THE NEW INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORDER -
THE REAL THREAT TO HUMAN SECURITY

An Essay on Global Armament, Structural
Militarism and Alternative Security

Jan Øberg

Department of Sociology
Department of Peace and Conflict Research
University of Lund, Sweden
Chair in Conflict and Peace Research
University of Oslo
P.O. Box 1070, Oslo 3, Norway
"In the 20th century the military, diplomatic, economic and propaganda aspects of war have undergone a transformation. Most states from fear of war have tended to increase armaments, to subject their role to more discipline, to organize their national economy and opinion in the interest of efficient war without realizing that their efforts decreased their security and increased their fear."

- Quincy Wright, A Study of War (1964), italics added

"The mechanism that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present there as a reservoir for the system itself to draw upon, just as the healthy body has the ability to generate its own antibodies and does not need ad hoc administration of medicine. More particularly, structures must be found that remove the causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur."

- Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defence (1976)

"In politics there are only two decisive powers, the organised force of the State, the Army, and the unorganised, elemental force of the popular masses."

- Frederick Engels, The Role of Force in History (1968)
## Contents

**Introduction**  
1

The New International Military Order (NIMO)  
4

I Globalization  
10
  1. Center armament dynamics  
11
  2. Arms trade to the periphery  
11
  3. Peripheral arms production  
12
  4. Nuclear technology  
12
  5. A West-European military-industrial complex  
13
  6. An Atlantic Defence Market  
13

II Transnationalization  
14
  7. Arms capital integration  
14
  8. Arms project management  
15
  9. Research, development and planning  
15
  10. Armament economics  
16
  11. Arms interest integration  
16

III Militarism  
17
  12. Civil-military isomorphism  
17
    (1) Growth  
30
    (2) Centralization  
30
    (3) Excess of means  
31
    (4) Technology  
32
    (5) Classes  
33
    (6) Space  
41
    (7) Time  
43
    (8) Epistemology  
44
(9) Man-man relations  45
(10) Man-Nature relations  46
(11) NIMO and NIEO  47
(12) Inflexible response and crisis  48

13. Military monopoly  51
14. Social vulnerability  57
15. Insecurity  61

Alternative Security and Defence - Some Preliminary Considerations  64

1. Security as a basic human need  64
2. Alternative defence strategies  69
3. Peaceful society and constructive defence  74

Notes and references  84
World military expenditures passed $1 bn a day in 1977, reaching $400 bn a year which is approximately $50 mn an hour and roughly $100 for each human being on Earth. This was the price of what is usually termed security.

This price increased 30 times in real terms throughout this century. However, the 20th century is probably the most war-ridden of all in Western history; at least 100 million human beings lost their lives in war on average 3500 a day. Only since 1945 there have been 120 wars all over the world, primarily in the periphery of the global system (1).

In the name of security, armament spreads its branches horizontally to ever more nations and peoples at the same time as it tends to root itself ever more deeply into social formations - creating new ones, maintaining others while destroying still others.

Although virtually impossible to grasp in its striking absurdity, we shall try to approach the phenomena related to these developments within a conceptual framework of a New International Military Order (NIMO). Gaining momentum as it is as a result of so-called legitimate security needs of
all nations, it represents probably the largest single threat to human security and the survival of mankind. To counteract it effectively is a civilizational challenge only comparable in scope and depth with that of creating a truly equitable New International Order meeting the needs of the structurally underdeveloped majority of peoples. And – as so strongly emphasized by the Non-aligned Nations – the establishing of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) will not stand a chance unless the armament trends are effectively reversed.

This essay attempts, first and foremost, to give the concept of the NIMO a reasonably precise content away from the status of a mere slogan. In this respect it is considered especially relevant to relate the "hardware" developments with those of social and economic driving forces and consequences, i.e. the transnationalization of arms production and the militarism which is a phenomenon at the level of social structure. This is not too often done within peace research, not to mention the deliberate exclusion of such factors in international disarmament negotiations which, more often than not, focus at symptoms – the arms – not their raison d'etre.

However, there is no endeavour on the part of the writer to deliver a decisive or concluding concept of the NIMO – we are much more at the exploratory stage hopefully stimulating more research as well as a dialogue about countermeasures.

Secondly, there is the idea that the concept of militarism can be usefully employed not only as a descriptive concept but as an analytical tool which demands partly a reliance upon already existing theories of militarism, partly an updating and renewal. If so, there is a possibility that militarism can serve as a bridgehead to a deeper understanding of the very important ways in which social and military structures interact.

Thirdly, the essay aims at pointing out the need for a discussion of peaceful structures, constructive defence and human security. The rationale behind this is that if it is
true that direct violence and armament as one of its tools grow out, so to speak, of structural violence, the questions could be asked: What would be the imaginable and possible characteristics of much less violent structures? To which degree would alternative social formations have a kind of built-in defensive capacity or 'inner strength'; to which degree would they employ non-military means of defence. Would they meet the legitimate security needs of human beings at all?

This last part, even more than the former, will be tentative, exploratory. It will also immediately be clear to the reader that there is very little attention paid to the question of strategies - how to move from the present armament trends towards an alternative. This - together with much more elaboration on what is found on the following pages - should be the object of much more research, discussion and experimentation.
Table 1 on the next page outlines the New International Military Order as conceived of in this essay; it has three main dimensions making up building blocks each of which has a number of elements and sub-elements.

The reasons for pleading this rather broad model - which to some may not even represent too much inner coherence - may be illustrated by asking counterquestions: What is the result of studying only building block I - the arms systems themselves?

We would presume that it would end up in a sterile armament study covering only empirically obvious manifestations of trends, stockpiling data without much theoretical grounding or argument and leaving us with little, if any, understanding of the complex driving forces - military as well as civil. It would also be a highly unfortunate omission of all discussions of structural violence. Finally, it would lead to the most typical "arms control" proposals - isolated and focussing upon symptoms as is the case with so much of the international disarmament negotiations.
Table 1  The New International Military Order (NIMO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBALIZATION</td>
<td>1. Center armament</td>
<td>arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politico-military</td>
<td>2. Arms trade</td>
<td>&quot;arms control&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Peripheral arms production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Nuclear technology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. West-European MIC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Atlantic defence market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSNATIONAL</td>
<td>7. Arms capital integration</td>
<td>arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic</td>
<td>8. Arms project management</td>
<td>production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. R&amp;D and planning</td>
<td>&quot;conversion&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Armament economics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Arms interest integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARISM</td>
<td>12. Civil-military isomorphism</td>
<td>social and military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociological</td>
<td>13. Military monopoly</td>
<td>structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Social vulnerability</td>
<td>&quot;social transformations&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Insecurity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, weapons systems do not descend from the sky; they are part and parcel of conflict formations, social and economic structures and functions in time and space. Thus, studying both blocks I and II would improve the picture considerably as block II contains the elements having to do with military-economic and civil-economic driving forces. Especially the elements 10 and 11 could serve as possible gateways to relating civil and military dynamics, e.g. within the framework of the military-industrial complex theorizing as well as the marxist-oriented conceptualization of armament as a systemic necessity of capitalism.

But there is still the risk that such considerations would limit themselves to almost exclusively the military 'sphere' and only include structural features from the civil 'sphere' to the amount that such serve to explain "inputs" to armament and arms production.

Logically, therefore, within this type of reasoning proposals are likely to come out emphasizing the control of arms production, nationalization of enterprises, bureaucratic-legislative measures, registration of arms transactions, the erection of new national and supra-national control bodies and - more recently, with a future-oriented view - an emphasis upon the possibilities of conversion, i.e. changing from military to socially useful production.

None of these, however, are likely to have any major influence upon society at large. And this is precisely the problem: If it is correct that armament and everything that goes with it in the modern world has acquired a substantial influence upon societies and, at the same time, is the "product" of the interaction of certain characteristics of these societies - how should we ever hope for a change towards peace and disarmament if the need for deep structural transformations is systematically ignored?

Thus, the third block is a modest attempt to come to grips with the interaction of civil and military 'spheres' at a deeper and empirically less-transparant level.
It could be maintained that the general thinking within this block is stimulated by considerations from other frameworks. Thus, a number of global issues - e.g. population growth, unemployment, education, industrialization, health, habitat, food - are increasingly discussed as problems arising out of socio-economic structures like that of over-development/underdevelopment or center/periphery.

Not the least stimulated by the increasing participation of radical Third World scholars, there seems - to be optimistic - to appear an awakening understanding of the need for structural changes and not only functional modifications and adaptations - that functional remedies like giving more aid, transferring Western technology or continuing centre nation economic growth which should later "trickle down" will no longer do the trick - far less satisfy basic human material and non-material needs of the masses. Instead, what is needed is transformation of old orders - economic, political, social and cultural - which, it may turn out, will come about only in the moment when more and more peripheral nations embark upon self-reliance, dissociation from the rich world and enter new horizontal bonds in collectivities.

In this light it seems the more peculiar that when facing the global problems related to armaments and militarization such transformations of underlying structures are seldom discussed - often not even in theory, far less actually proposed in the international fora. Many otherwise excellent analyses go the piecemeal way implying that we can get rid of arms - i.e. the tools of direct violence - without getting rid of (or substantially reducing) structural violence which causes so much - but not all - of the armaments. How come that such analyses most often refrain from arguing clearly that to disarm, the world shall need truly new national and international orders and that such orders should be based on certain criteria of peacefulness and, thus, reduce substantially the need for armaments and military defence measures.
Exactly in the same way as it may be demanded that truly new NIEOs and NNEOs should eradicate poverty (as well as other features of the overdevelopment/underdevelopment syndrome) and satisfy the basic material and non-material human needs, there must be a demand that they shall be structured in ways that aim at eradicating all overconsumption of means of destruction and satisfy basic human security needs.

Of course, there will also be questions related to such strategies of change: Will there be peaceful ways to e.g. self-reliance at the individual and collective level or is the strategy of dissociation prone to cause violence - demanding for instance a rather strong military force to withstand internal as well as external pressures against such liberation? Or should we expect that centres - nations as well as local elites in the periphery - will arm increasingly against each other if successively deprived of peripheries to exploit?

Thus, a basic motive behind the building block III of the NIMO concept is to penetrate a bit into fundamental structural problems in order to examine whether there is a spring-board to the "radical optimism" argued for by Galtung - "that the measures needed to decrease structural violence will also lead to a decrease in direct violence (3); as pointed out by Galtung it is true that in order to share such an optimism, one should neither underestimate the complexity of the direct and the structural violence nor leave the analysis without at least some tentative ideas about possible alternatives.

In what follows, the elements of the NIMO building blocks are dealt with; the politico-military are only treated cursorily as they have been taken up by others as well as the present author. Our main interest is with the conceptualization of militarism in this essay.

But a few words of clarification are needed anyhow before the NIMO is outlined.
It may be asked what is new about this order? Elements 2 - 6 are all phenomena that are qualitatively or quantitatively new in the world system compared with the arms trend of 1950. In other words, the globalization of hardware is new and, it may be added, it is here the largest expansion in consumption of military means is taking place.

The increasing emphasis upon economic driving forces signified specifically by the transnationalization of arms production (also related to elements 2 and 3) is also new in the sense explained above. It is a post World War II trend. So is the case with merging of major civil and military interests under the heading of the military-industrial complex which was first paid attention to by Eisenhower in his farewell-speech. Finally, we tend to argue that these developments challenge old concepts of militarism and have gained such a momentum that one could actually speak of a 'new militarism' of the post World War period. That is the one we are trying to develop a bit later.

It could also be argued that this order is not 'military' but military-industrial. This is partly correct. Our main point is that it is within the military-economic or -industrial field that we first find, in general, indicators of things to come. A typical example would be the present developments in Western Europe where it is obvious that - while most of the political focus is upon the integration of military policies, foreign policy and the possibility of a 'European army' - these are features of much less significance than the pace with which the idea of a unified European military industrial cooperation is being developed. If this trend continues we would predict the rest - policies, armies, strategic thinking etc. - to follow almost 'automatically."

Then of course there is the problem of the word order: Isn't it simply the old disorder? How should we speak of order when there is such an obvious lack of control in this field?
The word 'order' does not signify that these developments are under political control. What we suggest is a degree of regularity which, at least in certain areas, makes prediction possible. To give an example: If the elements of building block II are correctly understood it will be more readily acknowledged that advanced projects within the center nations will tend, by and large, to 'spill-over' into arms trade, and why there is a trend towards transferring military technology to an increasing number of peripheral countries. Or it will be realized how and why the development of a West European military-industrial complex will lead to arms exports and export of military technology (4).

Such a conceptualization, then, should be of help in assessing the driving forces and consequences of single major armament project - preventing the view that each should be an isolated case. Rather, many of the present specific developments are parts of general trends and - as will be realized by the reader - the elements of the NIMO are all trends, not static phenomena.

But there is an equally important idea behind 'order' - that, of course, of its relationship with NIEO as a concept. We here lean on the idea of verticality, of exploitation and penetration - even of isomorphism between the present international economic order (PIE0) and NIMO. Many of the structural features pertaining within the civil order are also found within the military order, as will be developed later on.

I. Globalization

The catchword of this dimension of the NIMO is the changing 'geographics' of armament, its global reach. Advanced weapons systems flow around in increasing amounts and the military-industrial capacity of nations likewise is intensified. This is the most conspicuous manifestation of the order, and its main elements are the following:
1. Center armament dynamics

The NIMO originates in the overdeveloped, overarmed center nations - especially within the super powers. The two main military pact systems consume around 70 per cent of world military expenditures combined. They prepare for the 'worst case' over the entire weapons spectre - strategic as well as conventional - their developments spill-over into trade expansion supporting civil trade patterns, investments or the acquisition of strategic raw materials and energy.

The global strategies contain, of course, the building up of allies, pact systems, bases, infrastructure, the militarization of oceans and space - as well as the continued threat of using force, interventions or invasions. Here the capacity to operate weapons are spread to more and more peoples, and the center nations function fundamentally as pace-setters as well as technological models.

2. Arms trade to the periphery

This is probably the element in the NIMO which, in fixed prices, has increased most rapidly during the last 25 years. The main exporters being the United States, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France which export to about 100 peripheral nations of which roughly 50 per cent of all arms trade goes to the Middle East.

The export of weapons - larger as well as smaller, the first representing the larger share - serves several purposes: to 'police' an area as subimperialist in harmony with center interests, to open up or maintain civil markets, to support investments, the existence of certain loyal local elites or to secure supplies of raw materials and energy - apart from purely strategic purposes. More fundamentally, it should not be forgotten that a rather important function is to 'facilitate' specific socio-economic systems within peripheral countries through a number of civic actions undertaken by local military forces which mould society to be receptive for investments, trade favourable to e.g. multination companies (5).
3. Peripheral arms production

About 35 peripheral nations are now engaged in local production of advanced weapons systems - Israel, India, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina being the largest. Roughly 20 are manufacturers of major weapons. Recent developments also point to a number of Arab countries, Iran, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Pakistan. With the development of an indigenous military-industrial capacity goes the development of a militarized infrastructure and a potentially very serious distortion of civil development priorities - not the least because domestic arms production within this type of economic structure will not only draw heavily upon scarce resources, but is also likely to lack any beneficial spin-off effects upon social development (6).

4. Nuclear technology

The export of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes may very well have military implications - especially when entire fuel cycles are exported. The most probable nuclear powers in the periphery are all among those which have imported most conventional weaponry during the last 25 years. There is, thus, the direct possibility of diversion of fissile materials for military purposes, and there is the indirect effect of the expansion of nuclear energy technology - not the least through the possible next step, the breeder reactor - that increasing amounts of highly dangerous materials will flow around in the global system. This development, in general, already causes great concern in respect to stopping nuclear proliferation. The call for control systems - at the national as well as the international level - may imply, in their extreme, a repression and social control of populations and the boosting of security forces even to the degree that the 'police-state' emerges - in the name of security (7).
5. A West-European military-industrial complex

As a part of the overall integration in the European Community, there seems to follow a slow, but increasing integration of foreign policies, defence policies and - especially - a new type of military-industrial cooperation. Integration of procurement, military research and development (R&D), production and export is on the program within various EEC bodies, represented in a number of reports during the last few years (related to names like Gladwyn, Spinelli, Tindemans, Normanton,) as well as within NATO - the latter still heading for standardization.

The Independent European Program Group (IEPG) with its close EEC and NATO ties is, by far, the most significant and successful in the sense that also the United States has accepted this body as the main negotiation partner across the Atlantic concerning future military-industrial cooperation (8).

6. An Atlantic Defence Market

The United States definitely prefers a military-industrially integrated Western Europe to deal with in the future - securing continued US technological superiority on the way to standardization within NATO. New huge armament projects are likely to take place across the Atlantic, the co-production scheme of the F-16 fighter aircraft being the most significant indicator of developments likely to become more typical in the future.

The logic of this future is well outlined in the so-called Callaghan Jr. report suggesting a treaty concerning an Atlantic Common Defence Market. The rationale with respect to the Soviet Union is simple: The civil Western technology which will be developed within the framework of the Atlantic Defence Market is to be used as a bargaining point, making the Soviet Union "ending its drive for military supremacy," as this report explains.

