THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PEACE RESEARCH:
TASKS AND PROSPECTS

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1. The 8-Fold Path

Is peace research, or peace studies as it is now often referred to, in any way related to Buddhism, as the introductory heading of this paper might indicate as being the author's view? The 8-fold path of Buddhism is based on the right views, thought, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and concentration; all of them heavy words, of problematic interpretation. To many this has a ring of the metaphysical. To others it is highly practical, and to the present author it is surprisingly similar to peace research.

The point of departure is the "right view," in the broad sense, varying from rational understanding to total permeation. And this right view is then informing or imprinting thought, speech and action, yielding a rather classical three-fold division of what an actor can do and should do. From there it spreads into praxis, as livelihood, effort, mindfulness and concentration. In short, the concrete human being is a bridge between fundamental, deep insights and the actions he engenders, as well as the inner and outer structures in which he is embedded. Of course, like in most oriental thought, the focus is on inner life and the micro spaces around the individual, not on local, national and global politics that certainly has to be a major concern of peace researchers. But that is less important than the insistence, predominant in Buddhism, on the deep connection between struggle to develop deeper insight and struggle to do what is right, in any context.
What a distance between this insistence and what so often is found in the occident, and also in oriental practice for that matter! The "struggle for deeper insight", that is left to the institution of science, and its search for knowledge and know-how. The "struggle for the right action", that is seen as a question of values, of morality, of religion and ideology, of Church and Party, presumably informing us about the know-why. The bridge is unclear, lost in the midst of a tragic dichotomy said to exist between facts and values. It is considered perfectly normal to be high on facts and low on values, or vice versa. In the United States I might even offer the observation that there seems to be some kind of division between East coast and West coast intellectual milieus in this regard, the former high on knowledge and low on morality, the latter much lower on concrete knowledge, but also much higher on practical morality. That the exceptions are numerous on either coast, goes without saying. But the combination "high on knowledge, high on morality" is rare.

I have chosen this as a point of departure for another 8-fold path, possibly useful in discussing the coming twenty-five years in peace research. But the buddhist point of departure is too broad. I have to take as a point of departure the peace researcher as an intellectual; it is to that community the article primarily is addressed. And the question naturally arises: what do intellectuals in general do, and what do we think peace researchers qua intellectuals could usefully do in the coming twenty-five years?
In my experience intellectuals tend to do four things, all of them more or less well.

First, there is the exploration of the underlying paradigms, or intellectual frameworks, trying to understand better the underlying assumptions, making them explicit, criticizing them; making them irrelevant, or more relevant, but certainly not trying to deny their existence. Some of these assumptions take the form of values; some of these values may be closely related to the concrete interests of the researcher or the age, gender, race, class, nation, community from which he originates. One type of critical thinking in the scientific enterprise as a whole finds its focus in this paradigm exploration; but there are other kinds to be explored below.

Second, there is the effort to arrive at description, of empirical reality, through the collection of data, even data banks; in other words highly empirical activity.

Third, there is the effort to arrive at explanation, to weave more or less rich fabrics of verbal constructions providing the basis for understanding why the empirical reality is the way the descriptive activity leads one to believe. The what is seen in the light of the why.

Fourth, there is the commentary on how other intellectuals are carrying out paradigm exploration, description, explanation
and commentary. Just as well as one can explore paradigms underlying paradigm explorations, one may also comment on commentaries, construct theories about theory formation, and collect data about data collection. In other words, there is more than enough work for intellectuals to do, as testified by the sheer size of libraries today.

It will be noted that what has been said so far constitutes a relatively complete description of what intellectuals as we know them, or us, from universities and similar institutions, do. Depending on where the points of gravity are located in this quadrangle we can get different intellectual styles, more or less lop-sided. However, rather than exploring that theme let us turn to the incompleteness of this paradigm for understanding intellectuals, already implicit in the difference between the number 8 in the section heading and the number 4 we have arrived at so far.

