PEACE AND THE WORLD AS INTER-
CIVILIZATION INTERACTION

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February 1986
1. Occidental Cosmology: Peace and Development

The problem to be explored in this paper is the following: given some postulates about the deep structure or cosmology of various civilizations, and more particularly about the organization of space, time, knowledge, person-nature, person-person and person-transpersonal relations according to these civilizations, what are we to expect in terms of theories, and practice, of peace and development? From the very beginning a methodological remark is needed. The exercise to be engaged in is not a deductive exercise with well known facit. We know, for instance, what occidental theories and empirical practice look like, so it might be tempting to try to deduce them from first principles. Rather than deduction with long, logical chains however, what we are engaged in here is articulation: spelling out what those basic postulates mean in two areas, in casu peace and development. In this context "peace" stands for reduction/elimination of direct violence and "development" for reduction/elimination of structural violence. But they may also be seen as two sides of the same coin.

Thus, starting with peace, and with space: an occidental world order for peace and security would have to be centered, even rooted in the West in order to be seen as normal and natural by homo occidentalis. A peace order cannot possibly have its center elsewhere. In that case a secondary role would have been given to the West, which would not only not be in the interest of the West but also be contradictory to the very idea of world order, hence of
peace and security: a world with its center in the West and a vast non-Western periphery waiting to be stimulated, converted, influenced, to be civilized.\[^3\]

From this point on there are evidently two possibilities depending on whether one is operating with a division of space in two parts, center and periphery or three parts, center, periphery and evil. The first conceptualization of space is compatible with the universalism of organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations, with built-in executive power to Western countries, constructed around Western theories and practice, for instance in connection with international law (the Hague system). And the second concept, correspondingly, gives rise to a system of treaties and alliances centered around the major Western power, for the time being the United States: NATO TIAR, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, AMPO and so on; all of them tying the periphery to the center, in an alliance against Evil: "international communism." A reflection of this is then found in the system built around the major power in the Eastern part of the Occident: the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, against "imperialism".

The Principle of Evil has been organized around two axes in history as seen from the West: one national and one ideological. The nations singled out as candidates for this important position in Western constructions of the world are above all the "barbarians/savages," the Jews, the Turks and the Russians and the corresponding
ideologies Paganism, Judaism, Islam and communism, even "atheistic communism." Thus, the evil has been located in the non-Occident on the one hand and competitive religions/ideologies within the Occident on the other. The amount of violence exercised in the name of peace and security against these "evil forces" in history is incredible: Jews killing Christians (Christ), Jews killing Muslims, Muslims killing Jews, Muslims killing Christians, Christians killing Muslims, Christians killing Jews (Holocaust). The stage is now set for the secular follow-up: liberalism-capitalism vs. marxism-socialism.

When it comes to time one would expect an occidental peace and security order compatible with the idea of progress, but also of crisis that might lead either to dem ewigen Frieden, eternal peace, or a total disaster; in other words, an apocalyptic vision. I think it can be said that the reliance on military means in general, and offensive military means, either for retaliatory deterrence or simply for aggressive attacks in order to get at the evil at its roots, are compatible with both ideas. On the one hand painstaking work to build alliances and perfect balance of power; on the other hand, playing with fire. The point would be that to the majority within the species referred to here as homo occidentalis the circumstances so often pointed out by all kinds of peace movements through the ages—that armament policies are dangerous and not only destructive but also self-destructive, carry no news. On the contrary, such policies may be accepted precisely because they are seen as normal
and natural, compatible with the general idea of progress. Dis-
armament, if it should ever take place, not to mention a disarmament
race as a process, would somehow run against the natural course of
affairs and probably be counteracted. Peace should be like conver-
sion, a sudden transformation, brought about by hard work, crisis,
maybe also providential grace. 

Occidental theory of knowledge enters here: a couple of simple
ideas on the top, and a lot of highly concrete, more or less logical,
satellites, at the bottom of the thought system. The ideas are well
known and also very old: si vis pacem, para bellum—if you want peace,
preserve yourself for war—and "attack is the best defense." Be-
lived in by occidentals for centuries, or millennia, with some im-
portant variations through time, they are essentially examples of how
the Western theory of knowledge is based on a widespread faith in
such ideas that attain axiomatic character, never to be falsified,
not even falsifiable. Moreover, if war breaks out in spite of all
the work to deter Evil that is only taken as proof that we live
in a dangerous world, indeed. And in that world balance has to mean
to mean "superiority," which, when pursued by both parties closes the
circle.

