, in latterday terms, of the Biblical vision of the 144,000 elect white-clad righteous who are to be transported to the new and heavenly Jerusalem. Which is probably the reason for its popularity (with in particular the government of the Fundamentalist-leaning USA), as well as for its conception in the first place. (The enormous costs involved, and the minimal chance that planets inside or outside our galaxy can be made, i.e. changed, to support human life and make it self-supporting there, are indications that such dreams, apart from military considerations, or perhaps together with the military considerations entailed, are dreams - of a religious, or with a broader expression, of a basic cultural nature.) Interesting in this connection is the US-originated ecologist Spaceship Earth sub-ideology, in which ecological concern for our single refuge is combined with the idea that it is on its way, from some take-off explosion towards some mystical touchdown with a yet transcendent reality.

2) Although all moves towards a goal in the Occidental conception of history (and in some non-Occidental conceptions as well, cf. the nirvana of Buddhism), this goal is not the cause of history: the flow of history is not pulled, but pushed towards it. As we have noted above, the First Cause or more generally all causes are "objective", outside of human control, in the Judeo-Christian as well as later, secularized European tradition, and we have been conditioned - by the Judeo-Christian tradition, it would seem - to seek not merely the superficial, situational "causes" but the ultimate ones which "push" our acts and history at large.

This is reflected in historiography. It is reflected
in psychoanalysis. It is reflected in jurisprudence - when a crime is judged less severely because the perpetrator can be shown to have had great and unsettling problems in his upbringing, i.e. his past - or in his economic or other responsibilities, his work, i.e. his present (references to his past, in particular to childhood and adolescence, appear to be the most effective); here the criminal is judged leniently since he is not defined as the cause of the crime, he is but an intermediary, and what is judged, in absentia so to speak, is the ultimate causes - or more precisely, as ultimate causes as can be convincingly substantiated.

The question, however, is whether acts of human history are in fact pushed; are they not pulled? (Or ought both parts of this simile to be scrapped? If so, only after due consideration:) The pull of history is acknowledged when talk is of someone "rising to fill a challenge", "stepping into a vacuum", and the likes. It is obliquely referred to by the Marxist classic Plekhanov, in his discussion of historical causation. His solution to the question of whether great men and women "make" history was to say, expectedly, that on the contrary, history "makes" great men and women - makes them its catalysts: If Napoleon Buonaparte had not come from Corsica, another person with the same function, the same historical mission, would have risen to the occasion. The similar problem of whether the length of Cleopatra's nose decided the course of history he answers by saying that if it mattered, it was the objective circumstances that made it matter, or seem to matter, in the way that it did.

Incisive though Plekhanov's discussion is, it is not exhaustive (what discussion of history is?). Cleopatra may not be the beat of examples. (Though her nose did not appeal to Julius Caesar, but did appeal to Mark Anthony, thus causing the latter to dally with her in Egypt while Julius Caesar mobilized against him, the history of the Roman Empire, of Egypt and of their relationship might have come off the same even had it not been for the nose. Mark might have won, instead of Julius, making a world of difference to them personally, yet would that have made much of a difference to the Roman world?)
It is of course quite plausible that in the absence of Napoleon another and similar general would have "risen to the task". Yet what was the "task"? If the Great French Revolution were in fact the victory of the French bourgeoisie, as any good Marxist will insist, would not the appropriate task have been a régime of capitalists, protecting and nurturing French industry? In point of fact Napoleon did try and break British hegemony on the India route by occupying Egypt; this of course could have, as a corollary, brought lucre to French private capitalists, yet there is little evidence that this figured in the French and Napoleonic calculations. Being a military man, it appears that Napoleon simply thought in military-strategic terms, as well as in terms of a hazy Freedom. What Napoleon gave Europe and the French was a series of wars. And is there anything to suggest that his attack on Russia was historically inevitable - instead of an all-out go at Britain, or even a policy of peace with Britain and with Russia in order to digest Europe?

Naturally, it is both possible and tempting to opt for a general hindsight that all in history is inevitable, or with a milder word, determinated: everything has a cause, simply. This is a requirement of the human mind; yet the problems arise when we, honouring our Occidental cultural imperative, strive to single out not causes but an ultimate cause: That "the productive forces" of society produce the history of society is either a tautology or, if they are defined to mean the producers of material goods, wrong. What transforms nature into material goods is consciousness (human experience) - and parts of nature as already transformed by consciousness (i.e. machines, materialized experience). Thus it is not a question of merely the (primary, secondary, tertiary) producers of goods at a given moment, but also of the whole system of ideas, including ideas on production, preceding them and producing them, of which they are a continuation, as well as of the materially non-productive classes of society at the given moment, who order the system of material production and its utilization and who produce ideology.