It should be noticed that the last two elements have been included primarily because they are likely to contribute to globalization in the same way as the other elements. However,
their actual realization belongs more to the future than the other elements. On the other hand, the NIMO concept should be sufficiently flexible to take into account such important new features (9).

Likewise, it deserves mention that these elements are considered basic in relation to others which are more or less to be perceived as their natural spin-offs - e.g. base policies, infrastructure build-up, the flow of technicians, experts and advisors following the arms, training programs, military aid programs and numerous other features. These are part of the picture, of course, but are not dealt with directly in this essay.

II Transnationalization

The catchword of this building block of the NIMO is the changing economics of armament. It represents the step from the arms to the economics of their production, to the economic driving forces underlying armament.

7. Arms capital integration

On top of the international military production structure armament capital is increasingly concentrated on few hands. Modern armament production is outgrowing national boundaries, many are merging and others become state-owned in order to be able to bear still larger projects, share the burdens and counteract the consequences of the rapidly increasing costs of modern weapons systems.

Vertically integrated development-production-export programs are appearing more frequently and add to the number of subordinated coproducers taking part in various types of coproduction schemes. Rich countries "push out" parts of their armament manufacturing in order to exploit lower wages, evade environmental restrictions or arms export regulations.
What seems to develop these years is a fundamentally new international division of military-industrial labour with a top-heavy control and management and still fewer main producers competing on a world market' (10).

8. Arms project management

Where armament capital does not merge, integrated project management represents a lower degree of unification - a form of cooperation which takes place, most typically, among governments, ministries, military bureaucracies and industries at the inter-national level.

The structure of this type of cooperation is tied together by means of coordinating groups and committees often established more or less on an ad hoc basis and functioning at the transnational level which defy national parliamentary, democratic control as well as public insight. The transatlantic cooperation and management structure of the F-16 fighter aircraft which is the largest of its kind ever undertaken is an example of this particular element of the NIMO (11).

9. R&D and planning

Together with capital and management, research and development as well as overall military planning are significant driving forces behind world armament. R&D continually add to the sophistication of military technology making systems more and more rapidly obsolete and contribute, thus, to cost increases.

Various planning tools with various time horizons tend to fix military activities increasingly to non-military, non-security-related factors. This, again, makes for the possibility of over-reacting when facing 'real' threats.

These factors also contribute to enlarging the cycles of arms generations now taking 5-10 years from development over use to phasing out, thereby making it increasingly difficult to counteract armament projects efficiently (12).
10. Armament economics

This element is based on the idea — or rather experience — that more and more security and defence decisions are taken on the basis of economic considerations and less and less on actual security analyses.

System cost explosions, standardization, saving of taxpayers’ money, combatting unemployment, acquiring the newest technology, offsetting balance-of-payment problems, civil spin-off effects, regional development potential and the survival of individual companies are all arguments exemplifying the mentioned trend.

It is more often heard that disarmament proposals are turned down on such economic grounds than on reasoning in terms of an endangered security position.

This may point to some systemic need for armament — and not only an armament need of the system; it should stimulate the development and renewal of the marxist theorizing about the role of armaments within the capitalist system. However, such reasoning should be stripped of its dogmatism and be more oriented towards an understanding of the character of armament processes than is most often the case. It should, in that case, also be stripped of its many contradictory assertions, e.g. as to the basic function of armament in the economy as well as of the weaknesses inherent in much of the underconsumption argument (13).

11. Arms interest integration

There is a rich variety of theories concerning armament "complexes"; the main interests seem, however, to be the Military, the Industrialists, the Bureaucrats and the Scientists (MIBS). Each of them has a substantial interest in armament versus disarmament and they belong to the category of "topdogs" in most social formations. As such they possess the potential for monopolizing security policies as well as the development, production and use of the means of destruction (14).
III Militarism

The catchword of this building block of the NIMO is the changing sociology of armament; we shall here attempt to take the rather problematic step from the arms and their production down to the very basic civil and military structures and their interaction. While the two former blocks primarily represent reasonably visible phenomena, this one attempts to outline features of armament which are much less transparent - the structural "roots".

12. Civil-military isomorphism

The basic idea behind this conceptualization of militarism is that of isomorphism between civil and military spheres of society - an idea expounded by so different writers as Nisbet, Galtung, Senghaas, Kaldor, Liebknecht, Engels and Abrahamsson (15).

We shall, in what follows, try to penetrate this idea in much more details than the above points. Isomorphism suggests a fundamental, continuous correspondence between the two "spheres" of society. In principle, the notion applies both to the national and the international level of analysis.

Thus, we assume a basic correspondence between social, economic and political structures on the one hand and the way in which the society defends itself. Something like: "Tell me which kind of society you are, and I shall tell you the general outline, at least, about your military apparatus and the character of the social forces which promote your ongoing armament!" It suggests that the two spheres reflect each other, that there is a structural similarity between social formation and military formation or, to stay within the base, between modes of production and modes of destruction.
In this way we attempt to avoid speaking of a mere military and civil "sector" - which only signify (often in statistics and political analysis) the result of the social forces behind armament and not the social forces themselves. The term "sector" also gives the false impression that it is possible to draw a clear-cut line between what is civil and what is military. The point about "sphere" is that this illusion is broken down indicating that the same interests often are active in both civil and military activities - in changing alliances and with different caps on, so to speak.

It also indicates the intention here to speak of structural causation instead of merely relying upon a factor analysis. This is in harmony with the fact that there is no clear boundary between empirically distinguishable sectors, but rather a multitude of systems and actions relating in constantly varying ways to each other - in correspondence with the changes taking place in the social formation of society at large.

It may be argued here, however, that although there exist quite a number of social formations - or national orders - and different socio-political systems, we find a rather high degree of similarity among military systems and armament trends all over the world.

First of all, this may be only seemingly so. Armed forces in a peripheral, capitalist and structurally underdeveloped nation do not automatically resemble those of an overdeveloped center nation - neither do they serve the same functions. It may well be so, on the contrary, that there is a two-way process going on, leading to the increasing isomorphism mentioned.

One the one hand there is the case where the civil sphere have the upper hand and is in the process of transforming and adapting the military - e.g. if there is an effective parliamentary control and a low-politicized military sphere or where the "party is in command."
On the other hand, one may imagine the case where the military sphere may have acquired the upper hand and attempts to transform and adapt the rest of society - as may be the case in some military regimes, in nations with armed forces of the new, so-called "new professionalism", in extended civic action programs or where external forces, through coup d'états intervention or intelligence operations, succeed in installing a loyal regime beneficial to such external interests.

In these cases, militarism will not imply the same socio-military profile; militarism will vary according to social formation, specific circumstances, history and level of overall development.

The force at play - which should definitely not be ignored - is, of course, that center nations (or interests) may have a constant interest in influencing peripheral societies for their own purposes. Thus, the transfer of technology - civil as well as military - will have substantial effects upon social structure. Only in this sense would it be meaningful to speak of a global military 'mono-culture'.

Depending on the stage of development and the other factors mentioned, isomorphism will vary - in some social settings it may be stronger than others at a particular point of time. This does not invalidate the basic hypothesis that isomorphism increase over time - as an effect, one may aid, of militarization of the civil sphere and civilianization of the civil sphere. The point is that all nations, all social formations may not have proceeded equally far in this process. Those having a high degree of isomorphism are likely to try to influence those at a lower level.

Finally, it deserves mention that the conceptualization does not imply identity, but, as mentioned, similarity, affinity, mutual reflection. This is the reason that there is no adherence to e.g. a "garrison state" model here (16). The idea should help us to understand why a society may be militaristic although it is not experienced that way by the citizens. Militarism, especially in Western democracies, does not exhibit itself through large military parades, militaris-
tic attitudes, charismatic military leaders or a militaristic educational system etc. But it is there — in a most sophisticated manner, less open, less transparent and less stamped on people’s consciousness. If it wasn’t there, these democracies would hardly be so overarmed and gotten so deeply stuck with consuming ever more resources for armament — which have long ago stopped adding to security, but rather resembles the situation of a drug addict.

* *

We shall now proceed to examine the concept of civil-military isomorphism itself.

Liebknecht should be quoted at some length as he seems to have produced one of the oldest and still most fruitful points of departure for an understanding of militarism:

"Militarism is not specific to capitalism. It is moreover normal and necessary in every class-divided social order, of which the capitalist system is the last. Capitalism, of course, like every class-divided social order, develops its own special variety of militarism; for militarism is by its essence a means to an end, or to several ends, which differ according to the kind of social order in question and which can be attained according to this difference in different ways" —

and:

"A history of militarism in the deepest sense discloses the very essence of human development and its motive forces, and a dissection of capitalist militarism involves the disclosure of the most secret and least obvious roots of capitalism. The history of militarism is at the same time the history of the political, social, economic and, in general, the cultural relations of tensions between states and nations, as well as the history of the class struggles within individual states and national units" (17).

Thus, militarism reflects social orders — there may be feudal, capitalist and socialist militarism (would Liebknecht agree today?)
It would be typical Western thinking to ask: What is the basic driving force behind militarism? To give such a cause would violate the idea expressed earlier of structural causation versus factor causation (or explanation). Anyhow, Liebknecht argues his case in favour of division of labour and the role of technology:

"The natural process of development is of course that the division into classes, which is the consequence of the economic-technical development, runs parallel with the cultivation of the technique of arms, including the fortification and strategy. The production of arms therefore becomes to an ever greater degree a professional skill. Further, since class domination as a rule is constituted precisely by the economic superiority of one class over another, and since the improvement of the technique of arms leads to the production of arms becoming ever more difficult and expensive, the production gradually becomes the monopoly of the economically dominant class. The physical basis of democracy is thus removed...The general and equal arming of the population only becomes permanent and irreversible characteristic when the production of arms itself is in the hands of the people." (18).

and:

"In the lower cultures which know no division into classes the weapon serves as a rule also as a tool for work. It is at the same time a means of acquiring food (by hunting, by cultivation etc.) and a means of protection against wild beasts and of defence against hostile tribes, as well as a means of attacking them. The weapon has such a primitive character that anyone can easily acquire it at any time (stones and sticks, spears with stone tips, bows etc.)...If the lowest form of culture employs the weapon inside the community at most to settle individual conflicts, the situation changes when a division between classes appears together with a higher development in the technique of arms. The primitive communism of the lower agricultural peoples in which women were dominant know no social and therefore normally also no political relation of class domination. Generally speaking, militarism does not occur" (19).

There is a number of important catchwords here - class domination, monopoly, technique of arms, a tool for work etc. The general point to be brought out here seems to be that the structural similarity of spheres within total social formations
evolved around technology as a main factor - but not the only one. The higher the level of sophistication, the larger the probability of division into classes and the likelihood that center-periphery structures develop and - consequently - that the need for armament (especially within the dominant classes) emerges and starts gaining momentum, needing ever more armament which again deepens social divisions etc.

In other words, mode of production determines mode of destruction - the focus being upon the production, distribution and use of the means of destruction. It is pretty obvious, however, that technology should not be seen as an independent variable. As techniques develop - civil as well as military - so does social formation and division into classes emerges or develops further (20).

Another dimension to be noted is the internal/external one; as pointed out by Liebknecht, militarism is at hand as well within states (the class struggle) as between states (the imperialist perspective) which Lenin has expressed the following way:

"Contemporary militarism is the result of capitalism...
In both its forms it is a 'vital manifestation' of capitalism: as a military force utilized by capitalist states in their external clashes...and as a weapon serving in the hands of the ruling classes to crush all (economic and political) proletarian movements..."(21).

Following the idea of the close interaction between military and civil spheres - of militarism being a structural phenomenon - the question of course occurs: To which degree is militarism primarily a function of the base and to which degree a function of the superstructure of society? Engels here provide an insight:

"Militarism dominates and is swallowing Europe. But this militarism also bears within itself the seed of its own destruction...The second moral...is that the whole organization and method of warfare, and along with these victory or defeat, prove to be dependent on material, that is economic conditions," and:
"Nothing is more dependent on economic prerequisites than precisely army and navy. Armament, composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend above all on the stage reached at the time in production and in communication." (22)

At the same time as Engels emphasize the priority of the base in the armament process, he also - elsewhere - stresses that the military and the whole field of warfare activities belong to the superstructure (23). There is no effort made to try to "solve" this problem. Our main point would be that one should not take for granted any kind of automatic change of superstructure in consequence of changes in the base.

First of all, the material production for military purposes substantially influence the economic base - especially in a number of Third World countries - and military technology is often ahead of civil technology - especially in the overarmed super powers.

Secondly, one of the main issues (later to be taken up) is precisely the fact that the superstructure organization - organization for war preparation, military indoctrination, attitudes, politics, national interests, alliances with church, schools etc. - may gain such influence vis-a-vis the civil sphere that one could maintain that "superstructure functions as the base" - to borrow a perspective from the anthropologist Godelier, - signifying the "nation in arms".

The preliminary conclusion to be drawn concerning this dimension is the following: Militarism cannot be understood simply be relying on the classics; it cannot be attributed exclusively to the superstructure as a "cultural", attitudinal phenomenon - neither can it be automatically derived from the socio-economic base. Rather, warfare, the military sphere, the economics of armament exercise such deep influences upon social formations at large that militarism as a structural phenomenon must be ascribed both the base and the superstructure. As pointed out again and again by Niabet:
"It would be possible to write the history of postmedieval western Europe in terms of what happened to the feudal military community and then to the whole military sector of Western society. Capitalism, nationalism, the territorialization of power as well as the centralization, large-scale organization, mass society, technology; all of these make their first appearance in the modern West in circumstances strongly characterized by war and the military. This fact has received far less attention from the historians than it deserves. Much that is said to have been caused by capitalism, nationalism, the middle class, and technology might better be thought of in terms of pressures for war and of a rapidly expanding military force in modern Europe" (25).

Thus, it is not sufficient to outline the characteristics of militarism simply from the base - although the isomorphism exists at this level, too. This kind of determinism should be avoided when meeting the extremely broad concept of militarism. Trying to do so anyhow - leading to among other things a denial of any non-capitalist militarism - could be said to represent the major, classical mistake of the more or less marxist-oriented school on militarism theories.

On the other side, of course, we find a number of liberal-oriented conceptualizations which, in general, tend to detach militarism from socio-economic structures and leaves it entirely as a way of thinking, a reminiscence from precapitalist or pre-industrial periods etc. - much like the whole discussion of imperialism between these two main schools around the turn of this century. Names of relevance here would be Vagts, Proudhon, Ferrero, Lee Bernhard, Hinze, Spencer, Miller, Radway and - more contemporarily - Radway, Eckhardt, Thee, Lumsden (26).

An ideal combination of classical approaches may therefore be the following: The basic idea of isomorphism between civil and military structures is derived from primarily marxist-oriented thinking, but - to avoid any kind of determinism or selectivity as to social formations which can be militaristic - we shall try to put much "liberal" heritage into this framework on the following pages.
It remains to be mentioned that the military-civil isomorphism can be traced over time, i.e. that there is a dimension of history not to be forgotten.

The feudal military structure is characterized by the local decentralized activities of the knights and their warriors with large differences in terms of status and armament; it was a temporal affair in the sense that, when the fighting was over, the knight rode back to his castle and the warriors dispersed. It was based on relatively simple armoury and on men fighting face to face. The nobility had the monopoly of command, and - sometimes - also of the weapons.

The social hierarchy at that time reached from the serf who was tied to the land, over the feudal master of the estate - the basic economic unit - above which again we find the counts, dukes and, on top of it, the king and the church; all were vertically related to each other through economic and military right and duties.

Essentially, this formation represents an exchange between classes: the primary economic duty of the vassal to his superior and the protection he received in return.

In the towns, of course, other values were defended than in the countryside - trade, markets, roads and cities with their handicraft. The burghers found out that the "reserve army" coming into town from the countryside could be employed to fight for them as mercenaries or soldiers (solidus = a heavy coin), organized by the war entrepreneurs - the condottieri. In Germany, for instance, the system of princes and war lords having colonels to organize regiments for them of "Landesknechte" was fully developed around 1500.

But technology enters the picture; as Kaldor has pointed out - "it took the introduction of mercenary soldiers, financed by the new bourgeoisie on behalf of the emerging absolute monarchy, before guns - the products of bourgeois technology - could be accepted into the armed forces" (27).
Vagts in his classical, A History of Militarism, has the following to say about the transition to the formation of merchant capitalism:

"With the introduction of artillery, the antagonism of bourgeois and noble increased. The devices were the products of urban arts and crafts; they resulted from the economic, social and intellectual changes that disintegrated feudalism and were manufactured by the foes of feudalism - the city bourgeois and the artisans. In a strict sense, gunpowder, muskets and cannons did not 'smash feudalism'; plebian foot soldiers without firearms had already beaten chivalric bodies before their introduction; moreover, the last feudal armies had themselves employed guns...The weapons themselves were the fruit of a long period of development in which urban independence was growing and money-economy spreading, challenging the old social system based on soil. Artillery was made and introduced, however, by antifeudal classes, it is true, and it remained in bourgeois hands henceforth" (28).

