PEACE AS A PROFESSION AND NEW PEACE ACTION ROLES

by

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1. Introduction

Today we see relatively clearly that there are liberal and marxist conceptions of peace, and perhaps we also see more clearly than before that "liberalism vs. marxism" is a false dichotomy - although we still live under the pressure of the false dichotomies, and particularly in the thinking about peace. Hence, this essay is an effort to try to indicate, at a very simple, common sense level, that both views are fruitful in conceiving of new forms of peace action, and that they in a sense reinforce each other.


In the liberal model peace is above all seen as an ordered system of relation between states, any kind of states, a finely architected set of bilateral and multilateral inter-state relations. When one makes use of this distinction, bilateral/multilateral, and in addition makes a distinction between ad hoc relations and permanent relations then we get the four major forms of diplomacy: (1) bilateral, ad hoc or envoy diplomacy (2) bilateral, permanent or residential diplomacy (3) multilateral, ad hoc or conference diplomacy and (4) multilateral, permanent or IGO-diplomacy, the international organization at a governmental level. (1)

By and large one may say that since the Renaissance diplomatic history is the history of a growth of the total system, but also a transition or transfer of the point of gravity from the first via the second and third towards the fourth of these forms; from the first negotiators with a white flag to the almost 40,000 bilateral diplomats we have today (about as many as the number of Jesuits), via the enormous number of
international conferences to the about 500 international governmental organizations found in the world today. (2)

The liberal idea is now that any form of state or society can be put into this system as long as the multilateral conferences and organizations mirror the relations found at the bilateral level (otherwise the conferences or organizations are referred to as "unrealistic"). Peace is seen as a structure at the inter- and supranational levels, levels that exist sui generis; the intranational plays a secondary role. (3)

Who then are the peace actors, who are the concrete carriers of these liberal peace solutions? They are the professionals, people who are specially educated for the purpose, diplomats and experts. In earlier ages they came from nobility circles, today they are no longer addressed as "Sir", rather as "Dr." - and curiously enough the same people who often are very much anti "Sir" are rather annoyed if the title "Dr." is omitted. In short: it is an upper caste of professionals who see to it that their power is made use of to put into practice their peace formulas.


Then there is the marxist approach to peace which stands in contradiction to what has just been said: the question of the inner nature of the states and societies is in the foreground. Most important is the nature of the single society, not the relations between them. In its simpler form the idea would also be that there is only one major dimension along which societies have to develop, through the transcendence of capitalist society with its contradiction between work and capital, and when this transcendence has taken place in the world in general and the socialist social order has been realized all over, then peace will come as an extra gift to humanity. In that state there would in a sense no longer be any problem, for war and peacelessness are only expressions of capitalistic forces in their search for raw materials and markets and even serve to conceal the contradictions inside such societies in order to reinforce and strengthen its class nature.
Who then, are the carriers, the concrete people to put such ideas into practice? In this case the carriers are not the professionals, but the politically conscious workers, the proletariat. Of course, sometimes the proletariat does not express so clearly what they really wish, for that reason they might need students as spokesmen, and the students are all too ready to do this and also to bring some of their professors into the struggle - bolstering their opinions through the idea that they speak on behalf of the working class. Concretely expressed: one is a carrier of peace when one is a carrier of the revolution. The intranational, the intrasocial is the essence of social reality, international and supranational relations are merely epiphenomenal.

4. The problem.

These two social cosmologies have something in common: they are typically western in the sense that they assume, somehow, that the idea of progress is a guiding principle of the universe. In addition to that comes the idea of chosen people, that there is somewhere a narrow circle of first class people - the professionals here, the true proletarian there - and a vast periphery of second class people. The world, and in particular the future belongs to the former, they are more equal than the others, however much they themselves stand for an ideology of equality. And this is where the problem enters, with two major components.

First, when one starts acting under this ideology of equality, starts realizing and changing something, then it is always done with some kind of division of labor. Also relative to peace are there Herren and Knechte, in liberal theory the professionals are the former and the latter are all the rest; in Marxist theory the members of the working class as well as their sons and daughters are put in the former and all the rest in the latter. According to both conceptions the topdogs are enlightened - filled with scientific insight and fundamental faith in the historical significance of their own role.

