THE COLD WAR AS AN EXERCISE IN AUTISM

The U.S. government, the governments of Western Europe - and the people

by Johan Caltung

Université Nouvelle Transnationale
154 rue de Tolbiac
F75013 Paris

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1. Five missing arguments

During the last thirty years or so I have had the occasion to participate in what must by now be a couple of thousand debates on the Cold War, its origins, and the danger of it becoming hot. The East-West conflict, in other words. If I now look back on those debates, trying to reflect not so much on what was said as on what was not said by "the other side," those who by and large support U.S.-N. policies, a number of points stand out as conspicuously missing in the debates. It is as if (Western European) politicians never really thought of them. Let me add, however, that my experiences do not necessarily apply to the military. They may have the same blind spots, but are not blind to their own blindness.

First, there is no doubt about the depth of anti-communism on the Establishment side, nor about knowledge of the Soviet Union in general and its role in the countries dominated by the Soviet Union in particular. What is conspicuously absent, however, is any evidence that the Soviet Union ever planned an attack on Western Europe. Almost equally absent is any good theoretical reason why they should do so, given that the Second World War to a large extent secured their borders through a system of buffer states, and given their marxist faith that the capitalist system will abolish itself, although that process, the last phase, the imperialist phase, may be long-lasting and dangerous. Discussions center on capability, not on motivation. I remember vividly a debate in the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of NATO, where I asked a leading Norwegian NATO parliamentarian whether he, in retrospect, would say that the fears of 1948/49, stimulated by the coup in Czechoslovakia February 1948, had been justified in the light of later evidence. The response was a flat "No." One should not underestimate the basis for that fear at the time, however--as he was quick to point out. And yet, the policies are as if the answer were "Yes." The absence of evidence of intent (to attack) to some even is evidence--of how cunning "the Soviets" are, proving to the satisfaction of the paranoid, that the attack will be a surprise attack.

Second, related to this: whenever I ask for the reasons to assume that the present arms race will not lead to a war through some confrontation, somewhere I also draw a blank. I do not even get reasons why the arms race should stabilize, why this arms race will be that different from arms races in the past given the danger of escalation from the third world (the Balkans of today). The idea seems to be either that the Soviet Union one day will give up for economic reasons, or that the race can continue indefinitely--both highly dubious assumptions. The position may be realist, but hardly realistic.
Third, and related to this: I am struck by the almost complete absence of justification of the highly idealistic faith in disarmament (as opposed to arms control) negotiations. Given the fact that the West feels threatened by the offensive strategic capability of the East and develops counter-capability in order to deter, it seems rather obvious that the East might feel the same way. To believe that disarmament negotiations may succeed in spite of all the evidence and the theory to the contrary, shows a high ability of credo quia absurdum. But in the debates no justifications are forthcoming as to why disarmament negotiations should be successful on the (N + 1)st occasion when they have failed (in the real sense of reduction of destructive capability) on all prior N occasions. Again, the countless times that I have put the question to people from the Establishment in various NATO countries have engendered only the tame response. "but we have to believe in this, that is our only hope!"

Fourth, I have been struck by the absence of any real interest in the strategic game between the alliances in general and the superpowers in particular. Each side publishes accounts of the military capability of the other side in general, and the growth rate in particular, presumably to mobilise support for armament efforts in its own camp. But how they are really going to use those weapons, what is going to happen in a hot as opposed to a cold war, is left to behind-the-doors scenarios, game-playing in hidden bunkers; and to the more or less informed exercises engaged in by the opposition, presumably to scare the armers so that they become disarmers. One typical example: a rather obvious argument, that any offensive, strategic capability on one's own soil will attract strategic attacks from the other side--fission warheads for the softer targets and fusion warheads for the harder ones--is attempted countered by a lame "Yes, we have to avoid that...Yes, it must not happen, for that reason we have to be strong enough to deter the other side". In other words, there is a faith in balance of power, just as there is a faith in disarmament, and presumably equally idealistic in the sense of being detached from the real world, both empirically and theoretically. When asked "Would you be kind enough to tell me exactly when in recent world history arms races have not led to a war when the parties are so intensely locked into the conflict they share that they frequently meet in indirect confrontations and are bound by the laws of probability to meet in direct confrontations sooner or later?"--and,"When did disarmament negotiations lead to reduction in destructive capability?" the answer becomes both tame and lame, "well, what would you suggest that we should do?"
Fifth, I am struck by the lack of interest in alternatives. In Europe alone there are five very clear alternatives just around the corner: Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia (to which could be added Albania and Malta). Grosso modo these alternatives are based on military doctrines (of course, like anything else, conditioned by their histories) characterized by absence of offensive, strategic weapons and reliance on defensive defense; non-alignment or even neutrality relative to the super-powers (with a high level of credibility that the country cannot be used by one super-power to launch an attack against the other); some measure of inner strength (economically, politically); and outer usefulness, relative to other countries on both sides. One may certainly discuss how well this is done in all five countries, but what cannot be disputed is that these countries constitute alternatives. All five countries have defense doctrines available for study by those who are interested; I am struck by the lack of interest. They are written off in advance with very cheap, uninformed arguments. They are all seen as "special cases," as if any country is a non-special case. It is usually assumed that if they were "left free" or were "sufficiently informed" then they would become alliance members--except for Switzerland, written off as the super-special case. Or, that they are free riders on balance of terror.

Now, if there is neither any serious effort to show that the Soviet Union ever has contemplated an attack on Western Europe, as a whole or on individual countries; nor that disarmament negotiations given present military doctrines have ever worked; nor that balance of power policies given arms races and frequent indirect, even direct confrontations do not lead to war; nor a real understanding of what a war would imply; then the lack of interest in alternatives is simply irrational. There is so much at stake. Not only a never-ending arms race (because the balance of power is not stable and disarmament does not work) but an unthinkable war, possibly ending with a nuclear/laser holocaust and a major disruption of the civilization exercise.

Of course, this high level of irrationality is found within a civilization prideing itself precisely on rationality. But there is a certain partial rationality in all of this: nobody will deny that broadening and deepening militarization is in fact taking place and is pursued unrelentlessly, because the balance of power and disarmament axioms—that balance of power can stabilize and disarmament can (then) take place—are involved. However, there is no ability to see—in a more global manner—the impact of the Cold War for the
whole world, and--in a holistic manner--the impact, the causes and the consequences of the Cold War from the point of view of several disciplines and specialties, not only military science, diplomatic history, but also the whole range of social sciences.

To me this presents the person who wants to understand what has been going on these last thirty years since the North-Atlantic Alliance was founded (and thirty years since the Warsaw Treaty Organization was founded) with a major research problem. How does one explain a high level of irrational behavior among people who not only pride themselves on being rational, but also are generally regarded as such? At least there have to be some good answers to these questions, they cannot just be brushed under the carpet. Within the logic of the East-West conflict, it is important that the Soviet Union should at some point have planned some attack, or at least said that it could imagine doing something like this (never missing in Hitler's utterances); that balance of power could be stable; that disarmament should be possible; and that alternatives are even worth considering given the horrors of a nuclear war, and can be countered by the allegation that the military expenses per capita would be much higher if a non-aligned/neutral course of action were engaged in (exactly the opposite has been the case for comparable countries).

There seem to be two ways of trying to approach this problem which in the first run I see as an intellectual problem, as something to be understood.

