THE PEOPLE WERE RIGHT
(at least so far)

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July 1984
1. Two basic questions: who were right, and who were more right?

When the first draft of the questionnaire for the survey "Images of the world in the Year 2000" was prepared, in 1966, the "Year 2000" sounded quaint, distant. It was far away. I myself was 35 years old, and the idea was to find out what people in the "younger generation" (defined as between 15 and 40) thought in connection with the future in general and the year 2000 in particular. For them the future was also quaint, distant. The only thing that made the Year 2000 stand out was the figure itself, three zeros, and the novelty of a "2" in stead of a "1" starting off the designation for a year in the Christian tradition. Close to 9000 people were asked close to 200 questions, mainly in the year 1967. There were about 1.8 million answers to register, to code, to punch, to tabulate, to analyse, to comment on, to edit. A little bit of work, the reader can be assured. Anyhow, in the year 1976 the book was out, 729 pages, neither much better nor much worse than other books of that kind, and practically speaking immediately forgotten - including by its authors. I guess also by the respondents whom we were not able to compensate in any way for their work in reacting to the rather long questionnaire. The distance between them and us, "respondents" and "investigators", was considerable as the social science tradition was at that time - and to some extent still is.

We are now midway in time between 1967 and the Year 2000, in 1985. The Year 2000 is no longer quaint, certainly no longer distant. And very, very close is the Orwell Year 1984. We are living in an era of great tension, evident to most people. There is not only tension between East and West, partly due to the ever increasing level of armament with qualitatively different types of weapons being brought in all the time, particularly from the West, partly to menacing postures and words being emitted all the time, particularly by Washington. In addition to this there is tension within West and within East, a sense of crisis within both systems - as evidenced very clearly by the quick rise of the peace movement in the West, followed by similar movements in the East; and a quick rise of the Green movement in the West and the Solidarity movement in Poland (although not quite similar: the Greens are more marginal; Solidarity includes the very core of Polish society). The so-called North-South conflict is developing to a point of tremendous tension, with interventions and invasions,
particularly in Central America, in a certain sense also in Afghanistan although that is - perhaps - better seen in an East-West context (Soviet security belt).

The gap between rich and poor is increasing, between countries and within countries; the absolute number of people deprived in one way or the other through malnutrition, ill health, lack of education is increasing.

At the same time there are important problems within the countries of the North, the industrialized countries, West and East - problems that are seen by many as linked to industrialism and "high" levels of scientific-technical revolution or development. There is "economic crisis", unemployment, increase in "civilization diseases", new diseases, etc. [4]

All of this is well known. There may be disagreement about the extent to which these problems and conflicts are now crystallized, how important they are; what the causes - not to mention the remedies - may be. But there is no basic disagreement that these problems are on the agenda of today, and more so than they were, say, 18 years ago.

And that is what matters in this connection since we are now midterm, between the initiation of the study and the object on which the images were to be focused, the Year 2000, now considerably closer, almost touchable.

And that leads us straight to the two basic questions to be addressed in this chapter. They are: how correct or incorrect were the perceptions, the images the respondents had of the future? And: were the respondents, by and large, more or less correct in their images than the elites, the decision-makers, as we know them from the images they tended to propagate about that time?

These are important questions, and they are also problematic questions. The first one is important from the point of view of social science methodology: it raises the whole problem of validity of public opinion studies. And the second question is important from the point of view of democratic theory: it raises the whole problem of where there is more wisdom, among the people at large, or among the elites, the "center".

In putting it so dramatically let us immediately try to get two important misunderstandings out of the way. Thus, validity should be seen in a broader context than the narrow
significance often given to this in social science methodology. Important here is not whether the response given by a respondent is "valid" in the sense that it really reflects what the respondent feels about the issue. One may refer to that type of validity as respondent validity.

Here the focus is in another direction; perhaps one could refer to it as issue-validity. The standard approach to public opinion, or to individual opinion for that matter, is to use a person's views of an issue not as a guide to an understanding of that issue but to understand the person, in a social context. This is often a very paternalistic approach. It is usually assumed that the investigator has somehow a really issue-valid image of the issue, a kind of terra firma, and can use the distance from that fixed point in his own mind (and that of his colleagues) to the image held by the respondent as an indicator of something about, or in, the respondent. We assume respondent validity, not doubting his own issue-validity. Or, he thinks he has no image at all, is completely neutral and hence objective. What will be done here is to explore the question of whether people in general might simply have some deep insight about the world that may teach us something about the issues, possibly even a deeper insight than that held by the investigators themselves. In short a change in orientation, from studying respondents and images to studying the world and the year 2000.

Similarly, when the focus is on democratic theory it should be remembered that "wisdom" is something much deeper than technical knowledge and capability. Nobody doubts that those in executive command in a modern country, including those dubbed "technocrats," have technical capabilities much above those possessed by the population at large, or by the average person in the population. But "wisdom" is something different. It touches the long term views, the deeper issues, the underlying currents. Out of "wisdom" would come general directions, not specific directives for action. One might even say that the entire democratic theory is based on the assumption that there is more wisdom among the people at large than among the leaders since leaders are held accountable to the people, not the other way round. In theory leaders can have their mandate to rule withdrawn by the people in free elections, regardless of the fact that in practice it happens just as often, or more often, that the leaders withdraw or cancel this basic right of the people. After all, people elect their leaders, the leaders do not elect their
people. They only select individuals for positions of prestige and/or power, no doubt often wanting to elect another person, more obedient — as Bertolt Brecht pointed out in East Berlin in 1953.