Second, from this division of labor there is an unfortunate consequence, even with fascist overtones: that those who are not
belonging to the first class people are slightly less than human, more like things, objects, not subjects of their own fate. Since they are objects then it is also possible to manipulate them, even to sacrifice them; thus a fundamental alienation arises between the first and second class people. The typical example would be all the international conferences with professionals representing both superpowers discussing the balance of terror, ideas like "first strike" and "second strike", "credibility" and "commitment" - but always from the basic assumption that the professionals themselves will be hidden in mountain caves and underground bunkers, well prepared in advance, and the others, those on the outside, they are the hostages, the pawns and sacrificial lambs of international theory and historical processes. Something of the same applies to the marxist solution: when for instance kulaks stand in the way of historical development, then it becomes possible to sacrifice these people precisely because they are second class and are not located in the Center, in the very engine of the historical machine.

Seen in this perspective Gandhi appears as some kind of transcendence of this crisis in western thinking. For if there was anything Gandhi emphasized then it was exactly that his concept of peace comprised everybody and gave to everybody a role to play if it were not of that kind, then it would not have been a peace concept. So that is my first thesis: a theory that only appoints as carriers of the future a limited part of humanity is a bad theory. The theory can have all other kinds of advantages, perfect correspondence with empirical data, the deductive beauty of an axiomatic system built like a gothic cathedral where everything is deducible - it nevertheless remains a bad theory when the basic assumption is a new division of labor leading to first and second class people. For that reason it looks like a major task of peace research today to direct itself against any type of professionalization of peace, against any type of mechanistic and more deeply seen, even fascist division of people, a priori, in those that are peace promoting and peace impeding. The term "fascist" in this connection refers precisely
to our knowledge of the type of attitudes and fundamental alienation that so easily develops when people are only regarded as objects.

So that becomes the basic problem: how to make peace relevant for everybody, not only everybody's concern in an ideological and perhaps intellectual sense, but as part of his action program, even his daily activity.

What contribution, then, can peace research give in this direction? It is precisely at this point that a concept of "structural violence" becomes important not only as an expansion of the field of peace research, but even more as an expansion of the field of peace action. For as long as peace is only understood as absence of direct violence at the level of collective organization, then "peace" is only too compatible with the self-understanding indulged in by the liberal professionals. Peace becomes the concern of foreign policy, and limited to that. But foreign policy is the task of diplomats, people working in the foreign ministries and some others which means that this particular definition of peace in and by itself appoints a special group - for people in general, for the big masses there will be no real peace duties.

This is all very clearly reflected in the Images of the World in the Year 2000 study carried out in eight Western and two Asian (India and Japan) countries 1967-1969. Some people were interviewed about their ideas and ideals relative to the future, and among the 180 questions there were also many relating directly to the problem of peace. To the question "What is the most important problem for the future of the world?" the most frequent answers always related in one way or the other to war and peace, to what happened at the international levels. When one then as the next question asked "What is your peace theory? How is it possible to realize peace?" then many proposals were forthcoming - on the paper. But to the follow-up question "What can you do in that connection?" there was hardly any answer at all. Some people said "I could perhaps try to become a better person or do something in my family or participate in a
demonstration". The demonstration seemed to be the maximum in terms of peace action, but it is not because the 9000 people interviewed were short of imagination as simply because the world is made in such a way and the division of labor goes so deeply that even highly peace motivated people are left without real tasks and the most important task of humanity without sufficient carriers who can put the idea of peace into reality.

6. Expanding the concept of peace.

Let us then see what happens to this problem when we expand the "absentia belli" concept of peace, adding to it the concept of "peace as absence of structural violence". We then define structural violence through the following four main components: exploitation, or vertical division of labor - a division of labor that is better for those on the top than for those who remain at the bottom - penetration, which means a process whereby the autonomy of people at the bottom level is threatened, eroded and their consciousness is manipulated; fragmentation - the classical but always equally valid idea of "divida et impera"; and marginalization - the tendency to divide societies into an inner circle and a periphery of second-class groups and people. What happens when we add these ideas to the concept of peacelessness? For we know that these ideas go relatively deep, for instance that the type of socialist revolutions we have had in Eastern Europe do not manage to uproot such evils from the social structure, thus indicating that they are not only immanent in the form of production referred to as capitalism.

