THE PEACE MOVEMENT;
A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL EXPLORATION

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1. On the socio-historical background of the peace movement

When the modern state emerged out of the feudal background in Europe the government, in the European sense of the cabinet, took over some of the functions that until then had been prerogatives of the Prince, the King, the Emperor. In parliamentary democracies that cabinet was responsible to the parliament and parliament to the people; in presidential democracies the president was the successor to the prince and responsible to the parliament and/or to the people. In the party states of single party countries the chairman or secretary general of the party was more or less responsible to a more or less limited assembly, but some principle of responsibility there was and is. The general idea of carrying the mantle of the feudal prince was more or less the same, however, limiting the accountability in one important field.

The feudal prince in Europe came out of a military caste, the aristocracy. He was not a cleric; he was not a merchant. The power he wielded was military rather than cultural or economic; the power of coercion/destruction rather than the power of ideas or the power of exchange/construction. In other words; one might certainly debate to what extent the prince should have the final say in religious/ideological matters, or in economic matters; but one could not debate whether the prince should have the final say in military matters. This was his territory, his turf, the very basis of his power. Hence the theory emerged, naturally, of the modern state as an organization that might give freedom to
the individuals in cultural and economic affairs, but not in
military matters. The physical means of exercising power, the cannon,
gun to put it concretely, was the _ultimo ratio regis_, the final
argument of the king. And it became the final argument of the
government, the president, the general secretary. The word
"argument" is interesting here. What is said is exactly that there
is a language beyond and behind the language of verbal reasoning,
whether in the form of decree or in the form of dialogue:
coercion, in its crude and simple form. Of course, the analyst
might say that there is a language even behind that level of
coercion: culture in the deepest sense as the code defining
when coercion can be legitimately applied and when not, thereby
drawing the fine line between the king and the tyrant, a
distinction inherited by the king's successors. But, however that may be
there is something final in the argument coming out of a gun.

In western history movements fighting against any monopoly held
by the top in the fields of cultural and economic power have been
numerous. The long tradition of struggle for religious freedom,
freedom to speak one's own language and the freedom to express almost
anything one wants in that language bears clear testimony to the
significance of the former; the long struggle of the emerging
merchant class or bourgeois class in general for the freedom to
make use of their property to make more property in one way or
the other to the second. There is also a very important coupling
between these two known as the French Revolution: the bourgeois
class ascends in society, gains power and makes itself felt in two
directions: economically as free entrepreneurs unimpeded by the
king and his successors, and culturally as the carriers of new
ideas in religion, ideology and culture in general.

Droits de l'homme et du citoyen, of people and citizens in
particular, is an expression of this coupling between economic
freedom and cultural freedom. What is not mentioned in the human rights
declaration is any freedom of the citizens to, for instance, re-
fuse military service or to deny power to a government that wages
war, leaving alone an aggressive war. To the contrary, we may
even argue that what entered European history almost at the
same time as the Declaration of Human Rights, general conscription
into military service for able bodied males, was the quid pro quo part
of the new social contract. More freedom was given in the fields
of culture and economy, but at the expense of less freedom
relative to military power. A passing
observation: the human duties in connection with
conscription into military service, and also taxation, were levied
on men, not on women as women were not
given rights as independent entrepreneurs, being sub-
servient to their husbands, nor supposed to make use of their
freedom of expression. All of that was to come between one and
two centuries later, as a part of the struggle of the feminist movement.

As cultural freedom and economic freedom proliferated there
were, of course, reactions. There were efforts by the state in
several countries to regain cultural and economic control, or at
least not to give in further to the demands of the middle classes.
And there were efforts lower down, in the proletariat, to defend the population against ideas they did not want to know; an authoritarianism from below that could be used by those on the top to bolster their autocratic tendencies. And, there was a defense movement in the proletariat against the heavy impact of entrepreneurial dynamism in the shape of capitalism, known as the labor movement with its trade unions, social-democratic or socialist or communist parties, and so on. In other words, the reactions against the triumph of the blue, the forces released by the French Revolution, could be brown, or they could be pink/red. Or both.

Interestingly military power monopoly went unnoticed, *grosso modo*. The focus was on *political* power, or the power to decide over the use and abuse of the other three power types. Political monopoly was challenged; the basis for the exercise of that power was gradually expanded through a system of concentric circles, including more and more people in the electorate of the democracies. The process was and is slow, and hardly ever went without struggle. But even so the tendency to see military power as relatively sacrosanct in the sense of not being seriously questioned or debated remained. It was assumed that in the higher powers of the state, somewhere in the deeper recesses of that organization, even in the concrete buildings referred to as ministries and so on, some unchallengeable wisdom was located. For the personal interest of the prince was substituted not the personal interest of the successors but the "national interests", presumably encompassing leaders and led alike. It stuck; we are still living under the spell cast by that mystique.
However, the key factor here more than mystique, the awe with which exercise of violence by those higher up is surrounded, seen as ultimately receiving their mandate from the Almighty, was the new social contract. Exercise of coercive power was legitimate as a way of protecting the newly gained freedoms in the fields of cultural and economic power, perhaps even of extending them to new groups. The notion of "security" is located somewhere here: the means are military, but the ends are cultural, political and economic, preserving the gains made. Having said this, the mystique taken over from earlier periods would tend to legitimize further the exercise of ultimate, military power, within and between states, thereby definitely adding elite prerogatives to the social contract, giving them an aura of something sacred.

The reader will have understood at this point that I see the peace movement in this context. The peace movement is to military power what the other movements mentioned above were and still are to cultural and economic and political power. The essential task of the peace movement in a historical perspective is to challenge monopoly control over means of coercion in general and military power in particular, by the government, in the modern state. Since this should also be the task of the major institutions of political power in a democracy the peace movement at the same time constitutes a challenge to democracy, more or less saying that its institutions, such as parliament and cabinet ministers responsible to parliament, accountable and accounted for, have failed in
exercising this important function. Something else is needed, because--so the peace movement--military monopoly power is being abused as cultural monopoly power before it, and economic and political monopoly power, whether in the hands of public or private sectors or both.