First, there is the possibility of accepting the usual approach to the Cold War and the East-West conflict as an actio-reactio system where one party acts, then the other party reacts, and so on. Within this model one may then say that it is rational to have these five underdeveloped spots on the intellectual map because the anti- or counter-Establishment positions that the Soviet Union does not contemplate attacks of the kind against which NATO is supposed to give protection, that balance of power policies given the climate of confrontation will lead to wars, that disarmament negotiations as currently engaged in will continue to fail, and that there are alternatives to all of this) are simply blatantly false. They are so wrong from the very beginning that it would be even irrational to engage in
any serious disproof. Those who hold such views have already disqualified themselves from intellectual discourse and exchange. Or, one might 
that it is irrational not to have answers. But this "irrationality" is nothing but a disguise for a much deeper malaise: one keeps silent, does not answer, simply because one has nothing to say. The numerous military and politicians to whom I have put these questions seem sometimes not even to understand them, certainly have not done their homework, and usually look uninterested. These three small points are compatible with either interpretation.

But then there is the second approach, that of assuming rationality, but within a different game than the Cold War as an actio-reactio system. What happens if we look at it as an autistic system, not only where the armament process is concerned—where there are obvious self-propelling forces under the heading of "modernization," usually seen as located within the MBIC-complexes (military—bureaucratic—intellectual—corporate complexes)—but in a more general, all-inclusive psychopolitical sense? What if most of these politicians on the Establishment side are simply engaged in a different game, not relating so much to the Soviet Union and WTO, except as ritual exercises, as to the left-hand side of the diagram in Figure 1, relating the Western super-power to the Western European countries, both of them divided into centers and peripheries, the political class close to the government, and the rest?

[Figure 1 about here]

That for Western Europe the Cold War is a question of relating to the United States more than the Soviet Union? For simplicity, let us see three actors: the U.S. government (USG), the Western European governments (WEG), and the People on either side of the Atlantic. Let us see what we can make out of this tripartite scheme for the Western, and then for the Eastern, side of the Cold War system.

Of course, the two approaches do not exclude each other. The Cold War is not autism or actio-reactio; it is both—and. But political competence, even expertise and involvement seem to be as much or more on the intra-alliance aspects. So, let us see where this approach might lead us.
Figure 1. The Cold War: The actio-reactio and autism models

Western autism

U.S. Government

Western European governments

People

NATO

actio-reactio

Eastern European parties

Eastern autism

Soviet party

People

WTO
2. The Cold War: An alternative theory for the West

In this alternative effort to come to grips with the Cold War, there will be three parts: one relating to the past approximately until the crystallization of the alliance systems (1949-1955), one relating to the present, more or less up till today, and then some speculations about the future. To start: three roots of the Cold War.

First of all: the Soviet Union matters; it is not cognitively absent, indeed. Any effort to trace the origins of the Cold War as experienced by the Western side will have to assume a solid element of anti-communism in general and anti-Sovietism in particular. There are general aspects to this attitude as well as specific ones. Among the general aspects I would count a tendency to see the East in general as threatening: vast hordes of people; primitive and beastly; oriental and despotic, byzantine oriental despotism being the key; pagan and, if Christian, a strange Christianity; and (after the advent of communism) excluding market economy and private property; atheist and dictatorial. What happened to Russia in 1917 and to the Soviet Union afterwards is just what one might expect in the East. There may be some apparently good aspects, but sooner or later the basic, dark truth will come out. The simple fact that neither Russia nor the Soviet Union ever attacked Norway, a border country, does not seem to matter to most Norwegians. What does matter, and here the Bolsheviks certainly committed their major mistake, was that they murdered the Tsar and his family, and that the Moscow Trials forced the Gulag system developed the way they did. "If they can do that to their own, they might one day do it to us" is not an unreasonable logic to engage in, even if contrary to theory and historical evidence. Before the Soviet Union withdrew, in Europe, not only from Norway, but also from Denmark (Bornholm), Finland and Austria, but countries might not understand.

The basis of anti-communism is solid, but more articulated in the centre than the periphery of the Western alliance countries, with the possible exception of the Federal Republic of Germany. At no point does an anti-communist attitude, even when founded on deep knowledge and personal experience, in itself prove that an attack is being contemplated unless one believes in the following syllogism as guide to empirical reality:

Premise 1: (1) The Soviet Union is bad

Premise 2: (2) Bad countries tend to expand, attack

Conclusion: (3) The Soviet Union is going to expand, attack
Of course, there is a mistake in the logic here. From the premise that the population did not in any major way resist nazi occupation, or at least that it took a long time before the resistance movement built up, it does not follow that the population would not, with all possible means, resist a Soviet invasion. It could simply be that the population is more anti-communist/anti-Soviet than it ever was anti-nazi/anti-German. There are many reasons for this. Nazism did not necessarily threaten private property, and was willing to make compromises with Christianity in general and existing churches in particular. Nazism was violently anti-Jew and anti-Soviet. But then anti-Semitism was certainly not unknown in Western Europe, nor was anti-communism/anti-Sovietism, as mentioned above. What remains is that nazism was dictatorial which was bad, but not so bad as being both dictatorial, atheist, and anti-market/private property. In addition, Germany was a much-admired country in the centre of Europe; Russia/Soviet Union a scorned, hated and feared country in the periphery, shading into the "asiatic."

However that may be, the Western European political class seems to have drawn a very important conclusion: ultimately, it was only the United States that saved us. The true part of this is that the only country in Western Europe resisting nazism, the United Kingdom, proved able to defend herself but did not have sufficient surplus fighting capacity to liberate occupied countries. Had the Soviet Union and the United States for some reason or other not been engaged in the fight against Nazi Germany, it is not unlikely that Europe would have been divided into three parts: a major part dominated by nazi Germany, the neutral countries, and the United Kingdom. However, the super-powers certainly entered and this is where the perspective becomes blatantly wrong: almost 95% of the nazi German fighting capacity was engaged in the East up to the summer of 1944 (the invasion of Northern France); of the 13.6 million German soldiers killed during the war, 10 million fell on the eastern front. The Red Army liberated the parts of Europe where Nazi Germany had been at her worst. In short, the brunt of the burden of fighting this horror called nazism fell on the Soviet Union, objectively speaking. This is not to belittle the U.S. part, but as the figures indicate; if the German war machine eventually was reduced
to nothing, then most of that job was done by the Soviet Union and not by the United States, which lost one fifth of the Soviet losses (400,000 as against 20 million).

What remains, however, is that the United States is to the West and entered as a liberator in Western Europe, whereas the Soviet Union was to the East and entered as an occupier in Eastern Europe where most of the countries wholly or partly (with the exception of Poland) had been with the Axis powers. It is also true that although Soviet fighting capacity was a necessary condition for beating Nazi Germany, U.S. (and Western) assistance to the Soviet Union during the war was a necessary condition for that fighting capacity to prevail. In the psychopolitical calculations destined to end up with the conclusion that the United States was not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for liberation from nazism, this fact is over-emphasised and the casualty figures (including the Soviet loss of 20 million people) played down. According to Soviet figures Lend-Lease amounted to 4% of Soviet production 1941-45, and in the latter half of the war, the U.S. was its chief supplier.

Thus, the net conclusion is simple: in order to be able to resist a surprise attack from an evil power, given the unwillingness and incapability of the population to defend itself alone because of its lack of true patriotism, spirituality, and its unwillingness to sacrifice material comfort or for whatever other reason, there is one way out. One has to rely on the United States that has already saved us twice, from 1917 and 1941 onwards, and may be counted on to do so once more.

But not unconditionally, and this is where the second part of the theory starts. What I now see as essential is a tripartite system, USG, WEG and People in a complex—and of course changing—relationship where there is a give and a take in all directions, with some deals more favourable than others. It is this psychopolitical exercise in autism referred to in the title of this paper, incomprehensible, however, unless the premises in the first section are taken into account. And something similar applies to the Eastern side.

Basically the relationship between USG and WEG is a feudal one. USG came out of the Second World War strengthened, WEG heavily weakened. Given the background expounded above, the basis was
there for a classical feudal relation: I shall protect you! in return for - You are the Leader of the Free World! The question is what this strategic relationship means in more precise terms. Let us first look at what USG gives to WEG as a part of this bargain.