In other words, technology is introduced at the same time as social formation at large is changing fundamentally. It implies a transfer of the means of destruction from one class to another, an enlargement of armies, and increasing need for knowledge and skills, an increasing mercenarization and - in general - a trend towards professionalization.

However, in the same way as the warfare system may indicate fundamental future changes in social formations - not the least through the development of new military techniques - there are also indications of its ability to sustain outmoded social groups. In this period, the bourgeois did not want to be soldiers nor to lead the soldiers it bought. That was still the task of the now otherwise rather redundant nobility:

"Although the bourgeois left the direction of war to the princes, the princes did not themselves control their armies in the beginning: rather they contracted with private entrepreneurs for the collection, organization, disciplining and feeding of forces. Thus the bourgeois financed arms they did not start - kings started wars they did not fully manage" (29).

The nobility did not rely on education but on social status, but gradually they were forced to enter the military academies which were set up during the latter half of the 18th century.
The next phase is represented by the increasing nation-state formation and nationalization of warfare. It is excellently described by Nisbet in the following manner:

"But Gemeinschaft in war is succeeded everywhere in the West by Gesellschaft; that is, by increasing use of the wage system (even the economic-oriented Karl Marx wrote that the wage system in the strict sense began in the modern West with the military), by ever-larger social units of war - national armies instead of feudal militias, by a constantly improved technology along with a constantly improved system of military accounting in matters of supplies and weapons, and finally by all the attributes of secularism, impersonality, and contractualism that were later to be found in almost all parts of Western society...the passage of Western warfare, beginning in the late Middle Ages, from traditional Gemeinschaft character to a Gesellschaft one is scarcely less than a preview of a similar passage to be observed in economy, polity, and many other areas of society" (30).

This kind of development put increasing demand upon society's resources at the national level. Centralization, bureaucratization and specialization became central features. Again there was an interplay with the factor of technology, and from around the French Revolution it is probably correct to speak of the industrialization of warfare - parallel with changes of the overall social formation towards modern industrial capitalism.

The idea is to rely exclusively upon mass conscription and mass-produced weapons - making warfare economically cheaper but much more costly in terms of casualties. With more complicated weaponry goes larger wars, a need for higher education and training, much more emphasis upon logistics and a substantial reliance upon resources of the whole society. The main trend benefitting from this particular stage were the capitalists producing the weapons as well as the general supplies. With rising levels of the means of destruction goes, furthermore, the organizational differentiation as well as overall planning. A new type of officer appears on the stage - the military manager - expert and highly professionalized.
From now on, warfare becomes rapidly more capital-intensive, needing relatively fewer and fewer people to service the weapons systems and needing more and more for "software" occupations and infrastructural development.

Abrahamsson has summarized well the emerging stage of totalization of warfare which dates back to the beginning of this century:

"Today, the enormous expansion of the logistic functions of armed forces has made the military establishment almost a replica of civilian society. Further, the invention of the aeroplane and, later, the ballistic missile created a new concept - total warfare. Total warfare brought total defence; this, in turn, meant closer integration between the military and civilian sectors" (31).

In other words, the total warfare trend contributed to militarization of the civilian society and, at the same time, the structural similarity between the two spheres increases. The other side of the coin, of course, is civilianization of the military - a trend which, as pointed out by Abrahamsson, signifies integration, but at the same time also fertilizes the ground for a dangerous autonomy of the military vis-a-vis the rest of society. To grasp the implication of this feature, one may speak of an asymmetric integration which is increasingly characterized by the military sphere acting as a "centre" while the rest of society serves as its "periphery". Abrahamsson expresses it in this way - borrowing from Janowitz:

"Thus, it is not only the case that some such tasks have civilian counterparts but, more importantly, the military establishment as a whole shows a notable similarity with civilian society. Military training and practice today gives the military elite the experience and managerial expertise to run something which is, with few functions excepted, a replica of civilian society..."(32).

The military runs legal systems, education, communication, transport systems, health services, engineering etc. and contributes to infrastructural development and, more often than not, influence overall political management. Through this "taking over" of civil functions, the military sphere has become more and more self-sustaining and independent vis-a-vis
civillian society, while the latter has become still less able to survive without a huge military apparatus — for economic, political, social and so-called security reasons.

"The only functions which are not readily included into the military organizational structure are, first, production of base materials like iron, coal, oil, textile fibres and grain; and, secondly, the reproduction of men. Were it not for these basic needs, military society would exist entirely on its own" (33).

And he might have added — "as long as the civilian society is willing to pay for its own subordination", i.e. as long as it is politically accepted that the military sphere exploit ever-larger civil resources in order to deliver a product called security, while civil society is rapidly losing every kind of inner strength and non-military defence capacity.

It is a tragic fact that this short summary of the history of civil-military isomorphism points to the following conclusion: With the totalization of warfare we also face a fundamental de-democratization. It is so excellently expressed by Reynolds that his account will round off this section:

"The nuclear powers are bound together in a system which virtually ensures reciprocal strikes in the event of any one state taking a nuclear initiative. Communications between nuclear powers have been developed in order to preserve some element of choice in crisis situations. Never have potentially belligerent states been so closely linked in terms of communication. The point here is that the political element is removed from this area of decision and is insulated from domestic politics. Public opinion and the political process can only have influence on the question of capacity, that is, on expenditure during the initial stages of defence policy. Once a nuclear capacity exists then they become irrelevant. Thus the possibility of nuclear war and the nature of a nuclear strike remove the area of foreign policy and national security more completely from national politics than ever before" (34).
What we shall try to do now is to give a number of examples of isomorphism between civil and military structures as they pertain to - primarily - modern Western societies. In other words: Let's walk out into the landscape, dwell at certain view points and examine our map against the landscape. Some of these view points - if not all of them - could also be called indicators of militarism:

(1) Growth - the militarized society relies on growth, economic growth for "development" which is measured by GNP or GNP per capita and on military growth for "security" which is measured by military expenditures. Neither measure has anything to say about basic human need satisfaction - rather, the rationale is: The bigger the better.

There is the built-in idea of accumulation at centres, of values "trickling down" leading to expansion. And the two spheres relate directly to each other - the military not only expands into the civil sphere, but also delivers the physical means and legitimization for national expansion.

Development as well as security is the monopoly of centres - they are not created from the bottom-up, never "pushed up" from local efforts.

(2) Centralization - the overall Western capitalist system tends to increase economic as well as political and military decision-making and power in fewer hands - making for larger units. The military sphere contributes to this effect - through military technology, specialization, enlargement of systems and the control of ever-larger societal resources.

The effect of warfare itself is, more often than not, centralization and it is embedded in the effective use of the modern means of violence that centralization is increased - as has been pointed out so well by Sharp (35).
It seems that in the same way as overdevelopment causes underdevelopment somewhere else, overarmament creates underarmament somewhere else. Typically, topdogs of societies - in as well as between states - have much more means of security at their disposal than have underdogs. Armament under the present conditions satisfies certain security needs of the armament interests - the military, industry, bureaucrats and researchers to name some - while the security of the rest of the populations is rapidly decreasing. "National security" has become a euphemism for national expansion as well as internal violence and repression.

This is the more absurd as it could be maintained that topdogs ought to have less military means at their disposal precisely because they already rank highly in terms of economic, political, social power - or security. If civil power is already large why should military power be even larger?

Thus, if one speaks of a development gap it is equally relevant to speak of a security gap as the means of military security are terribly unequally distributed in the international system.

1 Excess of means - where the idea is that when facing problems the system automatically answers by pouring more means into sectors. When facing deep structural problems, more economic means are applied - whether for development or security purposes. Goals are not questioned, neither are definitions of focal concepts or the basic character of the system itself. Where solutions might be to reduce economic growth, save energy or disarm to some extent, the system always goes for an "inflexible response": Give us more...
(4) Technology is a prime mover in both spheres. The idea here is that the progressive development of technology influences both the forces of production and the forces of destruction. Typically it is increasingly capital-, energy- and research-intensive, it is expert-based, big and expensive and it alienates people (although, of course, there are exceptions like new types of small-scale weapons systems to be operated by one man).

Human identification with the product in the one sphere and with the cause for fighting in the other sphere is rapidly decreasing. Overview over entire processes is lost - personal responsibility decreases; each is only a small nut in a large machinery.

Kaldor has explained how the concept of 'weapons system' is most central here:

"The characteristic of the relations of force is the way they appear to be built around a particular technique of force, the weapon system, the product of a particular industrial era. The weapons system comprises the weapon platform - the ship, aircraft, tank, etc. - the weapon, and the means of communication. Whereas formerly, the weapon was the instrument of the soldier, the soldier now appears to be the instrument of the weapons system. The resulting organization is hierarchical, atomistic and dehumanizing. It reflects the importance accorded to industrial products, particularly machines, in society as a whole " (36).

Thus, we are moving away from the idea of arming men to manning weapons. This is structurally comparable with what is also happening within factories and the result of the process is also comparable: There is little difference between the automated, computerized factory with operating robots in a sterile environment on the one side and the automated battlefield, managed by all kinds of computer operations, remote control, and a number of new weapons which do not require any close operation by human beings - e.g. pilotless aircrafts, electronic sensing devices firing off deadly ammunition etc.
Technology also plays a fundamental role in another sense - that of "facilitating" the introduction of a specific social structure in peripheral countries. As pointed out e.g. by the Indian researcher Amulya Reddy: With technology follows structure; thus, the transfer of technology - civil as well as military - into the periphery will have substantial consequences for the development of these areas. Societies will have to adapt to this foreign element if effectively using it. The tendency will be to create "enclave" economies for the production of advanced military equipment which detracts scarce resources and have little or no spin-off effects upon the rest of society. Investment for armament will therefore be investment lost for true socio-economic development.

Adapting the infrastructure to military needs - influencing the educational system, communication, transport etc - the social formation has been broken up to also receive foreign civil investments, trade, Western technology and, consequently, accept the ideology needed to serve as a periphery or as a sub-imperialist towards another periphery locally adapted. There is no reason to be surprised that military rule is often an effective tool in facilitating such transfer of social formation components (37).

(5) Classes - the main idea here is that the relations of destruction reflect the relations of production, that there is a structural similarity between the position of the military and the business manager vis-à-vis the soldier and the worker. Like other indicators of militarism this applies to other social formations, and we shall here make a digression to a typically feudal situation which has been described so well by Sotelo, Esser and Moltman (38), namely the "armed technocrats" in Latin America.

During the period where the "haciendado" economy got the upper hand, a new military class made its appearance - the caudillo. In order to raise reasonably large armies, the mass
of peasants had to be engaged at the local level. The people sought protection through relations with local officers, creating a most heterogeneous military structure displaying the fundamental weakness of the state in the feudal system: It was not able to finance regular national armies or keep up law and order. Thus, the leaders of the military units were either allied with the latifundias or themselves owners of these.

About this Sotelo et al. has the following to say which illustrates our basic idea about classes:

"Die Beziehung zwischen den Offizieren und Truppen reflektierte die zwischen Latifundisten und ihren Arbeitern" (39).

It is precisely the melting together of economic/political and military power that constituted the feudal caudilism at various levels even up to the national caudillo who guided the local ones and their bands.

With this digression in mind, we shall proceed to discuss various aspects of the class/militarism problem. First of all there is the idea of class alliances. It is dealt with by Lumsden in a recent paper:

"Military forces belong to the category of social groups which do not themselves produce for their own material requirements (food etc.); like rulers, administrators, priests, artists and scientists they are dependent upon expropriating the surplus of others. This expropriation may either take place by force - which military forces are well-equipped to do - or by "legitimising" the expropriation either by providing security in the event of a real attack or by inventing an appropriate mythology" (40).

Lumsden categorizes these social groupings as coalitions and terms them "macroparasites" which can no longer actually protect people as they claim, but rather ruthlessly exploit them for its own purposes.

Liebknecht expressed the idea of class alliance this way:
"Militarism manifests itself as a pure tool in the hands of the ruling classes, designed to hinder the development of class-consciousness by its alliance with the police and the system of justice, with the school and church, and further to secure for a minority at any cost, even against the conscious will of the majority of the people, its dominant position in the state and its freedom to exploit" (41).

It is of importance to note this surplus-alliance-exploitation-surplus relationship revealed by the two quotations. It is central to the understanding of militarism in general and the role of classes in particular.

In the modern Western society there is most typically the alliance between Militarists, Industrialists, Bureaucrats and Scientists (MIBS). Whether this is a class alliance or not depend upon the social formation at large; the interests mentioned here often comprised what is called the "military-industrial complex" but there is little reason why this should not also be seen in relation to the concept of class - a new bureaucratic strata within the social formation e.g. in the Soviet Union and the United States (42).

So far we have taken up the function of classes - i.e. the tendency of the military to form alliances within the top echelons of society - whether feudal or capitalist. What about the origin, then? The second major aspect of class which we want to take up is that of recruitment.

In principle it is true that there is also a parallel here; as pointed out by Lang (43), "in the United States the enlisted milieu represents one of last refuges for a genuine lower class culture" which will grow even more obvious with the change towards an all volunteer army. We have also already pointed out how the armed forces were built upon the manpower made surplus in the rural areas in consequence of industrialization.

However, the overall trend during the 20th century - and not only so in the rich Western world, but rather globally - has been for a broadening of class base with a marked increase in middle-class background.
Thus, rather than individual social background, the social formation in general, the particular military training organization and the character of the political-ideological environment seem to influence the role which the armed forces are likely to play. Furthermore, the officer corps is seldom a homogeneous social group.

Along with increasing professionalization there has been a change from ascription to achievement, so to speak (44). According to Woddis, the conclusion drawn by Janowitz that "no profession resists inquiry into its social origins as stubbornly as does the military" (45) should perhaps also be kept in mind here. In Africa, for instance, he maintains that "the majority of officers are drawn from the educated petty-bourgeoisie and even from the educated sons of workers and peasants" (46) - which does not make for any automatic conclusion that the political line followed should be "petty-bourgeois."

Woddis makes the following account concerning Latin America:

"As regards Latin America, a number of scholars have noted the changed class composition of the officers caste. In these countries the traditional ruling circles in the 19th century (and even into the 20th) were based on the trinity of the army, the church and the landowning oligarchy. These three forces were largely intertwined; and the officers were mainly drawn from the landowning oligarchy. The economic and social changes of the past few decades, however, have modified the class structure of these countries, and this has had its impact on the composition of the armed forces, especially on its officer sections" (47).

And concerning the Middle East he maintains:

"Thus, in a number of Arab states the regimes established by the military leaders include in their social base both the rich villagers (or kulaks) as well as the urban petty-bourgeoisie, technocrats, intellectuals and parts of the State bureaucracy, factory managers and sections of private capitalists" (48).

Now, how does all this apply to modern Western types of armed forces today? Abrahamsson has investigated this in de-
tails; he gives three reasons that the social recruitment has been considerably broadened and that, therefore, one should avoid any kind of "ascriptive determinism" as to the function of the military: a) the middle class has increased its influence while the aristocracy has declined, b) the sheer size of armed forces has made it increasingly unlikely that one class should be able to keep a monopoly of officer positions and c) more and more skills are needed in the military system which makes it less likely that one class should be in a leading position - and especially so, as many of the skills have attracted the middle class as they are also increasingly useful in the civil sphere too (49).

With increasing technocratization followed professionalization and the monopoly of the aristocratic class was broken. Abrahamsson comes out, however, with the following four main patterns concerning recruitment of army officers (50):

(a) the elite pattern (the United Kingdom, Argentina and Spain),

(b) upper class dominance with a limited representation of lower strata (Chile, Australia, the Netherlands, Ireland, Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and France),

(c) the mixed pattern with an as strong representation by the middle class as by the lower strata (Norway and Sweden) and

(d) the working class dominance (Poland, Czechoslovakia)

As is also remarked by Abrahamsson there are reasons to believe that this trend towards democratization will not continue. One reason which he does not mention is the trend towards an all volunteer army.

The third and final aspect of the relationship militarism and class to be taken up here is that of professionalization. Stepan provide us with an interesting investigation of this concept in Latin America (51).
First of all, he refutes the Huntington thesis that professionalization implies more or less of a withdrawal from politics by the military. The "new professionalism" rather implies a much more fundamental social power by the military as it is here primarily occupied with internal defence and not only national defence against external threats. Thus the military sphere exercises both a major military and political role in a type of managerialism (52).

He points out that through the changing role of the military, the social base of its activities becomes much broader - because national security and national development becomes inextricably intertwined (53).

As an example, Stepan offers the following information concerning the graduatings from the Superior War College (ESG) in Brazil: Of 600 graduating officers in 1966, 224 came from private industry, 200 from ministries, 97 from decentralized government agencies, 39 from the federal congress, 23 were federal and state judges and 107 belonged to various other occupational categories - professors, economists, writers, medical doctors and catholic clergy.