Thus, the basic argument of the peace movement in the broad sense is that the state abuses military power. The peace movement is an expression of fundamental distrust in the functionaries of the state in this sector, be they military or civilian --a distrust that carries over to the many experts used by them in the study of security matters and foreign affairs, and to the politicians inside and outside parliament concerned with such matters. The distrust is exactly of the same nature as the types of distrust mentioned above for earlier periods in standard western history: not only that these people are self-centered and concerned with elite security and ambitions and interests rather than the security of people and consequently have set themselves the wrong goals, but also that they do not know what they do, and are essentially acting in routine manners, without any clear goal at all. Political, intellectual and moral bankruptcy, in short.

This challenge comes from many circles, and must be particularly strongly felt in Eastern Europe where the emergence from feudal structures is more recent and the obsession with the construction of the modern state still in its early stages. The power given to the modern state under that post-feudal formation currently referred to as "socialism" in Eastern Europe, probably a prelude to Eastern European capitalism rather than its successor stage as declared by marxist theory, must make believers in that
strong state particularly bitter at the Eastern European peace movement. It is difficult enough to defend state absolutism against those who would prefer the operation of stronger market forces -- not to mention against those who are arguing in favor of the production, distribution and consumption in a far less controlled and more decentralized manner not only of goods and services, but also of decisions and the underlying information and ideas--and then, on top of all of this, that primary bastion of state power, the military monopoly is also challenged!

In this perspective the peace movement becomes a natural part of European social history, and since European social history, through the power grip Europe has held over the rest of the world, has taken on a world model function one would assume that some of this should also apply to other parts of the world. That will be explored in the subsequent section. Let us here only devote some remarks to the rather important problem of how the peace movement conceives of the alternative to state monopoly on military power.

First, it should be noted that the struggle is not necessarily only against state monopoly on military power but on coercive power in general. Many of those who challenge the military sector would also challenge capital punishment, and even other types of punishment such as imprisonment, being in favor of other methods of social control and social reform, such as the duty of the law-breaker to compensate, undoing completely the bad effects of his crime. And those who defend the military tend to defend the strong, punitive state in general. However, for our purpose let us leave that aspect of the peace movement in the most general sense aside.
Second, the peace movement could be seen as an even broader movement, against any power concentration of any kind, following in the wake—as we have hypothesized here—of movements for cultural, economic and political freedom. One ultimate conclusion would be anarchism, the dissolution of the modern state in favor of many and diverse human communities all over the globe, each of them pursuing their cultural and economic goals in the spirit of political decentralization, nonviolently, for instance in the manner described and foreseen by Gandhi. However, let us also leave this broader perspective on the peace movement aside since what has now been mentioned is a description of the green movement, of which the peace movement may be said to be a part, rather than of the peace movement in a more limited sense. Thus, liberals may not have fully understood how much the green movement agrees with them that cultural, economic and political power should be decentralized and be in the hands of people themselves. But the green movement directs this demand not only against excessive public control, but also against excessive private power concentration, for instance in the fields of mass media and production of goods and services important for basic human needs in general—and includes the challenge of coercive power monopoly.

Third, there is, of course, one approach to governmental monopoly on the means of violence that could be imagined: distribution of the means of violence to the citizens, as argued by conservative circles in the US such as the associations
favoring as many rifles and handguns well dispersed in society as possible. From a purely logical point of view this idea is entirely consistent with distribution of cultural, economic and political power. However, there is a limit to logical consistency when the consequences seem to be disastrous in terms not only of homicide, but also suicide. And that is linked to a basic asymmetry between cultural and economic power on the one hand and military power on the other: a higher level of cultural production that might follow in the wake of distribution of cultural power and a higher level of economic production that seems to follow in the wake of the distribution of economic power, would in principle be constructive. But higher levels of military "production", when military power starts flowing and is not only kept in stock, is in principle destructive. Saying this does not imply any neglect of the negative consequences of excessive economic production, for instance, on the environment, on social structure and on human growth. And something similar may also be said about excessive cultural production and excessive decision-making. Nor any denial of the significance of military "production" in some cases for the sake of security, internal or external. It is only put as a general rule for observation, and makes military power difficult to compare except in the formalistic sense done so far, with the other basic forms.

With these three alternatives declared out of order for the present article, the peace movement stands not only for a challenge of the governmental monopoly, but also for
a general reduction of the means of violence. In its most radical expression this reduction takes the form of disarmamentism, a general orientation in favor of reducing, down to zero, all means of destruction, hardware and software, in other words an abolition of the military sector as we know it. The general philosophy behind this stance is simple, bordering on the simplistic: there is no way in which these instruments of power can be used legitimately anyhow; any use will tend to be or become abused. And there is no way in which wars can be fought without arms.

Then there is a second position which is, in the view of the present author, more reasonable: transarmamentism, the ideology of getting rid of the most dangerous, obnoxious, offensive (in both senses of that word) weapons, keeping those that can only be used for defense of a country, well knowing that they can also be used for considerable exercise of violence inside the country. In other words, the peace movement becomes an organization that tries to draw a line between use and abuse of means of violence, declaring some of them to be legitimate and others to be illegitimate. The position is less absolutist, less radical, but in another sense even more challenging. Transarmamentism is more political, disarmamentism more moralistic. Disarmamentism has as its consequence the total abolition of the military sector, transarmamentism its limitation. The former may be seen as so radical as to be hopelessly utopian and for that reason less of a challenge; the latter may be seen as meddling into the legitimate business of the military sector itself with its political appendices, including
defense and foreign affairs committees in parliaments, experts of various kinds, and so on.

This is not the place to explore these two positions in detail. Suffice it only to say that there are many other dimensions also of concern to the peace movement. Some of them are political at the domestic level and are concerned with the institutions that exercise political power, or should exercise political power over the military sector. Others have political goals at the international level and are concerned with the nature of international conflict and its possible resolution, and also with the international institutions that exercise power or should exercise political power over these relations. All of that belongs to the general picture. But this essay is about the peace movement as such, and not about the subject matter of peace in its countless ramifications, so let us concentrate on the movement itself.

