POSITIVE PEACE POLITICS FOR JAPAN

Some Proposals

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"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of its nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized".

Thus reads the famous Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. No doubt this Constitution was a result of the dialectic between Japan and the United States; not an internal dialectic in Japan itself, pushed forward by the Japanese people alone. On the other hand, the Japanese nation had during the Pacific War caused untold suffering to itself and its neighbors. Like any war the causes of the war were complex, and by no means rooted in Japan alone. Nevertheless, it is important to know that in the wake of the 15 years Pacific War, started with the attack on Manchuria in 1931, three million Japanese and 15 million others, mainly Asians, were killed. Much of this untold suffering Japan brought upon herself and others. The Peace Constitution should be seen in that light. On the other hand, if the Peace Constitution had emerged from the Japanese people themselves as a moral imperative to future generations and not only to Japan, the impact might have been greater. As
history unfolded itself after the capitulation of 15 August 1945
the Peace Constitution, of course, also carried the connotation
of a peace foisted upon the loser by the winner, and more particu-
larly by a winner who certainly does not have anything corres-
ponding to Article 9 in his Constitution, nor practices its principles.}

The position taken here is **positive** in the sense of
welcoming Article 9 as a historical fact, seeing it as a unique imperative
opportunity for the Japanese to do exactly that which is mentioned
so well in the Preamble to the Constitution: "We the Japanese
people—desire to occupy an honored place in an international
society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment
of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time
from the earth". We all know perfectly well how weak such words
are relative to deeds. Yet words can also serve to bind the bad
and inspire the good deeds—a good reason why something corres-
ponding to Article 9 should be worked into the Constitution of all
countries in the world. And Japan can still play a major role in a process of
that kind.

The question, of course, is how Article 9 (A9) can be inter-
preted, first, in terms of meaning; second, operationally. As to
the first point which will be dealt with in this section let me
reveal my own biases immediately.

I read A9 as outlawing war, as "the right of belligerency
of the state" forever. I do not read A9 as outlawing a purely
defensive, non-provocative defense that "for structural reasons" can
not be used for the conduct of war, neither as "threat or use of force". The Article mentions that "land, sea, and air forces"-- "will never be maintained". No doubt this can be interpreted as a completely pacifist stance, and I certainly do not agree with those who would find an interpretation of that kind unreasonable. But I find even more reasonable an interpretation that takes into account the whole sentence and the preceding sentence: "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" ("renounce war as the sovereign right of its nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes") and the other clause in the sentence, "as well as other war potential". It seems to me that the wording rules out the kind of forces, land, sea, and air forces that can be used as the means of "belligerency of the state". And it is hard to see purely defensive arrangements even if they involve land, sea, and air forces as compatible with "the right of belligerency of the state", including "the threat—of force."

Let me take some examples.

Coastal batteries, bunkers in mountain passes blocking access from the coast to the hinterland, mining (with land or sea mines) of land/sea passages, trip-wire arrangements demolishing airports when hostile aircraft lands are certainly violent, but not, I assume, what was in the mind of those who drafted A9. The simple reason is this: none of them can be used as "war potential", none of them can be used to exercise "the right of belligerency of the state", or to threaten. Short range conventional military defense cannot do that.
The same goes, of course, for all kinds of preparations for nonmilitary and civilian defense, even if a precondition for their enactment and preparation is that there might once, in future history, be such a thing as an attack, meaning that others are making use of their "war potential". And this also applies to an organization of civil defense in peacetime, making the country less vulnerable than it otherwise would have been.

Does it also apply to militia, to para-military forces? I would say yes, but only if it is absolutely clear that they would not easily have at their disposal the land, sea, or air transport that would extend their radius of operation beyond the limits of their own country. At this point the exercise becomes more difficult for even if a military organization does not itself possess means of transport with a sufficient radius of operation they may requisition what they need from the civilian sector. After all, during the Second World War and also in the period afterwards huge quantities of troops were transported in passenger ships, ocean cruisers, ferry boats, long-range motor boats, passenger aircraft, civilian buses and what not. How it is possible to make credible that this will not happen again is problematic. But problems are there to be solved, and one indicator of where that solution may be found is perhaps in the construction of defensive defense in such European countries as Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Albania, Sweden, Finland and Austria. All of them have these means of transportation at their disposal, all of them have troops,
also conventional military with short-range weapon systems. And yet neighbors do not seem to feel threatened to any significant extent because their war potential is embedded in a generally defensive stance.

At this point the outline of a defensive, non-provocative defense has already been given; on the one hand not provoking others, on the other hand offering a capability for effective resistance that probably also will serve as an effective deterrence at least against most possible enemies. And I would tend to feel that what has been said is entirely compatible with A9 because there is no offensive capability implied that can be used to engage in acts of belligerency, and I take those acts to be different from pure acts of self-defense.

