THE BASIC NEEDS APPROACH *
by Johan Galtung

Why a Basic Needs Approach?

From the very beginning let it be stated unambiguously: a basic needs approach (BNA) is not the approach to social science in general or development studies in particular, but one approach. There are others. They may focus on structures (particularly of production/consumption patterns of any type of goods and services), processes (e.g., of how the structures change over time), and on how structure and process are constrained and steered by culture and nature; just to mention some examples. In more classical approaches there is also heavy emphasis on actors, their strategic games in cooperation and conflict, their motivations and capabilities. Nor is it assumed that one can pick any one of these approaches at will; they are probably all (and more could be added) rather indispensable for a rich picture of the human condition. The only thing that is assumed in the following is that a BNA, although not sufficient, is at least necessary; that a basic needs approach or its equivalent in other terminologies, is an indispensable ingredient of development studies.°

To justify this position we shall make use of two arguments, one negative and one positive.

The negative argument would be based on the futility of other approaches as the single or dominant approach, because they fail to make development human. It is then assumed that 'development studies' is not simply the study of social processes; that somewhere in 'development studies' there is an
assumption of goal-directedness, of an arrow other than physical time itself. There is a sense of better and worse, if not of good and bad, not to mention perfectly good and perfectly bad. It is not the study of blind processes, but of 'development.' No doubt this is an expression of the idea of progress. It may be that after some time it will be given up; for instance, because later generations will come to the conclusion that there is no such thing as progress, not regress either, that processes just are. What matters is human self-realization, liberation, not external processes alone.

But as long as the object of study is development, it matters what the primary unit of development is. And this is where the negative argument enters: one may define better or worse structures (e.g., more or less participatory, autonomous), institutions (e.g., more or less powerful or deficient nation-states), production (e.g., with more or less output, and better or worse output/input ratios), distribution (e.g., more or less egalitarian, more or less socially fair), culture (e.g., more or less endogenous), and nature (e.g., more or less ecologically balanced). But, when taken as developmental goals these tend to become bene per se. They become reified, and countless are the sacrifices that are demanded in their name. A developmental process, then, is seen as based on one perspective but carrying other changes in their wake, like the liberal promise that production will ultimately bring goods and services, and social stability to all, or the marxist promise that structural transformations, particularly from capitalism to socialism, will ultimately do the same. In the name of a-human theory considerable anti-human crime can be committed.

Pitted against this stands the single and clear idea that development is development of human beings, because 'human beings are the measure of all things.' This does not mean that one cannot talk about development of other things than human beings, but only if changes in these 'things' can be shown to be means related to the development of human beings. If this is not the case, reification will set in, what should be seen as
means after some time attains goal character. Instead of difficult, complex, ever changing, very often dissatisfied, contradictory human beings, infinitely diverse, manifold, and volatile "development" escapes into production and distribution patterns, institution building and structural transformation, cultural 'aspects' and natural balances. All of them are complex, but not that intractable, among other reasons because being humans ourselves, we know something about how complicated we are, and can simplify the task for ourselves by studying something else. We also know that human beings can protest against the images developed of them, against labeling in terms of better and worse. Production and distribution patterns, institutions and structures, culture and nature are abstractions without minds; they do not mind how they are defined.7

Thus, the negative argument is based on the futility of other approaches, not because they are not feasible, but because they are not valid—neither theoretically, nor practically. Indeed, pragmatically they often lead to anti-human practices because there is no built-in guarantee that such development really aims at improving the condition of human beings. We may be free to have the intuition that democracy is better than dictatorship, socialism better than capitalism, and that democratic socialism (not the same as social democracy) may be the best of them all; but how do we know? They all refer to social formation, not to human beings. To assume that human beings develop inside them is like assuming that inside a beautiful house there must by necessity be beautiful people. We know already very well today that inside a rich country there may be very poor people, inside a democratic country very often authoritarian relationships, inside a socialist country very capitalist ways of doing things, etc. In short, these other approaches are futile not only because they make development studies too easy by dodging the real issues. They may also lead to most dangerous development practices that ultimately serve only the interest of those managing the 'things' singled out as the objects undergoing development: the production managers, distribution bureaucrats,
revolutionary leaders, institution-builders, nature conservers, and culture preservers.

The basic needs approaches constitute one answer to this type of dilemma, and this is where the positive argument starts.

The expression, 'a fully developed human being' may have no precise meaning; and that may be just as good, for if such a being existed, he or she would in all likelihood either be rather arrogant or be lifted by admirers onto a pedestal from which the arrogance of power, as well as the power of arrogance, might be exercised. There is no reason to believe that such human beings would be different from countries producing development theories according to which they themselves are 'developed'. In fact, it may be argued that development criteria should be so manifold that they will never all be satisfied so that nobody or nothing can stand out with a claim to perfection. However, we may still know something about what it is not to be developed as a human being, and one approach here would be to say 'when basic human needs are not satisfied'.

Development, then would be seen as a process progressively satisfying basic human needs, where the word 'progressively' would stand for both 'more and more need-dimensions' and 'at higher and higher levels'. When saying 'more and more' and 'higher and higher', it is not assumed that there are no upper limits to the number of basic needs dimensions or the level of satisfaction; both will be seen as finite, as having (highly flexible and variable) maxima. But there are also minima to the number of need dimensions and the level of satisfaction, and current approaches tend to look in that direction.  

In the pages to follow some of the perplexing and difficult, but also highly interesting and fruitful problems connected with BNA will be discussed. At this point let it only be said that other approaches for conceiving of human development should be explored. Thus, there are concepts of psychological development where such terms as 'maturity' would play an important
role. Such approaches become, however, psychologistic in the same way as production-oriented approaches are economistic: they tend to focus on non-material, mental aspects of the human being only. The insights gained may be necessary, but not sufficient. What is needed are very rich, many-dimensional and many-faceted, views of human beings, ranging from the most material to the most non-material aspects. As far as we know, the basic needs approaches are the only ones that bring that entire range of aspects under the same conceptual umbrella.

What is a Basic Human Need?

The following observations should mainly be seen as semantic, dealing with the use of language. However, there is nothing innocent in semantic discussions, they always touch the substance matter, so when the task is to come to grips with the expression 'basic human need', more than the regulation of language is involved.

A need should be distinguished from a want, a wish, a desire, a demand. The latter are subjectively felt and articulated, they may express needs, but they also may not, and there may be needs that are not thus expressed. Thus, there is no assumption that people are conscious of all of their needs. It makes perfect sense to talk about the need for freedom of a person born into slavery, knowledgeable of nothing else, as it may make sense to talk about the need for creativity of a person born into the routine jobs of 'modern' society, knowing nothing else. Correspondingly, it is well known that we may want, wish, desire, demand something that is not really needed in the sense of being necessary. Necessary for what? For the person to be a human person, and this is, of course, where the difficulties start.

Thus, one aspect of 'need' is tied to the concept of necessity, which means that we have an image of what is necessary to be human, or at least of what it is to be non-human.
Moreover, we shall claim that there is something universal to this image. This does not mean that a list of needs can be established, complete with minima and maxima, for everybody at all points in social time and social space as the universal list of basic human needs. The claim is much more modest: that it does make sense to talk about certain classes of needs, such as "security needs," "welfare needs," "identity needs," and "freedom needs," to take the classification that will be used here, and postulate that in one way or the other human beings everywhere and at all times have tried and will try to come to grips with something of that kind, in very different ways. It may even be fruitful to look for needs in the least common denominator of what human beings are striving for: if one were capable of making lists of what everybody at any time had wanted, as inferred from words and deeds, from conscious and unconscious wishes—and they would be many lists indeed—then there would be a certain overlap. That overlap would be a guide to (basic) needs.

When we say "something universal" this applies to the needs, not to the satisfiers; they may vary even more than the needs. Moreover, there is no assumption that needs can universally be satisfied. There are, as is rather well known, needs that cannot be met because of some empirical scarcity—even needs held by the same person. And there are needs, like a possible "need to dominate," "need to be dominated," "need to be more educated/healthy than my neighbor," "positional needs" that cannot be met by everybody for logical reasons. But the needs language should be open also to such relational and relative needs, not only to absolute needs that define the level of satisfaction in an individual without reference to other individuals—and be open to needs that are morally unapplauded (like the "need to dominate").

Let us then proceed to the second term from the end in the expression 'basic human needs': human. Our concern is with human needs, and by that is meant needs that are located, if not necessarily perceived, in individual human beings. The need-
subject is an individual, but that does not mean that the
satisfier, the 'things' necessary in order to meet or satisfy
the needs, are in the individual or can be met by the indi-
vidual alone, without a social context. The problem is that
the term 'need' is also used for non-subjects; there is talk
about 'national needs' (for prestige of a country), 'social
needs' (e.g., for a good urban sewage disposal system), and
'group needs' (e.g., for a place to meet, to be together).
The argument here would certainly not be that there are no
necessary conditions for these social entities or actors to
function, but that the term 'need' will only be used with
reference to need-subjects, and the only subjects we know of
in human affairs are individual human beings. It is only in
them that the "click of correspondence" between need and sat-
isfier can be experienced. That these individual human beings
develop their need consciousness in a social context and that
most of them have most of their needs satisfied in a social
context does not change the circumstance that groups, cities,
and countries do not have minds in which needs can be reflected
and even articulated. On the contrary, the usual experience is
-- and this brings in the negative argument from the preceding
section-- that such 'collective needs' usually express wishes
and wants, the desires and demands of the ruling elites in
these collectivities, more or less poorly disguised.

Then, the term 'basic'. It serves to qualify further the
notion of a need as a necessary condition, as something that has
to be satisfied at least to some extent in order for the need-
subject to function as a human being. Again, one should avoid
too clearly defined positive images of what that means, not
only to discourage the arrogance of being 'developed', but also
because such images might define development too much as a
point, rather than negatively as a region, as the opposite of
'non-development', thereby permitting diversity. Consequently,
when a basic human need is not satisfied some kind of fundamen-
tal disintegration will take place. This is not an obscurium
per obscurius definition, for we know at least something about
fundamental forms of disintegration. At the individual level they show up in the form of mortality and morbidity, the latter divided into the two interrelated categories of somatic and mental diseases. However, even if needs are seen as individual, the disintegration resulting from deficient need satisfaction may not necessarily show up in the individual, or be classified as such. They may also show up elsewhere, for instance as social disintegration. After all, there is no argument that the social context is not a major source of need satisfaction (if this term means the same as 'man-made environment', then the other source would, by definition, be nature); hence, it would not be strange if disintegration would first be registered at this level.

Two relatively clear types of social disintegration can now be identified, using the metaphores of freezing and boiling: on the one hand, the society that suffers from lack of participation, from apathy, withdrawal; on the other hand, the society that suffers from over-activity, mutiny, revolt. Disintegration must be used positively as a social force, for instance, by revolutionary forces--a possibility not explained by classical functionalists--and illness may be a source of personal renewal. Just as for individual biological death social disintegration may not necessarily be bad, it may put an end to something that no longer is viable. But both are signs of disintegration. Whether societies disintegrate because individual human needs are not sufficiently satisfied or the societies are incapable of satisfying them because they are disintegrating is less interesting. The two would probably be part of the same process, and from our point of view social disintegration is an indicator (as opposed to a cause or an effect) of insufficient satisfaction of basic human needs in concrete historical situations.

All that has been said in this section now amounts to one thing: although we do not want to be rigid in the conception of needs, one should not be totally free in the use of this term either. If a person says 'I disintegrate unless I am permitted to starve', one might accept starving as a way of meeting other needs (for a sense of meaning in life, a sense of faith in one's
own tenacity), but if it means 'starving to death', it might not be seen as a way of becoming more human. No doubt all of this raises the important problem of who are to be judges of what constitutes basic human needs if the person himself or herself is not considered sufficiently capable of judging --and we shall have something to say about that later.

Conclusion: the way we have defined it, needs = basic human needs; for needs are (1) human, (2) basic. For other concepts other terms should be used.

Towards a Typology of Basic Human Needs

So far we have touched upon a distinction between material and non-material human needs, preferring 'non-material' to the term 'immaterial' because of the connotation 'unimportant' also carried by the latter expression. There are at least two ways of trying to clarify this distinction, one relating to the need-subjects, one to the satisfiers.

Thus, there is a tradition, and it is not Western in general nor Cartesian in particular, to distinguish between the bodies and minds of persons, and correspondingly between somatic and mental (spiritual) needs. One of the difficulties with this, of course, is that mind and body are related. Thus, the satisfaction that derives from eating food, even unappetizing food and in an environment devoid of good company and esthetic pleasures, is it really merely somatic? Of course, there are digestive processes that perhaps may be referred to as merely somatic, but there is also a feeling of hunger abatement, of increasing satisfaction that, if not spiritual, at least is mental (whatever being the exact borderline between the two). What about sex, is it 'merely somatic' (the word 'physical' is often used in this connection with 'love' presumably on the other end of the somatic/mental/spiritual ladder)--or is it rather that the somatic/mental dichotomy and the desire to clas-
sify something as one or the other is in itself responsible for a view of sex as somatic, and love as mental/spiritual?

Conversely, is a feeling of togetherness or an esthetic experience merely mental, or could it be that it does something to our body that, although unknown to us, could be as important as what good food and good sex do to our souls? In short, it does not look as if the body/mind distinction serves as a good guide here. 22

A distinction based on satisfiers is not unproblematic either. It is relatively clear what is held to be material satisfiers: military or police hardware, food, clothes, shelter, medical hardware, schooling hardware, communication/transportation hardware. All these objects are scarce, ultimately due to the finiteness of nature, so that they obey the principle 'if you have more, I have less, and vice versa'. In that sense they are economic objects, for economics can be seen as the social science discipline dealing with how human beings produce, distribute, and consume scarce objects (or with scarce components).

Then, there are clearly non-material satisfiers, and the major example would be social structures or arrangements. But it is not quite as simple as that. To enjoy togetherness, proximity is needed if one's needs are not met by telecommunication; to enjoy loneliness, geographical distance may not be absolutely necessary, but it is helpful, and certainly sufficient (provided one avoids telecommunication). Both can be referred to as 'human settlement patterns' and put in the category of 'structural arrangements'. But whereas the former does not require much geographical territory, the latter does, and geographical territory is scarce, given the finiteness of our globe. Hence, if I benefit from a certain geographical isolation as a Norwegian, somebody else, in the densely-populated Netherlands, in Hong Kong, may benefit less (but they may not define it as a problem; their taste may be different). Correspondingly vertical and horizontal social structures 23 are social arrangements and as such non-material, but human beings themselves being material have to have some kind of material embodiment. Thus, although a beta-
structure involves relatively few people, its horizontality can only be meaningful if they interact with each other relatively frequently, for instance, in the form of having meetings; and for meetings to take place there has to be a physical 'somewhere', a house, a room, some place under a tree. And that somewhere can also be used for some other purpose. There seems always to be material constraints somewhere, and hence some opportunity costs.

Then, how would one classify human beings? It may be argued that it is not my wife who is a "satisfier," but her love, both her capacity to love and to be loved, and that has to do with some expression in her eyes, the tone of her voice, the feeling of when we look at a full Easter moon together. It is hard to refer to all of this as material, but it certainly does obey the principle that "if I have more of it, somebody else has less." It may be objected that if I have more capacity to love or to be loved, that does not mean that somebody else has to have less of either, and this may be very true and very important; yet I may be less interested in love in general than in love in particular. That there is a scarcity principle involved here, most human beings who live and have lived, and very much of human literature can testify to. In short, there is some scarcity in the non-material sphere, too.

Does that mean that one should simply give up this distinction? No, it is terribly important as a reminder, and its validity does not stand or fall with our ability to clarify it here and now. Nor is it so important that the distinction is so clear: something like "a material need requires for its satisfaction clearly material satisfiers; if the satisfiers are not, or only partly material, the need should rather be seen as non-material" will do. This, however, should not make us lose sight of the type of insights arrived at above as to how interrelated these categories are because it leads to deeper insights in the relation between needs and satisfiers.

So much for that distinction; then the social context referred to frequently in the preceding section. Like the needs
The satisfiers do not fall from heaven, and they do not exist from eternity to eternity; they are produced in and by a social context and are dependent on that context. Since any social context can be looked at in at least two ways, as a set of actors, and as a structure, it may make sense to distinguish between actor-dependent and structure-dependent needs. Thus, an actor-dependent need would be one where the satisfaction depends on the motivation and capacity of some actor to meet or impede the satisfaction; a structure-dependent need would have the level of satisfaction more built into the social structure itself, as an automatic consequence, not dependent on the motivations and capabilities of particular actors. To this could be added a third category: nature-dependent. For social analysis, however, we shall take that one for granted and be more interested in how actors and structures, in other words the social context, impede or meet needs over and above what nature yields. An earthquake kills and maims, but particularly in the lower classes with the poorest houses; a floodwave hits and destroys, but mostly those who live on the waterfront, unprotected by adequate dams—as two examples of how structures work.

The following very tentative typology, giving four classes of needs, is based on the two distinctions made above:

| TABLE 1 |
| A TYPOLOGY OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| Dependent on actors | Dependent on structures |
| Material | SECLUSION (violence) | WELFARE (misery) |
| Non-material | FREEDOM (repression) | IDENTITY (alienation) |

It is readily seen that the distinction actor-dependent vs. structure-dependent is also highly problematic. Thus, take the case of security: there is some military and police hardware that is related to security; one reason for classifying it as a material need. No doubt insecurity may also stem from the
evil motivations of capable actors. But then security may also be highly structure-dependent, be something provided for by a structure which makes the members more able to resist any attack, violently and non-violently. And insecurity may also stem from structures, e.g., from exploitative relations between groups in general and societies in particular. And then both factors may be operating together, as they usually are: the structures produce the 'evil' actors, and those actors make use of bad structures.