Professionalization otherwise does relate to the question of de-politization. That is particularly so in the cases of China and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese case is well discussed by Whitson, Gittings and others (54). The main concern of the post-revolutionary period has been to have an "army of the people," where ideally there would be no class differentiations within - and no professionalization above or isolation from the people. As J. Jorden has pointed out, there existed also a "professional vision" signified by the adoption of the Soviet army model oriented towards specialization, regular pay and technological and educational modernization (55).

Paid officers started finding that they should not occupy themselves with civilian work or engage in production work. Rather, it should rely on the surplus produced by others.
The old idea of a peasants militia which had been formulated as early as 1927 by Mao Tse-tung was not respected. A countermeasure - the "Everyone a Soldier" Campaign in 1956 -- never reached its goals, and Jordan states:

"The younger schooltrained officers were no doubt strongly influenced by their Soviet advisers and leaned toward the Soviet model, in which the political arm played a less dominant role day-by-day. By 1961, the deterioration of the influence of the political officer had become especially significant in the lower echelons of the PLA, where it was reported that 7000 companies, or roughly one third of the PLA, had failed to establish Party branch committees" (56).

This development also violated the idea of a mass army without classes and integrated in society at large. "Big bossism" started, physical labor was avoided by officers and the army did not care about cultivating land or participate in other productive areas of the Chinese economy.

By 1960, Lin Piao became Minister of Defence and de facto chief of the Military Affairs Committee and started restoring party leadership in the army.

Gradually, it became the main instrument of the party and served as the main example to the nation through the "Learn from the PLA" Campaign. Mao's old idea about a mass army of the people had won over the professionalized version - and this victory was confirmed during the Cultural Revolution.

However, other accounts deny that this is a true picture. They indicate that the Chinese army is by no means a classless army but has served to recruit a "gun-barrel elite" (57).

No matter how this may be, it is only too obvious that a new examples of isomorphism between military and civil structure is appearing now in China since the death of Mao. The line introduced by the Hua Kuo-feng regime oriented towards growth, incentives, managerialism, centralization etc. corresponds well with the apparent changes within the armed forces towards professionalization, modernization, a new emphasis on
hardware and a tuning down on ideology. It expresses well the saying by Teng Hsiao-Ping that "Modern warfare is fought with steel" (58).

Concerning the Soviet Union, its attempt to export a social formation through export of military expertise, hardware and ideology has already been mentioned. It is worth noticing that after the 1917 Revolution, the modern type of conventional army headed by former Zarinist officers was chosen.

Formerly Lenin had argued strongly against a standing army - "Das stehende Heer ist ein Heer, das vom Volke getrennt ist und dafür ausgebildet wird, auf das Volk zu schiessen" (59) - but while the political debate polarized between a revolutionary ideology-oriented militia type of army on the one side and a modern professional, less politicized on the other, the military programme introduced in 1918 and carried out by Trotsky should have been a two-step effort: First setting up a capable, conventional force and secondly - after the struggle against counterrevolutionary forces - it should turn into a revolutionary force, i.e. a territorial militia under the leadership of the Bolshevik party. However, later on - not the least during the Stalin period - centralization, professionalization and political neutralizing took place (60). The consequences of this development for today's Soviet forces are expressed this way by Kolkowicz:

"One of the most remarkable aspects of the military technocrats' position in the Soviet armed forces is their consistent and vehement refusal to become involved in the normal political-educational activities in their units... The (professional officers) resent the fact that they themselves must submit to large doses of indoctrination and political work, while the technocrats, who enjoy greater career security and preferential treatment, are allowed to remain aloof from such time-wasting activities" (61)...

The influence of the technocrats in the Soviet officer corps will continue to rise - though the tension between them and the traditionalists will lessen - partly because of the technical and scientific needs of the armed forces and partly because the Party elite increasingly favors the pragmatic approach, as shown in its use of managerial and administrative techniques" (62).
Much of the wording here could just as well have been taken from the description earlier of the attempted Soviet influence upon the Chinese military sphere. The important thing, of course, is to notice that professionalization - the trend from "redness" to "expertness" does not imply any real de-politization. Rather one may see in this a giving up of integrating the army with the rest of society, a strong element of pragmatism, an opening up towards differentials and class divisions within the armed forces and - which is still important - an increased role accorded to the advancement of military technology (63). Thus, whether we speak of Chinese, Soviet or Latin American professionalization of the armed forces it seems, in general, to represent a movement to the right, a trend towards modernization, technocratization and "Westernness".

What has been said under the heading of classes here has circled around three aspects - class alliance, recruitment and professionalization. The overall idea of isomorphism between the position of the military and the business manager vis-a-vis the soldier and the worker would be too simple if not specified by means of taking these three perspectives into account. These positions will vary according to social formation and level of overall development. In most cases, however, we would take the class alliance perspective to be the most fruitful for an understanding of the class/militarism problem. But again - class alliances will differ according to social setting and also according to factors like recruitment and professionalization.

(6) Space - where the fundamental dimension is that of center-periphery which, as the next few points, are typically Western, belonging to Western "cosmology."
Within the military sphere we find the ideas of centralized command, logistics, management and planning. In strategic thinking, likewise, there is a preoccupation with centers: If you can only blow out the political, industrial, communication etc. center of the enemy - which makes wars against nations with strong centralistic tendencies much "easier" than those against nations having no single - or a few - but rather many centres extremely difficult, as was the case for the United States in Vietnam.

Center thinking is also applied in the domino type of reasoning - if you can only stop the enemy in one country, you may have stopped him in all the rest. Containment policies aim at the same philosophy.

The fixation upon one enemy is compatible with this reasoning and applies will to the idea that the national centres acquire the monopoly to define security threats and decide upon security measures at the national and even supra-national level which is then supposed to "trickle down" to guarantee individual human security.

The features around center thinking have also been dealt with in relation to the concept of "Schwerpunkt" e.g. by Boserup and Mack (64). The concept, of course, is that of Clausewitz' - the centre of gravity, a center of power and movement on which everything depends. It may be the army, the capital, alliance membership, unity of interests, a charismatic national leader or - as in non-violent struggle - the unity and solidarity of the masses - against which the final blow must be directed by the enemy.

The interesting aspect here is that it is the defence which determines what is going to be the "Schwerpunkt"; it here has a superiority over the offence according to classical strategic thinking.

Although this may run counter to our immediate intuition, it was well illustrated in the case of Vietnam, in much guerilla fighting all over the world and in cases of non-violent struggle like Prague 1968 against the Warsaw Pact invasion. The attacked part chooses the mode of defence.
It would hardly need many words to illustrate that the civil sphere in modern Western society is also directed towards centre thinking - in the way society is organized, companies and administrations are organized, in the way the economy is made to grow through development centers and technological superiority or in the way in which a few regional centre powers around the world are picked to function as new poles of capitalism within a so-called New International Economic Order. One could likewise notice the increasing use within business life of terms like "strategic planning", "early warning", "market offensive" etc.

(7) Time - where there is a preoccupation with a short, dramatic settling of conflicts, seeing the immediate results which are possible through the wiping out of one or a few centres and where the time of warning has decreased rapidly over the last few years.

It resembles the way in which the capitalist wants to see a quick return from his investment blowing the competitor out of the market with a surprising new product - sometimes ending up in buying the competitor like one nation may occupy another's territory.

In general, the short-sightedness of Western political and economic decision-making is reflected in the short-sightedness immanent in raising the level of military expenditures in order to acquire a short period's superiority until the opponent catches up and you feel relatively insecure again.

The opposite kind of thinking can be found in other social formations, under other ideologocal guidelines and conceptualizations of time. Thus, Mao Tse-tung writes:

"However cruel the war may be, we must absolutely and firmly endure until the last five minutes of struggle. This is especially the case with our present enemy, who finds his advantage in a rapid decision in the war, whereas our advantage is to be found in the strategy of protracted war" (65).
(6) Epistemology - a dimension which has to do with ways of learning and accumulating experience, with the understanding of causality. In the Western world it is often expressed in the idea of finding one basic cause to explain things - even rather complex ones. This is typical for military thinking, too.

Ego never finds the cause of fighting within himself or in the relationship with Alter, but exclusively within Alter: If he could only stop being aggressive with me, if he could only stop arming against me! The building up of enemy images and threat scenarios usually serve the function to place Alter as the independent, threatening, dangerous and "bad" guy whereas Ego appears dependent, peaceloving and as the "good" guy.

It is also found in the individualism paradigm - the collective "we" (not particularly me!) is used to explain conflicts as well as development: There are wars because we as human beings are born aggressive (or sinful!) and, in the civil sphere, everybody is the architect of his own fortune! There is, according to this type of Western reasoning, little we can do about the collective problems facing us. Causes are seldom sought for in structures or in the interaction of different levels of reality. Thus, we are also less interested in the motives behind conflict behavior (or behind civil political or economic activities) than in the empirically available results: the armed struggle and its outcome (and the political or economic investment and its pay-off). It gives high prestige is you win a conflict - no matter whether you are right; and so it does if you receive a lot of votes or get a high return from your investment - no matter what is your product.

The idea of mono-causality is also apparent in much theoretical thinking as to the driving forces of armament - it is found in arms race theories dealing with action-reaction patterns where the opponent is treated exclusively as the stimulus, and in marxist thinking about the basic causes of
armament and of militarism in which the sole driving force is assumed to be the profit orientation of capitalism, its problem of realizing surplus capital, and that therefore militarism as well as armament "complexes" can, per definitionem, only be found within this social formation.

*Man-mem relations* which are typically *vertical* in both the military and the civil sphere. In front of the manager - military or civil - human beings are subordinated, lack opportunities and the power to active participation as well as the right to withdraw. They are atomized, their social background and individual capacities as human beings are stripped away. Only parts of the human being are made use of.

Most often, personal commitment is counterproductive - don't feel committed to the value system or an ideology, don't commit yourself to the product or the cause of fighting: Do your job and you will be paid accordingly! The job as a soldier is increasingly a job like any other - monetarized, professionalized, unionized, "democratized".

As pointed out by e.g. Ries, values like honour, courage, sacrifice, courtesy or civility, "adoration and idealization of the female" and religiosity were important during the Middle Ages and onwards. Wars were fought with some kind of collectively accepted cause, morale mattered.

What is more often found today is a *brutalized, demoralized and dehumanized* type of fighting - often for the sole purpose of getting a salary or for "adventure" - except in cases, like e.g. national liberation movements and anti-colonial struggle, where there is a mass support for a cause. This is much more difficult to raise today in the Western, overdeveloped nations.

The amount and depth of social problems among soldiers during and after wars are rapidly increasing - especially in the United States - adding to criminality, drug addiction and fascist political orientations.
It has also to do with the characteristics of the nuclear age. In a way, the personal commitment to a value system was reflected in the Clausewitzian distinction between the aim and the purpose of war. The first was purely military - to win the war when first it was started - the other identified political goals. Wars could be rational in the sense "that destruction and violence are means to an end and not ends in themselves, except in certain cases" as Reynolds has expressed it (66). This is no longer the case with the strategic nuclear arsenals representing "over-kill" since nobody could "win" in any rational sense.

Would it be to go too far to maintain that in many cases in the civil sphere do we find that the means which formerly were directed towards an end have become ends themselves?

(10) Man-nature relations in both spheres are built upon the fundamental idea of man's domination of nature. Economic growth is now meeting its outer limits and so is military growth - in terms of resource depletion and pollution, but also in terms of direct means of environmental warfare - e.g. chemical warfare, deforestation, poisoning, burning, deliberately provoked earthquakes, lightnings as well as the systematic bombing of dams, agricultural facilities and land etc. - not to speak of nuclear radiation.

The point, of course, is that the planned destruction of nature adds to the general ecological crisis - also during peace time. In wartime, it is probably correct to say that the destruction of your neighbour's environment may very well, in the long run, imply your own destruction. Nature has a "second strike" capability.
(11) NIMO and NIEO - where the idea is to move to the international level and ask: Would we also find examples of isomorphism between civil and military structures - or "orders" here (67)? We would expect a positive answer taking into account the fact that - presently - the NIEO discussion is moving in the direction of the N standing for "neo-imperialistic" in which the centre nations and the centre elites in the periphery are harmonising their mutual expectations without many considerations for the poor, underdeveloped masses.

In this conceptualization, NIEO may well imply that a number of regional powers develop, that there will be a transfer of resources from centre nations to peripheral elites and that certain nations may become richer - while people become poorer as often pointed out by e.g. Galtung.

Some of the examples of isomorphism here could be those already mentioned at the national level - economic and military growth, the role of technology, the lack of respect for Nature etc. One may very well imagine that hand in hand with the demand as to industrialization we shall see the peripheral arms production (see p. 11) boom; that with increasing transfer of Western technology will also go transfer of military technology - also nuclear - with consequences for armament.

Likewise, if peripheral nations want centres to purchase more manufactured goods - why should this not imply the import of weapons systems from the periphery to the centres some time in the future? Or, if the world division of labour is changing towards a "higher level" of sophistication, why should not an ever-larger part of less sophisticated military production be pushed out to peripheral growth centres? Would it be too daring to assume that the transnational corporations will serve as the basic economic unit and as carriers of both the civil and the military technology?

If only parts of these possible trends turn out to be correct - and much would speak in that direction taking into account the features of globalization and transnationalization (see p. 10-17) - we may conclude that NIEO and NIMO are likely
to share a number of structurally compatible features, to be realized "hand in hand", each serving to maintain status quo at a higher level and mutually supporting each other - while the opportunities to realize a truly new order globally are rapidly declining. Thus, with the concept of militarism as structural similarity between civil and military "spheres" - or here, orders - there will be no difficulty in applying militarism to the transnational level of analysis. Much more could, of course, be done than this sweeping summary may suggest.

(12) Inflexible response and crisis - militarism obviously is a sign of crisis. On the background of all that has been said so far, it can hardly surprise anyone that when the general social formation is in a situation of crisis - as is Western capitalism presently - there will also be a crisis in its military sphere, in the entire field of security thinking. Like material overdevelopment has started causing an increasing number of problems and distorts the opportunities for true human need satisfaction - so does overarmament e.g. in the sense of causing an ever-increasing insecurity.

Militarism signifies the military side of the overall crisis - a security crisis, and - like the civil, economic situation - there will be a need for fundamental structural changes as well as in the employment of means to satisfy basic goals of the future.

However, one of the essential features of the crisis is precisely the lack of ability by the decision-makers to accommodate, to adapt, to meet challenges with sufficient depth and insight. What we find is a monotonous reproduction of old functional remedies to structural problems - e.g. in meeting the challenge of the underdeveloped peoples by means of more growth and talk about more aid, in meeting lower energy supplies and an energy crisis that has to do with the unequal
distribution of resources, production and consumption by embarking upon new energy sources where the throughput of energy is declining - "the poverty of power" - in meeting increasing health and overdevelopment problems by more institutionalized treatment, medicine and high medical technology, and in meeting global economic problems by "making the wheels spinn again." All these examples could be subsumed under the heading of "inflexible response."

There is here a play on words related to the "flexible response" in military thinking. However, the fact is that in the military sphere, the more characteristic feature is the lack of creative thinking and new responses to security challenges (see point 14 on social vulnerability). While societies are growing more insecure and vulnerable because of military overconsumption, new challenges - primarily civil of nature - are coming up these years against which we are virtually unarmed. Security being conceptually limited to military means, the inflexible response of the military sphere is always the same: Give us more!... - a response which only adds to the structural problems against which society should guard itself. Indeed a dangerous syndrome.

* It is time to summarize the idea of isomorphism as a central feature of militarism before we go on to the three next. An attempt in that direction is made in table 3 on the next page in which we are showing the interplay of social and military structures during various stages - making use of a typology developed by Galtung in his "Methodology and Ideology" (Volume I, Chr. Ejlers Forlag, Copenhagen 1977).
Table 3  Social and military structure - a typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uniformity/Collectivism</th>
<th>Diversity/Individualism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FEUDAL (I)</strong></td>
<td><strong>CAPITALIST (II)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knighthood, condottieri, caudillos, beduin levies etc.</td>
<td>modern, professionalized, expert, capital-intensive, status quo, centralized, high technology, weapons manned, class-mixed, verticality, permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decentralized, low technology, men armed, class-divided, verticality, temporary, Motto: Service</td>
<td>Motto: Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIALIST (III)</strong></td>
<td><strong>COMMUNIST (IV)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guerilla, liberation movement, militia, &quot;red&quot;, popular, centralized/decentralized, high/low technology, men armed, classless, horizontal, permanent, Motto: Solidarity</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To exemplify, the most widespread military structure is type II - relatively applicable to both NATO and Warsaw Pact nations as well as many of the peripheral capitalist countries. Type III is typical for liberation movements and nations having passed through revolutions and established new national systems. It is to be noticed that the technological profile in that stage is often mixed - militia type combined with a conventional, even nuclear (China) type of defence. China, by the way, is probably moving slowly from type III to type II in the post-Mao period, accompanying also changing civil priorities. Few belong to type I today and we know of no examples of what could be type IV. This type is precisely the one to be developed somewhat in the final part on alternatives as we consider the three types above militaristic - in various ways and degrees. Could we imagine an alternative defence that would not be?
13. Military monopoly

The idea of a military 'radical monopoly' is, of course, borrowed from Illich who defines it in this way - although only in relation to the civil sphere:

"The establishment of radical monopoly happens when people give up their native ability to do what they can do for themselves and for each other, in exchange for something "better" that can be done for them by a major tool. Radical monopoly reflects the industrial institutionalization of values. It substitutes the standard package for the personal response...Against this radical monopoly people need protection...The cost of radical monopoly is already borne by the public and will be broken only if the public realizes that it would be better off paying the costs of ending the monopoly than by continuing to pay for its maintenance" (68).