I think there are two layers of values flowing from USG to WEG. In the first layer is what can be referred to as costs and risks. USG is paying a disproportionate share of the total Western outlay for military preparedness, so the costs are definitely there. And the same applies to the risks, both by being the major partner in the alliance and thus particularly exposed to pre-emptive attacks and to retaliation from the major party on the other side, the Soviet Union, and through its many forward bases and installations, including placing U.S. soldiers as trip-wires so as to guarantee the engagement of the U.S. from the very beginning. The nuclear dimension of the military preparedness enhances the risks enormously, although at the same time, according to some calculations, it also reduces the costs. This may be true for the warheads, possibly for the weapon systems, but hardly when the whole infrastructure needed to operate a nuclear capability is taken into account, however.

Through the flow of costs and risks to the "allies", WEG, deterrence is supposed to be obtained, as well as adequate fighting capacity in case of a war, at such a level that WEG gets off the hook. And this "hook" has a very precise nature: basically it is a question of saving the Western European countries in general, and WEG in particular, from the ignominy of once more being overrun by an enemy without really standing up and defending the values of the Free World. Supposedly these values are, in descending order of importance from the point of view of USG: Free markets/enterprise, freedom of religion, and freedom of political choice. More particularly, this means capitalism, Christianity, and democracy - the three factors uniting, at an ideological and also structural level, the Western countries. "Getting off the hook" means status quo. This must have played a considerable role in the early post-Second World War years.
with strong communist parties and labor movements in general in Western Europe; WEG must have feared insufficient popular identification with these values, particularly the first two, to be willing to sacrifice life, property, even the whole country for that matter. USG is probably correct in assuming that in general terms there is more allegiance to the three values in the U.S. than in the countries run by WEG. In short, by assuming the costs and the risks, USG is also trying to avoid a showdown that ultimately might hit the very basis of U.S. consensus, already showing its cracks in connection with the student/youth/Vietnam unrest/revolt of the 1965-75 decade. A divided Western Europe might be contagious; as a disease divisiveness might spread to the Western core, the U.S.

Then, there is a second layer of values, let us call them spin-off benefits, flowing from USG to WEG, often very conspicuously. USG is letting WEG in on the secrets, of course not on all strategic plans, but on many. A top reward in the system must be for a WEG member to be party to the ultimate plans; an important punishment to be kept out. And from there it is only a short step to be let in on research projects, perhaps of a mainly military nature, but certainly with civilian spin-offs so as to be included from the beginning with all that might entail in terms of economic benefits, not to mention economic costs if one is kept out. And that leads straight to the third additional value: to be granted certain trade advantages as a member of the family. I think these advantages can be summarised under one heading: by US. not playing fully to market rules, being considerate, opening US markets to Western European goods for such political rather than strictly economic reasons.

Of course, by doing so, a certain moral indebtedness (possibly on top of an economic one) is incurred; in other words a political credit that can be drawn upon in the future.

Let us now look at it from the other side: what does WEG give to USG in return for these five major value flows, in themselves considerable, on top of the basic point: I (USG) shall protect you! USG gets in return from WEG the unquestioned status as the Leader of the Free World, You are our Leader! The question is what this means in concrete terms. In other words, what are the specificities of the counter-flow of values; how can this flow be subdivided? I think
there are three major subdivisions. The Leader can only lead if the followers follow: the first layer of the flow of values is in terms of submissiveness. The second layer is in terms of certain structural arrangements within the alliance and relative to the outside. And the third layer is in terms of economic arrangements. What does it mean to be a follower, not just for a short time and in specific situations, but a more professional follower? Essentially it means to accept the definition of the situation, particularly in conflict situations, as given by the Leader. It means accepting his image of the world, his myths. More particularly, it implies acceptance of his idea of the Balance of power at any time, and of his military doctrines; not to mention his changes in military doctrines. Basic decisions already taken by the Leader have to be accepted. There can be argument about details, but no fundamental challenge of the Leader's right to lead, and the follower's duty to follow. Moreover, the Leader is not supposed to be exposed to criticism. One need not necessarily praise all his actions but if there is nothing good and positive to say, then at least "do not undercut us!" And when there is something good to say, expressions of gratitude should be forthcoming, not only for past acts of protection and liberation, but also for possible future ones. The Leader is beyond criticism and evaluation. He is not to be scrutinized as with the Lord, his "ways are unfathomable". The Leader is accountable to nobody but himself, does not have to announce whether his ships carry nuclear arms or not, not even to friends, nor does he have to comment on his failure to comment. The Leader is, simply beyond, above. The leader leads; He is caused by nothing but Himself.

Clearly this attitude of submissiveness is in the realm of psychopolitics. Screening of delegates for alliance meetings, "security clearance" is probably essentially a question of whether the person is willing to submit to these rules of submissiveness. Of course, he does not necessarily have to believe in them as long as there will be no overt signs of protest. In other words, "security" is more a question of relation to the Leader than relation to the other side, the Soviet Union and her allies (where, it goes without saying, very similar relations obtain). The negative attitude to the Soviet Union is, presumably, being shared—probably a reasonable assumption—the sticky question becomes the attitude to the U.S. A security risk is a person challenging, questioning the unquestionable: the implicit covenant between leader and led.
However, psychopolitics and attitudes/behaviour are not enough. The social scientist will immediately look for the **structural arrangement** that on the one hand is an expression of this attitude, and on the other will reinforce it. By and large this structural arrangement has two aspects: maintaining a feudalized relationship within the alliance, and a polarized relationship to the outside. By "feudalized" I simply mean that interaction is predominantly bilateral: except for routine matters directly with the Leader, not among the followers. More particularly, and that is the key test: there should never be any "ganging up" against the Leader, no effort to establish a trade union of lesser allies, a class structure instead of a feudal structure. There may be grievances but they are to be handled adjusting the bilateral balance between USG and that particular WEG, not with the WEG as a whole. Feudalism is based on particularism, not universalism.

Similarly, a "polarized" relationship to the other side implies that there will be no separate deal with the other side in general and the Soviet Union in particular. All major forms of interaction will be handled directly between the USG and the Soviet leadership. There may be "more consultations," but they are for information about what is going to happen or has happened rather than real dialogue. If one of the lesser allies has direct contact with the Soviet Union, and that happens often, consultations before and after with the Leader will be major aspects of the total exercise, to assure that nothing disloyal is intended, or in fact took place.

In short, the Leader-Follower relation has its culture of submissiveness on the side of the follower, and its structure. Of course, all of this relates particularly to military and political matters; to the power of coercion and destruction, and the power over power, the realm of politics. But what about the power of ideas and the power of exchange/construction, in other words culture and economics? They certainly also belong to the picture, and what is expected of the follower is presumably that he will uphold the basic three values on which the alliance is founded and also see the Leader as a major partner for economic exchange, for trade, investment etc. Again, the follower may not necessarily accept all aspects of the American Way of life, but is at least
not supposed to criticise it. And the U.S. may not necessarily
be the major trade partner, but should at least be a major point of reference for international
economic relations. In this way the values and the patterns of
the Free World are maintained, both in the sense of being articulated
and in the sense of being implemented. It should be noted that the
assumption is not symmetrical. The followers are supposed to see
the Leader's cultural and economic systems as exemplary, as models
to be imitated or at least never to be criticised; the Leader
reserves for himself the right to see the cultural and economic
systems of the followers as "traditional", even as "hopelessly old-
fashioned". He may demand visa to visit the U.S.; but be highly offended if the
demand should be reciprocated. He may spy on WE citizens, but would not like their
secret services spying on U.S. citizens. And so on.