Nevertheless, the typology may serve as a rule of thumb, as some kind of guide, at least sensitizing us to some problems in connection with satisfiers and need satisfaction. When people starve, for instance, it is usually not traceable to strong actors with a motivation to kill through starvation (except during a siege), but to structures distributing the fruits of nature and human production unevenly. The same applies to alienation: it is generally a non-intended rather than an intended effect of the workings of the social context. But repression is different: at least the forms reflected in human rights are highly actor-dependent (although also structure-conditioned). In fact, the human rights can be seen as norms directed by some norm producers (e.g., internal bodies) to some key actors (usually people in governmental, executive positions) to the effect that they shall not impede the freedom of their citizens.

As mentioned, the four types in Table 1 stand for classes of needs. For one effort to spell them out in a way that may be particularly relevant for rich, industrialized countries see next page. Some comments are necessary, but this is not the place to go into any detail. First of all, in line with what has been said above: although it is claimed that the four classes of needs have a certain universality about them, this list is by no means a universal list. Similar lists could be imagined for other types of need-subjects, and even within the category 'rich industrialized countries' variations will be tremendous. However, as mentioned: this is not the list, it is one
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A LIST OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS—AS WORKING HYPOTHESIS</td>
<td>Satisfiers held to be relevant in some societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY NEEDS (survival needs) — to avoid violence</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- against individual violence (assault, torture)</td>
<td>POLICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- against collective violence (wars, internal, external)</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WELFARE NEEDS (sufficiency needs) — to avoid misery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for nutrition, water, air, sleep</td>
<td>FOOD, WATER, AIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for movement, excretion</td>
<td>CLOTHES, SHELTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for protection against climate, environment</td>
<td>MEDICAL TREATMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for protection against diseases</td>
<td>LABOR-SAVING DEVICES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for protection against excessive strain</td>
<td>SCHOOLING</td>
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<tr>
<td>- for self-expression, dialogue, education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IDENTITY NEEDS (needs for closeness) — to avoid alienation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for self-expression, creativity, praxis, work</td>
<td>JOBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for self-actuation, for realizing potentials</td>
<td>JOBS + LEISURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for well-being, happiness, joy</td>
<td>RECREATION, FAMILY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for being active and subject, not being passive, client, object</td>
<td>RECREATION, FAMILY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for challenge and new experiences</td>
<td>RECREATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for affection, love, sex; friends, spouse, offspring</td>
<td>PRIMARY GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for roots, belongingness, support, esteem; association with similar humans</td>
<td>SECONDARY GROUPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for understanding social forces; for social transparence</td>
<td>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for partnership with nature</td>
<td>NATURAL PARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for a sense of purpose, of meaning with life; closeness to the transcendental, transpersonal</td>
<td>RELIGION, IDEOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREEDOM NEEDS (freedom to; choice, option) — to avoid repression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice in receiving and expressing information and opinion</td>
<td>COMMUNICATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice of people and places to visit and be visited</td>
<td>TRANSPORTATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice in consciousness-formation</td>
<td>MEETINGS, MEDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice in mobilization</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION, PARTIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice in confrontations</td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice of occupation</td>
<td>LABOR MARKET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice of place to live</td>
<td>MARRIAGE MARKET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice of spouse</td>
<td>(SUPER-) MARKET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- choice of goods/services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- choice of way of life</td>
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list and can be used as a working hypothesis, as a point of departure to see what kind of consequences follow from that particular perspective.

As to the various comments that can be made, the following is sufficient for the present purpose. The list no doubt has a Western bias—and may be of some use as a check list to discuss problems of Western societies. There is certainly no assumption that the satisfiers to the right really meet the needs—they may do so in a way, up to a certain point. The hypothesis is that they are held to meet the needs. It should also be pointed out that these needs are posited; there is no systematic empirical research behind them. They are included here as an example of a need-set to facilitate discussions. Such discussions have a tendency to become overly abstract unless there are examples to refer to. Thus, there is definitely no universal pretense behind this list—if it should be used as a base line for exploring how societies function, it would be from the point of view of this need-set, postulated from the outside. Whether that is a meaningful procedure can hardly be decided a priori. One way of testing it would be by also carrying out the opposite process: exploring Western society by means of non-Western need-lists. So we leave it, with the hope that it can stimulate a debate.

Is There a Hierarchy of Needs?

In most literature about needs there is an explicit or implicit assumption of a general hierarchy of needs. Usually, there is a distinction putting some of the "physiological" or "animal"—in general very somatic or material—needs at the bottom of the hierarchy, and mental or spiritual needs—in our terms identity needs and freedom needs—higher. The thesis may be seen as an axiological thesis (the higher needs are higher in the sense that they are less shared with animals, for instance), as an empirical thesis (the lower needs are pursued, in fact), or as a normative thesis (the lower needs should be
satisfied first before attention is given to the higher needs).

Any such thesis is dangerous because it limits the range of possibilities that should be opened by any good theory of needs. As such these theses constitute threats not only to cultural diversity but also to human diversity within cultures, and throughout any individual human being's life cycle. Thus, the idea that non-material needs are "higher" than material needs can be seen as a way of legitimizing the position given to intellectuals in many societies, and to ascetics as sacred or holy in some societies, presumably specialists or specializing in non-material needs. As such their lives seem to be built around higher needs, should that not also give rise to a higher position? (The latter not necessarily meaning a more materially rewarded position--intellectuals also seem to get that--but a position of particular esteem). As theories about needs are more likely to be formulated by intellectuals than by non-intellectuals, the point is worth considering, e.g., as reflected in utopias.

This does not apply so much to the hierarchy thesis as an empirical thesis: if it can be ascertained empirically that people in fact do pursue material needs first and then non-material ones, even under conditions where they cannot be said to be forced to do so, then this is an important consideration. However, the basic point would be that as an empirical thesis this is certainly not a generally valid rule about human behavior. People are willing to suffer both violence and misery--including the sacrifice of their own lives--in struggles for identity and freedom. What is a general rule might be the possibility that the thesis is valid at an extremely low level of material satisfaction: that in utter deprivation (hunger to the point of starving, thirst, exposure to pain inflicted by nature or by human beings, not permitted excretion or basic sanitation, no possibility of moving, suffocation, "starving" for sex) priorities are clear. These are the cases where the epithet "animal behavior" is often applied--and reference is made to extreme behavior under, for instance, concentration camp situa-
There is no denial that a rock-bottom basic physiology of human beings exists which--under what we are used to seeing as extreme situations--would seem to steer completely human behavior. But this is not the same as saying:

(1) that all human beings first pursue the satisfaction of these needs to a maximum, or at least very far, before any attention is given to other needs; under all circumstances;

(2) that other needs, "non-material needs," cannot be given immediate attention at least after extreme material deprivation has been overcome; or that they are not there all the time only that they are overshadowed by the activity to overcome material deprivation; nor

(3) that all human beings have the same minimum borders, the same floors where deprivation is concerned. It is assumed that some cultures and some individuals can stand physiological deprivation much better than others, that the thresholds are much lower, in other words, whether this is the result of conscious training and practice or not. 33, 34

It is the normative thesis that is the most dangerous one as seen from diversity. In this thesis a presumed empirical regularity is elevated to the status of a norm with considerable political implications. What it says is, in fact, that concrete policies and strategies, both on the individual and collective levels, should be ordered in time sequentially so as to give first priority to the satisfaction of material needs, and then the time may come for non-material needs. In other words, the normative thesis may serve as a pretext for deliberate inattention given to non-material needs, claiming that "time is not yet ripe." Both individually and collectively, this may serve as a basis for indefinite postponement: the individual may always feel that there are some material needs not yet sufficiently satisfied; in the collectivity there will always be some individuals whose material needs have not been sufficiently satisfied. Again, it should be repeated that at the level of extreme deprivation there would be no difficulty
accepting the thesis as one indicating short-time priorities; the difficulty is with the longer run. And here there are two problems: first, given the number of material needs that could be listed, and given the number of members in collectivities such as nations or countries, the time needed to arrive at anything like full satisfaction of material needs first is long indeed; the assumption then being that for this entire period non-material needs will not be attended to.

In practice this will serve as a carte blanche for the type of policies that might guarantee security and economic welfare, but at the expense of considerable amounts of alienation and repression. Emergency relief operations, the soup kitchens, right after natural and social catastrophes are good examples of how this can be done in a way which in the long run would be highly alienating: people are literally speaking fed; they are at the receiving end of a chain of decisions and actions, not the subject of their own need satisfaction (except for the circumstance that many of the tricks and efforts to cheat that take place even during such samaritan activities --much like in schools--may be interpreted as an effort to get out of the status as receiver and client and into a status as acting conscious subject again, less alienated by the structure). Zoological gardens and more benign concentration camps are examples of how material needs can be satisfied in a way completely compatible with alienation and repression. The hierarchy thesis may serve to legitimize the construction of societies that de facto are zoological gardens writ large.\textsuperscript{35} And the problem here is not only that non-material needs are put lower down on the priority list. It is also that the structures that have been used in order to satisfy only material needs may later stand in the way of satisfaction of non-material needs. They may freeze social action into patterns of high level managerialism, making out of society a permanent emergency operation, not to say a zoological garden or concentration camp.

But that does not mean that the opposite strategy is any better: to put freedom and identity or non-material needs in
general higher or even highest on the list of priorities. Translated into a political program what this means in practice is a considerable range of options for those who have their material needs satisfied to expand even further, adding more and more material "needs" and ever higher levels of satisfaction, legitimizing this action under such banners as "freedom" (to choose consumer goods, for instance) and "identity" (with consumer goods). To this it may be objected that in doing so they are in fact not pursuing non-material needs, they are only adding to "having," even at the expense of "being."  

If need theory is to have any purpose or positive political function in contemporary society it should be to serve as a basis for revealing such social malconstructions or cases of maldevelopment and to indicate other possibilities. A society that is incapable of giving attention to non-material needs, or a society that is incapable of giving attention to material needs for the masses of the population, may be acceptable or compatible with theories of historical processes that define them as inescapable, necessary stages of development. In the name of such theories any kind of crime can be defended, and any kind of alleged privilege can be legitimized as "historical necessity" or as "the only historical possibility at this stage of development."  

A theory of needs should serve as a basis for a rich image of human beings and demand of social constructions that they respect this richness. That, in turn, may also serve as a basis for committing crimes: the "image" conceived of elsewhere may be forced upon others or used as a pretext to upset or thwart their sense of priority. Hence, the argument is not against having priorities in concrete situations--all of us have--but against any theory of needs that tries to universalize the priorities, freezing them into a general law, thereby decreasing the diversity. Moreover, the theory of needs should also serve as a check-list, as a warning of possible basic problems that may ensue if priorities are organized in such a way that important classes of basic needs are pushed into the background
for large sections of the society and for considerable periods of time. What kind of set of needs can serve this purpose is an open question.

Finally, some words should be said if not in defense of, at least as an effort to explain the popularity of the hierarchy thesis. Confronted with any relatively rich list of needs, the task of moving forward looks so formidable. When the needs are ordered in terms of priorities, hierarchically, the task of trying to meet those at the top may look less formidable. In today's practice the needs at the top in the sense of having top priority—usually the material needs—are those that render themselves best to administration and management by the elites already in power. Higher attention given to "self-reliance," which is one way of expressing a range of welfare and identity needs, would run directly against their position; the same would apply to freedom (meaning by that, of course, a critical and conscious choice, not a "choice" manipulated by intellectual, commercial, and political elites). Thus, the hierarchy thesis may serve status quo purposes, particularly in a structural sense. On the other hand, it should not be denied that the hierarchy thesis may also serve to give much more attention to the material deprivation so prevalent in the world at large and that it has served to build a certain consensus among people and groups that otherwise might have remained inactive because of disagreement about non-material needs and how to meet them. 38

The position taken here would be one of avoiding any built-in hierarchization of needs. Individuals and groups will have their priorities and indeed their own conceptions of needs. The purpose of need theory would be to inspire them into awareness, not to steer and direct them into well-structured need sets. In this there is, of course, no denial that not everything is possible for anybody at any time. Scepticism about theories limiting the range of the "historically possible" is not the same as a position claiming that everything is possible; it is less historically determinist. A major purpose of development theory and practice would have to be to expand
the range of the possible, and this is better served by non-hierarchical than by hierarchical need sets where the priorities are universally given in advance. People should work out their own priorities, and the self-reliant ones will always have the courage to do so in dialogue with others.

Needs and Westernization: Ten Problem Areas

After this preliminary exploration, an effort will now be made to go more into depth. The basic assumption will be that human beings do have needs, that there is such a thing as basic disintegration or pathology that shows up at individual/personal or societal levels, or both, if and when needs are not met (one would, of course, have to add to this assumptions about the range of needs, the degree to which they are not met, the length of time, the number of people involved, etc.). Above, the expression "human beings" is used; thus the assumption is seen as universal. On the other hand it does not say very much: needs are not specified, nothing is said in precise terms about the breaking points where the pathologies will start developing. Nevertheless, there is a position taken: human beings are not infinitely malleable. We do have goals, some of them take the form of basic human needs of which the individual may be more or less aware. Those basic human needs differ between individuals and groups and vary over time; they are malleable (although not infinitely so), but once they are sufficiently internalized in a human being that individual is no longer malleable without considerable risk. Inside him or her, more or less consciously, some sort of reckoning takes place; satisfaction/dissatisfaction is the term used for that. Thus the theory of socialization will have to play a fundamental role for any theory of needs unless that concept is reduced to a physiological level held to be socialization-independent (and hence culture-independent). And it raises the problem that people may be socialized into trying to satisfy some needs that will stand in the way of their own satisfaction of some other needs, or in the way of others trying to
satisfy theirs--these others being present or future generations. Consequently, the theory of conflict is also around the corner of any theory of needs, particularly if one is searching for those patterns of development (meaning meeting basic human needs) that are not at the expense of others.

What we shall now try is to develop some ideas about the relation between this very broad concept of needs on the one hand and something referred to as "Westernization" on the other. Westernization, then, is seen as a process that shapes anything in a certain direction, a Western direction. It is seen as a social code that leaves its imprint on whatever comes its way, transforming it so that the result is compatible with the code. Thus, the code will accept and produce certain types of technology and reject others as incompatible. The problem is what happens, or can be expected to happen, to the notion of needs when exposed to Westernization. To have anything to say about that, the concept of "Western code" has to be defined.39

To do this it is sufficient for the present purpose to spell it out, not to justify the way it is spelled out. It is assumed that the code is expressed partly as some general assumptions about how the world in general and human relations in particular are organized and how they evolve--referred to as the social cosmology--and some more specific ideas about social structure. To describe the code two short lists with five points on each will be used:40

The Western social cosmology is characterized by:

1. A Western-centered, universalist, conception of space
2. A unilinear, present-centered, conception of time
3. An analytic rather than holistic conception of epistemology
4. A man-over-man conception of human relations
5. A man-over-nature conception of relations to nature

The Western social structure is characterized by:

6. A vertical division of labor favoring the center
(7) A conditioning of the periphery by the center
(8) Marginalization: a division between a social inside and outside
(9) Fragmentation: separation of individuals from each other
(10) Segmentation: separation inside individuals.

Further explanation will be given in connection with the discussion of the various need concepts. Let it only be stated again that this is an effort to separate a general theory of needs from Western "perversions" that tend to slant the concept, including the criticism of the concept, in specific directions that are compatible with the Western code. Thus, the position taken is that much of what has been done, both in theory and in practice, in the field of needs so far bears an unmistakable Western imprint; the following is an effort to help identify that imprint. But the position is not that the concept of need itself is Western—as pointed out above. What belongs to a more general concept and what to a Western specification is a field of research under the general heading of "needs" and of increasing significance as Western power exercised from the West (which is not the same as the Western code, that may be implemented from other centers than the traditional Western ones) is waning. To do this we shall proceed one by one on the list of ten, above, and try to draw some kind of demarcation line between the Western and the general. It is not important that the line is sharp nor that it is generally agreed upon; what matters is the effort and the consciousness about the problem.

(1) A Western-Centered, Universalist Conception of Space

Given the tendency in the West to see itself as universally valid, as models to be imitated, and in addition to promote and institutionalize processes emanating from Western centers, penetrating all over the world (at least to the level of the elites) implanting the Western code, it is obvious how the West will make use of a basic human needs approach. The first
step will be to establish a list of needs so that it can serve as a basis for a universal conception of man. Leaving aside whether such lists are meaningful at all, the lists emanating from the West will have a Western slant, meaning that if people attempt to meet these needs all over the world fewer changes will be needed or expected in the West than elsewhere. Whether consciously or not, some or many of the needs will be Western needs with universal pretensions, the West thereby being built into other countries as a model. Given the power of the West to institutionalize and implement its conceptions, not the least through intergovernmental (and other international) organizations, this is not an abstract exercise; it becomes political reality. Thus, the West may make use of such lists, with universal pretensions legitimized through UN and UN-related resolutions, to exercise pressure on other countries to conform and become more compatible with models from the West.\textsuperscript{43}

The first answer to this point is simple enough: instead of universal lists of needs, stimulate the search for particular lists. The ultimate in particularity would be one individual, here and now. However, it is generally assumed that there is sufficient overlap between individuals over some intervals in time and some distance in space not to have to disaggregate to that extent. But what, then, is the unit of aggregation sufficiently homogeneous to posit its goals in the form of its list of what for it is basic human needs--or at least to posit some of their goals in such terms? The honest answer would probably have to be that we simply do not know; much empirical research would be needed. But if we assume that there are two roots of human needs, one physiological and one cultural, transmitted through the socialization process, no doubt in interaction with each other, then a fruitful point of departure might be to think in terms of groups that, \textit{grosso modo}, are physiologically in the same situation (as to underconsumption, adequacy, or overconsumption) and groups that belong to the same culture.\textsuperscript{44} Neither approach would lead to the nation or the country as the group to formulate sufficiently homogenous needs. Neither would
reflect the class differences usually mirrored in substantial
differences where physiological adequacy is concerned, whereas
cultures might also cut across classes and even unite nations
and countries if they belong to the same cultural area. It
should also be noted that both criteria have to be applied,
ot only one of them. A need-homogenous group would be scattered
all over—hence, it would not necessarily be a political actor.

