THE WESTERN CULTURAL TRADITION
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

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1. INTRODUCTION

A glance through world history and world social geography is sufficient to give the impression that the propensity for violence is unevenly distributed through time and space. Through social time it may well be that nomadic societies, simple in their division of labour, non-sedentary are among the least belligerent; such as for instance the Eskimos. And looking through social space it seems that purely Buddhist societies, particularly Theravada Buddhists, also are rather peaceful. From this one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that it would be an advantage to humanity if we all were Buddhist Eskimos, or something similar to that. The fact is that we are not. We are, among other things, highly vulnerable industrialized societies dependent on a world-encompassing grid of demand- and supply-networks. And among other things we are also western, and in a broader sense occidental societies, with particular systems of faith - religions - with some very particular characteristics. Without necessarily pitting against each other Christian, industrialized nations, and Buddhist, nomadic societies, the basic point in this paper is certainly that the cultural-structural basis of a society is crucial in determining its possible role as a carrier predominantly of war, or predominantly of peace.

For one approach to this the analysis of social cosmologies may be useful. In the table on the next page an effort is made dividing a considerable part of the world (not including, however, Amerindian, African and Pacific cultures) into Occident and Orient, with Hindu civilisation as an in-between category. (1) The definition used here of "Occident" is that which is rooted in the religions of the Kitab, the Book, the Old Testament - in other words Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The corresponding definition for "Orient" is that which is rooted in Buddhism, both the southern (Theravada), northern (Lamaist) and eastern (Mahayana) schools.
About table 1 very much can be said, but the focus here will be on the last line, how the six cosmologies view the relation to the transpersonal. It is seen here in terms of five dimensions, and in terms of a spectrum ranging from the extreme Occident to the extreme Orient. By the "extreme Occident" one might mean a very individualistic Protestantism, and by the "extreme Orient" a very collectivistic, pure Buddhism. There are all kinds of shades in-between; Catholicism being by and large "more oriental" than Protestantism, Shia Islam perhaps more so than Sunni Islam, Sufism being a very oriental element in Islam; Theravada Buddhism perhaps being more individualistic and in that sense "more occidental" than Mahayana Buddhism, and so on. To some extent this gradient is correlated with geography, and that cannot simply be by chance. But the correlation is by no means a straight line; human history with its ebbs and flows, its currents and counter-currents being far too complicated. Nevertheless it is my thesis that as a rule of thumb there is something to the world civilisation map as indicated in table 1.

Thus, on the one extreme are systems of faith focusing on a personal God; a God who tolerates nobody at His (it is not Her) side being singular, the only one; a God who is universal, for the whole world, for all of human-kind and certainly not only on this earth but also valid for other celestial bodies if they were inhabited by beings capable of relating to a personal God; in other words beings equipped with a personal soul and, hence, with capacity for eternal life.

On the other end of the spectrum one would find almost exactly the opposite. There is no God, hence no transpersonal Being capable of jealousy of other faiths, hence more opening for plural conceptualizations of the universe, coexisting within the same individual. There is no pretense at universalism, the faith is for the
believers, for those who see its truth; others may find it and adhere to it, but there is no compulsion to spread the message to the end of the world, if necessary at the tip of the sword, or accompanied by rewards in this life. (2) The individual is not equipped with a soul, there may be rebirth but not transmigration since there is nothing that migrates from one body to the next, hence no capacity for eternal life detached from this world.

Hence, the conception of salvation could hardly be more different in the two meta-civilizations. In the Occident human beings are equipped with a soul capable of eternal life and the problem is how to gain access to this eternal life. In the Orient as here depicted the problem is how to overcome the illusion of an individuality rooted in a soul capable of existence independent of the body, and that overcoming is in itself a part of the liberation process that leads to the form of extinction known as Nibana (Nirvana). (3)

Just as the concept of salvation is different the method of attaining it becomes very different. In the Occident the relation to God becomes of paramount importance, and the key vehicle for this relation is prayer. In the Orient relation to oneself becomes paramount, and the key vehicle for exploring that relation would be meditation. In both cases it is a question of improving the relation, and this in the Occident would take the form of some kind of submission under God, and in the Orient the form of some kind of mastery over oneself (what that "self" is which attains mastery over some other kind of "self" remains a mystery in Buddhism—at least to those who have not advanced very far in that system of faith. As a mystery it is probably on par with the mystery of God in occidental thought).
However, the key focus here is on the religions as carriers of peaceful or warlike patterns of contact. This is probably more determined by the first three characteristics than by the last two although there is an important relation to be explored later. Off hand one would assume that the system of faith based on a personal God who is singular, excluding others and universal, including all beings would by necessity lead to conceptualizations of the world in terms of centralized world states, with a center in the part of the world where this type of faith is particularly common. Sharp distinctions would have to be drawn between adherents and non-adherents to the faith, possibly with a division of the latter into those who might become adherents and those - the hard periphery - who are beyond conversion because of their total rejection of the faith. Needless to say, one finds this conceptualization of the world both in Christianity and in Islam, and in earlier times also in Judaism before Judaism gave up its pretense at universalism.