Without delving too deeply into the Marxist scheme of thought, we note that Marx and other classics are not clear
and consistent as to what constitutes "the productive forces", and furthermore that no Marxist has defined, nor can define this concept as exclusive of human experience, i.e. consciousness. At the same time this "basis" (of objective truth) produces a "superstructure" (of ideas, and false ideas in the bargain, yet ideas suited to the power needs of the ruling classes and thus functionally "true", i.e. 'true" for functioning). This is a (or the) basic quandary of Marxism: That human consciousness not only constitutes the "subjective" department of existence but also is constitutive of the "objective" one, which is supposed to create and explain the "subjective". For both categories are basic to Occidental tradition, as said above. And Marxism (through its far from lower-class and proletarian creators Marx and Engels, Lenin and others) faithfully re-produces, re-defines fundamental structures and concepts in the Occidental tradition. God being dead, and nature being dead or inert (as in European Christianity - versus latterday Ecologism), the productive forces are launched as the ultimate cause - reproducing, in secular form, Christian talk of God as the Productive Force; and defined as, or as going back upon, human needs.

The question is, what are these needs? Food, clothing, shelter? These are hardly the needs and reasons that have brought us two world wars and the atom bomb, Ronald Reagan to the White House, and man to the moon. Nor is it what created the Mona Lisa, or the death mask of Tutankhamon, or the Stars and Stripes. Any rat can feed itself. Any ape can find shelter. Except in extraordinarily favourable natural circumstances (the stereotype south sea atoll, with fish popping from the lagoon and coconuts dropping from above), man is basically insecure (he is at a number of disadvantages in comparison with other animals, as to running speed, claws and fangs, weaning period etc). We may freely venture: This historical insecurity is the basic fact and the basic force of human history. At the risk of designating another Ultimate Cause (how escape from the fact of being born to Western culture?) we say:

A basic need of man is for security. The need is for security in our surroundings - meaning control over our
surroundings. This control, or harmonizing or reintegration of man and surroundings, can be attempted in many ways (why assume that people are so thoroughly alike in needs, or in their ways of coping with their basic need and urge?): Wars and armaments are one. (We arm and go to war, and risk a nuclear holocaust today, basically out of fears of the type "What are the Russians up to?", "They'll get us if we don't get them first, while we still have an advantage". A number of wars are wars of revenge, i.e. born of a wish to reestablish one's former harmony and control, "teach'em their place".) The man who promises easy and clear "solutions" out of a complex situation of insecurity, i.e. where voters feel insecure because of the complexity, is always preferred (cf the Cowboy President, 1981). Stepping about on the moon is proof that we "master" space (and are not eternally "caught" on this insecure earth).

The Mona Lisa is the come-true wish of a Florentine merchant's wife to be projected into her surroundings - quite as mirrors are made to reproduce us, yet the painting is forever (as are photographs today, freezing us in time, preserving us in a precarious way through the insecurity of surrounding time into posterity). The Mona Lisa is also part of Leonardo da Vinci's affirmation of the nature of humankind and of nature (see her, and his other persons', many-layered, harmonious and secretive smile and the dreamscapes behind). All artists fight, and fight a running battle of troubles and insecurity, to interpret and order the chaos of life, to express it, to press it out into frozen form.

The Stars and Stripes may not be more than a piece of coloured, generally flimsy textile (and the Starspangled Banner may not be a very good piece of poetry), yet it stirs tens of millions of individuals into a feeling of pride and security in togetherness; burning any bit of cloth with such stars and stripes on will provoke strong reactions, and is indeed done to provoke strong reactions (more precisely to shatter people's complacency, their "wrong" feeling of security, and both the feeling and the reality of control).

The Tutankhamon deathmask, like all the paraphernalia of death, and of marriage, and of the coming of age, and of
birth and baptism, are attempts to come to settled terms with, to define and regulate the most unsettling, fluid and violently challenging situations in life. Yet this applies to not merely these so-called rites of passage, but to all rituals, and more. Such attempts at formalizing and materializing, at both attempting and symbolizing, a security which is not there, are all our good-luck charms and amulets; all official papers designed to prove to us and others that we "own" (i.e. control) this or that part of our surroundings (and the more of our surroundings the "richer" and "safer" we are); all laws, and of course the ceaseless cry for law-and-order and more police.