Illich does not mention the military, but there is hardly any doubt that it fits into this conceptualization. It has succeeded in taking the security and means of security out of the hands of people and - with the overarmament we are facing today - the people need protection against this monopoly because it increases insecurity.

But there is a terrible difference - the military radical monopoly holds the power to exterminate all living things on Earth and leave us with a nuclear desert. In this sense, the military radical monopoly is the most dangerous of all; therefore, no institution or individual, no single nation and no ministry should be given the sole responsibility for the actions of such a monopoly.

The monopoly has deprived people of much: the right to define their own security, the opportunity to develop local defence measures as well as the opportunity of choice concerning the means to satisfy their security needs. Likewise, people at large have been deprived of the control over development, production, distribution and use of weapons.
Of course, it may be asked: How come that people have tolerated this monopoly by an alliance of elites concerning their own security? One explanation is given by Lang:

"The monopoly that the military claim over military expertise has naturally thrust them in their capacity as technical advisors into important policy roles. Since the military sense a strong identification between their own professional commitments and the national interest, disputes inevitably arise over how much say they or civilians should have over certain national security matters"... (69).

This identification of elite interests with national interests and security is of primary importance - employed as it is by the military, the industrialists, the bureaucrats and the scientists (MIBS). However, it is only possible to exercise this monopoly if there is a) a sufficient amount of information or propaganda material issued from the military sphere, if b) the general popular knowledge concerning military matters is low in comparison with that of the monopoly and c) that alternative security and defense concepts and policies are virtually non-existing - i.e. that the status quo of pact membership, high technology, modernization, enemy images are presented as the constants of the only possible policy.

In other words, the managers of the military sphere must seek to narrow the political battlefield and have the discussion taking place on their territory - employing the old Clausewitzian idea that defence (in this case the military sphere) has superiority through choosing the mode of the struggle.

Thus, there is a fundamental difference between accepting the military because it is found right and accepting it because it is found right - through socialization, indoctrination, mass media and experts' work - to accept the military as it is. "Ex-doctrination" and much consciousness-raising may certainly be needed to change the most traditional military security thinking among people at large. The "military mind" installed in much popular thinking would then be broken up, too (70).
It is certainly not enough to show, as we have attempted here, the structural similarity between the civil and the military sphere; neither to maintain that the military has acquired a monopoly position over the parts of human life which have to do with security.

We would also have to take a closer look upon the interaction between the two spheres. Formerly, we have argued the much of the tendency towards militarism is signified by the increasing civilianization of the military and militarization of the civil sphere, i.e. a deeper and more fundamental integration. On the one side, the military sphere has become more dependent upon the civil resources and skills; on the other, civil society has turned more dependent for its security and is virtually left vulnerable and helpless if general and complete disarmament arrived tomorrow.

Thus, the aggressive potential of the military sphere has increased beyond human imagination while the defensive capacity, the inner strength and cohesiveness of societies have rapidly declined. The only appropriate term for this is asymmetrical integration - suggesting an element of exploitation by the military sphere of the civil society around it, a type of "internal imperialism." This is, indeed, one of the results of the increasing structural similarity, of the mutual adaptation over time.

To examine this idea a bit more, let's make use of an interaction budget and ask: Who benefits from what? The first thing to do would be to try to assess the flows of resources from the military sphere to the civil and the other way around.

From the civil sphere flow a number of resources - goods, services, manpower, capital, raw materials, energy etc. These are the constructive flows. The negative ones are, of course, the conflicts: Civil society, by being class-divided, center-periphery-oriented, based on inequality etc., delivers much of the justification for armament and the expansion of the
military sphere through the simple fact that society does not have the built-in capacity to solve conflicts in a non-violent manner - at least not in sufficient degree.

From the military sphere flows likewise positive and negative resources or "goods": The positive one, in principle, is that of security, the ability to defend society. The negative ones are things like pollution, depletion as well as many other features which have been accounted for already; here should also be included outright destruction in warfare.

What seems to be happening is that the civil sphere contributes more and more and receives less and less. A tremendous amount of resources are poured into the military sphere with hardly any positive effect upon security. Rather, it may actually be more precise to state that never before could so many people feel so insecure with so much weaponry. In other words, here - as with energy, capital, raw materials, manpower, medicine - the value added by one unit more of resource investment decreases or turns negative. The system is turning less and less able to handle resource investments in an effective manner - while anyhow "needing" still more, in this case, for its security. The quality of the throughput is declining, and in consequence society is not only facing the "poverty of power" in terms of energy, but also in terms of its security policy. Continuing along the same line indicates that we have long ago entered a militarist phase (see point 15 of the NIMO).

It may, of course, be argued that security cannot be measured and therefore the above can be nothing but postulates. This is probably true - if we should be looking only for quantitative measures, e.g. for a breaking point which would indicate that exactly here do we enter a militarist stage of development. However, what we have tried to argue all through this essay is precisely that there are a number of unmeasurable indicators - but circumstances which can anyhow be evaluated - which point in the same overall direction.
In this respect it may be much more thought-provoking to notice that armament and security policies in general have not contributed to a more secure world, that the direct outcome of all this cannot be measured. Why demand that those working for disarmament and social restructuring should be able to point out exactly where we know "how much is enough" when the military sphere has been able to seduce millions of people that a particular level was never enough? We would hypothesize that there is a **peacetime indicator of a legitimate level of security investment** (although it may not exist at the present level of theoretical development), while it is already clear that for the military and the armament interests there is only a **wartime indicator** - as pointed out by Lang:

"Since war is the exceptional rather than the routine state of affairs, many operating procedures appear strangely inappropriate to existing circumstances. They are not so much rooted in everyday experience as designed to protect against every possible contingency. For all the drill and simulation, there is no direct test - save war itself - of the adequacy of the various practices, at least not under realistic conditions. Battle alone is the pay-off. Although it has been demonstrated that a good showing in training or a high performance rating in peacetime activity has only a loose relationship to combat effectiveness, faith in established procedures and weapons functions to reduce anxieties about an unpredictable future" (71).

Not the least through monopolizing also the visions of this unpredictable future (threat scenarios, studies of future development trends etc.) the military sphere has succeeded in developing a security apparatus which is built-upon society - in much the same way as center elites build their position upon an underdeveloped periphery through the classical mechanisms of domination and imperialism. These are:

(a) **exploitation** where an asymmetric pattern of division of labor makes the exchange between actors more profitable to one than to the other. In this case, of course, the partners are the civil and the military sphere. The main arguments have
already been given in relation to the "interaction budget". The point, among others, is that the military sphere exploits the social surplus produced by others. If we take the example of peripheral countries, the surplus is most often created by peasants and workers, and they serve to finance the defence industries as well as the military and para-military apparatus although it seems to serve elite security more than the security of the masses.

(b) Penetration where the center controls or influences the center of the dominated. In a direct manner, the military has taken over government in roughly 50 nations around the world and in a more indirect manner the military is strongly influencing the "centres" of the rest of society - the industrialists, bureaucrats, the State as such as well as the scientists, engineers and security experts; they all have prescribed roles within the MIBS-complex mentioned earlier.

It could also be added that the military sphere has the capacity to hold a firm grip upon the human "center", the minds of people, through threat scenarios, enemy images, employment arguments, arguments about the welfare of the nation etc.

(c) Fragmentation where the dominant interact with each other while the dominated are split and kept apart. It may take two directions here: First there is the atomization of individuals within the military systems including the selection of young and able men which leaves women, older people, less physically able, less educated as well as a number of social groupings out of the system. Secondly, there is the fragmentation by the elites vis-a-vis people: the integration of the MIBS interests which close their territory from insight, rather often from parliamentary control and which sees to it that contact are kept and developed supranationally - driving the game of armament above our heads.

As part of this game they have established their own organizations - military-political expert committees, boards of military-industrial enterprises, military societies, lobbies,
inter-ministrial councils, supranational management committees, military pact organs, various ad hoc bodies – all of which function as a bureaucratically organized mist closed from outside penetration (even physically when they meet behind barbed wire and surrounded by security forces, police, intelligence officers, body-guard and are transported back and forth in special aircrafts and helicopters) – all in the name of "national security."

To summarize, it is typical for this element of the NIMO that the military sphere and security apparatus is built-upon society, with a high degree of autonomy, with structural similarity with civil society – while exploiting the rest of this same society which is rapidly growing less and less secure, losing its inner defensive strength and becoming more vulnerable.

The way out of this, of course, is to deny the military sphere the resources by which it has overdeveloped itself and underdeveloped civil societies.

14. Social vulnerability

The idea behind this third dimension of militarism is easily understood by means of a very simple dicotomy which makes us come out with the typology of threats of Table 4 on the next page. It will immediately be clear that the main security interest is related to type I. Of military expenditures in total it is not unusual that 95-98 – if not 100 pct – are poured into purely military defence measures. Depending on the overall social setting these measures may be directed primarily towards external threats or primarily towards internal threats (type II).
**Table 4. A typology of threats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military/violent</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Internal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International warfare</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil/non-violent</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic warfare</td>
<td>Social warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type II threats are exemplified by revolts, guerilla warfare, liberation movements which are obviously considered threats to centres - but not necessarily to the people. Terrorism may also be placed here with specific reference to a number of overdeveloped Western societies which have proved virtually unable to deal with this security challenge in a meaningful way - but rather has tended to move in the direction of a "police-state" in responding to terrorists, a policy which only violates the human security of the majority of citizens while, at the same, confirms the "theory" of terrorism - i.e. that modern democracies can easily be brought to the verge of a dictatorship.

Type III threats have to do with pressures from outside which are not military or directly violent but aim at breaking up structurally violent systems. It may be the threat experienced during an oil crisis, the threat from certain nations running an economic war or boycott of one's products, it may be the threat experienced from global economic problems or that perceived through the demand for a New International Economic Order which - if properly realized - is likely to cause rather fundamental changes within the centre economies and demand that they become more self-reliant instead of exploitative.
Here there are no threats against territory, rather against a lifestyle, against a structure, against a culture and - in the final analysis - against a historical stage of a particular social formation. It will hit countries which are highly other-reliant particularly hard - nations which are especially dependent upon trade and mobility of production factors in large economic cycles and it will hit those nations which are increasingly unable to satisfy the basic human needs of their population by means of their own resources.

It will appear that a much neglected aspect of the dominance-dependence theory is the increasing vulnerability on the part of the centre when it relies on exploiting, penetrating and fragmenting others. When dominating others, you also turn other-reliant - exactly as the military sphere relies upon the civil sphere to an ever-larger degree. For national as well as international peripheries (whether in economic or military matters) the solution may very well be to withdraw from the interaction and extend collective self-reliance.

Thus, to be structurally overdeveloped implies also to be increasingly insecure - the "poverty of power" again - and when facing structural challenges it will be no good to take to arms. Against this type of threat there are no military security (partly because the challenge is not territorial). It is only a sign of deep-rooted militarism that a super power could ever dream of taking to arms - e.g. in the Middle East - in order to secure its oil supplies. The power of the oil - civil, economic and structural as it is - is, in principle at least, simply stronger (provided the "Opecization" could be carried through in collective solidarity).

In other words, it is extremely dangerous to try to transform a type III threat into a type I threat. Under all imaginable circumstances, the challenge of the NIEO could not be met by means of arms - except for a period.
The only reasonable defence measures for the rich, overdeveloped and structurally vulnerable nations would be to restructure their economies towards more self-reliance, i.e. in terms of learning to survive without exploiting a periphery. This would be nothing in the direction of isolationism as is often presumed. Rather, it would imply equally much interaction but of a different type and with different "commodities". Growth would be much more in terms of quality - to which there are no limits - and not in terms of quantity which has to be limited.

Type IV threats are exemplified by the increase in social problems within societies. It may be centralization (of people, capital, transport, communication) which increases vulnerability - according to traditional center-oriented strategic thinking. It may be that ever more people are passified, that commitment and creativity is not needed as much as before or it may be signs of social disintegration - like criminality, corruption, decreasing health standards, lack of value-orientation, decreasing social solidarity, individualism, pollution, lack of general happiness etc. It may be the situation where an increasing number of social groupings are left idle, superfluous - in other words, the society which faces the consequences of a deep economic crisis where system maintenance cannot be taken for granted anymore.

To summarize this point of militarism it is probably true to say that the maldeveloped, militaristic society keeps on accumulating military means to meet threats of type I and, to a certain low degree, type II. While it grows increasingly vulnerable socially and insecure militarily, threats are misperceived, the military sphere becomes ever more powerful and civil society is left torn apart, defenceless and fundamentally threatened. The point is well stated by Kudlde:

"National security requires a stable economy with assured supplies of materials for industry. In this sense, frugality and conservation of materials are essential to our national security. Security means more than safety from hostile attack; it includes the preservation of a system of civilization" (72).
15. Insecurity

It will hardly surprise anyone that militarism embraces the feature of insecurity - apart from the idea of structural similarity, military monopoly and social vulnerability. The NIMC as such increases human insecurity as we have already touched upon.

This point is by no means new - but it deserves mention again. Already in 1916, the historian Edward Krebsiel wrote in his most visionary and well-cumulated study of "Nationalism, War and Society":

"It is to be noted that the cost of insuring peace by competitive armaments has in the last decade risen very rapidly and out of proportion to the increase in population, wealth or prosperity. If armaments insured peace all nations should be more secure than formerly. On the contrary no nation feels one whit more secure. Even if a nation out-runs all competitors it gains no security, as fear impels other nations to make new alliances which change the balance of power...Thus uncertainty, suspicion and fear are abroad and are subject to theexploitation of the unscrupulous" (73).

And a modern analysis by Reynolds substantiates this view in the following way:

"Thus all statesmen prepare for the eventuality of war, and the history of the nation-state has also been the history of warfare. War thus appears not as abnormal but as being pre-eminently normal in international politics. However, the paradox which makes this apparently sensible policy create the condition which it most wishes to avoid stems from the notion of security*. Security only exists when a state possesses the capacity to fight successful wars against any potential aggressor, and defence policy is concerned in the main with relative military capacities and not the intentions of other nations. Clearly, if all nations share this concern then the result is a condition of permanent insecurity in the world*. To refer to a point made earlier, the central problem is that one state's security is another state's insecurity. The consequence is a competition between states which takes the form of arms races, treaties for mutual defence, and social and economic preparation for war, which can only be finally resolved by war itself*. In attempting to achieve security the nation-states of the world succeed
instead in creating anarchy and violence. Yet war can decide the question of national security or, to be more precise, which nation is secure, only if that nation succeeds once and for all in monopolising violence in the world, in the same way as its government has monopolised violence within the state.

In theory, security can be achieved through world hegemony or empire, or by creation of a one world state. None of these possibilities has been realised. No state has ever won a war, for victories and defeats have never been total. The end of every war has been the beginning of another power struggle" (74 - *italics added).

Reynolds has been quoted here at some length because few analyses express the features of what could properly be called the security crisis of the world system so well. It is a problem in which all nations share a part, large or small (75).

What is not explicitly stated above is the fact that this security crisis naturally violate human security - a circumstance which reflects the fact that "security" is almost exclusively thought of in terms of "national security". Thus, security - in this field - is never seen as a basic human need, which may very well be one reason why there is so little popular debate and protest against the armament developments in general. It may be added that other means of controlling the populations are also influencing human life today - although of a more civil orientation they are often managed by military, paramilitary or intelligence apparata as well illustrated by LeMond and Fry, Achroyd et.al. and Hedrick Smith (76). In other words, national security may no longer be able to deliver the goods, it may no longer be the purpose of it; rather it seems that a substantial part of all security investments are directed against the people. The world of 1984 may thus be closer than most often realized.

Therefore, the curve on the next page may very well illustrate our main point concerning insecurity. Any society or individual in a state of perceived insecurity is likely to employ a certain amount of the resources available for security purposes. During most of the history this investment has been
primarily military or directly violent. The accumulation of security means may increase up to a certain point at which the investment tends to come under the law of diminishing returns and beyond this point, security turns rapidly negative \((y)\). Our basic assumption is that this point has been passed long ago in most countries and that this is part of the security crisis. The dimensions and elements of NIMO outlined throughout this essay all contribute - in various ways - to our tumbling down of the curve beyond \((y)\). More military security investments are outright counterproductive in terms of security - but productive in terms of the military, industrial, bureaucratic, scientific interests. This is where the basic social conflict is situated: The people and the elites no longer share a "national interest" in security, there is no common objective when the point \((y)\) is passed and the madness of ever-increasing armament and militarism gains momentum and elite autonomy at the expense of human security \((77)\).