Then, on the other hand, would be systems of belief/faith - call them religions or not - without or with very mild pretenses at universalism, and quite willing to accept coexistence with other systems of faith, including what could be called religious ones. Both in China and in Japan there would be millions of people combining Buddhism not only with animistic, nature-oriented religions or systems of faith like Daoism and Shintoism, but also with occidental religions like Christianity. There must be something in Buddhism that encourages this type of amalgamation, and here it is seen in terms of the absence of a centralizing, omnipotent and highly jealous God.

Already in these ideas the nucleus in the bellicose nature of Christianity can probably be located. It is perhaps most clearly expressed in Matthew 28: 18-21-the
missionary command. But it is also found in the many passages in the New Testament where Christ gives expression to what would and what should happen to those who do not share His faith. I do not think one could find anything similar to this in Buddhist teachings. Like all systems of faith there is a distinction between believers and non-believers, and the non-believers are pitied for the implications of their lack of insight. But that is seen as their own responsibility, they are themselves the victims of that which happens when one does not follow the Path; that self-inflicted punishment is more than enough, there is no additional punishment meted out by the believers to the non-believers as is so abundantly found in occidental religions.

But then there is Christianity and Christianity. In table 1 above there is also an other column for the Occident, a more modest Occident, exemplified by the Middle Ages (not the later part, though) whereas the expansionist West is better exemplified by Graeco-Roman societies in Antiquity and by Western imperialism in the last centuries. This may be seen as the under-side of the West, as a mini-version rather than a maxi-version of what the West stands for. The difference is seen clearly in three major expressions of Western social structures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maxi-version</th>
<th>Mini-version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>Vatican system</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inquisition</td>
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<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
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<td></td>
<td>corporations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialism</td>
<td>Macro-planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(inter)governmentalism</td>
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In recent centuries the maxi-version of Christianity has been the dominant one. But the other versions are always there. An Occident based on the second column above is very different from an Occident based on the first column - and this is clearly seen in the peace concepts.
2. PEACE CONCEPTS IN THE OCCIDENT

Peace, however conceived of, is a characteristic of some "system": intra-personal, inter-personal, intra-societal, inter-societal, intra-global (and here we choose to stop). It is a concept applied to a system, hence it will necessarily be colored by the traditions governing concept-formation and system-creation in that civilization. If Occidental civilizations differ from Oriental civilization in the sense that there may be said to be more similarity within than between these vast categories, then this should be reflected in the peace concepts. They are species of a certain genus, and as they refer to vast, ephemeral and deep states or processes, close to or identical with the final goal, the ultimate telos of humankind the genus reflected in them will have to be even more vast, ephemeral and deep. The cosmology or deep ideology of the civilization may be such a concept(4), and in the Western case this would lead to two immediate predictions about peace concepts: they will tend to make a very clear distinction between in-group and out-group, center and periphery or however one might refer to a distinction between "us" and "them"; and they will tend to be universalizing, encompassing the whole (known) universe. The Weber distinction between Binnenmoral and Aussenmoral(5) would be reflected, seeing "peace" as something pertaining to relations within the in-group and war as something referring to relations between in-group and out-group, as well as (but this is less significant insofar as it does not concern "us") relations within the out-group.

Thus, one would expect Western peace concepts to deal with the world as a whole, one way or the other - either by planning "peace" for us in the center as a state of affairs regulating internal relations at the same time as external relations based on defensive or even offensive activities are prepared, or by extending the peace concept to the whole world, universal peace, but in that case according to Western concepts, or even administered from the West, one way or the other. Obviously, these two can be combined in the idea of a iustum bellum against the outgroup, the periphery, a war for peace, a final war, with a view to extend in-group, Western peace to the whole world, by westernizing the world one way or the other.

The Hebrew Tradition. The word "shālôm", often translated as "peace" seems to stand for a relationship between Jahve and His chosen people of Israel, a contract that sooner or later will result in Justice and Prosperity for
that people. One possible interpretation might be that it refers to peace with God, with Jahve/Jehovah, and not with other peoples. As this is a pact that cannot be extended to others proselytizing becomes meaningless: what is meaningful is to raise all Jews to an understanding of this "special relationship". Jahve becomes a tribal god, not a universal god in the standard Western sense. Thus He becomes very exclusive, and His people very much a chosen people, capable of administering peace unto others by virtue of this special relationship:

- He will decide the disputes of the nations, and settle many a people's case, till swords are beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks, no nation draws the sword against another, and no longer shall men learn to fight. (Isaiah,)

- A wonder of a counsellor, a divine hero, a father for all time, a peaceful prince! Great is his authority, endless is his peace, over David's throne and his dominion, to base it firm and stable, on justice and good order, from henceforth and forever - thanks to the jealous care of the Eternal! (Isaiah, Ch. 9)

- He will strike down the ruthless with his verdicts, and slay the unjust with his sentences, Justice shall gird him up for action, He shall be belted with trustworthiness. The wolf shall couch then with the lamb, the leopard's lair shall be the kid's! the lion shall eat straw like any ox, wolf and lion shall graze side by side, herded by a little child -- him shall the nations then consult, and his seat shall be famous. (Isaiah, XI)

- That all nations, races, and folk of every tongue, should serve him; his dominion is a lasting dominion, never to pass away, and his kongdom never shall be overthrown. (Daniel, Ch. 7)

