THE COLD WAR, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: A comparison of the Atlantic and Pacific theatres

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Introduction: a plea for **globalism and wholism**

Most Europeans, East and West, but probably not most North Americans, seem to be of the opinion that the cold war is something only found in the Atlantic area, between the United States and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the other, with some neutral countries interspersed. Of course, this is the eurocentric vision. Much of the Cold War, if not considerably more, is found in the Pacific area, with the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its former and present allies on the other, with some neutral countries interspersed. I repeat, even more so. After all, it is in this part of the world, far away from Europeans, that two major wars after the Second World War have been fought: the Korean War, 1950-53, and the Indochina wars, 1945-75. This is the region where a Cold War became hot. In the complex tangle of reasons why, perhaps one stands out: the temperature of the war was mainly a problem for "Asiatics", although quite a lot of U.S. soldiers also lost their lives (one major reason why the United States cannot be accused of eurocentrism or atlantocentrism).

In a similar vein, very many people tend to look at "peace" and "development" as two separate issues, the former being "east-west" and the latter "north-south". Like the separation between the Atlantic and the Pacific, which is not only conceptual but also geographic, this distinction is not only geographic but also conceptual and serves some purpose: directing our attention to the danger of a major war in the first case, and to the ever-present misery and its reproduction in the second. And yet the conceptual separation may be driven too far. Interconnections may be lost. And similarly, for the Atlantic/Pacific distinction: not only interrelations, but also obvious similarities and dissimilarities between what will now be referred to as the two theatres of the Cold War may easily be lost sight of.

Hence, this article: an exercise in the holistic approach, trying to see the Atlantic and Pacific theatres from a common vantage point, trying to explore how peace and development go hand in hand in a structure that essentially was the product of the Second World War.
2. A general theory of the Cold War

Let us start simply asking the question: What does it take to make a Cold War, with its tremendous scope and domain, covering so much of the world, even with the possible extinction of major parts of the world as a consequence? How did one ever get into that kind of structure/process, evolving every day, spreading in domain and deepening in scope, and usually in a way which seems to make a mockery of both peace and development, although there are also some setbacks to this negative process?

Let us try to reason at the general level, yet keeping elementary history of post-Second World War relations present in our mind. What do we see, forty years in retrospect? Of course, back in Spring and Summer 1945, from May till August, we see the victors and the defeated, in principle the allies and the axis powers. However, among the axis powers, Italy with characteristic sense of the dialectics of history managed to get rid of what seems to be an indelible stamp as an axis power, and emerged almost as an ally. And on the other side, although there were many victors, there was no doubt in anybody's mind that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were in a class all by themselves - the former having contributed materially in an absolutely major sense, the latter with 20 million Soviet lives, and with 10 million of the 13.6 million German soldiers, 95% of whom were killed during the war fallen on Soviet soil.

Of course, there were also Great Britain who had managed to stave off the enemy, and France and China who had not managed to do so. They had been partly, even wholly, occupied by the Germans and the Japanese respectively, but managed to put up a resistance credible enough to be present among the Potsdam powers, although in the case of China only by cable.
When I now count only the two powers, subsequently to be defined as superpowers, as the victors, it is essentially for four reasons.

First, they entered the war with a basic traumatic experience: the Operation Barbarossa, 22 June 1941 for the Soviet Union; Pearl Harbour, 7 December 1941 for the United States. Surprise attacks that shaped the image of world events, for years, generations, maybe centuries, by providing them with a strong NEVERMORE ideology.

Second, both superpowers came out of the war with a very high level of self-righteousness. They both regarded their own contribution to the defeat of the axis as not only necessary, but to a large extent sufficient. The abysmal moral quality of the enemy made the victors look perfect, the self-righteousness stemming not only from the magnitude of the effort to defeat him, but also from the depravity of the defeated party. The feeling of having done away with vermin, with pests, was strong and to a large extent justified.

Third, both powers were new on the world scene, essentially creations of the First World War. Both of them were strongly ideological in their world outlooks, liberal/conservative/capitalist versus marxist/socialist. In short, both of them had programmes; not only for themselves but both of them knew what would be good for the world.

And fourthly, whereas the preceding three points make them look similar, this last point locks them in with each other: they both knew perfectly well that their ideologies were incompatible; their models for socio-economic (re-)construction were also incompatible, and that their interests to a large extent might be incompatible - for instance the U.S. interest in market penetration and the Soviet interest in a geo-political buffer zone around Soviet territory. But incompatibility of values or interests already spells conflict; incompatibility of values and interests may even spell deep conflict. And they knew perfectly well that they had been at logger-heads before the War, that they had been brought together in an uneasy
alliance, both of them suspecting that the other would make separate peace with Nazi Germany and that a friendship based on little more than "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" factor might be of short duration. A self-fulfilling prophecy.

So, what did the defeated countries look like? They left the War deeply humiliated, certainly not self-righteously. However, there is a difference between Germany and Japan in this regard: in both countries almost the whole population was mobilised and continued fighting to the very end; opposition was small, insignificant. And yet the Nazis were more different from the ordinary German than the Japanese leadership from the Japanese people. One can to some extent draw a line around the Nazi leadership, count them, arraign them in court and even punish them. A similar exercise for the Japanese would almost have to be futile, given the collectivist nature of the country and the amount of consensus between elite and people.

Of course they also left the War deeply wounded, the defeat being a major traumatic experience, the sequel of which we do not as yet know. The destruction of Berlin, the dismemberment of Germany and the plunder after the War may be seen as revenge for Operation Barbarossa; the nuclear genocide committed against the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as revenge for Pearl Harbor. Whatever damage the Nazi powers had inflicted on the allies on the Western side was amply revenged in saturation/carpet bombing, even to excess. But the wounds inflicted on the Soviet Union were of such a depth and magnitude that no commensurate revenge could be found, given the short duration of the fight on German soil. Except, and this is important: the dismemberment of the German Reich in the East into three parts, some of it absorbed into the Soviet Union, some of it into Poland and some of it constituting what today is known as the DDR. And then there is BRD. And the situation of West Berlin.