That warfare is compatible with the biblical four class society,
with a godly principle on top, then humankind divided into two parts,
men and women, and at the bottom nature, is obvious. To possess
overwhelming force and intelligence are manifestations of omnipotence
and omniscience; godly characteristics, and not only of occidental
gods. But how can warfare be compatible with benevolence, a third
major characteristic of god--good? War itself is malevolent, in its
consequences also for oneself. So benevolence only manifests itself
by assuming that war is for a higher principle, something far above
the untold suffering on the battlefield, and in the war aftermath.
And such principles indeed exist: the Triumph of the Lord would be
the religious version; the Fight for Freedom for the Glory of the
Nation, for some ideology. And from such principles the theories of
the just war, the Justus bellum would easily emerge, in the name of
some occidental religion/ideology (Judaism/Christianity/Islam, or
liberalism/marxism).

At the same time military organization is deeply vertical, ex-
cept in its transitory non-hierarchical form, the guerilla-usually
abolished after use. It is also quite individualistic in the sense
that there are great chances of rising, even very high, in these
hierarchies, through risk-taking, through acts of heroism. War loosens
up rigid class structures and provides new opportunities as a reward
for sacrifice, if sometimes only post mortem. But women have been
denied this opportunity: they are on the margin of the system, serving
as victims, also of the particular anti-woman violence known as rape,
and as the little helpers not only engaged in reproduction as ever
(including as nurses, repairing the men for more war) but also
taking over productive tasks left undone by the males participating in
belligerence. And these are not the males of a professional warrior caste only, but in principle the entire male population (except individual objectors). In fact, the more universal the conscription, the more ideology has to enter as a motivating force. As conscription is done by the nation-state, nationalism will be the motivating ideology used by the state for war in a world construed as an interstate system. Paradoxically, the more human rights the nation-state grants, the more human duties can be exacted from the population (taxes, military service).

To this picture, then, should only be added war as devastation of nature, as rape of nature, as total inconsideration; thereby manifesting the ascendancy of human beings over the lower levels of life, and the environment in general.

Conclusion: anybody who in one way or the other fights against the war establishment and the military approach to peace and security should realize that this fight is at the level of deep ideology and deep structure, at the level of cosmology. It is not merely a question of an ideological debate and struggle, as between the ideological right and left in domestic occidental politics. Much more is at stake: the whole military approach is an almost perfect articulation of the cosmological assumptions and for that reason deeply rooted in occidentalism itself. Preparation for war, and war itself fit only too well with the general code. In other words, it is very unlikely to yield unless that cosmology itself is not only challenged, but to some extent effectively changed. And that is more easily said
than done. In Western history the last 1,500 years it probably only happened twice: the transition from the Roman Empire (in the West) to the Middle Ages and from the latter to the Modern Period.

Unfortunately, something of the same can also be said about occidental theory and practice of development. One may dislike it, but in so doing one should realize that to homo occidentalis "development = economic growth" is not a random choice among many possible views of development. It is simply truth in the sense of that which is normal and natural, that which is compatible with occidental cosmology and for that reason not a subject of really serious debate. The language of discourse is already set by the cosmology, largely within the economic growth approach—just as is done for peace within the balance of power approach.

Thus, take the dimensions of space and time. It goes without saying that "development" is a special case of the more general Idea of Progress. But it also goes without saying that however this special case is defined in a more precise manner it will have to be done in such a way that the West comes out as "more developed countries" (MDC) and the non-West as "less developed countries" (LDC), even as underdeveloped/undeveloped. There has to be center and periphery, both of them "developing" since there is supposed to be a dynamism in these matters. There is a promise of progress for everybody if they accept some basic parts of the Western code.
In this, however, there is a contradiction: if the non-West is developing and the West only is developed, then one day non-West might catch up with the West! LDCs may catch up with MDCs, and MDCs may catch up with Washington, D.C.!

But this is precisely where the other aspect of Western time cosmology enters: the idea of crisis. Yes, there may be a crisis: they may catch up! From this follows two clear possibilities: either that the developed countries also have to be developing, along the same line as before or some new line, or that the non-West takes over and forces the West out of its central position. I think it is precisely this frightening possibility—to some extent even realized in the world today because of the rather rapid development of Japan and neighboring countries—that validates, confirms development theory as normal and natural, because of the strong identification of the West with Crisis. A tantalizing challenge, like facing death and avoiding it. A non-Western center as defined by development is anti-cosmological, some kind of crime against nature, as the West has to be the model, not the non-West.