But this is only a first answer: it leads to quite a lot of
questions. One criterion of the fruitfulness of the needs ap-
proach is whether these questions are fruitful questions; the
claim is that they are. So, imagine that we have a number of
such need-lists, a set of need-sets, the best possible expres-
sion of the goals of humankind in such terms. Where do we
stand, then?

First of all, we assume that the lists differ; and that
some, but only some of the lists are Western. This would give
us a basis for an important distinction between "universal" and
"universal using the West as a basis." A rejection of the latter
as undesirable/impossible is not the same as a rejection of the
former. Thus, from a set of need-sets there are at least three
ways in which some kind of non-Western universalism might devel-
op. It is possible; whether it is desirable is another question.
The three methods can be described as through intersection,
union, and abstraction, respectively.

Through intersection. The first and obvious question to ask
would be whether these lists do not to some extent overlap. As
the number of lists increases the overlap will at least not in-
crease, but it may still be non-zero. Given the fact that human
beings have certain similarities physiologically speaking and
that human societies also have certain similarities, a univer-
sal minimum would be expected. To the objection that it might be
"trivial" the answer would, of course, be that although trivial
from an intellectual point of view it is far from trivial from
a human point of view, particularly for those for whom these
needs are not met. Incidentally, it should not be assumed that
the overlap or intersection would only contain material needs.
Thus, it would be surprising if something like a "need to be loved/esteemed" would not enter into this minimum, and the same might apply to a "need for a sense of meaning with life." There might also be several needs classified as material in one context (because of the heavy load of material satisfiers) that would not be included in the minimum. However, such speculations about the content of the minimum without being guided by empirical research are rather futile.

Through union. This would be the opposite approach, joining all lists together and seeing the joint list as an expression of human needs because human beings somewhere (and, one might add, at some time) perceived them that way. As the number of lists increases the union will at least not decrease, but for each new list one might expect some sort of diminishing return in terms of new needs to be added to the pool, in other words a convergence towards a universal maximum. But in what sense would that be universal? What does it matter to me, as a Norwegian, that somebody from Rwanda posits a need to die with dignity, and with progeny, on a list? It does matter the moment we assume a certain communality among human beings. I as a Norwegian might never have thought of that, and even after it has been brought to my attention, I might put it very low on my list of priorities. But even so, I might sense that it plays some role, and it might help me understand my own problems and that of my society better because I might start asking why we do not give more attention to it, and whether it might not be worthwhile doing so.

In other words, I would assume that there is something of a Rwandan even in a Norwegian—and vice versa—and that we might learn from each other through a conscious process of increasing understanding. Thus, the assumption would certainly not be that cultures are fixed and immutable—nobody would stand for a thesis like that—but that they can inspire each other. Still, given the union of need-sets, it is obvious that each group would differ tremendously in the weight (not the same as priori-
ties) they might assign to each need. The new idea brought in through the union approach would be that this should be a conscious process, not just a 0.1 weighting (does not belong to us, does belong to us) out of old habit and low level of consciousness.

Through abstraction. Imagine we compare two needs-sets and find something that can be translated into "need for a minimum of 2600 cal per day" on one and "need for a minimum of 1600 cal per day" on the other. Does this mean that the needs are different and not overlapping? Does it mean that both are expressions of human needs, in other words, that neither belongs to a universal minimum (intersection) but that both belong to a universal maximum (union)? The answer seems to be no to the former and yes to the latter. One might abstract from the two formulations a need for something for which food (calories) are held to be a satisfier. Thus formulated it would clearly enter the intersection. At the same time the two more concrete, more specific expressions might lead to obvious reflections in the other group about possible over-consumption and under-consumption, respectively, particularly as these are formulations about needs, not about factual consumption.

The step from quantities of satisfier to a more general need for food (calories) was not much in terms of abstraction, so consider another example: a "need to move at least twice a year" (formulated by a nomad group), a "need to stay at the same place for at least two generations" (formulated by a more sedentary group). Looking at them, one might draw the conclusion that place of residence matters, and that people want to be able to choose or decide themselves. They may choose to move or choose to stay, but they do not want to be imposed upon in their choice. They simply express the need for a "freedom of choice of place to live," but in different ways (obviously any such generalization should be referred back to those groups to see whether they could accept them as--diluted--statements of their views). Similarly, such expressions as the "need to change residence" on one list and a "need to change spouse" on another might
lead to a "need for change in personal environment" or something like that; a "need for commensalism" and a "need for cohabitation" to a "need for togetherness in everyday matters," and so on. And, a "freedom of choice of place to live" on one list and "freedom of choice of spouse" on another might lead to a general need for some freedom of basic choice," where, in what matters, is another question. The complete strait jacket is accepted nowhere.

The examples serve to indicate two levels of abstraction: from needs specified in terms of satisfiers to need-dimensions—and this is actually what we mean by needs, the quantity of satisfiers being another matter. And then there is the more interesting abstraction: from need(-dimensions) to need-classes, and these classes may be more or less inclusive. The division of needs into such classes as security, welfare, identity, and freedom needs is one such effort, and there is the hypothesis that these need-classes, with reasonable interpretations, will be non-empty on any well- reflected list even if the more specific content of the classes not to mention the satisfiers, differs widely. Thus, there may be very little universality in the intersection or overlap sense of that word at the level of quantity or quantity of satisfiers, even not much at the level of need-dimensions, but there may still be some universality at the level of need-classes. On the other hand, the more abstract these classes are in their formulation the less interesting is the statement just made, ultimately ending with the statement "there are human needs" (some might also deny that this has any universal validity). The problem is to formulate these classes of needs in such a way that something interesting can be said about them in general terms, and this is a reason why the fourfold division indicated above is preferred to such distinctions as "physiological/cultural" or "biophysical/psychosocial/spiritual" or "psychosomatic/psychosocial/psychohabitational." Such categories may be good for classifying origins or "roots" of needs but not so good for analysis of the politics of needs, and that is our key concern. 49
The three universalizing approaches do not exclude each other. For some purposes, particularly as a defense against the particular type of cultural imperialism that might be referred to as need-imperialism, the universal minimum approach with no abstraction might be used; this would be the way of emphasizing diversity. For other purposes, when human communality should be pointed out, the universal maximum approach might be used, although any effort to distribute weights would soon highlight the differences. Perhaps the major utility in the union, or maximum, approach lies in the implicit challenge: through this approach each group challenges the others—an indispensable tool against the flatness of cultural relativism. A Western group postulating a "need to dominate other peoples" and an Indian group postulating a "need for suttee (widow-burning)" should not have their needs accepted simply by reference to their culture which may be said to foster (have fostered) such needs. In general, whenever need-satisfaction of one need for some implies less need-satisfaction for self or others on the same or other needs there is a problem, and the claim "we are going to disintegrate individually and/or socially if this need is not met" is not the last argument in the matter. Rather, this is exactly where a dialogue des civilisations may be useful in suggesting elements that could be given up or modified. Thus, it may be argued that expansion with domination as a result is more than a wish or want or desire for the West; it is a need for Western people in the sense that if the West does not continue to expand, then some kind of disintegration occurs. What the examples serve to indicate is that there is nothing sacred about needs, nor about cultures; they are subject to tests of whether they serve self-realization without doing damage to others.

Finally, there is the abstraction approach. It can be used to show communality at "a higher level," meaning the level of need-classes. With great care this can be used to formulate more general theories about need-satisfaction, its dynamics and politics, as long as it is remembered that general reasoning at a higher level of abstraction is not automatically valid when
translated down to the more concrete level. At most it can serve as a good heuristic—usually starting from relations valid for one type of society (e.g., "when needs for welfare are met before needs for identity and freedom are attended to, it may be very difficult to meet the latter without basic structural change; the same is true with the opposite priorities"), using the theory based on need-classes rather than need-dimensions to arrive at hypotheses (not conclusions) for other societies. It is hard to see how social research can be meaningful at all without doing something like this; at any rate, it is being done all the time, as when regularities uncovered for a society at one point in time are postulated as valid for the next day, year, decade, generation, century (which is where most people would feel that their validity has to be tested anew, others might feel this also applies to shorter time intervals).

(2) A Uni-Linear, Present-Centered Conception of Time

There are two problems here, and the first one is similar to the problem just treated: some kind of Western time-imperialism in addition to the space-imperialism discussed in the preceding section. The basic logic is the same: a need list reflecting Western society today is postulated as valid for all times, is seen as time-less, in other words. History is seen as the gradual realization of this list, which is then constructed in such a way that approximation towards the West can also be seen as progress so that the West as model and the idea of progress are both reflected. Thus, the phenomenon is the same but the problem posed is not amenable to the same type of solution: the people of the past are dead and unable to defend themselves personally against temporal need-imperialism. But they have often left traces behind, "sources," and could have their views presented by component historians who would play the same role in time as social anthropologists can do in space: the advocacy of specificity and hence, by implication, of diversity—at least relative to the present.
There is, however, another problem here, hidden in the term "unilinear." More precisely, it is the non- or even anti-dialectic view of processes reflected in this term that has some important implications for how needs are conceived of. Thus, looking at the terms used in most lists of needs, one is struck by their onesidedness. One hears much about the need for security, very little about any need for insecurity. There is much about the need for food, but where is any need for hunger? If there is a need for togetherness, where is the need for separateness, even for isolation? Where is the need for hatred if there is a need for love—perhaps even a need to be hated or at least disliked if there is such a thing as a need to be loved or at least liked?

The answer to this should not be seen in terms of adding the opposites to the lists; that would also be too mechanical. Rather, what is missing is a more dialectical approach to needs and need-satisfaction. For the hungry there is a need for food, but for the well-sated, the satisfied, there may be a need to be hungry again so as to have the need for food and (if it is available) the satisfier of that need and with it the enjoyment of need-satisfaction. In other words, it is assumed that need-satisfaction is something inherently enjoyable—something perhaps to be included in the criteria of that elusive concept "true need." But if that is the case there should with each need be a need to feel that need again, a looking forward to next time. For this reason the words satisfy/satisfier/satisfaction/satisfied are not quite good; they portray what goes on as a single-shot affair. Moreover, one can easily conjure for one's inner eye the image of something "satisfied." For my inner eye, it is an orangutan once observed in a zoo: sated in all respects, well fattened, yet looking profoundly unhappy and static. The image is one of satisfaction as an Endzustand, as a place of arrival, not as a place from which one departs again into a new state of need awareness and, with it, a new process of need-satisfaction.

The two figures below are intended to represent the two views:
Fig. 1 Need-satisfaction

Mechanical View

\[\text{\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Mechanical View} \\
\text{Dialectical View}
\end{array}
\]}

\[\text{-}\]

It may be objected that the latter is implicit in the former, and this may be true. But it should be made explicit. There is a difference between getting security and having security: the latter may become a habit, a state of affairs one is not even aware of; the former is a process. We shall not assume that people in general are searching for one or the other—about this little is known—only that the concepts chosen should be such as not to block either possibility. This can be done by expressing all needs as word-pairs, including the opposites, or—as we shall prefer to do—interpret the positive terms used in this direction.

Thus, the need for food is seen as a process, with no beginning and no end, of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, undulating through time with sometimes slow, sometimes quick rhythms, with no resting point, full of contradictions at any point. The "need for food" should be seen as a short-hand expression for this more complex need. In all needs for something there is also an element of the need for its negation—that is the thesis.

This point is replete with political implications. Thus, some of the Unbehagen in der Kultur, here interpreted as a general sense of dissatisfaction with modern, industrialized welfare states, may possibly be understood in this perspective. The restlessness, or some restlessness to be more precise, may not be due to needs that are left unsatisfied, nor to oversatisfaction, but to too perfect satisfaction of some basic needs, so perfect that sufficient need deprivation is not permitted to what the appetites and derive the satisfaction from need-satisfaction which in turn make people appreciate more not only the social environment that
provides the satisfiers, but also themselves. Where is the joy that can be derived from "labor-saving devices" if one is surrounded by little else, to the point that fatigue is never permitted to build up? Is not togetherness something different for a person always surrounded by crowds than for one sometimes lone-
some? In short, there is probably a rhythm, or many rhythms (de-
pending on the need, on the person, on where and when) to need-
satisfaction, a dialectic that should be permitted to unfold itself freely.\textsuperscript{55} If this dialectic is forced into some mechanical, truncated form there will be negative consequences of which we probably know very little. Suffice it only to say that this may be what many people seek during vacation: a counterpoint to their regular level of need-satisfaction; higher if the general level is low, and lower if the general level is high. Thus, the lonely manager surrounded by material comfort may seek the company of friends under "primitive" conditions (from which he may easily escape, though); the worker, less materially endowed but bowling, doing other sports, drinking in the pub/bistro or whatever every night, may go on package tours to "good" hotels, alone or with his/her spouse. The question is whether annual rhythms of this kind—and even they would only be available to a few—really speak to their condition,\textsuperscript{56} or whether quicker rhythms might be wanted.

(3) An Analytic Rather Than Holistic Conception of Epistemology

Western epistemology, it is often said, is analytic, follow-
ing the Cartesian dictum of subdividing a problem into components that can then be attacked one at a time, starting with the simpler. The problem is whether a problem can be subdivided, or whether anything for that matter can be subdivided and still remain the same. Elephants cannot be subdivided and remain the same; there is something irreducible, the elephant as \textit{holisis} that is (considerably) more than the sum of the trunk, legs, tail, etc. A list of needs looks like a list of components. The question is: what is the whole that has been subdivided to deliv-
er that list, and what, if anything, has been lost in the process? Thus, we add the possibility that nothing may have been lost: if one subdivides a toybox of lego-bits into the component parts it makes good sense to say that nothing has been lost (because it was only a mechanical heap anyhow, and even intended to be so—full of unintended possibilities for synthesis).

In a sense it is the human person that has been subdivided into components. Hence, there is a double problem here: the wholeness of human beings and the wholeness of our images of human beings. Both problems are difficult; they can be approached, but not solved in what follows, written by an admittedly analytically minded Western researcher, probably the worst possible point of departure for this type of exercise.\(^57\)

First, it should be mentioned that people in general, unless their own situation in terms of need-lists and need-satisfiers. If a verbal expression is asked for, the expression "state of well-being," used in the WHO definition of health, is probably as good as any.\(^58\) There is a sense of well-being and a sense of its absence; the latter possibly more acute, more capable of reaching up from the deeper recesses to the outer layers of consciousness from where it can be articulated as cries of pain, as expressions of ill-being. People may also, but again not much seems to be known about this, react to the total situation: they may be undernourished, badly clad and housed, in poor health, yet enjoying good company and a sense of "education" (as distinct from schooling) and exude well-being.\(^59\) How do they arrive at that conclusion? Probably not by personal utility calculus, by assigning + and − in checking lists of needs (like the checking list for a plane before take-off), multiplying by the eights and calculating the product sum before facial expression is decided upon. One day we may know more about what happens, e.g., what kind of division of labor takes place between the two famous halves of the brain (the model just given would be for the analytical half, a more direct reading of the total situation for the synthesizing half).\(^60\) Whether it is use-
ful for us to know more is another matter, for the question asked is a political one, not only belonging to brain physiology. The problem is what happens when powerful analysts subdivide a holistic experience of well/ill-being into components called need-dimensions, use them to construct images of human beings as need-sets, and then propagate these images to the people they are images of, asking/demanding that they accept these images as their own.

Second, however: analytic vs. holistic images is not a dichotomy of alternatives; it is or can be seen as a both-and rather than an either-or (using both halves of the brain). The problem is not how to suppress analytical thinking in this field, but how to facilitate, promote holistic thinking. (Some of the dangers of analytical thinking will be pointed out under the heading of (10) Segmentation, below).

Third, how is that done? How can the researcher develop images that are one-sidedly analytical? Probably best by learning from the people, by understanding, through dialogues, how they understand their own situation. Sometimes it may be by emphasizing only one (or very few) of what the analyst might refer to as the need-dimensions. Sometimes it may be by referring to what the analyst would see as need-satisfiers. Sometimes it may be in what the analyst would experience as relatively loose and unstructured expressions, using such undifferentiated words as "well-being," "happiness," etc.; sometimes the expression may be non-verbal and may even escape totally the attention of the analyst. All of this is to be taken seriously, as another mode of experiencing and expressing life, not as something to be understood in analytical terms but to be understood in and by itself. Thus, one idea might be to have two parallel languages dealing with something of the same, not necessarily mutually translatable.

This is the point where other approaches to human development or human growth than those based on need theory would enter. Thus, what happens to a human being as he or she proceeds through the life-cycle, from childhood via adolescence to adult-
hood, is something often referred to as "maturation." It can also be seen as human development/growth—but not as satisfaction of needs. Rather, as age-groups differ physiologically and also in their level or kind of socialization into cultures, needs will also differ with the stages in the life-cycle. It may well be that some of these transformations of the need/satisfier matrices (see under (10) below) may be identified with, or at least related to, stages of maturation. At any rate, need-satisfaction should not be seen as something akin to filling empty glasses and then emptying them again because filling is more fun than the full glass (the argument in the preceding section). Rather, the glasses should be seen as changing all the time, some of them expanding, some of them contracting to the point of vanishing; other glasses growing, seemingly out of nowhere—all the time changing the need structure. Which of these changes should be referred to as "maturation?" What are the aspects of maturation that are qualitatively different from what we can express with need language and this type of metaphor? Thus, in need language there is something calculating, life is seen as an effort to extinguish lamps in the console signalling "need unsatisfied/unattended." There is not enough active, conscious work by the person, alone or with others, to transcend his or her own need structure, being the master, not only the operator of that console.

And then, another reflection: why should human development or growth be seen in unilinear terms—is that not in and by itself an expression of Western time cosmology? Why should maturity increase with age—to bestow more prestige on the old, using duration of life lived as a compensation for the shortness of the time span left? If degree of socialization into a culture that through dialogue with other cultures show signs of being antihuman is proportionate (or at least monotone) with time, would we still see life span lived in that culture as an indicator of maturity/wisdom and would linearity not lead to extrapolation, extrapolating from maturation curves from childhood via adolescence to adulthood into some kind of super-adulthood, so far attainable only by cognitive or ethical gen-
iuses, by sages and saints, exploring conditions under which this type of human development/growth might become normal, something available to most people? In other words, assuming that there is that potential in us all, under what condition can it be actuated?