In view of the isomorphism thesis it should be noticed, finally, that this type of crisis curve also applies to many other areas of Western society - e.g. one may substitute security/military expenditure with health/medicine, welfare/economic growth, human development/schooling, cultural growth/cultural institutions, quality of consumer goods/energy and capital investment etc.
Alternative Security and Defence - Some Preliminary Considerations

1. Security as a basic human need

Having outlined the elements and dimensions of the New International Military Order (NIEO), it is time to think about some possible, constructive alternatives - about ways of leaving the collision course.

It has been pointed out before that fundamental structural changes of national and international orders is a precondition for reversing the armament trends as well as the force of their economic and sociological actors. But it would certainly be too easy to leave the matter at that stage - especially as there is a need for alternative thinking to pervade social formation at various levels if any kind of social action shall come about. Criticism is necessary - but not enough. To make people give up the myth about security through armament, it is terribly important to be able to come up with alternative visions, to make better threat and security evaluations than those of the armament interests, to show that there is not one but many ways - i.e. to leave people with an open choice to ensure that the alternative ways are also more democratically realized than those of the present day.
Our point of departure here is the individual human being - i.e. we want to think of security as human security, as a basic human need. From there, we would move to a broadened defence conceptualization implying structural changes towards a type of society which has a built-in strength and in which security measures can never be overdeveloped and never become aggressive - i.e. thinking of a world system in which the security apparatus of one is not automatically a threat to the others. Much will have to be done to integrate and improve this part - especially when it comes to the pertinent question: How do we get there? But hopefully this last part will serve a legitimate function - to stimulate a dialogue.

At a first glance it may seem terribly simplistic to argue that security should be about human beings - and much less about nations. But it is not; it should be recognized again and again that human beings are extremely distant in the schemes of the armament interests and that their monopoly, as it has developed, has removed human beings at large from the decision-making processes. Therefore, actual human security is rapidly decreasing these years - and it should thus be our main task to restore human beings in the centre of security thinking, in decision-making and in carrying out defence policies (78).

Security has to do, of course, with the avoidance of direct violence - bodily injury, being killed, tortured etc. by a deliberate human or machanic actor. This definition is our main concern here. But it should be recognized that it is rather limited.

Security may be seen as the most fundamental need of all - that of survival (79). An individual who has not satisfied his or her basic needs like food, clothes, housing, health, education and employment can hardly be called secure - no matter how much weaponry the individual may otherwise have at its disposal.
Furthermore, an individual lacking in basic human rights to speak, travel, meet and communicate is no secure human being either. Likewise, it could be pointed out that those deprived of choice and opportunities to use their creative capacities and are alienated in their life situation in general are not secure.

In other words, being the object of direct violence and/or structural violence through poverty, repression or alienation prevents anything that could reasonably be termed security. Consequently, societies in which such features are significant should not be called secure either - no matter how much armament they have stockpiled.

Thus, if security is considered a basic human need, it should be the security of people - of the majority. The contrast to the present security concepts is obvious as these have increasingly come to mean security of the topdogs only - in some cases even directed against the masses. They have turned euphemisms for power politics, law and order and the status quo maintenance of exploitative societies, as has been excellently pointed out for instance by Sharp (80).

But the spectre is broader; security could, to employ a categorization made by Galtung elsewhere (81), be related to people (minds, bodies, life-styles), to things (production), to systems (distribution) and to structures (transformation) and nature (utilisation).

At present, security measures serve almost exclusively to preserve things and territory - so fundamental to capitalism (82). If, on the contrary, basic human security needs were in focus it would be necessary to widen the types of security measures, employing different ones at different levels. It would become possible to speak about a more equal distribution of security and to realize security, it would be of major importance to involve people much more, ask them what they feel and think about security and contribute to the breaking of the elite's monopoly and overarmament. To defi-
ne and operationalize security should be the task of many of not the few.

Thus, secondly, security should be the security for people: Concepts, principles, defence policies, strategic thinking etc. should be comprehensible to people at large. Mystifications, closedness, expert-orientation should be abolished and decision-making processes be brought back to fora under ofen, democratic control and insight. Today "national security" serves as an argument to have more and more people kept uninformed about matters of vital importance for their own security (83).

Thirdly, it may be implied that security should be the security by people - implying an opening up for a much broader participation in security and defence activities. Defence - no matter the type - must be democratic, mass-based because it usually involves the use of the most dangerous tools of power. Here more than perhaps anywhere else is it vital to secure public support and participation.

When security is defined by people in a broad social dialogue, there must also be a much wider opportunity for the development of local strategies based on local resources. As with much newer development thinking, we have to start out from the smallest units, from the local resources and the local needs of human beings.

It is quite likely that there shall be much innovation from a collective definition of security. Concepts would differ according to geographical, social, economic, ecological etc. conditions - and not, as at present, be based on the illusion that all people, all regions and all nations principally need the same aircrafts, tanks, missiles etc, or the same type of defence strategy.

The farmer, the businessman, children, urban dwellers, the assembly line worker, the state bureaucrat, the housewife - all may very hold different views of what security is all about. And among cultures and social formations, security and defence would vary considerably.
If the world system embraced a large number of defense structures - all locally-based and oriented and all centred around the security needs of the people - it would probably become much more problematic to e.g. transfer military technology, arms or socio-military structures because of the variety. Likewise, it could be imagined that it would be considerably more difficult to start wars or invasions, because the rules of the game would be locally determined and much less known to a foreign, distant enemy. The "priority of defense", to speak with Clausewitz, would be even stronger; the defeat of the United States in Vietnam would be one indicator of this problematique, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia - in which "another defence" primarily non-violent struggle was employed - would serve as another example.

It also seems reasonable to hypothesize that such a variety at the local level would be much more attractive to people. It should actually be asked: If people are seeking "another development" in alternative housing, energy production, energy consumption, food production, transport, lifestyle, experimental living, alternative productions etc. - why should they not seek also alternative defence? Could it even be that there are things to learn from the civil experimentation to that of new defence strategies - as for instance the defence developed by the Christiania Community in Copenhagen seems to indicate (84)?

One preliminary conclusion to be drawn from what has been said so far is the following: If taking the individual as our point of departure for an alternative security and defence thinking, it will be much more easily recognized that security and defence is something much broader than the military can possibly deliver and that there will be a variety of defence strategies applied at the local level and, thus, building up security from below.

Thus, by focussing on the smallest social unit - the individual - we hope to open up for a number of strategy alternatives and thereby placing military means of security in
a more proper relation to civilian mean. This is an explicit
determination to make up with the "only one alternative"-myth
driven through again and again by the armament interests like
e.g. either pact membership or we shall be occupied tomorrow,
either a new aircraft acquisition or we shall have no airforce
in a few years, either we increase military expenditures or
lay open to foreign invasion, either we stockpile the newest
military technology or give up defending ourselves, either
strong or embarking upon non-violence, either we arm or some-
body else does....

Today we experience that security at the national level
does not, in general, lead to security at the individual
level. Rather, we are all threatened - although in various de-
grees and ways. Armaments have become a direct threat to our
civilizational survival. But in this attempt to do some
alternative thinking, we are ready to build upon the hypothe-
sis that a nation full of secure human beings will also be
a secure nation, possibly a nation with a deep inner strength
and one that is not likely to be a threat to its environment.

2. Alternative defence strategies

As often pointed out, military expenditures are much too high
in many countries to serve human security purposes. Actually,
it is an important indicator of militarism that security
is measured by military expenditures (Milex).

What is less often acknowledged is that defence budgets
are composed in a counterproductive manner; in almost all
nations, about 98 per cent of the defence budget is composed
of the military while civilian defence investments are negli-
gible. "Total defence" (85) is most often conceptualized as
95 per cent or more to the military while political, psycho-
logical, civil defence measures have to share the rest.
But it should be obvious by now that a plurality of defence measures must be employed if society is to meet all four types of threats outlined on p. 58 and not only type I and, to a certain degree, type II.

In Table 5 below, we have tried to outline a number of defence strategies - each of which would actually deserve a rather detailed description although we shall here limit ourselves to a general discussion.

Table 5  A typology of defence strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent/Destructive</td>
<td>Non-violent/Constructive</td>
<td>Built-upon/on top of social structure</td>
<td>Non-violent/Constructive</td>
<td>Built-into/from below, local</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built-upon/on top of social structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Non-military</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive, threaten others</td>
<td>Non-aggressive</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-aggressive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status quo-oriented</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are thus three broad categories; first, there is the predominantly military which - in various appearances - is well-known today. Some nations here are exclusively basing themselves on modern conventional and have no nuclear capability and no guerilla/militia system. Many combine modern conventional with civil defence subsumed under the military budget.
Secondly, there are the measures which are included in the concept of "total defence", i.e. those additional types of defence which are mobilized during crisis or during war time. Taking the example of economic defence measures, they may imply that the country holds stocks of strategic materials, increases food production, keeps up its research and development efforts for instance to substitute products which may disappear during war time. Much of such "reforms" within present structures are undertaken under the headline of "preparation employment" (beredskapsarbete) in Sweden.

It also deserves mentioning that many foreign policy initiatives could be interpreted as belonging to this type of constructive preparation - like e.g. being open to the demands of a New International Economic Order, participating actively in international disarmament negotiations, serving as bridgehead between various groupings in the international system, or taking limited regional cooperation initiatives about such policy matters. However, the basic characteristic is that of reformism - i.e. trying to "soften" the implications of the present dominance relationships and conflict formations, but not aiming at transformation.

The strategy of non-violent struggle should be mentioned particularly as it is difficult to place. Most of the literature deals with non-violent struggle, i.e. how it is employed in times of conflict, occupation and war. Rather little is said about the preconditions for this type of defence within the present social formations, about its application in peace-time. It is a means of struggling within the conflict formations found and only secondarily a way of restructuring society.

But, of course, this distinction is not clear-cut; we would not mind placing non-violent struggle closer to that of structural defence - aiming at emphasizing the close correspondence and the desirability of carrying out transformation by non-violent means (86).
However, it is reasonable to point out here that it would be a major neglect of the idea of isomorphism between civil and military structures expounded earlier to assume that non-violent defence should ever become the predominant instrument of overdeveloped, capitalist countries. Non-violence used within this social formation may function as a seed, "a sign of what is to come in another formation and as part of an overall political strategy.

The third type of defence – the structural or constructive defence is not aimed at struggling in conflict situations. Its orientation is towards the extremely difficult question: How do we build into society such structures that "remove the causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur" to borrow a formulation by Galtung.

It is not concerned with how to act out conflicts within present society but with restructuring it towards the mentioned goal of having an inner strength, cohesiveness, a built-in defensive capacity. It will be seen from Table 5 that it shares many of the items ascribed to the reformist types, but it differs in two fundamental ways: (a) it is built-into society and from below and (b) it aims at transformation. It may be a weakness, it may be a strength – but we are here speaking of how one could imagine a more peacefully structured, more safe and human oriented future society. Actually this is what our final section 3 attempts to discuss.

Now, the question obviously arises: Can the various strategies be combined and, if so, how? Following an excellent examination of this question concerning the combination of military and non-military defence by Boserup and Mack (87) the arguments against a combination are primarily that civilian defence would reduce the credibility of the military defence as a deterrent (also implying, however, a taboo on discussions of what actually to do if an aggressor succeeds in occupying one's territory where non-violent means could be highly useful).
Secondly, Boserup and Mack point out that for nations bound by alliance commitments and relying upon the retaliatory capability of allies, the national options may have little, if any importance.

Thirdly, and rather well in line with classical non-violence thinking, a military component should never be added to non-violent defence - for reasons of principle, moral and credibility.

Boserup and Mack also supply three main arguments for a combination: 1) using the two types of defence in clearly differentiated situations, 2) to employ them in different geographical areas and 3) to use both means simultaneously and more or less coordinated e.g. "total defence" with a clear subordination of the civil under the military component or taking the form of a partly violent resistance.

Having emphasized as a point of departure the desirability of a pluralistic approach in order to satisfy human security needs, we would leave the matter here by stating that the possibilities for combinations should be investigated as much as possible pushing the resource allocation and inventive capacity as much to the right of the table as possible.

It would even be reasonable to state that, depending upon the social formation at large, all types of defence should be considered except that of nuclear weapons. Their existence is fundamentally incompatible with any human-oriented security thinking. Likewise, it seems historically true that any larger commitment to type 2 defence (modern conventional) precludes a deeper commitment to other types. This is why the pushing to the right of the table is so important; it should be most natural and logic to investigate all the non-military options in the present situation where an increasing number of high-level statements and reports emphasize that the military defence only increases insecurity. An alternative must re-establish human security at a much lower military level and, in the longer perspective, do away altogether with the arms. This will hardly come about without structural transformation towards more peacefully organized societies.
3. Peaceful society and constructive defence

The focus upon security as a basic human need and the idea of defence as the defence of human beings, lifestyles - more than of territory and things - leads to an opening up in terms of defence strategies: They may be much broader than usually assumed; there are a number of non-military measures that should be taken into consideration, especially when the total threat spectre is acknowledged and not only that of external military aggression.

In the short-term perspective much can be done to redress the balance between military and non-military means; in various ways the opportunities for combining them should be investigated within a framework of "total defence". However, this approach is reformist - and does not attack the root of the problem: the conflict formations themselves and the fact that society is increasingly defenceless in terms of its own structure. One may say that we are here arguing for the withdrawal of civil society from the dominance and exploitation by the military sphere and - as pointed out here by Senghaas - this can hardly take place without deep structural changes:

"Die Militärapparate brauchen um ihre Zukunft nicht zu bangen. Sie sind eingebettet in zwischen- und innergesellschaftliche Konfliktilformationen, die durch mehr oder weniger virulente Konfliktherde immer wieder eine Existenzbestätigung erfahren. Aus ihnen resultiert die Dynamik des Militarismus; in ihr wiederum ist Rüstungsdynamik begründet. Gibt es Auswege aus dieser - in ihren Konsequenzen katastrophenträchtigen - Entwicklung?...
Es scheint keine Lösungen des weltweiten Militarismusproblems ohne eine Auflösung bestehender Konfliktilformationen zu geben. Diese Erkenntnis ist insbesondere dann bedrückend, wenn man Versuche partieller und segmenthafter Lösungen des Rüstungsproblems angesichts der Explosivität der Rüstungsapparate innerhalb bestehender Konfliktformationen nicht von vornherein als hoffnungslos aufzugeben bereit ist." (88, italics added)

In this last section it is our aim to say something of what could be imagined to fill the fourth box of table 3 on page 50, working our way not only towards an alternative de-
fence but also an alternative society - imagined to be more self-reliant, horizontal, based on equity, on smaller economic cycles with opportunities for self-realization (the motto of the imagined communist structure) and diversity in goals and means.

Its main defence is the way in which it is structured; if it makes use of weapons we would imagine them to be much different from those of today - possibly like those mentioned by Liebknecht, i.e. weapons which also serve as tools of work. In any case, they would be there with the recognition that there are limits to military growth - but hardly limits to human security.

The task thus is the following: Could we imagine radically different types of societies in which need for armament is virtually non-existing or very close to zero, because they are fundamentally peacefully structured, have a potential for solving conflicts and tensions in a rational way and, if attacked, have a defensive capacity built into their structure?

This task, of course, is immense - if at all possible. It has been investigated by surprisingly few - liberals as well as marxists (89). All that one can hope to do here is to suggest a couple of principles and ideas - to stimulate discussion and further theoretical development. This should, also in this particular field, be a central task of peace research.

The idea of "constructive" defence is rather simple: The best defence is that which is built into - and not upon - social formations. A strongly decentralized society is much less vulnerable than a highly centralised one; a society which is not too other-reliant in terms of imports/exports, technology and basic need resources is stronger and more resistant to external pressures than a highly other-reliant society; a society built upon human commitment, solidarity and belief in the future is stronger than the crisis-ridden, polarized and disintegrating society; the horizontal, symmetric interaction
between relatively autonomous units is much less likely to cause conflicts and violence than the vertical, exploitative exchange - and so on. This alternative society would also, we imagine, have more of a potential for solving its own problems without violence and not represent a threat towards others. These three features - change of conflict formation, capacity for rational conflict solution and non-aggressiveness - should be closely integrated and reinforce each other. This has been well pointed out by Sharp:

"Nonviolent action appears to have quite different long term effects on the distribution of power in society. Not only does this technique lack the centralizing effects of political violence, but nonviolent action appears by its very nature to contribute to the diffusion of effective power throughout the society. This diffusion, in turn, is likely to make it easier in the long run for the subjects to control their ruler's exercise of power in the future. This increased potential for popular control means more freedom and more democracy. There are several reasons why widespread use of nonviolent action in place of political violence tends to diffuse power among the subjects. These reasons have to do with the greater self-reliance of the people using the technique, as related to leadership, weapons, the more limited power of the post-struggle government, and the reservoir capacity for nonviolent struggle which has been built up against future dangers" (90).

In other words, what we are looking for is not only disarmament to counteract direct violence but fundamental restructuring to counteract structural violence. They should not be separated as to distinct strategies, as we rely on the hypothesis that a society with very little or no structural violence will have a very low level of needs for armament - most likely it would be non-existent. Therefore, it becomes pertinent to ask: What would a peacefully strong society devoid of structural violence and the need for means of direct violence look like?