However, rounding off this socio-historical background: maybe the essence of the peace movement goes further back, to the origins of the modern state. Maybe the essence lies in challenging that vestige of feudalism, the right to exercise violence, vested in the leadership of the modern state as the successor to the feudal prince, who, in turn, exercised his power over life and death gratia dei. And maybe disarmament, transarmament, domestic and international politics have one common denominator: to challenge the unchallengeable.
2. The peace movement: a guided tour around the world

Let us now make use of the mini-theory in the preceding section to arrive at some conclusions about the distribution of the peace movement in the political geography of the world, very much based on the author's own impressions, not on statistics of membership, demonstration participation, public opinion polls etc. I would sometimes even tend to distrust the latter because they depend on so many circumstantial factors, and rather try to be guided by impressions and intuitions. At any rate, the differences in peace movement articulation are so considerable that the conclusions drawn are not easily shaken by what usually passes for empirical evidence.

Let us start by a division of the world into four parts: a northwestern corner of first world "advanced industrial democracies"; a northeastern corner of second world state/bureaucratic socialist countries; a southwestern corner of the third world countries in South America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Arab world, West Asia and South Asia; and finally a southeastern corner of the countries in Southeast and East Asia. This last corner is problematic since some of the countries have first world characteristics (Australia, New Zealand), some of them have second world characteristics (Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, possibly also Laos and Kampuchea) and some of the countries have third world characteristics (the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Oceania). But in this
corner there is also what could be called the fourth world proper: Japan, the mini-Japans/mini-Chinas (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and the People's Republic of China. Let us simply ask the question: where would we expect the peace movement to be significant, given what has been mentioned in the preceding section?

The basic factor would not be the level of abuse of governmental power, or potential abuse of that power, but where the country is located in socio-historical time. More particularly, the question to be asked might be how far the country has moved away from feudalistic control at the very top of all kinds of power. The point made about European history is that cultural, economic and political power were relinquished (but not necessarily in that order) before military power. If there is no freedom worth mentioning in these three fields we would not expect much popular demand for reduction or transformation, or at least effective control of state military power either, except insofar as military power is used to block any effort to transform the patterns defining the exercise of cultural, economic and political power.

This brings us immediately to the general conclusion: the First world, the northwestern corner, has the most active peace movement. Only in this corner of the world have the agenda items of cultural, economic and political power distribution been pursued with sufficient success and perseverance for a sufficient amount of time to place military power on the agenda for popular movements, including movements that have run out of old causes and are in search of new ones.
We would expect the second world to be lagging behind not only because of strongly repressive forces emanating from the state, but also because the issue is not yet on the agenda. If we assume that the second world is now at the stage where Western European countries were in the period of monarchic and/or state absolutism in "early modern" Europe, then the struggles fought are for cultural freedom of expression and economic freedom, meaning expansion from red (planned) and black markets via a grey zone to a blue (private) sector in full bloom, accompanying both struggles with fights for political democracy. We would not expect the peace movement to be very important. On the contrary, we would expect the human rights movement to be of primary significance, bridging as it does the struggles in the cultural and the political sectors, often also relating them to movements for more economic freedom. The peace movement, as Solidarnosc and Charta 77 insist, is for later. \textsuperscript{13}

Correspondingly, we would expect the Third world to be much more concerned with development in a general sense. This would cover the issues mentioned for the second world of cultural and political freedom as human rights concerns, and economic growth however arrived at, as the pivotal concern covered by the blanket term of "development". Military power exercised openly by the state or by the strata closely linked to the state might be challenged, resisted, even with counter-violence in the form of terrorism, guerilla, or open armies in internal wars. But that is not the same
as challenging any governmental monopoly over military power. An internal war of the kinds mentioned has as its goal to conquer the state, presumably for economic, political and/or cultural reasons, using coercive power, not to reduce state monopoly over coercive power, but redirect it. Consequently, we would not expect much of a peace movement in the third world, but much movement to conquer state power monopoly.

What has been said so far also goes for the first, second and third world countries in the southeastern corner of the world. We would expect a peace movement in Australia and New Zealand, but not in the second and the third world countries in the east corner of the world, the political agenda items being different. But what about the real Fourth world countries?

In Japan we would expect a peace movement. The reason is simply, and in agreement with theory: there is a fair amount of distribution of cultural, economic and political power, all three of them to a large extent brought about recently by the defeat of Japan after the Second World War, to no small extent by the US Occupation Forces. In short, we would expect the mystique of a state only very recently emerging from the feudalism of the Tokugawa era to have been eroded, at least shortly after 1945, even if powerful forces in Japanese society now try to recover what has been lost by standardizing from above cultural and political expression. We would not expect much of a peace movement in the mini-Japans/mini-Chinas, the basic concerns of the citizens being cultural, political
and economic freedom, not military. Even though these countries are economically powerful to a level not typical of a third world country they resemble third world countries in these regards, and the comments made above would apply accordingly.

What, then, about the biggest country in the world, the People's Republic of China? What has just been said to some extent also applies to that country, but with some additional remarks. The political freedom of the country is considerably limited, there is no provision for general elections in any meaningful sense. During the cultural revolution there was some cultural freedom in the sense of debate, even dialogue, within what many would call a narrow spectrum--but then the spectrum is narrow in most countries, the basic problem being whether there is a debate at all. During that period there was certainly no economic freedom. In the present period after the cultural revolution there is considerable economic freedom at least relative to the past, but practically speaking no debate at all, no cultural freedom. Hence, the conclusion would be that the focus would be on cultural and political freedom today, on economic and political freedom yesterday, on all three tomorrow, and that the challenge to military power may only come later. But then it may also be argued that the position of the military, in the sense of soldiers, is low in China anyhow, this being an ancient Chinese tradition. The military sector is already weak meaning that China will not entangle herself in the kinds of foreign policy problems characteristic of the first and second worlds, and of Japan.
Let us then turn to Europe, to the first world together with the second world, for a more detailed description. In some countries the peace movement is strong, in others it is weak. The general difference between first and second world countries is accounted for. To account for the differences within first and second world countries we could make use of the factors already mentioned since there are obviously questions of degree. But we would also immediately introduce another factor: to what extent a country is involved in the major crystallization of war and peace in our time, or even of all times: the NATO/WTO alliance systems spearheaded by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, both of them possessing incredible amounts of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, nonaligned versus aligned, and with the latter degree of alignment.