The two questions to be explored, as already indicated, are closely related. But they are not identical. The first one is simply the problem of comparing people's images of issues to what happened. The second is a question of comparing their images to elite images, all the time relative to what happened. The first raises epistemological problems, the second problems in democratic theory.

This means that we are now operating with a number of real world descriptions. First, there is the world "as it really was/is/will be" in the years 1967, 1985 and 2000. It is not impossible to describe it. There are data, statistics, chronicles of events and so on that are available for the first two. With some luck the world, roughly as we know it, will still be around in the year 2000, and there will be statistics, chronicles of events etc. also at that time. Second, there are the images. The book gives us the images of 9000 respondents in ten countries, eight of them in Europe, around 1967; there is hardly any better description of that particular view of the world available. As to elite images it is more problematic. We do not have anything like a representative sample survey, all we have are important pronouncements at that time, possibly also today, nothing very systematic. But we have for 1967 a second best: the "elites" inside our samples, the people more in the center.

From what has been said so far we are clearly concerned with seven different views of the world, as indicated in Figure 1:

Figure 1. Realities and images

![Diagram showing realities and images](image-url)
The problem is how these images fit in on the scale 1967/1985/2000. Of course, there is no reason why these images should be linear; they could be A-shaped, U-shaped, whatever. But they are assumed here to be linear, things getting worse, or getting better—because people probably think in such terms. Moreover, it is assumed that when people talk about "Year 2000" it is not really that precise. It is not really that year they mean, but some time in the not too far, not too distant future. Hence, it is fair to check people's 1967 images of the Year 2000 against the reality of year 1985, and if the general direction of their views seems to tally relatively well with the trends 1967 to 1985, then that might already be seen as a positive test of the issue — validity, in the sense discussed above. In fact, it may even be a more important test than how they tally with events in the Year 2000. From 1985 to 2000 there may have been very important surprises, discontinuities, possibly to the good, possibly (and many would today feel more likely) to the bad. Hence, I am in a sense arguing that when people talked about Year 2000 back in 1967 they may also be seen, and perhaps even more rightly so, as talking about the mid-1980s. This interpretation is, however, also open to the accusation of paternalism and of twisting what was done in order to fit the fact that the present study is carried out in 1985, not in 2000.

To summarize: we have two tasks before us. First, to see how the images of the future held by these big samples tally with what actually happened, so far. Second, to see who was more right about the future: the people or the elites. The first problem is more easily answered than the second. But there is a way out also for the second. We do not have interviews with elites on the same questions, but we do have certain social gradients present in the samples; there are people who are more in the center and those who are more in the periphery. It makes sense to ask: who were more right in their general judgment, those in the periphery or those in the center, those without or those with education, for instance? And finally, it also makes some sense to ask: who were more right, the respondents or the authors of this study, for instance the present author? I say the latter with some trepidation, being myself a futurist, a student of the future - in preparing for the self-critical comments towards the end of this chapter.
2. The respondents were right.

The conclusion is already in the title of this section. There are some qualifications, but by and large the conclusion holds. To substantiate that we shall make use of the same order of presentation as in Images, proceeding point by point.

2.1. The concern for the future. In very general terms, the tendency to think, or at least to express thoughts about the future does not seem to be well developed, "it is mainly located in the direction of technological future and war/peace problems, not in the direction of social future." People said very clearly that the best thing that could happen would be "world peace, disarmament, united world" and that the worst thing that could happen would be "nuclear or non-nuclear war". In other words, this was in 1967, the dominant concern; it was only Japan that had "automation, less work" and "unemployment, mechanisation" as a concern at the same level. It should be remembered that these were the early years of détente. It was a period when the leaders of the world were seeing the East-West conflict as something more remote, in spite of the events in Czechoslovakia. The Indochina wars dominated the political horizon, and all the problems referred to as "North-South" were coming up. And yet the population at large were hanging on to the fear of a war, and to the nuclear threat. I can vividly remember myself irritated by the conservatism in the population samples when this came out so clearly!

Today I would be inclined to say that people were right. One may discuss how they came to that conclusion, not the conclusion itself. Was it because they had not seen, or understood, that there was a change; or was it because they did not believe in that change at all? We shall not know, we were not wise enough to probe into the matter. All we know is that today, 18 years later, there is more concern about nuclear war and war in general than ever, only that today it is rivaled by the concern for unemployment, and also crime and other social diseases. In other words, if one should criticize the popular insight it would be in the other direction: it was not pessimistic enough, it did not sufficiently
cover social items. However, in the next subsections it will be clearly seen that this was also on their mind, only not on the very top in an open-ended question, with no pre-determined answers.

2.2. The attitude to science. "In the more developed nations (all the time in the narrow technical-economic sense) a certain science scepticism seems to exist whereas in the less developed nations a green light is given for scientific development in any field". We then defined as the "more developed countries" Great Britain, Japan, Norway, Netherlands and Finland, and as the "less developed countries" Czechoslovakia, Spain, India, Poland and Yugoslavia. The correlation between this division of nations and the tendency not to want scientific knowledge to make it possible "to decide in advance the sex of one's child", "to decide in advance the personality of one's child", "to decide in advance the economic development of a country", "to decide in advance what the weather will be" and "to go to other planets" was 1.0, except for the last one where it was 0.88: Japan being more positive about expeditions to other planets, Yugoslavia less than they should be according to this split into categories. In short, the higher the level of technical-economic development of the country, the higher the science scepticism - among our ten countries.