First of all, it would be organized in such ways that structural violence is negated. This has been dealt with by Galtung (91):
(1) **Circular ranking order** - there should be doubts as to where actors are ranking, changing from time to time,

(2) **Cyclical interaction pattern** - all actors are connected and there is not one single "correct" channel of interaction,

(3) **No correlation between rank and centrality** - high rank of an actor in the system should not automatically imply his centrality; low rank not necessarily peripheralization,

(4) **Differentiation between systems** - all systems and dimensions are not structured in the same way,

(5) **No concordance between ranks** - having high rank on one dimension or in one system does not automatically imply high rank on other dimensions or in other systems,

(6) **Low rank coupling between levels** - so that no actors at level n-1 are represented at level n through the highest ranking actor at level n-1.

But peace should not only be considered the negation of direct and structural violence; it is "something more", something positive and constructive. Galtung, again, is of help in outlining some basic features. According to him peace structures could be characterized by the following (92):

(7) **Equity** - no part should be exploited, classlessness, horizontality, mobility,

(8) **Entropy** - a high degree of people-to-people interaction, disorder, randomness, unpredictability, away from center-center interaction,

(9) **Symbiosis** - a high level of interdependence,

(10) **Broad scope** - many types of exchanges and interactions,

(11) **Large domain** - many actors participating,

(12) **Superstructure** - extending the relationship to other units sharing the basic characteristics.

These theoretical points of departure or criteria of more peaceful structures may be supplemented with ideas and principles pervading so much of present development thinking in terms of alternatives in the Third World and in smaller experimental "irelands" in the overdeveloped world - much inspired by names like Gandhi, Schumacher, Harper and Boyle, Nuss, Roszak, Pirsig, Illich (93). Thus:
(13) Smallness and communitarianism - small is not only beautiful, but also likely to be peaceful (94); society could be made up of a variety of smaller units - communes. There is a need for general scaling down, for human scaling.

(14) Self-reliance - communes and societies should aim at achieving as much as possible by means of local resources first. As self-reliance will never be complete - and does not mean isolationism - horizontal cooperation is necessary also as a collective measure to reduce economic, political and cultural other-dependence (95).

(15) Self-realization - which is the motto of the fourth category of social structures mentioned earlier. Basic need satisfaction for all comes first, and the economy is built to fit people, not capital. Mutualism, meaningful and creative work, opportunity for identification, commitment, mass participation involving also women, children, the old, the handicapped etc., opportunity for inward spiritual engagement, religousness and human right - all are relevant catchwords here.

(16) Pluralism - the more units, the larger scope for variety in means and goals, the lower the chance of monocultures; no stage theory of development, no dogmatism (e.g. some things may still be produced centrally and be 'big', the state may still have a role in mediating between units), away from specialization towards mixed systems like agricultural cities and industrial villages; balance between manual and intellectual work.

(17) Recentralization - many centres and no peripheries, society is recentralized and minimized to fit people instead of human beings being minimized and centralized to fit capital and growth; decision-making at the lowest possible level and a multiplicity of councils, meeting places, committees for real participatory democracy.

(18) Ecological balance - emphasizing the need to live in closer contact with Nature, in harmony with inner as well as outer limits, away from pollution, depletion and the use of capital energy.

(19) Simplicity - society should be generally comprehensible to people, open for their participation, scope for simple life-styles and less materialism, radical monopolies are built down, softer technology employed - but no ascetism or puritanism.
(20) Federalism - aiming at satisfying the need of building relationships with others, but always starting from the smallest unit - family or family-like units, community, village, district, nation, region and - possibly - a global unit, the "community of communities" which is likely to be necessary especially in relation to the "global problems" facing us and the administration of the resources of mankind.

Many more indicators of the "good society" could be mentioned. All we have attempted is to offer some orientation, not the final goals. Much more should be done through research and public dialogues as well as through actual experimentation.

But the question of course remains: Are there any indications that societies structured along the lines mentioned here would be more peaceful, would have a built-in capacity for rational conflict resolution and be non-aggressive towards their environment? A couple of answers could be given - although we are fully aware that we do not know, that much too little empirical evidence is available about this question drawn from the experiments going on here and there around the globe.

First of all, as much of what has been outlined above represent a systematic negation of many of the most conspicuous features of the present overdeveloped and overarmed world, we may be on the right track. Much of what is will have to be given up in the future, and there should be no illusions as to reaching any more substantial change in defence matters via the piecemeal way.

Secondly, it has been a major point in the entire essay that to disarm, the world will need more than attack on particular weapons systems (polittico-military approach), more than arms production restrictions and "conversion" (the economic approach); it will demand a deeper engagement and social transformation because of the intimate connection between civil and military structures. In other words, we must combat both the globalization and transnationalization of armament trends and the militarism which is less actor-oriented and more structure-oriented.
The point is that the problems of alternative security and defence on the one side and alternative social structures on the other must be addressed simultaneously.

As far as we can see this is where the forces working for a true NIEO and true NNEOs on the one side and the forces working for disarmament on the other should reach out and join forces. How should a NIEO ever come about if the security problems are not properly dealt with? And how should we ever realize disarmament if structures with built-in violence continue to exist? In both movements structural transformations are needed and they point in the same direction. But their goals will hardly ever be reached if the visions about "the good society" are not brought out into an open debate or if, for political reasons, the forces fighting for development and disarmament pretend that the struggle can gain momentum without visions being explicitly stated. For it is true that we shall have to go through deep changes if a true NIEO and a more peaceful world shall be attained before it is too late.

To discuss openly such images of the future is also an important precondition for ensuring that changes will come about in a democratic, mass-oriented way and not lead only to change of elites on top of society. Likewise, such openness should help changes being non-violent.

Thirdly, it may be argued that the self-reliance model outlined here and the idea that dominated nations should withdraw from exploitative relationships, on the one side, and that civil society should withdraw from the dominance of the military interests and regain its inner defensive capacity on the other side - are arguments running parallel. They both aim at reducing conflict potentials.

Thus, to summarize, we do not state that surely the above alternative society will be more peaceful - although there is some evidence to the hypothesis. Rather we argue for the idea of presenting utopias.
Constructive utopias - isn't it all unthinkable? We would answer in the same vein as did Roszak concerning the task of thinking and practicing alternatives (96):

"Unthinkable, yes. Almost as unthinkable as it would have been only four generations ago to imagine that we could have created the monster. But it was of our making. And it is yet ours to unmake and replace."

As a first step in a necessary dialogue, we shall end this essay by listing the main characteristics of the present destructive defence and what could be imagined as constructive defence. Readers are thus invited to participate in extending the list, challenging the answers given and discuss whether alternatives should simply be the negations of what is today or there is "something more to it." Hopefully, it will turn out that there is much more to it if human security and development needs shall be satisfied for the majorities lacking in such satisfaction. Only a "critical mass" of human beings can bring back security of, for and by people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTRUCTIVE DEFENCE</th>
<th>CONSTRUCTIVE DEFENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Built upon social structures of inequality, upon structural violence and supposed to trickle down from the top</td>
<td>Built into alternative structures, where structure in itself is a measure of defence - e.g. decentralisation, participation, pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Aims at an abstract &quot;national security&quot; need - in reality defending topdogs against underdogs and legitimizing expansion</td>
<td>Satisfy basic security needs of human beings, building-up from below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Growth-oriented, quantitative (Milex), security met with more armament leading to overarmament</td>
<td>No growth-oriented, quality of structures and human participation - security met with social and non-violent means</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DESTRUCTIVE DEFENCE  (continued)

4. Center thinking, center-oriented, integration between topdogs of civil and military spheres marginalizing people

5. Excessive consumption of one security means - arms, cost-ineffective, large opportunity costs

6. Capital and research intensive armament, high and hard technology

7. Class-based and class-mixed

8. Centralized command and the idea of an enemy centre to be destroyed

9. Short time perspective, the idea of a short fight and a final blow

10. One major cause of it all: the activities of the enemy - image development, threat scenarios, fixation, legitimizing functions

11. Vertical man-man relations; professionalization, right-wing politicized, no explicit human commitment, low morale, no fighting for a cause - well paid. Stripped of religious or ethical values

12. Damages nature both directly and indirectly

13. Reinforcement between military structure (NIMO) and the present international economic order, incompatible with a true NIMO

CONSTRUCTIVE DEFENCE

Periphery thinking and orientation, structural integration of development and security measures - fit to local circumstances

Appropriate consumption of a variety of means balancing each other, cost-effective - much is paid by structures

Man intensive, low and middle level technology generally more soft and non-violent

Classless

Collective command, many centres

Long time perspective, struggling for years if necessary, many smaller steps, winning the people

More causes, able to analyse more elements of a conflict, little fixation, no continuous building up of enemy images

Horizontal man-man relations; more left-oriented politicized, explicit human commitment, morale, fighting for a cause - money not the motivation. More often based upon religious, ethical or ideological values

Defence in balance with nature, no direct environmental warfare

Security and true human development would go hand in hand; no NIEO without the breakdown of the NIMO and no alternative defence and security without the breaking-down of the present international order
**DESTRUCTIVE DEFENCE**

(continued)

| 14. | Functional approaches to structural challenges - "inflexible response" |
| 15. | Radical monopoly of the military sphere over the civil sphere |
| 16. | People need protection against the security apparatus |
| 17. | Exploiting the civil society and makes it defenceless |
| 18. | Penetrates and controls civil elites |
| 19. | Fragmentation by topdogs over peripheries |
| 20. | Adds to social vulnerability and misperceive threats for its own sake |
| 21. | Increases human insecurity |
| 22. | Of the nation or the elites |
| 23. | Incomprehensible to the majority |
| 24. | By the topdogs |
| 25. | In defence of territory and things |
| 26. | Ultimately destructive, aggressive, deterring |
| 27. | Exclusively military and violent |

**CONSTRUCTIVE DEFENCE**

| 14. | Structural approaches, fundamental transformation, flexible |
| 15. | No such monopoly |
| 16. | No such protection needed from the internally designed defence |
| 17. | Non-exploitative |
| 18. | Mutual reinforcement of development and security measures |
| 19. | Integration from the bottom upwards |
| 20. | Increases the inner strength of society and its capacity for meeting rationally various types of security challenges |
| 21. | Increases human security |
| 22. | Of the masses |
| 23. | Comprehensible to all |
| 24. | By the people |
| 25. | In defence of human beings, lifestyles, structures and true development |
| 26. | Ultimately constructive, defensive, non-deterring |
| 27. | Only military - if at all - to a very low level and only for specific tasks and under civil control |
Notes and references

1. The figure $400 \text{ bn} \text{ a year}$ is the estimate of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in its yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1978, Taylor & Francis Ltd., London 1978 p. 133 which is based on US intelligence estimate of the dollar-cost in the USA of 1976 Soviet defence activities. SIPRI's own estimate for the world is $360 \text{ bn}.

The estimate of the number of people killed in wars stems from Milton Leitenberg, R. Kalish and D. Lombardi, A Survey of Studies of Post W.W. II Wars, Conflicts and Military Coups (Cornell University, 1977) p. 1 and is based partly on Encyclopedia Britannica 1972, partly on Istvan Kende's estimate of the post-1945 casualties and, finally, on the estimate of the authors.

Concerning the number of wars in the world since 1845, see Istvan Kende, The Wars of Our Days - And Some Reflections on the Term 'Militarism', presented at the 28th Pugwash Symposium, Militarism and National Security, Oslo, November 1977.

2. I am particularly indebted to Johan Galtung with whom many of the ideas in this essay have been developed during my participation in the World Indicators Program at Oslo University. I am also grateful to Dieter Senghaas for discussion and much help during two research visits to Frankfurt.

Being a part of the research program of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Oslo, I am happy to thank Håkan Wiberg for much good advice through several years.

Many of the thoughts of the essay have been presented at conferences - e.g. the above-mentioned Pugwash symposium, at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in Uppsala and at the Symposium Armament, Tension and War at Hanaholmen in Finland in 1977. They have also been presented before several fora of concerned citizens and peace activists in Denmark and Sweden during the last couple of years. I am most grateful for all these contributions - their substantial content and criticism as well as inspiration and encouragement.

Finally, it deserves mention that the essay can be seen as an outline of my doctoral thesis - for which reason much of it will be subject to changes in the years to come. In this sense, the present essay is preliminary, may have serious shortcoming and needs further elaboration. Hopefully, any reader feeling inspired - or annoyed - will contribute to the further developments.


5. For more information concerning world arms trade, see among other the following sources:
   - SIPRI 1971, The Arms Trade with the Third World, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm; SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers 1975, the MIT Press, Massachusetts; all SIPRI Yearbooks contain materials on arms trade;

6. For more information concerning peripheral arms production, see among other the following sources:
   - The SIPRI publications mentioned above; U. Albrecht, D. Ernst, P. Lock, H. Wulf 1976, Klistung und Unterentwicklung, Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg; P. Lock, H. Wulf 1977, Register of Arms Production in Developing Countries (available from 2000 Hamburg 13, Parkalle 72);

7. For more information concerning the global spread of nuclear technology, see among other the following sources:

8. For more information concerning the developing West-European military-industrial cooperation, see among other the following sources:

9. For more information concerning the prospect of an Atlantic Defence market, see among the following sources: Many of the above-mentioned sources are relevant here, too; Callaghan Jr., 1975, US/European Economic Cooperation in Military and Civil Technology, 2nd edition, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington

10. The earlier mentioned study on the F-16 fighter aircraft illustrates this point extremely well - being built on a clear division of labor. This is also what motivates much of the pushing-out of military industry - e.g. component work - to peripheral countries, as well as the idea of having a limited number of major peripheral nations, like Brazil, Israel, South Africa, Iran, India, South Korea a.o. take over the bridgehead function of being partly main recipients of advanced military technology and manufactured weapon systems, partly manufacture their own weapons which are partly employed in these nations, partly exported to a local periphery of customers.

11. See the chapter of the author in the mentioned F-16 study.

12. It should be noticed that military R&D is often pointed out as the driving force behind armament. It is almost as often overlooked how fundamentally the long-range planning in soft- as well as hardware influences the ongoing armament. This idea is expounded in the case study of Denmark by the author, Military Research and Development and Planning (forthcoming 1979 as part of a larger comparative study of military R&D in the Nordic countries).

Arbeitsplätze durch Rüstung? Warnung vor falschen Hoffnungen
Kowolli, Reinbek bei Hamburg; The Report of the Labour
Party Study Group 1977, Sense About Defence, Quartet Books,
London; D. Elliott, M. Kaldor, D. Smith, R. Smith 1977,
Alternative Work for Military Industries, Richardson Insti-
tute for Conflict and Peace Research, London; U. Albrecht,
P. Lorenz, D. Smith 1978, Rüstungskonversionsforschung,
Berlin; the classical work on the relationship armament and
economics is Edmund Silberner 1946, The Problem of War in
Nineteenth Century Economic Thought, Princeton University
Press, New Jersey;

14. There exists a very large literature on the so-called
military-industrial complex and related conceptualizations;
for an overview which applies the concept to both East and
West - although with various contents and profilation - see
Steven Rosen 1973, Testing the Theory of the Military-
Industrial Complex, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Comp.,
Massachusetts.

15. See e.g. R. Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, Paladin, Herts
1976, chapter I, p. 21-100 for an excellent historical account
of the use of this idea; Galtung in a forthcoming book from
the World Indicators Program (WIP); D. Senghaas in his
Abschreckung und Frieden, Studien zur Kritik organisiert er
Friedlosigkeit, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am
Main 1972, touches upon the idea of isomorphism in the use
of the concept of "organized peacelessness". It is also
penetrating the same author's Weltwirtschaftsordnung und
Entwicklungspolitik. Fläden für Dissociation, Suhrkamp
1977 (see especially chapter 9, p. 223-261 on the New
International Military Order - here borrowed by the author);
Senghaas' article Military Dynamics in the Context of
also deserves mention here.
Development No. 6 (especially p. 467), and in The Signifi-
cance of Military Technology, in: Bulletin of Peace Propo-
sals 2:1977; Liebknecht 1907, Militarism and Anti-Militarism
Rivers Press, Cambridge 1973; F. Engels, Anti-Dühring,
Lawrence and Wishart, London and Progress Publishers, Moscow
1975, especially part II, chapters II-IV.
The idea of isomorphism is also strongly present in B. Abra-
hamsson 1971, Military Professionalization and Political
Power, Stockholm

16. See H.E. Laswell, The Garrison State Hypothesis Today, in:
Ed. S.P. Huntington, Changing Pattern of Military Politics,

18. Ibid., p. 11-12.
20. For further elaboration on this point, see Kaldor, op.cit., in which it is stated that:

"One way to draw out the political role of the military institutions is to distinguish between the techniques of force and the relations of force. As we have seen, the techniques of force are the weapons and the way they are used. The relations of force are the organization of men, the nature of the military hierarchy, the methods of recruitment. Together, they comprise the form of force. The techniques of force are at once the product of the level of technology in society and the appropriate tool for a particular set of military relations. The relations of force are those most convenient for organizing a body of men, in a given society, and those most likely to generate loyalty to the social formation. The form of force is thus a reflection of the social formation, or prevailing mode of production. But it can also alter the social formation and it is this contention which is important for an understanding of the military in development." (p. 467, italics added)

The change effects of techniques of force is expressed this way in the Sowjetystem und demokratische Gesellschaft. Eine vergleichende Enzyklopädie, Band IV, Verlag Herder KG, Freiburg im Breisgau (1971):

"Gerade die durch die waffentechnische und militärische Entwicklung bewirkte Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Krieg und Frieden und das Vorhandensein ständig aktiver Abwehrbereitschaft vergrößern das sachliche und materielle Gewicht des militärischen Sektors und damit dessen Einwirkungsmöglichkeiten auf Politik und Gesellschaft." (p. 535, italics added).