If this, then, is a reasonable interpretation then the current focus, in the last years, on the purely quantitative measure of the Japanese military establishment in terms of whether the appropriations are below or above the magic 1% of the gross national product is highly misleading. I might even refer to it as an intellectual trap. The problem is certainly not the magnitude of the military budget, but the quality of the military establishment: can it be used offensively, or is that highly unlikely due to the nature of the military capability, regardless of what the motivation might be? I think the case can be argued that it would be much better for Japan to have a military establishment costing 2% of GNP but of a purely defensive nature than
a military establishment that can be effectively used to attack at least the much weaker neighbors in Southeast Asia and Oceania but costing only 0.5% of the GNP. But we live in a quantitative rather than a qualitative age, and the returning annual debate in Japan shows the power of figures, not the power of military doctrine and military reasoning. The 1% limitation becomes like a meager gnaw-bone thrown to the opposition to keep them busy while considerably more important things are going on elsewhere. To understand what goes on elsewhere, however, the Japanese peace movement unfortunately has to possess a minimum of military expertise, and with the generalized hostility towards the military sector this expertise is not easily forthcoming.  

With this positive interpretation of A9 I now proceed to the next and more important question: could the Japanese Constitution be used as a basis for a more complete positive peace policy? In other words, instead of deploring that the Constitution is being eroded, which it certainly is when Japan allies herself militarily with a highly aggressive and offensively equipped super-power, one might also take the Peace Constitution seriously and ask the very germane question: what would a positive peace policy look like for Japan? And that is the topic of the main section of this paper.

"We the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith for the peace-loving peoples of the world. The desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want."

(Preamble of the Constitution)

Again, these are bold words. The positive ideals to be obtained are peace, security, justice and freedom; the negative points to be avoided are tyranny, slavery, oppression, intolerance, fear and want. Others might have slightly different words and put them together in a somewhat different way; this type of comment is inconsequential. The formulation is as good as such formulations go. It is sufficiently rich and sufficiently vague and quite descriptive of a very positive world not only with absence of direct violence, but also with absence of structural violence in the form of slavery, oppression, intolerance, fear and want.
There is nothing wrong with the list of problems, or with the goals. The problem is how to get there; which are the productive, not counter-productive, processes. And one approach to answering that question would be to see peace in terms of power, and not only military power, but also economic, cultural and political power. In other words, not only the power to coerce and destroy, but also the power of contract and construction, and the cultural power of ideas and values, not to mention the political power of ultimate decision-making. Any war is abuse of power, and so is structural violence whether it takes the form of injustice, inequality, or inequity and expresses itself, in the words of the preamble, as slavery or tyranny, oppression or intolerance, fear or want. A fair amount of humankind live outside these scourges today, in and by itself a good reason for assuming that it should be possible to extend that happy state of affairs to all of us if sufficiently peace conducive policies are pursued with sufficient vigor. And here A9 may be a guide.

I think the basic building blocks of the world system today, the nation-state, will be with us for some time so any peace-thinking has to be done in terms of the nation-state. But the problem is not only that of negative peace, of making the nation-states less aggressive, but also that of positive peace, of linking them together in a cooperative manner. Instead of negative and positive peace we might also talk about passive and active peace. Positive peace politics will have to pursue both lines of action, both taming and linking nation-states.
At this point we get an eight-fold table with eight "proposals", or rather tasks, to perform based on four types of power, and the pursuit of negative as well as positive peace (see the table on the next page). What will be done here and now is to offer some comments on all eight tasks, with particular reference to the case of Japan—in all humility, as an outsider.

The first task is to implement Article 9 of the Constitution, by making sure that Japan is not in a position to wage war against other countries, not only in the sense of not using force as stated in A9, but also in the sense of not being able to threaten with the use of force. I have already dealt with this in the preceding section and will not repeat the points here. Suffice it only to say that the task splits into two. A critical analysis of the Japanese Self-defense forces, both air, land and maritime Self-defense forces, with a view to whether they can be perceived as aggressive by others is indispensable, not hiding behind A9. An important task for the peace movement would be to dialogue with the Self-defense forces, and to explore the reactions of Japan's neighbors, particularly those who in the past have suffered from Japanese militarism. A dialogue with people from Oceania and Southeast Asian nations might be extremely useful in this regard. A big country, and here it should be remembered that Japan in military expenditure is number eight in the world, may have difficulties herself understanding how aggressive she may look in spite of the limitations imposed upon Japan in post-Pacific War history.
### TABLE 1. Positive Peace Politics for Japan

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY POWER</th>
<th>Negative (passive) peace</th>
<th>Positive (active) peace</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not to make states less aggressive</td>
<td>How to tie states better together</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Defensive defense: conventional military, para-military, non-military</td>
<td>World Peacekeeping Forces</td>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>Decoupling, non-alignment</td>
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<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC POWER</th>
<th>(3) Self-Reliance I</th>
<th>(4) Self-Reliance II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-sufficiency in basic economic independence</td>
<td>Horizontal, not vertical economic interdependence; active peaceful co-existence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building down</td>
<td>Building up</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>aggressive culture;</td>
<td>positive culture;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attack Chosen People ideas (shinto)</td>
<td>unity of &quot;god-in-man-in-nature&quot;</td>
<td>(Buddhism)</td>
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| CULTURAL POWER | | POLITICAL POWER |
|----------------||----------------|
| Building down | Democracy in foreign policy; nuclear-free municipalities | |
| aggressive culture; | | Japan active for 2nd and 3rd Chamber (Assemblies) of the UN |
| attack Chosen People ideas (shinto) | | world-wide network of municipalities and other people's organizations |

(1)-(2)-(3)-(4) are elaborated in some detail in Roads to Peace and Security

There Are Alternatives:

(in English, German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian and Japanese editions)
And then there is the second aspect of this task: decoupling, non-alignment. If Japan is perceived as aggressive it may be less because of the composition of the Self-defense forces as because of the way in which Japan is integrated, particularly with the United States through AMPO, with others with a very clearly aggressive potential. A positive peace policy for Japan is, in my view, not incompatible with some kind of military security treaty organization with other countries. I am not arguing simplistically "down with AMPO", "Yankee go home". The problem is not that of having some type of military cooperation or of having foreigners, even military foreigners stationed in the country. The problem is the content of military doctrine. What are the military tasks, what kind of military capability. Even if we should be generous enough to take it for granted that the intent is defense only, maintenance of peace in a defensive way, the capability always speaks more loudly than intent. Hence, what is asked for is a total redrafting of the kind of military commitment Japan has to other countries rather than a total rejection of any such cooperation. Thus, I do not think it is necessarily negative for a country to cooperate with another country in finding out how one could make a highly defensive, completely non-provocative defense even if that should mean some exchange of military expertise and mutual stationing on each other's territory.

The second task for Japan would be the internationalization of what is just mentioned: World Peace-Keeping Forces, (WPKF), again entirely defensive, non-provocative. In Europe we need such a
force: a belt of WPKF stationed between NATO and WTO countries, kilometers deep on either side, a living fence guarding against any transgression on land. It may be argued that this is old-fashioned, that attack today would be through the air, even through outer space, not to mention on the sea, even under the sea. But in order to occupy a country land forces would nevertheless be necessary, sooner or later, so there is a definite function to be fulfilled by that living fence.

It is said that Japan cannot fulfill such a role, Japan being much too aligned to one super-power in the present world. WPKF is for the non-aligned, or possibly for the smallest and most innocuous among the aligned (such as Norway). I think it would be much more positive for Japan to cooperate with an international WPKF under the United Nations, than to cooperate with the United States under AMPO. That should be the pattern of argumentation, always coupling any negative stance with an equally strong and positive proposal. At the very least Japan should contribute heavily to financing such operations, much the same way as Japan has done for the United Nations in the field of refugees (although this also casts a dark shadow on Japan and the country's inability to let in non-Japanese and accept them in full equality with Japanese citizens--Japan suffering from a complex of national purity).

The third task for Japan would be to become more self-sufficient in basic goods and services, in other words economically more independent, or Self-Reliance I. All countries that trade much are de-
pendent. As will be pointed out in the next section this in no way means that Japan should stop trading. Rather, the idea would be to have a second, shadow economy that might be brought into action in times of crisis, being totally capable of satisfying the basic needs of the Japanese population. That means, more concretely, a Japanese capacity for self-sufficiency in food (not so easy), in clothes and housing (easy), in health and education (easy), and in energy (difficult) and arms production for a completely defensive defense (easy for Japan). The sticky points would be food production and energy conversion. And here Japan has one enormous advantage: the ocean. Japan can farm the ocean, not only for things edible in the water or on the ocean floor, but also for energy. And not only in the traditional sense of striking off-shore oil, but in the more modern, and very Japanese sense, of mining the ocean for molecules capable of producing energy, e.g. uranium.

In saying so let me immediately add my own skepticism about nuclear power as a basis for the energy supply of a nation. I think this is not only a question of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; more significantly nuclear power makes a centralizing country even more centralized by playing up to heavy bureaucracy, heavy corporations and heavy intelligentsia, with clear military and police over-and undertones. But given a choice between that and a Japan always looking for raw material resources, including energy, abroad and hence interested in maintaining trade relations even when this might be against the interests of other countries I think I would prefer nuclearization as an alternative in times of crisis. As a part of a shadow economy, in other words.
However, in no way should this be necessary for Japan. Japan has four or five other sources of energy: solar, wind, waves, geothermal, and, in addition, biomass conversion. Already today Japan is developing several of these although not as much as could be done, and with the tremendous ingenuity of the Japanese people in general and their researchers in particular—when they set their collective mind to it—I am in no doubt that great strides could be made forward.

This is important. Any nation highly dependent on trade is precisely that, highly dependent. Most frequently mentioned in the literature are countries low in technical-economical development and their dependence on the more developed countries for supplies of processed goods and technology. But these more developed countries that depend on raw materials, commodities and markets around the world are equally or even more dependent because they might have, in the process, destroyed the resource bases for satisfaction of basic needs, particularly in the field of food (using soil for buildings and roads and military purposes rather than for agriculture) and because of the famous deskilling process that sets in with higher levels of “sophistication”. Japan has become rich precisely because the country did not have raw materials, but devoted its ingenuity to the processing of raw materials from abroad, marketing the processed goods, pocketing the added value, seeing to it that foreigners did not take too much commission at any stage. That policy worked very well
for Japan since it was among the first countries to do so.\textsuperscript{18} Precisely because it worked so well most other countries would like to do the same. This will eventually put Japan on a collision course, and Japan as a consequence might like to maintain status quo, not only with political but with military means. To prevent such inclinations from becoming dominant Japan should already today conscientiously prepare for this situation. It belongs to the tasks of good political leadership to tell the population that this should be done and is being done, before rather than after it is too late.

