THE CHANGING INTERFACE BETWEEN PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
IN A CHANGING WORLD *

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1. What is the relation between peace and development? It is not a simple one, but it also depends on what one means by these two words. So we start with the meaning:

**Peace:**
- **narrow meaning:** absence of war between states
- **broad meaning:** absence of direct and structural violence between and within states, which means realization of **survival** **well-being** **identity** **freedom** for all,
  in other words satisfaction of human needs

**Development:**
- **narrow meaning:** economic growth, GNP etc.
- **broad meaning:** the satisfaction of human needs, the minimum people cannot do without, for all -
  **survival** **well-being** **identity** **freedom**

Thus, **peace = development;** it is in a sense the same thing! So, why the difference in words - because the problem of peace is what the rich countries are worried about, and the problem of development what the poor countries are worried about. "Poverty is the name for war in the Third World countries", says the famous bishop Helder Câmara. The two words come out of different concerns. In modern peace studies and development studies they are brought together; a reason why peace researchers also tend to study development and vice versa.

2. But if war and poverty, or rather misery, are of the same kind it should be possible to compare them. The concept of "structural violence" makes this possible. The idea is actually very simple. In a war life is taken away from people, people are killed. But in misery life is also taken away from people, they are not killed instantly or quickly by a bullet or a bomb, they are killed slowly, through diseases till they pass away. We know people can live longer, we know it is possible today to live till one is, say, 70 years old given the right health conditions, even more. But that means that a person who dies at the age of 35, whether through direct or structural violence, through war or misery, has half of his or her life taken away. And a little child who dies through infant mortality has the whole life taken away. And that opens for an important point. Misery is war, but not on everybody: it is war on poor people and
poor countries, and especially war on small and poor people in poor
countries. It is a double class war, against low class countries and
low class people. For we know today that this misery is avoidable;
when it is not avoided it is because of social structures that will
have to be changed.

3. This idea, originally developed at the International Peace Research
Institute in Oslo, was taken up by two US researchers, Charles
Zimmermann and Milton Leitenberg, in an article "Hiroshima Lives On",
in Mazingira,\(^{(1)}\) a magazine related to the United Nations Environment
Programme. They calculate the avoidable deaths for children by
comparing how many children died in a country with how many would
have died had they had the health conditions of the United States -
as a reference country. They also do this for other age groups, and
the youngest group, 0-4 years, make up 84% of the "excess deaths".
Much of this is infant mortality. When they limit the study to the
age group 1-4 years, they find that the excess deaths from this group
alone in the world amount to 236 Hiroshima bombs. They then use the
US estimates of number of dead, 68,000 for Hiroshima, 38,000 for
Nagasaki, and calculate the average, 53,000. Recent Japanese esti-
mates are 170,000 and 140,000 respectively - average 155,000 -
100,000 higher! But regardless of that difference; this shows the
horrors of misery and also how we get even more used to, and accept,
misery than we accept war.

4. If we now take the concepts "peace" and "development" in their more
conventional meaning, as absence of war and economic growth, both
concepts combined with state-formation, the relation between the two
seems to be clearly negative: the more development, the less peace.
In the famous study by Quincy Wright, A Study of War, very interest-
ing data are given about how belligerence for economic or political
gains against other societies relates to the "level of development."\(^{(2)}\)
If his data about close to 500 societies are organized from the most
"primitive" to the most "civilized" there is no doubt that the most
primitive are the most peaceful (0% belligerence, only ritualistic
war-like activities with very low level of violence) and the most civilized are the most belligerent (95% of them). The "primitive" are nomadic societies, very simple social structure, living off nature, certainly no "economic growth" - the concept does not even make any sense - and the "civilized" are societies with fixed territory, a state organization, complex social structure, agriculture etc. "Civilization" and war seem to be related; it is among the societies very close to the state of nature that we find most peacefulness.