Of course, in saying so it should immediately be added that capitalism as a form of production is an almost perfect implementation of structural violence, particularly in its imperialistic form. There is exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization in ways that are in no need of elaboration here. It should only be emphasized that capitalism has no monopoly on structural violence.

And this is seen particularly clearly the moment we turn
to the problem of this essay: "peace as a profession". Here we immediately run into the four characteristics of structural violence. He who has a profession is already a member of a caste with a monopoly on the exercise of that profession. And all the others are fragmented clients whose consciousness are penetrated precisely because the professional is regarded as the only person with competence, presumably not only knowing better but also knowing what constitutes knowledge. In every concrete work situation the professional will have the important and challenging tasks, other people will be used as assistants. Thus, every profession is in and by itself some form of structural violence which does not mean that they are all equally peaceless: there are those with more and there are those with less structural violence built into them. Among the most violent one could mention the example of the United States Air Force: on big posters at the ASB Nouasseur in the neighborhood of Casablanca one could read, written with very big characters "Peace is our Profession". When that is peace, when that is the interpretation of "peace as a profession" then it does not seem to be worth having. (7)

The most important aspect of the idea of "structural violence" is perhaps that by means of this concept a social net is constructed whereby birds of many feathers can be caught and kept, not only the good old scapegoats such as "capitalist ", but for instance also us, the intellectuals. With this concept an instrument is created whereby intellectuals, including peace researchers can be seen as carriers of violence, just as much as any other professional always claiming that "I know..." and is in a position to give not only answers but also to formulate the acceptable questions. So this really raises the question whether one can define new peace strategic roles that are compatible with such an expanded concept of peace in really distributing, democratically, the tasks of peace. I think it is possible, and I would like to contribute with a small list of five - not definitions, not even examples, but rather illustrations in order to make the point more clear.


First, the citizens' initiatives - Hans Rokahr Bahr and others at the Bochum University have written an important book
about this theme *Politizierung des Alltags* (3) Citizens' initiative constitutes for us some kind of proof about the falseness of the dichotomy between evolution and revolution; these initiatives transcend that dichotomy. As already mentioned we are always living under the pressure of false dichotomies - so what makes this a false one? When one says "revolution" then it is almost always assumed that the revolutionary process takes place at the level of the nation state: one can imagine a revolution in Germany, but not in Niedersachsen - a revolution in Rheinland-Pfalz even sounds like a semantic impossibility. The problem, however, is not "Federal Republic vs. Rheinland-Pfalz", it is not a question of size or territory.

Rather, the point is that we have come to know other forms of revolution. Since 1968 there have been revolutions at the micro level, in the schools, in the prisons, in the hospitals, in universities, at institutes - even at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Thus, we have tried in Oslo to apply the definition of structural violence to our own Institute and saw more clearly how there is a small caste of researchers who fragment assistants and secretaries, even to the point of penetration and exploitation. What does one do then? Well, one might try such efforts as equalization of salaries, giving for instance to a secretary with seven years professional experience exactly the same salary as to a Ph.D. with seven years "experience" - which in this case means experience in university life combined with studies. One has also tried to have researchers do more typing and let the secretaries participate more in research and some experiences have been made, perhaps a certain creativity has been developed - but not too much progress has been made. At this point I think that one can only say that we have seen clearly how the concepts of "violence", "revolution", "peace" etc. have to be developed in such a way that they also focus the attention on oneself, not only being traps in which to snare others.(9)

Hence, I see citizens' initiatives as a plurality of revolutions at the micro level: they are concerned with city quarters, factories, institutes, with organizations in general,
also with the family. When in the small family father and mother ask their little two-year-old child: "What would you like to have for dinner today? There are two possibilities," instead of saying "Here is your food!" then that has something to do with the opposite of marginalization, which is participation, and also it is solidarity, autonomy, equality. In fact, a large quantity of micro revolutions is not incompatible with a bigger revolution (but may be a condition, or a consequence of that one), nor is it incompatible with general evolution. This only to indicate how all such dichotomies tend to be false, for firstly they are almost never dichotomies but trichotomies or polytomies, and second, there are almost always possibilities of combination, there is always a tertium.