If we return to the 8-fold path for buddhism for a moment it may be noted that what has been said so far is not only a verbal description of a purely verbal activity, but even of an activity that does not at any point equip human beings, or their environment, or the interaction between the two, with any kind of an arrow, in the sense of saying what is better and what is worse. Put very simply: the rather important word "right" in the buddhist 8-fold path is at no point implicit in this standard 4-point model of intellectual activity. "Rational understanding"
yes, "right views" no, or at best as a by-product. Hence, we have to continue the list, not so much of what the activity of intellectuals consists in as of what it might, or even should, consist in, in order to come closer to something bearing on the day-to-day reality of a peace researcher. The problem is how to weave values in general, and the broad family of values referred to as "peace" in particular, into the paradigm of intellectual activity, not as a detachable prologue or epilogue, but as an indelible part of the intellectual activity itself. The next four points are devoted to that effort.

Fifth, the effort to engage in criticism, viewing empirical reality with the optique provided by (peace) values, exploring the connections between data and values.

Sixth, constructivism, in the sense of exploring the connections between values and theories, constructing a future (as opposed to merely criticizing the present) seen as "right," not only because the right values are embedded in the verbal construction, but also because that future is seen as viable, even as attainable ("transition strategies") in the light of theory.

Seventh, peace education, the effort to broaden both the range and the depth of those who have the "right views," the insight about peace, in a peaceful manner.

Eighth, peace action, the basic translation from all of this into concrete, peace-promoting praxis.
I propose to discuss activities of peace researchers under these eight headings—no doubt others can come up with equally good or better schemes. In a sense the first six points refer to peace research as it has developed, and then there is peace education and peace action; a division into three parts that also has become relatively commonplace.

But if one compares this 8-fold path with the buddhist one the correspondence is, of course, somewhat less clear. The rightness in what is "right" certainly refers to peace, a concept that may be said to harbor within itself some deep inter-connection to enlightenment (sartori) and nirvana, in the buddhist sense. Stretching the concept a little one could perhaps say that the first two on the buddhist list, view and thought, correspond to the first six on the present list for peace research as intellectuals. The view is the paradigm, the thought the others. Then, there is a relation between "right speech" and "peace education," just as there is a relation between "right action" and "peace action." But even so the remaining four on the buddhist list are missing, or at least not made explicit, with their increasing subtlety as to what peace praxis might imply. I just mention this: it may be good to feel that there is a far distance to go in order to catch up with insights developed 2,500 years ago in a very distant place.

Let me then only add that in buddhist thought any list of eight elements, or of any number of elements for that matter, is
usually not seen as a linear progression, but as a wheel. In other words, one may start at any point, proceed to any point and keep the process moving as the point of gravity changes from one point to the other, but in no particular order. This is important because it sensitizes us to the rather obvious idea that there are many roads, not only to but in peace, and also not only to but in peace research. Some people might like starting exploring the foundations of peace research, sometimes going deeper and deeper into the matter until they disappear and are never heard from since. Others might start with peace action, guided by some intuitions that they then might like to explore further. Still others, to me often surprisingly so, feel they can jump right into peace education not really knowing what to teach, but certainly doing so with much energy and perseverance. But what then happens is that they start exploring other corners in this octagonal wheel, until after some time they have spun a rather rich web of interconnections that makes their paradigms much more significant.

I feel one should enter this with an open mind, with no a priori conviction as to where any such process starts or ends. A brownian movement might be better both as a descriptive and a normative model than any linear order. Also, any trajectory obviously crosses itself, even overlaps with itself, many times. And that is perhaps the most important insight that can be derived from this introductory comparative study of 8-fold paths.
2. Peace Research: An Agenda for the Coming Twenty-Five Years

Let us now make use of these eight points fully, and try to see for each point what might be particularly useful pursuits for a period bringing us into the twenty-first century, conscious of the fact that that also means the third millennium of the era initiated by a person sometimes referred to as the Prince of Peace.

2.1. Paradigm Exploration

The way I see peace research—as an effort to explore the conditions of peace in a holistic (meaning more than transdisciplinary, and much more than interdisciplinary) and global (meaning more than transnational, and much more than international) manner—there are three relatively clear but also unending tasks.

I think we shall never come to anything like a final conclusion as to what "peace" might mean. Nor do I think we should ever hope for that to happen: the moment we arrived at a consensus within, and even without the peace research community, as to the meaning of "peace" the basis is already laid for the ossification of peace research and practice, and the creation of one more technocratic production line, presumably producing peace.