Did the defeated countries emerge with a programme? Of course: after such a total war and such a total defeat, they emerged with the programs of their victors. What else could they do? They could not continue, at least not overtly, with their
old programmes. Their "crimes against humanity" had been of such a magnitude that the past had to be disavowed, at least for some time. The War, having been at least partly ideological, carried in its wake an ideological peace where the defeated countries had to confess their sins, reject their past, including their inhuman ideologies, atone and declare themselves on line with the victors. The victors wanted not only total capitulation but also total defeat; a prostrate, defeated country, not only willing to, but asking to receive the Word, the imprint of the victor.

In so doing conflict was courted. The conflict between the super-powers with their super-ideology was transmitted to the defeated countries who then learned to express their world views, second in line only to the super powers. Some kind of peace with the victor was gained at the expense of ever-deepening conflict with the other victor and defeated country. The relation was, and is, a tight one: the major characteristics of the situation of the victors would necessarily have to be reflected in the situation of the defeated countries; all four of them.

However, much more is needed for a group of victorious and defeated countries to make that solid structure/process known as the Cold War today. The last two elements mentioned, the missionary calling of the programme, and the emerging conflict, would have to be whipped into shape as an ideology. That ideology took both positive and negative forms. The positive aspect was already a model of development: liberal/capitalist versus marxist/socialist; the models of the super powers. The defeated countries had a vested interest in good relations with the victors, and the victors were ever present as occupation armies, busily working to implement their programmes at any point, implanting their genetic code wherever they could in suitable carrying mechanisms: multi-party versus single-party systems; market economies versus centrally planned economies. The defeated countries started increasingly to come out like clones, leaning over backwards to perform their roles; the distance between cloning and clowning being a short one, not only phonetically.
But the ideology had also a negative component; one side being anti-communist in general and anti-Soviet Union and/or anti-Moscow, in particular; the other side being anti-imperialist and anti-United States or perhaps rather anti-Washington, in particular. Pre-war incidents and attitudes were invoked, a short term war alliance gradually suppressed or even successfully forgotten, new post-war incidents and attitudes being sedimented on top of old ideological baggage. At this point it should not be forgotten how the 1917 revolution was a major trauma for the west, with the killing of the Tsar Nicolai II in Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk) as the major event, just as the interventionist wars 1918-22 constituted a major trauma for the new Soviet Republic; like the United States one and a half centuries earlier built on a considerable basis of elite and popular idealism, and also suffering interventionist wars.

And yet, ideology alone would never have been sufficient. Something more was needed: a particularly nasty component that was brought into the recipe for the Cold War. I am thinking of the divided nations, not only the idea of drawing a line on somebody else's territory, but of enrolling one part of the nation in one camp and the other part in the other. People in the two parts of divided countries take opposite sides, and the conflict is fanned by the emotional, to the point of fratricidal, energies associated with internal as opposed to ordinary external wars. Two such countries became particularly important: divided Germany with divided Berlin in its midst; divided Korea. Of course these were the places where the Cold War became extremely tense (Berlin 1945/49) and even very hot (Korea 1950-53) because of built-in conflict production. Another, of course, Vietnam (1945-75); this incredible country that has defeated Japan, France, the United States and - to some extent - even China.

And these were the two decisive events that served to take one more step: the lining up of like-minded and like-interested countries in alliances. Obviously, for a country to enter into alliance with a super-power it is not necessary to hate the other super-powers. It is not even necessary to be anti-communist or anti-imperialist. All that is needed is to assume that the enemy of my friend is my enemy. And for some reason or other...
accept a super-powers as friend. The latter may be done on the basis of ideological similarity or interest, literally speaking, in the programme presented for development. Where peace/war issues end and development/mal-development issues begin in this extremely complex web of values and interests is impossible to state in general terms; nor is it very important. A good example is the Spanish elite today, being taught that Spain is threatened by the Soviet Union.

The process may run also counter to what was just said: driven by intense anti-imperialism or anti-communism, one arrives at the conclusion: the enemy of my enemy must be my friend. One may be willing to enter an alliance with the nearest super-powers. The triangle involved is actually the same, the logic is the same, the conclusion is the same - only the premises are organised a little differently. Actually, it should also be pointed out that it is enough for the elite to think in the way just mentioned; they will probably be in command of foreign policy anyhow. The people may be of the same opinion. The people may be marginalised, alienated, apathetic, leaving the whole foreign policy game to the classe politique. But they may also be dead against, having just the opposite views. In that case people will draw the conclusion that the other super-power, being the enemy of the super-power that is selected by their own hated elite, cannot possibly be that bad: “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” But, as can be noted: the chains are now becoming somewhat long and unwieldy. They might easily break if one of the links in the chain is exposed as weak, even blatantly wrong. And isn’t that exactly what most of Cold War propaganda from all sides tries to show?

Let us now add to this one particular element in the total recipe: to make the defeated country the most faithful ally. It is not an unproblematic policy. On the one hand, the defeated country is easily blackmailed into posturing as the best pupil in the class: this may set a model for others to follow. But it may also happen on the other hand, that others do not like to follow a model set by the former enemy. On the contrary, they may have the suspicion that some kind of collusion between the victorious super-power and the formerly hated, defeated country is going on, that they have become too cozy and that...
this is all directed against the rest of the alliance. Hence, the super-power has to exercise political talent in the effort to make use of the defeated country as most faithful ally.

The U.S. has probably been more fortunate with the Federal Republic of Germany than with Japan in this regard, partly for the reason mentioned above that Japan changed less, or less in depth, as a result of defeat, and partly because of less sensitivity to East Asian than to European affairs and relations.