By means of such citizens' initiatives a fight against structural violence is launched, experience is made, autonomy is realized, peace is created. Broad masses in the population learn that, and to some extent how, peace can be made. And the important point in this connection is not that structural violence is dangerous because it may one day express itself in direct violence: that was the old problem formulation, the one that also has found its place in the Charter of the United Nations. The point is that structural violence is peacelessness, in violence which makes a fight against structural violence active peace politics regardless of the level at which it is carried out. And the method of fighting is in itself a fight against structural violence: through active participation people are no longer objects of conflict, but subjects of conflict. (10)

And when that has happened, we would no longer live in a society where there is a clear division of labor between the subjects and the objects of a conflict. Thus, small children are in general only shown the glossy surface of social life. It is almost always true, particularly in middle class families, that the family as a whole and the parents in general present themselves to others, in everyday life, in a conflict free state: conflicts are something one deals with when the children are not present. One saves the children from the conflict, keeps them unconscious and at a distance, so that they grow up with a very
limited possibility of conflict participation. When they
achieve school age then the conflicts are also taken away
from them and processed as raw material by teachers, parents
and organizations, always insisting that the children are not
mature enough for participation in this process. Then they
become about 18 years old and they get into conflict, but at
this stage the possibilities of understanding conflict through
own experience have been so curtailed that their conflict
resolution repertory for that reason is very limited. As a
conclusion they become highly manipulable, as objects rather
than subjects. (11)

The most significant point about citizens' initiatives,
hence, is precisely the collection of *own* experience. For a
person who comes from the outside, a so-called "third party"
saying "here I am, I know quite a lot about conflict and you
seem to have a very interesting cue, let me solve it for you!"
is structurally speaking a thief, for he takes away from others
a possibility for personal, and thereby social, growth. At this
point one could actually mention, at the international level,
Finland which — although it certainly is a country I very much
admire — has developed a high capacity in the import of other
countries' conflict as raw material for processing in Helsinki.
Just as efforts to solve conflicts have such important spin-off
effects as the booming hotel industry in Geneva there is also
a conflict resolution industry in the Finnish foreign office
with obvious consequences for its qualitative and quantitative
growth. (12)

One might speculate a little bit about the conditions
of success for such citizens' initiatives. Concretely they
usually take the form of action, even of confrontation. But
these are phenomena that have to take place in time and space,
they are not abstract like paper solutions and verbal theories.
Preferably time and space should be defined in such a way
that it has immediate relevance for the issue. Thus, if the
issue is the devastation of an old quarter in town with highly
unprofitable—but also highly stimulating, soothing, inspiring
housed then time could be when the issue is debated in the City Parliament, or the bulldozers are about to start working, and space could be outside the City Parliament, or in front of the bulldozers. In either case it is quite clear how correct choice of time and space facilitates communication to the opposite party, to the neutrals if there are any, to one's own side. The abstract action with no inherent time and space link to the issue is very often a kick in the air: the empty demonstration gathering at some square frequently used for that purpose and at a good demonstration hour - for instance right after schools and working places are closing down for the day. Such demonstrations tend to be ritualized citizen action, not instrumental.

One obvious problem in connection with citizens' initiatives is that the international calendar of events is so removed from citizens' lives. A foreign minister has his diary studded with significant events but they are not found in the citizen's diary where the entries are more likely to deal with birthdays, parties, events of daily life. Hence, what is more than anything else needed in this field is some kind of convergence between the diaries, some way in which citizens' daily life have an immediate link to international affairs. Our experience so far is that one important way of doing this is the referendum on international policy, for instance the referendum that took place in Norway on Norwegian entry into the European Community - one of the most mobilizing political event in modern Norwegian political history. Again, it is obvious that too many such events will also have a ritualizing effect.