The message seems clear: a Divine Ruler emerges from the Chosen People somehow embodying the pact with Jahve, and by virtue of this relation that "peaceful prince" can decide the disputes of the nations "thanks to the jealous care of the Eternal", he shall be consulted, his seat shall be
famous even to the point that everybody else shall serve him and his dominion will last forever. The structure seems to be something like this:

Jahve
  Divine Prince
  Chosen People
    Nation, race, tongue_1
    Nation, race, tongue_2
    ..............
    Nation, race, tongue_n

Peace in the sense of settled disputes, swords into ploughshares and all those animals side by side is not seen as a relation directly among nations, races and tongues, but as something that comes about by consulting and serving "Him". Shālōm is vertical, a pact fortifying the Jahve-Divine Prince-Chosen People relation, making it possible for them to work such wonders. No wonder that "Thou shalt not kill" from the Decalogue seems to "refer to private murder, and do not seem to be prohibitory of organized war"(7), for much war may be needed to "strike down the ruthless with his verdicts, and slay the unjust with his sentences".

The Early Christian Tradition. Maybe Jesus of Nazareth identified with Daniel's "he", maybe not(8). At any rate, the teachings of Christ seem to differ in a very significant way: there is the special relation with "my Father in the heavens", but there is not the reference to the Chosen People (that may have come later, almost definitely by the time Constantine made Christianity religio lecita, +313). Jesus spoke of a New Order, a basileia, a Kingdom/Commonwealth of God/the Heavens – and "My kingdom is not of this world". Bouquet sees in Jesus Christ peace in the sense of agapē, "the verbal synonym and embodiment of active good-will, self-giving and all-embracing"(9). The best expression is found in the Sermon on the Mount, for instance:

- "When you are reviled and persecuted and lied about because you are my followers — wonderful!
Be happy about it! Be very glad!
for a tremendous reward awaits you up in heaven.
And remember, the ancient prophets were persecuted too.

(Matthew 5:11-12)
There is reference to the prophets - like in the famous (verse 17): "Don't misunderstand why I have come - it isn't to cancel the laws of Moses and the warnings of the prophets. No, I came to fulfil them, and to make them all come true." But there is no special position for the Chosen People, not even for "my followers" who are not promised that they will be consulted and served and establish an ever-lasting dominion -- in this life. Whatever rewards are for the afterlife (Matthew, 5:3-10). And then he goes on even contradicting Moses on eye-for-eye, tooth-for-tooth -- "But I say: Don't resist violence! If you are slapped on one cheek, turn the other too" (5:39).

What all this means in terms of peace practice is far from clear - had it been clear "my followers" would have disagreed less among themselves throughout two millennia. What seems clear, however, is that peace is also here a derived relationship between people, derived from the relation each one should have to "my Father in Heaven", as told to them by Jesus Christ. The supreme virtue and goal is in the relation to God and Jesus Christ; a peaceful relation among men will follow if the former is correct. It becomes like the figure above for the Hebrew tradition, without the Chosen People. As for Jesus all peoples seemed to be equal, and all of them potentially equally much "my followers" (Matthew, 28:18-20) he of course could not be the Messiah of the Chosen People only - and was in fact the founder of a new religion. Peace is still steered by the relation to God, but whereas in the Hebrew tradition it was then to be imposed and administered by the Chosen People, in the early Christian tradition it would follow from correctly enacting the Christian faith. Later on the Chosen Church and the Princes ordained by it took the place of the Chosen People.

The Islam Tradition. Islam seems to be very typical of the general Western pattern, with a clear dichotomy of the world in two abodes or "houses", the dar-al-islam (the House of Islam, the house of peace) and the dar-al-harb, the house of war\(^\text{10}\). Peace within, war among the non-believers - and "in theory there was always a condition of hostility between the two dars, and although it was open to preach Islam persuasively, the caliph or his officers were expected to offer, either capitulation and the payment of jizya, or else a fight to the death"\(^\text{11}\). As for Christianity so also for Islam: everybody was a potential believer as Allah is a universal god; and to make Islam dominant in the world "Moslem lawyers have distinguished four different ways by which the believer may fulfil his obligation to
jihad ("struggle", "exertion"), by his heart, his tongue, his hands and his sword"(12).

Thus, jihad may become a justum bellum but does not have to; one obvious condition is whether the military power would be sufficient(13). "Relations with the dar-al-harb did not mean continuous fighting, but a permanent state of hostility"(14). It should be noted that this is very different from the Hebrew concept since Jahve was not for all to enter into a pact with. Under the Hebrew tradition one might go to war to impose Jahve's will as revealed to His people; under Islam (like under later Christianity) to impose a direct link to Allah/God from which peace would follow - as the outsider now would come inside the dar-al-Islam where peace should reign. One may agree with Ishida, however, when he says that "the fierce antagonism between Israel and the Arab countries -- seems to have been caused partly by a common tradition of monotheism and a similar militant concept of peace as a realization of justice by the divine will"(15). And yet there is a difference between wanting to bring others inside (Islam) and forever keeping them outside (Judaism) - the two monotheisms are both compatible with aggression, but are nevertheless quite different.