To proceed systematically let us divide the NATO/WTO system in six parts. Two of them are the super-powers on either side of Europe. Europe will then be divided into four parts using, as above, the compass.

In northwestern Europe we have what might be called the social democratic cluster. We place the Federal Republic of Germany in this corner, as the center of social democracy, with similar parties found in Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and Finland—which obviously belongs to this part of Europe. The social democratic movement has a number of characteristics: usually quite large, both democratic in the sense of having a broad popular base and being relatively
democratic on the inside, and social in the sense of solidarity and profound social concerns. It is usually slow. But, when moving quite effective, although it may also be slow in reacting to new signals, slow in turning in other words. Ideologically it is usually eclectic, and not very attractive to intellectuals who might prefer much clearer contours.

The movement has been instrumental for political democracy and in making culture more accessible to the masses, but more ambiguous on economic power. On the one hand it wants to defend the workers that once constituted the bulk of the movement against economic abuse. On the other hand the movement is divided between those who see the state as the basic economic protector, and those who see the state as the basic threat to the economic freedom of the small economic actor. This may be the former worker, or his offspring, liberated from the shackles of capitalism, possibly himself entering the market as small-scale businessmen ("petty bourgeoisie"). Or the present worker with more faith in the private than the public sector for economic growth. But economic gains there have been, undoubtedly.

In short, we would expect this to be the corner of Europe with the strongest peace movement, and would then include Canada on the other side of the Atlantic where the same description might apply. Moreover, we would expect the social democratic movement and related circles to be of top significance for the peace movement, easily placing on their agenda what is on the socio-historical agenda of the region in general and the northwestern corner in particular. But more easily so for those who have gained some cultural and economic freedom, the educated middle classes; less easily so for people in the working classes.
The rest of the commentary on the NATO/WTO region would take the form of why this should not apply equally much to the other three corners.

Let us start with some words about northeastern Europe with three socialist countries, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Everything said above about the second world in general would apply to these countries in particular: the basic concern would be human rights. Interestingly enough the strongest peace movement is found in the German Democratic Republic. To the authorities what matters in this field is less what is being said than where it is being said. The present author has witnessed very high levels of free speech and excellent debates in private apartments, in churches, and at universities although in the latter case the debate very easily becomes intellectualized. The basic concern of the movement, however, would be the protection of citizens against its own military, against militarization in other words. Essentially this is also a human rights concern more than a challenge of the linkage between state, military and war in general. As such it is only to be expected that it should be found particularly in Eastern Germany: DDR is a front state. Moreover, DDR is a part of divided Germany making all these issues very tense and emotional compared to other countries.

Let us then turn to southwestern Europe, and more particularly to France, Spain and Italy. These countries are remarkably different with regard to the peace movement, so a more differential analysis is obviously needed. We may by and large stick to the variables already used, but will have to modify the agenda axiom (military transformation comes last) somewhat.
Using that theory we would expect France to have the biggest peace movement as France tackled the problems of cultural, economic and political freedom many years ago, even two hundred years ago. Italy should be number two and Spain should have the smallest peace movement as Spain only recently, about ten years ago, emerged from the feudal shackles of los poderes facticos (clergy, landowners, military) maintained by Franco dictatorship with very little freedom of expression, no political democracy, economic freedom for the rich, but hardly for those not in tune with the powers in charge. The problem is that empirically we find exactly the opposite! Hence, there must be some other variable at work.

Or, maybe the variables are well chosen, only that time operates differently from what has been assumed here? Could it be that the French Revolution was so long ago that the French system refeudalized in the meantime, even at an early stage (Napoleon!)—carefully limiting debate, putting constraints on the operation of political democracy, and also introducing a heavy public sector and a system with state control over the private economy? And, correspondingly, could it be that the Spanish conquest of cultural and economic freedom is so recent, well into the second half of the twentieth century, that appetities for more freedom were whetted? And, could it be that Italy being in between when it comes to having a French Revolution also is in between when it comes to having a peace movement? Freedoms have to be reconquered; freedoms not reconquered are easily freedoms lost. They have to be put on the agenda again, and the military issue recedes into the background.
These are relatively reasonable assumptions, and any knowledge of French political culture would point in the direction indicated. The state is very strong, and the French socialist party that had governmental power when the French peace movement could, and according to many should, have grown rapidly was and is very far from a social democratic party. It appeals to state employees more than to the working class in general, the latter voting communist, bourgeois or, more recently, fascist. Much of the strength of the party, a party of teachers, professors, railroad employees and public functionaries, derives from the simple fact that for a state employee it pays to keep the state strong, capable of paying good salaries, maybe also some perks, Politicking rather than moralism.

The peace movement challenges the state and this challenge becomes even more significant in a period when France suffers international decline both in cultural power (the French language decreasing in importance), in economic power (France being in the same economic situation as other parts of the first world due to increasingly strong competition from the fourth world) and in political power (France like other first world countries having to face the circumstance, internationally, that all other three worlds are increasing in relatively importance and that the French Empire is coming to an end even if decolonialization was not the final blow). Military power becomes a dimension of a residual power, almost the last one, and with some promise for the future if
both super powers should wane in significance in Europe. France might be vexing in power.\textsuperscript{17} L'Europe de Paris, not l'Europe des patries. (A printing error for the former?) might take shape, \textit{ies}, built around force de frappe.

Much of what can be said about Spain would be very different. France had an industrial revolution after the French Revolution, Spain had the industrial revolution first and Franco saw to it that the French Revolution did not come--maintaining in power clerics, aristocrats in the shape of land owners and military, on top of business, national and foreign, and the Spanish people. Spain had until recently very much the same configuration as can be found in South America, a pattern which would lead to confrontations with the military, but not challenges of the military institution as such. However, in Spain there is a strong peace movement, here seen as a reaction of a very alert populace, having undergone one of the quickest trainings in theory and practice of democracy that any country has been exposed to recently, wanting more. People draw conclusions about a linkage between state and military power from the forty years under Franco rule, and the Civil War introducing that period. They were told by the government that Spain was to be enrolled in the NATO/WTO system and the reaction was sharp. Maybe for the elites this is the last stronghold of old Spain now that even military golpe is illegitimate.