7. Non-cooperation.

The second possibility is, under certain circumstances, to refuse to participate in certain positions in society with a particularly pronounced component of violence. I do not think it would be a bad idea if a list of internationally operating firms, the so-called multinational corporations was established, so that one could clearly see which of them (according to the full criteria of structural violence given above) are responsible for most of the structural violence in the world. One could then appeal to everybody who wants a position in an organization of
this type to abstain from it, by pointing to the twenty or so corporations on top of the list. And the same would apply to governments: there are governments with whom it is important not to cooperate, and among these governments there are ministries that are worse than others. (16)

In short, I think it is important nowadays that governments are not regarded as sacrosanct. Actually, one should only regard them as groups within our societies, with no source of legitimacy above the ability to do a good job, not only for one’s own population but for the world in general. And this legitimacy has to be proven over and over again because it should be doubted every day: this is what one sees so clearly in the Watergate scandal. Of course, the Watergate scandal is only an expression, even an idiom in which a much deeper scandal can be expressed, something built into the very structure of that gigantic society. But it is useful to express doubts at this point particularly because the roots of the scandal go so deep.

8. Increased Transparency.

Carl von Ossietzky was a man who like any good journalist and social critic saw it as his task to make the workings of society more transparent for the citizens living in it. However, I think much more dramatic forms than analysis - and that is what peace research usually limits itself to - can be found, and I am then thinking particularly of Daniel Ellsberg. As a matter of fact, there are interesting parallels between Ellsberg and Ossietzky: typically, neither of them functioned as a spy or an agent for a foreign power, Ellsberg even defined himself as a "spy for humanity". (17)

But before that Ellsberg was certainly an exponent of the "peace is our profession" ethos in the sense of the US Air Force. He participated in the formulation of equations and diagrams with military input here and military output there. The former is the destruction potential, the latter is the destruction made and particularly in terms of people killed; for instance measured in megabodies, one million dead.
In the Vietnam war one has perhaps brought it so far as to three megabodies, all together. Ellsberg was a part of this monstrous death factory as well as other intellectuals in Boston, at Harvard University or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; he was a "specialist" like the others. They conceived of themselves as first-rate intellectuals fighting against a fifth-rate power, only to see later that they were fifth-rate intellectuals engaged in a fight against a first-rate power.

They worked on the increments of the variables and expressed the relation in curves, using their expertise about military input and megabody output, and established a upper limit, the famous "unacceptable damage" for the military output. But then they experienced that this limit was a very different one in the society with total mobilization of the creativity of the total population - something quite different as the analogue they had consciously or unconsciously been using, contemporary American society. This came as a shock to Ellsberg, one could even express it biblically invoking the metaphor of Saulus on the road to Damascus: the conversion was total and now he is, as he says himself, a different human being.

So, how would it be instead of megabodies one made use of a megadan ("Dan" for Daniel Ellsberg)? That would be one million, in foreign offices, in defense ministries, in the multinational corporations, in each and every organization that somehow disposes over the means of structural and direct violence, implementing them and improving them. At times of crisis they would publish secrets, as Daniel Ellsberg did for the Vietnam conflict with the Pentagon Papers. For these papers were made secret not in order to protect or promote humanity, but in order to protect the United States and more particularly its government, not to mention its President. And most secret documents are of that kind.

Thus, Ellsberg's role was a new peace strategic role and mobilization of all the Ellsbergs of the world would be a rewarding as well as important task. With that mobilization the monopoly of governments on secrets would be threatened,
and I think by and large that would be most positive and a major contribution to peace. Thus, if this year the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee had as much courage as it had in the year 1935/36 when Carl von Ossietzky was given the Nobel Peace Prize, then Ellsberg would undoubtedly be the recipient of that prize. (18)

9. **Towards new science and technology.**

Fourth, I think there is much work to do in this field that has to do with new technologies and new branches of science. It is our experience that almost all scientists in one major country in the western world, believing in humanity and Christianity, were made use of for the Vietnam war. Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was to a large extent financed by the Pentagon, but it is more general than that: there was almost an incredible mobilization for the war that we today know extremely well, a war about which we today know most of what there is to know. What strikes one as horrifying is the compatibility, even identity between war and science - the way in which one has come to conclude that there is something in modern science that in and by itself makes it disposed for war. (19)

In our model of science the vertical division of labor is already built into the structure. This leads to the question of whether this is a good social model at all, promoting a small elite designating itself as scientific, regarding others as clients, students who understand little and whose consciousness they have a right, even a duty to help form. This is the problem, not only for peace research, but for any science; and it is not enough to engage in popularization since that is only a form of paternalism. Another solution would be to develop scientific concepts less based on division of labor so that everybody is included, everybody can participate. (20)

Of course, we have all heard about how such attempts are made in contemporary China. I do not know to what extent it is true, it may also well be hypocrisy; but I do know that in our vertical society not even efforts are made in that direction.
For that reason both scientific production and technology measure and integrate the verticality of society in general. Each element brought forth by that technology, such as a car, induces and reinforces the general verticality of society (there are those who decide what to produce, those who carry out the menial tasks of production, those who consume and those who serve the consumers), and when we try to export this structure to other countries as development aid then the result is of course a reproduction of our own society with its problems. Hence the need for much effort towards new forms of scientific production, and alternative, intermediate, soft, human technologies!