Rather, I think it is our task to continue to draw on the richness of that concept in the geography and history of civilization and culture, exploring more and more facets of that diamond.
manifested in the past, some of them still on the agenda of the present, but also dedicate ourselves to the exploration of the possible future manifestations of peace. Maybe the future is in the past; maybe the future consists in bringing together components of a richer peace concept that history has kept apart due to particular characteristics of particular civilizations. It looks as if each civilization has a peace concept compatible with its unwritten code, which then might make us explore the possibility of a joint human code, that famous "global civilization" so many people are talking about, for its implications in terms of peace concepts and a global consciousness.

I think it is rather obvious that any such concept can only be explored in a relatively holistic and global manner. These are problematic words, indeed—but they strike at the very roots of the epistemology of peace research. I see them as programmatic, not only as problematic. It is easily seen what they exclude: a narrow disciplinary perspective and a narrow national (or regional) perspective, as when some people try to make us believe that the problem of peace is merely a problem of military (nuclear) balance between two occidental powers, East and West. But it is more difficult to see what these concepts imply positively. I can see some link between holism and such ancient disciplines as philosophy and theology, and some links between globalism and a compassion for humankind as a whole. Both point in the direction of some type of spiritualism that certainly is not on the surface of any typical western social science discipline, and probably not
to be found deeper down either. On the other hand, I am also afraid that the invocation of such terms as "holism" and "globalism" shall serve as an invitation for everybody to utter his bla-bla with no concern for such tested and important canons of scientific activity as falsifiability of hypotheses, and/or possible confirmation through praxis.

However, perhaps this is a fruitful contradiction to live with: on the one hand the spiritual quest for peace, considerably more rooted in all human civilizations than what is found on the other hand, the research/scientific approach of our age. What is suggested is simply to see this as another fascinating domain to be explored by peace researchers who usually consider themselves more scientific than spiritual, and by people who think they have the opposite profile. By taking on the challenge to explore the conditions of peace researchers in the field are already in the thick of values that they should continue to try to make explicit. But we could also try to make them deeper, in the sense of re-linking (religio) with much older traditions in this field. The road to this is paved with holistic and global approaches.

One point, however, should be taken very seriously. For a person who has been well trained in one discipline it may be very painful to take on the perspectives of other disciplines, gradually evolving a trans-disciplinary, even holistic perspective. But it is also highly liberating--the caterpillar-turned-butterfly type of liberation--to have more dimensions at one's disposal.
in viewing the world. However, the delights of holism are only available to those who have suffered the distortions of excessive disciplinary discipline (this is not a pun, the double meaning of the term "discipline" is certainly not by chance). And exactly the same applies to the transition from a more or less narrow nation-state perspective on the world to a global perspective where one tries what is done in Picasso's cubism, to view the world from many angles at the same time: a great sense of liberation not easily communicated to those with a more narrow vision.

However, there is a dialectic at work here between the narrow and the broad, and then back to the narrow again because of a need to specialize in something, but now from a higher point of departure. From a degree in economics via exposure to and immersion in peace research, to a socio-cultural study of the (dis)-economies of the arms race? But the basic problem remains: can the same feeling of delight/liberation be obtained if peace research starts from the dizzying heights of holism and globalism, or is it thearduous struggle to arrive at those altitudes through personal effort, rather than being parachuted from above, from helicopters built by others? What attracted so many bright students to peace research in the 1960s was, in my view, less peace than holism-globalism. Today this is more commonplace, as witnessed by development-environment-future-women studies. What I propose is that this dialectic itself is seen as a field of study.
2.2 Data

As a point of departure I am not so sure that we are desperately in need of much more in terms of data. I have a feeling that the problem is more a question of digesting, understanding what we have than to give top priority to data production. We know an enormous amount about the inequality in power and privilege. Due to J. David Singer's and his collaborators' painstaking and path-breaking research on correlates of war, I think we know by now that arms races, when combined with confrontations, tend to lead to wars, and that wars occur more frequently to members of alliances than to nonmembers. I think we also know a lot, for instance due to the very important documentation provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) about the arms race.