However, no system can remain perfect. If there is a most faithful ally there is also the most unfaithful: the ally that opts out of the system. Theoretically, he has two possibilities: to join the other alliance, or to become non-aligned/neutral. Whatever he does, he may remain in that position or change again, in which case he will probably be classified as "maverick", not merely as unfaithful. There is also the possibility of the "unfaithful of all camps, unite", constituting a new alliance - but that seems to be a more theoretical outcome.

Let us now look at what has been said and try to put it down as a guideline, with the circles representing countries, super powers on top, a divided one in the middle and other allies and non-aligned countries at the bottom; each country being divided into elites and people, centre and periphery. The two thick broken lines stand for the basic negative relations, the four thick unbroken lines for the basic positive relations in the game; the other lines built around this nucleus (See Fig. 1)
The nucleus, as mentioned, consists of super-powers, divided countries and most faithful countries, based on very solid sentiments. Needless to say, the figure becomes much more complicated if the people do not agree with the elite; in other words if there are not only dissidents, but dissident movements, a dissident people, even to the point where the elite might have preferred to elect a new people (Bertolt Brecht). But the construction is based on elite allegiance, rather than country allegiance, assuming the elites are sufficiently in control to guarantee the super-powers military access: bases, nuclear tasks, command of the military forces in case of war (and for manoeuvres, etc) in peace time.

There seem to be two different super-power strategies. The first would be to build on elites that are really supported by their population, but certainly only if the two together, the country as a whole, is in favour of the super-power, is not both anti-Washington and anti-Moscow. The second strategy would be to build on unpopular elites, guaranteeing them against popular wrath; even to the point of coming to their rescue in case of revolts/revolutions, in return for complete loyalty according to the usual conflict polarisation scheme. In Europe, the United States has been using strategy No 1 and the Soviet Union strategy No 2, grosso modo, perhaps not so strange since the United States liberated nazi-occupied countries in Western Europe, as opposed to the Soviet Union that defeated axis in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Poland, of course) For the Soviet Union, both types are problematic. In countries where communism is popular the whole population may turn against the Soviet Union (Yugoslavia, Albania); in a country where communism is unpopular the people may turn against both elites and the Soviet Union with the latter coming to the rescue of the former in a bloody interaction. So much for the general theory of the Cold War; let us now turn to the two applications, the two theatres.
3. The Atlantic and Pacific theaters compared

On the next page the reader will find, in Table 1, a systematic
comparison between the Atlantic and Pacific theatres in the
Cold War. Very often this is referred to as the East-West
conflict, with the understanding that "East" is the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and "West" is the
United States and NATO. This, however, is eurocentric/atlantocentric:
in the Pacific/East Asian theatre it is the United States that
is to the East and the Soviet Union to the West. Hence, it may
be better to use ideological terms and refer to the conflict as
a conflict between capitalism and socialism, in other words
(in the view of the present author) as a conflict between two
rather than between two parts of global geography.

Let us take the 8 lines in the table. They are in
the same order as in the presentation of the general theory
of the Cold War in the preceding section, only with examples.

The victors are very clear, but they have been equipped with
some numerals in the table to indicate who was the major and
who was secondary in the two theatres. We have added
under the United States, Great Britain and France for the
Atlantic theatre and China (both nationalist and communist,
they were fighting together against Japan) for the Pacific theatre.
But it does not add anything to the analysis since a basic point
here is that the Cold War conflict is primarily a super-power
conflict. Only the super-powers have super-ideologies programmes
designed to fit the whole world, are potentially the creators
of world-systems, and are even holders of super-weapons, weapons
so strong that their use can only be justified against super-
enemies. In addition, they were the ones who saw themselves
as the not only necessary but sufficient causes for the defeat
of the nazi powers. Other countries may satisfy some of these
conditions but not all of them; that is the privilege of the
United States and the Soviet Union.

Then, in the second line, are the defeated countries, the
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<th>Dimensions</th>
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<th>PACIFIC</th>
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<td>Capitalist (West)</td>
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<td>1 Victorious countries</td>
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<td>(GB, F)</td>
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<td>2 Defeated countries</td>
<td>West Germany (I)</td>
<td>East Germany (H, R, BG, CS, Y)</td>
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<td>3 Ideology</td>
<td>Liberalism/Conservatism/Anti-communism/Development</td>
<td>Marxism/Anti-imperialism/Development</td>
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<td>4 Divided countries</td>
<td>West Germany (Austria)</td>
<td>East Germany + Polish terr. + Soviet terr. (A, SF, PI, CS, H, R)</td>
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<td>5 Alliance systems</td>
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<td>6 Most faithful country = defeated country</td>
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<td>7 Unfaithful country (Protest countries)</td>
<td>France (GR? NL? B? DK?)</td>
<td>Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania (PI, H, CS)</td>
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<td>8 Independent country (maverick country)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yugoslavia (Albania)</td>
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axis countries, with some lesser members underneath. It may be noted that whereas the United States have powerful allies, they actually only defeated West Germany and to some extent Italy; the Soviet Union was fighting alone but defeated not only East Germany but also the other axis countries: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe. In the Pacific theatre, however, no country can really be said to have capitulated to the Soviet Union which entered the war only one week before it was over, in agreement with Yalta-Potsdam (but not the Soviet Union-Japan pact).

The ideology is clear: it is already written into the headings of the table, it varies in meaning all the time, but both in terms of allies and in terms of interests of elites and people, the differences are very real. Much of the plan do make a difference, as dominant systems.

Then, we turn to the divided countries. They are more numerous than people are usually aware of. On the European side there is of course Germany, divided into four parts as mentioned, but one usually focuses on the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic only. However, Austria, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania were also divided as a result of the war and sentiments in that connection continue riding high, meaning that there are emotions that can be played upon in various ways.