Were the people right or wrong in this? One should notice the wording of the items: "to decide in advance" appears in four of them. In other words, what is rejected is not so much knowledge as the kind of technical proficiency that translates the knowledge into an instrument. It seems that the population is of the opinion that the "scientific approach" in this sense will not be better than what we have today, it will even be worse. And the interesting point is, of course, that it is the population in the countries most "benefiting" from scientific advances that said so. If science had really been perceived as an unmitigated good those populations should have been enthusiastic. On the other hand, populations in less developed countries might have been sceptical simply because of adherence to traditional values of non-interference with such matters as sex and personality of children, the economy in general, the weather and cosmic travel - at least four of them traditionally seen as the concerns and prerogative
of higher forces, of God. On the other hand, the countries here classified as "less developed" are certainly also a part of the scientific-technical part of the world, when it is remembered that the Indian sample was an "elite sample" of teachers mainly. Hence, their relative enthusiasm should be interpreted as having received the gospel of what in the socialist countries is referred to as STR (scientific-technical revolution), not yet being fully aware of what it means in practice. That awareness comes with concrete experience, it seems.

In the 18 years that have passed I do not think one can say there has been less effort to implement STR, nor that there has been real satisfaction. In other words, the negative correlations seen by the respondents in the more developed countries between science/technology and a positive development is certainly not disconfirmed, perhaps even confirmed. At the higher level of analysis where samples of respondents are made use of for national comparisons, clear correlations emerged: among countries, the higher the development, the higher the scepticism. In the 18 years that have passed I do not think that one can say that the five "less developed countries" did not in some sense develop technically/economically. Hence, we should expect them to become more sceptical, as they join what in 1967 already were the "more developed countries". As seen in another chapter in this book this is generally the case for Poland.

2.3. The attitudes to domestic future. "In the more developed nations a certain development optimism seems to exist (with a heavy emphasis on social ills), whereas in the less developed nations development optimism seems to prevail". One may say that this is merely repeating what has already been said in the preceding section; but this time it is more general, not only a question of attitudes to science. The correlations are clear, but not that strong. The more developed the country, the higher the tendency to believe that people in the Year 2000 will be less happy, less interested in inner experiences, less kind to each other, less interested in good friends. In short, the higher the development level, the lower the optimism. However, here it should be added that Finland or Japan were somewhat more
optimistic than the others. And then there are clear expressions of pessimism: the more developed a country the more do they believe that the Year 2000 will be characterized by unemployment, mental illness, narcotics and criminality - particularly unemployment and criminality which where exactly the major evils seen by the samples from nine countries in the poll published by the International Herald Tribune, 16 May 1983. "In general, unemployment, mental illness, use of narcotics and criminality seem to be important parts of the future of human society, and more so the more developed the nation". It is also highly interesting to note that the more developed the country, the higher was the tendency to hope that in the Year 2000 people will live less in cities, and to hope that people will have more manual jobs, contrary to the dominant trends at that time, the trends seen as carrying development.

How could people have this much insight in the social futures of their countries? It should be noted that when asked in a more open-ended way what they would hope to see happen, nothing much came out. When asked rather precise questions, however, the data seem to support the conclusion that "technical economic development is not reinforced by growing optimism, but rather seems to lead to growing scepticism and pessimism". Of course, there are some answers to this. And the most important answer is probably that people in most countries interpret the future as a repetition of the present of the "very most developed" country, probably in the popular mind meaning the United States of America. What they are doing when they interpret the future is to interpret the United States, much like Norwegians used to interpret Sweden. For the Irish it was probably Britain, for the Canadians also the United States, for New Zealanders Australia, and so on. In a sense this is not different from what "experts" also do: all social scientists, and politically minded people in general, all over the world, operate with their own favorite uni-dimensional organization of countries along dimensions where the United States has a tendency to be located at one extreme. The problem, however, is what one sees in the United States, and similar countries. And this seems to be our findings: the more developed a country, the closer a country is to the most developed country (remember, we are now talking of 1967)
the more do they tend to see the dark side, the mal-development aspects. And the less developed a country the more do the respondent tend to see the brighter sides, the attractive aspects. It is interesting to note that the socialist countries in the sample here followed the "less developed" pattern, with Czechoslovakia as a reliable optimist, whereas Poland and Spain both had minor deviations from complete optimism. In line with what has been said in the preceding section we would now certainly expect not only the Poles but also the Spanish to be considerably less optimistic than they were, and for the Poles the data in this direction are reported in another chapter. 

2.4. Optimism and pessimism: the Cantril items. "In the more developed nations a feeling of development fatigue, with predictions of retrogressive development, for one's country as well as for oneself, towards the end of the century could be found, whereas in the developing nations development is reinforced by growing optimism". This conclusion actually carries us further: it is no longer merely a question of science, no longer merely a question of concrete items, but of development as a whole.

In the study this was explored by means of the so-called Cantril ladder where people were asked to indicate where their country, they themselves, and the world, could be located on a ladder with nine rungs from bad to good; "today", "five years ago", "in five years" and "in the year 2000". What we found was simply that for six nations there was a consistent image of amelioration; that "today" is better than "five years ago"; "in five years" will be better than "today"; "in the year 2000" will be better than "in five years". It almost goes without saying that among the six nations were the five "less developed" ones, and in addition Japan, but less so. In the other countries the image is more problematic. Both the Dutch and the Norwegians felt that the situation is quite good along the whole time span, but they did not envisage any further progress. The British and the Finns even felt that the situation was better "five years ago" than "today". The developed nations feel they have reached the ceiling and are hitting their heads against it; for the developing nations, socialist or not, development will go from bad
were right or were they wrong? Let us first remember that the 1960s was the period of very high economic growth, complete recovery from the Second World War, and almost unbridled optimism in the elites, the governments of exactly these rich countries. Given a stable economic growth everything looked so possible. There might be disputes about how to share the cake, but resolvable because the cake was seen as ever-growing. And yet the population does not reflect this kind of feeling. It is as if the momentum has been expended, the drive has been lost; the faith in the future is gone. And this also shows up at the personal level when the same type of question is asked about oneself. Of course, the more developed the country, the more was the respondent satisfied with his personal standing today; if this were not the case what else should be the meaning of "development"? But the moment a dynamic perspective is introduced, comparing points in time, "the less developed countries shoot up again and exhibit the greatest differences, to the point that in the more developed countries there is even a tendency to see a downward dip to "the Year 2000" from "in five years" - "for oneself." Evidently: "development fatigue" and "development pessimism" are generalized, from one's country to oneself and vice versa. This does not come by itself; it is perfectly possible to be pessimistic at one and optimistic at another level.