When it comes to the associated theory of knowledge we are in a somewhat similar situation as in connection with peace and security. Simple axioms, such as "economic growth" and "labor productivity" are on top of a thought system guaranteeing development for all as logical consequence, in a mathematized economic ehtory. The bottom line is very promising: progress. There are variations of this theme, different schools when it comes to the construction of theory, differ-
assumptions, but basically it turns out like that. That the process is devastating of nature is a basic part of contemporary reality, known as environmental degradation. That it is compatible with verticality and individualism, with women being given a more inferior position (reproduction rather than production) and with great opportunities, like in the military, for rapid personal mobility through risk-taking, even sacrifice, for entrepreneurs or other types of players on the "market," is obvious.

And there is also a god-like principle, the secular successor to striving in your daily work for the glory of God. I think there is such a successor, and it is individual well-being, not in the sense of a welfare state, but in the sense of a high standard of individual material life, comfort. Material living standard plays very much the same role as freedom in connection with the pursuit of peace: the overriding concern that justifies the negative consequences of the actions engaged in. And they are many: ecological degradation, human misery and alienation, repression, war. But just as is also the case for security and freedom: it can certainly be argued that well-being is something people pursue, not something abstract like "peace," "development." But that is the individual level. Equally obviously: at the national level growth and productivity became heterotopic goals as collective conditions for satisfying individual needs for security, freedom and well-being. As understood by the occident, that is.\[\]
There are cases of success. Military ascendancy has created some space out of which some type of security and freedom can be wrought in the center, of course at the expense of the periphery, not to mention of the "evil" forces. And the same is the case for material living standard. Our present world shows considerable amounts of welfare at the center; less, though, at the periphery since the whole exercise is tied to patterns of exploitation, particularly through unequal exchange relations between center and periphery. There may also be some material living standard among the evil forces, evil because they have their own way of trying to get to that goal, and in so doing neither recognize the West as the center, nor the West as a model. That in practice they nevertheless tend to do both is another matter, very much to the delight of the Western center that sees itself confirmed through such heretic practices (heretic from the point of view of center ideology, that is).

Thus, in practice we end up with the four worlds that I think are useful in understanding peace and development in the present world. The First World, the center, defines development and sees itself as a model; the Second World is "evil" because it claims to have an alternative approach; the Third World is the periphery and continues to remain the periphery; and then the Fourth World which was once like the Third World but now is treatening to overtake the First World. So there are problems, just as there are for the pursuit of peace. But all those problems are already implicit in the occidental cosmology or implicit model, and not necessarily totally unwelcome since they spell crisis.
Conclusion: we have exactly the development theory and the development practice we deserve. And again the same problem: he or she who disagrees will have to understand that the struggle for "another peace," for "another development" is not only a struggle for another ideology; as it is often put, between right and left. In fact, when another peace or development is launched from the left, for instance within the marxist frame of reference, it will tend, in practice to turn out very much like what has been indicated above, with some minor modifications. And why: precisely because there has not been sufficient awareness of the cosmological aspect of the problem. The struggle for another development, like the struggle for another peace, has to be conducted also as a challenge, even a transformation, of occidental cosmology.
2. Peace and the World as Inter-Civilizational Interaction

So far I have tried to explore the implications of the code or cosmology of occidental civilization in general, and the western part of it in particular, for peace and development, theory as well as practice. Ideally I should now bring in a number of other civilizations and do exactly the same exercise for each one of them, bringing in all six aspects of the code, space, time and so on. However, that exercise, important as it is, lies outside the scope of the present paper.

A more limited exercise shall be undertaken here, making use of only one aspect of the civilizational codes, the construction of space. After all, it is in world space that peace and war take place so it is certainly a major aspect although the other five also play a considerable role and will be alluded to, more or less systematically.

The civilizations to be considered are the occidental civilization in the expansion mode, explored in the preceding section, occidental civilization in the contraction mode (a more modest version of occidental civilization, more corresponding to the Middle Ages), hindu civilization, buddhist civilization, Sinic (Chinese) civilization and Nipponic (Japanese) civilization—and then, in addition to these six, what will be simply referred to as indigenous civilization. Needless to say there is no unity to the latter, except, perhaps, in a crucial sense which is the only one that will be made use of here.
The assumptions about the construction of space are then as follows:

**Occidental civilization, expansion mode:** the world is divided into three parts, an occidental center, a periphery waiting to become occidentalized, and a recalcitrant, marginal, outer periphery of Evil.

**Occidental civilization, contraction mode:** the world is divided into many parts, each of them a center in their own right—in other words a multi-centric world.

**Hindu civilization:** the world is seen as one big unit, inspired by a basic unity-of-man, basically hindu although hinduism in its full richness has been better comprehended in India than anywhere else where only aspects of hinduism have been articulated.