5. This is seen very clearly in recent date about war after the Second World War, that means after the capitulation of militarist Japan on 15 August 1945. According to the famous Hungarian peace researcher István Kende, there were 120 armed conflicts in the 32 years 1945 to 1976 - wars because governmental forces were involved on at least one side. The average number of wars on any given day in that period was 11.5. Only five of them took place in Europe, the remaining 115 in the Third World - North America as usual managed to keep wars outside that territory. About 80% of the war activity was clearly anti-regime wars, with foreign participation. The intervention was by developed capitalist countries in 64 of the 120 wars, by socialist countries in six of them, and by Third World countries in 17 of them - particularly Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam. And the major intervening powers were United States, Great Britain, France and Portugal - in that order. In other words, the most developed countries were also the most belligerent! We know the reason and it is very simple: because their development was and is to a large extent based on colonial empires, and they wanted to keep them, to protect their position. The US did not have colonies, but they had and have neo-colonies, economically dominated rather than politically and militarily dominated in the direct sense. The war in Vietnam was not so much about Vietnam, it was about US power and hegemony -- and after the US was beaten and had to withdraw, first in 1973, then in 1975, of course the dollar went down, as the pound had done before, and the franc (not to mention the escudo).
6. So, war has been a means to development in the narrow sense. But the relation is not simple: peace has also been a means to development. The relation is complex, as mentioned in the beginning. A country can grow economically through imperialist, belligerent expansion, like Japan through the Sino-Japanese war 1894-95, the war against Russia 1904-05, the war against Korea 1910, the war against China starting with what in Japan still is covered up as "the Manchurian incident" 1931, the extended war against China and the Second World War and the effort to establish a real dai-to-ä. Territories like Formosa, Korea and a good part of China made it possible for Japan to have an external sector in her economy under total Japanese control, and use it for the development of Japan. The war against Russia served to stave off competitors. But to be beaten in the Second World War, in spite of, or perhaps because of, tremendous destruction also served development in the conventional sense for Japan: fixed capital destroyed had to be rebuilt (lives destroyed cannot be rebuilt), that defines a demand, the supply has to come, as a result economic wheels start spinning as never before. Even to destroy others in a war and having to repair the damage may stimulate development: "there is no business like reparation business". Economic growth stagnates when there is no effective demand, it picks up again when there is an effective demand. And that also applies to the wars of others: to be a supplier for the US wars in Korea and Vietnam gave a tremendous boost to Japan's economic growth.

7. However, as mentioned, peace can also be good for development. The Romans used the word pax for peace, meaning absentia bellum, the absence of war - within the Roman Empire. Trade is more easy in times of peace, for obvious reasons. But the best is, perhaps, a combination of war and peace - "best", that is, for economic development. War in some place sufficiently far away not to hit oneself, and sufficient peace in the near surroundings to be able to supply war material, or use one's territory for bases, would be one formula. Another formula would use time rather than space as the basic factor:
peace with growing production till there is over-production, then a
war to destroy fixed capital, peace to rebuild including rebuilding
the production capacity, then new over-production and new war. These
two formulas, the peace-war mix in space and in time, do not exclude
each other. Japan has, in fact, been using both and extremely skill-
fully:

![Diagram of Peace and War]

If there is something to this picture the conclusion is obvious: if
Japan should enter a really deep recession, a depression, one solu-
tion would be a new war sometime well into the 1980s, in the three
possible roles: as a conqueror, as conquered or as supplier to either
or both sides. The first role is, of course, excluded by the consti-
tution (Article 9); the other two are not. It should be noted that
Japan is one of the world's most vulnerable countries, much more
vulnerable than it was during the Second World War; for that reason
Japan risks either being very heavily destroyed or having to capitulate
before sufficient damage has been done to work as an economic
stimulus afterwards.

8. From this we can now draw one simple conclusion: if war can lead to
both destruction and to construction, the same probably applies to
peace. As we well know, under conditions of absence of violence of
the direct kind both the most despotic and most democratic, the poor
and the rich types of societies can emerge. So the relation is not
simple. But does the same apply to steps towards peace, to the
process leading from war to peace - if there is any such process, even if the goal peace in the conventional sense can be combined with all kinds of levels of economic growth?

