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PATTERNS OF WESTERN HISTORY: "UNITY IN DIVERSITY"

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1. **Introduction: Capitalism or Western civilization?**

Is there a general Western "crisis" today? Or do we simply experience one of those recurrent, cyclical saturations of the capitalist economy, like those in the 1870's and the 1930's? This question, whether such a "traditional" cyclical crisis has emerged, is presented with great clarity and answered in the affirmative, e.g. by Geoffrey BARRACLOUGH in his important review articles in the *New York Review of Books*. ¹

There are evidences of more long-term problems of capitalism as such: its need to expand and the ultimate limits of expansion. Although those limits may be steadily approaching, we are presently probably experiencing only the mild phase of so-called "growth problems": pollution, a certain depletion of resources, the straining of daily life in the form of increasing complaints of "stress", and the accumulating "urban problems". These are not cyclical difficulties, but gradual *deterioration* in very concrete and absolute terms. Both the economic cyclical problems and the more long-term "environmental" deterioration can be, and largely must be, analyzed in terms of capitalism. The emphasis in this paper, however, will not be on capitalism, but rather on "Western civilization", ² and I shall briefly explain why:

Our present global problems are certainly so imminent and breath-taking that a really long-term historical analysis, starting with pre-capitalist times, may seem extravagant. To use the *iceberg* metaphor: The myopic, narrowly contemporary view prevails because the top of the iceberg is alarmingly conspicuous, ³ and we fail to discover its deeper segments and its real size - the roots, patterns, and formats of our problems. If it was not a mere coincidence that just Western civilization - rather than the Chinese or Indian civilizations - produced capitalism and industrialism, then there is a case for arguing that the West, in certain crucial respects, must have been predisposed, though not necessarily predetermined, to give birth to capitalism. But if the rise of capitalism, with its endemic cyclical crises and long-term contradictions, has something to do with tendencies inherent in Western history long before the 15th and 16th centuries, then there is also a need to spell out these tendencies, just as we have spelled out the structural problems of capitalism - in order to understand it, confront it, and possibly transcend it.
Hence it is a basic assumption behind this paper that political strategies which are aimed only at the present capitalist system, will carry a certain degree of superficiality. To give an example: From the point of view of women's liberation capitalism is perceived necessarily, as only one form of patriarchy or male dominance. It is a highly specific form, but undoubtedly a fairly recent one in history, and capitalism must in this respect be seen as a continuation of much older trends. An analysis limited to capitalist social formations will therefore not be a sufficient study to explore the nature of patriarchy. Similarly, individualism and geographical expansionism are recognizable features of Western history during many centuries before the rise of capitalism, and must, precisely of that reason, be interpreted as preconditions for capitalism as much as "results" of it. Within this line of thought, one would be inclined to see capitalism, with its in-built machine of expansion and quantification-mechanization, as a logical potentiated highest stage of Westernness.

This may sound very teleological, as if it were anything like a predetermined "program", making certain "tendencies" fulfill their destiny in the later stages of Western civilization.

The aim of this paper is, on the basis of the records of Western self-perception since the early Greeks, exactly to discuss not how teleology worked in Western history, but how specific historical structures generated specific Western traditions and habits, of action and of thought. During the centuries these habits and traditions gain a weight or an inertia of their own in spite of the relative disappearance of those structures which generated them in the first place. The conventional way of comparing Western ("modern") and non-Western ("non-modern") societies is concentrated on just this differential role of tradition: In the non-West the inertia of tradition is conventionally described as almost total, whereas in the West tradition was, so the argument goes, at some point of time: the capitalist or industrial revolution, decisively shattered and left behind. In W.W. ROSTOW's dubious term, Western economy and society had "taken off". An obvious explanation of this uniquely Western development may be found in the very pattern of Western tradition before the take-off period. I shall discuss in this paper to what extent the seemingly fragile, crisis-ridden, and contradictory nature of the Western tradition made Western civilization preconditioned for
further abrupt social change.

A typical weakness of such a theory of "recurrent" instability and pluralism" in the West may be indicated already at the beginning of this paper. It is revealed in the works of William McNEILL. In his short and condensed *The Shape of European history* he has much to say about one element in the dynamics of change:

"Clearly, where multiple cultural models are available, departures from old ways become more and more probable; and after a particular society has opted for a series of alterations in accustomed patterns of behaviour, resistance to further departures from tradition weakens --- " (p.34)

"I conclude, therefore, that through the larger part of recorded history the main drive wheel for historical change was contact among strangers, causing men of both sides of such encounters to reconsider and in some cases to alter their familiar ways of behaving. Such contacts and the reactions to them generated civilizations. Within such civilizations, like a volcano in eruption, there arose specially active "metropolitan centers" of innovation ..." (p.42)

But why did McNEILL's "metropolitan centers" in the West come to innovate just capitalism, and a highly special type of capitalism at that? The availability and role of "multiple cultural models" are certainly essential, with the qualification that the multiplicity arose as much out of war, destruction and imperialism as out of mere "contact among strangers" in metropolitan centers.

But the limit of this kind of reasoning is that it tells us next to nothing about the content and direction of change. Any good theory about the course of Western civilization should comprise both the preconditions for basic social change in the West and the very special character of the Western changes.

With regard to the present changes going on in the West, we have so far briefly pointed to the apparently coinciding short-term cyclical economic crisis of the 1970's, and long-term, accumulating problems of capitalism. As I have argued, there seems to be also a third factor - an even older and more protracted crisis, which is embedded in Western civilization. Today, we do not know the extent to which these three phenomena will converge in time. The cyclical short-term economic crisis is conspicuous, although uncertainty prevails to the exact phase of it: Are we in the beginning, in the middle or at the end of it? To put it anachronistically: Do we now re-experience the twenties or the thirties? - The two other crises are much more difficult to determine.
This is part of the nature of these crises since they have the form of long trends. When the trends will become absolute and dramatic, we cannot know: e.g. in the history of capitalism major wars and new technologies seem to have had the function of postponing or overcoming, but not abolishing economic crises.

Before we go into the historical dimension of Western civilization, an attempt will be made - in the next chapter - to spell out the characteristics of some of the present crisis-trends of this civilization. In our context, those trends which are older than capitalism will be emphasized, not because of their age, but because they are politically important and often neglected as long-term factors.
2. The closing of the Western frontier

The image of the permanently expanding frontier - be it the frontier of land, wealth or knowledge - is one of the really dominant themes of Western civilization. It is not just an image; for several centuries and in long periods the expanding frontier has been a reality to the point of becoming a natural law to Westerners. To those who identify themselves with the "mission" of Western civilization, the closing of this expansion has always meant the shattering of the universe, the world turned upside down. Such a close-down appeared at the end of the West-Roman Antiquity, in the late Medieval Ages, and perhaps the most visible crisis-trend today is that the Western law of expansion is broken again, first in the case of Europe, then in the case of the U.S.

There is no need to go into detail about the present contraction - since it is almost universally recognized, even in the West itself. The rise of China to the normal superpower position of the old "Middle Kingdom", the ties of anti-Western solidarity developed between the new nation-states in Asia and Africa, and particularly the successful anti-imperialist wars, and the new bargain-position and counter-penetration strategies of the oil-producing Islamic countries, - these are tendencies which will not necessarily weaken capitalism, but they obviously represent severe blows to the Western self-consciousness.

The reason why one should not mix "Westernness" and "Capitalism" in this case is that the waves of anti-Western revolt are often compatible with pro-capitalism, most visibly in the Middle East. The centers of capitalism are not eternally bound to the U.S. or Europe; they may well shift to other parts of the globe. With the novel concentration of finance capital on Middle East hands, the prospect of a loosening of the ties between Western civilization and capitalism becomes more imaginable. Already Japan has shown that capitalism, first started, is capable of striking root in civilizations very different from its birthplace. Unlike Christianity, capitalism tolerates foreign gods.

This is to say that the closing of the Western frontier and the revolt against the West is a factor of its own, working on Western capitalists and non-capitalists alike, to the extent that they identify themselves with the fate of their "own" civilization. This identification is largely unconscious and undeclared.
For Scandinavians, innocently living on the fringe of Western civilization, there is a very reluctant and a particularly unconscious identification with the West. Until now the need to clarify our being Western has not seemed urgent. The underlying idea has been, of course, that a Scandinavian outside the West is primarily a Scandinavian or a Norwegian, in the second place he is a European, and only in the third place is he a Westerner.

Today we are slowly beginning to learn that to non-Westerners this is exactly the other way round: "Even" Scandinavians (and "even" Scandinavian Marxists for that matter) are, for most practical purposes, primarily Westerners.

Therefore, a necessary implication of the attempt to look at ourselves with non-Western eyes, would be to see our different habits of thought and action as variants of a common Western pattern rather than something singularly Swedish or Norwegian. The refusal to see ourselves in terms of civilization instead of nation-states makes it possible for us to continue debating without questioning the unspoken Western assumptions about space, time, rationality, and logic. These assumptions are taken for granted until the self-conscious rise of non-Western cultures and political formations will lead to ever more systematic attacks on the pretended or unspoken universalism of Western cosmology.

In the Third World the originally Western weapons of modern universities and mass media are increasingly turned against the West. Inspired by the global decline of the Western hegemony, these ideological machines have steadily begun to re-actualize, articulate and promote the rich indigenous traditions of non-Western culture.

Narrowly connected with the closing frontier is the decline of the Western Idea of Progress. Against Spengler's, Sorokin's and Toynbee's return to Vico's cyclical development model of civilizations a lot of relevant criticism has been raised, but no leading historian or sociologist outside the marxist tradition has answered the cyclists by redressing the Western linear idea of progress. Today the bearers of such an idea are no longer the Western middle and upper classes, but the socialist movements and the anti-Western Third World movements. The steady "Progress of Political Liberty" in the tradition of European Liberalism has long since been substituted by movements of liberation as an on-going process beyond the horizon of capitalism, or for that matter, stalinism.
As Johan GALTUNG has pointed out,\textsuperscript{15} there is one important element in the traditional Western idea of progress which modern capitalism has not actualized, and that is the prospect of utopia conceived of as something very different from the accumulation of wealth and material welfare, or purely technological science fiction.\textsuperscript{16}

Today, what could be regarded as the functional equivalent to "good-old liberal politics of progress and reform", is Social Democratic politics in Scandinavia. But even here the momentum of "reform" seems largely lost. From Social Democratic headquarters the electorate is now regarded as "reform-tired".\textsuperscript{17}

Particularly disappointing are the various public reactions to the extensive educational reforms. On this point - the emphasis on better schooling as the main device to modify the class structure - continuities with the older liberal traditions are conspicuous. Utopia through schooling is precisely the sort of social engineering from above which the Social Democrats have inherited from elitist liberalism,\textsuperscript{18} and it is typical for the decline of the traditional, liberal idea of progress that large-scale educational schemes to increase social and geographical mobility no longer evoke enthusiasm, not even in a Social Democratic presentation.

Instead of enthusiasm for educational engineering a fairly general feeling of social deterioration pervades Western societies.\textsuperscript{19} This feeling is concentrated on the issues of "environment", and "ecology", on the relations between man and nature, man and technology, the latter being considered as, somehow, gone out of control. This development is classically symbolizer in GOETHE's poem \textit{Der Zauberlehrling} (The Magician's Apprentice), in which catastrophe occurs when the apprentice tries to use forces of the magician without knowing how they can be controlled, i.e. ought to be used. An older metaphor about the ambiguous character of technological possibility is contained in the Greek myth of PROMETHEUS - a constant element in the Western self-understanding throughout centuries.\textsuperscript{20}

Today, in the face of increasing ecological imbalance, there is a widespread belief that e.g. pollution is a new problem, and that Western awareness of the ambiguities of technology is something unprecedented before our industrial age. This is a fact
which reminds us that one of the necessary - and permanent - tasks of historians is to emphasize that most problems are very old ones, and that it is impossible to see what is really new in the present without knowing what is old in the past. In this case it is essential that the present industrial system was imposed not because of ecological ignorance, but, on the contrary, in spite of the available knowledge of its detrimental effects on nature and man. 21) This is not to say that modes of thought which advocated ecological balance were in any sense dominant in the centuries of Western industrialization, but they did exist as alternative knowledge and belief.

Indeed, a very striking part of the Western preconditions of industrialization is the history of how biological and animistic ideas about the sacredness of nature were forced down as a mere undercurrent of Western thought. 22)

Instead the peculiarly Western 23) tradition of quantification was extended to become that mechanistic world-view which got its classic formulations from BACON, DESCARTES, LEIBNIZ and NEWTON. The new mechanistic universe did not necessarily imply a complete separation of science and theology, but it infinitely enlarged the autonomy of the "laws of nature" and thereby removed theology and religion as an immediate control on science. It meant the rise of Weberian technical rationality (Zweckrationalität) 24) as something largely independent on religious, and hence, social control. In turn, the combination of the particularistic forces of private property and "value-neutral", technical rationality came to produce the modern Prometheus Unbound - technology unbound by community power, "solidarity with nature" and solidarity with future generations. However, this kind of Prometheus has proved to be as fateful a Zauberehrling as that one in GOETHE's poem, and again we are confronted with a closing frontier: Prometheus Bound, the necessary end of one-dimensional technical and economic rationality.

Among the recent general interpretations of Western history, The Rise of the Western World 25) elevates the unique character of Western property rights as the decisive phenomenon, in the evolution of early capitalism. In a separate paper we shall discuss the role of property rights. It will be argued that their emergence in Western civilization are much older than what NORTH and THOMAS seem to imply, but they
they are certainly integral to (though not necessarily "causing") capitalism. Therefore it is indeed a crisis today when this private property right to production is clearly perceived against the social effects of e.g. depletion and pollution in the West today. This is a dramatic demonstration of one part of the truth in Marx's prognosis about capitalism as a process of integrating production and society. It means a mounting contradiction between traditional private ownership and socio-political implications of production. The spectacular increases of the state sector and the private monopoly sector in all capitalist countries can be seen as so many attempts to transcend the severity of this contradiction. As is obvious from our experiences in Scandinavia, "going public", and more state control are not at all incompatible with capitalism, but these developments effectively curbs the freedom of each individual, personal owner of property - they strengthen the bureaucratic-collective trends in the system and reduces the number of individual capitalists acting on their own behalf. In other words, the classical capitalist universe of the many small, busy and independent entrepreneurs based on their own private property is today, more than ever, regarded as fiction. The promising frontier of ever-expanding private property combined with individualist enterprise is closing.

Entrepreneurs are traditionally males, and one essential part of this dissociation of capitalism and the Western tradition of property-based individualism is that the role of the independent entrepreneur has become limited to very few men indeed. The traditional, expansionist and dominating role of men is to a lesser degree than before supported by the structure of society. Nothing fails like success! The very power and overdevelopment of male expansion, private property and technical rationality have become a threat to the male role itself, and the new closing frontiers seem increasingly to become internalized in men's minds and conducive to self-doubt and sex role-questioning, particularly within the middle-class male population, the standard bearer of the traditional role.