**Buddhist civilization:** there is a basic unity-of-man assumption, but also a multi-centric construction of space, each center being its own center of concern rather than of control of others.

**Sinic civilization:** the world is first divided into two parts, China and non-China, or the barbarian part, which is then divided into four, North Barbarians (the worst), East Barbarians, South Barbarians (probably the best) and West Barbarians.
Nipponic civilization: the world is divided into three parts, a center which is Japan, a periphery consisting of the countries in the fourth world, the world southeast, roughly speaking the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (daitōa kyoeiken) and an outer periphery, the rest of the world, which is considered a resource for raw materials and other production factors, and as a vast market.

Indigenous civilization: the world is here again seen as multicentric, with more or less explicit knowledge of the other centers that are around. In this multicentric construction there may also be elements of any one of the other configurations just mentioned.

Before we now proceed let us simplify a little by combining the occidental contraction mode, buddhist and indigenous civilizations because they all operate with the same basic space configuration. They are not truly world encompassing, as opposed to the other four where some structure is given to the world as a whole. Rather, the world is seen as divided into many parts basically relating to themselves, with no assumption to the effect that others are a peripheral part of oneself, necessarily antagonistic to oneself, or something to be used by oneself. There may be elements of such ideas, but not as basic and long lasting conceptualizations. So we shall combine the three as civilizations having multicentric, and relatively small centers at that, space constructions.
That leaves us with a total of five to be considered, and the matrix now to be explored can be found on the next page.

In the figure the main diagonal has been marked clearly: the intra-civilizational encounters. They have been numbered in the order they are to be explored, as also the combinations above the main diagonal, yielding a total of fifteen bilateral relations. The case may be made that the matrix is not symmetric, that a bilateral relation can always be seen from both sides which is of course correct. But the nuances to be gleaned from such considerations are of minor significance in this context. Conclusion: there are fifteen tasks to be done.

(1) This is probably what is considered normal international relations in the west in general, in the theory of international relations in particular, and in United States theory of international relations more particularly because of the strong assumption that United States is somehow the most normal country in the world. Expansionism is taken for granted for all states; empty space is filled and non-empty space is conquered until the costs outrun the benefits—at that point a more-or-less stable border can be drawn if adequately protected through balance of power mechanisms. I have argued above that the system does not tend to be stable, that the offensive arms used for deterrence through the threat of retaliation engender arms races and that arms races sooner or later end with wars. It is difficult to calculate what percentage of total human belligerent activity is found in this first combination, but it must be considerable.
FIGURE 1: Inter-Civilizational Relations: Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occidental, in expansion</th>
<th>Occidental, in contraction; Buddhist Indigenous</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Sinic</th>
<th>Nipponic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) war</td>
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<td>(2) live and let live (by and large)</td>
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<td>(3) horizontal tolerance; vertical violence</td>
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<td>(4) only one</td>
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<td>(5) only one</td>
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<td>(6) absorption; extermination</td>
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<td>(7) penetration</td>
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<td>(8) penetration, war, defense</td>
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<td>(9) war</td>
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<td>(10) tolerance; expulsion</td>
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<td>(15) war, defense</td>
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</table>
(2) We are here dealing with a totally different logic. Ideally speaking each one of the centers can regard all others as simply another part of a multicentric world, and continue inspired by a doctrine of "live and let live." In practice, however, there was warfare in the Middle Ages although much of it was ritualistic; towards the end of the Middle Ages expansionism set in (but then one may argue that they were already in another civilization); there are Buddhist kingdoms with considerable belligerent activity (Burma, Thailand); among the indigenous people expansionism, even imperialism is certainly not unknown (Inca, Aztec Empires or the Zulu Empire in Africa). But the argument can also be made that these are aberrations and in any case trifling relative to the first constellation. There is probably much more to learn for he who is interested in a peaceful world from the promises of (2) than from the rather well-proven failure of (1) -- although it is one of the prerogatives of the occidental civilization in expansion to display utter disconcern for the belligerent data in its wake, believing itself to be the center of any peaceful construction the world can obtain.