10. Democratization of Foreign Policy.

Fifth, there is the important problem of democratization of foreign policy. By this I do not refer to a multiplication of the number of foreign policy debates and study groups, nor to more literature produced by the researchers for the benefit of the population. Nor do I refer to votes and referenda inside a country about its own foreign policy initiatives. Thus, imagine that the United States were a perfectly democratic country, even a direct democracy - what would this mean concretely? I think one important component in any definition of democracy is participation of everybody who is somehow hit one way or the other by the consequences of the decision to be made. Moreover, if these consequences are literally speaking lethal to some people, then these people should also have a veto.

Nothing of this would be changed if the entire American population (about 210 million, out of which 2/3 have the right to vote) should vote over bombing or not bombing of Cambodia. Why not? For the simple reason that this decision certainly affects the peasants, particularly the poor people in Cambodia - and they would have no right to vote, leaving alone the right of veto. The concept of relevance knows no national borders in the contemporary world, and particularly not when the issue is foreign policy - for that reason it is a very bad model of democracy to try to extrapolate from domestic political processes to foreign policy decision making; unless the consequences are rather limited to one's own population.
To make this more clear let us imagine that we have two countries, both divided in three: on top there is the government, below the people and in between the researchers, including the peace researchers. In a sense they have contact neither with the government nor with the people; for that reason some of them try to make contacts upwards, others make efforts downwards and most of us are more or less schizophrenic - I feel - which may not be so bad when one is living in a schizophrenic world.

The old model of foreign policy was foreign policy as a relation between governments, and the peace researchers might try, as lobbyists like so many others, to make their influence felt at the top. This is to some extent the role of the prostitute. The researcher enters as a highly paid call-girl, more or less willing to produce rationalizations, even entire ideologies of policies in the interest of the upper parts of the two pyramids. It does not help to say that this is the only way in which it can be done, that foreign policy is made from above for the whole structure is elitist as we today so clearly recognize in connection with the East-West conflict. People in general are not at all participating and hardly very interested either, in what takes place in Helsinki and Geneva.

The second model in this connection would include the idea that researchers instead of working upwards work downwards, address themselves to people in general, enter into dialogue with them and thereby develop a new structure that can more effectively exercise some pressure on the government. But this is actually the old model internationally considered for the assumption is always that the unit of foreign policy is the nation state and that the target group is the foreign policy elite.

Hence, I am actually thinking of something quite different, a third model: relations directly from people to people. If governments are to be regarded as a group among others then other groups should also be taken into consideration and participate. Thus, it might be good if this very summer, in addition to the summit meeting dealing with all-European affairs
in Helsinki there had also been a conference of trade unions. How do the trade unions from all over Europe conceive of all-European affairs? For instance the trade unions in Gdansk in Poland and Renault in Paris - they had had some of the same experiences in connection with their elites. A conference between them would be good, then an international organization, and then the possibility of developing more contacts at the international level - that would already be a much better foreign policy model. Thus, the point is not a conference of trade unions as such, but at the same place and time as the summit meeting takes place and in some kind of dialogue with that meeting.

Or, thinking of students: as far as I have understood the first real cooperation between the Polish and the French Ministry of Education some years ago was a conference about "Student Unrest" and one certainly did not hold a conference about "Professorial Rest". The Poles had had some experiences in March 1968 in Krakow and the French had their experiences in the famous "Événements de mai", also from 1968. Of course, the theme was not how one could help the students but rather exchange of experiences about how to avoid such conflicts in the future. This elitist exchange of experiences at the summit level is today even referred to as "peace" - I think that should be seen as some kind of semantic crime. (22)

Without real participation of the popular - there is always the possibility that the transcendence of the East-West conflict only leads to new conflict formation with the governments, and particularly the governments of the superpowers on one side and the population on the other. Of course it is true that some countries are more or less closed to this type of people-to-people foreign policy, but no country is totally closed, just as no country is absolutely open. Hence, one should not think in dichotomies! There are many new possibilities, and the most important difficulty lies in my opinion in our thinking where this point is concerned: the old prejudice that foreign policy in general and peace policy in particular is a monopoly
of the princes and that the governments of today are the legitimate successors of the princes of yesterday.