The fourth task is the international aspect of what has just been mentioned, Self-reliance II. Of course self-sufficiency is no goal in itself. Interdependence is one of the bulwarks of peace. But to believe that there is a simple relationship between interdependence and peace\textsuperscript{19} is as naive and intellectually sloppy as to believe that there is a simple relationship between military preparation and security. Above something has been said about the different ways in which offensive and defensive "defense" works. The former threatens, and regardless of the intent will lead to arms races with those who feel threatened, and arms races have a tendency to lead to wars. The latter may not guarantee security, but it is nevertheless interesting to note that countries like Switzerland and Sweden who have practiced this kind of defense for a very long period (Switzerland far longer than Sweden) also have enjoyed considerable amounts of peace. Correspondingly we may subdivide "interdependence": the basic distinction is between horizontal or equitable interdependence and vertical
interdependence, which is also called dependency. The latter is what has been described under task three above, and it tends to lead to conflict and eventually wars of various kinds rather than to peace. The former, exchange not only for mutual benefit but for something like equal mutual benefit seems to be highly peace-building. The Nordic countries are an example of this. The European Community countries are trying to make use of that mechanism to build peace. And the six ASEAN countries are today doing the same and have been able to constitute a peace community since ASEAN was founded about 20 years ago, in itself certainly no minor achievement.

This is what Japan should be aiming for. But Japan is doing everything possible not only to be on a collision course with the United States by making the United States dependent on Japan, but even accelerating the speed with which the two countries are moving toward that collision. On the other hand, the possibilities of building peace in the relationship to the Soviet Union through a pattern of "active peaceful coexistence" (to use Soviet phraseology) are very far from fully utilized. The difficulty with that, however, would be that Japan might run the risk of making the Soviet Union dependent on herself, given the tremendous economic strength of Japan. Hence, great care has to be exercised. It is sad to note that in Japanese economic theory, at least as far as I am knowledgeable of it, nothing or very little has been done to correct the bias of
classical and neo-classical economics in general, neglecting the dimension of exploitation or inequity completely. The theory, or at least the practice, seems to know of no stop signals.

I could summarize these economic points in four statements:
Japan should prepare an adequate level of self-sufficiency; Japan should prepare for decreased trade and more equitable trade with the Third World; Japan should prepare for the same with the United States; Japan should prepare for increased trade but then making it equitable with the socialist countries. This probably means that Japan also would have to go in for a higher level of internal consumption in order to have a demand structure meeting some of the tremendous supply provided by the Japanese economic machine. Clearly, increased trade with the Second World will not compensate for decreased trade with the Third and the First, and both types of decrease are on the horizon unless Japan wants to court political, and potentially military, disaster in the longer run.

The fifth task for Japan, which can be seen in conjunction with the sixth task, would be to have a careful look at Japanese culture. This is a complex, and also a painful theme. Japanese culture is an amalgam of many strands. There is shintoism, there is Buddhism. With the reconstruction of shintoism in early Meiji as state shinto the Chosen People aspect was emphasized, combined with tennō worship and with elements of the hakkō ichiū doctrine of assembling the eight corners of the world under one roof (echoes of Emperor Hideyoshi in Baron Tanaka), and from there to the
highly concrete policies of Japanese militarism, today seen in a much more positive light, or at least less negative light, by the Japanese leadership. On the other hand there is the softness of buddhism, very much the idea of "God-in-man-in-nature"—ideas that, incidentally, can also be found in soft shintoism. Thinking and feeling along such lines would lead to doctrines of unity of man, world unity, peace all over, to ideas akin to the Preamble to the Japanese Constitution and A9. I say this in order to emphasis that A9 is certainly also rooted in Japanese culture, but so is the opposition to A9.

In fact, one could depict the Japanese as somewhat schizophrenic, suspended between the hardness of state shinto and the softness of buddhism. The confucian doctrine, which is also a part of Japanese culture, makes them behave diligently, with perseverance, discipline and zest regardless of which way they ultimately come out relative to the hard/soft divide. The schizophrenia lies in having this divide, it seems, inside the individual Japanese, not only as separate strands in the culture generally. The crysanthemum and the sword. This goes at least some distance towards explaining how a people supporting Japanese militarism could turn around and become so pacifist, and --it seems--turn around again.26
Of course, there are also strong occidental elements in the Japanese amalgam: liberalism, and although this is very much a minority position, marxism. Whatever the Japanese do they tend to do very well, whether it is a shintō colored occidental type expansionism or some type of buddhist introspection; capitalist or artisanal production.

The major conclusion in this connection would be to fight, constructively, the Chosen People aspect of shintō, the idea that the Japanese have somehow been selected by Amaterasu Okami, the Sun Goddess, today perhaps for most people a myth; yesterday something translated into reality; tomorrow? And this more negative, critical attitude to a strong strand in Japanese culture, ever more strongly expressed in the focus on the Yasukuni Shrine (also a construction of early Meiji), should be coupled with much more constructive efforts to explore the implications of buddhist faith. Much of that is already going on within the settings provided by, for instance, Soka Gakkai and Risshō Koseikai.