Many questions, no answer. Need theory does not serve as a guide here, possibly because it serves as a better guide for defining minimum requirements for human existence than for human development goals beyond that. This is not necessarily an objection because this approach may be less elitist than other approaches—particularly if the hierarchy thesis is rejected. But something is missing. The image is far from complete, and it is too atomistic-like a chemistry contented with the description of compounds in terms of the atoms that enter, unable to describe and explain in terms of molecules and their structures and *sui generis* properties.

(4) A Man-Over-Man Conception of Human Relations

One way of expressing this part of Western cosmology would be in terms of verticality and individualism. Society is seen as some kind of a jungle where conflicts are resolved through processes defining winners and losers rather than through consensus and solidarity-building processes. If such processes are enacted often enough, the net result is a society of vertically organized, mutually detached individuals; as the process is built into the social code, this type of structure will be not only produced but also reproduced. The problem is how a code of that type would affect the theory of needs. In general terms: by emphasizing those aspects of needs that would give prominence to the three themes just mentioned: conflict, verticality, and individualism.

As to conflict: one would expect Western theories of needs to emphasize the need, or the theories of needs, that, when translated into political practice, would generate conflict
rather than cooperation. One way of doing this would be by giving priority to material needs, remembering that one perspective on such needs is that the satisfiers are high on material components, that such components by definition have some element of scarcity (at least when pursued ad lib., because of the finiteness of the world); consequently, that if I have more, somebody else will have less. This may be one factor behind the Western tendency to give priority to material needs: by doing so conflict is guaranteed, conflict that can serve to arrange human beings vertically and individually.

More emphasis on non-material needs would, in general, produce fewer zero-sum games in society. As will be seen immediately below, there are exceptions to this: there may also be non-material scarcity. The important point, however, is not whether the fine line between competitive and non-competitive needs passes exactly between material and non-material (thus, there are also material needs, e.g., for air, that at least so far can be seen as largely non-competitive—but decreasingly so with increasing pollution). The point is only that other codes might steer people and societies in less competitive directions by emphasizing other needs more and the competitive ones less—of course, not by pretending there are no such things as human needs.

As to verticality: there is the point already referred to above of promoting images of human beings and their needs so as to foster competition and conflict, ultimately leading to vertical ordering. However, it should be noted that this can be obtained also in other ways. Thus, need-dimensions may be used for vertical ordering even when the satisfiers are not competitive. A switch from attention to things such as cars to attention to, say, joy may be compatible with the competitive code of Western society—"look at how much more joyful I am than anybody else on this street" is not very different from "look at how much finer my car is than any other car on this street," or "look at how much more educated I am," etc.

Behind this is not only the possibility of ranking people
but a cultural norm pressing people to do so. Earlier generations might have talked about competitive instincts. Does this mean that we should talk about a basic human need, at least in the Western context, not only to have and to be, but to have more and to be more? In other words, that it is not only the absolute level (of need-satisfaction) but also the relative level that counts, perhaps even more than the absolute level? Clearly, the thesis would be that the Western code would tend to foster need definitions of that kind.

One possible approach would be to stipulate that what cannot even for logical reasons be met for everybody should not be referred to as a "need," or at most as a "false" need: for if I shall have or be more than anybody else, others cannot be in the same position—that would constitute a logical contradiction. To rule it out, by definition, however, sounds a little bit like removing sin by outlawing it. The problem still remains that this value persists, and certainly not only in the Western code. And the value seems often to be so deeply internalized that we should refer to it as a need, specifying where it is found, if it passes the test that its non-satisfaction leads to some kind of disintegration, and then proceed to question it in a dialogue, which ultimately means questioning the culture that gives rise to it.

However, we choose to look at this, neither conflict nor verticality can be said to be built into the need concept as such. But what about individualism?

As to individualism: no doubt there is something individualistic in a need concept stipulating that the only need-subjects there are are individual human beings. Thus, the position taken is that the need for togetherness is felt inside human beings, nowhere else, and that it is inside human beings that a feeling of well-being—because that need is met—is generated, nowhere else—other positions being seen as obscurantist and lacking empirical referents and as politically very dangerous. The need to belong to a society of which one can be proud is also located in members of that society; a country outdoing others in wars
or economic competition is a satisfier of such needs, but both
the need and the need-satisfaction (not the satisfier!) is in-
dividual. This trivial point, however, is not enough to label
need theory in general as individualist.

A clearly individualist need theory would go further and de-
mand that the satisfaction not only take place inside the indi-
vidual, but inside the individual in isolation; in other words
that a social context is not needed. No doubt need theory can
be slanted in that direction, and this will be discussed in
some detail below (under (9) Fragmentation). But nothing in that
direction is built into the concept as such. What is built into
it as here presented is an effort to rule out concepts of
"social needs" because they seem so often only to be felt by
ruling elites and often confuse satisfiers with needs. People
may feel a need for security, elites may try to express this as
a social need for nuclear weapons and try to convince people that
they feel a need for this. Ultimately they may succeed in so
doing in which case this objection would have to be removed--
there remains the problem of whether this is a true or a false
need, and whether the posited satisfier would meet the need.

(5) A Man-Over-Nature Conception of Relations to Nature

The assumption that only individual human beings are need-
subjects draws a line not only against human collectivities of
various kinds as legitimate need-subjects; there is also another
borderline with nature on the other side. Nature--animals,
plants, and other forms of nature--is not seen as being a sub-
ject possessing needs. No doubt this is in line with Western
tradition of desouling nature and be-souling man and only man--
and as such an item of Westernness built into the theory, sub-
ject to challenge and possible modification.70

In the meantime let it just be noted that to deprive nature
of the status as need subject does not mean that there is no re-
cognition of necessary conditions for the survival of, say, an eco-
system—just as there are necessary conditions for the survival of, say, the capitalist system (only that we would not identify these conditions with satisfiers of human needs, at least not without having more evidence). The concept of a \textit{conditio sine qua non} is broader than the need concept,\textsuperscript{71} or the need-satisfaction concept to be more precise (as the satisfaction of the basic human needs is held to be a necessary condition to avoid disintegration or pathologies from developing). Given this, it is not obvious that it is necessary to extend the range of need-subjects to our neighbors in nature—but it is readily admitted that this anthropocentric position is both Western and unsatisfactory and that it should be replaced by something better. But just as the recognition of collectivities as need-subjects opens for all kinds of reifications of non-human development (such as productionism, distributionism, revolutionism, and modernism—institution-building) that may easily prove to be anti-human, the recognition of nature may open for an ecologicalism that may also become anti-human, or at least a-human. And these are five of the dangers we wanted to avoid, the sixth danger being "culturism," the reification of any culture as an infallible guide steering the human enterprise. The position taken here, no doubt, is some kind of humanism, seeing the concerns for ecological balance as anchored in man's "enlightened self-interest": if the "needs of nature" are not satisfied, human beings will ultimately suffer. Thus, the "enlightenment" refers to ecological awareness rather than to subjects that may be posited in non-human nature, but with which/whom at least so far we seem to be unable to communicate.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{6} A \textit{Vertical Division of Labor Favoring the Center}

How this vertical division of labor works is obvious: by a group in the center telling the rest of the population what their needs are. Under (1), above, the tendency towards a Western view is discussed—in geo-political terms. The point here is how the same structure is also found inside societies. There are
those who work out lists of needs, and satisfiers, thereby contributing to the programming of others, and there are those who have their needs defined for them. The system is found in capitalist and socialist countries alike; in the former the corporations play more of a role, in the latter the state bureaucracies (and the party). It should be pointed out that this usually goes beyond such tasks as stipulating a political program with priorities. The point is not only that major organizations and those who manage them steer a social policy but also that they have a tendency to deny that what is not included in their program of action could also be of basic significance.

As pointed out above there will for several reasons be a tendency to focus on material needs; in the capitalist countries denying the reality of some of the identity needs, in the socialist countries adding to the denial list many of the freedom needs --they are all for "later." The examples are chosen so as to make very clear how profoundly political the problem of needs and their satisfaction is, which means that the struggle for the right to define one's own needs is a highly political struggle. In a sense the situation is very similar to the situation that has reigned in the field of "development": the idea has been co-opted by powerful elites, a combination of bureaucrats, capitalists, and intellectuals at national and international levels. That the idea can be abused by those in power is, of course, what power is about. The needs of human beings do not disappear because the idea of needs can be abused, nor does reality change if one should decide to use some other term. The same applies to "development": it can be used for political, even military manipulation and for economic exploitation; the problems are still there, particularly if development is seen as a process aiming at meeting human needs.

Consequently, the problem relates not to the concept of needs, however it is defined, but to the power of defining needs, particularly for others. If anything should relate to a need for identity then it must be the need to define one's own situation, including in this--indeed--the definition of one's own
needs. Again, which is the unit defining needs—the individual, the group, the country, the region—can be discussed, but regardless of what level is chosen, participation in the need-definition would have to be the general norm. This is basic in any self-reliant approach: a self-reliant group sets its own goals in a participatory manner, including the goals that are formulated in human needs terms. About such goals human experience is certainly that consensus is not to be expected; if it were possible, humankind would probably have had it by now.

But is consensus desirable? Would that not merely mean a uniform world with each part of the world being a replication of the other, in space and throughout time—like we imagine termite societies? The point is not to arrive at consensus but to arrive at dialogical processes that permit the issues to be articulated and the mutual challenge that we have made a plea for—under the heading of the universal maximum mentioned in (1) above. In such dialogues bureaucrats, capitalists, and intellectuals, national as well as international, should also participate; they are also people. But in the present structure they count too much. The vertical division of labor will make them use what others say and express in various ways as raw material for them to distill and elaborate and process towards standard operating procedures that can serve as blueprints for societies of the future.

Does this mean that people with some element of power should abstain from postulating needs at all? No, first of all they might do it for themselves; second, they might participate in dialogues about needs; third, they should help explore what in the power structure, including themselves, might stand in the way of people meeting the needs they themselves stipulate. In other words, less effort to administer others, more effort to search for, and counteract, causes of maldevelopment at home, in the immediate social surroundings.
A Conditioning of the Periphery by the Center

This conditioning is not merely a question of potential and actual culturocide and depersonification to be expected when Western need-structures (point (1) above) elaborated by elites (point (6) above) are beamed in all directions as universal norms to be pursued, but also a question of making people dependent on the satisfiers that will follow in the wake of the propagation of need structures. It is difficult at present to see fully the possibilities of conditioning the periphery by means of basic needs strategies—on some other occasion we have listed six:

- the BN approaches as an effort to sidetrack the NIEO issue
- the BN approaches as a new way of legitimizing intervention
- the BN approaches as an instrument to increase the market
- the BN approaches as a way of slowing down Third world growth
- the BN approaches as an effort to decrease technical assistance
- the BN approaches as a weapon of defense against the poor.

Whether such consequences are intended is of less significance; the problem is that a basic needs oriented strategy may work this way when operated from the center, including Third world centers.

In a sense this is to be expected. When fed into a certain structure, steered by a certain code, needs will be structured so as to be compatible. It is only possible to do this, however, with a very truncated need-set, singling out from more complete sets the needs that fit, excluding others (such as the need for self-actuation, for self-expression, for being active and a subject, for challenge, for creativity, etc.). Thus, the safeguard is built into needs theory, analytically
speaking; an enormous amount of distortion or perversion must have been exercised to make such important needs recede into the background. This is in itself worthy of research: how is it possible to distort images of human beings so much, what were the preconditions, how did it happen? The functions served by the distortion process are increasingly clear; the process itself should be better understood. As it is now, satisfiers tend to define the needs rather than vice versa. Needless to say, this leads to an overemphasis on material needs.

Marginalization: a Division between a Social Inside and Outside

What could be better for reproduction of the marginalization of the masses of our societies than a hierarchy of needs, having at the bottom people whose major concern it should be to have material needs (physiological and safety needs in Maslow's parlance) well taken care of before they can/ought to (the ease with which one slides from descriptive to normative statements here is part of the mechanism) proceed to non-material needs? The isomorphism between needs hierarchies and social hierarchies will reinforce either of them, giving a sense of confirmation to either. Elites will be the first in propagating the idea of "material needs first" under the guise of humanitarianism, thereby preserving the marginalization for generations still to come, giving the magnitude of the job of "meeting the basic needs of those most in need" when it shall be done the way these elites suggest: managerially. To meet those needs may even be a low price to pay to retain a monopoly on social management—as this is done in the social democratic welfare state.

This becomes even more significant given what is probably a reasonable map of the real situation where need-satisfaction is concerned:
TABLE 3

THE LEVEL OF NEED-SATISFACTION: A CONJECTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MATERIAL NEEDS</th>
<th>NON-MATERIAL NEEDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>Non-basic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELITES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rich countries</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor countries</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elites in countries poor and rich in the world today certainly have basic material needs satisfied and in addition a lot of material satisfiers (often called "gadgets") beyond that. The masses have much less of the latter; this is, in fact, how some of the borderlines between elites and masses are drawn. As to non-material needs the conjecture is simply that in a modern, corporate society based on the typical bureaucrat-capitalist-intellectual top management (with somewhat more power to bureaucrats in the state capitalist and to the capitalist in the private capitalist countries) satisfaction of a broad range of non-material needs is impossible—and the consequence of this is probably found, among other places, in the rates of mental disorder. For the masses in the poor countries, this is all different: the material situation is deplorable in most regards; the non-material not necessarily so. If one of the keys to identity is closeness, this is where it may still be found; as many authors, often naively startled by this obvious circumstance, report: "in the slums I found the solidarity, the generosity, the warmth so often missing where I come from." Could there even be a faint suspicion in the elites that this is so, that this is...
terribly important to the total "quality of life," that the elites, hence, are jealous "why should these wretched people have a right to be rich where we are poor," and that they even--consciously, mainly unconsciously--unleash upon them processes of such a kind that even this closeness may be taken from them, with vague promises of a better material existence? Thus, if they materially remain low (and this is where the concept of minimum satisfaction, of a floor of better distributed poverty enters) while at the same time the processes make them conform with the hierarchy thesis, then marginalization could continue forever (the bottom line in table 3 would then read "YES-NO-NO").

But there is another forceful way of fortifying marginalization in a society, also easily seen within the framework of any reasonably well-answered needs theory. There is the possibility of constructing a hierarchy of needs well suited to draw lines, even solid lines, between those who engage in "lower" and "higher" human needs. But there is also indeed the possibility of creating a hierarchy of satisfiers for each need-dimension, with a second-class variety for common people, the masses, and a first-class variety for people high up, the elites. A look at table 2, right-hand column will immediately make the reader fill in the information: for each satisfier (good/service) this stratification exists. In the market a range of satisfiers is offered, for basic and "non-basic needs" (the latter would actually not be needs, but this is nonetheless a useful figure of speech), but stratified so that some is accessible to only a few. Hence, even if people were equal on the level of material satisfaction, quantitatively speaking, quality or pretended quality differences in the satisfiers could still carry the function of ensuring marginalization. Of course, this aspect is not so central to needs theory as such as the hierarchy of needs.

But is there not also a hierarchy concept inherent in the idea of basic human needs, even if one draws a line and
assumes that needs theory stops when the needs no longer are basic—beyond that are the wants and desires, etc.? Is not marginalization coming in the back door even through any needs theory, even when a distinction between lower and higher needs is rejected?

There are two ways in which this can be said to be done even within the present theory, and they have to be examined critically. First, there is the idea that when basic needs are not satisfied this will be harmful to that individual, there will be some type of pathology whether it shows up at the intra-personal or inter-personal levels. Second, there is the idea of a hierarchy of needs according to how harmful the non-satisfaction is, from needs whose non-satisfaction is lethal to needs whose non-satisfaction seems compatible with maintenance of the personal and social systems.87

No doubt a theory of needs draws a line between those whose basic human needs are not satisfied and those whose are, given the specificities of the society. So does, incidentally, the whole tradition of caring for the ill: there is marginalization involved with the institutionalization of the ill, (temporary) non-membership in society, separation from healthy people in family and work, and so on.88 A good theory of needs, however, should serve as a corrective here by constantly reminding us that even if a person is deficient relative to one need-dimension, need-satisfaction cannot possibly consist in a trade-off sacrificing other need-dimensions in order to make up for the deficit. Thus, there is not that much difference between a hospital and a zoological garden: freedom is dramatically reduced, so is identity; security and welfare usually being the need-classes taken care of. Consequently one would expect the effect of hospital treatment to be some disintegration in other fields, unless, of course, the stay is of a very short duration. If a theory of needs is to be of any value at all it would be to serve as a reminder of the needs of the total human being, also in such a situation.89
But even if this is done there will nevertheless remain a distinction between those with more needs deficits one way or the other and those with less. To this, it may be retorted that since basic needs are not necessarily material needs by the definitions in these pages, those with a deficit are no longer necessarily located among the materially poor; they would equally much or even more (see table 3 for some indication) be found among the non-materially poor. Thus, in today's society those with a deficit would be found all over; it would be a more "democratic" concept. But this is at best a temporary answer: given the tradition of most societies to stratify, and of Western societies to stratify individuals, one could imagine a new type of marginalization: between those who suffer from no needs deficiency and those who suffer from much and consequently have to be treated by the first class.

Of course, this would be against needs theory with its emphasis on the need to be subject of one's own situation; still, there is something to this objection. One line of defense would be to insist on the diversity of need-sets, but even within small and homogeneous groups this marginalization may be reproduced. In other words, the use of needs deficiency as a weapon: "your need X is not satisfied, so how dare you--" This is already seen clearly today in connection with schooling: "You have only so and so much schooling, hence your need for education is not met, hence you are not a competent individual." Of course, here the usual confusion between pretended satisfier (schooling) and need (education, very broadly defined) is clear; lack of schooling, even literacy, is, of course, not the same as lack of education. But there is something here in which a new type of marginalization may be rooted, and this something should be the subject of intense dialogue.