At some point it is a good idea to say, this much we know, let us put the data in perspective. There is a particular reason for this view: it is at least not my experience that data in and by themselves produce any major social change, although some revealing data may precipitate change. I do not even think that data change theories however much this is supposed to be the case from the point of view of normative scientific methodology. I think theories more than data change society and other theories, and that calls for constructivism relating values to theories; not only for empiricism relating data to theory, and for criticism relating data to values. Data are indispensable. Seen through values they provide the second basis for critical thinking: society does not work, a theory does not work if they are contradicted by
data. But that is at most necessary, certainly not sufficient for social or theoretical change. Rather, it is at least my experience that power elites are only moved by data, however critical their implications, the moment two conditions are fulfilled: they think there is a solution to the problem posed, and they think that solution will not seriously challenge social paradigms investing them with power and privilege. The same goes for theories or intellectual paradigms: critical data are only acknowledged when an essentially theory-preserving solution has been found. But minimum theory change is still change and may also be undertaken for other reasons (e.g. compatibility with deeper values and beliefs than data). Break-throughs, with break-downs of old social and/or intellectual paradigms are rare. 

On the other hand, data collection should of course be continued. And I am not even sure that it should always be guided by theory and value. It is like perusing the shelves of a good library: when you know what you are looking for you may find exactly that but nothing more; when you do not know you might find the unexpected, the unknown that might release something in you so far unborn. So, all I am saying is that I am not sure that data collection is the top priority for the coming peace research generation; the preceding and succeeding points on this list are more important, for instance.
2.3 Theory

I am convinced that theory formation is a top priority. My personal bias in this field is to see the manifestations of anti-peace, direct and structural violence, not so much in the light of concrete political events, nor in the light of general theories of "human nature" in general and social biology in particular, but in the light of those two middle level factors between the most general and the most specific: structure and culture. Much has been done to relate the phenomenon of war to the structure of capitalism; we now also know a lot about non-peaceful behavior between socialist states. We might turn the attention to industrialism as such, and that is useful in order to understand environmental degradation. But it may very well be that the structure we should now focus on would be the state as such, and that the military should be seen as its inevitable concomitant for internal and external purposes. I think the approach taken by Krippendorff in this direction is extremely important.

This also leads to a new type of international relations theory, viewing world politics as something much broader than inter-state politics. States will probably still for some time continue thinking of themselves not only as having ultimate power, power over power in the territory over which they have "jurisdiction," but also as having monopoly over basic aspects of foreign policy. They will try to link domestic and foreign
policy through the nebulous concept of national interests usually left for self-appointed elites to define, even in such a way that national interests have a global reach. Evidently some states and some military organizations are more anti-peace than others: I would prefer states with a defensive rather than offensive military doctrine, and a military organization that has clearly understood and implemented this to those with the opposite profile. But it may also well be that future explorations will increasingly pose the question whether there is something flawed in the very conceptualization of the state as an organization found within all countries, and that it simply has to come up for serious review because of intrinsic links between the state and the military as organizations.

If some states are more anti-peace than others the same certainly applies to cultures: some are more anti-peace than others. Maybe one reason why we have tended to stay away from comparative culture and civilization theory in the field of peace research has been the doctrine of cultural relativism, meaning that all cultures are equally much to be respected. I think this doctrine was important to give dignity to cultures and civilizations (I use the latter term in the sense of macro-culture, the culture of big and related chunks of social geography and history) even when they are all ranked according to how similar they are the northwestern corner of the world. This was, and is still, ethnocentrism, pure and simple and itself an important aspect of the civilization of that corner. But I do not think cultural rela-
tivism should stand in the way of permitting us to rank cultures in terms of their peace potentials. Nor should it stand in the way of regarding cultures as changeable, even if we do not know today how a civilization can uproot and discard unfortunate elements in its civilizational code and substitute for those elements something more compatible with our common desire to continue staying alive on this planet.

We are also badly in need of general conflict theory and general peace theory; with general conflict resolution theory as a part of the former, and general theory of how wars end as a part of the latter. Needless to say the four are closely related, and should present the social scientist with extremely difficult and fascinating problems. I do not think we are helped very much in this endeavor by contemporary efforts to delineate "schools" in the field of international relations studies, such as structuralism and functionalism; the realist school (balance of power?); and the idealist school (world order?); actor-oriented (liberal) and structure-oriented (marxist, neo-marxist, dependencia) schools, and so on. I think we should be guided by the problem, not by allegiance to any school, and pick what we need wherever we can find it. There is such a thing today as peace research/peace studies, but within that field let hundreds of schools bloom! One day we may transcend all those schools; maybe we already have; in that case the transcendence of that transcendence should already be on the agenda. There is no final state of affairs in the human enterprise in general, nor in world politics, nor in peace, and certainly not in peace research.
2.4. Commentary