Again one might ask the same question: how did people arrive at this type of pessimism? Only a couple of years later various types of crisis became public property, conveniently labeled according to issues, one at the time. The "environment crisis" was particularly important 1970 - 72 as a way of organizing discussions; followed by the "energy crisis" 1973 - 75; followed by the "economic crisis" from about the mid - 70s onwards. Not that the environment and energy crises have disappeared, but the family of crises has expanded to the point that from the end of the 1970s an increasing number of people have been arguing about a general system crisis. In 1967, long before it became public property, the population samples already sense a crisis. The question, of course, is in what system there is crisis, and here the finding from Images was quite clear: "for all the above points (sections 2.2 - 3 - 4) the dividing line was generally in terms of level of development, not in terms of capitalist vs. socialist."
Thus, Spain and Poland were very similar in their science enthusiasm and development optimism. Hence, in a sense the population samples pointed to what to analysts was very far from obvious: the problem was located in "development" in the conventional sense of that word. "Development" was a part of the problem, rather than of the solution. It should be remembered that the end of the 60s and the early 70s was also a period in the Western countries when marxist analysis almost dominated the intellectual scene, certainly drawing the line between capitalism and socialism very clearly, if not necessarily recognizing the Eastern European countries of the "really existing socialism" as socialist.

I am adding that comment because it shows very clearly how the insights communicated by over 9000 anonymous respondents hit not only the liberal-conservative/capitalist establishment but also the marxist/socialist establishment, and with almost equal strength.

This last point is born out particularly strongly in connection with a rather important variable: the feeling of personal powerlessness was highest in the less developed countries, and particularly in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The feeling of being oppressed, of having the future more determined by "external circumstances" than by "self", and by having "too little" influence was definitely most pronounced in these two countries, although closely followed by Spain. At the time of the study these were the three authoritarian regimes, although Czechoslovakia was in a turmoil rather than effectively repressive. On the other end of the scale we find India, Japan, Norway and the Netherlands and Finland, somewhat less so Great Britain. Not a bad predictor, it seems, of events to come! We would expect much lower expressions of this type of alienation, this lack of autonomy, in Spain today since the country handled the power transition after the death of the franquismo so well, and higher scores than ever in Poland and Czechoslovakia since most of the things that have happened in the 18 years that have passed have been a constant confirmation of that particular perspective. The samples mirrored well not only "development" levels, but also the "democracy/dictatorship dimension". As we shall soon see the "capitalist/socialist" aspect is also reflected.
Again, it should be emphasized how sensitive this type of study is to the reality of the situation. In retrospect it looks almost unbelievable that we were able to ask such questions in those three countries at all, leaving alone to publish the results. But there they are for everybody to read, perhaps also serving as one more validity test, giving us even more confidence in the ability of the population samples to reflect accurately the nature of the systems in which they live.

2.5. Perspectives on war and the prospects of the world. "With regard to the chances of a world war the most optimistic nations seemed to be motivated by a credo quia absurdum: the more they believe that their own nation would be dragged into the war and suffer heavy and even irreparable losses, the less did they believe that there would be armament and war by the Year 2000". The general tendency in the data, however, is what one could call "short term pessimism" and "long term optimism". They were asked what they thought the world situation would be like in five years, in 20 years, and in the year 2000—would there be world war, more armament, about as now, partial disarmament, total disarmament? Very few predicted world war, the overwhelming majority predicted "more armament" or "about as now", in five years time, but not in the longer run. In the longer run people thought in terms of "partial disarmament" and "total disarmament".

The "short term pessimism" has certainly been warranted, and in both regards: there has been no "world war"—taking this word in the European sense of a "world war", meaning a major war in Europe—and there certainly was "more armament", but not so much more in that five years interval that the characterization "about as now" could not also be valid.

On the other hand, the "long term optimism" does not seem to be born out by the facts. We are sufficiently close to "in 20 years" to feel that responses towards "partial disarmament" is far from a correct reading of the situation. But then, on the other hand, maybe the population should also be excused. The mere
thought that "about as now" or "more armament" should go on so to speak for ever is unbearable for anybody because it evidently will, sooner or later, result in a war. Hence, the same people asked today the same question would probably exhibit exactly the same short term pessimism and long term optimism, the former because it is the realistic reading of the situation, the latter because it is the only psychologically bearable reading of the future. There are limits even to people's realism.

This interpretation is born out by the fact that a very clear majority in most countries thought that "if a world war should come your country could not stay out of it"; particularly pronounced in the countries members of the two blocks. And they had no illusions about "the results for your country if it were involved in a third world war": particularly the aligned countries saw the outcome in terms of "total destruction". In other words, even at that time the population harbored the perspective that has become so important lately, that involvement in a war would have disastrous consequences. One may object that this perspective was also present at the end of the 1960s, and not only in the population, and this may be true. Once more the deep sense of realism in the population at large: very few think in terms of "winnable", "limited" wars.