But this is insufficient to dampen Japanese thrusts into world space in general. Those thrusts are colored by the ethos of the castes coming out of Tokugawa, forming a formidable alliance: the shi, intelligentsia—bureaucratic—military samurai with the shō, the merchant—capitalist—corporate element. The shi-shō alliance may sometimes turn shi, military, in its outward expansionism; sometimes (for instance in the contemporary period) turn more shō, economic. The buddhist element of reconciliation with God and nature and all other human beings would be hard to detect.
With the seventh task for Japan we run immediately into the usual problem. Our political institutions in a democracy, such as parliament and cabinet, are primarily geared to domestic matters; preserving for the successors to the Prince of earlier periods, the government and particularly its inner circle, some kind of monopoly over foreign affairs in general and the military in particular. There is a strong linkage between state, military and war/peace. A democratic system of representation does not necessarily change this; people's representatives may not be strong enough to penetrate the iron ring protecting those said to take care of "national interests". Or, rather, if and when they penetrate they may be successfully co-opted—or else caught as spies.

And then, there is of course the second possibility; politicians may not want to penetrate and reveal anything since the assumption that the elites are more belligerent and the people more peaceful is a very dubious one. In some countries and under some occasions it may be easily be the other way round. In addition, if the population suffers from a Chosen People complex then they may see elites planning any kind of aggression against other peoples as simply acting out the civilizational code of that people, and not only have no objection but even fully endorse such endeavors.

Hence, the struggle for less aggressiveness in the field of political power probably has to be fought in a different way. And most important in this connection is the movement for nuclear-
free municipalities, very important as a new approach to peace politics. The significance is not only in the word, the name, that a municipality declares itself a nuclear-free zone, wholly or partly. Even more significant is the idea of people at the local level not only demanding but in fact in a sense getting some say in foreign affairs. By proclaiming the municipality a nuclear-free zone the government will have difficulty using that particular territory to manufacture, store or deploy nuclear weapons. Of course the government can force its will through, having more coercive power at its disposal than the municipalities. But people in the municipalities—if they have been adequately conscientized and mobilized and the whole matter is not merely a resolution passed by delegates in the municipal council—can respond by all kinds of non-violent resistance, making the situation troublesome for the government. In fact, so troublesome that the government may prefer to assign nuclear tasks to other municipalities. As they, by definition, will tend to be more conservative, and as nuclear arms in the nuclear age will be target number one in a possible nuclear confrontation, this means a higher exposure, and hence mortality, for conservative than for more progressive municipalities. A new linkage between domestic and foreign affairs, and a powerful one if used skillfully.

In other words, we are in the realm of real politics. The question is how to expand not only the domain of nuclear-free municipalities by adding more, but also how to expand the scope by making the movement even more meaningful. More particularly, we
might perhaps think of three possible directions for the future field of municipal foreign policy.

First, the network of such municipalities has to be strengthened. Two classical ways of doing this are both meaningful. An international organization of nuclear-free municipalities is already a reality, having meetings on a national, regional and world basis. And then there is the old idea of twinning and tripling, even quadrupling. Thus, each Japanese-free municipality could have links with one in the First World, one in the Second (socialist) World, and one in the Third World, with a view to exchanges at all levels, tourism, schools, work places of different kinds, municipal organizations and workers, the young and the old, men and women.

Second, a nuclear-free municipality might contemplate the possibility of having its own economic policy. If the nuclear option is out, for instance for energy conversion, then what else should be done? A municipality of that kind should be aware of the possibility that national governments might try to blackmail the municipality back on the nuclear track by limiting energy access. As mentioned above, Japan has more than enough of alternatives for energy, but such matters should be thought through and even put into practice before any confrontation arises. Another form of retaliation from the central government might be to deprive the municipality of military contracts, an issue that immediately raises the specter of conversion: what else do we do if the military production option is not available? All issues that could be and should be discussed
at the type of seminars organized under the auspices of the organizations mentioned in the preceding paragraph, as nuclear-free municipalities certainly would have common interests in these matters.

Third, a nuclear-free municipality might contemplate having its own defense policy. This may sound very far-fetched. But there is one aspect of defense policy that a municipality could handle very well: nonmilitary defense. In case of an attack followed by an occupation the municipality would certainly be interested in surviving intact, contributing to national defense by making the municipality as inaccessible as possible to any illegitimate power. Non-cooperation and civil disobedience; effective hiding or destruction of artifacts needed for the operation of municipal institutions in ways unacceptable to the population (for instance, indoctrination in foreign ideology, in the school system); all of that has to be thought through and to some extent organized in advance and not only in order to be more effective as a means of resistance, but also in order to deter a possible attack. Well knowing that this is far beyond the horizon of many of those who have been fighting so meaningfully for nuclear-free municipalities I nevertheless mention the point since it would contribute greatly to the erosion of the monopoly on defense held, in the present construction of the nation-state, by the center or rather the center of the center—the "inner circle" referred to above.
In short, under the heading of a more democratic foreign policy there is much more to be said than merely having a better discussion of foreign affairs in the country as a whole, and representatives in parliament able to argue, effectively, peace policies. Very much can be done in Japan simply by improving the level of the media. Thus, the level of television communication in the field of foreign affairs seems to an outsider like the present author to be extremely low in Japan. Not a question of being informed or uninformed—obviously Japanese reporters are very well informed—but more a question of language of discourse. Which are the dimensions of discussing foreign affairs, what are the options discussed and the options neglected, what kind of news are reported, what kinds are not, and so on. Much could be gained by simply having a well organized, intelligent TV channel for peace politics, of course with a broader concern than that alone, run in the public interest, highlighting other issues and making the Japanese aware of other aspects of the world surrounding them than what comes through to them through, for instance, NHK. I am not by that saying that the world of the AMP0 Magazine is the only real world. The truth is certainly not located right in the middle of NHK and AMP0, but is more a dialectical combination of these two truths. The basic point, however, is that so many Japanese seem to live in total ignorance of that other world.