The first efforts to write histories of peace research, from within the peace research community, from without, are already visible. It is certainly useful, particularly if it serves to pinpoint limitations in peace research paradigms by studying their origins, and if it serves to point out how the effort could be improved. As a chronicle of events I would tend to put it in the category of data collection and give it, in the present phase, somewhat lower priority. Maybe it should also be noted—in passing—how easy it is to engage in this kind of activity: all that is needed is a good library and a visit to some peace research conferences in order to get a direct touch of that type of reality; meaning peace researchers, singly and combined. At no point does one have to touch the problems of peace. There is even the danger that there might be people who think that studying peace research is the same as studying peace—just as there certainly are many people of the opinion that to study books about world politics is the same as to study world politics.

2.5. Criticism

I see this as a very important activity: the documentation of what happens in the world, in the perspective of peace values. In doing so we are helped by an important concept bridging data and values: the type of value-dimension known as "indicator." The concept of "indicator" has to some extent come into disrepute
because of the way it has been abused by the establishment, focussing on aggregate indicators for the country as a whole (such as the gross national product), at the expense of focussing on internal differences and the external impact, sometimes negative, sometimes positive, of the country on its surroundings in world space and nature space, on the total system in which it is embedded. In order to do this peace values are to be made even more explicit and to some extent operationalized, and at this point it would be excellent if such indicators could be not only of or about people (as opposed to such abstractions as states and countries), but also be developed by people, and be for people in the sense that people can understand them and use them. It is easily seen that this presupposes a world system that is less of an inter-state system, and more of a, say, inter-person system, inter-municipality system, inter-people's organization system—avoiding the negative expression "nongovernmental organization" as only one more way in which governments try to make themselves important by defining people as "nongovernments" (one might try referring to governments as "nonpeople organization" in order to feel more clearly how unfortunate this negative terminology actually is).

I think this type of critical research should also be used for prognosis, for the type of political meteorology that is so needed. And here, of course, peace researchers should not be second to geo-physical meteorology, not by that suggesting that ours should be geo-political, a term destroyed for a long time. But it should be macro-political, global. The formulation "what does that
mean to us" is perfectly acceptable, as long as "us" stands for humankind and our natural environment, and not for any limited version (such as, for instance, US). In doing this we would have to be guided not only by theory, but also by some of those analytical tools that may make more global and holistic prognosis possible; I am thinking particularly of dynamic matrix and graph analysis, with the hope that something much better might also soon be available.

2.6. Constructivism

However, it is in this particular area of visioning I think the point of gravity of a research activity should be in the coming twenty-five years. More particularly, I think it is our task to go much beyond the current concern with alternative security policies, based on such ideas as defensive rather than offensive defense and deterrence, on transarmament rather than disarmament and the possible integration of conventional military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary defense, however important that may be.

To put it bluntly: I think nothing less than the abolition of war as a social institution should be our goal; and for that images of a peaceful world is not only a conceptual tool, but in and by themselves a strategy of major significance. Once in the not too distant past some people had abolition of poverty as their goal, and they had images of a welfare state. In some parts of the world this goal has to a large extent been attained, and well
maintained. In still some other parts the goal was attained and the welfare state is now to some extent being dismantled, in still other parts of the world it remains as a compelling image of the future. We could think in terms of the peacefare state if it had not been for the circumstance (see 2.3 above) that this may be a contradictio in adjecto. If a slogan is needed, maybe; but one should rather settle for "from welfare to peacefare." Humankind designs new agendas for itself all the time; it is the task of peace researchers to contribute not only to the exploration of the points on the agenda, but to the agenda itself.

Abolition of war as an institution is by no means more a priori impossible than abolition of slavery as an institution, and abolition of colonialism as an institution. For all three of them the defenders of the institution have always invoked the idea that slavery/colonialism/war is intrinsic to "human nature," never really contemplating whether it is equally intrinsic to the persons bought and sold (the slaves), the peoples possessed and sometimes dispossessed (the colonies), or the countless victims of war. That there is a potential in human nature for horrid institutions we know extremely well; that that potential is acted out more under some structural and cultural conditions than under others we also know (although we may discuss which ones).