This is a colossal deal: security against both external and
internal enemies (USG always being ready to help WEG in their
fight against subversion), at considerable costs and risks for USG,
letting WEG in on military, political and scientific secrets and,
in addition, offering trade advantages - all that in return for
submissiveness, certain structural arrangements within the alliance
and towards the outside, and cultural and economic receptivity
to what the Leader can offer. In saying so, a major point has already
been made: the deal is so colossal that it must necessarily dominate
the political horizon of WEG. More likely than not, this will be
the lynchpin of politics, the point around which relations with other
parts of the world will cluster, defined by the relationship to the
Leader. Since the basic psychopolitical rule of submissiveness is
to accept the Leader's definition of the situation, WEG has to
structure their interaction with the rest of the world in a way not
too dissimilar from the structure developed by USG.

Implication: there cannot possibly be much psychopolitical
energy left for a detailed understanding of the Soviet Union and
her allies, not to mention for developing alternative interaction
structures - if not for ideological and concrete reasons for the
simple reason of limitation of capacity. And that already goes far
towards explaining the five lacunae in conflict thinking and
behaviour explored in the introduction. It is not merely that the
Leader thinks for the followers, and that the followers accept the
outcome of that thought process, *grosso modo*. It is also that
the followers are so engulfed in their relations to the Leader
and within the system set up by the Leader that there simply is
not much time left over to question their conclusions, let alone
the basic assumptions. At least not for rank-and-file politicians.

However, the Western countries are to some extent democracies,
meaning that no political structures can be analysed only as
inter-governmental relations. There is also that amorphous, highly
unpredictable factor referred to as the People, those outside the
centre, the Establishment, the *classe politique* or however one likes
to refer to the extended cluster surrounding USG and WEG.

Let us focus on the People in Western Europe, leaving out the
United States for the moment. Question: What kind of deal has
emerged between WEG and the People, what are the gives and takes
in this relationship?

Of course, WEG cannot tell the People that "we simply do not
trust you, and for that reason will be relying on somebody much
stronger than ourselves, USG." The People have to be convinced
in other terms; and in a predominantly economic and security-oriented
culture this means by persuading the People that the US is carrying
much more than its proportionate burden of costs and risks. A very
basic part of the whole structure of give and take in this tripartite
relationship is the WEG effort to convince people that the devil is clever, that
*basic savings* involved, that security would have been much more
expensive if the Western European countries had done it alone.
In that case, the military budget would soar, the argument runs,
at the expense of social costs and/or economic growth because there
would be less money available for the welfare state and/or investment.
At the same time much longer military service would be needed, partly
because there would be no US soldiers on European soil doing jobs
that otherwise should have been done by the local young men. And
above all, the country would be lying there, alone and exposed,
a possible victim of an all-out Soviet attack with neither any
assistance forthcoming from the Leader, nor with the U.S. there to
take the brunt of the attack, having more than its share of strategic
capability (and motivation). And with no U.S. trip wire, forward basing,
guaranteeing U.S. involvement. [7]
Of course, all of this tallies extremely badly with the factual situation of the neutral/non-aligned countries of Europe. The military budgets are not higher per capita, nor is the military service necessarily longer, nor is the welfare state less effective or economic growth slower. Nor have they been more exposed to Soviet aggression or likely to be so in the future, although the latter cannot be completely ruled out. Failure to go deeply into this type of argument is a clear sign of irrationality, and by now the reason for that irrationality should be clear: there are certain aspects of the USG-WEG-People exchange balance that are of such a kind that the deal struck does not stand up against scrutiny. The topic is simply taboo; never to be discussed openly in its totality.

What, then, do the people have to give, in return, to WEG? They are promised security, less costs and risks, and a certain access to secrets, research, trade, etc., all of this as citizens of WEG countries. What they have to give in return is probably relatively similar to what WEG has to give USG - submissiveness. The deal is not to be undercut, not to be exposed, not to be openly criticised. Even if unanimity is never to be expected in a democratic country, the opposition should not be too vocal. More particularly, it should not be concerned with the basic aspects of the relationship, only with details of a more particular nature. Percentage increases of defense budgets may be good subjects of discussion, not whether the whole arrangement enhances security at all. And most particularly, one part of popular submissiveness to WEG is not to criticise WEG's submissiveness to USG. The topic is taboo.

People's submissiveness takes on a particularly sinister character when the consequences of a war in the form of a nuclear holocaust are thought through. Even if it is granted that the People with a certain probability receive an important utility, improved economy and security, there is also a non-negligible probability that a highly negative utility might be visited upon them - nuclear annihilation. In the case of a major war, WEG will be in their bunkers, the People will be exposed to the direct or secondary effects of a nuclear war, too well-known to be repeated here. Rather asymmetric.

And there we are, of course, at a rather crucial point. If we now review the total system, it is very clearly seen why there
is a peace movement erupting in large-scale demonstrations from time to time: people may simply feel short-shifted. They may have doubts about the economy and security benefits, and at times almost no doubts at all about the cost ultimately to be exacted from them in particularly tense periods of inter-bloc relations: they expect nuclear annihilation. Western European governments, particularly those more sensitive to such parts of the population (more left wing, perhaps more social democrat, more liberal, governments) may have similar doubts, although they are bound by the system not to articulate them clearly. They may let the population and their demonstrations speak for the country, however, showing USG, "There you see, the kind of problems we have. . . Can't you do something. . .?"

But what about the nature of the whole deal from the USG point of view? May they not also have their sincere doubts about the wisdom of the arrangement?

I think so, and a major analytical perspective on the triangular relationship would be that the USG at times might feel the need to distribute better costs and risks, particularly if submissiveness is not forthcoming but criticism and divisiveness, inability to show a united front behind the Leader. This was the formula that emerged so clearly at the end of the 1970s and dominated the scene for the early 80's: sharing costs and risks, a simple 4 words formula that very clearly expresses USG concerns. And it is difficult not to sympathise with Washington in this, since they had so clearly been short-shifted, bearing a tremendous financial burden and at the same time assuming most of the risks in the strategy known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). The country above all to be destroyed on the Western side would no doubt be the United States since this is where the nuclear capability and motivation were located.

Hence, two major points in USG policy recently: sharing the costs by increasing the military budgets of WEG countries 2, 3, 4% per year; sharing the risks by installing Pershing 2 and cruise missiles on European soil, capable of hitting the western part of the Soviet Union, presumably also Moscow. The popular reaction was not immediate but not too slow in coming either: the biggest peace movement in post-war years, still with us. And in this connec-
There seems to have been a kind of division of labour between the People and WEG, with the former being concerned with increased risks and the latter with increased costs.

At this point one might speculate how a WEG could be playing on the situation, getting a far better deal from USG. The country might be unwilling to increase the risks by having nuclear arms installed on its soil— the policy of Norway and Denmark. But in that case, so the hypothesis goes, there are at least two currencies with which the debt can be paid: increased costs (higher military budgets) or increased submissiveness. Norway seems to be paying both, Denmark neither— Norway for that reason being very well-regarded by USG, Denmark not. On the other hand, there is Italy unwilling to assume higher costs, but certainly much higher risks, at least to Sicilians if not to people in Rome, and also willingness to pay in terms of submissiveness. And then there is the Federal Republic of Germany: over-accepting both costs and risks. But then its long-term submissiveness is in doubt, given the impact the peace movement seems to have had already on the opposition party that for a very long time also was the government party, the Social Democrats—and Die Grüne, the most dynamic factor in Western European politics.

In other words, the situation is dynamic and is bound to erupt from time to time. The WEG have been exploiting the USG economically, and USG WEG psychopolitically. But submissiveness does not cost, at least not in the short term, or at least not in a direct economic sense. It may even have given people a sense of welfare and security, but at the expense of a terrible danger at some point in the future. So, what then will the USG have to do at regular or irregular intervals in order to assure WEG, and WEG have to do in a similar vein in order to reassure the People?