The Greek Tradition. By and large the picture seems clear, with the highly important exception of Alexander the Great (but then he was a Macedonian, not a Greek): eirene ("peace") is an in-group relation as is also homonoia ("harmony")(16). It should apply to the household, to the village, to the city-state - and the maximum extension, a very audacious one, would be to all Greeks. Major figures in Western civilization, such as Plato and Aristotle, drew very sharp lines between Greeks and barbarians. The non-Greeks were only fit to be slaves - to Aristotle there were races born to be masters and races born to be slaves; the latter to be treated like animals or plants. "Plato said that disorder in Hellas was worse than a war against outsiders, since barbarians were the natural enemies of the Greeks"(17). Sparta was admired by Plato (and by Diogenes, Zeno, Rousseau and Nietzsche). Isocrates was the universalist among them: he wanted all Greeks united in brotherhood, and then war against the Persians to make slaves out of them. The concept of "natural enemy" is important here: it makes peace thinking extended to relations with the out-group, not to mention within the out-group, meaningless. The relation will forever remain one of enmity, and relations within the in-group are either uninteresting (who cares how plants relate to each other?) or brutish.
Alexander the Great seems to have wanted homonoia extended to a politeia which would be a world state, and not only that: he also seems to have thought in terms of koinonia, partnership, between Macedonians and Persians, i.e. not a politeia with a center where he himself came from(18). W.W. Tarn in his famous book about Alexander seems to argue that Zeno and the Stoics in general have it from Alexander rather than vice versa - an Alexander obviously inspired by the peoples he had beaten in war. However this is it should be noted that the Greek concepts of relate people to each other directly, not via faith in a god or submission to chosen and the believers. The concept is rational, as one would expect from the Greeks, not metaphysical(19).

The Roman Tradition. The Roman pax, related to pactum (pacta sunt servanda) was also a direct concept of order (including absence of violence) and unity - but no doubt an order and a unity with a center - the center of the Roman Empire(20). Homonoia became concordia ("harmony"), extended, like citizenship, ultimately to everybody living in the Roman Empire and accepting the rulings from the center. The philosophical underpinning may have come from Stoics, but it is hard to believe that the Romans did not also have a relatively clear distinction between the Empire and the barbarians outside. Homonoia among all Greeks, incidentally, would have had to be based on some kind of balance of power because of the multi-centric (or at least bi-centric) structure of the Greek world; concordia in the Roman Empire could be and had to be uni-centric. The Romans did not have to develop a balance of power philosophy as a basis for peace. They developed law, "through the writings of Cicero, Stoic notions passed into Roman Law, and Law came to occupy the place of religion for many Romans. Many of the sentences in the U.N. Charter read like passages from Cicero"(21). Marcus Aurelius, of course, was a Stoic.

The pax romana, then, in the peak period of the Roman Empire (say, under the Antoninies) was "peace" in the sense of "absence of violence", but certainly not in the sense of justice and prosperity for the periphery of the Empire - and the barbarians, at least the distant barbarians, were not included in the pax. As a concept it was compatible with the type of system that ultimately proved too exploitative, both of nature and of the internal and external proletariats. At the same time it was a system that facilitated centralized bureaucracy and trade and taxation, enriching a numerically small elite in the center(22). This is important, for these are among the
connotations or correlates of pax as a system of law, a jus gentium that evidently served some much better than others. Nevertheless this is the dominant peace concept in the Western world, internal order and unity, often exploitative, with si vis pacem, para bellum (in fact also against internal revolts).

The Middle Ages. The interesting thing about this period, the Oriental time pocket in Occidental history, is that it did not produce peace plans. Of course, there was a conception: the pax oecumenica or pax ecclesiae Christian Commonwealth, outlined in Augustine's De Civitate Dei. As the successor system to the Roman Empire in the West was a large number of relatively small units, by and large with the same faith, this could work with the Church as a unifying factor, perhaps with normative rather than remunorative or punitive power. Wars were of smaller scale because the political units also were or a smaller scale. Although different from the Roman Empire and perhaps resting on a common faith more than on common law, the system was still at a higher level uni-centric. However, the basic reason why it worked was perhaps precisely that the units were small and not too concerned with what went on outside themselves - that came later. No doubt the basic meaning given to any word that might have been translated as "peace" during this period must have been "inner peace, peace of the soul, of the mind".

The Modern Period. The contrast with the "modern period", which is here dated from the high Middle Ages, the "Middle Ages Renaissance", is considerable. In a sense the whole story of Western peace plans is the story of the two themes mentioned in the beginning of this section: in-group/out-group and universalism, but then a universalism with the center in the West. To quote some of the most important examples:

"INGROUP PEACE AGAINST THE OUTGROUP" PROJECTS

1306  Pierre du Bois De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae
       General peace in Christendom to reconquer the Holy Land

1324  Marsiglio di Padova Defensor Pacis

1460  Marini, for George Podebrad
       Federation of Christian princes to fight the Turks
       Henry VIII (England) and Francois I (France)
       Universal peace with collective security against the Turks
1620 Duc de Sully, for Henri IV (France) Grand dessein
Europe as a federation of 15 states using arbitration, designed to
limit the power of the Habsburg dynasty and for war with the Turks

1814 Henri St. Simon
European Federation, starting with England-France, others join
Federal parliament, central administration of utilities as Europeans
are racially superior, Europeans should colonize (shadow of the
Churchill 1940 plan and the European Community)

Many more could be mentioned. However, the political reality went in
another direction, or, rather, practised the ingroup/outgroup idea not at
the federation level but at the nation-state level. The idea of peace
within the nation-state, and any kind of behavior without, becomes the domi-
nant theme - in other words, the peace area contracts, leaving a mosaic of
more or less homogeneous states in shifting alliances, but basically eleva-
ting the vice of amorality at the international level into a virtue. The
ingroup/outgroup plans mentioned have at least a federal element in them
because they are alliances: the tradition carried by NATO and WTO in our
days.