11. Conclusion.

Thus, there is a direct line from the citizens' initiative at the local level to foreign policy democratization – nongovernmental foreign policy – at the world level. It is mandatory today to make the society more transparent, to refuse to cooperate in certain positions in certain situations, to develop new technologies and new types of science. And that was more or less the theme: to define some new peace strategic roles that in themselves are meaningful as instruments of a more peaceful society without bringing in their wake new professional castes. For peace researchers should not make the same mistake as the military have already done in assuming that peace can be obtained by non-peaceful means.
NOTES

This is the English version of a public lecture given at the University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, June 1973 when the author was Carl von Ossietzky Professor of peace research at that university. The verbal style of presentation has been kept.


2. The number will always depend in the definition. See, for instance, the yearbooks published by the Union of International Associations, where numerous organizations in the European Community and UNTA areas are singled out for special attention—should they be included in the total number or not?

3. The way Nixon and Kissinger make use of the term "peace structure" does not seem to imply any analysis of the internal forces in a society that may be peace- or war-productive, regardless of the good or bad will of the rulers.

4. For an exploration of this theme, see Johan Galtung, On Macro History and Western Civilization (Trends in Western Civilization Project, No. 1), mimeo, 1974.

5. His major peace force, the satyagraha brigades, explicitly excluded nobody, and because of that mobilized forces that had been grossly under-used in Indian political history, e.g. women and harijans (the casteless).

6. Published under that title by Mouton, 1974.

7. And one reason for that is located, precisely, in the underlying theme of this essay: peace is not to be professionalized, for in so doing a closed group is formed, a guild, a caste, with high technical competence but increasingly removed from the people they are supposed to serve. Technical efficiency, command of means, become more important than the ends: the well-being of everybody. This is particularly clearly seen in the unquestioning way in which military men develop such horrendous doctrines as counter-value strategies whereby masses of fellow humans are held as hostages, possibly to be exterminated in a nuclear holocaust.


9. For more information about this, see article written by Nils Petter Gleditsch in the report for the years 1970-72 from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

10. This is a major theme in the author's "Conflict as a Way of Life", in H. Freedman, ed., Progress in Mental Health (London: Churchill, 1969), pp. 11-34.

11. For a further exploration of that theme, see the author's Schooling and Future Society, mimeo, 1974.
12. Thus, an expansion program of considerable magnitude was initiated by the foreign office in 1971 when it became clear that they were to play a major role in the all-European process.

13. This is particularly true to the extent that the authorities learn patterns of dealing with them: with respect, permitting, even encouraging the demonstration process, and then pay no attention to them whatsoever.

14. The referendum was held in September 1972, and was a very close race (53% against, 47% in favor) as an indication of how heated the political fight had been.

15. One is thinking here of the Swiss referenda, often with very low rates of participation.

16. Work along such lines is an integral part of the World Indicators Program, directed from the Chair of Conflict and Peace Research at the University of Oslo.

17. That does not mean that they were accepted as such by their contemporaries who tried to see them as spies for "the enemy", not only to blackmail them, but also, partly, because this was the only alternative to loyalty and empathy known to the authorities in either case.

18. It did not have that courage, but instead gave the prize to Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho - the most hotly contested award in the history of the prize and likely to lead to a major depreciation of the value of the prize.

19. This point is repeatedly made by Herbert Marcuse.

20. See the author's "Social Structure and Science Structure", in Methodology and Ideology, Essays in the Theory and Methods of Social Research no. I.

21. See the author's "Science and Development Assistance", in Papers on Methodology, Essays in the Theory and Methods of Social Research no. II.

22. For a further development of this theme, see the author's East-West Cooperation and Security: A Skeptical Contribution, mimeo, 1974.