Moreover, a great many individuals, it will be observed, cling on to jobs that are basically unchallenging, uneventive, bleakly stable - for this very reason; and in politics and religion likewise clamour to uphold "traditional values" and clichés for the very reason that they are clichés, regardless of their often unjoyful contents or implications. The vast majority insist on an "ordered life" (and the repeated and vocal nature of this insistence is proof of how basic this need, or this insecurity, is). What is important, and what we consequently talk a great deal about, is the way we "order" our lives - from procuring a spouse and the correct amount of offspring to, as early as possible an assured pension, life insurance, insurance against theft and ill-health etc. Supreme happiness for most consists in "feeling secure of oneself and one's capabilities" and in that warm feeling of security and belonging in somebody's caring, protecting arms which is called love. What sells a product is appeals to the potential buyer's wish for control of surroundings (appeals to virility, independence, action, "come to where the flavour is", "the cigarette men smoke") or his wish for safeguarding what he has already ("is your home burglar-proof"/"...fire-proof", "buy your own swimming pool and escape from pollution on the beaches", "safeguard those you love - the safety car, the concept of dynamic safety "). One product among many is politicians - those of them who can make people believe, for the duration of the crucial balloting, in their promises of "security in your own home", "every man's right to defend himself and carry a gun", 'security on the streets" and "national security".
That extreme concern with regulating and controlling all details which is characterized by annoying others is termed pedantry. Yet extreme insistence on punctuality is very much the same phenomenon. And very many people insist on doing things even inside their own home walls in exactly the same way and at the same time of day, making their whole life into a carefully controlled ritual (often euphemistically called habits).

Finally, the conviction that one has a historical role which must be played should be mentioned. This is another way of saying (to oneself and to fellow men) that there is something fundamentally wrong or dangerous in the world, something deeply "out of order", which it is one's irresistible impulse to "set in order". (Calling this impulse a duty, an absolute imperative, the demand of history itself, shows how a volatile, uncontrollable and hence threatening upsurge of personal insecurity is "controlled", by being frozen into something objective and outside oneself.) It should not surprise that a man like Hitler was "deeply out of order" inside, meaning emotionally very unstable, given to sudden bursts of crying and lack of belief in himself (though not meaning insane or "irrational", which he was not).)

Returning now to Napoleon, what was it that he sought? It was not food, clothing and shelter. According to the above exposition he was after security. As a revolutionary general he was out to secure the Revolution and the interests of France. There is little indeed to suggest that he was primarily interested in the profit rates of French industry, or in French industrialization, or that he cared about them at all. He wanted and he loved soldiers, which set back economic development and disrupted creative potentials in much of Europe for decades. As stated simply above, individuals are not alike, and seek security in different ways. He was a military man, conditioned (both by his training and by the general violence-steeped experience of the Revolution) to seek military security - and as far afield as possible, pushing back the borders of insecurity as far as possible. Being insecure of the capabilities and intentions of Russia, he could not forgo the historical duty of defeating her and her "threat" to Europe.
Napoleon miscalculated; and that, we may say, was the cause of his failure in Russia and, by extension, in general. Cleopatra miscalculated, both as to Julius Caesar and as to the worth of basing herself on Mark Anthony. Hitler miscalculated. At least in the cases of Napoleon and Hitler history could have turned out otherwise. With Hitler, it was a close shave for Europe - given some adjustments in his plans and behaviour he could very well have won.\textsuperscript{23} His miscalculations thus had tremendous historical effect. One major miscalculation was that non-Aryans could not fight,\textsuperscript{24} and would not react decisively if maltreated and slighted. They did, in Russia, and he lost. The question is: what caused such bad insight? In the case of Napoleon there was non-knowledge of the perils of Russian winter and of the Russian capacity for withdrawing and regrouping. In Hitler's case, the same non-knowledge in addition to his being a civilian and a racist.

It can be argued that both racism and Hitler are products of crises in capitalism. Yet other countries were quite as affected by these crises without producing a Hitler and his extreme brand of racism. Thus Poland knew both a strongman and anti-Jewish (as well as anti-Russian and anti-others) sentiments, along with dire economic problems, and even a measure of militarism and expansionism, but nothing approaching Nazism. France got no strongman, but knew anti-Jewish sentiments, militarism and expansionism of old. What then created Nazism? Three things it seems. One was indeed the economic crisis, or more appropriately put, the crisis in millions of individual lives (i.e. consciousnesses), and not only in Germany of course, caused by the workings of capitalism. This mass humiliation and insecurity shattered the established surface truths and conventions (e.g. the Weimar Republic) and disposed people to dig deeper into the fundamental concepts and structures of their culture in order to explain and overcome the crisis they were experiencing. The second element was the feeling of collective humiliation as Germans, resentment at the peace terms after World War One. Similar resentment, with regard to World War One or earlier, was however to be found, and could be mobilized, in other countries too. Thus the most important element was, it appears, the third one:
The Nazi ideology redefined basic concepts and structures of the Judeo-Christian tradition so as to both explain and redress the two humiliations or anomalies mentioned above. This meta-ideology, mobilized by the Nazis, was as present in people as the feelings of individual and collective humiliation. The economic crisis of unemployment, inflation etc caused people to dig after the fundamentals of culture, and here they were, for a new historical understanding, and here it was. (That it was false is something we are privileged to see who do not labour under the same strains.)