Thus, the emerging disintegration of the traditional sex roles has an important implication for history: the re-actualization of the old macro-historical theories of patriarchy and matriarchy as basic construction principles for historical periodization and
analysis. Obviously, the rise of the new history of women will give these construction: principles more life and blood, and so will kindred studies of family history, the history of childhood, the history of love and sexual life. The best of these studies show that the differential position of men and women is integral to the most basic structures of society, such as the division of labor.

Within capitalist self-understanding, e.g. in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, one of the structural heros of history is just the division of labor role specialization as the really ingenious and rational use of human resources, and as an essential feature of civilization itself. Therefore, attacks on the principle of the division of labor do not only hit capitalism, but the very idea of civilization as we know it. Such radical attacks are now coming, primarily from two corners - the women's liberation movement and the People's Communes in China. In both cases the "vertical", the inegalitarian and alienating division of work is seen as something very different from a real sharing of work. It is much too early to assess the strength of these impulses from China and the women's lib, but few would deny that they receive a growing attention and represent a much more radical critique of the principles of our civilization than does the traditional socialist one.

Of course, aristocratic and humanistic proponents of the ideals of the many-sided, harmoniously cultivated personality, have long since reacted against the effects of narrow specialization, but it is only in our days that such reactions are turned into the social criticism of political mass movements, and this change is inseparable from the enormous development of role specialization itself. Again there seems to be a limit for overdevelopment: a limit where specialization enters into a self-sustaining and, in the end, self-defeating process, serving no one. It is symptomatic that not even the most prestigious of all Western sciences, viz. Hippocratic medicine, has escaped severe criticism in this respect. The possible rationality of specialization becomes overshadowed and deformed by the very power of the specialists.

The intensification of the division of labor is inseparable from the more general process of differentiation (Ausbildung) and the emergence of organizational complexity at all levels of modern Western society. The degree of complexity is such that the possi-
bilities of a reasonable overview and control are diminishing: The introduction of systematic planning and computers has undoubtedly increased control in some respects, but has at the same time added just another element to the system complexity. Thus control becomes possible only at the elite level of information and accessibility to administrative decision-making.

The ecology debate has made it more clear how alternative structures must be like. The central idea is, almost too simply, smallness, in Rousseau's programmatic words: "The first reform you need is that of territorial size". The very existence of extended economic cycles, not only within the nation-states, but at a world scale, presupposes complex organization and transportation systems which evade local, popular responsibility and control, and, seemingly, even the pretended understanding and command at the elite level.

Today, decomposition of all our structures of bigness to limited economic cycles operating and manageable at the local or semi-local level would mean a much more radical break with modern civilization than the mere socialization of the means of production. And it is typical that when Rousseau reopened the question of size as a critical perspective on contemporary Western civilization, he did so in the name of the ancients, within the preoccupations of the Polis tradition of Greek thought.

The utopian character of this kind of Kulturkritik is all too evident, especially when considered in its close relation with two other very old paradigms, that of the "noble savage" and that of uncorrupted nature, both recurrently in Western history being hold up as contrasts to the vices, complexities and time pressures of civilization, not only Western civilization, but civilization tout court.

This sense of pure nature, of small societies, of simple life styles have not, until now, made great impact on actual politics in the West. In the arts, however, and in the imaginations and longings of men it has meant a lot, and of course this side of culture is as much "real life" as practical politics. Today the old utopia of smallness and simple life styles has been expanded, by the contradictions and excesses of "overdevelopment", into the realm of practical ecology and politics: The former utopians are gradually proving more realistic than the realists.
This is not to say that the structure of bigness have yet reached their limits or that the break-down into small, local and semi-autonomous systems of production and polities is feasible within the foreseeable future in our part of the world. But no doubt relatively more people than ever in the days of Rousseau see, today, the eventually closing circles of bigness, and that deficiency of organization cannot be transcended by just creating more organization or that harmful technological effects cannot be redressed by endlessly increasing the demands on technology and non-human energy.

At the present stage of civilization the utopian character of *small is beautiful* is still very utopian, one has to admit. A modern world-system is in existence, economically and politically, and there are no practical plans for how it can be decomposed so that localism and smallness may prevail. But at the relative onset of this paper on the historical *dynamism* of Western civilization, and its *limits*, it can safely be stated that what seemed to be, formerly, the escapism of art, namely the *interest in nature*, *simplicity*, and *primitivism*, is today apparently seen as one of the necessities of *future* politics. This "necessity" entails fundamental organizational problems, how the local system may function, co-existently with global relations.43)

Due to i.e. Niklas LUHMANN 44) we may now have sharpened our sense of the extremely complex reality of modern Western civilization to see that this *Problematik* of organization, of mediation between the local level of production and consumption and the global level of communication is still very unsolved, even in theory. Yet, the awareness of the new necessity of utopia - the necessity of ecological control and local-popular responsibility and authority - may point to the direction of solutions.

The image of the closing frontier, which has penetrated this chapter, has been conceived of as the possible limit of certain recurrent patterns in Western history. In the next chapter, focusing mainly on the Near East, we shall analyze the conventional geographical setting of Western civilization.
3. the re-assertion of Ancient and Near Eastern history

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil crises have drawn the Near East, again, into the center of world politics and world history. These crises have re-actualized the geography and history of this area as well as re-established Islamic civilization as an economic and political factor in its own right.\(^{45}\) In the wake of the new Arab strategy of economic counter-penetration, we shall also experience the rise of formidable Islamic counter-interpretations of history, making the Near East more than just introductory and sporadic chapters in the "story of the mainstream of Western civilization". The rise of Islamic studies, both in the East and in the West, and of Near-Eastern self-consciousness will ultimately compel us to reconsider the role of this area in World history, not only as connected to European or Western history.

One of its "roles" has been to produce an unrivalled series of highly different empires, stretching to all directions, but generally clustering around the Mediterranean. It is maintained by an authority, on U.S. foreign policy\(^ {46}\) that one of the long-term nightmares of Dr. Henry Kissinger is precisely the possibility of a repetition of this historical configuration: economic and political combinations across the Mediterranean, to the exclusion of U.S. interests.

The rise of the U.S. and of the U.S.S.R. to super-power position has widened the perspective on both Near Eastern and European history since the political interests of the two super powers are much more directly involved in Asia than the traditional European powers ever were. This perspective has given birth to the important concept of Eurasia as the geographically main context of Western and Eastern history alike.

To stress the Eurasian context implies above all a constant attention to the dialectics between the sedentary civilizations and the historical movements of the nomadic populations on this vast continent and the uneven, but ultimately steady, spread of civilization from both its Eastern and Western bases.

This process was already noted by LEIBNIZ, to whom it was

..."a unique disposition of fate which has placed the highest civilizations the human race has achieved as it were at the two extremities of our continent, that is in Europe and in China, which adorns the opposite end of the earth as a kind of oriental Europe."
And the highest providence is also at work in the fortunate circumstance that while the nations which are most highly developed and the same time the furthest separated, reach out their arms to one another; everything that lies between them is gradually brought to a higher way of life." 47)

According to Adda B. BOZEMAN, already CICERO observed that war could not occur anywhere in the East without shaking to its foundations the money market at Rome, 48) and further:

"A study of correlations in the historical events of Europe and Asia during this international epoch (during the Han dynasty) indicates that war along the Chinese trade routes in the Tarina basin resulted, many times, in disturbances in Parthia, in Armenia, and on the borders of Syria; and that, likewise, it was interruptions of the traffic on the Black Sea that stirred the people north of the lower Danube and so led to the long train of violent disturbances that concluded in the historic collisions of the barbarians with the Roman legions along the Rhine. Even peoples in no way connected with the silk route were affected by the remoter repercussions of any serious interruption along its course between the Chinese Wall and Rome." 49)

The waves, repercussions and pressures of such nomadic invasions belong to the central core of Eurasian history. Indeed, the way these invasions of barbarians differentially affected the various bases of civilization constitutes a catalogue of decisive events in world history. The effects of the most crucial of these events has L.S. STAVRIANOS interpreted in this way:

..."during the ancient period (up to ca. 500 B.C.) the Middle East had been the center of initiative from which had diffused the fundamental innovations of those millennia. But during the classical period it was Europe, India and China that generated most of the innovations, while the Middle East lagged behind. And the reason was precisely that the ancient civilizations of the Middle East had survived the invasions of the second millennium BC, while the ancient civilizations of the peripheral regions had gone under, leaving the way clear for a fresh start - for the emergence of the new classical civilizations.

So it was during the transition from classical to the medieval civilizations. But this time the existing classical civilizations survived everywhere except in the West." 50)

... "only in the West was classical civilization permanently submerged and superseded by something fundamentally new - - - Only in the West was the classical civilization shattered beyond recall despite repeated attempts at restoration over several centuries." 51)
Professor STAVRIANOS overstates his case ("the reason was precisely that . . ."), but here we have at least one important condition of change: the effects of the nomadic pressures, the pervasive break-down of millennial traditions. This is not at all to say that these pressures operated as single "causes", only that the emergence of new "centers of initiative" was directly correlated to the differential outcome of the various phases of the nomadic/sedentary dialectic on the Eurasian continent.  

Very often the epochal waves of nomadic invasion are seen as "accidents" or just "in-puts" in the system of society. These waves are looked upon as "external factors", now and then working on the real history of sedentary societies. However, within the larger Eurasian "system" they are not external factors, but very internal ones. They are not accidental or contingent phenomena, but integral to the very structure of Eurasian history. It is only because the nomads were perceived as barbarian threats to civilization that they are continuously, both in traditional European and Chinese historiography, seen as external factors and not analyzed in their own terms.

From the nomadic invasions of the second millennium BC, affecting all Eurasian civilizations, until the last great nomadic victories of the sixteenth century (Babur's conquest of North India, 1526) and of the seventeenth century (the Manchu conquest of Peking, 1644), Eurasian or Afro-eurasian history could as well be analyzed in terms of the nomadic as in terms of the sedentary populations. Indeed, a closer attention to the vast nomadic movements would compel us to realize the unity of Eurasian history as something different from the aggregate of separate histories of civilizations. In addition to the conventional image of the nomads as destroyers of civilization, there is also the fact of their being important transmitters of culture and trade, as in the case of the Turks and Turkomans who for centuries operated that decisive East-West contact: the caravan routes in Central Asia.

Historically, the nomads developed on the fringes of civilization, and, being excluded, they were constantly attracted to the accumulated riches of the sedentary populations: "...les exclus éprouvent une curiosité insatiable, morbide, pour ceux qui les ont rejettés."
In order to be successful invaders they had to gain a rather expert knowledge of political affairs in the very centers of civilization:

"Chaque fois que le Barbare triomphe, c'est qu'il est déjà plus qu'à demi civilisé. Toujours, il a fait longement antichambre et avant de pénétrer dans la maison, frappé dix fois pour une à la porte. Ils s'est, sinon à la perfection, du moins sérieusement frotté à la civilisation du voisin." 58)

The role of the nomads as transmitters of culture, as instable, exceedingly moveable bridge-heads across different Eurasian civilizations, is particularly evident in the case of the Mongol empire which for the first time in history permitted real encounters between the Chinese, Indian, Islamic and Western civilizations. If each one of such nomadic states was ephemeral, they made up for this inconstancy by their sheer recurrence, and thus, by the cycles of their expansion and contraction, constituted permanent structures of Eurasian history until the eighteenth century.

Recently, Perry ANDERSON, on the basis of the works of Owen LATTIMORE and Soviet historians, has elucidated the structural characteristics of nomad social formations and their geographical conditions. 59) The nomadic invasions are no longer represented as external accidents, but as intelligible structures within a Eurasian system of cultures, in BRAUDEL's dramatic language:

"Une loi de physique porte (les nomades) tantôt vers l'Ouest, tantôt vers l'Est, selon que leur vie explosive éclate plus à l'aise vers l'Europe, l'Islam, l'Inde ou la Chine". 60)

In Perry ANDERSON's European perspective:

"The pattern and frequency of these invasions thus made them one of the basic coordinates of the formation of Eastern Europe. If much of Eastern European history can be defined in the first instance by the absence of classical Antiquity, it is differentiated from that of Western Europe in the second instance by the pressure of Nomadic pastoralism." 61)

To revert to I.S. STAVRIANOS's interpretation of the main phases of nomadic invasion, we can now extend it to the Western Medieval Ages and the Early Modern Period: Although both North India and North China were periodically occupied by nomads in late Antiquity and early Medieval Ages, traditional economic and social structures survived, whereas in the West the successive invasions of the Huns,
Avars, Vikings and Magyars only deepened the irreversible break with the Roman past. But after the end of the Viking invasions and especially after the westward thrust of the Mongols was stopped in Eastern Europe in 1241, the nomadic invasions were increasingly concentrated to the East, first in the form of the Mongol empire, and then in the later Moghul and Manchu conquests of India and China respectively. This periodicity of the invasions meant that just in the decisive centuries of the rise of capitalism the West, although challenged by the Turkish empire, did not have to cope with nomadic invasions. This respite from barbarian attacks can largely be explained in terms of internal developments in the European system of economy and technology, and also in terms of its consistently warlike character, a result of the successive reorganizations of increasingly more militarized society to meet the demands of a millenial period of endless invasion and internal warfare.

But the level of European military deterrence vis-a-vis nomadic invasions was always relative to the conditions within the other Eurasian civilizations and within the nomadic populations. Since these conditions were not, as yet, determined by the European world-economy, they worked on the European system by their very presence or, in this case, absence. Therefore the Eurasian conditions of an absence of powerful nomadic invasions into Europe after the 13th century constituted one of the necessary preconditions of the rise of capitalism.

Thus, by constantly referring to an Eurasian context in addition to national and Western ones, one again and again touches on the problem of endogenous versus exogenous theories of social change. 62)

Before we embark on the central discussion of the significance of the peculiarly Near Eastern and proto-Western networks of cultural interaction and diffusion, it is necessary to clarify our position on the endogenous-exogenous issue.

According to Anthony D. SMITH,
"......the dominant tradition in Western thought has been the endogenous paradigm of change. According to this perspective, change is like the growth of a plant or animal: slow, continuous, upward-spiralling, inexorable and irreversible, uniform, and above all immanent and natural.
...... From simple beginnings, from crude and small rudiments, societies and cultures have grown "little by little" into complicated and sophisticated civilizations displaying
in full bloom the inner character and ethos of the embryonic original form.
.... At the centre of neo-evolutionism's appeal, of its virtues and its errors, stands the image of society as an unfolding of inherent potentialities". 65)

The importance of this endogenous idiom is shown by the fact that both traditional liberal and marxist thought is strongly attracted by it. A typical example is Marx's reiterated location of the origins of capitalism within the "womb of the old society", an expression which occur both in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and in the preface of the first edition of Capital.