The second point, a hierarchy of needs according to how harmful the non-satisfaction would be, is more easily dealt with. Our present society makes deficits in material needs visible: poverty can be seen, so can illness. Deficits in non-
material needs are less visible: alienation, lack of ability to love and be loved are more easily tolerated than is poverty, both in the need-subjects and in others. Why? Because of the material bias of our societies, implying that material problems are the problems held to be resolvable within these societies—other problems are either defined away or given up—and that consensus for action is built around material "facts," not non-material "values." But in a different culture, more emphasizing non-material dimensions, this may all turn out very differently. Sorokin makes the distinction between sensate and ideational cultures; no doubt the ranking of needs as to how basic they are depending on how harmful the consequence of non-fulfillment will differ in these two cultures. But this is what culture is about: needs are bio-social, they are physiological-cultural, this will be reflected in any hierarchy of needs. It can be deplored, but that is what socio-cultural reality is about.

Thus, the Maslow hierarchy can be seen as a very precise sophisticated translation of Western culture into a theory of needs. But did we not argue against that? Yes, and on two levels. First, because it is often offered with the pretension of being a universal hierarchy, of being something beyond merely a reflection of Western cultural biases. Second, because it reinforces Western-type social stratification, even class formation, further. Thus, the critique of that kind of hierarchy is partly located in the contradiction between West and important parts of non-West, partly in contradictions inside the West. Our personal bias would be that a society is best served with a theory and politics of needs satisfaction that place the material and the non-material on a more equal footing, as argued several times above. In that case a hierarchy drawing lines between the material and the non-material would be impossible; no marginalization could be built on that basis. But this is the type of struggle that has to be fought inside each culture/society.
(9) Fragmentation: Separation of Individuals from Each Other.

If the only need-subjects there are are the individuals, why should not this individualization be carried further? The problem has been mentioned above (under 4): "that the satisfaction not only takes place inside the individual, but inside the individual in isolation; in other words that a social context is not needed. No doubt need theory can be slanted in that direction, . . ." Actually, "that direction" splits into two, both of them meaningful within a Western tradition of individualism and fragmentation, but very different in their consequences: that the need-subject alone provides for the need-objects, the satisfiers; and that need-satisfaction takes place in social isolation. The hypothesis would be that the Western tradition would pick up both possibilities and slant a theory of needs in these directions.

The first interpretation points to the hermit or in modern parlance: not only to individual self-reliance, but to individual self-sufficiency. This should not be confused with general self-reliance theory which would tend to emphasize the smaller group, the beta communities, at the level of local self-reliance more than individual self-reliance. But in Western--and not only Western--perhaps even more in Hindu--thought, people who provide for themselves have always inspired great respect, and rightly so. To slant a general theory of needs in this direction would be something quite different and certainly not implicit in the theory. There is nothing in the theory speaking against "goods and services" as such; the argument would be about their relevance for basic needs, the access to them by the most needy, whether there is under-consumption and so on. There would also be much emphasis on whether the individual need-subject also is a subject in the sense of participating in decisions concerning the satisfaction of her or his needs; but this can be done without having monopoly over decision-making, production for need-satisfaction, distribution till consumption takes place, including disposal of waste products. That a soci-
ety is needed in general to satisfy needs is not disputed.

The second interpretation is more important because it touches on major trends in contemporary society: need-satisfaction in social isolation. Food is consumed on TV trays, from luncheon boxes, and in "diners;" shelter takes the form of detached houses and apartments away from each other—very different from the clustering in the village as a human habitat; pills and other forms of medication in a sense permit the individual to treat herself or himself but also deprive him or her of social experience in that connection (the outstanding example of the latter being bottle-feeding of babies depriving both mother and baby of physical contacts and moments of beauty); machines are more often than not operated by one individual; schooling can be done in loneliness through correspondence courses and "university at a distance;" leisure and recreation are individualized. (The reaction against package tours, with groups traveling together, is more Western individualist than the package tour itself—which also can be seen as a way of recapturing something valuable, like the Muslim Hadj). TV watching in isolation substitutes for secondary and even for primary groups; political activity is reduced to a lonely act of voting in a booth, isolated from the outside; Protestantism and other religious trends define the religious dimension as a God-individual relation (unmediated by the congregation and in principle, if not in practice, also by the priest); telephones reduce communication to a relation between two persons at a time; transportation is in very small units—a car is made for the family at most, a bicycle for the individual; consumer decisions are increasingly made by individuals, not even by families as women and children emancipation get under way. And so on, and so forth; we have only made use of the obvious points dictated by the right hand column of table 2 to see how our society fragments.

All this, or some of it, one may be for or against; that is not the point. The basic point is that there is and should
be nothing in needs theory as such that would make this type of
social formation a logical consequence of needs theory. On the
contrary, under the need-class of "identity" it would be strange
if most need-lists would not one way or the other include some
reference to "togetherness." A society that systematically
counteracts this need will be punished sooner or later, regard-
less of efforts it might make to make a virtue of its vices by
proclaiming that this is a "natural" tendency.

(10) Segmentation: Separation inside Individuals

We have discussed above--under marginalization--how hier-
archies of needs may serve to reinforce social hierarchies,
and--under fragmentation--how the individualization of the need-
subject may spread to the production of need-objects, or at
least to their consumption. Here an effort will be made to dis-
cuss how lists of needs may serve to reinforce tendencies
towards segmentation, or rather: towards a segmented mode of
need-satisfaction, as opposed to an integrated mode of need-
satisfaction. One way of exploring this may be as follows.

So far we have looked at why need objects/satisfiers are
consumed/enjoyed (to meet needs), but not at how. Let us split
this "how" into three simple but important parts: where, when,
and with whom, referring to space, time, and what we might call
social space, respectively. Together, these three might consti-
tute an action-space where each point indicates where in space,
when in time, and with whom in social space. For simplicity
let us reduce this to a two-dimensional space, collapsing space
and social space to SSS:
As time progresses, e.g., from morning to afternoon to evening to night, a person's action-line passes through new points in space and social space: maybe with family in the morning, workmates in the afternoon, friends in the evening, and back to the family at night. This is the segmented mode; in the integrated mode time also progresses, but all these activities are carried out with the same people, more or less at the same place (SSS is constant, hence the straight line in the integrated mode). The continuity in space and people provides for a carry-over, a social continuity from one activity to the next. The segmented mode is often referred to as "compartmentalized" because transition from one activity to the next implies a change of place and social partners; a new "compartment" in space. As we all know this is in practice carried out much more dramatically than the figure conveys: space is divided into minute regions for distinct activities ("Don't eat in the living-room!"); time is divided into intervals for distinct activities ("Don't eat between meals!"); and social space is divided into regions called role-partners by the specialists on social space, the sociologists ("Don't eat together with your superiors or inferiors!"). There are space-budgets, time-budgets, and social space budgets—hopefully they add up in the sense that if one gets through them all the net result should be "balance," interpreted as need-satisfaction. The condition, of course, is that the budget is made up over a sufficient range in space, time,
and social space, and many do not have the resources to get sufficiently far into the corners of space and social space (as to time: time gets into us, it is not we who get into time).

One may now be for and against either pattern. The segmented mode is disruptive, but it also provides for new experience; the integrated mode provides stability, but there may be too much of that. This is not the point, however. The point is that needs theory may be used to reinforce the segmented mode, by assigning to each point in the space in figure 2 one type of need-satisfaction, one need-dimension or at least one need-class. One model would be, as mentioned: in the morning eating and togetherness with family, in the afternoon work (to make money, the universal satisfier) with work-mates, in the evening recreation with friends, at night eating and togetherness with family. Inside each of these four categories minute subdivisions can be made, tracing the action-line through urban and/or rural space and inside the dwelling as the hours, even the minutes proceed. In the integrated mode all of this would happen at the same place with the same people. Marx wanted to break the monotony of work by allocating four different types of work to these four time zones: hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, rearing cattle in the evening, and writing social criticism at night. He says nothing about where and with whom, in other words where the stability, continuity, would be.

With the rise of bureaucracy during the last centuries, and in this century also at the intergovernmental level, a new type of distant role-partner appears on the scene: the governmental ministry, the intergovernmental agency. Looking through the list of satisfiers (goods and services) given in table 2 many of the ministries and agencies are readily identified. It does not take much imagination to supplement the list with some more: the Ministry for Love and Friendship, the International Agency for Marriage-Making. The more segmented (and fragmented, marginalized) a society, the less competent will
people become in intra-personal and inter-personal integration (and love, friendship, and marriage certainly have to do with that); hence, as these needs persist, new satisfiers will be created—and the ministry/agency is the form into which problem-solving is cast in this phase of Western (and hence, by implication, also for much of the rest of the world) history. Any list is an encouragement for governmental and intergovernmental bureaucratic growth and differentiation, for professional specialization, and in general division and subdivision of labor. Since these are so deeply ingrained in our societies, the process will also work the other way: lists of needs will be refined further, including sub-needs and subsub-needs and so on, to correspond to increasingly specialized producers of satisfiers. 

Again this is not implicit in needs theory as will be seen immediately, but there is no doubt that analytical rather than holistic presentation of needs renders itself to this kind of process. On the other hand, it is difficult to prevent lists from being made. Moreover, the problem is not so much located in the subdivision of needs as in the specificity of the satisfiers. With specific satisfiers geared to meet only one need, we get the matrix to the left in figure 3; with diffuse satisfiers geared to meet several needs at the time, we get the matrix to the right:

Fig. 3. Segmented and integrated modes of need-satisfaction, II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S₁</th>
<th>S₂</th>
<th>S₃</th>
<th>S₄</th>
<th>S₅</th>
<th>S₁</th>
<th>S₂</th>
<th>S₃</th>
<th>S₄</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N₁</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>. .</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>N₁</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>N₄</td>
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<td>. .</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>N₄</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: need; S: satisfier; x: satisfaction; o: irrelevance. Possible negative effects are not shown in this presentation.
To the left is the one-one correspondence, orderly and neat, that so easily grows out of planning and specialization; to the right a complex pattern where there may still be some very specific satisfiers, but most of them are diffuse, meeting any needs. They are satisfier-contexts, meeting need-complexes: a good meal in an esthetic surrounding, in good company, good talk, perhaps some music, much friendship and love—and joint food-making not only joint food consumption. Of course, the analytically minded may still discern components both on the need side and the satisfier side and subdivide till a matrix of the segmented type is produced. This is what one might expect of any Western intellectual trained that way since this is part of our craft; the problem is how it appears to people, not to analysts.

Thus for the need-subject it may still all hang together, but why? Because of the unity of space, time and people and action—like the old precepts for Greek drama. In other words, there is an intimate relation between segmentation and integration as displayed in figure 2 and as displayed in figure 3: the separation in terms of location and social actors in figure 2 is almost necessary in order to obtain the type of specificity given in figure 2. Without that separation the place and the people, all the things around that do not change will provide continuity from one satisfier to the other, and from one need to the other. Thus, the integration on the satisfier and the social context side may constitute one approach to the problem of lack of holism in the basic needs approaches.

In the phenomenon of segmentation one key to the understanding of basic lack of sense of satisfaction may also be located. The atomized, one-need-at-a-time approach may simply not lead to the same satisfaction as the more molecular approach to a whole need-complex. Maybe the belief has been that satisfaction is proportionate to the quantity of satisfier when one should have looked in another direction, the richness of the context and the complexity of the need-bundle! If there
is something to this, the obvious prediction would be increasing dissatisfaction of the diffuse kind as a consequence of increasing need-satisfaction of the specific kind! A paradox that one would not expect the protagonists of the present departmentalized social structure readily to embrace: it is too threatening.\footnote{100}

* * *

Concluding this survey of possible perversions of a general theory of needs, presenting what in reality is adaptation to Western social cosmology and social structure as if it were universal theory, let us now summarize. "Westernization" is like a machinery: something goes through and it comes out, recognizable, but twisted in particular directions. Thus, our assumption is that Western theories of needs will tend to claim universal validity; that the approach to time will be non-contradictory and mechanistic; that the epistemology of needs will be analytical, non-holistic; that needs whose satisfaction generates conflicts of scarcity will be overemphasized; that nature will be seen as without needs; that there will be a strong division of labor between those who define the needs and those for whom needs are defined and that the former will plan the lives of the latter; that the center will propagate not only need images but also satisfiers and thereby create or awaken needs; that needs will be ordered into hierarchies thereby reinforcing current stratification into higher and lower classes, engaging in satisfaction of higher and lower needs; that need-satisfaction will be individualized; and that need-satisfaction will be increasingly segmented, one need at a time and context. If this were needs theory, the present author would be against it; a theoretical tree should be known by its theoretical and empirical fruits.\footnote{101}

But it is not. It is not even Western needs theory, although there are strong inclinations in these directions. And theory can be twisted, and those who do the twisting may be unaware that they do so, and/or may rightly/wrongly claim that others do even more twisting than they do. In this case the
distinction made is between a general needs theory and a specification adapted to Western conditions along the ten lines indicated above. From this one should not draw the conclusion that the general theory is good and the Western specification is bad. What is wanted are many more specifications, none of them pretending to be the universal truth. What is needed is a general theory broad enough to help us generate such specifications. In short: let one hundred specifications of need theory grow--.

Basic Needs Approaches: Some Strengths and Weaknesses

Basic needs approaches are certainly not new. Just to mention two traditions, the Western/Christian and Indian/Hindu. Give us today our daily bread is an invocation for minimum satisfaction of basic material needs (it certainly does not stand for bread alone); John Ruskin's Unto This Last is filled with this idea (but the source of satisfaction is now more secularized); Marx' entire theory is actually based on thinking about needs; and in the history of the UN Lord Boyd Orr's famous Quebec speech when FAO was founded in 1945 is certainly along the same line. Gandhi, deeply inspired by Christianity and John Ruskin on top of his Hindu roots always had those most in need as top priority, in theory and practice. This orientation is reflected in Indian planning, perhaps particularly due to the influence of the late Pitambar Pant, an extraordinary person. The twin ideas, which focus on what is fundamental and on those who lack precisely this, run through history but not as a mainstream: had it been a mainstream, then there might still have been inequality, even exploitation, but not so much abject misery. And that leads us straight to the major strength of and the major weakness of BNA.

The major strength is that BNA serve to set priorities. It is an effort to cut through rhetoric, focusing on what is
essential and basic, and to provide individuals and societies with a measuring rod that lowers the focus of social attention downwards, "unto this last," saying this: "tell me how much material and spiritual misery there is at the bottom of society and I will tell you what kind of society you have." It is then not assumed that the spiritually poor are not necessarily the same as the materially poor; what is said is that a society should be judged by the misery it produces, of either kind, not by its riches. Human suffering, deprivation shall count more, and serve to set our priorities straight.

The major weakness is that BNA say nothing about how misery is produced; they do not comprise a social theory. Thus they say nothing about inequity, for these are relations, even abstract ones, and it would be hard to assume that there is a need not to be exploited, or not to live in a society with too much inequality. Equity and equality are social values, and so is social justice. As such they may be so deeply internalized that they attain need character, but one would assume such cases to be exceptional. What is felt inside a person would be concrete deprivation, leading to concrete tension, even suffering, and that is what needs theory is about, not about social analysis. Thus, by raising the floor above a certain minimum agreed to by people themselves so that misery is abolished, basic needs will be satisfied; even when inequity and inequality are constant or even increasing. Thus, there is no automatic extension of BNA to cover all good social values; that would be to stretch the needs concept too far. And in this a major danger is located: it is quite possible, even when material and non-material needs are put on a more equal footing, to combine BNA with many kinds of exploitative processes, channeling most resources towards the rich as long as the poor are above the minimum. One may impose a social maximum, a ceiling—but between ceiling and floor there may still be inequality and inequity; there may be need-satisfaction at the expense of somebody else's need-satisfaction. Needs theory does not automatically guard against that, except in the (postulated)
need to be a subject.

The answer to this should not be to pretend that BNA can offer what is not within their paradigm, but to call for additional perspectives, theories, paradigms, approaches. Most important would be theories about how misery is produced and reproduced, and such theories exist—they are indispensable to get at the roots of the phenomena. And here the words "satisfier" and "need-object" show their limitation: they give an impression of something given to the need-subject or obtained by her or him, like food or medicine. But it could also be more automatic, as something provided by the structure if the structure is set right. Further, a theory of conflict is an indispensable additional perspective: satisfiers are often scarce, there may be trade-offs and choices to be made.

A second strong point in BNA is the rich image they can give of the human being when they are not too narrowly interpreted. A list of needs like the one given in table 2 can so easily be subdivided among the social sciences, and it is rather obvious what the psychologist, the social psychologist, the sociologist, politologist, and economist would focus on, deriving their homo psychologicus, and so on till we reach homo economicus. BNA transcend such efforts at compartmentalization, aiming at rich bio-social, physiological-cultural images.

But then comes a major weakness again: the empirical procedures for developing these rich images are far from clear. Survey research may get at values, depth interviews may probe more deeply into motivations. But for needs it is more complicated: what the subject says, in spite of being a subject, is not necessarily to be taken at its face value. To use the two distinctions made use of in this paper, conscious vs. unconscious (also called manifest vs. latent) and true vs. false needs: the subject is not necessarily conscious of her or his needs, and what is held to be needs may turn out to be false needs: they may not be that important.
The answer to this would be that empirical methods do exist, but they certainly have to go beyond simply asking the person what her/his needs are. The dialogue should be a much more promising approach, around the theme "what is so important that we cannot do without it" ("we," not "you;" if a social scientist is involved; he/she is also supposed to enter the dialogue answering, not only questioning). A process of mutual probing into depth may reveal to what extent non-satisfaction of the need can really be held to be that crucial, and how much effort or sacrifice one would be willing to make for that need. This would still be verbal, only intense so that it may explore the deeper recesses of the mind.