No wonder people could and did identify with Nazi aspirations: This was deeply familiar. Christian joy at being God's chosen instruments was translated into mass conviction of being chosen instruments for the mission of history, and even the rhythm of history was the same: Golden Age or "Paradise, sin-fall, wanderings in the wilderness and loss of the righteous vision, the forces of depravity seem to have world power and delude the masses, yet revelation comes, the elect are mobilized in the critical hour for the final battle of history, "imminent now", by a series of prophets ("national-minded thinkers" in Nazi parlance) and a final Saviour and Guide, whereupon the hosts of depravity are to be annihilated, utterly massacred, and a New Golden Age is to arise. It of course was quite beyond Hitler's powers of comprehension, and those of his followers, that all this is merely a twist to and a secular, latterday translation of the Judeo-Christian fundamentals - and worse still, that Nazism in its military expansionism and its insistence on the Chosen People (with a Promised Land and a bloody mission in it) is not "Christian" but "Judaic", and not Judaic in the lofty, pacific ways of the Diaspora, but in the primitive, bigoted ways of the Hebrew invaders in Palestine.

Though such theorizing was beyond him, he had - as a political animal - a fabulous nose for theory, and created the "right" theory according to it, on instinct. Beginning as a racist, hatefilled rhetorician with a minimal following, he observed which of the signals he emitted that boosted this following; and it took many years before Nazism really caught on. This totalitarian ideology, "explaining" both the crisis
and insecurity ordinary Germans were feeling and the way out, to salvation, to the pride and security of Germanic togetherness, was the source of his victory and his defeat. His miscalculations flowed from it.

Here then is the case of a person "rising to fill a task" from nil - not because "if Adolf Hitler had not been born, another person would have risen to do the same things, fill the same task", but because he in the perverse wisdom of his orientation and instincts created and defined the "task", in such a way that people believed in it. He gave them what they wanted, what they had in themselves latently beforehand, in their minds: ideas not created by the economic base of 1930 Germany as a theoretical superstructure over, and reflecting, this base. These ideas certainly comprised an explanation of 1930 feelings - including German wishes for revenge after the First World War; yet this was not the core. The core ideas certainly reflected a historical material basis; yet this was not 1930 Germany, it was the protracted desperation of the Jews in troubled Palestine more than 2500 years before, and their fervent belief in the coming End Days of battle, revenge and salvation (born of this desperation), as continued in Christianity and instilled in generations of both analphabets and scholars in Europe.

For the security of total conviction, be it that of Hitler or Jesus, millions have marched and millions more may continue to march to their (and others') deaths. (In a case such as Hitler's millions were also caused to die for having weaker convictions, for not opposing him and his followers resolutely enough, in strong enough organizations and with decisive and desperate enough means.) On this subjectivist note we shall hazard a simple theory of historical causation:

The one element is human experience, the other is human perception (through the senses) of a challenge. Causation is the challenge as interpreted by experience. This causes action (or inaction). Now human experience varies, between individuals and between groups (societies etc); it includes passed-on, indoctrinated "experience" from earlier
ages (e.g. such formative materials as are found in parts of the Bible, representing so to speak an early childhood layer of Occidentalism), as well as more recently digested information. Experience certainly has a material basis: all its elements are conveyed in material form, i.e. through the senses. Yet much of it is second- or third- (etc.-) hand, and the elements are constantly regrouped and readjusted in the light of new impressions, new experience - a process called thinking. The point is: Though "all I know is what I hear and see", much of it is in the nature of hearsay. (Cultural originality, of a thinker or artist or whatever, consists in reinterpreting either the sensate impressions or the stored conclusions based on them, in new ways in which people recognize their own, hitherto insufficiently defined experience of reality. This and all other aspects of human "progress" is an unending process - as our need for "security" widely defined, consists not in having it but in attaining it.)

The other party to causation is the new, fresh impression at any given moment - before it has been relegated to the past, to experience. Our sensate present is a continuous challenge to the past - and continuously interpreted by the past. This interpretation is causation. What is caused is generally undramatic - often simply the hardly registered confirmation, or some slight adjustment, of previous experience. (Thus new impressions in the form of hearsay will often strengthen, or modify insubstantially, previous hearsay "experience": "Have you heard the Russians have done so-and-so? Goes to show that what we've heard of them and their intentions before is correct." Our need for psychological security is also a need for patterns we can "trust"; the more they are "proven" the more we feel at home with them.)

Sometimes however this nexus (causality = link between challenge and subjective past) produces "history" (the popular word for great and in particular dramatic and abrupt change). The "challenge" may be so many things - a natural catastrophe is one; yet it is strictly incorrect to say, as is often done, that a landslide, floods
draughts, climatic changes in general etc cause people to move, for instance, rather they cause people to think and to choose what to do, from their previous experience. The challenge may also be a societal phenomenon, e.g. a crisis in the economy, or in political authority - in one's own society or a neighbouring one. (Thus Hitler with his authoritarian ideals and experience evidently thought that French and British appeasement of Germany, from the Saar-Rheinland militarization to the liquidation of Czechoslovakia, was proof of a breakdown of their stamina - inviting more of the same kind, with Poland first on the list. Internal problems in Czechoslovakia, between Sudet Germans and Czechs and between Czechs and Slovaks, were also seen as an invitation: an opportunity.)