And that makes us interested in how they thought a world war could break out: by "accident", by "extension of a limited conflict" or by "one big power attacking another big power"? The accident philosophy had very few adherents, the rest were about evenly divided between the other two possibilities. That perspective is as valid today as it was 18 years ago. Moreover, there is also in the populations a total rejection of war with nuclear weapons: only very few people "could imagine any value, goal or ideal that could justify a war with nuclear weapons"; some more people (between 10 and 20% - 6% and below in the nuclear case - with the exception of India in both cases) for a war without nuclear weapons. The concrete value, goal or ideal thought of is, of course, "keep independence", "keep freedom", "keep democracy", and similar answers. In this context it is probably significant that in New Zealand "accident" has decreased and "attack" increased between 1968 and 1982: they feel closer to the conflict.
In short, one gets the feeling of a population in all this countries very much against war, nuclear or non-nuclear, with no illusions at all about the consequences should it ever come. The sentiment of the peace movement of the early 80's was there, 15 years earlier.

This same kind of realism shows up when people are asked what will happen to the three major structural conflicts, "the relation between capitalist countries and socialist countries", "the relation between rich countries and poor countries", and "the relation between the different races in the world". That the "differences will disappear" or that "people will forget about them" is very much a minority view, held by less than a fifth or less than a quarter (India being an exception in being more optimistic about racial differences). The majority in most countries seems to think in terms of "peaceful coexistence" for the races; they are more evenly split between that and "major conflicts, but no war" for the relation between rich countries and poor countries; and tend more in the direction of the latter for the relation between capitalist countries and socialist countries. For the East-West conflict, as mentioned, only few see the possibility of a war, for the relation between the different races this number is very low, but it is also quite low for the North-South conflict between rich countries and poor countries. But there the population samples were wrong, or they did not correctly interpret the war already going on at the time when the data were collected: the Second Indochina War. One reason for this may be that most of the samples are European, that the Japanese in this regard perhaps react like Europeans and that the Indians were very atypical. The North-South conflict certainly has had belligerent expressions.

Finally, people were also asked "what do you think could be the result of general and complete disarmament" with answers in terms of "world peace", "less probability of war", "personal peace", "less worry", "higher standard of living", and so on. The answers are relatively obvious, but there is another finding of more importance: "the socialist countries (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the question was not asked in Poland) believe much more than others in specific and positive effects of general and complete disarmament. The five"more
developed nations were all highest in being sceptical in GCD. In other words, for the first time in the study the division of the world of which everybody is thinking and talking, and particularly in Europe, shows up at the population level. Not only is war more real to "socialist" Europe: higher probabilities of being totally destroyed if a war should hit the country, and higher probability of the war coming to one's own country. But peace, here in the sense of general and complete disarmament, also seems more real to "socialist" samples. Again we are at another level of analysis. This is not something the respondents are telling us directly. It is something we, the analysts, make evident merely by putting the responses together.

What we learn is simply this: West seems often to feel that East-meaning the leaders of the Eastern block - talk too much about the dangers of war and the blessings of peace in general, and disarmament in particular; and that they are essentially concealing their aggressive intentions and internal repression by doing so. What the data show is that this inclination to take the war/peace dimension very seriously is also found in the population. We have already seen that the population of the socialist countries do not necessarily agree with their leadership; their feelings of being low in autonomy are evidence to the contrary. Hence it cannot necessarily be interpreted as mimicry of party and government people, reflecting "his master's voice". Once more a finding to be taken seriously, this time having an edge against the West. Could it be that peace simply means more to the East? And that there is more, not less, agreement between people and government about peace/war affairs than in the West?

2.6. What is needed to obtain peace? "The sample as a whole showed a considerable level of consensus concerning a set of peace philosophies that can be characterized as liberal and structural, as opposed to conservative and power oriented ones. In general the samples seem to embrace the UN ideology rather than traditional state ideology. Analysis of the national samples seems to indicate that the socialist countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia) are on one end and Great Britain at the other with the others in between, just as is often the case in international politics. The socialist countries seem to emphasize peace through autonomy at the national level, and Great Britain peace through strong world institutions, with the others having more intermediate and eclectic positions. Thus, the dividing line is here
in terms of capitalist vs. socialist. Norway and Finland were closer to the socialist end of the spectrum, India and Spain closer to the British end with Japan and the Netherlands in between. In almost all nations there were more people who were pessimistic about the possibility that the proposal they found most likely to lead to peace would in fact lead to peace (by the year 2000) than there were optimists.

I have repeated that lengthy conclusion, not going into any detail as to the "peace philosophies". The five most popular ones were actually that "hunger and poverty must be abolished all over the world"; "increased trade, exchange and cooperation also between countries that are not on friendly terms"; "improve the United Nations so as to make it more efficient than it is today"; "the gap between poor and rich countries must disappear"; "it must be possible for people all over the world to choose freely their governments". Of course, these are not peace philosophies as really pursued by the governments. What governments pursue is military power policies, and they are not among the popular ones. The idea that "to obtain peace countries must be members of military alliances so that no country or group of countries dare attack others" was one of the least popular ones, it ranked number 17.5 out of 25. But even lower down came the idea of withdrawing from military alliances, it was number 19. In short: "in the popular mind the military approach to peace, whether it is formulated in terms of increasing or decreasing the power potentials of various kinds, does not seem to be generally endorsed".

Nor did people seem to attach much importance for peace/war to the factors of whether the economy should be in private hands, in public hands or both; probably more popular among governments than in the popular mind.