Thus, Machiavelli saw amorality in the behavior among the Italian city-state
not only as a fact, but also as a norm - the question was how to do it as
well as possible. One may ask: where is the peace concept in that, and the
answer is all the time: within. Jean Bodin (1530-96), in De Republica
elaborates a theory of the unified state with central authority vested in
the monarch, this is where the summa potestas is located, majestas. But it
is for Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) to formulate a more explicit, although
rather minimal, peace theory in Leviathan. There is a covenant between
people and their sovereign whereby the sovereign protects them against each
other since their natural tendency is to get at each other's throats where-
by life becomes "nasty, brutish and short". But there is a price to pay for
this covenant and the effective rule by the sovereign: "People thereafter
have no right to rebellion, because the convenant obliges them to obey the
sovereign power, whereas the sovereign is not bound by any contract."(26)
Moreover, "The relations among states are conceived by Hobbes as being ana-
logous to those among men in the state of nature, i.e. war of all against
all", the bellum omnium contra omnes.(27)

In the Peace of Westphalia (1648) this system is crystallized(28), "a death-
blow to the lingering notion that all Christendom was a unity". Since this
is by and large the dominant system today, the major rationalizations, in
this context are the efforts to show that it is peace productive. Thus, to G.W. Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) "people afraid to tolerate sovereignty at home fall prey to subjugation from abroad"(29). Universal peace will never work, for each unit will dialectically create others as their enemies - a peace federation somewhere will create an antagonistic federation or state elsewhere. "The state is an individual and individuality essentially implies negation."(30) Bu endowing the state with individuality, like an organism with personality, German cleverness in theory construction, essentialism and reification (not to mention deification, here of the military, the absolutist state) is made ample use of. Thus, there is a direct line Machiavelli-Hobbes-Hegel and Fichte - to which von Clausewitz (1780-1831) added romanticization of war, so did Rousseau (who "did not decry war, but took it as the test of true spirit")(31) - and, of course, Nietzsche (1844-1900) with his distinction between Herren-moral and Herden-moral, and his contempt for Buddhism, Christianity and humility which "is but a disguise for the will to power"(32).

The logical culmination of this is, of course, nazism/fascism, for instance as formulated by the Italian theoretician of fascism Alfredo Rocco (Mussolini's minister of justice). He traced his ideas back to Greece, to "the twin concepts of a regimented military state, and a sovereign state based on inequality and entitled to demand the sacrifice of individuals when necessary"(33). Like Aristotle he believed that men were fundamentally and need dictatorship by an elite at home; that democracy is impossible as seen in the Greek city-state (Plato!) and the Italian cty-state (Machiavelli!), and that states in order to offer internal security and enough food to eat - the two great benefits for the people - have to be strong (and vice versa). So, here is the state divided into free men and slaves, essentially, offering the satisfaction of basic material needs (security and welfare) and internal order (the trains running on time) in return for giving the elites a free hand, within and without.

"UNIVERSALISM WITH A WESTERN CENTER" PROJECTS

We shall only mention some, and one should note the difference in the authors: this is where the great spirits enter, the philosophers also well known from other fields. It took that kind of person to think large, in universal terms - the others mentioned above were too tied to statesmen and politicians, too busy adjusting thinking to their power politics, one might surmise. Maybe it also took the kind of invulnerability real greatness bestows on some
people to think that large and yet get away with it - even to the point of getting into the annals of political thought. (34)

1310 Dante Alighieri De Monarchia
An universale imperium, the whole world united under supreme government, secular; and all of it ruled according to Roman Law.

1517 Desiderius Erasmus The Complaint of Peace
Inter-state arbitration by a body consisting of the Pope, bishops, abbots and "wise men" - with an ethical basis.

1625 Hugo Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis
Sovereign states to be bound by international law, an assembly of Christian princes to deliberate and propose sanctions.

1692 William Penn An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe
"The first scheme which openly says that no universal peace is possible without the inclusion of Russians and Turks."

1713 Charles Réné Castel de St. Pierre Paix Perpétuelle (edited by Rousseau 1761) although conceived of as a republique européenne, it was not directed against anybody and looked on principle open. Plenipotentaries of Sovereigings to meet in permanent Council, to settle matters by arbitration; chairmanship on rotation; expenses shared; internal self-determination; no armed force to be used by individual states; sanctions against offenders.

1786 Jeremy Bentham A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace
Anti-colonialism, International Court of Judicature, a Congress or Diet of States, abolition of secret diplomacy - decisions made by the people themselves; all Christians to support peace.