In the Pacific theatre one is usually thinking of Korea as the divided country; and it is often, unfairly, compared with Germany. Korea was treated by the victors as a part of Japan, and the Japanese war effort and to a large extent, heroic resistance fight was not recognised as such. Korea was divided probably because giving the Soviet Union control over a part of Korea was found to be preferable to giving what the Soviet Union might have liked: Hokkaido. The United States wanted Japan for herself, but the Soviet Union was given the famous islands north of Hokkaido, as well as Sakhalin. Thus, Japan was also a divided country as a result of the war, and so was, later on, China with the People's Republic on the one hand, and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
on the other, leaving out Hong Kong and Macao. And in addition to this, certainly not to be forgotten: Vietnam which was also divided in the aftermath of the War and in a major way.

When we now turn to the alliances, their names and shapes are very well-known in the Atlantic theatre because of NATO and WTO.

In the Pacific theatre they are less clear cut, consisting of a number of bilateral, perhaps to some extent trilateral constructions. The United States has her security treaties with Japan (AMPO), South Korea and Taiwan (and at some time with Vietnam); the Soviet Union has her arrangements with Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam (and at some time with the People’s Republic of China). Further south the United States has various arrangements with the ASEAN countries (bases; SEATO) and ANZUS; the Soviet Union nothing.

There is no doubt as to who are the most faithful allies; by definition the defeated countries, BRD and DDR in the Atlantic theatre, Japan in the Pacific theatre – again leaving the Soviet Union out in the cold with no faithful ally. I have added Italy in parenthesis for the western super-power and Bulgaria in parenthesis for the eastern one: both of them were axis countries, both of them have repented, and joined the fold. But they were not the major axis countries; Italy was an ally in the First World War and Bulgaria too close to Russia for cultural and historical (the war against Turkey) reasons.

Then, the unfaithful allies. There is no doubt which the major ones are: France, Yugoslavia, China. But we have also added some lesser ones in parenthesis, the most recent entry into this field being New Zealand with the refusal to accept US warships that may (but also may not) have nuclear connotations.

And, at the bottom, the independent actors have been added. There are not many of them and for the time being, only one maverick country: Albania (with the possibility that North Korea may play a similar role in East Asia). One may of course also discuss how independent the independent actors are. Discipline is the rule. Maverick countries are there to be rejected on both sides, like Die Grünen in Germany rejected by blue and red alike as a “maverick party”.

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These are the major points, using the general recipe for a Cold War as developed in the preceding section. In order to gain more depth in this presentation, let us try to point out some major differences between the Atlantic and Pacific theatres; the similarities being only too clear from the table. And let us take as point of departure the Atlantic situation and show how the Pacific situation differs, proceeding line by line.

First, to the extent that the Second World War determines the logic of the scheme: there was no symmetry between the two super-powers and the system they built. The United States was so much more important. That, of course, changed four years after the War, 1 October 1949, with the victory of the communist revolution in China and the Soviet-China Treaty based on the idea of "eternal friendship". And it changed again, equally dramatically, about ten years later when the rift between the two communist powers, the largest country in the world and the most populous country in the world, became increasingly apparent, exploding in open hostility still ten years later, in 1969 (Ussuri River incident). In other words, the logic of the power balance is more determined by the internal dynamism, the "development" of the countries, than by the massive belligerent interaction known as the Second World War.

Second, very much related to this: the Soviet Union had nobody capitulating to them in the Pacific theatre, North Korea being an artefact. This is important because it may have something to do with the way the Soviet Union was treating China. Maybe China was regarded as "theirs", in the same way as the United States regarded Japan. To the Soviet Union the Nationalist Government had been an enemy; during the war they were fighting on the same side against the axis, but four years after the war that government was defeated, its enmity being continued from Taiwan (and vice versa). So maybe there was an ambiguity in the Soviet attitude to China: on the one hand the Communist party had come into power, on the other hand, China as a country had been defeated. Such attitudes may take the form of self-fulfilling prophecies turning friends into enemies, thereby
confirming to the Soviet Union that they were right in seeing China as a defeated enemy. However, regardless of how that might have been, the slot is empty as far as the Second World War is concerned. The capitulation was to the U.S., not to the Soviet Union.

Third, the ideology. There is a difference; in the Pacific theatre, the ideology is much more directed against internal enemies; the internal contradictions, usually related to class one way or the other, being much stronger, much more pronounced. A country is threatened by its internal opposition, the (oligarchic) elites turn against the opposition, well knowing that they can get support from a super-power by casting the opposition in the role of subversive forces for the other super-power. Plots and spies and agents everywhere. The picture is certainly not unknown in the Atlantic theatre, but there is an asymmetry in quantity if not in quality.

Fourth, the divided countries. There are two major differences: in the Atlantic theatre, the defeated country was the divided country; in the Pacific theatre, a colony of Japan was forced into that role. The immediate assumption would be that this creates even more emotional energy from the feeling of being totally unjustly treated by history. The Germans had, having after all, a sense that horrendous crimes were committed, that division is the punishment, too light or too heavy depending on how the matter is evaluated, but perhaps useful for prevention and atonement. The Koreans have no such sense at all, nor any reason why they should have. And this is where the Cold War became hot, already in 1950. Even thirty years after the armistice in 1953 nothing basic has changed. The Koreans may rightly draw the conclusion that their obligation is to stay divided to provide conflict energy and not rock the boat; that the present abnormal situation is considered the normal situation and that nobody cares much, essentially for racist reasons. Much of the same attitude was underlined in the situation in Vietnam, but an extremely bloody war took place and the result was unification. Japan also got Okinawa back, China will ultimately get Hong Kong and Macao, but when or whether Japan will get the four islands to the north back again, and Taiwan will join China as province No 30, is still for the future to see; as is also the case for the two Koreas.
One thing is relatively clear: there has been more dynamism in connection with the divided countries in East Asia, and probably it will continue that way, than with the divided countries in Europe. The big exception is, of course, Austria in 1955—exchanging unification for neutrality. If that formula were to be applied to all the divided countries in East Asia it is easily seen that the U.S. would lose more than the Soviet Union: it would lose Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the Soviet Union only North Korea—China already having been lost and Vietnam already having been gained (although both could be adjusted, retroactively). As to the other divided countries in Europe: for the countries bordering on the Soviet Union, it looks as if the borders are permanent (the Final Act of Helsinki), but some formula for the two Germanies might still be found in exchange for neutrality, at least nuclear neutrality. The Soviet Union would then probably have to throw more countries into the bargain (Rapacki Plan).