21. From Milovidov and Kozlov, Problems of Contemporary War, Moscow 1972, p. 65. Notice that Lenin sees capitalism as the only militaristic social order and as a "weapon" - not as a structural phenomena pertaining to various social orders throughout history. This makes Lenin's conceptualization much more limited than the other mentioned above.


23. This according to Silberner, op.cit., p. 253.


25. R. Nisbet, op.cit., p. 63-64

26. Proudhon was probably the first to use the word 'militarism' (in 1864) to describe "Das Heer-wesen eines monarchisch und zentralistisch regierten Staates sowie die damit verbundenen Finanzlasten" (here quoted from the excellent anthology by
Volker Berghahn, *Militarismus*, Klepenheuer & Witsch, Köln 1975, p. 10). Berghahn also notes that the word was found in a German dictionary in 1870, defined as "das Vorherrschen und die Bevorzugung des Soldatenwesens" (ibid. p. 10). There is a clearly liberal-oriented tradition or school on militarism; Guglielmo Ferrero in his *Militarism* from 1902 (Garland Publishing Inc., New York 1972) defines militarism in relation to war which serves a) to provide civilizations with sufficient capital and bring it into circulation and thus imparting new life to decadent societies, b) to accumulate land and c) to secure a supply of slaves in the ancient world.

Hinz in 1904 related militarism to feudalism and, where it existed at his time, it was considered a "feudal reminiscence" (see Berghahn, op.cit., p. 13). This draws closely upon Herbert Spencer's distinction between the warfare-oriented society and the industrial society. These two could have nothing in common. This is also the view of the American liberal Joseph Miller according to whom "the military spirit is always on the side of reaction - always allied with the non-progressive and anti-liberal movements of the time." (Quoted by Berghahn, op.cit., p. 12-13).

Lee Bernhard in his *War and Its Causes* from 1944 (Garland Publishing inc., New York and London 1972) defined militarism as "that personal attitude and collective practice which develops in connection with a highly organized and self-conscious profession or arms, whether it actually dominates society or merely seeks to do so. It looks upon the military as the most important and essential phase of the total social organization and regards all government as in the last analysis necessarily dependent upon military support and control," (p. 91).

In his famous work, *A History of Militarism* (Hollis & Carter, London 1959), Alfred Vagts distinguishes between the "military way" which he perceives as a specific concentration of military strength to achieve a clearly defined goal in an effective manner, limited in scope and time, and - on the other hand - "militarism" which he sees as customs, interests, prestige etc. associated with wars and military actions which transcend any true military purpose and permeates all corners of society for its own irrational purpose (p. 13).

The World Council of Churches in a recent Report of the Consultation on Militarism (Glion, Switzerland, November 1977) separates between militarization "as the process whereby military values, ideology and patterns of behaviour achieve a dominating influence on the political, social, economic and external affairs of the State" and militarism as "one of the more perturbing results of this process" (p. 3).

William Eckhardt in an article titled The Causes and Correlates of Western militarism maintains that "militarism as an attitude, then, is the readiness or willingness to engage in behaviours which have been authorized and institutionalized by a government for the purpose of using or threatening to use destructive weapons against the people and property of another nation, or even against the people (but seldom the property) of one's own nation, (paper presented at the Pugwash Symposium on Militarism and National Security, Oslo, November 1977, p. 2).

In his article, Militarism and Militarization in Contemporary International Relations, in Bulletin of Peace Proposals 1977:4, Marek Thee has the following broad collection of symptoms: "Under the term 'militarism' I subsume such symptoms as a rush to armaments, the growing role of the military (understood as the military establishment) in national and international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of prevalence and political power, and the increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs. Seen from this angle, militarism has indeed become a global phenomenon. I understand "militarization" as being the extension of military influence to civilian spheres, including economic and socio-political life." (p. 1)

Finally, it deserves mention that Malvern Lumsden has recently attempted to distinguish clearly between militarism and militarization. He defines militarism as "the military exploitation of 'mythology' in order to 'legitimize' the expropriation of surplus for illegitimate macro-parasitic purposes," (in: Militarism - Cultural Dimension of Militarisation, paper presented at the above-mentioned Pugwash Symposium. Thus, he links militarism to the superstructure and militarization to the socio-economic base.

Marek Thee is, at the moment, preparing a reader, Problems of Contemporary Militarism which will embrace a broad variety of aspects, dimensions and definitions of the militarism concept (forthcoming).

These conceptualization - no matter how different they otherwise are - closely resemble the liberal-oriented way in which the concept of imperialism was formerly treated, i.e. as something alien to capitalism as such but primarily serving as "reminiscences" or as "attitudes" or "ways of thinking" (the military mind etc.). They are, in this respect in sharp opposition to most Marxist-oriented conceptualizations which, on their side, are extremely limited in seeing militarism as pertaining to only one social formation.


29. Ibid., p. 47


31. B. Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power, op. cit., p. 23 (italics added)

32. Ibid., p. 35-36

33. Ibid., p. 36


37. On the consequences of this development, see especially D. Senghaas: Military Dynamics in the Context of Periphery Capitalism, and P. Lock/H. Wulf: Transfer of Military Technology and the Development Process, and Miles Woipin's: Military Dependency vs. Development in the Third World - all in Bulletin of Peace Proposals 1977:2, op. cit. Add to this the contrasting view of e.g. E. Benoit in His Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Massachusetts 1973. or Shahram Chubin 1976, Implications of the Military Build-Up in Non-Industrial States: The Case of Iran which states that "Iran's policy makers have sought to enhance its defense capabilities rapidly. This sense of urgency reflected in the country's development programme as a whole, has shaped the pattern and style of the defence build-up. Underlying it is His Majesty's belief that the nation needs to compress the usual development process, and advance rapidly by temporary heavy reliance on Western technology. The leadership's attempt to drag the country into the modern world rapidly is reflected in the arms build-up. This is based on the premise that the best means for acquainting Iranians with modern technology is by its systematic and massive infusion into the economy. The most efficient agency for transferring this technology and exposing large numbers of ordinary Iranians to it is the armed forces." (paper presented to the Pugwash Symposium on Problems of Military-Oriented Technologies in Developing Countries, Feldafing, the FRG November 22-26 1976, p. 37). The idea expressed could hardly cover our point more clearly.
38. For further details, please see Ignacio Sotelo, K. Esser, B. Moltmann 1975, Die bewaffneten Technokraten. Militär und Politik in Lateinamerika, Fackelträger - Verlag Smidt-Küster GmbH, Hannover

39. Ibid., p. 25

40. Malvern Lumsden, Militarism: Cultural Dimensions of Militarisation, op.cit., p. 5 (italics in the original)

41. K. Liebknecht, Militarism and Anti-Militarism, op.cit., p. 22; see also K. Lang 1972, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War, Sage Publications, London p. 87 ff for an account of the class perspective

42. We refer again to Steven Rosen, Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex as well as to Beiträge zur Militärökonomie by the Autorenkollektiv der Militärakademie "Friedrich Engels", Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratische Republik, Berlin 1976

43. K. Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War, op.cit., p. 66. See also p. 91.

44. K. Lang here quotes Janowitz, see p. 34 in Lang op.cit.


46. J. Woddis, op.cit., p. 81

47. Ibid., p. 82

48. Ibid., p. 87

49. See especially chapter 2 in B. Abrahamsson, op.cit.

50. B. Abrahamsson, op.cit., p. 72. The statistics, it should be noted, date back to the mid-60s, on which the patterns are based.

51. For further details, see Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil. Origins, Policies and Future, Yale University Press 1973

52. To quote Stepan on this point: "Instead of increasing functional specialization, the military began to train their officers to acquire expertise in internal security matters that were defined as embracing all aspects of social, economic and political life. Instead of the gap between the military and political spheres widening, the new professionalism led to a belief that there was a fundamental inter-relationship between the two spheres, with the military playing a key role in interpreting and dealing with domestic political problems owing to its greater technical and
professional skills in handling internal security issues. The scope of military concern for, and study of, politics became unrestricted, so that the "new professional" military man was highly politicized" (op.cit., p. 51).

53. Stepan notes "That the new professionalism of national security as developed at the BSG (the Superior War College) was very different in conception from that of the old professionalism, which in theory confines military activity to a more restricted sphere, is clear from an examination of the seven academic divisions of the college. These were (1) political affairs, (2) psychological-social affairs, (3) economic affairs, (4) military affairs, (5) logistical and mobilization affairs, (6) intelligence and counterintelligence, and (7) doctrine and coordination" (op.cit., p. 54).


55. For further details, see James D. Jordan, The Marxist vs. the Professional Vision of a People's Army, in Whitson (ed), op.cit., p. 25-47

56. J.D. Jordan, op.cit., p. 30

57. For more details, see John D. Simmonds, The New Gun- Barrel Elite, in Whitson (ed), op.cit. p. 93-115 in which it is stated - on the basis of an analysis undertaken in 1971 - that "the central core of the present leadership may not be the standing committee of the Politbureau as much as a small group elsewhere in the Politbureau. It suggests that this group is a quite cohesive one bound by a number of common backgrounds and experiences, not the least important of which is the role played by making possible or executing the Cultural Revolution. The particularly significant common denominator comprises three factors: fairly low formal educational level, Hupheh origin, and service in the Fourth Field Army" (p. 111).

58. See articles in the International Herald Tribune of December 4-5 and 10, 1976 and February 8, 1977

59. Lenin is here quoted from the Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft. Eine vergleichende Enzyklopädie, op.cit., p. 558

60. See the source mentioned in note 59, p. 560 ff


62. Ibid., 321
63. It should be mentioned that the situation pertaining to the Soviet Union does not necessarily apply to that of Eastern Europe. Dale Roy Herspring in his East German Civil-Military Relations, The Impact of Technology 1949-72, Praeger Publishers, New York and London 1973, shows how a balance between "redness" and "expertness" is attempted: "The results suggest it is possible to develop individuals closely approximating the military dual executive. Although they do not represent a perfect combination of "expertness" and "redness", East German officers do combine both these characteristics to a considerable degree" (chapter 8).


66. C. Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics, op. cit., p. 181. It is further elaborated by Reynolds in the following manner: "The confusion between the notion of national security as a capacity to defeat any opposition or threat to territorial integrity, and the pursuit of more limited political national objectives through the use of force, weakens the rationality of war as an instrument of foreign policy." (p. 182)

67. See J. Øberg's chapter, Towards a New International Military Order in the forthcoming F-16 study for many more details and references


69. K. Lang, op. cit., p. 47

70. See e.g. B. Abrahamsson op. cit., p. 81-129 for an account of the "military mind."

71. K. Lang, op. cit., p. 59


74. C. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 178-79. See also the UN study on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race...op.cit.

75. The reader should also be referred to Reynolds analysis of the territorial vulnerability built into strategic doctrines and the nuclear hostage function which the non-nuclear nations in Europe play, see. e.g. p. 184-86 - an aspect which has also been dealt with in detail by Alva Myrdal in The Game of Disarmament, Pantheon, 1976


77. The security crisis, of course, is related to a "crisis of legitimacy" which van Doorn recently has pointed out:
   "This term implies a comprehensive complex of developments such as the diminishing acceptance of military force, the increasing public criticism of the military, the popularity of compulsory military service, the decivilianization of the military and the concomitant loss of institutional identity. Though these phenomena are especially evident in Western countries, they are also found in the socialist world..." - where van Doorn defines legitimacy as "the capacity of a social or political order to develop and maintain a general belief that the existing social order and its main solutions are generally appropriate;"

78. See Bert Röling (SIPRI) 1976, The Law of War and Dubious Weapons:
   "Nor does the possession of nuclear weapons enable a country to protect its own citizens from the weapons of an enemy. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possess a far greater potential for destruction than any state has ever possessed before, but if total war broke out, there would be nothing to prevent them from reducing each other to rubble. The city walls of earlier times offered better protection to citizens than do today's defensive forces" (p. 17)

79. Much of the following conceptualization has been borrowed from the wider framework of the World Indicators Development.
80. G. Sharp, op.cit., p. 802

81. See Johan Galtung and Anders Wirak, Human Needs, Human Rights and the Theory of Development, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, Oslo University, World Indicators Program No. 10, p. 4

82. Here it should be noticed that territorial vulnerability is built into nuclear strategic thinking as pointed out by C. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 184:
"The nuclear stalemate itself arises out of a situation in which two or more states possess an invulnerable nuclear capacity and vulnerable territory."

83. The extreme secrecy has been experienced by the present author in his analysis of the Danish purchase of the F-16 fighter aircraft. The often asserted "openness" of Western democracies as compared to the "closedness" of the Eastern society is only part of the wider military mythology prevailing on the part of the former countries.

84. Christiania is an alternative society outside the centre of Copenhagen which was threatened by being closed down as it is part of the areas belonging to the Ministry of Defence (!). The "Christianites" made up a plan of defence involving sit-downs in the streets of Copenhagen, a telephone-chain mobilizing about 50,000 people and blocking of the main passages and communication sources so that police and military forces would have to be withdrawn from the Christiania. There is no doubt, that the free city has survived also because of a large sympathy among Danes towards this non-violent strategy itself. It is also of particular interest that high-ranking military experts have expressed their admiration of the plan.

85. For an example of the modern total defence strategy, see Säkerhetspolitik och Totalförsvaret (Statens Offentliga Utredningar), Stockholm 1976. Concerning the increasing social vulnerability the Ministry of Defence has issued the report Samhällets Säkerhet (Society's Vulnerability), Sekretariatet för säkerhetspolitik och långsiktspanering inom totalförsvaret, Stockholm 1976


87. A. Boserup and A. Mack, op.cit., p. 140-148
88. D. Senghaas 1977, Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungs-
politik, op.cit., p. 258-259

89. Liberally-oriented discussions of militarism usually do
not take the full step to challenge structures because they
do not consider militarism and armament dynamics as embedded
in capitalist formations. To marxist-oriented writers there
is, of course, little interest in 'utopian' thinking and
there it is taken for granted that with the disappearance
of capitalism and the emergence of a new social formation
the future will be freed from repression, armament and
militarism. Both these frameworks are - in the matters
discussed in this essay - highly dogmatic and closed.

90. G. Sharp, op.cit. p. 802-803 (italics added)

91. J. Galtung 1976, Peace: Research, Education and Action,
op.cit., p. 120-22

92. J. Galtung 1976, Peace, War and Defence, op.cit., p. 298-
302

93. See e.g. G. Boyle and P. Harper 1976, Radical Technology
Wildwood House, London; E. F. Schumacher 1973, Small is
Beautiful, Abacus, London; R. Pirsig 1974, Zen and the
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Corgi Books, London; A. Niss
Ekologi, Samfunn og Livsstil, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo;
Theodore Roszak 1972, Where the Wasteland Ends, Faber and
Fater, London a.o.

94. Concerning the positive relationship between smallness and
peacefulness, see e.g. Quincy Wright 1964, A Study of War
The University of Chicago Press, p. 57 and 168 and
Norman Alcock 1972, The War Disease, CPRI Press, Ontario

95. Concerning self-reliance, see e.g. The Dag Hammarskjöld
Foundation 1975, What Now, Another Development, Uppsala;
the mentioned NIBO study by D. Senghaas; J. Galtung,
Self-Reliance: Concept, Practice and Rationale, Paper no.
35 of the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, Oslo and
J. Galtung, The Politics of Self-Reliance, Paper no. 44
of the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research in which an
extremely broad outline of the ideology of self-reliance
is given:
"I can give my own formula of how I see my ideology, one
among numerous, of self-reliance. I see it as a combination
of some vision of human beings; of local organization,
particularly in its relation to the state; of the structure
of social interaction in general and economic produc-
tion/consumption in particular, and of international
relations. The ideology of my vision encompasses some
insights about inner man found in buddhist thinking in the East and existentialist thinking in the West; anarchist thinking on the significance of local autonomy; liberal thinking on freedom and outer man in general - man in society; marxist thinking on social structure; anti-imperialist theory and practice from recent years; all of it tied together in ways that would draw upon modern visions of federalism with strong emphasis on decision-making at the lowest possible level, and tempered with ecological considerations of respect for the environment, in solidarity with present and future generations."

96. T. Roszak, op.cit., p. 415