1795 Immanuel Kant Zum ewigen Frieden
States cannot be traded with, not being a patrimonium but a society of people; standing armies to be gradually abolished; non-intervention; restraint if there is a war; republican constitutions; Law of Nations based on federations; submission to Providence, living according to Natural Law; consult philosophers.

Here we choose to stop. There is universalism, yet a limitation to Roman Law, the Christian Pope, Christian Princes, Europe (but not in an aggressive way), and even Bentham and Kant did not question the universality of their thinking - relying on Christians and philosophers (of their own kind).

How would one place marxism in this picture? It is original in many ways, yet very Western. It combines the ingroup/outgroup principles with universalism with a Western center very well. Thus, it is Hegelian with the difference that for states are substituted classes; "peace" in the Marxian sense to be obtained by maximum ingroup peace - working class solidarity - which will provoke dialectically even more cohesiveness on the other side. But then there is the transcendence in a sense missing in Hegelian thinking:
the contradiction will be overcome by the proletariat asserting itself over the bourgeoisie, possibly through armed struggle and a period of dictatorship, in one country after the other. Only in a world of socialist states can there be peace, (1) because there is no longer exploitation within the countries and (2) because the forces in capitalism that make for external war (securing raw materials and markets to make accumulated capital profitable) are no longer present. Marxism has been concerned with the infrastructure of peace, with the forces making for war, more than with the superstructure, the architectonics of peace — with very important contributions to the former, very little in terms of how socialist states should be organized so as to secure peace (beyond the idea of preventing them from sliding back to capitalism). Peace concept would emphasize justice in the sense of absence of exploitation not in the sense of absence of violence.

The idea is universal in the sense of applying to all countries, and rooted in the West by assuming that all countries will go through the Stufengang (slave, serf, capitalist, socialist) of the West. To bring a non-Western society into History by hitching it solidly into the Stufengang is, consequently, a way of working for peace in the long run — which produces the strange result that colonialism ultimately comes out as work for peace, as progressive. On the other hand, "peace" does not belong to the Marxian vocabulary in any fundamental way; hence this is not included here as a "peace plan".

Looking through these Western plans it is interesting to see how little has happened since. The International Court of Justice is obviously a reflection of what Grotius wrote in 1625; the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations reflections of what St. Pierre published in 1713. Both of them must have been deeply impressed by belligerent forces let loose by the emerging state system, trying to tame these forces, yet respect them. One may say that the West today is gambling on both main tendencies at the same time: both the ingroup/outgroup principle as reflected in the si vis pacem para bellum systems of the NATO and the WTO, or the OECD/EC/CMEA systems in the economic fields, and the Western-centered universalism of the United Nations family. If the latter is becoming less Western-centered it is against the protest of the West. Alexander the Great's homonoia at the world politeia level, his koinonia, is still very far from being realized — and it is not even very clear what it might mean.
Alexander wanted partnership between the Macedonians and the Persians; it does not look as if he wanted either to change and become like the latter. The Western approach if the shoe does not fit is to change the foot - to westernize other countries until they fit a Western model. The key tool here is state-formation, the building of the state as an organization, with its summa potestas, ready and ripe to join a union of states.

In conclusion, let us try to capture the evolution in Western thought in diagrammatic form:

A circle is a peace system with low probability of war.

I stands for the Greek ingroup/outgroup system

II for the Roman ingroup/outgroup system with Herrschaft from the center rather than Partnerschaft

III for the vague arrangement during the Middle Ages, chaotic, fluid, secured through normative power among others sources

IV for the modern period replay of the Greek ingroup/outgroup model

V for the modern period replay of the Roman centrist model, for the whole world, and

VI for true Partnerschaft universalism - so far not even worked out on paper for reasons to be explored in 3 and 4 below.
3. PEACE CONCEPTS IN THE ORIENT

It is probably correct to say that the Orient is far more heterogeneous in cosmology than the Occident; yet some cross-cutting characteristics of the peace concepts produced in the Orient may at least be put forward as working hypotheses. Thus, it is not to be expected that Oriental concepts will be universal, applying to all of humankind. This is not because they did not know the rest of the world, nor because they did not care - after all the outside world was invading for instance India almost incessantly. Rather, it may be because what is outside their own kind, however that is defined, is seen as to profoundly different that they are not even included in the cosmologies as a periphery to be exploited. In other words, the civilizations in the Orient are here seen as conceiving of themselves as more self-contained: when plans are made it is for themselves. Their concern in not global architectonics on their own premises or not; their concern is to come to grips with themselves. Where the Occident - except for the Middle Ages - was extrovert and centrifugal, always feeling it had to strive for a "global reach" in action or at least in theory and conceptually, the Orient is more introvert, more centripetal (38).

This should also lead to another difference. The ultimate in extrovert peace planning is peace for the universe; the ultimate in introvert peace planning is the peace in one's own soul, intra-personal peace, harmony of mind. As the former should be overrepresented in the Occident the latter should be overrepresented in the Orient, relatively speaking. But since neither world can be defined as the horns of clearcut dilemmas there will be something of each in both - only that the emphasis, the point of gravity may differ. The basic point is to establish some relation between the way peace is conceived of and the general cosmological orientation found in the civilization on the one hand and the social interests of those who formulate the peace plans - or peace concepts in the Oriental case - on the other.