Answer: Disarmament Conferences, Summit meetings. Disarmament then, in fact becomes a major balancing part of the total package. Since the general tendency has been a practically speaking uninterrupted (although rather uneven) arms race after the system became articulated, it is not strange if people in general, and WEG in particular, sometimes
have doubts and start asking: "But are you really sure that this will not lead to a war?" Can "modernization" really go on for ever? "No," the answer comes from above, "We're very much concerned with this problem and for that reason we have a double track policy: on the one hand, being strong, at le. as strong as the Other Side; on the other hand exploring all possibilities of obtaining disarmament or at least good arms control agreements." As a matter of fact, the two tracks are related: the stronger we are the more likely it is that the other side will submit, if not for military at least for economic reasons; even if they don't, any excess strength or new arms that we might have introduced in the meantime can be used as 'bargaining chips' in a disarmament negotiation. And in the last instant, to win a war...."

Disarmament then, in other words, becomes the sweetening pill of bargains that have their obvious shortcomings. At that point one could almost postulate a regularity: the balance in the bargain breaks down, a peace movement breaks out, and there are disarmament negotiations with the other side. And if that does not seem to convince sufficiently many people, or threatens to break down in a way for everybody to see, then there is always a summit meeting to resort to. In short, the cycle looks something like this: modernization → unrest among people → modernisation goes ahead → large scale peace movement among people → modernisation is irreversible but disarmament negotiations are initiated → disarmament negotiations lead nowhere → summit meeting is initiated → summit meeting leads nowhere → new modernisation measures are already on the horizon or may have been there for a long time. And so on, and so forth.

Clearly, the total system becomes increasingly complex over time. Caught in the middle are the Western European governments. The US government assumes considerable costs and risks in the provision of "security" and offers access to secrets, including information about individuals or groups considered threats to the internal security of the allies; sharing of research and technology; and certain trade
advantages. This is much, and the spin-off effects can be used to hand
or some fruits of the cooperation to people in these countries when they become restless.

The cost is considerable. Submissiveness, not only in
the sense of accepting the newest definition of the situation
at all times, at least in the essential conflict theatres of
the Cold War with the Soviet Union that started in 1917; but also
submissiveness when it comes to the concrete way in which a
war is supposed to be deterred or in the worst case to be
fought with US military command, and US bases and US nuclear
strategies, the latter two possibly also in peace time —
and submissiveness when it comes to all stages in the modernization
process. The Western European governments are on an escalator,
the engine of which is found on the other side of the Atlantic,
together with the operator. Structural and economic adjustments
to the other side of the Atlantic may serve to share costs
and risks more equitably, but hardly to get the upper hand on
the levers of machineries that may cause nuclear disaster in
their own countries.

What is strange is that these governments prefer
submissiveness to real cooperation, and choose undemocratic
means to achieve it. I am not thinking so much of the
military coups or threatened coups in southern Europe as the
secrecy, the lack of information and participation, the way
in which the true nature of these deals is protected against
the insight not only of the people, but even of the parliamentarians,
the carriers of the most sacred of Western institutions.
Only carefully inner circles are given access, and the
public media, such as even the British Broadcasting Corporation,
filters information through filtered employees. And the irony of it all
is that it presumably serves to defend democracy against undemocracy, to defend
the Western party to the Cold War against the Eastern party!
Let us summarize the total deal as it has been explored in this paper so far:

Table 1: The Cold War as Autism: The Intra-Western deal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Government</th>
<th>Western European Governments</th>
<th>People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Government</td>
<td>US MBCCI* complex</td>
<td>- I shall protect you, against external and internal enemies. - Major costs, major risks - Military secrets, research projects - Trade preferences - Disarmament conferences</td>
<td>Delivery of the American Way of Life - US as a second country for career, tourism, life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European Governments</td>
<td>- You are the leader of the Free World! - Minor costs and risks - Submissiveness to USG - Cold War definition - military doctrine - Economic demands - No overt criticism of US - United front without</td>
<td>WE MBCCI* complex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>- Acceptance of the American Way of life - WE as an extended constituency</td>
<td>- Submissiveness to WE - Cold War definition - military doctrine - relation to US - No overt criticism - Willingness to be exterminated</td>
<td>Peace Movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MBCCI stands for military-bureaucratic-corporate-intelligentsia (complex)

There are some points to be made with an image of the total trilateral exchange process in front of us.

First, there is no market in the world where all of this comes together. USG and WEG negotiate in NATO and other contexts; WEG and People (in the Western European sense used in this exploration) use elections as one possible market place; but all three of them meet nowhere. We can introduce the US People as a fourth partner, but the relation between US People and WE People is weak. In short, the only place it all comes together is on paper, like on this page. The real world is not that global.
Second, nor is the world that wholistic. Look at the USG-WEC deal as an example. There are all kinds of power: cultural (essentially acceptance of American values of free market, judeo-christian faith and democracy), economic (buying US whenever possible, especially in the field of arms), military (the US definition of conflict and the way to handle it militarily prevails in the sense that the allies are at the lower end of the chain of command and not only in war time) and political (in the sense that the allies are accountable to the US, also in terms of what goes on inside their countries, but not vice versa). Thus, there is a broad agenda across which bargains can be made. But left out of this power game in the inter-state, or more correctly inter-government system is a rather key factor: people. This is left to the governments to handle in their relations with their own people, but in that bargain over investment, welfare and security (protection) the inter-state logic is missing. Thus governments become cynical, referring to their tunnel vision as "realism", and people - here meaning the peace movement - tend to argue as if only human and social space exist, not the world space with its - oh so real - state system, this tunnel vision often being referred to as "idealism". Of course neither partial vision is realistic.

Third, the structure functions smoothly as long as it does; then it may come to a grinding halt. Table 1 identifies all three bilateral relations as potentially critical, with WEC as particularly important given its in-between position. WEC becomes both the arbiter between USG and People (eg during the Indochina wars), and the party most squeezed by demands from the other two, legitimized by alliance and democracy logic. Table 1 also identifies all three parties singly, not combined, as potential points of crisis: they may look at their total situation, feel seriously short-shifted, and try to adjust wherever possible.
Fourth, the dilemma of USG is very clear. USG receives what they wanted most after the Second world war: a *pax americana* with US leadership for the good part of the world, the Free World, with submissive, respectful allied governments presiding over populations accepting the American way of life even to the point of being half-way US citizens -- not strange given that these are the countries from which most of the US population came (later on also taking in increasing part of the Pacific cold war theater, with all the Asian immigrants): Non-critical, united allies. Nothing could be better as long as the US really receives all of this. But the US has to pay enormously, in terms of costs and risks. Consequently, the US being badly exploited by the allies (also the view of the present author) there will always be a US motivation to exact a higher price from WEG. However, if the submissiveness is already at the maximum, with total feudalization within and polarization without, the price would be increased costs and risks. This is also the rational way out since at least in principle, this course may lead to decreased costs and risks for the US; "burden-sharing". The problem is that transfer of costs and risks becomes increased armament in Western Europe. Thus, an intra-alliance problem is solved at the expense of increased inter-alliance tension. Forward land-based deployment of missiles in Western Europe is a clear risk-sharing measure (that could not be obtained if the missiles were sea-based, SLCM); the growth in arms budget of 2%-4% in principle a cost-sharing measure that may not lower the US defense budget (it certainly does not) but makes it easier to finance the transition to the post-nuclear arms generation of offensive weapons - the Star Wars system (based on laser/particle beams for incineration of people and anything inflammable). Increased submissiveness is a poor substitute in economic terms, but better than nothing - if it had not been for the difficulty in delivering even higher levels of submissiveness than the usual WEG level. And decreased submissiveness cannot be punished with increasing costs and risks, only by making military secrets and trade preference less available.
Fifth, the dilemma of WEU is even more clear. The submissiveness is, of course, totally incompatible with what is usually expected of a "sovereign", "autonomous" nation. The three Western European powers that before the Second World War were "great", Germany, England and France, have pursued three different ways of handling this dilemma. Germany is the "most faithful ally" in the Atlantic theater (and Japan in the Pacific theater), but can tell itself and others that the submissiveness is imposed from the outside. England cannot say that, the submissiveness is clearly self-imposed. But then there is the plea for a "special relationship" deriving greatness from being a faithful satellite, obediently circling the US like the moon circling the sun, reflecting some of the light, at night, unto ordinary earthlings. France chose the third course of action, but mainly under de Gaulle: to reject the deal, trying to be a sun of its own, assuming that the other necessary condition is a totally independent nuclear force. France is still pursuing the second leg of that policy.