Hence what people do should not be seen as the product of "causes" inside people, behind them so to speak, but quite as much of the opportunities in front of them. This is stressing the pull of history as much as the push - and furthermore stressing that they are but one movement, one and the same causation: For when the present suddenly is seen as an opportunity for so-and-so, this opportunity is the sensate present as analyzed and defined by the subjective past of the protagonist. Cleopatra, Napoleon, Hitler - they saw possibilities, made others see them too, and in the upshot saw them wrongly. Push-or-pull discussions of historical causality can be heated enough, yet tend to be sterile. (One such is the debate on whether the Viking Age was the product of overpopulation and overproduction of martial young men at home in Scandinavia or of the lure of riches and weakness abroad.)

We shall presently see how the above points work out with regard to a historical character with as shattering an impact on the world as any Hitler or Napoleon (let alone the lady with the nose), yet born of quite another locality:

3. A LEGEND COME TRUE

The character is Chinggis (also spelt Dzhengis) Qan,
a child of eastern Mongolia and the twelfth century; 
the early thirteenth is his time of historical action: 
In 1203 he is all but vanquished, having barely escaped 
a murder attempt and meeting in secrecy with 18 friends 
in inhospitable terrain - they are reduced to drinking 
mud for swearing an oath of continued battle against the 
vastly superior forces of the Mongol kings. Twenty years 
later he dies, knowing that his troops have crushed all 
resistance from Beijing to the Caucasus. By the 1240's 
the armies of the Mongol emperor were entering eastern 
Germany and Indochina, they had reached the White Sea 
and were interesting themselves in the hunting falcons 
of Novaya Zemlja, they would soon be reaching the Mediterranean in Dalmatia plus Gaza and Aleppo and yearning to conquer Japan. Why? They massacred all they met, soldiers and civilians, men, women and babes, cats and dogs - until new orders flowed from an understanding that it was better to tax than to kill. Why these killings?

The standard answer runs: Because they were barbarians, acting on instinct and brute conditioning, and bent on plunder. They massacred because, well, that was their habit. (It demonstrably was not.) Such views are not too far from standard assumptions as to Africans in the days of the slave trade - that they were slaves of their instincts, and could be treated (and not merely in scholarly works) as such. The view that the Mongols acted as they did "because they did not know better" is an unabashedly condescending one. We opt instead for belief in the rationality (though often mistaken rationality) of human history. Just like Adolf Hitler was thoroughly rational (e.g. in his just as thoroughly inhumane and morally perverse treatment of Jews, Gypsies etc), so was the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea recently, and so too was once Chinggis Qan.

Above (p 6) the secularization of basic ideas was discussed. A case was made for modern Occidental ideologies as being continuations, with different accentuations and twists to it, of the preceding Jewish-and-Christian tradition: the old was transformed, literally, into new forms - and forms of explicit relevancy to
contemporaneous crises, challenges, opportunities. At the same time another transformation takes place: Potentialities in the meta-ideology are translated into action, released as energy.

The great Mongol expansion and the forms it took was, according to recent research\(^{25}\), such a transformation "in the second potency". It must have been this type of law of entropy in human history that Marx referred to by his judgment that material realities determine history in general, but that "ideas too can turn into material power when they grip the masses". Which is what happened with Napoleon's ideas, with Hitler's - and with Činggis Qān's. Later Mongolian traditions dwell on this point, quoting Činggis Qān as saying by way of advice to his sons that what one has to do is to capture men's souls, "then what can their bodies do?" in opposition to Činggis Qān's grand design of history. The existence of such a master plan, a structuring ultimate goal, is amply attested in our sources, though hitherto historians have paid surprisingly little attention to it.

What was transformed, through the Oriental mind of our Mongolian chieftain, was a decidedly Occidental ideology, it appears. The transformation that took place within Occidental culture itself centuries later, called secularization, i.e. change along the time axis but not along any space axis, comes across as a straightforward, readily comprehensible phenomenon on the background of the Mongol transformation: of an Occidental ideology into an Oriental one, along both the time and the space axis, of this Oriental ideology into a program for action, and action itself, of disparate, uncoordinated Mongolian tribes into a unified force of world domination.