This is not to say that factors outside the "womb", outside the system selected for scrutiny, are not taken into account by evolutionists. On the contrary, these factors are generally treated as the indispensable flow of external stimuli always necessary to elicit the contradictions and potentialities of the system. But as stimuli or in-puts they are obviously, in theory, accidental factors of a very second order of significance. Their structure, if structure they have, lies outside the system and, most often, of the theoretical interest. No doubt, most endogenous theories are preferable to that most facile expression of the exogenous paradigms, viz. diffusionism - cultural borrowing as the main mechanism of change. They are also preferable to mono-causal ideas of geographical setting or climate as the determinant of history. Compared to such ideas theories of social systems with their structural contradictions and potentialities are vastly superior also because they inherently stress the prospect of conscious political change of these human-made social forms.

Nevertheless also endogenism presupposes a severe limitation of the number of historical factors and interactions taken into full account.

In endogenous theory this limitation has allowed for two strangely different perspectives: In the case of Parsonsian functionalism the quasi-absolutization of the system and its borders has led to a reification of the tendencies towards stability, whereas in the case of marxism the system approach has only too often led to an over-confident stress on the revolutionary fruition of the internal contradictions and a
corresponding neglect of the external forces "accidentally" interacting with the social system.

In marxist theory this endogenism of the social system has also been disputed. Although widely disapproved of today, both for his determinism and for his violent anti-communism it was Karl August WITTFOGEL 64) of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research who in his important works of the 1920's and 30's 65), reopened the debate of the Dialektik der geographischen Lage and the Naturbedingtheit der Arbeit.

The context of that debate was the rise of "national liberation movements" in Asia after the First World War and the publication, for the first time, of a collection of some of Marx's central texts on the "asiatic mode of production", which raised the crucial question why capitalism had not developed independently in the Asian civilizations. 66) Briefly, WITTFOGEL's position was to emphasize the way geography and nature, being the most material of all material factors, ultimately conditioned the concrete means of production and hence the mode of production. In the debate between himself and LUKÁCS he severely criticized the latter for perceiving nature as a purely social category, as a"fetisch", and attributed this "idealism" to what he regarded as LUCÁCS's subjectivist-activist propensity.

Both in the debate with LUKÁCS and at the 1931 Leningrad conference on the Asiatic mode of production WITTFOGEL's view of nature-conditioning was generally rejected as too deterministic. Neither these debates nor the renewed post-1960 discussions of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production or the extensive marxist critique of the various positivist modernization theories have produced any satisfying middle course between the WITTFOGEL-LUKÁCS extremes.

One of the reasons of the theoretical barrenness on this point seems to be the overwhelming endogenous tradition in marxist thought which has almost always favoured LUKÁCS's elevation of the totality of the social system, to the detriment of fruitful analyses of the environment and of the system-environment interactions.
Thus, with all the dangers of the mechanistic fallacy, any new attempt, still within a marxist framework, to transcend its bareness will have to start with WITTFOGEL, because he as at least given much thought to the nature-society relations in macro-historical terms.

Firstly, WITTFOGEL drew attention to the non-endogenous elements in MARX's writings. One such central passage from capital clearly deserves quotation in our context:

"Nicht das tropische Klima mit seiner überwuchernden Vegetation, sondern die gemässigte Zone is das Mutterstand des Kapitals. Es ist nicht die absolute Fruchtbarkeit des Bodens, sondern seine Differenzierung, die Mannigfaltigkeit seiner natürlichen Produkte, welche die Naturgrundlage der gesellschaftlichen Teilung der Arbeit bildet und den Menschen durch den Wechsel der Naturumstände, innerhalb deren er haust, zur Vermannigung seiner einigen Bedürfnisse, Fähigkeiten, Arbeitsmittel und Arbeitsweise spornen. Die Notwendigkeit, eine Naturkraft zu kontrollieren ... spielt die entscheidendste Rolle in der Geschichte der Industrie". 68)

The theoretical status of this passage is ambiguous. 69) It is nevertheless natural to draw the conclusion that according to MARX the climate and geography of Europe constituted one of many necessary conditions of the emergence of capitalism in just that part of the world. What WITTFOGEL did was to extend this kind of analysis to Asia, to find corresponding conditions of the non-emergence of capitalism there. After all, as BRAUDEL and others have made sufficiently clear, 70) rice production-and consumption - have organized Chinese daily life for millennia, and who would argue that this millennial choice of rice has not been at the same time a necessary one and highly a rational one, given i.a. the natural geography of parts of China?

But habits of food and hence traditions of food production (or the possible introduction of food imports to satisfy the old habits), can also go on in spite of the local nature-conditions of food production 71) - depending on the strength of the social structure to which the particular food traditions belong. Speaking about production, it is a truism that nature by itself is sufficient for nothing, but necessary for almost everything. The study of nature in the form of geography is therefore indispensable for history 72) because it makes us pay attention to all those necessary conditions which generally are taken for granted and simply not mentioned.
It is sometimes argued that the historian's business is to study society, and not nature. But this dualistic position would mean to yield to a narrow, obscurantist perspective where all conditions imposed by nature would be seen as unrelated and incomprehensible phenomena. Therefore WITTEFOGEL's main contribution was, in the period which saw the peak of Westerners' hallucination with the dynamics of the social system, modern technology and its assumed capacity to transcend nature, to redirect attention to the constant presence and pressures of the nature conditions.

But the dialectic of the geographical position (Lage) must be seen as much more complex than it is in WITTEFOGEL's analysis, where the relationship between soil, climate and society, mediated through the labour process, is prevalent. Although the factor of transport (Verkehr) is rather extensively taken into account, such dimensions of a geographical location as the proximity of the neighbouring social formations and civilizations, and, necessarily, the character of the latter, point beyond WITTEFOGEL's concerns.

Again there is a case of the endogenous-exogenous problem. By insisting on the Naturmoment WITTEFOGEL escaped the fallacy of explaining everything in terms of the social system. He did indeed compare different social systems, but he did not establish the structures of their exogenous relations of war, conquest, trade, cultural and technological borrowing. Professing to be a dialectical materialist more consistently materialist than Marx himself, WITTEFOGEL remained within an endogenous cage: the local nature conditions of a political unit together with its social system were the absolute determinants of continuity or change. Again we see that an enormous amount of historical forces are relegated outside the explanatory unit and can be left largely unexplained as accidental in-puts necessary only to feed the internal dynamic of the endogenous system.

Perhaps China (isolated, from other civilizations, though not at all from its "barbarian" neighbours) is the most promising big case for those who are inclined to see all historical societies as essentially self-made.

However, if we now (at last) revert to the Near East and Europe, we shall see that endogenous macro-explanations are
particularly ill suited to account for what has taken place in these regions. (As for China, a corollary of our argument will be, to take just one example, that the sheer absence of that kind of close cross-civilization interaction which dominates much of Near Eastern and European history is precisely one of the many necessary conditions under which Chinese history discreetly operated, regardless of the actual dialectic of the local Chinese geography.)

The first step in our argument about Near Eastern history as the proto-Western context has an exceedingly simple point of departure: let us take the existence of the first four civilization bases, in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China, for granted, and just look at one basic geographical dimension: their proximity to each other and the conditions of possible interactions between two, three or all of these civilizations. As so many historians have noted, the first conspicuous fact is the unrivalled proximity of the Egypt-Mesopotamia centres as compared to the other interaction possibilities in this structure. 74) Apart from the later migration of Buddhism from India to China, there is no comparable traffic between India and China, whose geographically and culturally remote position is a constant feature of history up to our time. Although more important, the relations between India and Mesopotamia were negligible as compared to the Mesopotamia-Egypt interaction.

The second basic fact is the different age of these civilizations. Mesopotamia is indisputably the oldest one, maturing between 3500-3000 BC, whereas Egypt and India emerged as civilizations in the centuries after 3000 BC.

Chinese civilization developed in the centuries after 2000 BC. Thus, for a millennium before China even existed as civilization, contact had been established between Mesopotamia and particularly Egypt, and in the second millennium BC, as we shall discover, something like a "great society" (to use McNeill's phrase) encompassing Egypt, Mesopotamia and their interjacent and surrounding regions had come into existence.

As the world's first beginning of agriculture had taken place in the Near East since about 7000-6500, and did not develope
in other areas before much later, the number of settled communities in that region increased gradually as population, just because of the agricultural "revolution" multiplied perhaps sixteen times between 8000 and 4000. Thus when civilized societies developed in the 4th millennium, they did so on the basis of the less spectacular, small-scale experiences of village life as those in ancient Jericho.

The slow, local growth of the first cities in the Euphrate-Tigris valleys developed into a cultural and economic network of petty, politically independent city-states during the first millennium of civilization. This was the first formation of which later came to be a dominant European pattern: a plurality of city-states (Greek, Italian, German) or nation-states politically sharply divided, but united in a common economic and cultural system of regular, protected exchange.

This system differed decisively from the bureaucratically, unified centralized empires of Egypt and, later, China, where the structures of uniformity and monopoly created better conditions for the stability of the system. 74(B)

It is no coincidence that such stable and often isolationist imperial structures could be created in the remotest and, by geography, best protected civilizations, whereas the oldest area of civilization, centrally and vulnerably situated, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, developed much more protractedly, spontaneously, and locally, and when centralization was at stake, it met with fierce resistance from age-old advanced local power, the vested interests of the traditional city-states. 75) Hence, all empires established on the basis of Mesopotamia were endemically more short-lived and instable than those which are sanctified in the records of ancient Egypt and China. Take the evident case of Egypt. As W.H. McNeill argues:

"The most obvious precocity of Egyptian development was political. About 3100 BC, when large parts of the Nile Valley were probably still unreclaimed marsh and desert, when local communities had scarcely begun to rise above the simplicity of the neolithic villages, and when the intellectual and artistic traditions of Egypt were as yet un-formed, the country was united under a single ruler ...." 76)

"Before 3100 BC, no strong, wealthy, and self-conscious organizations comparable to Sumerian temple communities and city-states existed in Egypt." 77)
When China, much later, as the advent of agriculture in that area also was later, was unified, many of the same conditions prevailed. However, after the first semi-unification China did go through the period of "The Warring States" (5th-3rd century BC), and it is symptomatic that this pluralist and instable system of competing states sharing the same culture produced the only school of Chinese thought which bears any direct resemblance to Western philosophy. 78)

When the King of Ch'in redressed political unity, he at the same time established a state monopoly of the trade of several important articles such as all metals, and thereby prevented the rise of an independent merchant class, which, debarred from the politically most decisive trade, could not enter into a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the state. 79)

This was also the case in Egypt, whereas in Mesopotamia, even under a forceful ruler such as HAMMURABI of Babylon (ca. 1700 BC), merchants enjoyed a more privileged position. But most important of all: It was legally protected in a uniform law code with state officials to enforce it. This included the enforcement of mercantile contracts. 80)

Although merchants' actions were severely limited as compared to modern times in the West, they were so by written laws, which enabled merchants to calculate and make plans within a stable, legal framework. From the point of view of the merchant economic system this was a decisive step forward in rationality because it reduced the element of incalculable, arbitrary interventions from outside this system, from the political rulers. 81)

Thus Ancient Mesopotamia developed three features which were to become paradigmatic for later Mediterranean and Western history:

1. The creation of a common economic and cultural system without any corresponding superimposed political unity. The lack of political uniformity both engendered endemic instability and preserved the comparative autonomy of the regional centers of economy and culture. Thus it was a "pluralistic" system.

2. The independence of and central role played by the cornerstones in this system, the city-states 81,82

3. The relatively protected and prestigious position of merchants and trade.
Certainly, this was not the only paradigm which occurred in later Western history. Time and again it was broken by the imposition of massive, imperial structures, which, for some period, reunited elements of the multi-centric system. However, the historical effect of the intermittent imperial experiences was not a contribution toward a more permanent unity, but rather a new addition to the contradictory complexity of the tradition.

Originally, this system developed in Mesopotamia, partly as a result of the geography of the two interlocking rivers, Euphrates and Tigris, partly as a result of the centuries of solid civilizational, local growth long before any imperial effort was unleashed at this or any other place in the world.

An important fact of history is that this system extended itself throughout the Near East:

"By about 2000 BC, the "great society" of Mesopotamia had begun to develop a wide fringe of semicivilized communities which were only imperfectly incorporated into its body politic. This evolution interlocked city and village, herder and warrior, merchant and artisan, priest and peasant, more closely and across greater distances than before. Self-sufficient village communities such as those which had dotted the landscape in the fifth and fourth millennia could no longer survive, save in remotest refuge areas of the Middle East.

But economic, social, and cultural interdependence outran the limits of political consolidation. This confronted Near Eastern society with a problem like that which had earlier distracted the Sumerian city-states; and in the course of time it was met in similar fashion. For just as in the third millennium BC, when internecine struggles among the Sumarian cities found surcease through imperial consolidation of the entire Mesopotamian flood plain, so in the second and first millennia BC, conflicts among rival territorial states states of the Middle East culminated in the erection of a much vaster imperial structure, the Persian empire, which united all the lands of the civilized Orient under a single administration" 82)

Another essential fact, which V. Gordon CHILDE has stressed, 83) is that the increasingly "wide fringe of semicivilized communities" was generally not exploited and dominated to the extent that these communities lost every bit of their autonomy, as they would have done in a modern imperialist system. Instead, some of them, Minoan Crete, Phoenicia, and Greece, in turn became the centers of new sub-systems, which linked the markets of the old civilizations in the Near East with those of the barbarian European continent. These sub-systems possessed some of the characteristics of the original Mesopotamian type:
"In temperate Europe by 1500 BC had been established a distinctive politico-economic structure such as had existed a thousand years earlier in the Aegean, but nowhere else in the Bronze Age world. An international commercial system linked up a turbulent multitude of tiny political units. All these, whether city-states or tribes, while jealously guarding their autonomy, and at the same time seeking to subjugate one another, had non the less surrendered their economic independence by adopting for the essential equipment materials that had to be imported. As an additional return for this sacrifice they also benefited from a free circulation of ideas and their exponents ...." 84)

For a later epoch in European history Perry ANDERSON offers a strikingly similar interpretation:

"The haphazard multiplicity of political units in late mediaeval Europe became in the early modern epoch an organized and interconnected state-system: the birth of diplomacy formalized the novelty of a plural set of partners - for war, alliance, trade, marriage or propaganda - within a single political arena, whose bounds and rules became ever clearer and more definite. The cross-cultural fecundity that resulted from the formation of this highly integrated yet extremely diversified system was one of the peculiar hallmarks of pre-industrial Europe: the intellectual achievements of the early modern epoch were probable inseparable from it. No comparable political set existed anywhere else in the world: the institutionalization of diplomatic exchange was an invention of the Renaissance, and remained a European particularity long afterwards". 85)

This pattern of Western history comes very close to what Immanuel WALLERSTEIN has defined as an economic world-system being something very different from an empire. 86) According to him, such a large-scale economic system which was not tied down by the burdens of the imperial bureaucratic apparatus, and which permitted uneven economic development in the core areas and the periphery areas, constituted a necessary and flexible framework for the development of capitalism. In the Early Modern Period the decline of Spain's imperial designs and the rise of Dutch and British preponderance in the new-world-system, marked a decisive phase in this development. However, in addition to WALLERSTEIN's more short-term perspective, we can insert the world-system phase within the Western tradition of large-scale economies without political unity, and with the baltic Hanseatic League and the Mediterraneans Italian city-state economy as its immediate predecessors. Needless to say, the very existence of a prior pattern of pluralism did not by itself make subsequent systems conform to it. We face the difficult task of finding out to what extent the same structural conditions which formed the original Mesopotamian and Agean models, also were present as determining factors in the later development of Europe.
Before we embark on that task, we shall have to further specify the nature and dynamics of the kind of pluralist system we have in mind. In Anthony D. SMITH's discussion of the exogenous-endogenous problem, he largely fails to make systematic distinctions between units of different size where the exogenous relations between the smaller units must be regarded as elements within the endogenous structure of the big unit. To speak of structural tendencies or potentialities in the latter case has not necessarily anything to do with an idea of organic growth "unfolding" a predetermined program as Dr. SMITH is inclined to assume. Rather, it is a question of basic positions, which by their sheer existence limit or favour certain possibilities, increase or decrease the probabilities of something to happen. To regard such structural probabilities as old-fashioned teleology is simply to miss an important dimension of history: the restraints and limits which reduce the repertoire of possible - or probable - options and tend to make different people behave and think in much the same way as long as they are confronted with the same basic conditions and problems.