The others are, of course, no longer independent states, even with leaderships who no longer know what that term implies. The practically incessant repertory of US crimes around the world passes almost unnoticed whereas small infractions of human rights (like exiling one man, Sakharov, and his wife, to Gorki) on the side of the Soviet Union is played up out of all proportions. At the same time, however, WEU tries to get economic compensation for lost sovereignty by refusing to increase budgets, by producing arms in Western Europe, possibly via a phase of US-WEU joint production. But there is not that much latitude. The basic policy would be small decrements in submissiveness to make US pay a higher price for loyalty, yet not going so far as to incur US wrath. All of this with, at times, a very restive populace at their back.
Sixth, the dilemma of the People is the clearest of them all. There are gains. The governments have delivered US protection. They can argue that an alternative government, the opposition, might only be able to do so or at higher costs and/or risks. They can argue, and indeed do, that any alternative would be more costly and hence make less money available for investment and welfare, and that more time will be spent on military service. And much of the population will submit, except when there is a new upward turn on the armament spiral.

And the reason is simple: the risks are far from zero and the total deal makes it clear who will bear the ultimate risk, that of being exterminated: the population itself. Of course, this is all in the construction of the state system in general and the alliance system in particular - as opposed to ancient battles between warrior castes acting it out among themselves, not pushing the basic burden downwards, on the rest of the population, the "non-military", the people.

As mentioned above, it is at this point disarmament, even summit meetings have to be thrown into the deal as a palliative. But since USG has to be involved WEG has to make it look as if they persuaded, even pressed the USG into doing so. And no people seems to want to be deceived again.

Seventh, this gives us some insight in the possible strategies of the peace movement. Beyond making the risks clear and stating unambiguously the total unwillingness to be exterminated on the basis of this "deal", the strategy would be to voice the criticism of USG that WEG does not voice, at least not openly (and it is the open criticism that counts), criticize WEG for not doing so, criticize disarmament and summit meetings as inconsequential sweetening pills. And then launch alternative security policies that, ideally, should be shown to be both less risky, less costly, and demand less in military service, yielding a surplus that can be used for investment and/or welfare state, appealing both to conservative and to social democratic parties. By and large
this is what has been done. In the process the peace movement has been split into two camps, the "fundamentallos" wanting WEG to sever the ties to USC in NATO and disarmament, with only nonmilitary defense; and the "realos" wanting WEG to negotiate a new military doctrine with USC inside NATO and transarmament, relying on a pattern of defensive defense that would include nonmilitary defense (but also conventional, short-range defense and paramilitary units). [33]

And that was the history of the Cold War, so far. Elections do not solve the issue as they do not adequately reflect attitudes in security affairs as opposed to the economy. The cyclical movement of the exchange relations undulate through political time, with tensions behind the doors in the USC-WEG system, inside the democracies in the WEG-People system and as anti-Washington demonstrations in the USC-People system. When all three tensions coincide there is a crisis, with none of them absent the system is at ease. [40]

What would destabilize the system? A consequence of the analysis is the weak position of WEG, being put under pressure from both sides at the same time. If USC should increase both risks and costs as perceived by WEG (eg by demanding that WEG pays for US bases at the same time as USC withdraws the Euro-missiles in a deal with the Soviet Union) and People start massive civil disobedience at the same time as they put forward alternative security policies WEG might revise the whole deal, possibly after a change of government. But the condition is a well thought-out alternative system, and a gradual transition - in other words a realo stance, egged on by a fundamental movement in the background.
3. **The Cold War: An alternative theory for the East.**

Back to Figure 1: there are two parties to the Cold War. Can the same theory of autism as a basic aspect of the Cold War be used for the East? I think the answer must, in general, be affirmative. Table 1 makes sense, *mutatis mutandis*. But there are some basic differences that also serve to highlight some of the differences between Western European governmental/parliamentary rule as opposed to Eastern party rule; even if the five missing arguments are the same and the relation to one's own superpower counts most.

(1) In what SUP offers EEP there is a major difference relative to what USG at times has offered WEG. SUP has offered to take on more risks even if they certainly take on higher costs. The Soviet Union has developed its post—Second world war strategy under the sign of NEVERMORE and would, predictably, have a forward strategy with fighting on Eastern European rather than Soviet soil, which is similar to US preference for a land war in Europe to a land war in the US. But the Soviet Union prefers a large-scale conventional war to a nuclear exchange whereas the US has, in a sense, offered itself as a hostage under the nuclear MAD doctrine. The Soviet official rejection as well as the US non-rejection of a first strike doctrine can be seen in this light.

(2) SUP has so much less to offer the People in Eastern Europe. There is no delivery of the Soviet way of life, and not the millions of emigrants to the US (from both Western and Eastern Europe) regarding the United States not only as a second but as a first country. There is tourism, but career only for very few. The Soviet Union is not the country of a new beginning, like the US has been for so many.
(3) EEP may well say "we have made the Soviet Union protect you" but will hardly be able to make any political mileage out of that. And this will overshadow any possible gains in terms of investment, welfare state, shorter military service, disarmament conference and summit meetings.

In short, SUP has much less to offer EEP but gets, nevertheless, submissiveness to SUP both in conflict definition, military doctrine, no overt criticism and by a large a united front without, except for the "maverick" Rumania, playing some kind of French role in the Eastern system. And EEP has much less to offer People, yet demanding submissiveness in conflict definition, military doctrine and relation to the Soviet Union, with no overt criticism and, eventually, willingness to be exterminated. Both deals are so bad that there has to be some counterflow in the system. And there is: the Soviet Union makes itself available as a major trade partner giving the value-added due to higher levels of processing to Eastern Europe. And EEP delivers, in several Eastern European countries, some kind of welfare state, at least in the fields of health and education.

The deal is, nevertheless, so bad (except, possibly, for some members of the Eastern European parties) that nobody would enter the deal voluntarily. There has to be coercion in the system. Soviet military-political imperialism in Eastern Europe, tying the parties in the Center and the Periphery together at the expense of the Eastern European people supplies the necessary and sufficient amounts of coercion at both levels, with the stationed Soviet troops as the ultima ratio. Much simpler, and also more brutal than the more sophisticated system in the West. But nothing of this implies that the Soviet Union is a credible threat to the West; even if it is not a threat, but a domineering reality in the East.

In the West there is some kind of balance with cyclical returns of tension when the balance breaks down; in the East an imbalance with tension as a more permanent state of affairs. In both systems the relationship to the superpower and the relationship to one’s own government rather than the relation to the other side is what matters. But those relations, in turn, are to some extent determined by the actio-reactio between the two camps.

Neither camp has been able to produce a credible scenario for an attack by the other side, leaving alone evidence that such an attack was seriously contemplated. Both camps need that scenario/evidence in order to bolster their case, the need for these strange deals that have been set up. Consequently the deals become goals in their own right. Both of them are autistic, running on their own steam, fueled mainly by themselves. Their military-bureaucratic-corporate-intelligentsia complexes are in and by themselves sufficient to explain increases in armament. That is where USC, SUP, WEC and EEP interact with themselves, the most efficient type of interaction because it is so direct. And the counterpoint, the people interacting with itself creating a peace movement is a weak counterpoint, particularly in the East.