For this was not the unintentional, unforeseen result of blind, instinctive forces: World domination was the explicit goal, as formulated by a shaman friend with reference to Činggis Qān long before his unification of Mongolia and official assumption of this name or title in
1206. And while it is true that many of the rank-and-file participants in the Mongol conquests were, as were Hitler's soldiers, little concerned with ideology and interested only or primarily in the booty to be gotten and the exaltation of the fight, not to mention saving their own skins, the two overriding truths are these: They were instructed as to their rôle in history. And they were acting under the strictest control, as were their commanders. If the Mongol soldiery was not indoctrinated on a very high level (though in quite some measure it seems to have been so), this would not have mattered too much - as long as it was doing its assigned job towards the assigned goal.

The inspiring ideology was the Occidental one regarding the end of the world. In briefest outline, what rather abundant sources indicate happened was this: Nestorian Christian missionaries and Muslim tradesmen managed to convince Genghis Qān and his Mongols that they were the peoples of both Biblical and Qur'ānic legend who had been pent up behind towering mountains in the northeastern corner of the world as the tools of God - to be let loose on mankind just before Doomsday, and that the occasion of their breaking loose was now. The mark of these Doomsday peoples, according to Bible, Qur'ān and tradition, was that they massacre all on their way. Which the Mongols conscientiously did.

Many of the Mongolian tribes were, superficially, Nestorian Christians, before the rise of Genghis Qān. In contrast to Muslims, who had a healthy fear of Doomsday, the Nestorian clergy within Islamic lands could look with expectation to it: They were a dwindling minority in their own homeland (Iraq-Syria) by the 11th-12th centuries, and though the Muslims were generally tolerant of them, they were certainly not tolerant of Islam. In Christian tradition, Doomsday has always been imminent - and only the small minority of righteous believers was to be spared and, from humiliation in an age of depravity, be raised to triumphant honour (thus getting their own back, obtaining redress) in the new Jerusalem. For centuries now the Nestorian masses had been converting to Islam, freely and peacefully
(lured by the Devil, Nestorian clergy must have reasoned), and attempts at re-converting Muslims to Christianity were forbidden. Yet Christian proselytizing among others was not; and from the missionary schools in Bagdad zealous Nestorians ranged far abroad.

The legend on the enclosed Doomsday peoples early percolated to the Mongols and, furthermore, begat a native Mongolian version, which had held sway for some time before the rise of Činggis Qān. According to this version, the Mongols had been enclosed behind the towering Bāgene Kun mountains by their hated local enemies the Ta(r)tars - but break out again and obtain revenge by boring and mining their way through a thin cliff of iron, thus forcing an exit into the outer world. This is essentially the Nestorian-Islamic legend - only here in the words of these fiends of the oicumene, and not the words of the oicumene itself. This identification of the Mongols with the Doomsday peoples, both by others and by the Mongols themselves, was intensified by the foolish behaviour of the Muslim Hwārizm Emperor immediately to the southwest-west of Mongolia and its towering Altai mountains. He postured vociferously as the defender of the oicumene against the Mongolian Doomsday peoples - and then proceeded to invite their onslaught by murdering Činggis Qān's peaceful envoys. These envoys were Muslims themselves; as early as in 1203, when Činggis Qān was in a desperate situation, with only eighteen friends around him, six or seven of these friends were Nestorians and three were Muslims. It was probably at this 1203 meeting, according to research, that the seeds were laid in his mind, by these very friends, for the program of Doomsday world domination. According to Christian, Judaic and Islamic tradition the enclosed fiends when they burst forth were to gain world mastery - only to be themselves annihilated in a final battle of battles in the Holy Land (i.e. by the forces of the Messiah). This conviction - of final annihilation after a spell of world mastery of so-and-so many years, in a final battle in the far west - is significantly found in Činggis Qān and his army too.
Hence what happened might be described, only half facetiously, as God (or his scribes on earth) writing the script and the Church playing the part of talent-spotters and instructors for the shooting of the film, going out and finding that the Mongols would fit the role admirably, convincing them, and reassuring them: "Here's the story, look up the text if you forget some lines, here's the scene too, now out in the limelight you go and act your part." Which is to ravage the scene and kill both co-actors and spectators, for the sake of unprecedented realism and drama, on the assumption that God will foot the bill and has wanted it that way. In the event millions of terrified human beings paid the bill with their lives, and though the Church was still sure it was God who had ordered the whole thing (for it said so on the title page and successive pages of the script), the script and the finished real-life film were consigned to the poste restante of history. Which is where we, on the indications of copious sources, may look them up 750 years later.

When speaking of "Occidental ideology" (or any other ideology for that matter) we note that it is mobile. Thus it can strike root and produce a harvest in other climes too, and quite as dramatically as in its native Occident. A case in point is of course Marxism, which has produced so many different flowerings, from the Marcuse-et-alia inspiration of Occidental student revolts to the widely varying Marxist régimes in power across the globe: a triumph through the agency not of the industrial proletariat but of military and intellectual leaders and their peasant following, not of matter but of the spirit.