In his stimulating sketch "The uses of exogenous paradigm", Dr. SMITH has outlined seven aspects of exogenous relations, starting with the general aspect of exchange between different units. However, since the proto-Western or Western pluralist system is perceived as a unit composed of several smaller, particularly independent sub-units, one could describe this heterogenous peculiarity of the system by using the exogenous paradigm for endogenous purposes: The relations between the sub-units are seen fundamentally exogenous or, in other words: The peculiarity of the Western system is precisely its strong intra-exogenous character, hence the dynamic tensions and crises arising from the co-existence and rivalry of several semi-united, semi-autonomous sub-units.

What is the significance of a high degree of exchange between very different(sub-) units? More often than not such exchange means trade, the exchange of goods, in private or public hands. That is: The formal category of interaction or exchange entails a specific, qualitative content, starting, in our case, with the commercialization processes of the Mesopotamian "great society". The remoteness and bigness of both Egypt and China prevented them from taking full part in the mainstream of these processes.
As John HICKS has observed, in order for foreign trade to make most easily impact, it must occur in a small country. Otherwise the magnitude of the internal economy will totally outstrip the significance of foreign trade. Of course, this is just one condition of the relative impact of foreign trade on a society, but it was certainly a condition which the ancient city-states, loosely organized in economic rather than political systems, were particularly apt to fulfill.

Therefore, although exchange in the form of commerce has played a minor role in most pre-capitalist societies, its significance or non-significance may nevertheless be decisive - in a comparative situation where other things are equal. This is true especially with regard to the development of the division of labour with its consequences for class divisions and political structure. Most theories of imperialism emphasize the way the international division of labour conditions the type of national or local division of labour, and in his recent work Immanuel WALLERSTEIN has applied this insight to explain the special course of East European history as due to the particular European division of labour. In this context trade comes in as an indispensable mediating transaction, the exchange which actualizes - and, generally, perpetuates - the uneven economic development and the differential modes of the division of labour in core areas and periphery areas.

Thus, geographical and historical conditions favouring international trade such as the existence of the "Great society" extending form the basis of Mesopotamian city-states, will necessarily have a cumulative effect on the division of labour and thereby on the social system. To use our terminology: Exogenous interaction entails endogenous changes. But the content and character of these changes are completely dependent on what position the "country" in question occupies within the larger systems of the Near Eastern economy. The following chapter will focus on the smaller, Mediterranean units of these systems and argue that the fact that these units were not turned into purely colonial peripheries, created special conditions for crucial deviations from the Near Eastern patterns. A comparison will be made between the Western tradition of self-perception and the reality of Western societies as they develop out of the original context of the Near Eastern economies and the Eurasian population movements.
4. The reality of the traditional Western self-image: Liberty & Pluralism, Unity in Diversity

"When Guizot, among others, opposed European civilization to all others, pointing out that never has any principle, any idea, any group, any class in Europe triumphed absolutely, and that this fact accounts for its continuous development and progressive character, we cannot help pricking up our ears. The man knows what he is talking about .... Freedom and pluralism are reciprocal and together constitute the permanent essence of Europe". 92)

These words by ORTEGA Y GASSET summarize the classical Western (for it is no longer a merely European) self-image. How can one know that this really is the standard idiom used by Westerners who characterize their own civilization? Actually, everyone would naturally start an investigation of this question with the idea that Westerners - throughout the ages - must have had rather different images of such an apparently diffuse entity as "Europe" or the "Occident". However, the thousands of pages of literature on this question is surprisingly unanimous. Those authors I have consulted - ROUGEMONT, HAYS, DUROSELLES, VOYENNE, MASUR, GOLLWITZER, DEHIO, BARRACLOUGH 93) - present, in spite of their many divergences and details, a very unified picture indeed, and end up, explicitly or implicitly, with conclusions that can be correctly summarized in the passionate words of ORTEGA. Perhaps this continuity, starting with the ancient Greeks, in the Western self-perception ought to be seen as a fundamental proof of the existence of a Western tradition. For those who indulge in starting "real" or "relevant" history with the advent of capitalism or the industrial revolution, this remarkable continuity of thought must be, to put it mildly, problematic. How could this tradition survive in spite of the changes brought about by capitalism and industrialism? Or is it equally correct to ask: could it really survive without influencing the rise of capitalism and, most importantly, the kind of capitalism which was produced by the West?

Some of the elements in the unity in diversity (concordia discord) formula should be spelled out in more detail: Firstly, there is the idea of a separation of the economic and cultural structures on the one side and the political structures on the other. Conventionally, the ideal "freedom" (liberty) is introduced in order to explain why this separation must prevail - the underlying assumption being that large systems of trade and culture exchange are beneficial and not contrary to freedom, whereas, at the narrowly political level freedom can only be
achieved through smaller units. Thus the unity - or the sub-
ordination to a common system - is to be based on some kind of
political freedom and on the preservation of diversity, understood
as the manifold of local, regional or national autonomy.

Behind this mode of thought we perceive the ambiguous
dealing with that perennial problem: size. The solution recom-
manded is traditionally simple, smallness is good for participatory
politics, bigness is good for economic and cultural growth. In
this dualism, going back to the Greek ideal of autarchy and the
contrary practice of extending commerce, we find one of the truly
long-term, dominating, and unspoken assumptions - and biases - of
the West. It is embedded in this dualism a schizophrenic conception
of political participation as something taking place regardless of
cultural and economic conditions, especially sizes of the units of
participation. But this is not to deny the revolutionary inno-
vation implied in the rise of the Western concept of politics.
As we shall discuss in a separate paper, this concept is thoroughly
linked up with "the making of laws", and the revolutionary point
is precisely the idea that laws are made, i.e. changed, and not
simply are - existing as unquestioned tradition and custom defined
by the eldest and mightiest in the community. However, the impact
of this Western insight was severely limited by its normal class
bias: the practice of politics was restricted to those few who
were actors in the bigger economic and cultural systems transcending
the local community.

The Western unity in diversity-system entailed another
fundamental bias: at the macro-level, i.e. as opposed to non-
Western formations, its extremely high degree of internal compe-
tition, rivalry, and warfare, due to its lack of political
unity, made up both its strength and fragility. When the Greek
city-states had successfully defended themselves against the
Persian empire, they weakened themselves through internecine
warfare 94) before they eventually succumbed to the Macedonian
and Roman empires. This pattern repeated itself several times
before it entered into the context of the European system of
nation-states. The solution which always presented itself to the
disunity problem, was some type of federalism. 95) It is an
interesting fact of history that as the Greek city-states were
succeeded by the empires of its two peripheries, viz. the Macedonian
and Italian ones, - the hegemony of the European nation-state
system was taken over by the two "frontier" empires of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. But centuries before this actually happened, it was foreshadowed by people who clearly perceived the limits of the self-competing European system:

"two empires will divide between them ... all the advantages of civilization, power, genius, letters, arts, armaments, and industry: Russia in the east and America, which has become free in our own time, in the west". (Melchior GRIMM 1790)96

Or, one generation later, in the words of Heinrich HEINE:

"What Napoleon said on Saint-Helena - that in the near future the world will be an American republic or the Russian world monarchy - a discouraging prophecy!" 97)

When the political system of the New World was created, it had the old European ideal of federalism as its model. In turn, the existence of the U.S.A. became a model of the ever-increasing projects of the United Nations of Europe, especially after the Napoleonic wars.

But it belonged to the ambiguities of European "freedom" that most projects of unity had a sinister twist with regard to on-European peoples. When Carolingian and Holy German, all-embracing imperial control ("unification") of Europe failed, the alternative federalist schemes were nearly always 98) linked to European expansion as the only means by which multi-centered Europe could be politically united, that is: against someone else. This is evident from Pierre DUBOIS' De recuperatione Sanctae Terrae (1306) and onwards. The Arabs, the Turks, the Mongols, the Tartars, all played the role of that common Europe foe, against whom the different European nations should mobilize in order to organize crusades and achieve unity. As Heinz GOLLWITZER has shown, 99) these schemes got a radical turn when LEIBNIZ and others drew up maps for how the world should be divided in zones of influence and thereby establish creative outlets for the military and economic energies of the various European states, which no longer would fight against each other. In the writings of SAINT-SIMON plans for a European federation entered into their present, modern form - systematically linked to economic colonialism and expansion, with Europe's cultural "responsability" (mission) as its pretext.

It was only when Western Europe, after the first and after the second World Wars, had become a semi-periphery rather than the
dynamic core area of the capitalist system, that it proved possible to actualize a certain degree of political unity in the form of an economic common market. But again unification was primarily directed against someone rather than for something. The lack of political unity which, under late capitalism and the economy of the multi-national corporations, became the end of the European preponderance, had been a great advantage in the formative periods of capitalism. To repeat WALLERSTEIN's central thesis:

"...the secret of capitalism was in the establishment of the division of labour within the framework of a world-economy that was not an empire ..." 101

The more this economy in fact became a military and political set-up with imperial pretentions, the more power shifted to more resourceful, politically consolidated territories. This is why traditional West-Europeans, in their plea for the Common Market, sometimes regard the U.S. as an imperial deviation of bigness from the Western pattern - in spite of the federal make.

The strength of traditional European diversity consisted in its existence within a common system of communication, - for transport of goods, transport of men and ideas. If it had been just diversity and no regular exchange, the dynamism of the system, the competition, the tension, the crises would not have occurred.

We have already touched upon the fact that conditions of such close interaction between different units make for something more than quantitative relations. They imply a qualitative content, as is shown in the case of the commercialization processes in the ancient Near East. Another perspective would be to emphasize interaction within the Western system as a fundamental process of learning through inter-city or international exchange. Again there is a factor which obviously cannot be seen as a "cause", but it represents one of those patterns which recurrently in Western history accelerates and extends important change. This is easily observed in comparative analyses of China:

It is always too tempting for the Western eye to disregard the trends of radical discontinuity and the vast regional differences in China and just stress monotonous uniformity, the assumed "stability" which the system of writing, the traditions of art, of imperial government and Confucianism apparently represent through
millennia. A classic example of the Western inability to perceive basic change and variation in the history of the non-Western world, and especially China, is the marxist category of the Asiatic mode of production, which in the last decades, however, have been further elaborated due to the recent publications of the Grundrisse and Marx's other writings on Pre-capitalist formations, and above all to the debate over Third World underdevelopment between marxists and the spokesmen of "modernization theories" 102)

But in spite of the undoubted discontinuities of Chinese development, we can nevertheless describe them as variations over themes which are often very different from those of Western history. Chinese history, in other words, is kept in its own key. One dimension is that it rotates around a civilization-barbary opposition, where the neighbours, from a normal Chinese point of view, are always seen as inferior barbarians from which there is nothing, or little, to learn. In the West, however, in spite of a similar arrogance starting with the ancient Greeks, there is a completely different tradition of learning from neighbours, not because of any idealistic principle, but because of a recognition of a simple fact: that Western culture developed in the periphery of the Near Eastern "great society". It was a fact not unknown to the Greeks that practically all their technology derived from Egypt and Mesopotamia, much in the same way as the general European technological bases before 1600 (including Bacon's three famous items: gunpowder, book-printing, compass) derived from other parts of the world. 103) Even in the heighdays of Greek power, as is shown in the writings of HERODOTUS, a keen sense of Greek superiority was combined with an equally developed ability to appreciate things foreign, not as mere exotia, but as useful knowledge or experience. 104) It is also typical that not only HERODOTUS, but several other innovators, such as THALES, SOLON, PYTHAGORAS, DEMOCRIT, travelled extensively in the regions of Egypt and Mesopotamia.

This pattern repeated itself of the same structural reasons. When Rome rose to political preeminence in the Mediterranean, it permitted itself to become thoroughly hellenized in the process where the Roman aristocracy adopted a more cosmopolitan and prestigious culture, produced in a region to which Italy for centuries had been a backward, receiving periphery. Again, when the Gothic and Germanic tribes invaded the Roman empire or settled around it, they became latinized, romanized. The whole expansion of the old, "central" Mediterranean and Christian culture as digested
and represented by the Romanic and Germanic upper classes, in the end, as part of the processes of centralization and repression of local tradition and culture, came to pervade all Europe, including the northern fringe.

But this constant victory of the cultural center over the cultural periphery was not accompanied by a similar political uniformity. On the contrary, one could argue that, politically, the periphery in the West always defeated the center. This was most obvious in the fall of the West Roman empire. Today it is futile to speculate what would have happened if the Roman empire had extended itself to all Europe and created a uniform system of politics and economy where the cultural and religious universe was thoroughly integrated and adapted, such as it happened in India (the caste system) and China (the imperial system). The fall of Rome represented, among other things, a "failure" to build up and perpetuate such a consolidated, comparatively uniform system where there was a close "fit" between its different sectors.