(3) There is only one relatively cohesive Hindu civilization and only one world so, consequently, it is difficult to see this as an intercivilizational relation. In modern times the parts of the Hindu world, inside or outside India, cannot be said to have engaged in any consistent warfare against each other. There is nothing reminiscent of the First and Second World Wars in the occident, nor of the possible preparation for the next world war between the United States and the
Soviet Union, with allies. It may be objected that this is because most of hindu lands have been under foreign domination until of late (British rule, Mogul rule before that) and that this has had a pacifying effect. Possible, but perhaps not quite convincing. Rather, it looks as if India as an inter-state system bringing together a number of nations speaking languages as different as those found in Europe, and in about the same numbers has been remarkably much more successful in achieving peace than has Europe. Of course there are conflicts, but there is nothing like a division of the Indian union into two alliances with a handful of neutral, non-aligned states in between. Of course this does not mean that there is no violence in India, only that it takes the form of sporadic direct violence and heavily institutionalized structural violence, linked to the caste system.

(4) There is only one China so the problem has not arisen. But that China has been capable of achieving a high level of cohesion for the last 2100 years—a considerable achievement even if it has been marred by warlordism, although not to the heights of intra-European warlordism.

(5) There is only one Japan, and it is remarkably cohesive today although that cohesiveness dates only a little more than one century back in time. Some aspects of the relations before that time might be indicative of what will happen if there were more than one Japan around in the world system. Two Japanes, each of them economically and potentially also militarily and politically expansionist, trying to capture the other as resource or at least as periphery might create
a rather intolerable situation for each other, somewhat similar to combination (1) with occidental, expansionist countries trying to make peripheries out of competing centers that they have chosen to regard as evil.

That concludes the first exercise in intra-civilizational relations. Conclusion: the danger point is very clear; occidental civilization in the expansion mode. One particular reason why is that the nation-state, itself a product, a construction coming out of that civilization is such a marvelous instrument for the type of relations already embedded in that particular civilizational code. Expansionist in its inclination, identifying expansion with progress, heading for a crisis of its own construction, inspired by simplistic theories about how to expand, inconsiderate to nature, eager to expand its periphery by conquering other peoples, thereby elevating its own kind, wholesale, into the center, and driven either by occidental gods (Yahweh, God the Father, Allah) or by such secular versions as nationalism; all of this somehow cohering as one great implementation of occidental cosmology. Since the occident has been relatively successful in bringing this construction to the periphery through colonialization and then, even more significantly, through deep neo-colonialization there is little doubt that much of this characterizes the world in general.

At the other end of the spectrum is another danger zone; Japan. I think the danger stems from exactly the same basic civilizational characteristics: the basic sense of being a Chosen People (in the
occident particularly pronounced in the Jews with their dream of the Promised Land, Eretz Israel, but also in such countries as Germany, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States) and the tendency to regard other parts of the world as periphery or resource. That a major war in this century, the Pacific War, should be between Japan and the United States is no wonder.

In between then are the other three; in my view considerably less dangerous except, possibly, to themselves. But they are non-dangerous for three very different reasons. Both in the Chinese and Hindu cases there is only one of them around. But there is more to it than that: in the Chinese case Barbarians might not even be worth going to war against, being too low—all one has to do is to maintain a credible deterrence posture through highly defensive defense measures. In the Hindu case war may not even be worthwhile since hinduism is already at the center of the religious universe, the richest of all religions found in human society. And the others, as mentioned, with their exceptions, might have live and let live as a basic doctrine.

Let us now pursue these ideas further, looking at inter-civilizational relations.

(6) This is, of course, the long history of occidental penetration into what it considers its periphery, both in the Greco-Roman period and in the modern period, the age of western imperialism. Some of this may be taken to prove that the balance of power theory cannot be that
wrong: most of the indigenous peoples were and are simply too weak to stand up against the occidental onslaught, and consequently end up peripherized and-or exterminated, as happened in large parts of the Americas. However, simple logic informs us that from the possible validity of the statement that absence of balance of power does not lead to peace (in any possible interpretation of that word) it does not follow that balance of power does.

It should be noticed that the other two categories here, occidental in contraction and buddhist civilization present us with alternative versions. The manorial and feudal constructions typical of the Middle Ages have been absorbed into the equally typical construction of occidentalism in the expansion mode in this "modern period": the nation-state. What can be said, however, is that process has taken remarkably long time, and is certainly not yet completed. There may not have been much in terms of military resistance, but considerable cultural, economic and even political resistance. And the same applies to buddhist civilization: maybe precisely because of its non-violence it was not beaten, and because of its ability to withdraw into the Sangha (monistic community, into its pagodas and temples), buddhism has shown remarkable resilience against cultural, economic and political absorption. In other words, we are dealing here with more refined inter-civilizational relations. However, it certainly also helped that for the occident in expansion neither occident in contraction, nor buddhism was seen as evil; "savages" sometimes were (or at least they were seen as belonging to a neighboring category to evil, "primitive").
(7) Of course one of those "Chosen People" in the occident, in this case the British, conquered India and left behind indelible imprints and was then finally forced, to a large extent by gandhian nonviolence, to withdraw in 1947. India, however, on the other hand, also absorbed from the conqueror what they wanted, assimilating it into that incredible rich culture of theirs. The British became, and are becoming in increasing numbers, as marked by India as Indians by Britain. Britain conquered India, India to a large extent absorbed Britain and Britons. As a matter of fact, India may even do it again, serving this role as a receptacle of the cultures of conquering civilizations, and turn out even richer than ever before. Who is stronger, he who is out to create of others a periphery, or he who already sees others as encompassed, absorbed in one's own universe? Two different ways of relating to each other: military conquest, economic penetration, cultural imprinting, political institutions on the one hand, and absorption on the other.