Such triumphs are not fortuitous, as has been said: They come through being functional answers to perceived challenges, they are "sucked" into a defined opportunity - by the process of defining the opportunity. (Thus in third world countries Marxism is a functional answer to Occidental colonialism and neo-colonialism, through "fighting the Occident with its own stuff", whereas traditional local ways have proven that they are not up to the task by being overcome; at the same time both real opposition to and posturing against
Western exploitation open up opportunities for a new native elite - often in the form of young, well-trained intellectuals and junior officers who are blocked by, and now get an ideological weapon for ousting, the native "tools of imperialism" and "symbols of corruption" installed by the Westerners.)

Of course the rise of Činggis Qān (like the rise of any great personality in history) opened up opportunities for enterprising, power-hungry warriors and intellectuals (meaning Mongolian shamans, Nestorian advisers and in particular Uīgur Turkic scribes and counsellors); indeed his rise was this opening up of opportunities for so many. What opened up opportunities was his vision (quite as with the third world visions of Marxism), and this vision was the symbiotic coalescing of an ideology (Occidental in origin yet anti-Occidental in its political implications) with native elements of culture and history. Thus the Doomsday scare of Muslims and Nestorians reflected the fear of sedentary peoples for the irruption of nomad culture-wreckers - an idea and a practice holding great appeal for nomads (such as the Mongols). Not only a distant past (relegation of the Mongols to bleak Mongolia, behind the Altai mountains), but also the more recent one was now structured (from the humiliations suffered at the hands of the Tartars, right down to their murder of Činggis Qān's father - of the equally personal afflictions of corporal A. Hitler, and right up to the behaviour of the Mwārizm Emperor). What Činggis Qān could give his fellow Mongols and allied tribes was a meaningful purpose and goal (and a meaningful way to reach it, through plunder and booty), what they could give him (and themselves) was its materialization; what he could give was the security of a "truth" both transcending and explaining their lives, what they could give, or wager, was their lives.

We began with a discussion of macro- versus micro-history, meaning the work of macro- and micro-historians respectively. What has not been discussed is these concepts as applying to the process of history itself. In this respect macro-history might be conceived of as comprising the
main lines of the visions and cosmologies (preferably not of the macro-historians but of the actors in history) which explain or may explain mass human conduct (be it a mass of individual acts, or concerted action), along with their possible causes. As to cause and effect, it is imperative that we do away with preconceived notions of what is objective, absolute, "the basis" versus what is subjective, relative, "the superstructure" - with the "basis" defined in and by our consciousness as lying outside our consciousness and wholly determining and causing our consciousness. Such thoughts are themselves the product of a certain historical setting and tradition.

Matter and consciousness are not two realities, but one (and infinitely many). Matter is sensation, sensation is material consciousness. Abstracts are built upon memories, memories are built upon material sensation in the past, yet abstract categories and memories are themselves our only tools and basis for defining, understanding, and acting in, the present. The sensations following upon our acts are all that can, and do, adjust our categories. Human history is human consciousness, which no-one can step outside, and the meeting of our remembered past with our sensate present is historical causation.

NOTES

1 A related, less extreme, indeed partially reversed position is that of my friend Thorleif Boman, Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen, Göttingen 1968, (trsl) Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, Norton & Co, N.Y.1970, popularized as Europas kultur og den jødiske arv, Oslo 1972, pp9-10: "...In Hebrew movement and change dominate. Common to all Hebrews... was that perception of reality which is expressed in their language, and which differs from that which the Greek (or Norwegian) language reveals. One’s mother tongue
one acquires before the gift for independent reflection is awakened. Yet it also binds our thinking to a specific tradition. As this has happened in an unreflected way in our earliest childhood, no-one is aware of this binding, but one discovers it when one encounters and reflects upon that mode of thinking and understanding of reality which a language of completely different form presupposes. Thus too it was with me."

E.g. Norwegian brene-brenner-brente-brent ("to burn", tr.) and brene-brenner-brant-brunni/brent (do., itr.) in English reduced to "burn-burns-burned-burned/burnt" (tr. and itr.). The evolution of formal categories and rules, called grammar and syntax, testifies to a need for consolidating a corresponding understanding of reality. The progressive reduction of such formal linguistic compulsion in its turn shows, not that this understanding is reduced, but on the contrary, that parts of the formal "scaffolding" needed to build and reinforce it are no longer necessary, and hence not kept up but allowed to fall to the ground, from disuse and disrepair.

e.g. in sports, with tenths and hundredths of seconds "deciding" victory or name-effacing failure, or in working life, with "time studies" (a telling name, meaning of course work studies) and clockwork-stamp control of the employees. Naturally, from early age everybody wears time strapped to their wrist.

or harmful, for focusing on and cementing certain historical paradigms at the expense of others, which is or at least has been the case with history written for a "popular" audience - from school books to bestsellers of adult purchase concentrating on war, war heroes, drama. (Not only books but also "comic" strips and films should be included under the general heading of "history-writing".) The danger consists in new generations of generals (and would-be generals) preparing to "fight the previous war" and in highlighting the negative, destructive sides of human life (thus in a sense "normalizing" them) at the expense of creative potentials.