The Indian Tradition. In the classical Hindu caste system the warriors, the kshatriyas were second to the top, to the brahmins. This had at least three consequences: war was conducted by a caste, hence circumscribed by rules, not developing into the all-out warfare that professionalism may lead to. On the other hand, their high position testifies to the far from pacifist nature of Hindu society. And then, on the other hand again: not being quite on the top like the military feudal lords in Europe and the
Samurais in Japan opened for ways of domesticating belligerent inclinations, and also for thinking about peace different from peace as order and unity, as absence of war within and preparation for war without; so typical of the Western tradition. Thus, the Hindi word for "peace", shanti, seems best to be understood as "a well-ordered state of mind"(39).

In the tradition of Jainism "everything possesses a soul. Since the universe is and organic whole, governed by cosmic order, all the living beings in it are fellow members of one another. The universe is a sort of republic of souls, having no creator, and no master except the moral law that governs them"(40). "The supreme virtue, according to Jainism is non-injury to all living beings (ahimsā)." The basic assumption is that "we are members of a creator-less republic of souls"(41), and - probably - that the relation between our bodies should reflect the relations that exists in that republic. Diagrammatically it may look something like this:

![Diagram of Jainism](image)

Albert Schweitzer seems to be in this tradition.

In the tradition of Buddhism a step forward is taken beyond ahimsā interpreted as (passive) abstention from injury to an interpretation in terms of compassion, good works and reconciliation of ahimsā with justice. "This, in Buddhism it ceases to become negative, and gains a positive value."(42) But then the metaphysics is different: "we are one with all because there is no self"(43), and "to identify oneself with a particular body and think others as foreign is irrational in a world which is a continuance of interconnected events"(44). Thus, Buddhism seems to establish an even stronger interconnectedness between human beings:

![Diagram of Buddhism](image)
The first Buddhist vow, "I take upon myself the vow of abstaining from causing hurt to human beings" comes natural, but this is the limited interpretation of ahimsā, and even more limited than the jainist concept as it applies to human beings, not to all life. Like for Jainism it should be noticed that there is no God, no Divine Prince - it just is like this, it is a question of seeing in a deep sense the Truth of this, and act accordingly. Human beings are related not indirectly by having the same Creator of all human beings, the same Father in Heaven (which would make us all siblings who should love each other because we have the same Father); human beings are "coupled" directly, and even more so in Buddhism than in Jainism.

In the tradition of Gandhism this is carried still a step further. Gandhi, the Hindu, seems to come closer to the Buddhist than the Jainist interpretation of ahimsā, but it adds to a positive interpretation a positive method, satyagraha(45). The oneness of all human beings, and indeed all life, is the basic premise: not only that to hurt one is to hurt us all, but also the positive aspect that whatever good one does is done to us all. Whereas in Christianity the souls seem to be detached from each other, only attached to God so that whatever one does of good or bad is done to (registered in) God; both in Jainism, Buddhism and Gandhism the coupling is direct.

The Chinese Tradition. As opposed to Europe, India and Japan the military do not appear in the classical caste/class systems - they seemed to have no social status at all(46). Most revered were the intellectuals, and then particularly the sages who in "The period of hundred philosophers", from -500, were both prolific and dominant. There was the Buddhist trend with its collectivist emphasis, the Taoist trend, also metaphysical, but dialectic, and then the Confucian tradition, assuming "an affirmative attitude to the secular world, unlike traditional Indian ethics, the aim of which was to escape from the world"(47). Just as for India the concept of peace directed the attention inwards -- it was unconcerned with the outside world and the relation to it, very much concerned with the inner state of mind, and the inculcation of personal virtue in the individual and with the political order, which as usual with include absence of violence. As an indication of how close these concepts came to each other in Chinese thinking Ishida maintains that the same two characters were used, in the order ho p'ing to denote political order, and in the order p'ing ho to denote "a well-ordered state of mind". However, as if this were not
close enough, either order of writing could also carry the other meaning.

The Japanese tradition. Ishida finds similarities with the Chinese, which is not strange given the use of Chinese characters, and the influence of Buddhism. On the other hand, the military samurai had a leading position in the hierarchy, and shintoism, very much revived after the transformation of Tokugawa feudalism into Meiji nationalism\(^{(48)}\) was clearly nationalistic and provided the context within which the Emperor was seen as divine (he had to renounce this status in the famous broadcast during the US occupation). Thus, the Japanese concept heïwa (and its parallel, wahei) had the same double meaning as the Chinese counterparts. It implies an adaptation to a social order, both in social action and in state of mind, but that social order was more nationalistic and more pyramidal than China. Hence, peace = heïwa = harmony (showa is another term) may simply mean not to disturb the war effort.