Let us then move on to the eighth task of more positive peace policies in the field of political power. Any argument in favor
of a much more extensive People's Diplomacy is not necessarily an argument against governmental diplomacy. But People's Diplomacy should be seen as complementary rather than as an alternative. In practice it takes the double form of building up worldwide networks from people to people, including people at the level of the municipality as already argued, the professions, the young, women, the old, men, any kind of category.

But then there is also the more formalized, some might even say too formalized form of building a second and third chamber in the United Nations, for people's representatives, and for nongovernmental organizations. In either case Japan could be tremendously supportive. In general Japanese participation in international organizations, as mentioned above, is not very articulate. There is still the validity of the old formula SSS, sleep, silence and smile (to which could be added T, tape recording, highly compatible with the other three given the noiselessness of excellent Japanese tape recorders.

However, like for WPKF, what Japan might be unable or unwilling to articulate in the form of concrete ideas, Japan could nevertheless help support politically, and finance, like Japan did with the 18 member committee of eminent persons, coming up with a number of important suggestions for getting the United Nations out of the current crisis. As a matter of fact, Japan could go down in history as a major peacemaker in this world simply by financing a people's chamber in the United Nations, capable of accommodating politically all nations in the world, preferably through a system of direct election. With one representative per one million inhabitants perhaps
being too much, the square root of the number of millions might be a better idea, also considerably less costly!

Let us have a look at Table 1 again, and ask ourselves one question: which of these policies would be more easy and which ones more difficult for Japan to engage in? If I should come up with my own answer it would run something like this.

First, I think in general it could be argued that Japan would be better at the cooperative, international game of building positive peace than at Japan-directed, national politics of trying to make Japan less actually and potentially aggressive. Japan's diplomacy in the world is of the relatively silent variety, no big fanfare. This has advantages and disadvantages. I think Japan could enter into the concrete policies mentioned in the second column in Table 1 in a relatively noiseless way, but perhaps not be good at taking initiatives.

Second, when it comes to the concrete forms of power in which peace politics will have to be articulated I guess the easiest ones to handle—not by that saying that the tasks are not formidable even if they are the relatively easy ones—could be the military and political policies. More difficult would be any basic change in Japan's economic policy. Japan is so obviously a superb center of sophisticated manufacturing and trading in the world, starting early Meiji with high level primary sector products;
then a long phase (which is now coming towards the end) of very high level secondary sector goods; now entering the tertiary sector, the services, the "invisibles". Regardless of sector and period in national and economic history Japanese products have by and large been characterized by high quality except, perhaps, in the very initial stages when something new is launched. To trade with others on an equal basis would run up against the difficulty of finding an equal partner. On the other hand, to retool some of the Japanese economy in the direction of more self-sufficiency for basic needs should not be impossible. And, where international economic relations are concerned Japan may be helped out of her own inability to change the structure by energetic, perhaps also aggressive action by those lower down in the vertical division of labor Japan is mastering with such a talent.

However, I would assume the cultural task to be the most difficult one. In the Japanese case this would not only be a problem of getting out of this peculiar mix of inferiority and superiority complexes that has been characterizing the nation for quite a long time, but also a question of regarding such transformations as not only meaningful but also necessary if a country wants to be a member in good standing of the international community. Japan is certainly not alone in being in the need of this kind of transformation. The United States and the Soviet Union, and France, and later on, in a sense, also China would be other examples. But that does not make the task less urgent for the Japanese. No doubt,
the transformation will be painful and it is not easily seen how some charismatic leader can stand up in Japan, announcing this as his mission without becoming a non-leader immediately. No doubt the task has to be carried out with extreme tactfulness, with a delicacy that only Japanese can master.

In this general menu of eight tasks, proposals, peace policies one may wonder: is there a minimum set of proposals? Again, returning to Table 1, I could argue in favor of the string (1)-(2)-(3)-(4); the four roads to peace and security discussed in my book *There Are Alternatives*. No cultural critique of basic aspects of Japan are required, no restructuring of domestic or international machinaries for decision-making. No World Peace-Keeping forces. The focus would be on what Japan could do herself:

(1) Change in military doctrine towards a defensive, non-provocative defense;

(2) A gradual decoupling from the dependence on the US, including the "nuclear umbrella", without developing nuclear arms of her own;

(3) Development of the Japanese economy so as to be able to sustain the basic livelihood of Japan in times of crisis;

(4) A trade configuration that is both more equitable, and more symmetrically distributed around the world.