This superstition is all the stronger for offering a focus and locus of compensation (and in the dramatic centre of otherwise secular politics) for the general dismay and bewilderedness of the faithful in the face of de-Christianization (and de-Judaization of the Jews). This is an important point, as roughly the same process of compensatory focusing helped to prepare and to unleash the Mongol storm of the world, cf pp 27-28. In the 12th-13th centuries it was Oriental (Nestorian) Christianity, in the 20th it is Occidental Christianity that is on the decline, the need is the same - and the net effect may yet become the same as well, or worse, with regard to human lives and civilization.

"the forces of light and darkness, progress and reaction" is really a Manichæan (i.e. Iranian) constellation, intro-
duced into Christianity and affecting Islam and Judaism much less. (Thus in Thomas Aquinas, who time and again reproduces thoughts found in Muslim theologians, "darkness is merely the absence of light, evil merely the absence of good").

e.g. the so-called "imaginary numbers"


I here accept the arguments of Boman, op. cit.

Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, Hutchinson, London 1970, pp 141-142; others also discussed in RM Rehder, The Unity of the Ghazals of Ḥāfīz, Der Islam, no. 51, 1974, p 67: "Some of Lewis' observations are true, but they misrepresent the subject as a whole"


as can ecologist thinking, for coming so late to the scene: Radical young theologians in particular gravitate towards ecologist views - on the sanctity of Creation, our duty to show reverence for the Work of God in Nature. Ecologists readily accept such support, for pragmatic reasons mostly, but partly one would think of intuition that Capitalism is threatening not merely nature but also traditional religion; this is patent, while the deep-structure link between Capitalism and (Occidental) Christianity is not.

chapters on US-USSR Cold War and its possible outcome

"The Future in Space" I-II, by NASA artist-informationist (Russian-descended) Yurij Semitjov on Kellogg's Corn Flakes packages, Oslo 1981

cf the different "motive forces" defined by Freud, Jung, Adler

GS Plekhanov, as quoted in A Mass, Filosofiens historie, Oslo 1980, II, pp 212-213

a common view holds that the ancient practice of blood-feuds in Arabia, and the rule of "an eye for an eye (etc)", have been psychologically motivated by a wish to reestablish a cosmic balance or harmony which has been disturbed by the preceding murder/insult

fittingly, Lutherans call their religious coming-of-age ceremony "confirmation" (though knowledge of the faith is hardly strengthened by the public examination of the youngsters, traditionally often nerve-wracking; what is 'confirmed' is their acceptance in society)
cf emphasis on security in childhood, by parents and child - from security through lactation and baby's lying upon mother/father; walk training which is generally accomplished by mother/father taking up position some paces in front of the toddler and thus making walking necessary to reach the parental haven; toilet training which must not induce traumas and insecurity; to the craving of 5-to-10-year-olds for dolls' houses, secret hideouts, tree huts, and closed-in beds like "caves" with curtain, door, table and toys inside etc.

the volvo slogan 1979-81, ingenious for combining the two complementary (usually either-or) sides to the security urge (being enclosed in an impact-proof shell, and the dynamic impulse of reaching out to control surroundings). On the car as vehicle of the Occidental cultural message, see HS, Materialized Ideology - On Liberal and Marxist Power Analysis, Westernness and the Car, TWC no. 12, and J Galtung, A Note on Cars and Apartment Houses

below, p 25; HS, Rise of the Medieval Central Asian Ideal of World Domination - Chinggis Qan and the Role of a Legend (hereafter: Rise), Foreword, p 8

in particular Hitler's insistence that the millions of Russian soldiers surrendering or being captured in the first weeks and months of the war should not be rearmed and motivated to fight Stalin, as some Red Army officers (including a general) suggested to the Nazis, but interned and badly treated

the "answer" to, or rather a way of turning around, the question "why are people never (or: so seldom) satisfied with what they have got?"

e.g. R Grousset, L'Empire des Steppes, Paris 1959

The following expose is based on HS, Rise, NAVF ms, Oslo 1961 (450 pp)

Études tibétaines M. Ialou, Paris 191, p 9/:
quotation from an ancient pre-Buddhist Tibetan text (7th century, from the Duen-huang finds), chosen here because it demonstrates a) interest in problems of causality, b) awareness that a world outlook, cosmology, doctrine may be defined as a way of explaining "the connections between causes and effects" (the way mentioned qualifies the Bodhagya = Buddha? people as heretics), c) that at such an early date there was awareness, in Tibet of all places, of a fundamental difference between "the manner of the east" and that of the west in explaining causality, and d) that Tibet would seem to accede to the latter (Manichæan, Sogdian?)