(8) This one is different. When the west came to China (and the United States belonged to the west from this point of view) they filled the slot as Western Barbarians; they behaved accordingly, and were perceived accordingly. In no sense does this mean that the Chinese can not also learn from barbarians what they want to learn, as they certainly did from the North Barbarians, the Russians. But whereas Indian civilization can absorb and encompass with its almost incredible tolerance, Sinic civilization was greatly wounded by the attack, hit back, retaliated and even exorcised (during the cultural revolution) the foreign devils. We are here dealing with an
asymmetric relation: the occident wants to penetrate, even to expand; the Chinese (and their neighbors, the Vietnamese) behave according to the old French adage

Cet animal est très méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend.

(9) This relation is considerably more symmetric: China is not out to peripherize other parts of the world, Japan is, although it may be argued that for the outer periphery it is only in the economic sense. It is only the inner periphery that is treated in a way relatively similar to the way western imperialism has tried to treat almost the whole world. The collision possibilities are obvious, and they have certainly not been removed by declaring Japan a part not only of the occident but of the western occident—(A) because this is simply an empty declaration with little factual basis and (B) even if it were the case intra-occidental relations in the expansionist mode are certainly not known historically as being the most peaceful. Rather, these are typically the countries with geo-political designs, the big powers in the occident, when in the expansion mode—and that is already built into the definition of a big power—and Japan.

(10) At this point another aspect of Hindu civilization is brought out very clearly. As mentioned that civilization has exhibited almost incredible tolerance to small occidental groups such as Jews and Christians and parsees, and even to large occidental groups such as Moslems for long periods at the time, provided the two "communities" do not offend each other religiously. Relations to that important
in-between religious community, the si\textsuperscript{13} have also until recently been marked by much of the same tolerance. But the same has not unconditionally been the case for the indigenous peoples, indicating that there is in Hindu civilization a dividing line between "higher" and "lower" cultures, probably to some extent similar to the dividing line between high castes, low castes and the caste-less. As to the latter: this is where Hindu violence shows up at its worst, directed downwards rather than outwards, as structural violence rather than direct violence. And buddhism was, like g\texttond{\textendash}hism, a basic challenge of that aspect of Hindu civilization, and had to be expelled. But this way: Hindu civilization is tolerant as long as the caste structure is either left untouched or can be reproduced by social change, even when imposed from the outside. A brahmin remains a brahmin even if his God changes from RAM (the Hindu word for "God") to RAM (the computer jargon for random access memory) and he himself is transformed from priest to computer specialist.

(11) I think that in general it may be said that Sinic civilization is tolerant of small pockets that do not constitute any basic threat. Occidental civilization expansion mode wants to peripherize, absorb, change, "develop"--Sinic civilization is probably more likely to regard them as some kind of barbarians but leave them in peace. The cultural revolution was certainly an exception to this, attacking pockets of occidentalism, buddhists and their temples, and also indigenous peoples--but as far as one can judge short of extermination, even if the attacks were violent. It may perhaps also be argued that
this was a relatively atypical period, and also relatively easy to comprehend in the light of the long period of western domination initiated by the opium wars.

(12) The same type of tolerance is not seen in Japan. Japan may of course be visited. But to live in Japan, even to settle presupposes willingness to become Japanese, at least in such external manifestations as changing one's name to a Japanese name which will then become the official name, but even then to sit at the bottom end of the table (as opposed to the visitor who might be very politely seated at the top end, and interpret that as a sign of reverence where it may actually be a sign of distance). And thus it is that Buddhism has become "Japanized" and, particularly in the form of Zen Buddhism, has become a part of the expansionist nature of Nipponic cosmology. In the same vein, indigenous peoples have been absorbed and Japanized, to the point of virtual disappearance (the Ainu).