Instead post-Roman history in the West resulted in that fragmentation known as feudalism, in which first the Church - the only great imperial bureaucratic institution left - and then the new regional monarchies, the towns, the estates gained relative independence according to a scalar "parcellization of sovereignty". But this fragmented system of power and autonomy merged with a religious and cultural traditions with very different orientation and distant, Near Eastern origins. Two consequences of this complex relationship between society and tradition should be spelled out:

Firstly, in a society where important parts of the culture are preserved in a written form there is a limit to the extent to which they can be just "remoulded" to fit the immediate interest of the rulers. This must be particularly so when the geographical and historical universe of the culture is conspicuously different from the present society. In other words: Culture in the West became, especially after the fall of Rome, very superstructural indeed, an alien, cosmopolitan, Near-Eastern, Mediterranean horizon far above the provincial, periphery perspective inherent in the feudal fragmentation.

Necessarily, this horizon contained a panorama of vastly contradictory economies and social and political forms - empires, monarchies, republics. From this panorama no singular form
emerged as the special, sacred structure, preordained from times immemorial. Western rulers could pick out what they wanted, but so could opposition groups, in order to desacralize, demystify the existing order. I do not know whether the radicals have been the best historians in the West, but they have certainly been the most efficient ones in their political use of history as an arsenal of counter-examples.  

It would be artificial to argue that this active, radical use of history has nothing to do with the very multiform structure of the Western tradition as such.

But there are other, more important conditions of such a use, one of them being the availability of knowledge, the degree to which knowledge, and especially alternative knowledge, is monopolized or not. As J.H. PLUMB has emphasized, historical knowledge in China was effectively controlled by the imperial central bureaucracy, and this normally blocked attempts by opposition groups to write alternative versions, not to speak of having them circulate. This function of the uniform political centralization of China had several similar consequences, of which some instances are so instructive that they must be mentioned:

Let us take those inventions which BACON associated with the very concept of the modern world: the printing of books, gunpowder, and the compass.

Whereas printing in the West soon became a weapon in the religious and political struggle and was used to widen controversy and democratize knowledge, in China it was monopolized, controlled, and used for limited elite purposes.

As for the use of gunpowder in China, Carlo M. CIPOLLA observes:

"Fearing internal bandits no less than foreign enemies and internal uprisings no less than foreign invasions, the Imperial Court did its best to limit both the spread of the knowledge of gunnery and the proliferation of artisans versed in the art."  

As for the use of the compass, nothing can be more illustrative than the differential fate of the Western and Chinese maritime explorative expeditions of the fifteenth century. Since it was through these expeditions that the West established its global network of communication and thereby came to dominate the emerging world economy, the counter-example of the really vastly bigger and
more advanced Chinese expeditions is singularly striking. Why did they suddenly stop for ever, when the Court Eunuch CHENG-HO returned from his last voyage in 1433? 109)

The fact that all the papers concerning CHENG-HO's expeditions were removed from the official files or destroyed when another eunuch, the Inspector of the Frontiers WANG CHIH, in 1479 wanted to consult them in order to plan an expedition to Annam, does not give us the cause, but surely one condition of the non-development of the Chinese maritime adventures.

Nor did COLUMBUS get any support from the Court (because the Portuguese were better informed than him and knew the direction to India), but in Europe there were many courts, many independent sources of information, patronage and capital. As J.H. PARRY and others have made clear: when COLUMBUS finally left from Europe, he did so with the combined resources of all the continent, in terms of capital, information, crew, technology. A fundamental process of learning and competing centers of power and initiative were behind him. According to Theodor RABB, in a recent study of the expansion of Europe, "it was this fierce competitiveness (of the different nation-states) that kept the momentum of the expeditions alive." 110) It should be emphasized that this irrational drive for "fame, faith, the simple joy of discovery, and the consuming desire for national prestige" created, in the end, a strong motive for systematic learning, for the rational use of experience, irrespective of national origin.

The other consequence of the special Western society-tradition relationship is actualized in the position of the Church after the fall of Rome. When political homogeneity had broken down, the Catholic Church, in spite of much obscurantism, preserved the cosmopolitan tradition and preserved a degree of cultural unity in the midst of the political fragmentation in Europe. But, being a late Antiquity phenomenon, the Church was constantly in a polemical relation to many of the older, pagan elements in the cultural heritage it came to transmit. Thus the ideological framework in which the Western tradition continued to be kept, implied a critical distance to it. This ambiguity of the ancient culture was always a potential source of controversy, within the Church itself, and between papal and secular interests. But until the Reformation it was the Church, Christendom, which was seen as the organized unity of the European diversity.
5. The dynamic backwardness of Europe

Throughout ancient history Egypt was the main exporter of grain in the Mediterranean area. The younger political centers of Greece and Rome were continuously dependent on food imports of which grain was the essential item. This is to say that in spite of the general economic and political hegemony these successor-states to the Near Eastern civilization acquired, they remained fundamentally backward in terms of the carrying capacity of their own food production.

This backwardness is all the more revealing when we compare the Greco-Roman and later European economies not only with Egypt but also with India and China. The cultivation of rice yielded far more than wheat and barley, the main staples of the Near East. Therefore lands favourable to rice culture could sustain — and indeed needed — denser population. This is the historical foundation of the vast populations of India and China. Already DARIUS of Persia regarded his twentieth satrapy, India, as his most densely populated one, and saw to it that it also paid the highest tribute, in gold dust.

The argument of this chapter will be that Greece and Rome achieved their expansion not really in spite of their backwardness, but very much because of it. Living in more or less "affluent" societies (or classes) today, we only too often neglect the supreme importance of the provision of food, what Lyle P. SCHERTZ of the US Department of Agriculture calls, with reference to our own situation, "the brutal facts of the world food market" ("of which", Geoffrey BARRACLOUGH comments, "the most brutal is the domination of the United States").

At several junctions of Western history the problem of food provisions is a central key to the understanding of the course of events. In his penetrating analysis of the European discoveries, Immanuel WALLERSTEIN observes:

"In the long run, staples account for more of men's economic thrusts than luxuries. What western Europe needed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was food (more calories and a better distribution of food values) and fuel. Expansion into Mediterranean and Atlantic islands, then to North and West Africa and across the Atlantic, as well as expansion into eastern Europe, the Russian steppes and eventually Central Asia provided food and fuel. It expanded the territorial base of European consumption by constructing a political economy in which this resource base was unequally consumed, disproportionately by western Europe."
But a systematic failure to become self-sufficient is not necessarily a result of an absolute deficiency in food production capacity. It may as well be that this capacity is turned to other uses, for instance specialized commercial production for export, such as happened in medieval Flanders, resulting in ever increasing dependence on large import of corn. It was precisely this international division of labour which ultimately crystallized a west-European core-area for the production of processed goods and a corresponding east-European periphery-area for the production of unprocessed goods, especially foodstuffs. 115)

When ancient Attica turned from being a grain exporter to becoming a grain importer, the conditions of this change highlight the European position of relative backwardness, and dynamic backwardness. This backwardness was an original feature of history: agriculture could in the beginning develop only in the riverine regions of the Near East. The rainwatered lands of Europe remained agriculturally barren or at best low-productive until, in the late second millennium, the age of iron, the precondition of the heavy plough which the European soil required. But even then the agricultural productivity of Egypt was clearly superior.

One could well ask, as V. Gordon CHILDE did, "how could European barbarians outstrip their Oriental masters as they have done?" 116) Since they necessarily were less successful food producers, what were their assets, their compensations? Firstly, one reason why the South-European semi-civilized fringe outside the Near Eastern centers did preserve its political independence, was that just because of the special climate and soil conditions in Europe, Near Eastern modes of production could not simply be extended in that direction, much in the same way as the Chinese empire could expand south to Vietnam, but not very much to the north.

A second reason was the very proximity of the two competing Near Eastern bases, the Egyptian and the Mesopotamian ones, which from the second millennium onwards kept each other busy and never permitted the other part long periods of expansion and supremacy. This rivalry created possibilities of independent actions taken by the smaller peoples around or between the two giants. The religious, intellectual, and economic originality of the populations of Minoan Crete, Palestina, Phoenicia, and Greece is
inseparable from this fact.

In GERSCHENKRON's theory of backwardness the step from backwardness to hyper-modernity is not always a far cry as witnessed in the industrialization of Germany. 117) There are often advantages of backwardness which, under certain conditions, may contribute to more radical change and adaption than what is feasible within a more advanced, but slowly developing structure. One of the advantages is that kind of "initial cost" with which the latecomer often can dispense.

Thus a third reason why the European fringe remained independent, was - according to V. Gordon CHILDE - that it partly evaded the extremely rigid social structure which seemed to be a necessary part of the first establishment of civilization:

"This class division and exploitation were historically necessary to amass the resources and evoke the personnel required to get a bronze industry established. But when it had been established by that division of Egyptian and Mesopotamian societies, other communities could utilize that machinery without themselves submitting to the same degree of exploitation". 118)

... "thanks to her very backwardness Europe could benefit from the Orient's achievement without paying the full price, could draw upon accumulated capital without accumulating it". 119)

The evidences CHILDE relies on are of different kinds: He notes the absence of enormous temples and priestly bureaucracies and the importance of religious practice in special rooms in private houses. 120) Having compared the contents of private and royal tombs in the Aegan, he reaches the conclusion that as for the Mycenaen period

"... quite a generous share / of the Oriental capital transferred to Crete and Greece / must have been dispersed through a broad middleclass of townsfolk and "companions", not separated from the many kings by an impassable economic gulf". 121)

It was only in the late Roman empire that an early European society elevated its ruler to the position of a god, as a "king of kings", but when this happened, many contemporaries regarded it as an abhorrent non-Roman, "Oriental", especially Egyptian, deviation.

Living outside the more or less ossified social structure of the first civilization, the craftsmen, traders, and peasants on the Aegan fringe, together with the Phoenicians, were the first peoples to exploit the opportunities offered by iron,
because "they enjoyed the greatest freedom for the development of trade". But it took centuries before the potential advantage of "freedom" became something else than just economic backwardness and military inferiority. The pattern of the international division of labour seemed to relegate the fringe to the normal periphery-position of that of raw-material producers. Thus Minoan Crete concentrated at first on export of timber and olive oil, and timber export was also the original force of Phoenician expansion.

Again, what were the fringe's compensations, - how could it manage to evade the subordinate role as a mere producer of raw materials? The answer is unsophisticated: the Mediterranean. As Perry ANDERSON says:

"...in a uniform agricultural world, the gross profits of urban exchange might be very small: but the net superiority they could yield to any given agrarian economy over any other might still be decisive. The precondition of this distinctive feature of classical civilization was its coastal character". 123)

"The Mediterranean is the only large inland sea on the circumference of the earth: it alone offered marine speed of transport with terrestrial shelter from highest wind or wave, for a major geographical zone. The unique position of classical Antiquity within universal history cannot be separated from this physical privilege". 124)

What the small Mediterranean city-states lacked in size, in agricultural productivity, in natural resources, they compensated in the advantages of communication, speedy transport of goods, men and ideas. 125) The Mediterranean gave birth to the world's first sea-borne empire, Minoan Crete, and its Phoenician and Greek successor states secured for themselves an ever increasing independence vis-à-vis the Egyptian and Mesopotamian centers.

Because the Mediterranean separated - and united - two vastly different geographical zones - North and South - the Mediterranean city-states were strategically located to organize commercial relations between the two zones. When they traded with the Near East, they were able to exchange not only their own products, but also reexport or process goods from Central and Northern Europe, such as tin and amber. Vice versa, they supplied barbarian Europe with refined products from the Near Eastern centers.
This position as in-between, as commercial middlemen, very early entailed specialization just in this role. We can see this specialization most clearly in the remarkably rich variety of styles and designs which, from Minoan times and onwards was always more typical of the articles made on the Mediterranean fringe than of those made in Egypt or Mesopotamia, where more uniform, traditional patterns predominated. The commercialized variety had three sources: 1) the fact that all the Mediterranean city-states were continuously influenced by both the Egyptian and Mesopotamian models, and spontaneously blendend them with local traditions, 2) the accessibility to extremely different markets (and tastes), at home and abroad, 3) the mobility of craftsmen.

In a suggestive article about "The social function of the past", E.J. HOBSBAWN formulates a very neglected and essential problem in Western historiography:

"We know very little about the process which has turned the words 'new' and 'revolutionary' (as used in the language of advertising) into synonyms for 'better' and 'more desireable' ...." 127)

Of course, throughout Antiquity'signifying innovation and novelty (such as res novae and homo novus, a modern example being nouveaux riches) generally had negative connotations, but no lesser critic of society than PLATO, "already PLATO", regarded the conspicuous Greek variety of style and commercialized changes of fashion as one of the roots of the Greek political tragedy. According to him, the relativism inherent in the variety of Greek styles had already gone too far and resulted in a deep cultural crisis. His recommended alternative was the supposed continuity and uniformity of the Egyptian tradition. 128)

Right or wrong, PLATO was fully conscious of the problematical character of the Mediterranean advantage of communication and markets. This advantage and its commercial uses represent a real trend of European history, a trend often broken, but always resumed.

No account of the Mediterranean advantage and necessity of communication is satisfying without a word on the rise of the alphabet, the supreme evidence of the Mediterranean uniqueness. For Egypt and Mesopotamia the Syrian seaports, the cities of Phoenicia, were the common gateway to the Mediterranean. From the cuneiform tablets found in one of these places, Ugarit, it is
clear that no less than seven languages were in use in that city. This is George THOMSON's conclusion:

"It was in these cities, in response to commercial needs, which required of every merchant a knowledge of several languages and several scripts, that the Phoenician alphabet was invented." 129)

What this meant in terms of commercial facility, democratization of knowledge, and, for the later European nation-states, vernacularization of culture and mass-mobilization, still remains to be spelled out satisfactorily. 130)

In most structuralist theory Saussurean linguistics provides the models. I do not think it is far fetched to suggest that the original Phoenician alphabetization provides - at least - an image of how the Mediterranean conditions of communication worked: the struggle for unity in diversity, for common denominators, for bold abstractions out of the confusion of contrast and variety. Is it a mere coincidence that the main tradition of Western science, Aristotelianism, is based on exactly this kind of comparison, abstraction, and classification of seemingly incoherent series of empirical phenomena? A case in point is Aristotle's own Politics. It was based on an empirical comparison of the remarkable high number of political systems about which Aristotle was able to collect data thanks to the Mediterranean pooling of information. The subsequent process of abstraction and classification, as presented in his book, became later the dominant Western alphabet of politics, through which information about all kinds of political systems could be translated. At least, so most educated Westerners in history assumed, and assume.

Thus the Mediterranean advantage of communication resulted in specific forms of specialization, of which the most important one was trade. The more trade in a city-state increased, the more it substituted local food production as means of subsistence, - which ultimately meant more trade, trade in food, imports of grain, and hence a stronger political position of the indispensable trader of foodstuffs:

"Ainsi, dans la Méditerranée, le commerce à longue distance a-t-il été, en grande partie un commerce de première nécessité, et le marchand est-il devenu puissance politique, la subsistance de la cité dépendant à lui."
Par contre, en Chine, le commerce à longue distance était essentiellement un commerce de luxe: le négociant avait moins de puissance politique que le propriétaire foncier, dont dépendait le ravitaillement de base de la cité." 131)

But the transition from self-sufficiency to specialization and food import was not just a result of agricultural backwardness and strategic communication positions.