Fifth, when one looks at the alliance systems there is a remarkable difference: multilateralism in the Atlantic theater, bilateralism in the Pacific theater. There may be many reasons for this. No doubt, one is that the countries related to the United States are not contiguous and the countries related to the Soviet Union only contiguous as long as China was included. But all three of them had problematic relations to China: the allies of the U.S. were separated by ocean, the allies of the Soviet Union by China. Second, there is less of a cultural/historical bond; the relationships are recent and usually negative. Third, and that may be the most important factor: the countries are less streamlined ideologically, possibly because Asians and particularly Asians influenced by Chinese culture may have a more ambiguous, highly dialectical approach to conflict. China had every reason to be anti-imperialist after one hundred years of history, from the Opium Wars of the 1840's till the fight against the Nationalist forces, supported by Western powers, came to an end. And yet, where is China today? More anti-communist in the sense of anti-Moscow than anti-imperialist in the sense of anti-Washington, for sure. If this has happened once, it can happen twice: the ambiguity may be resolved in another direction, once more.
It must be very difficult for a super power to preside over such countries. Perhaps better to deal with them one at a time, in a system of bilateralism, than in a multilateral treaty organisation, where their ambiguities might one day be aligned against the superpower.

And yet, it is not difficult to imagine how messy this must look, particularly in the eyes of Washington - less so in the eyes of Moscow, itself not alien to more oriental perspectives in politics. Washington must be itching for some kind of PATO - Pacific Area Treaty Organisation, paralleling NATO; with somewhere in the Eastern part of East Asia paralleling Brussels; obviously with Hawaii playing a role similar to the Canaries and Azores; maybe even with a joint NATO/PATO secretariat in Washington. I would doubt that Moscow is itching for the same thing, being more geared to bilateralism in general.

Sixth, in the Pacific the Soviet Union has no most faithful country generated by the Second World War for the reason that there is no defeated country that capitulated to the Soviet Union. Mongolia is of earlier vintage, created under quite different conditions after the First World War. In Europe the two superpowers have their Germanies and in addition one axis power each as somebody to be counted upon: Italy on the one hand, Bulgaria on the other. The United States has Japan, playing its role with diligence - but possibly also with a subtlety that one day may come as a surprise for the U.S. (vide the remark about trauma from the nuclear onslaught above).

Seventh, there is also a remarkable difference when it comes to unfaithful countries. In East Asia not only does the Soviet Union have no "most faithful country"; they certainly have also had an "unfaithful country": China, leaving the bilateral relationship. The United States suffered no similar ignominy in the Pacific theatre: it is only most recently that a protest country has appeared: New Zealand. In Europe the Soviet Union has also suffered more losses than the other super-power: Yugoslavia left in 1948, Albania in 1961 and around that time Romania became considerably less integrated in the military aspect of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, in a position not too different from
the position of France after 1965-1966. Both have their share of protest countries. But the differences are tremendous: Hungary was even taken out of WTO in 1956 for a very short period, sentiments in Poland and Czechoslovakia have definitely been in the same direction and have been one element in the revolts and interventions (counting the Soviet intervention in Poland as structural rather than dialectic). The protests and hesitations against nuclear armament by the governments of Greece, Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark have not (yet) led to such dramatic reactions. The pressure has been brought to bear on New Zealand in the ANZUS system, the trilateral organisation of the United States with New Zealand and Australia. As a warning to other protest countries? No doubt, possibly also because New Zealand is more isolated in its setting than the European protest countries in theirs.

and hence more easily dealt with precisely because the setting is more bilateral (this is the Australian reaction, though).

Eighth, the Soviet camp has produced two clearly independent actors, Yugoslavia and China; the U.S. camp produced one for a short period, France under de Gaulle, today, at most, a somewhat irregular member of the system. The Soviet camp may have been said to produce two "maverick" countries, countries that do not join the international system, keeping aside being isolated and for that reason "unpredictable", Albania and North Korea. On the other hand, it is also clear from what has been said that as a matter of fact it has been easier, in the sense of more frequent, to leave the Soviet camp than the U.S. camp. Yugoslavia, Albania, China and then partly Rumania, will give testimony to the falsity of the thesis that once a country has come into the socialist camp the process is irreversible. Looking at the evidence the opposite hypothesis might have more plausibility: countries are free to join the Western alliance but not free to leave. And maybe that is the point: countries were not free to join the Eastern alliance, they were enrolled - no doubt creating tensions which makes it more likely that they will leave.

This, of course, does not mean that it was easy for them to leave. The exit ticket for France and China were rather similar: "an independent nuclear force". As big powers they wanted big weapons, they also wanted to make it absolutely clear that they
could hold their own against their former super-power, not only against the one on the other side. For lesser powers the exit tickets may be less dramatic. Yugoslavia has paid with a high level of conventional military readiness; Albania which in addition has paid with isolation, feeling that neither a former enemy (the capitalist powers) nor the new enemy (the socialist powers), nor the newest enemy (China) and indeed not the age-old enemy (Yugoslavia) merit their active co-existence. And Austria paid her price, neutrality. Which price Rumania is paying is unclear but it may have something to do with the economically catastrophic condition of that country. For all of these non-nuclear protest countries, however, the price may be a benefit in disguise; a higher level of security by being non-nuclear, having little in terms of offensive arms and a high level of defensive readiness, at the same time as they are decoupled from the super-power. Other countries might like to do the same. Hungary in 1956 was no doubt inspired by the old partner in the Austro-Hungarian double monarchy the year before; all the other protest countries, East and West, may have similar visions. It is not that easy to be a super-power, presiding over large portions of human-kind according to the triple doctrine of being in favour of themselves, against the other super-power and all it stands for, and willing to express this in action, up to and including nuclear holocaust.