There could be something corresponding to the German situation here. Of course, Germany had an even harsher exposure to autocratic rule than did Spain; their experiments with democracy before autocracy being relatively similar. Increased militarization was interpreted by many as an increase in state power which might lead
to autocracy again, thus triggering off anti-Franco responses in Spain and anti-Nazi in Germany. Both responses might be seen as entirely unjust by a democratizing leadership trying to bring the military institution under democratic control with civilians on top of the military rather than vice versa. But at the same time they were increasing the size of the military and expanding its functions, as a part of modernization.

Will internationalization of the military in an alliance decrease the possibility of the military exercising political control in a country by grabbing political power through a coup? The answer could run both ways: the military could feel encouraged to so because of implicit or explicit super power support (Greece in 1967), or feel reluctant having new role models, relatively stable military sectors in stable democracies, made more visible through alliance membership. The latter is what German and Spanish and Italian governments must have hoped to obtain through NATO membership, but probably of less interest to the French leadership, operating in a political culture where the military already has considerable influence and is used to operating unconstrained by civilian norms as it has done in Africa, in the Middle East, and in Southeast Asia (French Indo-China).

Thus, the leadership in these countries have their projects, and they differ. The French leadership probably wants to maintain the military strong, preparing for a possible leadership role in
the Western Alliance, later on in this century or in the next. The Spanish leadership does not want a strong military, but do not date challenge the military, hoping to domesticate them by internationalizing them. How this is compatible with keeping Spain inside NATO yet outside military integration might be more difficult to understand, and that in itself is one of the reasons why the peace movement also voted against this half way membership. They expect it to be unstable, and to tilt in the direction of full membership and more militarization.

I see Italy as being inbetween. The Italian Socialist Party is in many regards similar to the French Socialist Party, a difference being that the Italian Communist Party is more flexible, and less illegitimate than the French Communist Party with its long-standing history of subservience to Moscow. But the threat of a coup from the military is real, hence the leadership will hardly try to challenge that sector. The population, on the other hand, may be longing for a continuation of the freedom agenda as outlined above.

**Conclusion:** most important is how recently the other freedoms were conquered, for the situation right now, in the 1980s. If the conquest was recent people may want more—energy is not dissipated in the reconquest of old freedoms. Thus, France may need a second French Revolution, this time directed against its own solid technocracy. The military and the arms industry, public and private, play a considerable role and would be fundamentally challenged. French democracy would be expanded so as to reduce the power of the classe politique, challenging its monopoly on foreign and defense policy, opening for debate all over France, not only in selected circles in Paris. Cultural freedom would include freedom to challenge
even French national glory and patriotic values, thus asking questions today never asked in a silence passing as unanimity. It is hardly a compliment to French democracy that security forces could organize a raid on a ship highly symbolic of the green movement in general and the peace movement in particular in the harbor of a friendly country (Auckland, New Zealand), killing a crew member. There was some kind of debate in parliament, but only after heavy questioning from the press. And there was no major demonstration, no popular mobilization against the government at all! Maybe France should learn from Spain: democracy has to be conquered and reconquered, and when reconquered the freshness makes it possible for the population to ask new questions, and sometimes for the decision-makers to make new moves.

We are now left with only one corner in Europe: southeastern Europe. Generally, the Balkans have second and third world aspects, but also first world characteristics found in Greece, if not in Turkey. Except for Greece where a peace movement would be expected for the same reasons as in Spain—democracy has been reconquered—the predictions would tend to be pessimistic. And yet in this corner of Europe some kind of peace movement can be found, but not at the popular level, at the governmental level. There is serious discussion about nuclear free zones. There is a nonaggression treaty between Greece and Bulgaria. There is a significant and consistent move in Hungary towards
political freedom (multi-person elections), economic freedom (more market operation) and cultural freedom (more freedom of speech, and assembly, although far from what is needed). This sounds inconsistent with the theory, but then the theory is not about state action but about popular movements. What is found at the level of governments can possibly be understood in the light of a common factor in the Balkans: the Orthodox Church, bringing together Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania and at least some part of Yugoslavia excluding the rest of that country, excluding Turkey and Albania with their Muslim traditions, and also Catholic Hungary.

Hence, we are left with the conclusion of a popular and strong peace movement in the northwest corner of Europe (and Greece), with the possible scenario of social democratic governments taking a lead to reorient NATO if they should come into power, and a governmental peace movement in southeastern Europe, held together by orthodoxies, with a completely different social dynamism. For the other two corners predictions are relatively pessimistic: they will have to be dragged along, carried by any possible momentum that could come out of the other two, singly or combined.

And this may also apply to the super powers. A peace movement at the popular level of the Soviet Union is highly unlikely, the focus being on human rights, on cultural/political and economic freedoms for the many reasons mentioned. Moreover, it is also very clear that the repressive potential of the Soviet state is considerable, and the urgency of the matter very dramatic, given that the country is a
super power, involved at the highest level in the East-West conflict, whatever that conflict can be said to be about.

That certainly also applies to the United States. And yet one would expect a peace movement in the United States, perhaps much bigger than what can occasionally be found in that country. The other three domains of power have been regulated to a large extent; there is freedom of expression, there is a considerable amount of economic freedom, and there is a tradition of democracy. So why not also a popular challenge of the state monopoly on foreign, defense and security policy? Or—is all of this not necessarily true?

One may now object that the US peace movement is not that small; after all a considerable crowd filled the Central Park in New York City June 1982 on the occasion of the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. However, relative to the size of the US population this was still small compared to the Western European demonstrations. Moreover, it was New York City, similar to the situation in France where whatever goes on only goes on in the capital city (and even so there is not much). An objection might be that people came from far away. And one might object that the US tradition of the single issue movement stands in the way of efficacy. The platform for a peace movement has to be so narrow that it cannot possibly lead to any basic change. But what the movement is
demanding is a rather basic change, even if the rhetoric is narrow.