When Attica, to take the most important example in Antiquity, changed its economy from relative self-sufficiency to import of food, the role of social relations, of class, was crucial.

Again, there is case of backwardness, of an archaic, semi-tribal social structure, which by the seventh and sixth century was a thing of the distant past in the great centers of the Near Eastern civilizations. The strength of the archaic egalitarian elements was such that in a situation when the small and medium farmers seemed to become ruined, they succeeded, in alliance with other groups, in preserving their position. Through the reforms of Solon and the tyrant Peisistratus, debt bondage on land was abolished and various forms of public credit and building programmes were introduced to the benefit of the small and medium farmers. Also, the rich farmers were prohibited export of grain.

But these measures had two very special effects aside from consolidating the peasant holdings and integrating them into the new military and political system.

1. **The beginning of the slave mode of production:**

".....the salvation of the independent peasantry and the cancellation of debts bondage were promptly followed by a novel and steep increase in the use of slave-labour, both in the towns and countryside of classical Greece". 132).

"Hellenic liberty and slavery were indivisible: each was the structural condition of the other, in a dyadic system which had no precedent or equivalent in the social hierarchies of the Near Eastern empires, ignorant alike of either the notion of free citizenship or servile property". 133)

2. **The end of self-sufficiency**

The other effect is less spectacular, but no less important: When they were denied the possibilities of exporting cereals, the rich farmers instead concentrated on garden cultivation
of wine and olive, for export.

In both cases the main precondition can be seen as the - by comparison with the history of all the great centers of civilization - extraordinary strength of the lower peasantry and the extraordinary weakness of the upper peasantry and the "ruling class". The compromises which secured the "liberty" and active participation of the lower orders, created a society and an economy where the internal possibilities of exploitation and proletarization became restricted.

Therefore expansion always took the form of external trade and geographical conquest and/or colonization in order to obtain, impose or control the vital provision of food and to capture slaves. This expansion was often extremely successful because it was stimulated by the social dynamism released by the first participatory democracy in the world. The ambiguity of this democracy was that it was based on a predominantly slave economy at home and imperialism abroad. In spite of the Greek ideal of autarchia the Mediterranean city-states became fundamentally dependent on external provisions.

Without an economic structure designed for self-sufficiency, there was a constant temptation to live beyond one's own means of subsistence and, ultimately, rely on conquest and gold: it is a well-known fact that from Antiquity to the advent of capitalism, gold and silver went from the West to the East. This was one way the West payed off its backwardness and its endless expansions. \[134\] In Greece the silver mines of Thracia was an invaluable source of compensation.

In the perspective of George THOMSON, classical Greek society was a special synthesis of tribal barbarism and Near Eastern civilization:

"The Greeks had emerged so rapidly out of barbarism that they carried with them into civilization, fully conscious of their origin, many tribal institutions and ideas; and in these conditions they created a new form of state, the democratic republic, characterized by the adoption of tribal institutions to the latest development in the mode of production". \[135\]

This kind of synthesis repeated itself, first in the Roman experience, then in the Germanic integration into the Greco-Roman world. In the present context, a couple of points about the importance of the Romano-Germanic synthesis for food production should be made:
Above all, the relative scarcity of stock-raising land and the availability of imported grain in the ancient Mediterranean world meant that meat played a minimal part in the diet, whereas in the even more backward Central and Northern Europe the old traditions of nomadic pastoralism and low-productive cereal agriculture made the eating of meat very often a necessity. 136) The break-down of the West-Roman Empire resulted in, among other things, that the traditional Roman diet - as a prestigious ideal with great consequences for local production, or, import - also lost its strength. 137) Of all the great civilizations, the West came to be the only one where the eating of meat was important, especially among the upper and middle classes. 138)

This extraordinary role of animal husbandry in Europe had three fundamental and most dynamic consequences:
Firstly, "the emphasis on cattle in Europe led to the extensive use of animal muscular power as an engine of production. Rice is more fruitful in calories per acre but far more demanding of manpower". 139) Thus, "European man possessed in the 15th century a motor, more or less five times as powerful as that possessed by Chinese man, the next most favoured in the world at the time of the discoveries". 140)

Secondly, the combination of animal husbandry and cereal agriculture resulted in the system called mixed farming, which was more prone to innovation and commercialization than any system of monoculture. 141)

Thirdly, "it is a commonplace of economic history that the farming communities of Europe, down to the late seventeenth century at least, suffered from a chronic shortage of winter feed for cattle. Large numbers of beasts had to be slaughtered every autumn, and the meat preserved for winter consumption by being salted or pickled ...... Apart from salt, the preservative spices were all produced in tropical countries ... The most valuable preservative spice - cloves - came from the most restricted producing area. a few islands in the Molucca group, ..." 142) In the centuries before 1500 production of spices and trade in spices became increasingly monopolized by the Muslims. This was one of the main reasons why Europeans organized expeditions and planned conquests.

The problem of spices is just one illustration of what has been the general theme in this concluding chapter:
Temperate, rain-watered Europe, backward, a latecomer to civilization, needed the world (as BRAUDEL aptly puts it), but the world was not in need of Europe. In George B. SAMSON's words:

"This relative unimportance of foreign relations in the life of the great settled communities of Asia is but one expression of their self-sufficiency, for in general their history shows that (---) they have felt no great need of foreign merchandise, ---"143).

But even this Asiatic non-need of European merchandise was something for which the less self-sufficient Europeans compensated, again by their communications supremacy, "the gift of the Mediterranean". Their monopoly of swift, global transport after 1500 enabled them, or rather tempted them, to take over the intra-asian trade, i.e. the trade between India and China and so on, when they realized that European merchandise was less attractive in that part of the world. 144)

Geographical position: proximity to the two oldest competing centers of civilization, the advantages of communication, and the initial backwardness of food production, - these seem to be some of the basic preconditions of the Western patterns of unity in diversity. The unity of culture and economy was, in our perspective, primarily due to the perfections and necessities of the communication system, and the diversity of political units and social structures owed the peculiarly Western, dynamic syntheses of centralizing, despotic civilization and the semi-egalitarian forms of archaic tribalism.
6. Notes and Bibliographical Essays


For an optimistic (on behalf of capitalism) analysis, see the feature article 'Can Capitalism Survive', Time, July 14, 1975. On July 23, President Ford's top economic aide, Mr. GREENSPAN declared that "developments in the first half of the year have set the stage for recovery" in the U.S. This new perception was echoed, with a strange ambiguity, by the U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 1., 1975: "Now that recovery is here ... why all the skepticism?" This key article reveals an almost psychedelic sense of reality:

"Assuming the recovery can be kept going for a few more months, the chances seem good for it to continue beyond 1976. Some forecasters think this could turn out to be one of the longest periods of prosperity on record". (p. 17).

But such wishful dreams are not shared by even W.W. ROSTOW, whose name is more than anyone else's associated with the liberal theory of the "take-off" to sustained, irreversible economic growth. In his gloomy article, 'The Developing World and the Fifth Kondratieff Upswing', Annals, AAPSS, 420 (1975), professor ROSTOW argues the case for regarding the present difficulties as the beginning of a "normal", cyclical Kondratieff crisis; and expresses in addition the novel
Establishment kind of apocalyptic apprehension:

"... looking beyond the contours of the fifth Kondratieff upswing, the creation or failure to create this (North-South) partnership will determine whether modern industrial civilization, after two centuries or so of glory, ends, like all the others in the past, in decline or disintegration... "

(p.124).

Crisis of capitalism, crisis of civilization. Nobody has given a more eloquent - although equivocal! - formulation of the new apocalyptic paradigm, the comparison between the general, not only economic, decline of Rome and the modern Untergang des Abendlandes, than the former U.S. President Richard M. Nixon:

"I think of what happened to Greece and to Rome, and you see what is left - only the pillars. What has happened, of course, is that great civilizations of the past, as they have become wealthy, as they have lost their will to live, to improve, they then have become subject to the decadence that eventually destroys the civilization.

The United States is now reaching that period. I am convinced, however, that we have the vitality, I believe we have the courage, I believe we have the strength out to this heartland and across this Nation that will see to it that America not only is rich and strong, but that it is healthy in terms of moral and spiritual strength. I am convinced it is there".

(The President's Remarks to News Media Executives Attending a Background Briefing on Domestic Policy Initiatives, Kansas City, Missouri, July 6, 1971).

The widespread comparison with the decline of Rome, however anachronistically it sometimes may be made, indicates the extent to which the economic crisis is just a part of a wider pattern of disintegration. Only by neglecting this wider pattern - or by relegating it to the speculations of philosophers - is it possible to retain an optimistic confidence in our present economic and technological structures. What is economically or technologically "feasible" depends as much on politics and culture. Therefore both the catastrophic prospect of the Third World and the slow disintegration of established political structures must be included in an assessment of the long-term prospects of an economic recovery of capitalism, cf. the perspectives in 'Krisenbegriff und Krisenforschung', in: Beiträge zur politikwissenschaftlichen Krisenforschung (Opladen 1975) and Hartmut Elsenhaus and

In spite of much ridicule, Pitirim A. SOROKIN's diagnosis of the future development of the West as a process of disintegration of civilization has not been particularly invalidated by the events since he wrote his overview 'The Twilight of our Sensate Culture and Beyond', the last chapter of his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vols. I-IV (N.Y. 1937 - 41),

At the philosophical level the present changes in Western civilization have recently been, in the tradition of HUSSERL, analyzed as a "turning-point of man's self-determination within his life-world" and as a re-view of the elusive issue of "pessimism and optimism in the human condition", an issue which not only conditions investment rates. See Anna-Teresa TYMIEŃIECKA (ed.), *The Crisis of Culture. Steps to Re-open the Phenomenological Investigation of Man* (Dordrecht and Boston, 1975).

Thus the main perspective of this paper and our *Trends in Western Civilization Program* is that the present economic crisis of capitalism actualizes deeper and more long-term problems of civilization. Today this perspective is shared by researchers in many countries, for instance the Cultural Paradigms group at the Advanced Concepts Centre, the Department of the Environment, Quebec, whose aim is to "explore the writings of those persons who assert that a fundamental cultural transformation is occurring and/or needs to occur in Western culture".

2. Both of these terms, - and especially the combination of the two, - 'Western' and 'civilization' - are highly controversial and often used for propaganda purposes. In our context the 'West' (the Occident, das Abendland) denotes, very traditionally, the cultural-geographical area which for centuries have been dominated by Christianity and which referred back to the common 'heritage' of the early Near Eastern history and especially the history of classical Mediterranean Antiquity; which means that i.a. large parts of the U.S.S.R. and the 'Europeanized' America will normally be included. But "some Westerners are more Western than others": There are centers and peripheries
with regard to 'westernness', and according to most definitions of 'westernness', it has been primarily represented by middle and upper class urban men in Western Europe and in the U.S. For some purposes, therefore, it is necessary to single out such special bearers, actors, of westernness and its global expansion.

But as both Oscar Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History (N.Y. 1950) and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (N.Y. and London 1974), in very different ways have made abundantly clear, there is a basic unity of European history which includes Eastern Europeans as well. See also W.E. Mühlmann, 'Was ist europäische Kultur?' and Th. Kraus, 'Europa als geographischer Begriff', Kölner Zeitschrift f. Soziologie, 4 (1951/52). For a series of articles documenting strong East-West connections in Medieval Europe, see G. Barraclough (ed.), Eastern and Western Europe in the Middle Ages (London 1971).

After the rise of the U.S. the history of Europe was 'westernized' and the old concept of the 'Occident' entered its modern stage. More often than not, this meant the strengthening of the Atlantic unity to the detriment of East European perspectives. During the Cold War the exclusion of East European history from the general 'Western' history reached its ideological peak.

The process started with the extensive circulation of the English translation of GUIZOT's classic Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe, which by 1850 was used in half the U.S. colleges (cf. Ch.A. and M.R. Beard, The American Spirit vol. IV (N.Y. 1942), p.93). After the First World War a distinct American tradition of college and university courses in 'Western civilization' was established, with H.E. Barnes, The History of Western Civilization, 2 vols. (N.Y. 1935) as the standard textbook. This tradition is discussed and bibliographically presented in H.E. BARNES' own A History of Historical Writing (N.Y. 1962). For an exceedingly ample display of the new products of this tradition, see the advertisement pages of The American Historical Review, Vol. 80, No.1 (February 1975). Some of these new books probably give the most scholarly up-to-date and complete short surveys of Western and World history which exist, and any critical bibliographical and political study must take this americanization
of the 'Western civilization' scholarship into account. This process is very thoroughly criticized from an East German point of view in Alfred Loesdau, 'Atlantismus und Europaidee in der amerikanischen Geschichtsideologie', in id., Globalstrategie und Geschichtsideologie (Berlin 1974).


In most of these works the fallacy of treating civilizations like biological organisms or like independent, completely isolated units is dismissed. But very few of these authors feel that they can entirely dispense with concepts of civilization if they want to analyze historical phenomena which are shared by several states or several large ethnic groups and at the same
time process a very long-term character. As Fernand BRAUDEL puts it:

"Realités de longue, d'inépuisable durée, les civilisations, sans fin réadaptées à leur destin, dépassent donc en longévité toutes les autres réalités collectives; elles les survivent."

(Ecrits sur l'Histoire (Paris 1967), p. 303.)

For discussions of the very concept of 'civilization', see also: E. Durkheim and M. Mauss, 'Note sur la notion de civilisation', L'Année Sociologique, XII, 1913; Centre International de Synthèse, Civilisation: le mot et l'idée (Paris 1930); A. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, Culture: a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Papers of the Peabody Museum of Harvard, 47, 1952);


Scholars using the concept of civilization as their main unit have been organized in the Société Internationale Pour les Études Comparantes des Civilisations (S.I.E.C.C.), initiated by the Austrian Specialist on VICO, TOYNBEE, and SOROKIN, Professor O.P. ANDERLE (Salzburg). The main publication of this society was The Problems of Civilizations. Report of the first synopsis conference of the S.I.E.C.C. Salzburg, 8-15 October, 1961 (The Hague, 1964). S.I.E.C.C. has later been succeeded by the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (I.S.E.S.C./US), headed by Professor B. NELSON of the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, New York.