Two autism running on parallel tracks do not an arms race make if they are not racing with each other, only with themselves, using the guy on that parallel track as a justification. Of course there is also actio-reactio, and we have no methodology with which we can assign percentages to the two perspectives. But some attention should be paid to a third perspective: actio-reactio between the two autisms.
My argument would run as follows. It is not the objective threat from the other side that matters since it is not credible enough. What matters is the autism of the other side. Both sides might feel, with considerable justification, that regardless of what they themselves do there is no or insufficient response from the other side. Thus, it may be argued and has been argued, that in the 1970s there was a period with less arms increase in the US while at the same time, under Brezhnev, Soviet armament just continued.

In the same vein it may be argued and is being argued that never has the Soviet system looked so open, receptive as under Gorbachev, with the "strength of politics" rather than the "politics of strength to quote Shevardnadze, not to mention the relaxation of SUP pressure over its own population, and the unilateral nuclear test ban of the Soviet Union. And yet, where is the US response? Or the French response for that matter - a country more vitriically anti-Soviet than ever, fighting stalinism 40-50 years after the fact?

However, the more autistic systems are the less attention will they pay to the circumstance that autism may in itself be dangerous because of its impact on the other side. To heed an hypothesis of that type would already be a sign of diminishing autism. This should not be confused with an admonition, frequently expressed by the peace movement, that "we have to start with ourselves". The only place to start is everywhere, at the same time. But one of this "everywhere" is the autism of the parties to the cold war, both our own party and the other side.

Where is change more likely? The answer follows from the analysis but may be surprising to some: in the authoritarian East rather than the democratic West. They have more incentives to change their
exchange structure, both the SUP-EEP relation and the EEP-People relation. If in addition the Soviet Union could become more attractive to people in Eastern Europe this would also be significant. In short, more democratic, less repressive. And that type of change is probably now under way.

But will that get us out of the Cold War? Not necessarily, and that conclusion may also be surprising to some. What we are witnessing in the Cold War is no only two parallel autisms as argued above, but two different types of autism, one democratic, one autocratic. There is no reason to assume that the democratic one is less autistic than the autocratic version. The logic of USG/WEG is not that different from the logic of SUP/EEP. The difference is that in a democracy many, sometimes most of the People believe what their leaders say even when they are wrong, in an autocracy they distrust what the leaders say even when they are right. Change the East from an autocracy to a democracy (this may not be so far away as we tend to assume) and the autism may merely get more firmly rooted. As a matter of fact, acceptance of SUP foreign policy doctrine may be the price for more economic freedom and welfare - as is, partly, the case in the West.

What would make a difference, then? Being responsive would make a difference. More particularly, I am thinking of the reaction of the West to the colossal changes now taking place in the East. Continued US nuclear testing (as was done 3 February 1987) is the worst possible example of extreme autism, not only because of the function of testing in building the next weapons generation of laser/particle beam weapons, but as an indicator of seemingly uncurable autism. Whether that autism is changeable remains to be seen precisely because it is based on an exchange in some kind of equilibrium, with vested interests in status quo all over. Hopefully with the exception of the peace movement.
For even that is not quite obvious. Nobody would pay any attention to the peace movement in a peaceful world; it is the threat of nuclear war and the exposure of the deal that makes the movement politically interesting. Hence, are we to conclude, then, that we are in a fix? That the conflict machinery simply has to be maintained, otherwise the whole delicate balance will be destroyed? And even that there has to be a balance of balance, that the two triads should not become too dissimilar lest the whole relation breaks down? Concretely: can WE continue in its subservience to USC, with the population under the Damocles sword of possible extermination if the Soviet Union for some reason simply decided to finlandize Eastern Europe, with the hope of obtaining higher security that way (which it probably would?) And would that not mean that both sides have a vested interest in status quo, not only in their triad but also in the triad of the other side?

The answer will probably have to be affirmative. Except, that is, if some other enemy could be invented capable of providing the same social glue as anti-communism to the Western governments (and to many, perhaps, most of the people) and anti-fascism to the Eastern parties (and to many, of not most, of the people). With China increasingly developing more, not less positive relations with either side there seem to be only two candidates, not mutually exclusive: terrorism, fundamentalist Islam - and the two combined.

Unless, some day, from the top of the system, somebody simply says to the other side: Let us call it off - . There is no serious conflict any longer, perhaps there never was. We have more important things to do - .
notes

[1] A small point for Europeans and Americans, but in the Pacific theater of the Cold War the political East is in the geographical West and vice versa. A reference to the conflict as being between socialism and capitalism may exaggerate the economic dimension: as being between dictatorship and democracy is too much of a black-white picture: as being between the Soviet Union and the US underestimates the degree of mobilization both at government and people levels in many countries in East and West. Hence, we stick to the usual term: the Cold War.

[2] One reason for this may be that military people are more technical and politicians more ideological; they are *zweckrational* and *verrational*, respectively, in the Weberian sense. A discussion of the adequacy of the means makes sense to the military man whereas the more politically minded may interpret any such discussion as indicative of ideological weakness, or of being less against and (much) less in favor of the respective superpowers, depending on where one lives.

[3] To the contrary, we may also argue that the Soviet Union withdrew politically and ideologically tenable positions:

"As it was, the British were able to suppress the resistance forces in Greece by armed force, the only such action by any Allied power in the course of the war. In Italy, Togliatti, the Communist leader, returned from Moscow with orders to cooperate with the Allied authorities. And the Italian resistance, composed of 150,000 fighters, surrendered their arms uncomplainingly. Therez, the French Communist leader, accepted de Gaulle's authority and helped to preserve the French state. Even in Eastern Europe, Communist governments were a consequence of the cold war, not its cause. In the Far East, Stalin aided the recovery of China by Chiang Kai-Shek, and the subsequent victory of Mao Tse-tung was highly unwelcome to him".

This position, by A J P Taylor, in *Essays in English History*, London: Penguin, 1976, pp. 304ff. may well be located closer to now this period is regarded in the 21st century than the historiography produced by the ideologies of the Cold War. Attention should be paid to the implicit indictment of Stalin.

[4] See chs. 3.2-3 in my *There Are Alternatives*. Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984, pp. 93-109, to some extent based on the work by Michael Wallace. From this type of reasoning two courses of action can be recommended for war-avoidance purposes: to stop the arms race, or to avoid direct confrontation. The superpowers have been incapable of the former (ibid., ch. 4), but not of the latter: the Nixon-Brezhnev "traffic rules" for the Cold War have to a large extent functioned in the sense that US and Soviet soldiers have not confronted each other eye to eye, gun to gun (but maybe button to button, over their nuclear war control consoles).
Of course the arms race deprives both superpower populations of a certain amount of living standard, possibly more, and from a lower average level, in the Soviet Union than in the US. However, given the expectations in an average US family the level attained may be a much lower proportion of the level hoped for than in the Soviet Union; the ability to cope with hardship much higher in the Soviet Union; and the collective defiance arising from outside pressure also much higher. Add to this that at least in principle the US population has more of an opportunity to voice a protest against the arms level, a change of course for economic reasons may be more likely in the US. Or - an effort to use a war as a tension release mechanism.

These are the "Four Roads to Peace and Security" referred to in the subtitle of There Are Alternatives!

I am using here the logic of the chapters in There Are Alternatives!