Consequently, other explanations would be needed. Of course there is the super-power element, the general idea of being on the very forefront of a major consultation, a factor used above to account for the absence of a Soviet peace movement, relative to, for instance, the level found in the German Democratic Republic. There is also less of a peace movement in the neutral and nonaligned nations in Europe: Sweden and Finland have a long and important tradition and so does Austria, but the movements are nevertheless small; in Switzerland and Yugoslavia very small indeed. The same could have been said about Spain: at the same level as Ireland—if it had not been for Spain's dramatic and recent transformation and the leadership enrolling Spain into NATO the level would still have been very low.

However, it is unnecessary to change grounds in trying to account for the sporadic nature of the US movement. There is almost no general peace movement, but an anti-Vietnam movement which probably would not have taken off the ground had it not been for general conscription hitting the US college population of a solid middle-class background. A group capable of hitting back, if not in the interest of the Vietnamese people or the national interest of the
US in the longer run, at least in their own self-interest! Correspondingly, the anti-ABM movement and the anti-testing movement can be seen as middle-class reaction in the Boston area and general US reaction to radioactivity in the atmosphere, hitting the food chains, rather than as a general peace movement. Why should this be the case given that the US has this high level of cultural, economic and political freedom?

The reason might be found in the same direction as the effort to account for the paucity of the French movement. What happened happened a long time ago, at the end of the eighteenth century, with no basic change since that time except for the expansion of the system of concentric circles defining the electorate in the democratic process. At that time the state also crystallized in the United States of America, exhibiting clearly feudal characteristics. The president, the successor to the king, was not president by the Grace of God, but by the grace of the people. But the people itself were there by the Grace of God, as a Chosen People in a Promised Land. To secure those lands, even to expand them became more than merely a question of cost-benefit analysis: does it pay to expand or will I have to pay too high a price? Rather, it became a sacred right, even a duty. To be conquered by the US was no ordinary conquest, it was an honor—a sentiment also exhibited by the French when they moved into a country and among other things bestowed upon that people a language held by them to be far superior to any other. The sacred
is not to be touched, a major reason in my view why US foreign policy and the military sector will remain as it is for a long time.

On top of this, but not unrelated to it, comes a factor not found in France. The socio-historical logic of the US is different. What was obtained two centuries ago was obtained by moving away from Europe, not by participating in the many and painful European transformations. Thus it is that the US never really had a labor movement concerned with basic social transformation; that movement also became a single issue movement of trade unionism, concerned more single-mindedly with wages and working conditions. It has been pointed out above that a social and democratic working class movement, as can be found in Spain, but much less in France seems to be at least a very helpful factor in connection with the peace movement. The factor is missing in the US. Even democracy is to a large extent missing in the US—the parties offering too little choice and the participation rates in elections (38.5% November 1986) being scandalous.

And thus it also is that the US does not really have a green movement: there was the explosive phenomenon of the flower your or generation for that matter, in the late "sixties, early" seventies, partly related to the anti-Vietnam movement. At any rate, as flowers they wilted relatively quickly, not providing a general context for a peace movement of sufficient strength. The narrowness of the debate, the discourse control, is an important factor here.

The conclusion can only be the same as for France: maybe there is a need for a second American Revolution, this time not against some foreign power but against itself in an effort to reconquer freedoms lost! In sufficient retrospect we might perhaps one day say that the anti-Vietnam movement was the beginning of this, later to be joined by other movements. Of course there was a
counter-revolution. The Reagan administration of the 1980s was strong, and in line with what one would expect: the strengthening of the state in its military manifestation, by right wing, christian fundamentalists. (And of course they are for capital punishment and against abortion: only the state has the right to take life; not the individual, and certainly not a woman).

That concludes our survey of the peace movement situation around the world. In a world perspective a small phenomenon, mainly located in the northwestern corner of Europe. In a NATO/WTO context a rather important phenomenon, threatening the solidity of these inter-state alliances, particularly because the super-powers are lagging behind so much that an asynchrony is introduced, causing rifts in the system. If the super-powers were moving climatically at the same pace as the leadership of lesser allies, who somehow have to reflect at least some of the unpopular sentiment, they could more easily find solutions together. As it is there are confrontations, not only between people and their governments, or leadership, in general, but also between the governments of the allies and super-power governments.

And inside Europe, as depicted with four quadrants, there is already a certain rift across the alliances with the northern part less reliable in the NATO alliance (to this should then be added Greece) and the southern part less reliable in the WTO system. This, in turn, is the only reflection of the impact the peace movement has had inside the countries, actually limited to
the northwestern corner since the movement is mainly governmental in the southeastern corner. But the debate has been reopened all over, on military doctrines in general and deterrence in particular, questioning the unquestionable. And the basic question asked is what always should be and always ultimately becomes the question of the peace movement: could we not abolish war as a social institution? Could we not do the same to war as has already been done to slavery and to colonialism and to imperialism—not that we can not find remnants of these institutions lingering on in some parts of the world, but they are no longer seen as legitimate!

What I have argued so far in the paper is that this question can only be raised provided a concomitant question is raised: not exactly the abolition of the state as an organization in the country, but a dramatic limitation of state power where exercise of violence is concerned. If the state has already given up control of culture and control of the economy this would actually come relatively close to an abolition of the state—although the variation from country to country when it comes to the relative significance of the military sector is considerable.

In short, the function of the peace movement cannot be understood as an anti-missile movement or nuclear freeze movement only. These are only the overt manifestations of a deeper phenomenon linked to the conjunctures of the circumstantial, the concrete
politics, in the military sphere of the day. The peace movement lives off such events. A country's leadership introduces new weaponry, referred to euphemistically as "modernization", people start questioning the necessity of demanding disarmament instead. The leadership persists partly because the super power demands so, people become more intransigent and the movement escalates. The leadership still goes ahead but has to give some concessions to the movement, for instance by promising a disarmament conference, and if that does not work even a summit meeting. And if that does not work either the leadership will try to convince the population that "we tried, but the other side did not come along". And after some time the movement starts again.