3. When do 'contemporary history' begin? In their remarkably informative and useful Report for the XIV International Congress of Historical Sciences (1975), 'Methods in the study of man in his environment', L. LUNDGREN, B. ODEN, and S. OREDSON quote G. BARRACLOUGH's dictum that "contemporary history begins when the problems which are actual in the world today first take visible shape". In the case of the history of our environment crisis
it is certainly "natural to seek one's point of departure in a time when the first symptoms of industrial externalities appear" (i.e. after 1700). But as the authors in their bibliographical references make abundantly clear, there is an alternative - and equally contemporary-directed - approach: not to study the new-ness of the contemporary, but the past-ness of it - the elements of massive continuity such as is found in many of the traditions described in C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore. Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley 1973, Reprint ed.) Individually, neither of the two approaches convey a full historical perspective on the 'contemporary'.

Very often analogy adds a richer and more dramatic dimension to our present problems than does mere contemporariness. Thus Professor BARRACLOUGH's own admonition to students of the contemporary crises is quite simply 'Read GIBBON!' It is this analogical approach which pervades his most recent book, The World Crash (London 1975), and which may encourage us to take a new look at 'ancient' history - just to find out how 'relevant' it is, cf. J. Donald Hughes, Ecology in Ancient Civilization (Albuquerque 1975).

4. One of the most recent and thorough proponents of this thesis is Ernest BORNEMAN in Das Patriarchat. Ursprung und Zukunft unseres Gesellschaftssystemes (Frankfurt 1975). See also Elise BOULDING's forthcoming world history of women The Underside of History.


6. A model of this kind of thinking is J. Hicks, A Theory of Economic History (London 1969), where he develops his theory of the spiral growth of a market economy in the West.
7. See footnote 97.


9. The expanding frontier, frontier conditions, and 'the frontier Spirit' - this complex is one of the truly classical themes of Western history and literature since the Homeric epic. For an analysis of this theme in Western literature, see Paul Zweig, The Adventurer (London 1974). The reckless, but heroic adventurer, the dynamic capitalist entrepreneur - both share the male virtues of being innovating, bold frontier men, the eternal columbuses of Western society. During the Early Modern Period this imagery also pervaded the self-perception of philosophers. Thus Francis BACON set before himself the ideal of becoming "the Columbus of a new intellectual age". Geographical and economic expansion and an expansion of spiritual frontiers - both forms are closely linked to the central Western Idea of Progress, one of our basic mental tenets. But this abstract "Pathos der Ferne", as SPENGLER calls it, has a most concrete correlate, viz. the territorial expansion of Western frontiers - either in the form of external expansion or internal expansion, especially new utilization of internal resources and territories: the "internal Americas" in BRAUDEL's words. For a broad assessment of this kind of expansion, see Georg Stadtmüller, Grundfragen der europäischen Geschichte (Munich/Vienna 1965).

Pierre CHAUNU in his Histoire, Science Sociale, La Durée, l'Espace et l'Homme à l'Époque Moderne (Paris 1974) has developed some extremely interesting perspectives on Western concepts of space and territorial expansion. The modern "frontier interpretation" started with F.J. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (N.Y. 1920) and was, after the Second World War, extended as a general formula of Western history. This evolution was most markedly pronounced by C.J.H. HAYES, then President of the American Historical Association, in his ideological article 'The American Frontier - Frontier of What?' American Historical Review, January 1946, where he advocated an extension of TURNER's frontier thesis within the context of the 'Atlantic Community' A somewhat more general approach is expressed in W.P. Webb, The Great Frontier (Boston 1952).

A scholar who has taken a particular interest in the theoretical discussion of frontier interpretations, is the specialist on East Asian history, Owen IATTIMORE. His works


But to what extent is the frontier perspective applicable solely to Western civilization? The vast migrations and frontier settlements in Chinese history are vividly described and analyzed in O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (N.Y. 1951) and in H.S. Wiens, *China's March Toward the Tropics* (Hamden, conn. 1954). As Mark ELVIN amply demonstrates in *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (Stanford 1973), China did not lack "internal Americas" either. Chinese and Western experiences in this respect may have been comparable up to 1500, although even this must be open to question, but certainly after the overseas expansion the new Western frontiers became so distant and at the same time so economically revolutionizing that the frontier mythology and dynamic made a deep imprint on the whole culture, on both popular and aristocratic traditions. For references to the Chinese non-expansion overseas, see footnote 109. Westerners very early expressed astonishment at this relative lack of really expansionist policy and aggressive frontier spirit in the Chinese population, cf. *China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci*, 1583-1610, trans. L.J. Gallagher, S.J. (N.Y. 1953) e.g. pp. 55 and 105. In Western history there is no lack of awareness that frontier settlements, however heroic at the personal level, and frontier spirit only too often are functions of imperialist expansionism, cf. for instance Benjamin Constant, *De l'Esprit de Conquête et de l'Usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européenne* (Paris 1814). To explore some of the material and cultural conditions of Western expansion-trends is indeed one of the main objects of this paper.


See also Fumiko Nishimura and Johan Galtung, *Learning from the Chinese People* (forthcoming), Norwegian transl. Oslo 1975.
A most useful collection of articles discussing various unspoken Western assumptions is R. Horton and R. Finnegans (eds.), Modes of Thought. Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies (London 1973).


13. The modern 18th century Idea of Progress, the secularized version of the Christian salvation theory, has been, with certain differences, the social creed which Western marxism and liberalism have had in common. In its crudest form it is articulated in Herbert Spencer, Illustrations of Universal Progress (N.Y. 1865). The literature on the origin, meaning, and functions of the Idea of Progress is enormous - proportionate with the significance it had the theme. Some of the main works, with extensive bibliographical references, are:

All societies develop institutions and beliefs in order to come to grips with death. Seen in this perspective the Idea of Progress is admirably suited as a social creed for the living, but is precarious for the dying—and for those who contemplate the prospect of their personal extinction. Therefore, correlated to the growth and the Idea of Progress there has been a systematic privatization of death, removed from social and public settings— it has become a tragic taboo. And when public life seems increasingly messy and does not satisfy our inherited expectations of social betterment, the Idea of Progress has little to offer to our personal needs and fears. It is only too symptomatic that just now, after the optimistic boom of the 'post-war period', and after the new doubts about eternal Progress, death again rises its head in our civilization. One example is the prodigious new wave of books about death—some of which are critically reviewed in Christopher Ricks, 'Explications of Mortality', The Times Literary Supplement, July 18, 1975. For historians the undoubtedly most important of these books is Philippe Ariès, Western Attitudes toward death: From the Middle Ages to the present, trans. P.M. Ranum (Baltimore 1974) — a history of the modern privatization and Verdrängung of death. This line of thought is directly linked to an analysis of the Idea of Progress in Johan Galtung, On Macro-history and Western Civilization, No. 1 in the present series of papers (Oslo 1973), pp. 25-32. It is no coincidence that simultaneously with new problematization of Progress & Death, the traditional role of men, the main bearers of the Idea of Progress, has become the object of serious questioning—also among men, cf. footnote 27.


As GALTUNG (op. cit.) has pointed out, the ideology of Western progress is easily compatible with a sense of crisis as a mobilizing factor. There is no better illustration of this than H. KISSINGER's recent tragic dictum that "the world in which we live is poised uneasily between an era of great enterprise and creativity and an age of chaos and depair". (US Information Service, September 1975).


16. For analyses of the historical development of utopian thinking, see Frank E. Manuel (ed.), Utopias and Utopian Thought (Boston 1966).

17. This idea is most clearly - and revealingly - articulated by two former secretary-generals of the Norwegian Labour Party: Ronald Bye, Synspunkter og vurderinger (Viewpoints and Evaluations) and Haakon Lie, Slik jeg ser det (The Way I see It) (both Oslo 1975).


19. G. Rattray Taylor, How to Avoid the Future (London 1975) and similar doomsday-books contain veritable catalogues of ideas of deterioration.

21. Again I would like to draw attention to L. Lundgren, B. Oden, Sverker Oredsson, 'Methods in the study of man in his environment', to be printed in the Reports of the XIV International Congress of Historical Sciences, Section II: Methodological problems. See for instance ch. II, the references to George Perkins Marsh and the U.S. tradition of "environmentalism".


23. Cf. footnotes 5 and 139.


30. On this point I can do no better than referring to Christopher LASCH's masterly review articles 'The Family and History' I-III, The New York Review of Books, November 13, November 27, and December 11, 1975. Closely connected to family history is the new tradition of psychohistory; see the special issue of the Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No. 2 [1975], particularly F. Weinstein and G.M. Platt, 'The Coming Crisis in Psychohistory'.


32. A theoretical and empirical study of selected aspects of division of labour processes will be undertaken by Tore HEIESTAD within the context of our Trends in Western Civilization Program.

33. This is not at all to say that MARX himself neglected the division of labour as a basic condition of both the emergence of classes and alienation, cf. Early Writings, trans. T.B. Bottomore [London 1963], pp. 120 and 181, 188, and Marx/Engels, Selected Works, II (Moscow 1962), p. 24. See also S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx [London 1968] and André Gorz [ed.], Critique de la division du travail [Paris 1973].

34. The neo-classical formulations of this ideal are given by Wilhelm von HUMBOLDT, cf. Eduard Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Humanitätsidee (Berlin 1928); E. Kessel, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Idee und Wirklichkeit [Stuttgart 1967]; W.H. Bruford, The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation. BILOUNG From Humboldt to Thomas Mann [London 1975].


41b. A systematic attempt to analyze societies in terms of life styles is made at the new Alternative Lifestyle Course, University of Lancaster. See also Johan Galtung, 'Alternative Lifestyles in Rich Countries', Development Dialogue, No.1 (1976), pp.83-98.

42. H. Baudet, Paradise on Earth. Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man (New Haven 1965); E. Dudley and M. Novak (eds.).

43. The People's Communes in China, although they on average consist of about 50,000 inhabitants - some much more, some much less, represent a systematic effort to build up small, more or less self-reliant societal units. It seems to be a condition of their present function that they relate very distantly to global structures. This limitation and the possible contradictions between the ideals of People's Communes and Chinese foreign policy are discussed in Fumiko Nishimura and Johan Galtung, Learning from the Chinese People (Norwegian ed. Oslo 1975, Eng. ed. forthcoming).

44. Of particular interest to historians is his 'Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte. Über Beziehungen zwischen Zeithorizonten und sozialen Strukturen gesellschaftlicher Systeme' in P. Ludz (ed.), Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte (Opladen 1972).


46. Dr. Eqbal AHMED, director of the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, described this Kissingerian preoccupation with the configurations of historical empires during the World Future Models
Course' at the Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik, January 1975.


50. L.S. Stavrianos, The world To 1500 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970) p. 228. This and the companion volume The World Since 1500 (new editions 1975) can be recommended as one of the best of the recent world histories written for U.S. students.


52. The general character of this dialectic is described by Herbert LÜTHY in the first part [Grundtypen der Kolonisation] of his article 'Die Epoche der Kolonisation und die Erschliessung der Erde'; Versuch einer Interpretation des europäischen Zeitalters', reprinted in In Gegenwart der Geschichte (Cologne 1967). He stresses the complementary character of the nomads' domestication of animals and the sedentary agriculturalists' cultivation of plants, and argues that a successful synthesis of these two forms of society and colonization took place only in the early Mediæval West - as the synthesis of the different pastoral and agrarian traditions of the Germanic and Romanic peoples. According to LÜTHY, the implications of this synthesis was 'vielleicht die letzte Grundlage der abendländischen Sonderentwicklung'. See also Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London 1974), p. 225, Footnote 19:

'Extensive desert nomadism could never fuse with the intensive irrigated agriculture of the Chinese imperial State, and the whole economic and demographic polarity between the two was consequently altogether different from that which gave rise to the Romano-Germanic synthesis in Western Europe.
The reason for the impossibility of any comparable synthesis are set out by O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, pp. 512 ff.'

53. Of course, Islamic historiography is very different since Islam to a large extent has been politically dominated by nomadic or post-nomadic peoples. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Islamic historiography contains profound analyses of nomad society and the role of nomads in history. For an introduction: Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldoun, *Naissance de l'histoire, passé du Tiers-monde* (Paris 1966).

53b. As late as 1793 Condorcet stated that 'there is only one event, a new invasion of Asia by the Tartars, that could prevent this revolution /the revolution of progress/, and...this event is now impossible.' [Sketch.... Eng. ed. 1955, p. 178].

54. In most contexts 'Eurasian' should be regarded as shorthand for 'Afro-eurasian' - especially after the islamization of North Africa, cf. the article by Hodgson in e. Schulin (ed.), *Universalgeschichte* (Cologne 1974).


'Bref les civilisations asiatiques, en pratiquant l'agriculture spécialisée sur les terres bien arrosées, ont contribué à l'apparition du nomadisme pastoral, en obligeant ceux qui avaient conservé une système d'économie non spécialisée à vivre dans des régions où leur intérêt était de ren-
oncer à une culture de sol de moins à moins rentable, pour se spécialiser dans l'élevage, d'une rapport grandissant, ou pour le moins assuré.'

According to LATTIMORE, the main Chinese expansion, right up to the 19th century, was to the south, which was geographically fit for intensive agriculture. When Chinese expansion reached the Northern fringes, and the Central Asian steppes, however, the arid or semi-arid climate did not permit this mode of production. Hence Chinese dominance in these frontier areas rather tended to nomadize new populations. - Thus the unparallelled agricultural success of the Chinese produced, or perpetuated, une ceinture des barbares, whereas the Romano-Germanic synthesis had necessitated a mixed economy, in which pastoral and agrarian elements were combined or co-existed, and which was increasingly sheltered from nomadic invasions by means of the East European buffer states.


60. Braudel, p. 70.


62. See the definitions given in chapter 7 of A.D. Smith, The Concept of Social Change (London 1973), a critique of neo-evolutionary, functionalist theories of social change. The following section is heavily indebted to this work. I do not, however, share Dr. Smith's pessimistic view as to the possibilities of uniting exogenous and endogenous paradigms of explanation:

'It may also be true that we need to aim at a synthesis of these two paradigms, to arrive at an interactive model of internal processes and external intrusions between units, their neighbours and their environments. If so, I know of no such attempt; and even the simpler task of weighing internal (cumulative or fluctuating) process and external intrusions, conditions and diffusion, let alone relating them in a convincing theoretical manner, has rarely been undertaken.
Pending this synthesis, if synthesis there can be, we have to choose between these two paradigms, when faced with the practical problems of analysing social change. A logical objection to this view would be to say that the sheer act of drawing a demarcation line between 'system' and 'environment' always implies some consciousness of this definitory, mutual dependence between the two: A system is a system only in so far it 'has' an environment, and especially vice versa. Since all system/environment borders are constituted by acts of human definition, such borders are ultimately somewhat arbitrary and hence never perfect, - which means that at least a minimal degree of system/environment interaction does take place.