Difficult? Perhaps; but absolutely possible.
3. The Peace Politics Triangle

Having read the preceding section the reader might think: interesting proposals, but how do we get from where we are right now in Japan to that kind of concrete peace politics? I think there is very little in concrete terms an outsider can say about this except giving some impressions. In doing so I shall make use of the figure below, a "peace politics triangle:"

FIGURE 1. Towards Synergy in the Peace Politics Triangle

The three corners in the triangle stand for the peace movement, peace research and political carriers. In a parliamentary democracy this would generally refer to political parties: a single party; a possible peace coalition of parties; factions within parties, and in the latter case particularly in the governing party. In a presidential democracy the political carrier might be one of the presi-
dent's advisers or in general people in the circle around him; political parties playing less of a role as a channel. In single party systems such as the socialist countries a combination of some of the approaches mentioned above would be meaningful.

In general terms what is needed for peace politics would be not only to strengthen all three corners in the triangle, but also the bilateral relations between them and above all the interaction among all three corners so that some synergy can emerge meaning a whole that is more than the sum of the three parts, and more of the sum of the three bilateral interactions. Let us try to spell out in more concrete terms what this might mean.

Obviously, the peace movement should grow and should contribute to peace research and to the political carriers by constantly challenging them to do much better what is in their power to do. The peace movement is certainly in its right to demand from peace researchers not only empirical data about past policies that were peace productive or peace counter-productive, and critical analysis of the present in light of data from the past and peace values. They should also demand constructive visions for the future; highly concrete proposals in addition to more general outlines. They should be clients, and masters, and debate partners of the peace research community at the same time. A difficult combination.

And exactly the same goes for their relationship to the political carriers, in the Japanese case mainly political parties
such as Japan's Socialist Party and Kōmeitō, but also factions within the LDP. What this calls for is dialogue. Any definition _a priori_ of all of these people in the political establishment as hopeless, beyond redemption, will not facilitate any dialogue, meaning that some common ground has to be found. One useful approach here, in debates, is to start exploring what the dialogue partners have in common rather than what keeps them apart so as to construct some basis for joint exploration of future policies.

The peace research community should of course also grow, and keep a good dialogue relationship both to the peace movement and to the political carriers. Peace researchers should deliver what is demanded of them in terms of both empirical, critical and constructive analyses. This is difficult, so one simple reason why not so much comes out of the peace research community may not be so much lack of good will as lack of ability. Traditionally researchers are trained in the first of these three tasks, empirical analysis, leaving critical analysis to political movements such as the peace movement and constructive analysis to policy makers, the political carriers. My point is that for synergy to emerge the peace researchers have to stretch out into all three fields at the same time, for dialogues among themselves, with the peace movement and with the political carriers.

A warning here: it seems absolutely mandatory that the peace researcher remains a peace researcher. Nothing is gained
if he gives up his most precious right: to remain an intellectual, always capable of asking critical questions, not only of his actual or potential clients in the peace movement and among the political carriers in all political parties, but also of himself. The moment he sees himself as an uncritical servant of the peace movement, accepting all premises of the movement, or of political parties, or of ministries of foreign affairs and defense, delivering the premises for conclusions already drawn he is no longer an intellectual, but a functionary. I do not know whether this is better or worse than the other way in which he can go wrong, by perceiving the peace movement and/or the political carriers as so stupid (because they do not accept his theories?) that they are not worthy of any dialogue. For sure, both attitudes are recipes for negative synergy, getting much less out of the triangular relationship than should be possible.

The political carriers should of course also be strengthened. They should demand a positive peace policy of the government. If the government has difficulty delivering one in the short term the obvious demand would be to ask them for a long term peace policy by saying something like this: "Ok, right now the situation as you perceive it leads you to a policy of armament. But how do you want to get out of that situation? How do you want, in the longer run, to construct a peace community in the world of nations in general and this region in particular? What is your long term goal?" Governments will tend to reject such questions as hypothetical yet many governments do not shun away from long term planning in an equally
uncertain field, national not to mention world economy.

The political carriers should serve as political watchdogs, inside their parties; and in coalition or alone over the party in government. In so doing they would feel stronger if they have an active, vocal peace movement backing them with roots deep down in the population in general; and a critical, highly competent, participatory peace research community always ready with good proposals. But both of them are independent of the political carriers and not their tools, meaning that their cooperation cannot be taken for granted.

From the peace movement comes, above all, the moral commitment, the thrust away from policies with belligerent over- and undertones towards peace policies. From the peace research movement comes the expertise. From the political carriers comes the potential for concrete decision-making. But there is more in the society than these three forces, and somehow they should also enter the picture. Thus, to stick to the four types of power given in the preceding section: there is also military power, economic power and cultural power. Japan would do well to do what the European and the North American peace movements have been doing lately: to develop good relations with people in the military, even if they are mainly retired officers, in order to understand better how the military functions, to benefit from their ideas and be able to enter into a broader dialogue. The same certainly goes for relations to economic organizations, not only on the employer side but also on the employee side, the trade unions. Any policy has its economic aspects.
Any actor on the national and international scene will immediately ask the proverbial American question "What is in it for me? Will I again, will I lose?" Their anxieties or hopes will have to be discussed critically, and constructive solutions will have to be found to all possible problems—much of this well-known under the heading of "conversion". At this point I am not so sure that much should be promised in terms of conversion from military to civilian production. Maybe the debate should rather be in terms of conversion from offensive military to defensive military. But since the latter is by and large less capital intensive and more labor intensive than the former there should be considerable savings economically and gains in terms of employment.