All of this is important and belongs in any analysis of the peace movement. But it is not essential. The socio-historical essence of the peace movement is abolition of war as a social institution; the peace movement gains in social significance because this may imply a partial abolition of the state as we know it. In other words, the peace movement is located centrally in the drama of social history. What today are small beginnings may tomorrow become a major social current—we have seen such phenomena before. But the condition is probably that the movement manages to keep both the long-term visions and the short-term goals in mind at the same time, being willing to bargain for any small gain, yet never losing sight of the more dramatic goals.
3. Some remarks on peace movement strategy

If this is the function of the peace movement, what would then be the structure of its operation? What would correspond to this rather dramatic function? Obviously, the tactics are nonviolent, assertive action, from analysis and debate via demonstrations to direct action even deep into missile sites, army camps, nuclear depots and what not. And equally obviously these approaches are more available to people having the privilege of living in democracies than to others.

More available, yes, but not necessarily more efficient. It may also be argued that when in a democracy in northwestern Europe 100 thousand people gather together in a peaceful demonstration for peace nobody except themselves pay attention. At 200 thousand some journalists come, at 300 thousand TV, press, other media; at 400 thousand politicians call in advance asking whether they might address the audience. Signs of success, but the old adage that in these democracies "everybody speaks and nobody listens" still holds. Afterwards no effect visible to the unguided eye may be observed. The exercise looks ritualistic. The demonstration is used as preparation for the next demonstration.

Take the single party autocracy where "everybody listens and nobody speaks". No such demonstrations would ever take place. On the other hand, one person standing in the public eye, with some little poster denouncing war and people already pay attention. Two persons, and people get very concerned. Three persons, and the police arrive and start arresting. Four persons, and there may be a change in the composition of the politbureau. Why is this so? Because
through the wall of control is so much more risky and
difficult. The personal sacrifice is so much higher than the out-
worn shoe soles in the western democracies that the leadership
not only pays attention, but is shaken. Even to the point that one
might argue that the individual utility of one demonstrator in
the East relative to the West is 100,000 times higher; and so
his individual risk. Consequently, the West German movement
was probably less successful in stopping the
missiles (it was not successful at all) than the East German
movement has been in halting the militarization process, providing
a basis for the Honecker regime's overture to West Germany.

The political formula is obvious:
the East German leadership can tell the Soviet leadership, "please
do not press us too much, we get so much difficulty with our population,
and ultimately that difficulty also comes to you!"

But this is tactics, not strategy. For strategy linkages are
necessary, and the question is in what direction. The peace movement
cannot stop missiles or militarization alone, nor can the underlying
Peace Movement abolish war alone.

**Domestically** it is indispensable for the peace move-
ment to link itself to movements in the other three domains of power.

More particularly, there has to be a solid cooperation with
cultural power, here simply defined as religious/ideological elites
and intellectuals who can formulate concrete policy alternatives.
This means church and political ideologues and, nowadays, peace
researchers. Equally indispensable are good links to the political
domain, meaning to political carriers that can take the message and carry it into the corridors of power where decisions are made, where footnotes are written to NATO communiques, and so on. In western democracies that means political parties such as the social democrats and the greens; in eastern party states this means factions within parties, generation groups, new social strata and so on.

But what about the economic domain of power? I think it has to be shown, convincingly, that what the peace movement stands for pays, and to all or most sectors in society. It has to be shown that the country as such, and the people more particularly, are worse off, not better off because of the arms burden; that conversion of much of the arms industry is possible; and that a world no longer ridden by armed conflict could permit an even higher level of economic prosperity for all. Today it is not so difficult to show this on paper, but difficult to convince the major actors, meaning state enterprises, private enterprise and workers of all kinds.

Finally, it may be argued that the peace movement also has to have links to the military sector. The issues raised have also to be raised within the army. In other words, the peace movement has to be a crystallizing, catalytic agent that mobilizes cultural power, political power, economic power and military power, bringing them together in a synergistic fashion capable of transforming the social formation. And if social transformation is best done by
people who themselves have undergone some kind of transformation then not only the tactic but also the strategy of the peace movement would be to provide people with a setting for that kind of personal experience. To let them be born again, in Christian metaphor.

All this is very important, a major reason why the peace movement is much more than a pressure group trying to change the minds and the actions of decision-makers. It is also a way of living peace, of engendering new relations among people, of practicing the goals of the movements in its actions. In that sense it can be compared to the Civil Rights movement in the United States where the most convincing message was less the public goals of the movement than the fact that within the movement blacks and whites worked hand in hand. The concomitant of this is clear: since blacks and whites now work much less together than during the conflict some of the momentum has also gotten lost. And correspondingly: there is a limit to how much internal squabble, how much conflict a peace movement can have before the public starts asking "are these people really peaceful enough, can they bring about a peaceful change when they are not even able to keep peace among themselves?"

Internationally it is equally clear that the movement has to have a very rich network of interlinkages. More concretely this means that all four corners in the quadrangle of the power domains just mentioned have to transnationalize, and the same goes for the catalytic agent in the Center.
This is exactly what happened in the 1980s: religious and secular ideologists found each other across borders and so certainly did peace researchers; there is cooperation (although far less than what will have to come later on) among like-minded parties on peace issues across borders; there are efforts to internationalize conversion movements but these are still weak; there are important organizations such as Generals for Peace across borders—and the peace movement itself, as was to be predicted under British leadership (as for the anti-slavery movement and the anti-colonial movement) has also transnationalized in the European campaign for nuclear disarmament (END) with its international conferences in Brussels (1982), Berlin (1983), Perugia (1984), Amsterdam (1985), Paris (1986), Coventry (1987).

In all these conferences the nations are playing their roles, much like they do in NATO, incidentally. The Nordics and the Dutch are moralistic. The British are highly political, conceiving of the peace movement as an extension of the left wing of the Labour Party. The Eastern Europeans inform the meetings that other issues have even higher priority; to argue in favor of equal priority is to betray their cause. The Southern Europeans are trying desperately to catch up with what is going on—doing so very well, incidentally, a giant exercise in adult education in countries where the elites share nothing with the population. And the Germans, the best of them all in morals, in politics and in knowledge, are keeping silent lest anyone should accuse them of excessive nationalism. Such as the French, desperately nervous lest the French bomb should be brought up.