The second major approach would be through practice, again with the same subdivision. Empirical situations of deprivation might occur where satisfiers usually present disappear wholly or partly; does disintegration take place or not? And in the concrete situation, what do people in fact sacrifice in order to meet a certain need? More particularly, are they willing to sacrifice along other need-dimensions, for if they do, that serves as an indication of relative priority. Thus, people are known to be willing to give up their lives for freedom and/or identity, so physical survival is not unconditionally the most basic need. But they are also willing to give up freedom and/or identity in order to obtain security and/or welfare—indicating the futility in trying to establish any universal linear hierarchy. From considerations such as these one arrives at a flatter need-landscape in general. For particular situations and groups clear peaks may be visible; we do not deny hierarchies in concrete situations.
Thus we have essentially four empirical approaches:

**TABLE 4**

**EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO EXPLORE NEEDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is it possible to do without?</th>
<th>How much sacrifice to have it satisfied?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal approaches</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(through dialogue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonverbal approaches</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(observation of behavior)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table can now be seen as an exercise in methodology, and one may discuss which method is more valid and which method is more reliable. The conclusion is probably that the nonverbal methods are more valid but less reliable, among other reasons because replication is less feasible; and the verbal method is more reliable, but also less valid. The verbal approach is certainly the easier to use.¹³

But the four approaches can also be seen as a form of social practice. Through dialogue people help each other, raising the general awareness and consciousness of their own true needs, manifest/conscious or latent/unconscious, meaning by that what they really cannot do without. This will have to be done by means of mental experiments, often with reference to past experience—asking both whether it is possible to do without, and how much one would sacrifice. And then from consciousness into practice: trying out, stripping one's existence of false needs, focusing much more on the true needs (not to mention the true satisfiers of the true needs), exploring what one is willing to sacrifice in practice. The good society is the society that permits such experiments within a wide range, for this is one way in which better societies can be built. And if a person engages in this endeavor, is that not a sign of maturity?
A third point in BNA is that they indicate a future agenda for development, and a very rich and open one. BNA do more than set a list of priorities, of things that must be done. Correctly understood they go beyond discussion of minimum level of satisfaction in at least three ways. First, they open for the whole exploration of true versus false needs, thereby potentially being a tool for enriching human existence. A condition for this, however, is not only to strip one’s need-set of false needs, but also to enrich it with latent, but true needs. This is where there is so much to learn from others—a reason why the union approach to universalism in the field of needs is so important. Second, they open for the whole exploration of true versus false satisfiers, question- ing all the relationships in table 2 with the pretended satisfiers precisely by being a theoretical construct, something non-observable which can serve to define a class of satisfiers from which the best, the most adequate in terms of a range of needs and resources available may be picked. Third, they open for the whole exploration of richer relations between needs and satisfiers, particularly how new satisfier-contexts can be imagined relating to whole need-complexes. Thus, maybe transcendental meditation is a way of meeting both the need for rest, health, and for identity? Anyhow, the point is to reason from the needs, combining them mentally, asking for rich satisfier contexts that may speak to new, more integrated combinations, and not to be steered by existing satisfiers simply because they are there.

The major weakness corresponding to this strength remains: there is a difference between tension relief and human development; and the image is not holistic enough. The preliminary answer would be that needs theory never assumes that needs remain at the same level, a sort of basement level in a building where values constitute the upper floors. Needs can be developed precisely because they are bio-social in character. We have tried to point to the process: through internalization of values, to want so much to do what is good and right that
it becomes a need to do so. But this will never exhaust any image of human beings because of our capacity of transcending whatever image somebody has constructed, in good directions, in bad, in both.

Conclusion: basic needs approaches are indispensable in any theory of development that sees development as development of human beings—in other theories BNA become unnecessary, even disturbing. In one way or the other, BNA will be present, even under other names. Thus, instead of letting the needs creep up that building from the basement, one may let the values creep down, into the basement, insisting that it is all culturally conditioned. But one does not escape from the idea of a conditio sine qua non. No development theory worth its name can do without an anthropology of human beings, and however vast the variations, the concept of necessary conditions remains. That the approaches are beset with problems is obvious; that constitutes important challenges for future research. But the major problems are those people, adherents or critics, who see them as the only approaches and either pretend that BNA have answers when not even the question can be formulated within a BNA paradigm, or attack it for the answers BNA cannot and should not give.

So what we need is a rich range of perspectives among which BNA are one, and a rich theory of basic needs, all of which will be very complex. And yet it will never be as complex as human life and social reality themselves, in their infinite variety. And that may turn into a virtue what to many seems like a vice built into basic needs approaches: they are not only complex, but also chaotic. But why not? Maybe they should be chaotic, to guard against the type of clarity that will only too easily serve as a basis for bureaucratic/corporate/intellectual manipulation! There is much wisdom in the tale related by Mushakoji in defense of the alternative of chaos: King Chaos died when the Kings of the Northern and of the Southern Seas "structured" him by giving him eyes and ears,
a mouth. For that reason we referred to the subject of this paper as approach, not as "model", and not as "strategy"; --well knowing there are strong forces trying to pull basic needs in that direction. Some clarification is needed, not too much--whether the present effort is adequate is for others to decide.
NOTES

* Paper presented for the Workshop on Needs, organized by the Internationales Institut für Umwelt und Gesellschaft (IIUG), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 27-29 May, 1978; for the sub-project Needs of the GPID-Project. It is also planned to appear as chapter I.3 in Johan Galtung, Dag Poleszynski, and Anders Wirak, Indicators for Development, prepared by the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, the GIPD Project. I am indebted to Poleszynski and Wirak and others at the CCPR, Oslo for countless discussions of this subject since the "World Indicators Program" was initiated in 1974, and for the discussion at the workshop. A short version of the paper was also presented at the Institut Universitaire d'études du Développement, Geneva 22 February, 1978. Some of the work was done while the author was visiting researcher at the IIUG, Berlin-West, a fine work opportunity most gratefully acknowledged.

1. In the GIPD project of the UN University, an international and interdisciplinary attempt at approaching the development problématique from all these angles at the same time is being made. One brief slogan joining these terms in one sentence would be as follows: "Development is a process transforming structures—particularly those of production/consumption and major institutions—so that basic human needs are satisfied for an increasing number of individuals at an increasingly high level" (M. Markovic), within the framework of meaning provided by culture and the outer limits provided by nature." Slogans like "self-reliance," "endogenous development," and "ecological balance" are compatible with this formulation. "Basic needs" occupies a central position because it is so closely associated with the goal of development which "should not be to develop things but develop man" (Cocoyoc Declaration). But this does not mean that it is given central epistemological position, neither descriptively nor theoretically, nor that it is the only perspective.

2. For an effort to draw a balance-sheet of strengths and weaknesses in BNA, see the concluding section.

3. For an analysis, see Johan Galtung, "Social Cosmology and Western Civilization", Papers, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research (hereafter, CCPR), 1979. No doubt this is a key concept in Western social cosmology. However, it makes a lot of difference what it is that is undergoing progress, whether, for instance, it is the "economy" as measured by the GNP, or the level of cosmic awareness, or happiness, or satisfaction of basic needs for the most needy. It may be said that all cultures have an implicit idea of progress: progress is to implement, realize basic aspects of the culture, e.g., to come closer to the One, to the transcendental. Typically western
might be the unrestrained emphasis on material progress which sooner or later will lead to competition because the material is scarce. This competitive attitude would probably also very easily carry over into non-material fields: "see how saved I am!"

4. This argument is developed in more detail in Johan Galtung and Anders Wirak, "Human Needs, Human Rights and the Theory of Development," Papers, No. 37 from the CCPR, University of Oslo (1976); also published by UNESCO in Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences, No. 37, 1977. More precisely, there is the liberal/capitalist "productionism cum consumptionism" (development as increase in domain and scope of the economic cycles); the social democratic "distributionism" (development as a more egalitarian distribution of access to goods and services); the marxist/socialist "revolutionism" (development as a special type of structural transformation in accordance with the marxist Stufengang scheme); "culurism" (development as whatever is correct by the culture at that point in space and time); and "ecologism" (development as whatever maintains, even builds ecological balance).

5. This is the thesis of automaticity, of a strong coupling between a process in the structure on the one hand and human needs satisfaction on the other. Much faith is needed to disregard all the data contradicting the liberal and the marxist automaticity theses (e.g., about trickling down and multiplier effects, or liberation of creativity), except, perhaps, for some limited groups of people or for a short period.

6. The "homo mensura" thesis (Protagoras) may have two interpretations: that ultimately it is the impact on the human being that matters, and each man/woman (or group of men/women) may have their own measure. The first interpretation would run against reifications of the types mentioned; the second against universalism. This paper picks up both interpretations.

7. This is the reason for the intimate link between reification and bureaucratization: the means become ends, and the bureaucracy administering the means reserves for itself a monopoly on the "definition of the situation;" they will tell the people how the means/ends are developing. If the ends are in the people themselves it may be more difficult to impose outside judges: the only judges are the people themselves.

8. The slogan for the official BNA so far has been "minimum satisfaction of basic/material/human needs," sometimes shortened in a way that blurs the important distinction between needs and satisfiers to "minimum needs." The most important efforts so far to define, analyze, and make some steps towards policy recommendation within the UN system are made by ILO (Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem (New York: Praeger, 1977)—very much based on the pioneering work done by the Bariloche group (Amilcar O. Herrera et al.,
Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model (Otawa: IDRC, 1976)--and by UNEP (John and Magda McHale, Basic Human Needs: A Framework for Action, with introduction by Harland Cleveland, Aspen Institute and preface by Mostafa Tolba, the UNEP executive director, [New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1977]--very much based on the work done by the Center for Integrative Studies (then at Binghampton, now at Houston) for the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies (John and Magda McHale, Human Requirements, Supply Levels and Outer Bonds: A Framework for Thinking about the Planetary Bargain, with an introduction by Harland Cleveland, Aspen, Colorado, 1975). The Bariloche concept focuses on the needs for food, housing, medical service, and schools; ILO adds to this, naturally, a "need" for employment (which would be hard to demonstrate, but not harder than to demonstrate any need for schooling--that is, there is a need for something to which schooling and employment may constitute some answers under certain conditions). The McHales are broader conceptually (but then they are not constrained by the demands to computerize, make models, simulate), focusing on food, health, education, shelter, clothing (Basic Human Needs, p. 22), but also adding some remarks on "socio-cultural needs," human rights, employment, security, recreation, and environmental protection (e.g., the matrix on pp. 118-19, both references to the book for UNEP).

The set of papers out of the ILO World Employment Programme follow up this tradition, e.g., M. J. D. Hopkins and O. D. K. Norbye, "Meeting Basic Needs: Some Global Estimates" (Geneva: ILO, 1978); papers on basic needs in Guayana (by Guy Standing, 1977) and in Somalia (by Michael J. Hopkins, 1978); not to mention Sheehan and Hopkins, "Basic Needs Performance: An Analysis of Some International Data" (1978), "The Basic Needs Approach to Development: Some Issues Regarding Concepts and Methodology" (1977), and Michael Hopkins, "Basic Needs Approach to Development Planning: A View" (1977). In the latter there is a comparison between the (minimum level of material) BNA and the World Bank approach, as expressed in H. Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (Oxford University Press, 1974) and summarizes the differences as follows:

"The main difference, of course, is the explicit focus on meeting basic needs and not solely on income generation for the poorest--basic needs is not only concerned to generate income through employment, to buy privately produced basic goods, it is also concerned that publicly provided basic goods and services, e.g., housing, health and education, reach the poorest groups of society" (p. 22).

Hopkins continues:

"Finally, perhaps the most important difference between basic needs and redistribution with growth is the process through which basic needs are to be obtained. Basic needs are not just a set of consumption items to be aimed at, they must also include a set of non-material needs which are both ends in themselves and the"
means (mass participation, self-reliance, social justice, equality) through which basic needs must be met. Therefore, any discussion of meeting basic needs targets must center around what is in the set of basic needs, who is to choose the basic needs and how is this to be done" (loc. cit.).

The last sentence summarizes the GPID approach quite well. Also see E. Lee, "Non-material Needs," ILO (mimeo, 1976). But even though Hopkins, in commenting on Lee, says "--in any attempt to determine a "core" set of needs, I would urge consideration of both material and non-material needs," the thrust of the ILO approach is certainly on the material ones.

UNESCO makes an effort to broaden the approach, as one would expect and even demand from UNESCO, in its UNESCO Policy Relevant Quality of Life Program; a presentation of which was given at the Xth World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, 14-19 August 1978. UNESCO has also voiced scepticism against BNA as competing with NIEO, see UNESCO doc. 105 EX/7, 22 September 1978.

Outside the UN mention should be made of the Overseas Development Council in Washington, e.g., John W. Sewell, The United States and World Development, Agenda 1977 (New York/London: Praeger, 1977), where the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is also presented (pp. 147-54), the index is based on life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy and yields startling results to the naive who believed that GNP had to do with such things--it ranks countries quite differently, of course. Many others could be mentioned, but the upshot is clear: the basic needs approaches so far have focused on a small number of material needs, and on the minimum or floor level of satisfaction. In the Aspen approach this is referred to as the first floor: the first floor is minimum human needs, the food, health, and education to which each person should be entitled by virtue of being born into the world we call civilized. The second floor would be such other basic needs as are defined (and redefined over time) by each nation-state for its own people (McHales, Basic Human Needs, p. 15). Nobody would belittle this highly important breakthrough in development thinking in a world where approximately 67% of the population of developing market economies can be described as seriously poor and 37% of this group as destitute (ILO, Employment, Growth and Basic Needs, pp. 21-22). But there is the very important danger in the whole approach that a group of the world population is defined as some kind of second-class citizen (a frequent expression in the Indian debate on this issue) for whom minimum satisfaction of a handful of needs is all one is aiming for. And in addition, it freezes development thinking at a very low level indeed, where development thinking should make us look forward to new horizons: increasing numbers of needs at increasing levels for increasing numbers of people.

9. Thus, there is something negative about the needs approach, very well expressed by Dorothy Lee in her "Are Basic
"The premise that man acts so as to satisfy needs presupposes a negative conception of the good as amelioration or correction of an undesirable state. According to this view, man acts to relieve tension; good is the removal of evil and welfare the correction of ills; satisfaction is the meeting of a need; good functioning comes from adjustment, survival from adaptation; peace is the resolution of conflict; fear, of the supernatural or of adverse public opinion, is the incentive to good conduct; the happy individual is the well-adjusted individual."

No doubt, there is in the need concept the idea of tension relief. But these tensions are real, whatever the mix of the physiological/cultural basis. When she argues that "it is value, not a series of needs, which is at the basis of human behavior" (ibid.), she is obliterating the important distinction between values in general and values so basic that the tension resulting from non-fulfillment becomes destructive. Needs are in this latter category, and it is not a fixed category. We can turn values into needs, the question is, which values should become needs?

10. Erich Fromm, in his seminal To Have or to Be? has a list of characteristics of "The New Man" (pp. 170ff.), introduced by the following words: "The function of the new society is to encourage the emergence of a new Man, beings whose character structure will exhibit the following qualities: willingness to give up all forms of having in order to fully be" and so on, and so forth. I like the list; it is full of moral exhortations, but then why not? In a sense it is a list of what it means to be good, to others and to oneself. To many people these are not only values but needs in the sense that not to be/do/act like that would have very negative consequences. Thus, a need may be said to be a deeply internalized value, and the question is, again, which values should be internalized?

11. Thus, world philosophies tend to be relatively silent on material needs, with the important exception of some of the basic western philosophies in Antiquity, important for the general materialistic bias of western thought (but they may also have been misinterpreted, and at any rate, the Middle Ages were less materially bent). What is generally associated with Oriental thought (for a good survey see J. K. Feibleman, Understanding Oriental Philosophy (New York: Horizon Press, 1976) has a very non-material bias. Some such biases are dialectical: one tradition tries to correct for the other, exposing humankind to images that are either non-materially poor or so full of disdain for the material that many human capacities remain underdeveloped; needs remain embryonic—human development is low. As can be seen from footnote 8 this is also very much the case with BNA: there is some kind of strange fear in connection with the non-material needs, leaving references to them parenthetical,
not integrated into the major body of thought.

12. There is an assumption, though, perhaps an unwarranted one, that they may be made conscious about their needs, e.g., through psychoanalysis and related procedures, through dialogues with others, and through practice.

13. Thus, there is agreement with Andrzej Siciński, in "The Concepts of 'Need' and 'Value' in the Light of the Systems Approach," in Social Sciences Information, 1978, pp. 71-91, when he writes:

"we may adopt the following definition: a need of a given system is that property because of which a defined state of the environment of that system is a necessary condition of the undisturbed functioning of the system in this environment. If a need is not satisfied, that condition is not met, which results in the functioning of the system being disturbed" (emphasis his, p. 73).

What he calls "a defined state of an environment" is what here will be called a satisfier or a need-object, and Siciński puts its location in the environment (in the system theory sense)—assuming, it seems, that what is called a need is something a system cannot meet itself; the environment has to come into the picture. However this may be, there is the idea of "necessary condition." Siciński applies the concept of "need" to systems, defined as "any set of objects with relationships between them and between their attributes" (loc. cit.). This is too broad for my purpose; I shall use it only for human beings, and refer to the broader concept of "necessary condition" simply as that, as "necessary condition."

14. Thus, some concept of freedom, not only of choice but of insight in how to choose, would be associated with a need in all societies and cultures, not because complete uniformity and regimentation are found nowhere, but because they are resented everywhere. This statement is clearly different from any hypothesis to the effect that "there is a need for freedom of choice of consumer goods, or of spouse, everywhere."

15. The danger, though, would be that one may abstract away from the particularities of any specific list in order to establish classes of needs at higher, and more universal, levels. But this danger is inherent in any process of abstraction.

16. So, what if a person says, and even demonstrates, that he/she would "disintegrate" unless in a position to dominate somebody? Such people exist, indeed. There is no argument that this may be a deeply internalized value, but that does not mean that we accept it. We might even like to challenge the culture that gives rise to that value.