When Dr. Smith refrains from trying to take such interaction into account in one consistent theory, and makes synthesis of the endo- and exogenous paradigms well-nigh impossible, he does so only by setting up ideal demands on weighting. Of course such demands make sense in this case only if they are usually, or at least possible, met in other cases: But do we really possess any generally accepted method of 'weighting' different series of 'internal processes' or different series of 'external intrusions'? At any rate, Dr. Smith's 'notable exception of WEBER' provides hardly any example of 'weighting'. He could as well have mentioned MARX's studies of various aspects of 'basis' and 'superstructure' where the degree of weighting is neither higher nor lower than in WEBER's case.

My final objection to Dr. Smith's position is that since systems, in practice, are defined at different levels of the macro-micro continuum, what is regarded as 'external intrusions' in a system at the micro level must naturally be regarded as 'internal processes' in a system at an higher level. Therefore, if we take this system-level continuum for granted, we can - and ought to - combine our micro-macro analyses in the form of intermediate theories of structural interaction between system factors and environment factors.

An important work which illuminated such interaction processes both at the theoretical level and at the concrete historical level is T. Baugartner, W. Buckley, T.H. Burns, P. Schuster, 'Meta-power and the Structuring of Social Hierarchies' in T.R. Burns and W. Buckley, Power and Control. Social Structures and Their Transfor-
mation (forthcoming, Sage Publications).

63. SMITH, p. 149.


65. 'Geopolitik, geographischer Materialismus und Marxismus', Unter dem Banner des Marxismus, 3 (1929); 'Die natürlichen Ursachen der Wirtschaftsgesichte', Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 67 (1932); 'Die Theorie der orientalischen Gesellschaft', Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 7 (1938), Doppelheft 1-2.

66. 'Karl Marx Über China und Indien' ed. D. Rajasanov, Unter dem Banner des Marxismus 1 (1925). For the revival of the concept of the 'asiatic mode of production' after the Second World War, see footnote 102.


68. Das Kapital, I (Note 23), p. 536 f. in Werke (MEA), vol. 23 (Berlin 1962).


70. Braudel, op.cit., the chapter on rice and rice production.

71. Cf. DUBY:

'For we should be wrong in thinking that a human society feeds on what the surrounding land is best suited to produce. Society is a prisoner of practices passed on from generation to generation and altered only with difficulty. Consequently it endeavours to overcome the limitations of soil and climate in order to produce at all costs foodstuffs that its customs

According to DUBY, the Romano-Germanic encounter in history was a 'collision between to strikingly different dietary traditions' and it was only the breakdown of the West-Roman empire which made real synthesis between the two traditions possible, cf. footnotes 136-139.

See also T. Dale and V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization (Norman, Oklahoma 1955) and E. Hyams, Soil and Civilization (London 1952).

72. This perspective is once and for all established by Lucien FEBVRE in the classic La Terre et l'Evolution Humaine. Introduction Géographique à l'Histoire (Paris 1922). The current ecological crisis make FEBVRE's book even more important to-day as a startingpoint for research. Only too often 'geography' has been left out as an 'exogenous' factor. A clear example is provided by CIPULLA in his editorial introduction to The Economic Decline of Empires (London 1970), p. 2:

'A number of calamitous events that at first sight look exogenous may have their roots in the history of the society which they upset. ...The story of China shows that even floods cannot always be considered exogenous factors. Flood may be the consequence of lack of public works or excessive deforestations which in their turn may be attributed to bureaucratic inefficiency or to bad social, political and economic conditions.'

It is precisely this kind of analysis which makes us see that so many of the 'Nature catastrophes' in the Third World today (e.g. the draught in Sahel) are very far from being 'exogenous' to the political and economical system.


74. This and the following observations on ancient Near Eastern history are mainly based on information given in Bozeman, op.cit., W.H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (N.Y. 1963), Stavrianos, op.cit.

75. This structure of an advanced network of strong, often autonomous cities reacting against political consolidation and territorial unification is a remarkably recurrent pattern in Western history, and it is an important element in the theory of European nation-building. Thus ROKKAN follows this line of thought in his analysis of the role of the Roman 'city belt':

'The heartland of the old Western empire was studded with cities in a broad trade route stretching from the Mediterranean to the east as well as west of the Alps northward to the Rhine and the Danube (...) The very density of established centers within this territory made it difficult to single out any one as superior to all others; there was no geography-given core area for the development of a strong territorial system.' (Op.cit., p.79.)

Consequently:

'The great paradox of European development is that the strongest and most durable systems emerged at the periphery of the old Empire; the heartlands, and the Italian and German territories, remained fragmented and dispersed until the nineteenth century.' (Ibid.) See also footnote 104b.

For the history of Western concepts of territory, see Jean Gottmann, The Significance of Territory (Charlottesville, Virginia) and 'The Evolution of the concept of territory', Social Science Information, XIV, 3-4 (1975).
76. McNeill, p. 70.

77. Id., p. 71.


'We may recall that, in the Warring States, the very stratum of state prebendaries who blocked administrative rationalization in the world empire were once its most powerful promoters. Then, the stimulus was gone. Just as competition for markets compelled the rationalization of private enterprise, so competition for political power compelled the rationalization of state economy and economic policy both in the Occident and in the China of the Warring States.' (Religion of China (N.Y. 1951), p. 62.)


81. This kind of rationality of the written law and of the official bureaucracy to enforce contracts constituted one of the main elements in both LEIBNIZ's and WEBER's formulations of Western formal rationality, see footnote 24. See also, from the point of view of Roman innovations, J. C. Smith, 'The Theoretical Constructs of Western Contractual Law' in Northrop and Livingstone (eds.), Cross-Cultural Understanding: Epistemology in Anthropology (N.Y. 1964).

81b. For a highly interesting critique of the idea of the 'progressive role' of towns in Western history,
see John Merrington, 'Town and Country in the Transition to Capitalism', New Left Review, 93 (1975), pp. 71-92. He stresses the innovating and often revolutionary economic and political role of the countryside, but I do not see, however, that he detracts anything from the historical specificity of Western cities and city-states as compared to non-Western forms of cities. If such specificity there is, its significance must somehow be taken into account, cf. Anderson, op.cit., pp. 422-423.

82. McNeill, p. 93.


84. Childe, p. 172.


86. Wallerstein, e.g. pp. 127 and 348.

87. Cf. footnote 62.

88. Smith, p. 149.

89. Id., pp. 162-165.


91. Wallerstein, ch. 2.


93. D. de Rougemont, The Idea of Europe (N.Y. and London 1966); D. Hay, Europe. The Emergence of an Idea (London 1957); J.-B. Duroselle, L'idée d'Europe dans l'histoire (Paris 1965);

'It is noteworthy', ROUGEMONT writes, 'that all the authors who have contributed to our becoming aware of the unity of culture, conceive it as unity in diversity' (p. 423).

94. 'In fact, during the eighty-five years that divided the Peloponnesian War from the conquest of Greece by Macedon, fifty-five considerable wars were waged by one Greek state against another. The record shows [footnote omitted] that every Greek city experienced at least one war, or one *internal* revolution, every ten years. (Bozeman, p. 69)


96. Rougemont, p. 54.

97. Id., p. 258. The list of such predictors may be prolonged on the basis of information given by ROUGEMONT: Johannes von Müller (1797), Abbé de Pradt (1823), Tocqueville (1835), Sainte-Beuve (1847), C. Cattaneo (1848), E. von Lasaulx (1856), J. R. Seeley (1883), Henry Adams (1900). Generally, these authors
presented the European prospect as a choice between the 'freedom' of the American preponderance and the 'servitude' of Russian hegemony.

98. Rougemont, p. 54.

99. Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, I (Göttingen 1972), the chapter on LEIBNIZ.


102. The basic Marxian texts in English are Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed. E. J. Hobsbawn (London 1964) and Grundrisse (London 1973). For the East-European debate, see the discussion in the long introduction of E. Schulin, Universalgeschichte (Cologne 1974). For the West-European debate, see Ahlers, Donner et al., Die vorkapitalistischen Produktionsweisen (Erlangen 1973); E. Terray, Marxism and 'primitive' societies (N.Y. 1972). A leading exponent of the theory of the 'asiatic mode of production' is M. GODELIER, whose extensive Preface to Sur Les Société Pré-Capitalistes: Textes Choisis de Marx, Engels, Lenine (Paris 1970) summarizes his position. ANDERSON, op. cit. p. 486 argues against GODELIER that the extension of the 'asiatic mode of production' to most non-Western modes of production makes the concept too broad and entails a corresponding extension of 'feudalism' as a stage of even non-Western societies. Paul Q. HIRST, in a thorough critique of ANDERSON, restates the more classical Marxist approach and criticizes him for over-emphasizing the significance of pre-feudal continuities of Western history, 'The Uniqueness of the West', Economy and Society IV, 4 (1975). Thus HIRST's article questions
the very assumption behind our own Trends in Western Civilization Program. See also B. Hindness and P. Q. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London 1975).

103. Cf. the table of transmission of techniques from China to the West and vice versa in L. S. Stavrianos, The World To 1500 (Englewood Cliffs 1970), p. 239, adapted from NEEDHAM.


104b. ROKKAN:

'Paradoxically the history of Europe is one of centre formation at the periphery of a network of strong and independent cities: this explains the great diversity of configurations and the extraordinary tangles of shifting alliances and conflicts.'


Cf. footnote 75.

105. Anderson, Lineages, p. 422. See also Brunner, op.cit.


108. C. Cipolla, European Culture and Overseas Expansion

Expeditions in the Early Fifteenth Century', T'oung Pao,
vol. 34 (1939), pp. 395-399; id., China's Discovery of
Africa (London 1949); W. Willetts, 'The Maritime Adventures
of Grand Eunuch Ho'in C. Jack-Hinton (ed.), Papers on Early
South-east Asian History (Singapore 1964). Cf. also
BRAUDEL and WALLERSTEIN.

110. Theodore Rabb, 'The Expansion of Europe and the Spirit of

111. Braudel, op. cit. For various population estimates, see

112. Bozeman, p. 53.

113. 'Food, in short, is the ace up the United States's sleeves,
its secret weapon in the new cold war which is brewing.'
(Geoffrey Barraclough, 'Wealth and Power: The Politics of
food and Oil', The New York Review of Books, August 7,
1975.)

114. Wallerstein, p. 42.

115. Id., ch. 2.


117. For the general theory, see A. Gerschenkron, Economic
Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Harvard 1966).
It was originally developed in T. Veblen, Imperial Germany
and the Industrial Revolution (N.Y. 1915).

118. Childe, pp. 95-96
119. Id., p. 81.

120. Id., p. 46.

121. Id., 161.

122. Thomson, p. 183.


125. See footnote 37: INNIS' works.


   The process which has turned the word 'new' into a synonym for 'better', is part of the rise of the Western Idea of Progress (footnote 13). A crucial stage of this process was the enormous widening of horizons connected with the Renaissance. As ANDERSON states:

   'The Renaissance remains - despite every criticism and revision - the crux of European history as a whole; the double moment of an equally unexampled expansion of space, and recovery of time.' (*Lineages*, p. 422.)

   Cf. e.g. G. Atkinson, *Les Nouveaux Horizons de la Renaissance Française* (Paris 1935). - It was this 'double moment' which contributes so decisively to the breakdown of traditional blockings on science:

   'In sum, the individual was confronted with an enormously wider range of competing beliefs in almost every area of social and intellectual concern, while conformity-inducing pressures of mainly ecclesiastical sort were weakened or discredited.' (P. M. Rattansi, 'The social interpretation of science in the seventeenth century' in

This widening of horizons and the shattering effects of the new capitalist world economy (the price revolution of the mid-sixteenth century etc.) produced indeed an unexampled, keen sense of the new, but it did not in itself make people perceive the new present and future as something ever better. On the contrary, part of the Renaissance obsession with Antiquity was a revival of the ancient cyclical, 'pessimistic' notions of history as alternatives to the Christian unilinear concept of history as the progress of salvation, cf. P. Burke, *The Renaissance Idea of the Past* (London 1969). It was only towards the end of the seventeenth century, during the famous *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*, that the idea of modernity emerged, the modernity of the present being regarded as something not only new, but also inherently superior and progressive, cf. P. Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européenne* (Paris 1934).

The whole vocabulary of 'modernity' and 'modernism' has ever since pervaded our language and sense of history. In the Western commercial system of fashions (of clothes, of furniture, of almost everything which can be made 'fashionable') we find the ever-changing forms of the 'new' in terms of the market, as merchandise, cf. Braudel, p. 314 and the chapters on clothes and fashion.

Since the early eighteenth century and right up to the present U.S. theories of 'modernization', Westerners have perceived differences between their own societies and non-Western ones in terms of modern/traditional and developing/stationary:

'/The Chinese/ are more fond of the most defective piece of antiquity than of the most perfect of the modern, differing much in that from us who are in love with nothing but what is new.' (Le Comte, *Empire of China* (London 1737)).
But although this tradition started in the eighteenth century, one should not neglect the older Christian framework of thought from which (and also against which) it developed. It was, after all, Christianity, as a fundamentally new religion in the Roman Empire, which first legitimized the 'ideology of the new', cf. A. D. Nomogliano (ed.), The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century (Oxford 1963). During the 'twelfth century renaissance' Christian thought again got a radical turn towards the future and the 'new' in the works of JOACHIM of Flora and ANSELM of Havelberg, with their dynamic insistence on the Nova religio, novus ordo and multiformitas of the coming Third Age, not in heaven, but on the earth. Cf. Otto Brunner, 'Abendländisches Geschichtsdenken', Neue Wege der Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte (Göttingen 1968), pp. 37-38.

128. In *Lepes* PLATO denounced the 'craving after novelty'. He recommended Egypt, where - he believed - 'no artist is permitted in any of the arts to make any innovation or introduce any new forms in place of the traditional ones.' (Quoted from Thomson, pp. 324-325.)


131. Lattimore (see footnote 56), p. 106.


133. Anderson, p. 23
   Cf. also his corresponding suggestion about later developments in Scandinavia, p. 176:

   'Scandinavian social formations were the last in Europe to make widespread and normal use of slave-labour. (...) It was precisely the presence of this external forced labour that permitted the co-existence of a nobility with an indigenous free peasantry organized in agrarian clans."


138. '... cette rupture de travail agricole au bénéfice de l'élevage et l'emploi des bêtes, cette association qui est l'originalité évidente des campagnes d'Occident et de Méditerranée...' (Braudel, p. 88, cf. p. 79, and Duby, p. 26).

139. Wallerstein, p. 56.

140. CHAUNU, as quoted by Wallerstein, pp. 56-57. For a further elaboration of this analysis, see the works by Lynn WHITE jr. 'What accelerated Technological Progress in Western Middle Ages?' in A. C. Crombie (ed.), Scientific Change (N.Y. 1963); Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford 1962); The Expansion of Technology 500-1500 (London 1969).

141. See the introductory article in E. L. Jones and S. J. Woolf (eds.), Agrarian Change and Economic Development (London 1969).