But this is the small peace movement, a prelude to the big Peace Movement qui attend son heure. One day time will come—hopefully not triggered by some major socio-political catastrophe.
NOTES

1. The King's last argument, inscribed on a cannon at Wavell castle outside Krakow in Southern Poland.

2. As any exchange oriented social scientist would take for granted there will be no human rights, granted by the state (meaning the government) without human duties to the state (also meaning the government); and the supreme duty would be to give up one's own life for the causes defined by the government. See J. E. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, Methuen, London, 1972, Ch. II "The Rebirth of Unlimited War".

3. The Nazis, Nationalsozialismus, made this political color combination brilliantly, combining extreme nationalism with welfare state measures--for those considered parts of the nation. And the Lumpenproletariat was included, indeed.

4. The perennial question in connection with spy cases is whether ruling elites are protecting secrets from becoming known to the adversary, a foreign power or to their own people, who may gain more insight into how peace is protected, and wars may be fought, than the rulers deem necessary/desirable. The taboo against the former can be used to defend the elites against the latter. There is also the possibility that secret communication with the other side, also when unauthorized, could dissolve tension and be in the objective interest of both parties. For an exploration of this the Norwegian Arne Treholt case, sentenced to 20 years for espionage by a court
that did not make public the premisses for its conclusion is an important case; see my (in Norwegian) "Treholt saken—en norsk tragedie" in Mads Andenaes, ed., Vi anklager, Oslo, 1985.

5. There is a correspondence here between institutional categories and needs categories, with economic power (potentially) protecting material/somatic well-being, political power freedom and cultural power identity (with religion, language, etc.).

6. The famous letter by Yuri Zhukov, president of the Soviet Peace Committee of 2 December 1982 contains a very bitter critique of the Western peace movement in general and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Movement for European Nuclear Disarmament in particular for "efforts to disunite the anti-war movements" with "debates on issues that have nothing to do with this task". These issues include, according to Mr. Zhukov, the "German question" and internal problems in the socialist countries. Underlying the letter is also the concern with the Western peace movement's refusal to hold the West alone responsible for the arms race, thereby concealing and justifying the "aggressive militarist policy of the USA and NATO". As Ken Coates (of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the ENDO) said in his letter to the editor of The Guardian of 23 December 1982: "Mr. Zhukov and the British Government should put their heads together, and they might at least cancel some of each other's misperceptions about the non-aligned peace movement". Events in the Soviet
Union, particularly the Second Russian Revolution, that of Mikhail Gorbachev, testify to the validity of the approach of the non-aligned peace movement, seeing internal factors in the socialist countries as major causes of the arms race.


8. Thus, 15 years ago most Californians who committed suicide did so with poison, today (1986) guns are the most frequent means.

9. In my book *There Are Alternatives!* (Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984) transarmament is seen in terms of a switch from a military doctrine based on offensive arms and retaliatory deterrence to one based on defensive arms and defensive deterrence. But this is seen in a context of a more broadly based alternative security policy with Switzerland as a good, although not unproblematic (for the critical remarks about Switzerland, see pp. 209-11) case. For an early presentation of Swiss foreign policy by an eminent Swiss analyst, Jacques Freymond, see his "Switzerland's Position in the World Peace Structure". *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXVII, Dec. 1952, pp. 521-33. Some examples:

"...neutrality was not imposed by an external pressure, but still remained the only way to preserve the existence of the country which, otherwise, would have been divided into two antagonistic camps". (p. 527)
"...Switzerland at least does not endanger peace and has not been, for a long time, a threat to any of its neighbors. In our era, when not only big states but even small nations have not always refrained from the use of arms for the defense of what they consider as their interests, I think that this readiness for peace and these pacific dispositions are important considerations". (p. 521)

"An even more important contribution, however modest, is Swiss self-reliance. This country is not a burden on its neighbors. It is not a satellite of any foreign power. It is not asking help from outside in order to maintain its standard of life, to defend its economic order, to make social experiments, or to build up its military strength". (pp. 521f)

Important points, born out of Swiss experience incorporating two articulations of christianity and three major European nationalities, in a small country that certainly cannot afford to be divided, be dependent on only one of its big neighbors, or aggressive. Other countries can emulate that posture without being conditioned the same way.

10. For a brilliant analysis of the transition from feudalism to the beginnings of the modern state see "Part III Conclusions" in Perry Anderson's monumental Lineages of the Absolutist State, NLB, London, 1974. The focus on absolute control over
military power while at the same time permitting economic decentralization is very clear. The royal princes in Europe are still supposed to become military men, not rejecting military training like the British Prince Edward.

11. For, in my view, the best analysis of the Western European Peace Movement, see Thomas R. Rochon, The Politics of the Peace Movement in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, 1986. He argues, persuasively, that the peace movement managed to change the way of thinking about security issues in Western Europe. For another less positive view see Jeffrey Herf, "War, Peace and the Intellectuals: The West German Peace Movement", International Security, 1986, pp. 172-200. J. Herf considers peace research and peace movement to be highly political which is obviously correct: anything dealing directly with politics is highly political. The same applies to his own piece and the type of movement behind the politics of "deterrence" (to use Herf's favorite means of expression, quote-unquote). He also gives much too much credit to peace research, including the present author, for inspiring the peace movement.

12. During the cultural revolution in China 1966-76 one impression was that military power was decentralized before at least cultural and political power, into local militia units of the People's Liberation Army. After the cultural revolution, however, central control seems to have been reestablished.

   1968-1945: militarization, "strong military, rich country"
   1945-1950: de-militarization, anti-nuclearism.

15. And why should people in a society where getting rich is a major value not try to do so, emulating the role models available?

16. See "Goals and Processes in Spanish Politics: Western Incorporation or Autonomy?", chapter 12 in this volume for an effort to explore these processes in the Spanish case.


19. A Catch 22: in a political culture highly skeptical of explicit political ideology the multiple-issue movement will also stand in the way of efficacy.

20. I am indebted to the DDR author and dissident Stephen Heym for this point, in a speech in Berlin, June 1982.

21. A major point in Manfred Halpern's analysis of politics; reminiscent of the Italian sociologist Alberoni's analysis of love as a revolutionary experience. A reason why revolutionary activity often is carried out by couples in love?