Given certain structural and cultural conditions it is also true that "if we stop doing it (having slaves, having colonies,
waging wars) somebody else will do it--and why should they get the benefits rather than we/me, when nothing changes anyhow?" But then it is also true, under some conditions, that "if we/I stop doing it; somebody else might follow." Moreover, it is true that some types of colonialism served as substitutes for the waning institution of slavery (it was more profitable to exploit black labor in situ, on the plantation in Africa, than to transport them across the ocean with all that implied) and that in the wake of colonialism came neocolonialism, possibly less political/military but equally or more cultural/economic in its exploitation profile. And that, of course, raises the terribly important question that any researcher with a minimum sense for dialectics will pose from the very beginning: if we should succeed in abolishing war as an institution, what would come in its place? What would be the successor state of affairs, and how can we anticipate, in order to prevent that something equally bad or worse should be a part of the antithesis to war?

I do not think this can be done without due consideration of two classical fields of inquiry: what would be the institutions of peacefare in a world where war is eliminated as an institution; and what would be the minimum meta-physical/spiritual requirement in a global consciousness? Many people do have and should have ideas about this; it is obvious to all that we are in need of as many good ideas as possible, trying to focus on the twin problems of abolition of war and a peacefare world.
2.7. Peace Education

Something new has happened relatively recently in this field due to the resolutions from UNESCO and the First Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978: governments are encouraged to engage in peace education/disarmament education. I think there are good reasons to believe that this is a major cause of United States withdrawal from UNESCO since almost any curriculum, even any statement about peace and disarmament education at least can be interpreted as having a certain edge against a country with the biggest war machine in human history. That edge is also directed against the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union has followed a wiser course, in a sense pretending that they do not feel the cut of the edge and for that reason feel comfortable in organizations launching such efforts to educate human-kind (watching closely the exact wording, however).

This does not mean that these efforts are unproblematic. In a dictatorship it is simple. The leadership knows exactly what messages they would like the population to believe in, and the task of education is to serve as a conveyor belt, filling people with those messages. In a democracy matters are more complicated. We would of course, as peace researchers, insist on being heard in these matters, but equally much insist that we are not the only ones to be heard, mindful of the multiplicity of views in this difficult problèmematique of peace.
A course of action that I have found useful would be to call for a broadly based committee of people who can design a textbook for schools of all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary) on the problems of peace and war, containing the type of information that everybody finds useful and relatively noncontroversial. This would contain material about wars in this century (when and where, who were the participants, causes, dynamics, consequences); the nature of governments in various parts of the world; the nature of disarmament conferences and treaties, and so on. And for that which is considered controversial we are in the fortunate position that we know what to do in a democracy: we put the issues to the people and let them discuss, meaning concretely that the task of the teacher would be to bring material to his class, distribute it to the pupils and then discuss it without the teacher feeling that the discussion has to end with the views of the pupils being more similar to his own. Peace education, in short, is a question of practicing democracy in the most consequential—to democracies, to all of us—area: peace and war.

But then there is another aspect of peace education that in a sense is more difficult, and also more fascinating than the design of curricula at all possible levels, and for all possible groups. I am thinking of the forms of presentation of insights, of the buddhist "right views." More particularly, I do not think oral and written presentations in the forms of lectures and articles/books, possibly with some pictures and tables and graphs, should be seen as exhausting the possibilities at our disposal. The
theatre is an extremely powerful form of presentation, and has not at all been used by social scientists in general, and peace researchers in particular, the way it should. The theatre is so powerful because of the live interaction between human beings, possibly also involving the spectators—and above all because it permits synchronic and diachronic presentations of phenomena, at the same time. What a way of portraying the key problems of our age!—the workings of direct and structural violence in space and time, the groups that try to fight against the machineries of war and exploitation, the power of the forces of violence and the apparent powerlessness of the forces against. All of these are, I think, dramas in search of authors. But I must confess that when authors feel called upon to delve into these difficult matters it often comes out as very bad social science in general and peace research in particular; and I am equally convinced that if we should try to write drama it might become good social science, but miserable theatre. There must be ways of overcoming this dilemma, and I think we should push forward in that direction, under the heading of education. New forms of presentation might also give a fresh impetus to the whole research enterprise.