(13) Two great civilizations, two large groups of humankind—in fact the two largest—even neighbors, and yet so little relationship! To the Chinese the Indians are among the South Barbarians, not dangerous, but barbarians (except when they transgress a line drawn in the Himalaya mountains, Fall 1982—the MacMahon line). To the Indians the Chinese are there, but as they have not conquered India there is not that much basis for a contact. Neither of them are expansionists, fortunately—if India were occidental expansionists and China had Nipponic cosmology we might have had major war theaters in the Himalayas. It is also interesting to note that this, at least so far,
has held true even though both countries have been equipped with that instrument of occidental expansionism, the nation-state with many of its trimmings.

(14) The basic point that has kept this relationship peaceful is probably a simple geographical circumstance: India is too far away from Japan, at least so far. Daitōšō did not include India. Had Japan been a border country the logistical difficulties would have been overcome, and many high caste Indians would by now have developed patterns of Japanese efficiency and many Japanese would have been absorbed, even transformed by the Indian mystique. In a sense India is relatively fortunate: there are two other big countries in Asia, one of them very close and non-aggressive, the other one quite aggressive but not very close.

(15) But China was not that fortunate. For the Chinese the Japanese are the East Barbarians, and they behaved accordingly, from 1931 and particularly 1937 on. To this could be added that the attack on China was a case of pure, unadulterated aggression with no hint of a defensive purpose. It came out quite similar, although on a somewhat lesser scale, to Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. But even if Germany had little or no basis for assuming that the Soviet Union would expand militarily into German territory they might say that designs for social transformation in a socialist/communist direction were made in Moscow, certainly also affecting Germany. Whether that aggressiveness towards China is still present in Japan, in latent
form, is too early to judge. After all, Japan has only been beaten once, and not a very long time ago. [24]

Let us now look at Figure 1 again, trying to summarize what has been said. Exclamation signs have been placed where danger is to be expected, among other reasons because it certainly has been observed in the past. It will be noted that they all refer to two of the five civilizational categories: occidental in expansion, and Nipponic. There is only one exception: the Hindu-Nipponic combination has not been marked as a danger zone, but for the reason of distance rather than innate non-aggressiveness on the side of Japan towards India (after all, the Japanese certainly did attack India and would have advanced considerably if the war in general had not turned against them). Moreover, the only reason why Japan is not seen as dangerous to itself is also negative: there is only one Japan around.

It should also be noted that the danger zones are of two different kinds. Relative to the strong they spell war: efforts to peripherize each other or to use each other as resources, or to demarcate the world as a periphery off limits for the other powers in the center. And then there is the second kind: penetration, accompanied or not by absorption and extermination, administered to the militarily weaker civilizations. The latter may have two defensive strategies, though: to hit back through a system of entirely defensive defense, and/or to retreat, refuse to be absorbed, and try to outlive the conquest. This may or may not be successful, at any rate it presupposes a long time perspective, patience, maybe also
a conscious policy of non-violence—all three characteristics absent in occidental expansionist civilization (and, although less so, in Nipponic expansionist civilization).

And thus it is that the center of the table, in six of the fifteen cells, exhibits a remarkable amount of relatively positive relations. Upon further scrutiny more violence can be detected, but not the large scale violence seen in the nine cells on the margin of the table (but in two of them in latent form).
3. Conclusion: "What Do We Do About It?"

Imagine now that there is not only some but sufficient validity to this type of analysis of the deep structure of international politics of peace (and also of development although it has only been spelled out in the first section). The question of course arises: What can we do about it? Is it possible to remove civilizations? Is it possible to change civilizations?

The candidates for removal would certainly be occidental civilization in the expansionist mode and Imperial civilization. Of course, this may have as a consequence that some of the remaining three (or actually five since we have combined three into one group) might acquire some of the characteristics of the expansionists removed. There may be a group dynamic going on here where civilizations are playing roles relative to each other, and the world is a system where the attitudes and behavior of one actor are determined not only by the code of that civilization, but also by the attitudes and behavior of the other actors. But then this may also work both ways: with the expansionists removed there may be less expansionism to imitate, less nation-state building to do, less "modernization" with its concomitant, a heavy military-bureaucratic-corporate-intelligentsia complex, to build.

A more important consideration is that these civilizations cannot be removed. Precisely because of their characteristics they are
at the top of the world community of civilizations rather than at the bottom, having themselves exterminated a considerable amount of considerably more peaceful civilizations. Had they been at the bottom, and been relatively small they might have been given the same treatment as meted out to delinquents: they would have been arraigned into court, a sentence would have been passed, adequate institutionalization would have followed. The process would probably have been better for individual than for general prevention, just as in the theory of punishment of crime in general.