Vicenc Fisas Armengol, in "Los gastos militares en los paises neutrales", El País, 30 August 1986, compares Spain, his own country, where this argument played a certain role in connection with the referendum with the six neutral countries Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia on the one hand and NATO without and with the North American countries on the other, in terms of population, surface, income per capita, military expenses 1976 and 1985 (including annual increase in the period), percentage military expenditure of the gross domestic product and military expenditure per inhabitant and per square kilometer. In terms of military expenditure per capita only Switzerland and Sweden are somewhat higher than Euro-NATO but lower than the NATO total; in terms of expenditure per square kilometer all of them are lower than both Euro-NATO and NATO total except Switzerland - perhaps more due to the smallness of the country than the vastness of the military budget. Relative to the gross domestic product only Yugoslavia is higher than Euro-NATO, but somewhat lower than the NATO total. Spain is in general located towards the higher end of the neutral countries (as it once was), permitting the author to conclude that "the cost of a defense policy of this type does not imply high leve, of costs and in any case never higher than what is already the case in Spain". There remains, of course, the problem of what type of policy offers more security - but the data are rather unambiguous as to the economic costs. And they also go for the increase: only Austria is higher than Euro-NATO (but lower than NATO total).

I am indebted to Dieter Senghas for his seminal work in this field. See his Abschreckung und Frieden: Studien zur organisiertener Friedlosigkeit, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt, 1969, 1981.

The Figure is an adaptation of the scheme used for analyzing imperialism in "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Essays in Peace Research Vol. IV, ch. 13, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1980. A more detailed analysis would make a distinction between people in the superpower and people in the client countries. This is imperialism theory applied, combining military, economic, cultural and political aspects.

From Stephen F. Cohen, The Nation, January 26 1985, p. 72. The figures are official Soviet figures.

Let me counter with a personal experience. Travelling through the Soviet Union in a camping car summer 1982 I came early a Sunday morning to a ceremony close to Novgorod commemorating one of the numerous
battles where the Red Army was able to stop the Nazi onslaught. After the ceremony was over I went to the commanding officer and said, in poor Russian, that he should know that there were numerous people in the West extremely grateful for what the Soviet army had done. The man had tears in his eyes when he embraced me. Why is it so difficult for Western leaders to acknowledge the obvious?


[4] Reaganism, in my book Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism: Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell (Cleveland, Oslo, 1984; Juan Gil-Albert, Alicante, 1985; Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1987) is analyzed in terms of these three principles not only as values, but as analytical handles in order to understand the phenomenon.


[6] Thus, the FBI played a major role in connection with the collection of evidence against the alleged Norwegian spy, Arne Treholt. See Mads Andenaes, Vi anklager!, Oslo, 1984.

[7] Of course this incurs costs for the US, and very much so. Pisas (footnote 8 above) gives military expenses as 2.4% of the GDP for the neutral countries, 3.7% for Euro-NATO and 5.6% for NATO as a whole. There are costs being a Leader. On the other hand, the tripwire mechanisms are essential for WEG to guarantee that they are not cheated when the chips are down; that all the years of submission have not been in vain.

[8] Against this may be argued that a Soviet invasion of, say, Finland would be a casus belli, that the US would retaliate, if not in Finland and if not against the Soviet mainland, against a fourth country. But, is this likely? The US did nothing of any military significance in connection with Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia 1968 which does not prove the point since these were WTO countries. But US action in case of an attack on NATO allies is also in doubt, which makes the point.

[9] to analyse

For one effort the kind of society this will add up to after a nuclear war, see Johan Galtung, Environment, Development and Military Activity, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1982.

[10] A distinction has to be made, then, between the peace movement as for instance, an anti-missile movement with limited goals and the Peace Movement as a social movement with an historical function of some major significance: abolition of war. Like the movement for the abolition of slavery PM has its ups and downs.

[21] On the other hand, a certain split between Prime Minister Craxi and Defense Minister Spadolini is discernible here. the latter possibly being the most submissive among his colleagues in Western Europe.
Interesting about those elections is not only that the Greens were able to increase their vote from 5.6% March 1983 to 8.3%, given the hostility to them and novelty of the issues they bring into politics, but also that the Social Democrats did not lose more (from 38.2% to 37%), in spite of being perceived as having moved to the left and the danger of a red-green coalition (which, of course, will come sooner or later). The loser was CDU, down to 44.3% from 48.8% - mainly losing, it seems to the liberal party in the government coalition. One interpretation of this is that the Peace Movement has left the streets as peace movement and is increasingly getting into the parties and the parliament.

The great articulation period was between the formation of NATO in 1949 and WTO in 1955 - but, of course, started earlier. When is still a matter of dispute.

According to the US to get the Soviet Union to the negotiation table; according to Egon Bahr to get the US to the negotiation table. The double track idea can also be seen as a general feature of NATO policy as expressed in the Harmel statement much earlier.

This is what General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe said in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee March 1983:

"Most people believe that it was because of the SS-20 that we modernized. We should have modernized irrespective of the SS-20 because we had this gap in our spectrum of defense developing and we needed to close the gap"

(Quoted from Generals for Peace and Disarmament, A Challenge to US/NATO Strategy, University Books, New York, 1984, p. 4. I am indebted to Tom Robohon for this reference).


Often the outsider sees it best. For an excellent analysis of the "deal", see M. Zubiri, Strategy, Technology and Insecurity: An Ensemble of Apprehensions, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1984. Zubiri makes a point not included in the present analysis: " - several of these countries were engaged in suppressing national liberation movement in their colonies in the early stages of the evolution of NATO. Policing the colonies was considered more urgent than raising troops for a hypothetical conflict in Europe" (p. 18).

However, it may be stronger in the US than in Western Europe. I have witnessed massive rallies in the US (eg in Portland, Oregon, October 1983) protesting deployment of the Euro-missiles as a threat to the European populations, not vice versa.

I think relatively few Norwegians, hearing criticism of their own country would refer automatically to the critic as "anti-Norwegian"; yet the term "anti-American" comes very quickly when the US is criticized from the outside.

The term "realist", hence, should not be confused with realistic. It is useful that the English language has both terms.
The seven biggest contributors to the US as "foreign stock" all decreased in percentage terms already from 1960 to 1970: Italy (13.3% to 12.6%), Germany (12.7% to 10.8%), Canada (9.3% to 9.0%), United Kingdom (8.5% to 7.3%), Poland (8.2% to 7.1%), Soviet Union (6.7% to 5.8%) and Ireland (5.2% to 4.3%). The next two in size, Mexico (5.1% to 7.0%) and Asia (3.4% to 5.2%) both increased. Recently the change has become more clear: the point here is only to show that this has been the tendency for a long time (U.S. Census of Population. 1960, 1970).

See, for instance, the article by Robert English, a former Defense Department policy analyst, "Offensive Star Wars", The New Republic, February 24, 1986.


The best keeper of that record is probably the world famous linguist Noam Chomsky: Turning the Tide, Southend, Boston, 1985 being one of the more recent.

For an excellent discussion of this theme, see Ekkhard Krippendorff, Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1985.

For a discussion of this theme, see J. E. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, Methuen, London, 1972; ch. 11, "The Rebirth of Unlimited War".

For this purpose it may even be advantageous for WEG not to participate in those summit meetings in order not to be co-responsible: yet trying to press USG into repeating the exercise.

Only the open criticism involves third partier who start watching the process. This may stimulate the critic to follow up his critique, but may also galvanize the superpower into more resistance to change. Good politics would be based on both methods, with judicious selection on the basis of the situation.

I use the terms describing the two camps of Die Grunen in Germany, where the SPD can be seen as realo, no doubt sooner or later cooperating with the green realos. But the political function of the fundamental will remain significant.

They are then construed, in the US, as anti-American demonstrations by the same logic as anti-Zionism is reconstructed as anti-Semitism and anti-socialist countries attitudes as anti-socialism.

The NATO decision 12 December 1979 to station the Euro-missiles was seen by many as an effort to Europeanize nuclear war, even to Western Europe. Logically the US had to come up with a forward and more conventional strategy, Airland Battle offering Western Europe what the Soviet Union offers its people: battles in Eastern Europe.