17. Siciński uses the broader term "environment"—of which the social context is a part. The emphasis on social context
serves the purpose of showing that there is no contradiction between saying that the needs are located inside individual human beings as need-subjects, and that many of them are social in character. In other words, there is no logical link assuming that from "needs are located inside individuals" it follows that "needs are satisfied by individuals in isolation," conjuring images of the hermit in a cave, the lonely Norwegian in his hut (the lieutenant in Hamsun's Pan, with his dog), of masturbation rather than social sexuality. When this misunderstanding so often appears in the less reflected literature it is probably due to a failure to distinguish between need-subjects and need-objects/satisfiers.

18. And from here there is a straight line back to the negative argument in favor of the BNA. The "nation/society has a need for production/consumption, for revolution, for cultural preservation or cultural change, for nature preservation of utilization," etc., are incorrectly formulated sentences, demagogically designed to give to political programs the character of something that has to be done for human beings to survive and develop, implicit in the concept of need. To attack the need concept on the basis of such demagogical uses of the concept is equally demagogic.

19. Siciński, "Concepts of Need and Value," p. 73f., speaks of a logical hierarchy of needs, namely:

"(1) needs whose non-satisfaction results in the annihilation of the system (these could be termed as in traditional terminology fundamental needs);

"(2) needs whose non-satisfaction results in the system's inability to perform some of its functions;

"(3) needs whose non-satisfaction results in disturbances in the system's performance of some of its functions;

"(4) needs resulting in disturbances in the development of the system (this applies to self-organizing systems in particular)."

In other words, this is an example of a hierarchy based on how destructive non-satisfaction is.

20. Unless, of course, as a part of a hunger strike unto death, as a weapon in a struggle for freedom and identity, for instance. Such things happen, showing clearly that physical survival is not necessarily the need accorded top priority in all situations.

21. The English language offers another example of this: "invalid" not only means "non-valid," but also "handicapped."

22. For more explorations of how dialectic apparent dichotomies turn out to be, see the article by Katrin Lederer in this volume.


25. I am indebted to my colleagues in the World Order Models Project for stimulating discussions on this subject, especially during the meeting in New Brunswick, August 1976.

26. Thus, both Gandhi and guerilla type resistance are based on very decentralized, numerous, and autonomous units—so that the society cannot be hit at any central point and dominated from that point.


29. It is actually being made use of in another GPID sub-project, "Alternative Ways of Life"; see Proceedings from the conference in Cartigny, April 1978.

30. This is a major lacunae in current development studies, and one of the many purposes of the GPID project is precisely, through interregional studies, to try to study Western society explicitly not on its own terms, but in terms of non-Western societies—e.g., as seen by foreign students and workers, to see what light that can shed on problems of maldevelopment in the "First world."

31. The best known author, most worthy of being discussed, is, of course, Abraham H. Maslow. His famous hierarchy was put forward in "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review L (1943), pp. 370-96; also see his books, New Knowledge in Human Values (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); Toward a Psychology of Being (Princeton: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1962); Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York: Viking Press, 1971). His hierarchy (from 1943) has five levels: at the bottom are physiological needs (hunger, thirst, oxygen, recovery from fatigue) and safety needs (freedom from pain, protection of physiological goals); in the middle, belongingness and love needs (friendship, love, and tender affection); at the top are esteem needs (prestige, achievement, status, and dominance) and need for self-actualization (expression of capacities and talents). We have grouped
them in these three because that seems to correspond not too badly with what one may associate with lower, middle, and upper classes in our vertical societies; the middle classes taking physiological and safety needs for granted but not able to actuate the highest group of needs; the upper classes deeply engaged in exactly that, taking the others for granted--maybe discovering that in the struggle for esteem and self-actualization, belongingness and love needs somehow get neglected. Any vertical ordering of needs is likely to be reflected in social stratification one way or the other, and a theory of needs hierarchy may therefore easily become a justification of social hierarchy.

32. This is very clearly reflected in the classical Hindu caste system with the brahmin on top and the laborer, the shudra at the bottom.

33. One is reminded of the classical text in this field by Eugen Kogon, *Der SS-Staat* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1961).

34. If for the sake of the argument we assume that the Western threshold is higher, meaning that more material satisfaction is needed before any attention is given to non-material needs, then we would also expect that in their tendency to universalize Westerners will assume these thresholds to be universal. This, in turn, means that Westerners will constantly be taken by surprise by the willingness of other peoples to struggle for freedom and identity even under conditions of material deprivation that inactivate completely an average Westerner. That both well-fed and well-clad people may be willing to lay down their lives for freedom and identity is well known and also throws doubt on the assumption of primacy in an absolute sense to security needs, to physical survival.

35. This is spelled out in more detail in Galtung and Wirak, "Human Needs, Human Rights, and the Theory of Development." G. Rist has offered the idea of a monastery instead, as a comment to the list in table 2--wrong if the need-class freedom is included, probably a good description if the range of needs is curtailed to include security, welfare, and identity only (in the GPID network meeting, January 1978). Elise Boulding (in the World Order Models Project [WOMP] meeting, August 1976) has suggested that one may still have a zoo with all four need-classes met--one may program people to accept administrative solutions to all problems rather than increase behavioral ability and the human capacity to sense the needs of others. The answer would be that this is a misreading both of identity and freedom needs--it would run against either class of needs.

36. The human rights tradition, which has its traditional strength in the field of freedom, has recently added much in the fields of security and welfare, but is still relatively weak in the field of identity. For an analysis, see Johan Galtung and
Anders Wirak, "On the Relationship Between Human Rights and Human Needs."

37. Neither liberalism, nor marxism, can be said to be a strong on emphasizing the possibility of non-material growth before or together with material growth.

38. Thus, a consensus in the UN around material needs would probably break down very quickly if the intricate, "philosophical" problems pertaining to identity and freedom should be entered into, with the First world accusing the Second world of repression and the Second world accusing the First world of alienation (and the First world retorting with a tu quoque), the Third world obtaining nothing for lack of consensus. The spiritual poverty of liberalism and marxism (compared, for instance to Oriental thought) may have been necessary for this consensus to be worked out--for good or for bad.


40. This version is also used in the author's critique of Western technology in Development, Environment and Technology, UNCTAD, Geneva, 1979.

41. In so doing it is also a response to the critique of the needs concept by my colleague Gilbert Rist (see his chapter in this volume). At least in earlier versions I perceive his critique as being directed not against needs theory but against the Western perversions of needs theory--or against some of them. For a more effective critique of that kind of needs theory, a map of Western social cosmology and social structure is needed to generate hypotheses about what kind of biases would be likely.

42. It is important because the world will now increasingly need a more abstract concept of "Westernness" to understand better what is happening. Power located in the West may be declining; Westernness may, in spite of that, or even because of that, be on the rise.

43. One might even say that this is the function of the UN system from a Western angle: what is profoundly Western may look more universal clothed in a UN resolution, at least till one starts asking questions about the degree of Westernization in the UN.

44. But there are difficulties here. In a paper by Brigitte Janik, "Die Befriedigung der existentiellen Grundbedürf-
nisse des Menschen als Faktor der Entwicklung und der Entwick-
ungsplanung," Vierteljahresberichte - Probleme der Entwicklungs-
länder, no. 47, March 1972, from the Friedrich Ebertstiftung,
pp. 77-94, the needs for calories and protein are given, sex-
specific, age-specific and for regions (the latter from FAO)
(p. 83). Keeping weight and height constant, the most needy are
men in the age group 18-35 (2900 cal), the least needy are women
in the age group 55-75 (1600 cal); this is for Europe and the
U.S. As to region: according to FAO the most needy are the North
American (2710 cal--but they get 3090, 14% overconsumption),
and the least needy are the people in "Asia and the Far East"
(2210 cal, but they get 1990, an underconsumption of 10%). But
how much of this is a self-fulfilling prophecy--the argument
being "because they are smaller they should get less" when the
reality is "because they get less they are smaller"? Even if the
standards for infants are the same? Anyhow, according to this
North Americans in general, and men 18-35 years, all over have
some kind of strange community: they are calorie need neighbors.

45. This becomes even more clear when needs are made life-
cycle specific, something relatively few authors have done. One
fine exception is McHales, Basic Human Needs, pp. 52-56. If
in addition history is brought into the picture, there will be
many places to search for companions with the same or similar
needs profiles, and hence a potential sense of solidarity.

46. The list given in Ervin Laszlo et al., Goals for Man-
kind (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1977) are not of this kind; they
do only in part refer to needs--mainly to goals such as enrich-
ment, power (couched in various terms), etc. It might be inter-
esting to have several groups look at to what extent these goals
can be said to reflect basic human needs at all.

47. In a paper for the seminar "Objectifs, Processus et

48. In Hindu thought this seems to be a basic element:
everybody has something of a Hindu in him and her; it is a
question of becoming aware of it. For the Christian there is a
potential Christian in everybody, but an act of conversation
is needed to bring it out; it is not there without faith.

49. Thus, the classification system suggested makes it
possible to explore such absolutely basic political and stra-
tegic problems as the time order: what kind of society does one
get by emphasizing welfare before freedom, or by trying to let
them grow together? It should be easy to formulate such problems,
the step from needs theory to everyday life both at the people
level and the politician level should not be too long.

50. See Johan Galtung, "What is Cultural Development?"
51. This is analyzed in some detail in Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad, Erik Rudeng, "On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared," Papers, no. 75, CCPR, University of Oslo, 1978.

52. The basic point is always to keep one's mind open and regard these as hypotheses, not as laws. Incidentally, the mistake of inferring from relations between need-classes to relations between need-dimensions is an example of the "ecological fallacy" for variables (it is usually for units of analysis, as when correlations for attributes of nations are automatically supposed to hold also for attributes of people); see J. Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (London: Columbia University Press, Allen & Unwin, 1967-68), pp. 45-48.

53. World history is then seen as some kind of rolling agenda, first welfare, then . . . , and so on--always assuming that the West is tackling the more advanced points on the agenda.

54. This is particularly important in connection with needs research, to avoid the fallacy of universalism. The ideographic trends in anthropology and history are indispensable for this reason, which does not mean that nomothetic approaches do not also have a role to play.

55. About this social science seems to have produced nothing. It is tempting to make comparisons with music, to see a person's life written as a score, each instrument corresponding to a need. Some may be silent, some may keep the same value throughout (meaning that the cycles are very long, but hardly infinite), others may oscillate in a fairly regular fashion, still others may show wild patterns through time. The score metaphor could sensitize us to vertical reading of the score: would there be points where many lines peak, at the same time? Or multiple troughs? What does it mean to "quality of life," to a general sense of well-being if many satisfactions coincide in time? How do people compose their scores, how free are they to do so, not only in terms of social forces restraining them, but also in terms of consciousness? What is it, this strange thing called savoir-vivre if not exactly an ability to compose needs-scores consciously and meaningfully? That is, not only letting each curve of need-satisfaction unfold independently of the others, but somehow harmonizing them, thereby also obtaining "peak experiences"? (Maslow, Psychology of Being, p. 160).

56. In Galtung, "On Alpha and Beta," alpha and beta structures are seen as two modes of existence; the rhythm of oscillation between them becomes a crucial factor in exploring how they can be combined.

57. Hence, a major topic of research in this field is precisely how to develop more holistic images. In what language can it be expressed without becoming some type of bla-bla?
58. Surveys also ask for general satisfaction, naively so, but maybe that is the most meaningful approach—maybe there is something naive, as opposed to "scientific" in the Cartesian sense, in holism? Thus, in the very important global survey (60 countries, 10,000 people) conducted by the Gallup International Research Institutes for The Charles F. Kettering Foundation, *Human Needs and Satisfactions: A Global Survey*, Summary Volume, June 1977, a key table reads as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;Generally, how happy would you say you are? (%)&quot;</th>
<th>Western Latin America</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very happy</td>
<td>40 20 32 18 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly happy</td>
<td>50 60 38 50 41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not too happy</td>
<td>9 18 28 31 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We leave interpretation aside; it certainly does not show, as expressed many times in the report, the "the people in the "materialistic" affluent nations are, on average, happier" (p. 16, p. 12)—look at Western Europe relative to Latin America. The clear difference is between the U.S. and the Far East, but from that it does not follow that the difference is due to level of affluence. But the point is that this is not only a global survey, it also reports fairly global sentiments.

59. The survey just mentioned (see footnote 58) would see this as exceptional, though. In general terms material well-being seems to correlate with general feelings of satisfaction (but correlation is not causation; there may be third factors operating).

60. A typical description of the image developed is:

"The left hemisphere generally specializes in analytic, rational thinking, especially in verbal and mathematical functions. It processes information in an orderly, linear fashion and is responsible for our time sense. The right hemisphere is predominantly concerned with synthetic and intuitive patterns of thought. It is primarily responsible for our spatial relationships, artistic endeavors, body image and recognition of faces. Its verbal ability is quite limited" (Bloomfield et al., *TM Discovering Inner Energy and Overcoming Stress* (New York: Dell, 1975), p. 66.

The point is not to posit one half against the other, but to obtain a harmonic balance between them, as emphasized by R. F. Ornstein in his *The Psychology Of Consciousness* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1972).

61. In *Basic Human Needs*, pp. 52-56, the McHales reproduce a chart from the US National Academy of Sciences, *Rapid Population Growth, 1971*, seeing the need for schools, housing, food, jobs, and personal health services as a function of years after birth age. The chart reproduces the obvious: the need for health
is highest close to the entry into and the exit from life; the need for housing and food increase towards adulthood and then remains fairly constant. And then the reproduction of dominant lifestyle: the need for jobs is seen as highest in middle age, very low towards either end; the need for schooling is from 5 to 20 only, with a peak around 10 years of age. No doubt, this is a way of organizing one's life, but it should be seen as only one way. Why not schooling throughout? Why not jobs throughout, even with a trough in mid-life, leaving time for reflection? Why not a variety of ways of life?

62. Dangerously close here would be a thesis mirroring the well-known heuristic from biology, that ontogenetic development is similar to phylogenetic development; describing countries with material abundance and hence at least the possibility of devoting themselves more to non-material pursuits, as more mature.

63. No doubt, the definition of a person as a need-bundle with clearly defined cut-off points, minima and maxima, for need-satisfaction, renders people eminently suited for administration by others.

64. In other words, if there is something basically wrong with a culture, e.g., because it produces phenomena like nazism, stalinism, and the war in Vietnam, would one still assume that adults are more mature than children?

65. A difference between instinct theory and needs theory, and an important one at that, would be that whereas needs vary greatly and are not only bio-physiologically, but also socially and culturally determined, instincts would be seen as bio-physiological, species-typical, and, hence, universal. Thus, the transition from one theory to the other also permits much more flexibility and variation in general.

66. Thus, the West would not have to reject Being as opposed to the more material Having; the West could embrace Being as long as it could make some competition and zero-sum games out of it!

67. Karen Horney, in her famous The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, expresses this position.

68. Thus, the assumption would not be that needs to dominate and to be aggressive, the psychological material out of which structural and direct violence can be built, cannot be true needs within some culture, but it can be argued that these are underdeveloped cultures precisely because they instill such needs in people. According to this view a developed culture (see Galtung, "What is Cultural Development?") promotes values that when internalized to the point of becoming needs inspire behavior that does not impede need-satisfaction in others (outside the culture), nor in those inside as judged by
standards common in the rest of the world. To stop the exploration of human needs with the idea that the culture makes everything right, that suttee and clitoridectomy are sanctioned by the culture and hence sacrosanct, is the extreme in cynicism, and exactly the type of "culturism" referred to in this paper.

69. Thus, the article on "Needs, Human" in Hunter and Whitten, Encyclopedia of Anthropology (New York: Harper, 1976), pp. 283f is divided into three parts: individual needs, social needs that seem to be

"a minimal social structure to facilitate ordered, necessary cooperative activities, necessary conditions for the society not to disintegrate, and canalization ('the process of meeting individual needs in specific ways unique to each society's resources and beliefs')."

Nothing is added through the concept of social needs, except some vague functionalism.

70. The effort to try to draw a line between humans and animals are countless. My own favorite formula is something like this:

"both animals and humans are programmed, but it is given to humans to some extent to reflect on this program and to change it, again to some extent. It is this self-transcending character that renders distinctness to man."

According to a view of this kind, animals do not have needs, they have instincts because needs can be the objects of reflection. This certainly does not mean that there are not necessary conditions that have to be fulfilled for any form of life to continue and unfold.


72. And I am quite willing to see my own position (footnote 70) as something to be overcome, precisely as an example of Westernness. I can see that it draws too sharp a distinction between homo sapiens and the primates. Thus, all we know about homo sapiens neandorthalensis would put it together with us, homo sapiens sapiens--but what about the primates and the in-betweens? A continuum rather than dichotomy? Or are such distinctions simply due to our lack of insight into animals, possibly not because we are not good at communicating with them, but because they do not even care to communicate with us?

73. "When time is ripe"--the "principle of unripe time" that may serve to legitimize almost any repression.

74. But not at meeting them in any way possible; in a human way (as emphasized by Anders Wirak, "Human Needs as Basis for Indicator Formation," Papers, CCPR, University of
Oslo). One way of formulating this might be as follows: development is not only to satisfy the needs of the need-subjects, but that this is done in such a way that the need-subjects can control the need-objects, decide over them. This is also one way of defining self-reliance, like the Chinese Tzu li keng sheng (re-generation through own efforts). For a very interesting example, see The Basic Human Needs and Their Satisfaction, Sarvodaya Development Education Institute, Moratuwa, Sri Lanka, with a preface by the president of the Sri Lanka Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, A. T. Ariyaratne. The needs are classified in ten classes: environment, water, clothing, food, housing, health care, communication, fuel, education, and spiritual/cultural needs. Thus the focus is on material needs, and the 167 satisfiers listed—based on dialogues with Sarvodaya villagers—are mainly material (no. 33: to have a raised raft built to keep pots and pans). But they are all within the reach of the villagers themselves, with modest means, and hence a basis on which autonomous development can start. Surely it will not necessarily stop at that level, neither materially, nor non-material. Needs are dynamic!