But we are not in that situation. Almost all nuclear powers are in this category (not India, and then China is nuclear but not dangerous according to this analysis); the super-powers are there, so are the big powers (but again China is included, and unnecessarily so). The most important of the most important industrial nations are also included in the concept. They are not easily removed. Hence we are left with the second choice: can they be changed?

The answer to this question is by no means clear, and the question seems to me to be about the most important that can be formulated in peace studies. We know that civilizations do change, in the sense that the deeper aspects, the code, what is here called cosmology, can be said to change (as indicated in the first section). But this was a change by a number of historical circumstances, not by voluntary design. We have today no such recipe, or one might even say therapy, for excessively belligerent civilizations.
Except one: by pointing out that much of the belligerence is rooted in the civilization itself. Change can come about, but probably only by going to the roots. The superficiality of believing that transfer of ownership of means of production from private to public hands should liberate humankind from the scourge of war becomes evident in the light of this type of exploration: whether in public or private hands the means of production can still be used for expansionist occidental aims.

Hence, what we need is analyses using civilizations rather than states or economic systems as units. And this should be done in the spirit of seeking solutions rather than condemnations. Evidently the present piece of analysis does not live up to that goal. However, this is certainly very far from the last word that can be said about this important matter.
NOTES

1. See Johan Galtung, Erik Rudeng and Tore Heiestad, "On the Last 2,500 Years in Western History And Some Remarks on the Coming 500", in Peter Burke, Ed., The New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Volume XIII, Ch. XII, pp. 318-61, for an elaboration of these concepts and an effort to use them diachronically, in Western history. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979


5. The problem here, it seems, is not merely monotheism but the idea of being in possession of the single valid faith for the whole universe, in other words, singularity cum universalism

6. For an exploration of how this theme is used in order to maintain a conflict see Johan Galtung, There Are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984, Ch. 2.1.

7. For a finer exploration of this theme, see J. E. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, Eyre Methuen, London, 1972, Ch. II, "The Rebirth of Unlimited War".

8. In other words, I am thinking of the obvious, on the back of any human rights declaration, the human duties, to those who are the presumed guarantors of the rights, the state (meaning the government).


10. This is one of the basic themes explored in Galtung, Rudeng, Heiestad, 1979

11. Of course, there is more than one Western code, and the point made is as valid for marxism/socialism as for liberalism/conservatism/capitalism


13. They are: the world Northwest (capitalist), the world Northeast (socialist), the world Southwest (Third World) and the world Southeast (Japan, China and other countries in East and Southeast Asia).

15. This is a part of a large scale research project on social cosmology and civilization theory.

16. I know perfectly well that this is doing violence to a diversity too rich to accommodate within the present scheme, but I see no other possibility in the present context.

17. And that all other countries, by implication, are aberrations from that norm. For some preliminary explorations of this theme, see Johan Galtung, "The United States in Indo-China: The Paradigm For A Generation", in *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. V, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1980, Ch. 8, pp. 219-28.

18. This is a basic theme in Galtung, 1984, ch. 3.2.

19. An unfinished research project that somebody should take up: India as an international system, with a systematic comparison of India with Europe. About the same size in population and territory (or not that different), yet India is doing so much better, with the same order of magnitude of nations, internationally, and so much worse intra-nationally. They both have a universal religion so it is at least very tempting to relate some of this difference to the tolerance of Hinduism as opposed to Christianity where other teachings are concerned, yet intolerance to the point of massive structural violence inside the system. I am indebted to K. P. Migra for giving me good opportunities to do some preliminary work on this during my stay as Visiting Professor at the School of International Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1971.


23. With the trauma inflicted on that religious community by an act of sacrilege, the invasion of the Golden Temple in Amritsar in 1984 the situation has certainly changed, and probably for generations, even centuries. Imagine a Muslim act of sabotage in St Peter's in Rome!

24. Not exactly this idea, but the potential for renewed violence must have been a basic consideration inspiring the Japanese historian Ienaga Saburo to write his book _The Pacific War 1931-1945_, Pantheon, New York, 1975. Very useful in this context (see particularly pp. 135-39, 154-55, 195-98, 200-81)

25. And yet, with all obvious and not so obvious shortcomings, there is also the soft undertone of Occidental civilization witnessed for instance in the acts of nonviolence in the Philippines in 1986, in the Civil Rights struggle in the United States, etc.
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20. For an excellent introduction to Chinese history also from this angle, see A. Cotterell and D. Morgan, China, An Integrated Study, Harrap, London, 1975.


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