Again one can learn from the respondents seeing how they inform us that the nations of which they are citizens group in connection with peace. Thus, there is a clear socialist cluster of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia, emphasizing abolition of colonialism, abolition of hunger and poverty, non-interventionist autonomy, general and complete disarmament and increased interaction and improvement of UN, even though one finds very
little in the samples from the socialist countries that sounds socialist when they are asked about domestic issues. It looks as if it is international rather than domestic perspectives that define their public opinion as socialist, and set them apart.

Then there is a second cluster of Finland and Norway, a social democratic cluster, emphasizing more the reduction of the gap between poor and rich. It is actually very close to the socialist cluster, and one sees something of Northeastern Europe in this connection.

There is a third cluster of Japan and Netherlands, a liberal democratic cluster, more moralist, emphasizing peace in the family, school and work, and a conservative cluster consisting of Great Britain alone, with much on international interaction and the United Nations, free choice of Government and the use of technical assistance and international peacekeeping forces as instruments to obtain the goals of peace. World interaction and world integration are seen as world instruments, where the socialist cluster emphasized more non-intervention and autonomy. "In other words the liberal and the marxist peace perspective, based on supernationalism and autonomy respectively".

However, they are similar answering the important question "is there anything you yourself can do?" The answers are overwhelmingly negative. When asked what one can do very micro-level answers come out, such as "improve oneself", "improve interpersonal relations", with a few adding "protest, demonstrations". One may add that it is sad that it should be like this, that people feel so powerless. On the other hand, instead of seeing this as a characteristic of the respondents one might see it as a characteristic of the society in which they live: people feel powerless and feel they have to come up with something at the micro-level simply because they are powerless and because this is the only type of thing they are permitted to do. In short, people are simply realistic. Or, as we concluded 18 years ago: "Mankind has so far made for itself a world where the phenomena seen as most threatening to people in general are also the phenomena most beyond what the common person can directly influence". People feel helpless, and they have reasons to feel so.
3. Who were more right, the center or the periphery?

In the preceding section the responses of the samples were compared with what actually happened. We did find that, by and large, the images of the future defined as the "images of the world in the Year 2000" were fairly accurate as predictors of what the world in general and the societies in particular look like midway to the Year 2000, in the year 1985. We might have compared that to a number of statements made by "world leaders" in 1967 in general and by such bodies of institutionalized Western optimism at that time as the European Community in Brussels and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. However, there is always one important methodological problem: whatever the issue - validity for the people in general, and the elites in particular, it is at least clear that the respondent-validity is higher when people are approached in a survey than when elite persons pronounce themselves. The latter are certainly doing politics. If they are issuing predictions at all one may be fairly certain that they are supposed to be self-fulfilling or self-denying rather than just simply predictions. People approached in a survey are hardly engaging in politics in front of an interviewer only, knowing that they are most likely to end up as crosses or dots or circles, punches in a card, magnetic traces on a disk. Their respondent-validity would, in general, be higher.

Hence, in order to keep the level of respondent-validity fairly constant we decided to make comparisons inside the samples obtained as far as this is possible. We are concerned, in general terms, with who were more right, "people higher up" or "people lower down". The question is what is meant by these terms, and the approach taken is an index of social position based on rank, age, income, education, class, occupational sector, ecology (urban - rural) and geography (center - periphery). Unfortunately the index could not be used for India because of the homogeneous nature of that sample, nor for Poland because of missing information. Hence, we were left with eight nations, and with the additional difficulty that the questions on domestic future were not asked in Great Britain. But the index could be constructed, dividing
the population samples into three groups according to social position, "low" (periphery), "medium" and "high" (center). What we then did in many cases was to subtract the values obtained for the periphery from the values obtained for the center to see how much of a social gradient there was in the sample.

To take one example: "Would you like scientific knowledge to make it possible to go to other planets?" As we know from the preceding section the "more developed countries" tended to reject this idea with the exception of Japan where science scepticism was not so effectively at work. What about the differences between center and periphery? They were quite pronounced, although not so pronounced as the national differences. And the relation to the total sample is also quite clear: the lower the acceptance, the higher the center-periphery difference (rank correlation = -0.83). The center defends interplanetary travel, relative to the very negative periphery.

Let us now simply say that science scepticism, development pessimism, development fatigue, and at least short term pessimism where international affairs are concerned, were entirely warranted, at least in the more developed countries in the sample. The general question, then, is: where were these tendencies more pronounced, in the center or in the periphery? Or, to use the terms of the title of this section: who were more right, the center or the periphery? The example we just gave is clear: science scepticism is more pronounced in the periphery than in the center. In fact, six of the eight gradients were positive, meaning more science enthusiasm in the center than in the periphery for cosmic travel.

But let us note that there is a methodological difficulty here. In all surveys the periphery has greater tendency to agree with whatever is presented than the center. Consequently the periphery tendency to accept something is higher than in the less gullible center, and the usual result is a negative gradient. We were actually studying 500 such gradients all together and only 159 of them were positive, or 32%. The item quoted above about whether people would like scientific knowledge to make it positive to go to other planets, in other words, is an extreme case; followed by the corresponding idea for control of the economy, also overrejected by the periphery. In general it is the periphery that overaccepts. And that makes the finding even more interesting.
One simple reason why so few of the gradients are positive is that almost all the items express some elements of change, as a prediction, a preference, or both. But this is not the taste of the center. They tend to prefer the status quo even when not entirely satisfied with it. It is the periphery that would be more grateful for any suggestion of change. Consequently, when the periphery comes up with a rejection of change it is somehow fighting against itself, making the views expressed even more important. In general terms the periphery hopes for change, but does not think there will be much of it. The center thinks there will be change but does not hope for much of it.