9. In other words, the thesis, so long cherished by the peace movement: disarmament both as a road to peace and to development, melting swords into ploughshares as it is expressed in the bible. The argument is well-known and it has much appeal: reducing the armament costs means reducing the capacity to wage war; investing the savings wisely could bring about development. Two birds killed with one stone - a genius operation that only fools could fail to carry out! The idea is supported by reasoning in terms of opportunity costs: the $400 billion spent annually are converted to basic needs units, to food, clothes shelter, medical service and schooling units. As a matter of fact, only one missile or bomber plane can be shown to represent considerable opportunity costs in such units.

10. But there are problems with both sides of this idea; in fact, one should be suspicious for the world is usually not made in such a way that two good things come together with no bad side effects. Thus, the approach is economistic; the connecting link is money. But less money for the military will not necessarily lead to less destructive capacity; it could also lead to higher "productivity", meaning more destructive power for the money available -- a "bigger bang for the buck". Moreover, when a conflict threatens to lead to violence the pre-disarmament spending level will be restored; there will even be an overshoot. And as to development: true development seems to be more a problem of structural change or transformation, not merely a problem of capital. On the contrary, much capital usually leads to capital-intensive projects that tend to reinforce oppressive, misery-producing structures however much it leads to economic growth. The same doubts apply to disarmament in terms of people: the military would respond by becoming more research-intensive, doing not only with less money but with less people - and the people released might be officers wanting jobs as administrators, experts in development, thereby contributing to a top-heavy society!
11. But if the economic approach does not seem so promising, what about a more structural approach? Here, suddenly, the whole relationship becomes more simple and one can easily see very concrete policies that would, by and large, promote both peace and development thus,

- at the international level: equitable co-operation between countries, but really equitable, tends to be a peace-building measure - it creates a symbiotic relation and at the same time may promote development in both countries through exchange of ideas, goods, services and people, with neither country dominating the other. The problem is that this is very difficult between big and small countries or between rich and poor countries - indicating that co-operation to be peace and development-building perhaps should be between equals. This seems, incidentally, now to be the emerging pattern: superpower-superpower, North-North, South-South.

- at the national level: making the country more self-sufficient in such essentials as food, health and energy inputs and in general self-reliant so that (1) it is less tempted to go to war against others to get at economic essentials (such as oil) and (2) it is less tempting for others to use food/health/energy as a weapon thereby increasing world tension! At the same time this may promote development by laying a basis for self-reliance which is a combination of self-sufficiency in essentials and equitable relations with others.

- at the local level: making the local level more self-reliant and more autonomous, more powerful - thereby both strengthening the local level and weakening the central level so that the center (the bureaucrats, the corporation, the intelligentsia, the military, the police and - sometimes - the party) is less able to exploit the people
and to accumulate enough surplus to wage aggressive wars.

The concept that best summarizes this is probably the concept used a number of times above already: self-reliance, but both at the local, national and regional (eg Third World) levels.

12. **Thus, to summarize:** the relation between peace and development is complex because the processes relating to them are themselves so complicated in the present world. "Peace" is good and "development" is good - but what if the machinery needed for war, militarization, to very many also is the machinery needed for development: a strong centralized leadership; vertical, hierarchical organizations; planning at the top and blind obedience at the bottom combined with bread and circus? What then? We have suggested structural change, smaller units, tied together in equitable exchange relations - federal structures, perhaps - and we have tried to indicate that such structures may both be better at true development, and at more peaceful relations. But what if war nevertheless comes, can such structures also offer its inhabitants sufficient security through defense? The answer is probably yes; but by changing the military rather than by abolishing it. There are concepts of defense much more compatible with decentralized structures: one is violent, the small, decentralized guerrilla units; the other is nonviolent, the whole repertory of ideas for non-military defense. To go in for transarmament rather than disarmament which would merely make people defenseless. In fact, these are the ways in which people tend to organize themselves against external and internal repression so there is lots of experience to draw upon. But it is not the ways pursued by the contemporary states in the world, where the general quest for central control also leads to a quest for centralized responses to any functional or structural problem the society may encounter.

13. So, **in conclusion:** the key to a policy that may, at least in the long run, lead to gains both in terms of peace and in terms of
development lies probably in a general structural change, changing the course of both the development = economic growth and the peace = militarization machines towards more humane societies.
1. No. 9 1979. See also Galtung, Hölvik, in Essays in Peace Research, Vol I., ch. 5.