75. See the article by Yona Friedman in this volume.

Denis Goulet, in a paper "Strategies for Meeting Human Needs" (prepared for the "Bread for the World Education Fund," 1978), writes:

"- Perhaps the most intriguing contemporary needs theorist is Ivan Illich, who preaches an "iron law" of need-pre-emption, according to which packagers with a vested interest in providing certain goods pre-empt the social legitimacy surrounding "generic" needs and redefine them to match the "specific" goods they themselves provide. Illich charges schools with doing this to meet the hunger for knowledge; hospitals and doctors to profit from the desire all people have to enjoy good health; and automobile manufacturers to translate locomotion needs to a need for cars."

In a sense this is a rather obvious point, but one worth repeating provided it can stimulate imagination in finding other satisfiers if we accept the needs. Of course, a critique of these satisfiers is not the same as a critique of the needs.


77. For a good analysis form one Third world point of view, see Firouz Vakil, "Basic Human Needs and Growth Process: The Dimension of Conflict," Aspen-Gajareh Workshop, Iran, June 1977.

78. This, of course, is a key point in Marxist analysis; and exactly the reason why Marx had to make use of need concepts.
This also shows that it may be useful to retain some of the old means-ends distinction in spite of the heavy critique of it. Reasoning from the satisfiers rather than from the goals, the needs themselves will have consequences for the redefinition of the needs. Thus, if the satisfiers are very unfunctional--food is just nutrition, not also an act of sharing, anesthetic experience--then the need set will probably also be structured as a heap of unrelated needs, thereby impoverishing life quality.

This is where the obvious linkage with market and sales promotion under capitalist economic structures enters: satisfiers can be promoted, a whole structure exists for that purpose, but they can only be sold and consumed if some kind of need is created for them. That need has to be implanted in people (see Goulet quoting Illich in footnote 75 above). In some cases this may bring to the surface latent but true needs; in other cases artificial, false need are created. The experience of children with toys is interesting here. There is a need for something which toys can satisfy--but what kind of toys? Children are fascinated by glittering, expensive looking toys, get them and get tired of them after one day--because they are too well made, too programmed, not sufficiently full of unexplored possibilities. The moment they are discarded the child may turn to a heap of pebbles, some old brick, etc. But the market does not press these upon her/him, which may mean that the child still has the capacity to be honest, to be faithful to true needs rather than to give in to the forces of the market. Socialization into adult consumer behavior, then, is socialization into dishonesty towards oneself--in part.

This managerial approach is very visible in the Bariloche model: everything is turned into market prices; the problem is how to generate enough income so that people can buy food and housing and the state can get enough revenue to provide for health and education. It is also found in the ILO "Blue Book," a preparatory document for the important 1976 conference, and in Hopkins/Norbye, 1978, e.g., pp. 41ff, in spite of Hopkins' excellent statements to the contrary (see footnote 8). And it is found in a less economically biased way in Soedjatmoko, "National Policy Implications of the Basic Needs Model," PRISMA, Indonesian Journal of Social and Economic Affairs, no. 9, March 1978, pp. 3-25. True, the article is about "the national policy framework for development with the Basic Needs Model" (p. 4) and also the international implications. But they have to be linked to self-reliance at the local level, as the Chinese experience indicates. There is indeed the danger, as the author says, "that after so many detours and compromises one has lost one's way, one's soul" (p. 25). For the point is that self-reliance is not only a strategy for the implementation of the basic needs "model" (it is certainly not a model, a concept is not a model); it is a part of the BNA. On the other hand, there is also the point that Erich Fromm has sensitized us to in his Escape from Freedom,
"who fears that most people prefer to have their needs paterna-
listically met by others so that they can escape from freedom"  
(quoted from Goulet, op. cit., p. 8).

82. For one effort to interpret some of the research in
this field, see Johan Galtung, "Culture, Structure and Mental

83. For a minimum easily becomes a maximum, or at least
a platform of social and political rest.

84. It should be noted that the Maslow hierarchy is good
for not only a more continuous stratified social order, but
also for the more dichotomous social order implicit in the idea
of a class society because of the clear difference between the
lower two and the higher two (three) levels.

85. I shall never forget the precise answer I got in a
wedding party in Southern India, with six hundred guests, tents,
tables, and the most delectable food beautifully laid out when
I made some compliments on the whole setting: "This is not for
common people, this is for people high up."

86. This also applies to what one might call the social
market, the market places of social interaction: the closed
political, social, religious group, not all of them keeping
the masses out (some also keep the elites out, in practice),
but very well mirroring social class formation.

87. See Sicinski, "Concepts of Need and Value" and foot-
note 19, above.

88. Excellent in this connection is the famous chapter
on the medical system in "Alcott Parsons, The Social System
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1951) made use of by Illich in his
Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (New York: Harper,
1974).

89. And this goes beyond needs for freedom and identity.
As the Norwegian author Finn Carling, himself handicapped, in
his many excellent books on the handicapped points out: most
"sick" people or "handicapped" people are only partially sick
or handicapped, most of them is healthy and represents capa-
cities. There is a need to use and develop further capacities,
also when a part of the person is sick.

90. In the Christian tradition, according to the Gospels,
somatic and mental deficits seemed to be regarded in the same
way: "And whatever their illness and pain, or if they were pos-
sessed by demons, or were insane or paralyzed--he healed them
all" (Matthew, 4:24).

91. It is already there: the welfare state as the con-
tinuation of the Good Samaritan tradition, secularized and
bureaucratized, with the sick giving up whatever healing power they themselves might have, abdicating to the non-sick. Thus, the Good Samaritan could not do without this type of verticality in society, nor can the welfare state without its clients.

92. This is a point of departure for a discussion of the phenomenon of overdevelopment. A satisfier may work positively up to a certain point, after that there are diminishing returns, then it becomes even counterproductive. See Johan Galtung and Monica Wemegah, "Overdevelopment and Alternative Ways of Life in the Rich Countries," paper for the Alternative Ways of Life subproject, GPID project, Geneva 1978.


94. The hermit tradition in India is legendary. Maybe it has its parallel in the West in the Robinson Crusoe idea. the person who proves his capacity not only for self-reliance but for complete self-sufficiency under adverse conditions? But note the difference: the Indian hermit seeks the transcendental and is admired if he comes closer; Robinson Crusoe is a spiritual dwarf, but a material hero—generations of children have admired his ability to eke out a material living under such circumstances.


96. The medical opinion on this seems to oscillate: sometimes eating is supposed to be concentrated on meals, at regular hours; sometimes the idea is that a little eating spread over the day is better (which seems to be the way animals do it when left to themselves). Medical opinion is probably to some extent dictated by social norms, and should not be seen as based on physiological premises only. It is like the admonition to "fasten your seat belts," presumably for the safety of passengers in case of a crash, in practice to leave the corridors open for the personnel.


98. The drugs should be good examples here; it would be interesting to know to what extent people start inferring diseases from the existence of drugs rather than asking for drugs because they are ill. As there are very many drugs, this should open a vast range of diseases.
99. One is reminded of meals in the Antiquity—an indication is given in Plato's Symposium—a very rich combination of material and non-material satisfiers indeed! How important was a slave economy in making this possible? And what about sex: earlier generations and other cultures seem to link sexual togetherness to peaks of social experience, not as group sex, but as a culmination of "tribal" dances, etc., with the couples drifting into the woods and fields. The so-called relaxation of sexual taboos in the 1960s and 1970s should perhaps be seen more as a way of recapturing patterns that got lost at some point.

100. Thus, a basic point for those who argue in favor of new life styles is not to ask the authorities for any help, guidance, steering of the process—all they want is to do it themselves, and the major task of the authorities will be not to stay in the way.

101. Thus, there is agreement, by and large, with the points made by Gilbert Rist (see his article in the present volume) if they are seen as directed against a special interpretation of BNA, not BNA in general.

102. And then there is Jesus feeding the masses, Mark 6:37-44 and Mark 8:2-9.

103. See the important book by Agnes Heller, Theorie der Bedürfnisse bei Marx (Berlin-West: VSA, 1976). In the very beginning the author states that Marx's innovations consisted above all in the idea that what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor but labor-force, the idea of surplus, and the idea of use value—and adds: "Untersucht man nun die drei Entdeckungen, die Marx sich selber zuschreibt, ist es nicht schwer nachzuweisen, daß alle drei auf irgendeine Weise auf den Begriff Bedürfnis aufgebaut sind" (p. 23). The entire first chapter, Vorbemerkungen: Über den Marxsehen Bedürfnis-Begriff (pp. 23-42) serves as an excellent introduction, and shows also how modern Marx is in terms of needs thinking—for the theory of needs has not developed inside the Marxist tradition that tends to be more sceptical (for reasons, among others, explored in section 6, particularly the first objection to needs theory).

104. "The hungry people of the world wanted bread and they were given statistics— No research was needed to find out that half the people in the world lacked sufficient food for health." Very clearly basic needs-oriented are the words of Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of December 10, 1948:

"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lacks of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."
And then there is the important report on "International Definition and Measurement of Standards and Levels of Living," United Nations, 1954, listing categories of material needs, adding at the end "human freedoms." Thus, the idea has been with the UN from the very beginning, but in different terminology. The debate within the UN about the proper position of basic needs in development strategy, not to mention the selection of development strategies to meet basic needs, is terribly important, and the steps forward should be appreciated, not belittled. At the same time as many watchful eyes are needed--there are strong forces at work.

105. The whole idea of "constructive work" and "positive action," so essential as part of a dialectic where "non-cooperation" and "civil disobedience" constituted the other part, was aiming exactly at basic needs for the most needy.

106. "In India the very first five year plan, commencing in 1951, took explicit notice of the need for broadening income distribution and meeting the special needs of the poor.... The present exponents of the basic human needs strategies in general differ from the second and third five years plans in India, not in the way they meet basic needs, but only in leaving out the heavy industry emphasis which came into the second and third plans. It is no wonder that many developing countries think that a concern for basic human needs springs from a desire to see to it that developing countries do not become modern, and hence, able to compete effectively in international power politics" (John Mellor, International Food Policy Research Institute, "Basic Human Needs - A Development Perspective," presented at the International Development Conference, Washington, February 1978, pp. 2-4).

B. S. Minhas in "Growth, Poverty and Basic Needs: The Current Development Debate," prepared for a Rothko Chapel conference, Houston, Texas, February 1977, writes that a paper prepared in 1962 ("Perspective for Development - 1961-1976: Implications of Planning for a Minimum Level of Living," reprinted in T. N. Srinivasan and P. K. Bardhan, eds., Poverty and Income Distribution in India, Statistical Publishing Society [Calcutta, 1974]), was poorly received from academic economists ("I remember a large number of visiting experts--I fail to remember anybody who showed any interest in it"). In 1972 and 1973, basic needs, self-reliance, and participation were given a better hearing, but "Unfortunately, the final document of the Fifth Five Year Plan, which appeared two and a half years too late in September 1976 under the Emergency regime, is almost silent on removal of poverty and the basic minimum needs strategy" (pp. 7-8).

Of course, the Indira Gandhi regime was a typical developmentalist regime, giving relatively free hand to the capitalists, tying the hands of the two forces that can restrain them--the
the trade unions and the ministries. The present author remembers a party in Madras in January 1976 with business people: enthusiasm for Indira Gandhi (also expressed in the full-page ads, "Thank you, Indira!"). It should also be mentioned that there is in India a trend of mobilizing scientists for basic needs-oriented research, as in the famous ASTRA (Application of Science and Technology to Rural Areas) cell at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore—see B. M. Udgaonkar, "Research and Basic Human Needs—Closing the Widening Gap," paper prepared for the UNESCO Seminar on Research and Basic Human Needs, Venice, December 1975, p. 13.

107. In one of the intellectually most primitive of the many declarations of recent years, the Houston Declaration of June 1977, very much below the sophisticated level of the report the participants were assembled to discuss (John and Magda McHale, Basic Human Needs: A Framework for Action, 1977)—and presented as the "first Declaration on this subject to emanate from a meeting in the industrialized world"—it is written like a discovery:

"The satisfaction of human needs is indeed the whole purpose of growth, trade and investment, development assistance, the world food system, population policy, energy planning, commodity stabilization, ocean management, environment protection, monetary reform—and of arms control."

As if this has not been said for ages. The point is to go beyond and at least suggest how this position is translated into political practice. Instead, the Declaration limits itself entirely to material needs, ending, with deep insight, with the sentence "Wide acceptance of responsibility for meeting "human needs" will enable industrial and developing nations to get beyond "dialogue" to a practical start on a new international economic order." Precisely, for the marketing of material satisfiers.

108. Nor that they do not at times coincide—as statistics on mental disorder show.

109. That means lower priorities to elite non-basic needs—hence not so strange if they are sceptical or outright against BNA. But a view of basic needs as leading to a zero-sum game between elites and masses overlooks the possibility of generating new satisfiers through self-reliance. Thus, it is hard to believe that the sarvodaya villages in Sri Lanka, based on much volunteerism and hard work, are competitive with elite interests. To many this would be an argument against them.

110. The history of the last generation or two of the rich developed countries under controlled, welfare state capitalism is about this. Is it possible for the whole world? My own view is yes. What capitalism presupposes is not misery or poverty at the bottom, but inequality, internationally, intra-nationally, to reward the entrepreneurs, to have vast differentials to play upon for motivation, and above all to be able to find new markets for old products when they have to cater to
old markets with new products.

111. The Bible has a clear formulation of maximum or ceiling in the admonition not to gather treasures on earth (Matthew, 6:19-24, 33). The reason given, however, is strange: because they can be destroyed or stolen (a challenge to the manufacturers of safety vaults?) It should be noted that the whole idea of minimum satisfaction of basic needs, once the satisfaction has been obtained at a minimum level, may be used as a carte blanche to go ahead more energetically than ever with the exploitation of man and nature—"but the needs are satisfied, what do you complain about now?"

112. Thus, a welfare state should eliminate as much as possible any tests of whether people really are needy, and let the availability of free milk at school luncheon be as automatic as the water in a creek in the Norwegian mountains at summer time.

113. The closest we have found to this list, developed through countless presentations and discussions with all kinds of groups, is the list given in David Krech, Richard S. Crutchfield, and Norman Livson, Elements of Psychology (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 498 (see the article by Katrin Lederer in this volume). There is a distinction between "deficiency motives" and "abundance motives," and between motives "pertaining to the body," "pertaining to relations with environment," "pertaining to relations with other people," and "pertaining to self;" eight combinations all together. The authors use "motives" rather than "needs" for reasons explained by Lederer—I prefer the sense of priority conveyed by the term "need." More famous, or infamous, in the history of the concept of needs (or related concepts) is the list of "psychogenic needs" (as distinguished from viscerogenic, or physiological ones) developed by Edward J. Murray in Motivation and Emotion (here taken from Hilgard, Atkinson, Introduction to Psychology, 4th ed., 1967). The 28 needs read like a guide to US/capitalist society:

"(1) need to gain possession and property . . .
(3) need to be tidy and clean; to be precise
(4) need to hoard, to be frugal, economical and miserly
(5) need to organize and build
(6) need to excel
(7) need to exercise power, to strive
(8) need to excite praise and commendation . . .
(14) need to influence or control others
(15) need to admire and willingly follow a superior . . ."

The list ends, incidentally, with a justification for intellectuals/researchers/professors:

"(28) need to print and demonstrate; to give information, explain, interpret, lecture."

114. Still worse, pursuing them further may even be counter-productive.

116. Paul A. Baran, in his Political Economy of Growth (London: Pelikan Books, 1973), makes a distinction between four types of potential economic surplus (defined as the difference between the output that could be produced and what might be regarded as essential consumption, p. 133):

"society's excess consumption (predominantly on the part of the upper income groups, but in some countries such as the United States also on the part of the so-called middle classes), output lost to society through the existence of unproductive workers, output lost because of the irrational and wasteful organization of the existing productive apparatus, and the output foregone owing to the existence of unemployment caused primarily by the anarchy of capitalist production and the deficiency of effective demand" (p. 134).

In situations of crisis this potential surplus is channeled into the war effort, all four types of the society are well organized. Most important here is type 1: this shows that this type of surplus is not used to satisfy really basic needs but goes to non-basic needs. Thus there is an intimate link between needs theory and surplus theory.

117. Dorothy D. Lee writes in Freedom and Culture: "I know of no culture where human physical survival has been shown, rather than unquestioningly assumed by social scientists, to be the ultimate goal."

118. Thus, there is the usual trade-off known from the general methodology of data collection in the social sciences: what one gains in validity one usually loses in reliability, and vice versa.

119. It should be noted that this excludes needs that for logical reasons cannot be satisfied for all, such as a postulated need to dominate. It does not exclude contradiction arising for empirical reasons, because of scarcity and couplings between needs and need-subjects. Thus, satisfaction of one need may very easily be at the expense of some other need-satisfaction; for oneself, for others today, for others tomorrow; along the same need-dimension or some other need-dimension. This yields a total of six combinations, also important in connection with the theory of overdevelopment. One is very clear, if I have limited resources, e.g., of time, shall I use it to get a job done or to relax—an intra-personal dilemma. But at the other extreme is the trade-off with future generations, not even here to plead their case.

120. See above, section 5 (1), on universalism in needs thinking.
121. The book on transcendental meditation by Bloomfield et al., *TM Discovering*, shows an astounding mass of data indicating that TM may have a positive impact on a variety of fields (metabolic rate, breath rate, skin resistance, blood lactate concentration, brain wave synchrony, galvanic skin responses, heart rate, blood pressure, "personal orientation inventory," anxiety level, "psychological health," self-actualization, perceptual ability, reaction time, recall ability, use of drugs, use of alcohol and cigarettes, academic performance (!), productivity, job performance [see charts 1-27 at the end of the book]).

122. If it is possible to train soldiers to storm onto the battlefield with very poor odds in their favor, much should be possible in human affairs.

123. And that is, of course, a major reason why it is rejected by those who have a vested academic, intellectual, political interest in some other theory: it becomes disturbing when development as defined by these theories may turn out to be not only a-human, but anti-human.

124. Dorothy D. Lee, *Freedom and Culture*: "It is values, not a series of needs, which is at the basis of human behavior. The main difference between the two lies in the conception of the good which underlies them."