If I now should try to summarise the whole argument, it might read something like this:

(1) The Second World War had two theatres, the Atlantic and the Pacific, leaving out only South America. Africa except for the Northern rim, South Asia. The Cold War has two theatres that are prefigured by the Second World War: the Atlantic and Pacific theatres. Much of the rest of the world is organised in the same way, but less clearly so. The Pacific theatre is also somewhat less crystallised than the Atlantic theatre, partly because of the asymmetry in the roles played by the two super-powers, partly because domestic issues are more salient, partly because oriental logic may be more ambiguous.

I mean by "South America" all countries to the south of North America, starting with Mexico.
(2) The leading non-aligned country in the world, India, may serve as an example of the opposite type of policy. The country was divided in 1947 into Moslem Pakistan, and religiously highly mixed India (although with a clear Hindu majority). Pakistan was enrolled in the Western camp (the now defunct CENTO system) together with Turkey and Iran. India could have joined the Soviet camp, but did not. If it had, the United States would have mobilised all surrounding countries creating European and East Asian conditions also in South Asia. As it stands now the relationships to the ASEAN countries have strong military connotations, directly or indirectly, but less so than in the two major arenas. Glory to India!

(3) Peacelessness and mal-development go together, hand in hand. There is a two-track programme everywhere: hostility and military mobilisation without and within, even with highly offensive arms imitation of specific aspects of the models set by the super-powers in the name of "development". But the militarisation resulting from the first part of this programme puts its stamp on the "development" effort becomes centralised, bureaucratic, and if not in all details imitative, at least not critical of the protective super-power. And those patterns of "development," in turn, giving power and privilege to capitalist entrepreneurial elites and socialist party elites, increases the tensions further, tightening the alliance between non-military and military elites, with the civilians working for the military effort and the military promising to protect them against the anger of the population. In short, grossly deformed societies in both camps, in both theaters - a heavy price to be paid not only by this generation but by generations to come. In Western Europe the struggle against the nuclear holocaust. In Eastern Europe it takes the form of the struggle against repression: for democracy against party dictatorship, however democratic that party may be for the moment in some countries. In capitalist East Asia it takes the form of struggle against misery, struggle to survive in the face of flagrant inequality, blatant exploitation. In socialist East Asia it takes the form of struggle against repression, against the monotony and lack of dynamism of the socialist system after the basic needs have been satisfied. The basic question: where does all this lead us?
4. On the future of the Cold War

The basic conclusions from the Figure and the Table given in the preceding section are that the structure is extremely strong, well woven together, and there is a generalised Cold War materialising itself in two basic theaters of the world. They are, at the same time, the points of gravity of the world economic system, another reason for the strong inter-connection between the issues of peace and war and the issues of development and mal-development. By and large the actors are doing their jobs, issuing the appropriate ideological signals, following the organisational blueprints for capitalist and socialist development, respectively, inside the countries and for polarised conflict behavior without.

The situation is even worse: more of the world is involved in the structure. The generalised Cold War also has a South American theater with such heavy components as the Rio de Janeiro treaty system, Cuba and Nicaragua, the tremendous efforts to train the South American military all over the continent, and so on. Africa is also partly being enrolled, in this case perhaps more due to Soviet efforts, assisted by Cuba (although also for special Cuban reasons: a sense of missionary zeal and responsibility being the first South American country to go socialist and for that reason making it more difficult for others to do so; in addition, much of the Cuban population comes from Africa, and partly from the South Western coast). West Asia has been crystallised for a long time by - as is also the case for Africa - two particularly malignant tumors left behind by the collapsing British Empire: South Africa and Israel, contributing to the Cold War with their own conflict energies, pitting races and ethnic groups against each other.

Question: can this structure/process be counteracted at all? Are these actors writing the future script, or has the script already been written and they are merely playing their roles, more or less well? In the latter case, who wrote the script?
The way that script has been interpreted in the present paper is relatively global and relatively holistic. That has the advantage of making inter-connections across geographical borders, and also across disciplines ("peace studies" and "development studies") more transparent. But it has the disadvantage of making everything hang almost too well together, with seamless webs so that the obvious conclusion, a major world nuclear war, releasing all that emotional and organisational energy piling up on both sides, seems inescapable.

We certainly do not want that conclusion even if it is rational, dictated by reason; and even if drifting towards such a war seems confirmed by newspaper headlines practically speaking every day. And yet, not only the fear of that war but also human reason leads to the obvious conclusion that there will be counter-forces. Precisely because there is a process of such grandiose dimensions in the wrong direction there will also be a reaction to all this. The points of attack are obvious:

(1) In the victorious countries: their righteousness, by pointing to less than idealistic motivations in connection with the Second World War; their traumas, by trying to cure them (not easy); their development programmes, by pointing out all the flaws, planting seeds of doubt; their conflict, by making it look not only dangerous but also ludicrous.

(2) In the defeated countries: absolving them of their humiliation; insisting that the Second World War is long past; trying to cure them of their traumas (again, not so easy); criticising their client behaviour in imitating super-power development programmes; stimulating more autonomous forces; making the conflict look not only dangerous and ridiculous but their own behaviour in that conflict an act of utter submission and servility.