And that little insight leads us to a conclusion by looking more specifically at the content of the items. The center sees the future in terms of mental illness and narcotics, the periphery perceives it in terms of more desire for success, more interest in material things, more kindness - and in terms of more criminality and unemployment. Who are right? Both may very well be right - only that the center focuses on center problems and the periphery on periphery problems. Unemployment and criminality as defined and expressed in most societies, hit more at the bottom. Mental illness and narcotics probably hit everywhere, but they will be seen as center problems if the center enjoys an otherwise relatively problem-free existence.

Then, we get an interesting social division of labor between center and periphery when we switch from predictions to hopes for the future. The center is only ahead of the periphery in hoping, (and then only for five out of eight nations) in the field of sexual freedom, whereas the periphery is clearly ahead in hoping for more success, including women in leading positions, more city life, more manual jobs (probably meaning more jobs in general), but preserving the old moral cement of society, attachment to family and to religion. The aspirations of the periphery are modest. Indeed, they look more like implementing old values and ideas than a search for new ones.
As to science attitudes the center is disproportionately sceptical when it comes to peace research. Like peace philosophies in general, by and large, peace research is a periphery favorite. Most insight can be gained from the circumstance that the center is lagging behind the periphery in all countries in wanting science to penetrate into such personal matters as deciding in advance the sex and the personality of a child. These are periphery issues, which makes one think that the center lives such a predictable life that they want to preserve some randomness, whereas the periphery lives more chaotic lives, and consequently, reach out for higher predictability even in personal spheres and in the field of the weather.

This actually matches well with the peace philosophies preferred by the two segments of the populations: the periphery specializes in the micro level, and the center in the macro level. The periphery sees the world more in personal and moral terms; the center thinks along more grandiose lines of international architectonics, military balance, supranational power and what not. But the radical solutions, such as world language and world state are periphery solutions - except in Yugoslavia (projection from own experience?).

But then, to return to the issue of who were right: the important point is that in the more developed countries it is the periphery more than the center that underselects nice things that might happen (happiness, enjoyment of work, friendship) and overselects bad things that might happen (divorce); in the less developed countries it is exactly the other way round (except for enjoyment of work). In other words, the development pessimism or even fatigue of the more developed countries is even more clearly expressed by the periphery than by the center, and the development enthusiasm of the less developed countries even more clearly expressed by the periphery than by the center. What this means is interesting: when it comes to problems of development and science the two centers are closer together than the nations, whereas the peripheries are more extreme versions of what the countries as a whole seem to stand for. So, by and large we may even say that if the more developed countries have not fared too well recently, then periphery scepticism on top of
general population scepticism was warranted. The less sceptical centers were less able to capture, well ahead of time, what seems to be the reality of the situation 18 years later. Once more, the people were right! (so far).

But what about the less developed countries? There the periphery is even more enthusiastic than the center! Again, may be there is some element of realism in that, simply because the level of technical/economic development is different. There is a common center culture, the centers are tilting towards each other in some kind of moderately positive attitude towards development, whether the country is more or less developed. The peripheries are wide apart, perhaps reflecting better the objective position of the country, the frustrations of the more developed and the expectations of the less developed.

On the other hand, however, one should not draw the conclusion that the peripheries in the less developed countries were right. It is legitimate to hope, but the fact still remains that they wanted their countries on a track leading to the situation in which more developed countries find themselves. Again this comes out in the case of Poland: science scepticism, development pessimism and development fatigue must now have set in, to a large extent, in connection with technical-economic variables—and one possible outcome might very well be that the peripheries in such countries are now turning 180 degrees and are even more sceptical, pessimistic and tired than the centers. Maybe because the non-material core as for freedom (in the East) and for identity (in the West) assert themselves over and above the material aspects built into development.

When it comes to problems of peace philosophy the two centers are even further apart than the countries, along the East/West divide. This is not strange. Whereas development, as generally conceived of, has an arrow, making some nations imitate others in a technical-economic sense, the East-West conflict has no such arrow. It is symmetric, whereas the former is asymmetric. Hence, in the East-West conflict we would expect the centers to present more extreme versions of the differences found among the populations in general, and in the comparison between development groups of countries we would, on the contrary, expect a relatively shares center culture. For if development is to some extent an imitation process, whether we like it or not, then it is rather reasonable to assume
that the communication channel for that message would be, precisely, from center to center, and that this would lead to a predominance of items with an oversceptical periphery in the more developed countries, and then an overly enthusiastic periphery in the less developed countries.

Thus, with some hesitation we come to the conclusion that the periphery in the more developed countries had by and large a more realistic view of the situation than the center. The picture is, however, by no means so clear as the picture drawn in the preceding section. For one thing, there is this general overacceptance of change in the periphery, however much it varies from item to item, and from one group of countries to the other. Second, the periphery specializes in some items, more moralistic, more at the micro level; the center in the others. Third, the periphery also overemphasizes the attitude of the less developed countries, but it is difficult to see this as a sign of realism.

And that objection, of course, also applies to the periphery in more developed countries. We might be dealing with attitudes that happened to be right not because of any underlying theory, but because of a certain social dynamism. The strong engagement for the future, no doubt, is found in the periphery inside and among nations. It can be criticized for being conventional, e.g. by the present author, himself a typical center person. But much more significant is the criticism of society for not permitting this engagement to flourish freely, to develop and grow. And it is precisely in this structural mechanism that the source of periphery frustration expressing itself as scepticism and pessimism, may be located, rather than in a more intellectual type of insight.