2.8. Peace Action

Peace action; that is a question of the choice of appropriate strategies for a more peaceful world. In this field something new has also happened: peace researchers have gotten a relatively clear role as experts/consultants of the peace movement.
It is not by chance that these two phenomena, the peace movement and the peace research movement, now coincide in time: they are created by the urgency of avoiding an impending holocaust. And yet relations are not unproblematic. There are peace researchers who feel much above the peace movement, seeing the peace movement as essentially stupid and misguided in their insistence, usually expressed in slogans, on simple factors. And there are peace researchers who take the opposite stance, of being the servants of the peace movement, letting the leadership state the course of action, leaving to the peace researcher to elaborate the rationale. In short, the old attitudes of the ivory tower intellectual on the one hand who does not want to get his hands dirty; and the willing servant, in this case working for a peace movement who does not even pay him, but in other regards is similar to the intellectual at the disposal of the establishment.

I think the task of a peace researcher is to steer clear of these two aberrations. In a democracy we should always have deep respect for popular movements, even if we do not like what they stand for. If we feel they are by and large in the right direction our task is to help and guide, and that is not done by being aloof or subservient. The dialogue model is much better, all the time keeping in mind that there are certain things peace researchers have had the privilege of studying in more detail than members of a popular movement can possibly have done. What they can do for the researchers, however, may be to point out that he has been studying in the wrong direction and not yet come up with useful
conclusions—a challenge that should make the peace researcher very grateful, because it means he has been taken seriously, as opposed to establishment attitudes characterized by disdain, fear (or both) for peace researchers.

But there are also other possibilities as role models for the peace researcher. I am thinking of Amnesty International doing an excellent job in the field of human rights, for instance for the abolition of torture. Why should there not be a War Abolition International, to some extent staffed with peace researchers, watching all governmental and popular committees and organizations to see to it that the right items are on the agenda, pursued with an energy proportionate to the urgency? In fact, many such organizations are needed such as Environment International, and the better they cooperate the more of a pressure towards a peacefare world might be created.

And the same applies to the other side of the peace research coin, structural violence, or its sister science, development studies. We also need a Development International; what we have is too scattered, too fragmented. The codification of human rights has served to crystallize our efforts in that direction; similar codifications for abolition of war and abolition of worldwide misery might be a flop—provided we are willing to see all such codes as a rolling agenda.
3. Conclusion

There is enough to do. I have chosen the parable of buddhist thought deliberately: an unending agenda. I do not believe in occidental sectarianism. I do not think there is a god somewhere, watching our painful endeavors, deciding to exterminate us (Revelations) or to save us from the scourge of war; not because we deserve it, but out of his grace. Peace, if attained, is through intense human effort. And peace research has an important role to play in that effort.

To summarize: peace research should press much deeper into the basics of peace, of holism and globalism, perhaps even in the search of a new spiritualism. Somewhat lower priority should be given to data collection than to making sense of the data we already have. But the search for better theory should go on unabated, particularly with a view to theorize on world politics of peace and war; not merely occidental, big power versions. The focus should be on conflict resolution and how wars end - that is where our knowledge deficit is most obvious. But commentary on the work of other intellectuals in general and peace researchers in particular could have lower priority. The thrust should rather be in the direction of critical predictions and positive constructions, and on peace education and peace action guided by these explorations.

But that still leaves us with the last four items on the buddhist 8-fold path: livelihood, effort, mindfulness and concentration. These points touch inner man, usually not the concern of
scientific epistemology in general and methodology in particular.

A researcher is judged on the basis of scientific production regardless of how the producer looks on the inside. There is a universalism to the scientific community, open to everybody who produces according to the rules. Maybe it should stay like that. Research, like a universal church, makes a great contribution to the never-ending task of weaving humankind together simply by being open and universal - a place where you can meet your antagonist along value and/or interest lines.

But there is something else that can be and should be done. [62]

In a very important paper Glenn D. Paige challenges not only the type of research that ends up legitimizing state-supported violence, but even his own book that in his own agonizing reappraisal had done exactly that, The Korean Decision. Paige rejects his own book, and with it a complete tradition in political science. Says Paige:

"In an age of unprecedented potential for violence, the supreme task of political science becomes the creation and application of non-violent knowledge."

I agree, certainly - hence peace research, hence my own involvement in it.

However, we could also try to go one step further: the hippocratic oath for peace researchers, corresponding the age-old, well tested oath for physicians. Merely trying to draft such a code would be more than a difficult and fascinating task: it might start dialogical processes that in themselves could be not only revealing and educative, but also peace-building. And: make the two 8-fold paths come somewhat closer to each other.