(3) As to the ideologies: criticising them as neither excluding each other (social democracy) nor spanning the ideological universe (green wave ideologies); trying to escape from the liberalism-marxism false dichotomy, from the relativism of anti-communism and anti-imperialism; criticising the "enemy of my friend is my enemy" and "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" logic by pointing to the ambiguities, the complexities of the real world defying
such simplistic conflict logic; being more imaginative in connection with development programmes.

(4) As to divided countries: do everything possible to bring them closer together, if not necessarily in the form of complete reunification; being willing to pay the exit price in terms of decoupling from super-powers, even to the point of neutrality, getting rid of offensive arms and in for defensive military preparedness - there is only security to be gained from such arrangements - not willingness to pay for the exit with nuclear proliferation (although it may be said that this was possibly the price India also paid for her remarkable stance mentioned above - the glory has spots).

(5) As to the alliance systems: the problem is probably more what kind of military doctrine they have, than their existence. Change that military doctrine from offensive to defensive, let the alliances be exercises in peace-making, not in preparation for war.

(6) The most faithful countries: that they gradually disappear, that they recognise that the Second World War is over, that victorious and defeated countries, both of them simply give up this idea. For the defeated countries: this means re-emergence in full autonomy without invoking the ghost of the past, meaning militarism, for both Germany and Japan. Not so easy.

(7) The unfaithful countries, protest countries: that more of them emerge, as many as possible. On the other hand, the question is how to do this without invoking not only the anger of the super-powers (this is automatic) but their fear, to the point that they strike out, not only against the protest countries, but also against the other side with the hope that conflict without might bring in its wake solidarity, loyalty within. It should be remembered that both super-powers have an image of what a normal client country is. A normal country is willing to be subservient not only in terms of following super-power (military) command and imitating its programme, but also to the point of being at its disposal as a "theater" for nuclear holocaust in the name of the struggle of Good against Evil. This is the solid basis on which popular movements can build, gradually eroding the tie between their elites and the super-powers - a process which probably has already gone a long way throughout the system, in both camps, in both theaters, only that the erosion process is not yet visible enough.
Independent countries; that more are produced, that they
align themselves as non-aligned countries in order to become
more visible, regardless of how contradictory such formulas may
sound. Will New Zealand become an example - and in that are
followed by whom in the Pacific or the Atlantic theaters?

Reading through this list it looks like a relatively
systematic catalogue of the nightmares of super powers and
client country elites at the same time as the hopes of the movements
working against the Cold War structure/process and that
immediately raises the problem: is there one point on the
list, or underlying this list, that is more important than
all the others? An Archimedeian point on which the Cold War
system may be altered?

I doubt that very much. I think they are all important,
although not necessarily equally important. The advantage
of a holistic analysis is precisely that it makes one see the
interconnection between so many issues that are treated in a
more separate manner in a more atomistic approach. And the
conclusion in terms of action is obvious: millions of human
beings acting at all these points at the same time, parallel, synchronous
fashion, in both camps, in both theaters so that the total
energy becomes considerable even if the reaction looks very
modest at any single point, and at any single point in time.
Of course, one might develop the theory that it all comes
from the super powers, and that two popular revolts, one in both
countries, and simultaneously, might change them. This may be the
case. But the counter-arguments against this type of reasoning
are rather heavy: the processes would have to be very simultaneous
which is highly unlikely, otherwise one would take advantage of
the weakening of the other. The system might then be continued
by other powers. Consequently, the case for parallel action everywhere,
which means that the peace/development forces have to be at
least as well coordinated as the peacelessness/mal-development
forces.

However, there is no ground in what has just been said
for excessive optimism. Just as the Cold War process engenders
anti-processes, anti-processes will also lead to their reaction,
in turn, in terms of efforts to solidify, reinforce, the Cold
War process. Ideological consensus in alliances may be threatened and that may serve as a stimulus for the super-power to reinforce their command, whipping dissidents into line. The career patterns of countries from faithful, via unfaithful to independent, may be reversed, and not only due to super-power pressure but for purely internal reasons. The peace movement in one theatre may find sources of inspiration in the other theatres because they are so structurally similar; this structural similarity may then become a causal factor. But that also works for the peacelessness movement: submissiveness in one theatre may lead to submissiveness in the other, "there you see, it does not work, we can just as well give in". And one or both of the leaders or the leading countries may at some point come to the conclusion that now is the time to strike, to get rid of all this irritating subversiveness by launching the Big War. A factor that might make for some caution in the peace movement: do not act too quickly, do not demand too much.

And yet the peace forces are there, like billions of ants, even termites, gnawing at something that looks very impressive, very solid. So, maybe one day the tenants of that structure will decide to vacate it, move out before it all crumbles, falls on their heads and kills them, creating a structure/process for peace and development instead. Things running the way they are that day should come sooner rather than later.
1. There is a peculiar symmetry in the world. There are two major oceans defining the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, separated by the Americas on the one hand, and by an enormous land-mass that can be described as the Soviet Union on top, then Europe (west and East) and Asia (West, South, Southeast and East), and at the bottom Africa.

For a number of reasons the North became stronger and more expansionist (climate, missionary Christianity with its secular offsprings in liberalism/conservatism-capitalism and marxism-socialism). Only the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, border on both oceans and can engage the two theaters - in that sense they are both global powers although the US deployment and networks in general are more far-reaching. Geo-politically the Americas "belong to" the US and Eur-Asia to the Soviet Union (and nobody bothers much about Africa)

- a position contested by the US bridgeheads in Western Europe and Southeast/East Asia and the Soviet bridgehead in Cuba (not to mention the US fear of more bridgeheads). But this is a "geo-political" vision - a perspective that can best be identified as some kind of global fascism, that geo, the world, is up for bidding and belongs to the stronger, singly or in concert.

2. The British historian A J P Taylor puts it as follows: "As Stalin said later, accurately summing up the record of war, 'Great Britain provided time: the United States provided money and Soviet Russia provided blood'" (Essays in English History, Penguin, London, 1976, p. 298).