Then there is the relationship to cultural power of all kinds, to all those dealing in one way or the other with values, ideas, arts and sciences, culture in the broadest sense. The deeper problem is that of building peace as a value into their concerns. Thus, take the case of universities: how much could not have been obtained if each faculty, each department saw as one of its tasks to develop the peace dimension within that particular field? Where, for instance, is the mathematics of peace as opposed to the mathematics of arms races, or cost-benefit analyses of how to inflict unacceptable damage to an enemy, and so on? Is there something in mathematics itself, for instance its cult of contradiction-free systems that might be inimical to peace? If the latter is seen as a very complex system, with all kinds of contradictions in all kinds of directions, rather than as a perfect, but for that reason also
sterile and vulnerable structure? This is not so far-fetched as it may sound as almost all research at our universities during the last one or two centuries has been geared directly and indirectly towards economic growth. Why not towards peace growth?

In short, there is more than enough to do. And the situation in Japan at present is not at all that good from the point of view of positive peace politics. The peace movement is quantitatively large, but suffers from two major weaknesses. First, there is the well-known split in the movement, almost paralyzing the movement as an effective force, between those opposed to nuclear arms of all political colors and those more opposed to some than to others. But second, and even more importantly since this factor might apply even if the first factor had been effectively overcome: the single-minded concentration on the effects of nuclear weapons. We are grateful to the Japanese movement for bringing the horrors of the US genocide in Hiroshima and Nagasaki into the world, as a part of human consciousness—in the form of the impressive manifestations in August each year, and, to mention one important single contribution: the exhibitions organized by Soka Gakkai, now circling the world. Due to this movement we know much better than we otherwise might have done that the effects last, from one generation to the next in various ways, that a nuclear attack is not only a bomb exploding but also a time bomb with delayed destruction and suffering—for how long we still do not know.
But this message is by now to a large extent well-known. While not denying the significance of continuing keeping the message alive I think a certain over-concentration has paralyzed the Japanese peace movement in its equally significant tasks of providing constructive analysis for today and tomorrow. There is also another aspect to this point: Hiroshima-Nagasaki becomes like a commodity, something marketed by the peace movement community around the world. Since there is a supply there is the assumption that there is also a demand—and a demand there is, but perhaps not quite to the level of the supply. This is the condition under which the price of the commodity goes down and I think that is what has happened. Something cheap has come into the dissemination of information about Hiroshima-Nagasaki. It is all suffering, little analysis of what brought the suffering about, and not much about how it could be avoided for the future beyond the rather simplistic "Total disarmament now" and "Yankee go home". This is all very clear from the declarations that come with annual regularity each August: testimony to suffering, no analysis, no viable proposals.

Then, the political carriers: maybe small political parties in opposition become conservative when they stay for too many years together with a conservative party that seems to be permanently in power. Maybe they take on the color of the environment. At least, I am not that impressed with what comes out: clinging to the 1% mark as if this were the only dimension of the military system and being against "SDI" without any analysis of what "SDI", more
properly called Star Wars, is about; to take two examples. I sense no projection of alternatives, of what a peaceful world or a peaceful region could look like in terms of constructive policies. As a matter of fact I often have a feeling that the party in government has more to offer in this respect only that the LDP party at the same time favors policies with belligerent over-and undertones.

And then, in conclusion: the Japanese peace research community. The community is about twenty-five years old and consists of many remarkable researchers. Yet it is also remarkable how little has come out of the community in terms of concrete policy proposals. Elsewhere I have argued that the strength of the Japanese intellectual style in the social sciences seems to be neither in the philosophical foundation, nor in theory formation, nor in constructive proposal-making but rather in collection of data, critical analysis and, above all, in commentaries on what other researchers do. No doubt this is an unjust comment in some cases, but as a general characterization I think it holds. In that case what is needed would be for the Japanese peace research community to address itself much more to the constructive task of peace-making even if that should bring the researcher out of his reliance on concrete data, or concrete literature, and more into real theory-formation and creative thinking about alternative policies. I am not necessarily saying that peace researchers in Europe and North America are that much better at this; but some difference there is, and not in favor of Japanese peace research.
In fact, if there have been some gains recently in the way in which peace policies are discussed in Europe this is probably above all due to the synergy in the peace politics triangle. Peace researchers have taken their commitment to the peace movement seriously while at the same time retaining their special position as peace researchers. The peace movement has been willing and able to discuss concrete policies even if they may conflict with some of their more deeply held beliefs of a more moralistic and ideologically pure—if also simplistic—nature. And the political carriers have been listening, above all because there is a growth in green and peace parties (particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany) which has inspired the social democratic and labor parties to change positions they have had for almost forty years. In the wake of all of this something interesting has appeared: the new defense policies of the Labour Party in England and the social democratic party in Germany, relatively clearly based on defensive defense, some degree of decoupling from the western super-power and more opening towards the eastern super-power. Of the fourth road to peace and security as I see it, inner strength also economically speaking, I have seen nothing so far.

This type of policy will hardly go down well with the voters in the coming elections. It is quite a break with the past we would certainly not expect a success to be immediate. But sometime in the 1990s something like this will happen, and when it happens we would like Japan to be a major participant!