There is something stifling and stale about the entire way in which the images are woven into the social structure; something unreleased, unborn. It is like a crust of center complacency and scepticism, mixed with some gradualist social technology, thrown over a dormant volcano of wishes and aspirations with some small eruptions here and there - but with too little oxygen to thrive and develop into a cascade of new images and new actions, reaching out
for a new future. In short, it is like a dormant giant, somehow waiting for something to release it into action; a redeemer perhaps, a crisis, something. And if that should happen the centers in the world might be in for many surprises. For the total variation in the images of the year 2000 is considerable, and not easily reconciled into order and quiet—except, precisely, by the type of distribution we have found. And they are not that stable; whether in democracies or in non-democracies.

The present author now oscillates a little between two positions. On the one hand the periphery is more right, in general. It is more right because the structure frustrates the periphery and makes it sceptical in countries that have tasted the medicine of "development" and found it bitter; enthusiastic in countries entering at full speed that particular developmental track. On the other, like the center, they are conditioned in their responses by their position in the structure. They give us insights in how society is operating by exuding scepticism and enthusiasm, and in that way, perhaps, may serve as better pointers to the reality of the society at that particular point in time than the more bland center can ever hope to do. Center gradualism will always be there. But periphery absolutism, pessimistic/sceptical or optimistic/enthusiastic, may tell us more about the direction of the society. Hence, if one wanted to predict in 1967 how the societies are moving one would not be far off if one predicted "towards stagnation" for the more developed countries and "towards growth" for the less developed countries. And that, to my mind, reconciles the two positions fairly well: the periphery as a conscious actor and the periphery as a part of a structure.

Final conclusion: the matter is complex. May be one should simply say that there is very much to learn about these issues from the population at large and that particular attention should be paid to the periphery as a barometer.
4. Concluding Remarks

I would now like to draw two conclusions from this study: first, respect for people who express themselves in a survey, and second, respect for nation as a basic variable.

The first conclusion is already built into the hypotheses in the introduction. I think one should be very careful psychologizing or sociologizing about people. Of course, attitudes, including cognitive attitudes such as descriptions and predictions, are conditioned by personality and society variables. But it is dehumanizing to regard a person's set of attitudes as "merely" an expression of objectively understandable conditioning factors. People are people, in their own right. Their attitudes are theirs, however much they may be correlated with such "objective" factors. More particularly, the psychological, socio-psychological and sociological analysts, myself included, should tend to be more aware of the way in which they themselves are conditioned by such factors, for instance in the way they perceive the conditioning of others. As a very minimum the possibility should also be kept open that people simply could be right, that society should be seen as possibly conditioned by people's attitudes and not only attitudes as conditioned by society. Conditioned, that is, under the condition that they are heard, paid attention to, and given more chances of acting according to their inclinations. If all these three factors are negated, as they so often are, then people become dependent rather than independent variables. One may even see society as a conspiracy to make exactly this happen; but in that case the society should not refer to itself as a democracy, and the social scientist who takes this state of affairs for granted should be aware of what a profoundly undemocratic position he is reinforcing.

Second, of all the ways in which human-kind is divided, by age and gender, by class and nation this particular study seems to indicate that the last of these four important foci, nation, is the most important one for this kind of human concerns. Whether one likes it
or not nations are extremely powerful in organizing people, including their attitudes. And likely to remain so, for some time.

But this finding has one basic consequence, which will not be elaborated here. If attitudes are correlated with nations both in a static and in a more dynamic way, then they become parts of the nation as a social construction. Not so firmly anchored as the geography, but perhaps not so different from governmental political inclinations, only more solid. In other words, he who wants to make models of the world system of nations would have to take this into account. Attitudes, images belong. They are part of the indicators of nations, even powerful parts. And they are indicators in the sense of telling us something ahead of time, certainly not in an infallible way, but which indicator does? If people have a tendency to be right, and those in the periphery even more so, at least in most countries, then we might learn more about the country and its future by asking the people, than about the people by studying the country.

In short: public opinion studies make sense, if and when people are permitted freely to express their images. People are not that stupid. Only those who do not take them seriously are.
NOTES


(3) See Johan Galtung, *There Are Alternatives*, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984, section 2.3, particularly pp. 62ff

(4) It is interesting to note the tendency to focus on only one of these phenomena at the time. Right now, fall 1985, the focus is on new diseases (Aids), but just before that (and still) economic crisis, with debt burden, over- and under-valued currencies etc was in the focus. Unemployment was before that again, and back in the 1970s the civilization diseases as such (mental disorder, cardio-vascular diseases, malignant tumors). But what the public debate separates, and the mass media cannot possibly keep in the public view simultaneously, people in general may keep together, at least at an intuition that things are not going that well at all.

(5) This is also the order used in *Images*, chapter 3.

(6) See chapter 4 for the replication of the study in Poland.

(7) *Loc. cit.*

(8) See *There Are Alternatives*, pp. 165 ff for a theory why the non-aligned countries offer more security for their citizens than the aligned countries. This is reflected in the subjective feelings of the population samples. Of course, the relation also holds the other way: because of fear the country enters an alliance. What then
transpires from the data is that membership in an alliance does not seem to bring that fear down to, or below, the level in non-aligned countries.


(10) See Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1967, section 5.2.

(11) This is basic in a theme I have tried to develop in the years after Images: social cosmology, the deeply held beliefs and patterns of behavior of a civilization, or of a nation, for that matter - seeing a civilization as some kind of macro-nation.

The Images study sensitized me to how significant the nation is in organizing attitudes and images; more so, it seems, than the competitors among the ascribed variables known to sociologists; gender and age, race, and class.