The figures are official Soviet figures, quoted by Stephen Cohen in several articles (such as The Nation, January 26, 1985, p. 72.)
3. In July 1945 there were other concerns in China, after all the victory of Mao Zedong's forces, as we know in retrospect, was little more than four years away - China tomorrow being considerably closer than Europe today.

4. A basic reason why the International Tribunal verdict is more problematic than that of the Nürnberg Tribunal: It is hard to imagine a dissent so fundamental as that of the Indian judge Pal (or perhaps even of the Dutch Judge Röling) in the Nürnberg case. But then there is certainly also the problem of using law retroactively, and of the moral status of the victors - the latter particularly in a Far East context against a background of highly violent US, British, French (and Dutch for that matter) colonialism. For an excellent description both of the degree of consensus and of the little there was of resistance in Japan, see Ienaga Saburo, *The Pacific War 1931-1945*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, particularly chapter 10, "Dissent and Resistance".

5. How does one explain this? It defies the explanatory power of any social science I know of, at least. On the other hand, although the United States had to withdraw they left behind, cruelly, two time-bombs with a devastating impact on Vietnam: an ecocide with genocidal consequences and militarization of the country. So, who won?


7. And the corresponding idea, frequently held by the elite, would be that the people on the other side is good, for they must be the enemy of the enemy of my friend! Thus, the governments of Western European countries seem firmly convinced that people in Eastern Europe agree with them rather than with their own governments where foreign affairs
re concerned. However, public opinion research may reveal something else: the views of foreign affairs are rather in line with official policies in general terms, not necessarily on very specific events. See Ornauer, Sicinski, Wiberg, Caltung eds., *Images of the World in the Year 2000*, Mouton, The Hague, 1976, conclusion.

9. Thus, Rimpac exercises involved US, Australia, New Zealand - in other words ANZUS - and Canada from 1971, and Japan was requested to participate by the Carter administration and did so. "For Japan to take part in the exercise alongside nations with which Japan had no security treaty was deemed by many to be illegal" - as pointed out by Takita Kenji, "The Emerging Geopolitical Situation and Changing Pattern of Reactions to it in the Asia-Pacific Region". Paper presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Anaheim, March 25-29 1986.


10. That gives us a total of three analytical perspectives: the predetermination of the configuration by the Second world war; internal development inside the alliances; and the actio-reactio system between the two alliances.

11. To illustrate this the thick broken lines in Figure 1 would be within the circles/countries, between elites and people and particularly in the periphery rather than between countries. One could then imagine all kinds of shades in-between intra-country and inter-country dominated conflict formations.

12. For a very creative approach to the Korean impasse, see Glenn Paige, "Nonviolent Global Transformation and Peaceful Korean Reunification, Dept. of Political Science, University of Hawaii, July 1985. My own point would be that a generational shift is needed in both Koreas, and that will come in the 1990s. The four islands may be a part of a major economic deal between Japan and the Soviet Union over Siberia.

14. On the other hand, the Western tendency to emphasize the bilateral nature of Soviet relations to Eastern European countries as opposed to the multilateralism of the West may be a carry-over from the Stalin period in the East and the West. More probably WTO has a moderating influence on the Soviet Union.

15. This was the "socialist world" when Hitler attacked in June 1941: the Soviet Union and Monglia. Ten years later it was a good third of humanity, from the Elbe to the Japan/China sea - with both East and West expecting that socialism would extend further, in all directions.

Still twenty years later the socialist world was in disarray with the Soviet Union failing to keep the flock together - and that has been the situation ever since.

16. But was it an intervention or an effort to stave off an intervention by a natio nal Polish general? In that case, what is the difference if the threat of intervention is so credible that a military coup is the response?

17. No doubt Prime Minister Lange, who is also minister in the sense of being a lay Methodist preacher, will stand in history as the first statesman in one of the alliance systems with sufficient courage to challenge nuclearism.

18. This was the logic in which Spain was caught by the UCD government that joined the alliance and the PSOE government under Gonzalez that - I presume - originally had the intention of leaving or at least seriously contesting the membership.

19. Again, Spain may be an example: the military may have been able to put the problématique in terms of "less nuclearism, but then membership" versus "no membership, but then nuclearism - under France if not under the US". Gonzalez steered the referendum of March 1986 towards
the former.

20. Rumania's nationally independent, militia type defense forces are, of course, seen by the Soviet Union as a vote of distrust, as being a defensive capability to deter Soviet rather than "imperialist" or "revanchist" attack. If the United States threatens not to buy butter from a recalcitrant New Zealand would it not stand to reason that the Soviet Union might force Rumania to pay an economic price for their acts of defiance, inspired, originally, by the Soviet intervention in Hungary?

21. And they would, of course, be very sensitive to the expressions of protest: not so much doubts about weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear systems, but proposals to build independent defense systems, be that with offensive arms including independent nuclear forces (France, England) or with defensive arms now being contemplated by the nuclear uni lateralists both in SPD in Germany, the Labour Party in England and to some extent by the PCI in Italy.

22. I mean by "South America" all countries to the south of North America, starting with Mexico.

24. This is a basic thesis of my book *There Are Alternatives*, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984 - in Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese editions.

25. Thus, sometimes one may wonder whether NATO and WTO really exist or are just creations in the minds of some skilful public relations managers. Thus, does it really stand to reason that the elites in these countries will follow their superpowers into military adventures that cannot unambiguously be seen as caused by an unprovoked attack from the other side? And is it ever likely that any situation will be that unambiguous?

26. I think this term was first used by the late Sugata Dasgupta in his paper at the Second IPRA Conference, Tallberg, Sweden, June 1967, together with the term maldevelopment - to articulate the point that peacelessness is some kind of peace, it is not war; and maldevelopment is also some kind of development, it is not status quo.