But this is the concept we also know from the Western tradition in general: peace within, in order better to deal with the outside. Of course, Japan being very small relative to the land masses that make up India and China; she has to relate to the outside, to gai-koku (outside-country, "abroad") - by isolation (Tokugawa period) by imperialist aggression (from the Sino-Japanese war 1894-95 till the capitulation in 1945 - fifty years), by economic expansionism with "peaceful" means (say, 1955 till ?). Japan is one, very homogeneous, geographically well-defined\(^{(49)}\), and after Meiji organized according to the twin maxims of verticality and collectivism - by and large. Had Japan had sufficiently similar neighbors peace thinking in the sense of (co)federations within, various types of defensive or aggressive behavior without might have ensued - and there would have been the Western succession of peace plans by federating a small part of the world. What would not have developed in Japanese thinking, however, would have been the universalism of Western thought. One thing is to relate to gai-koku, seeing it as a threat or as a resource or as both; quite another to try to think in terms of the world as a whole. More recently it may look as if Japan is catching up with the Western strategy of using universal organization for their purpose, but their contributions to these organizations seem to be limited to plans for their own elevation into higher positions\(^{(50)}\).
Thus, the thesis may be put forward - not a very original one - that there is an intimate connection between peace thinking and the geo-political situation of the country/region that produces it; not only between peace thinking and the general social cosmology. Since geo-politics is in the hands of the elites peace thinking will reflect their interests, but at the same time it has to be built on concepts that are intra-paradigmatic in that cosmology and couched in terms that are meaningful in more than a purely linguistic sense.

4. CONCLUSION

Can any conclusion be drawn from this, no doubt incomplete, review of peace concepts along the Occident-Orient gradient? I think so, and it is a relatively important one: the Occidental concepts tend to be too outer-oriented, including taking on the role as global architects, and the Oriental concepts tend to be too inner-directed. One senses the influence of the two conceptualizations of the trans-personal in the Occidental and the Oriental traditions: the centralizing, omnipotent God in the one, the search for conciliation with Him; and on the other side the search "nach Innern", the search for inner peace. The former may easily lead to the idea that it is compatible with almost any inner life, even the most material and greedy. The latter is compatible with almost any idea of global organizations as long as there is inner peace and harmony. Western, and Japanese, imperialism are the outcomes of this type of "tolerance".

In a sense humankind has been short-shifted by these constructions. The lack of a sufficiently broad spectrum from the micro via meso to macro levels gives more freedom to humans, but it does not produce peace. A peace conceptualization spanning the whole spectrum may lay the foundation for peace, but also tends to demand too much. Gandhism may be an example: the closest in our survey to an all-encompassing peace philosophy, reflecting the in-between position of Hindu civilization, retaining some individualism, shading over into Buddhism via Jainism. But Gandhi demanded too much. He was effectively exorcised, like Buddhism before him to that outpost of the real Orient, Sri Lanka [where both can be found together in the Sarvodaysa movement]. So, the search is on. And the Occident has so far not come up with an answer sufficient for our predicament.
The present paper, prepared for the Gujarat Vidyapith Peace Research lecture Nov. 82, is based on two approaches to the problem of relation between peace and culture by the present author. Both of them come out of a research project on Trends in Western Civilization supported by the Berghof Stiftung for which I would also in this connection like to express my deep gratitude.


Second, there is my own ongoing work on social cosmologies of various civilizations - hinted at in Table 1. In this work religious thought plays a [not necessarily the] fundamental role. The work is only made use of here as a loose framework to place better the conceptualizations of peace.


[2] This actually points to a typology of missionary activity, depending on whether it is based on merely giving the message, and/or rewarding materially those who convert and/or punishing physically those who do not. In saying that Christianity and Islam are proselytizing one might actually mean that they engage in all three, at least if they can, and in addition that they are universal in their ambitions. As a part of the more modest pose of Christianity in the world to day may come a truncated missionary activity where not only punishment but also reward (as as linked to development assistance) are given up.

[3] These are actually so different that one may wonder whether the term "religion" should really apply to them all.
6. The presentation is based on Ishida, p. 136, and Bouquet, pp. 35-9. Neither of them emphasizes the Chosen People aspect as much as is done in this presentation.
7. Bouquet, p. 38 - he refers to it as the sixth commandment, should be the fifth.
8. Bouquet, on whom we are leaning for this section, feels Jesus came to this identification "towards the close of his earthly life", (loc.cit.). There is of course the possibility that Jesus made use of an empty status, that of the Messiah, meeting some of the requirements, reinterpreting others. In my view a very basic difference is in Jesu transcendence from the ingroup/out/group tradition to the universalism tradition in Western thought. With the institutionalization of Christianity, its incorporation as religio lecita in the Roman Empire and the emergence of a strong hierarchical Catholic church a regressive movement back to the ingroup/outgroup tradition, culminating in the Crusades of the late Middle Ages (or Early Modern Period) and the regressive missiomanirism of later centuries started.


13. As at present petro-dollars to a large extent are recycled through the acquisition of arms, and arms that can very well be used for offensive warfare at that, this opens for some interesting perspectives.


15. Ishida, p. 137.


17. Ishida, loc.cit.

18. Bouquet, pp. 31ff. There are very few cases like this in peace thinking, but then it may also be mainly apocryphical.

19. Unless, that is, one accepts the Greek superiority complex as metaphysics.


22. See Galtung, Heiestad, Rudeng, "On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared", in Maco-History and Western Civilization, forthcoming.


24. Dimitriu (op.cit., p. 2) makes a distinction between two types of civilization, contemplative and action-oriented. The former will tend to develop peace concepts focussing on peace of mind and individual discipline; the latter will be oriented towards unity, prosperity, organization and collective action. The distinction is a fruitful one as long as it is not taken to coincide with the Orient/Occident distinction: there are highly action-oriented philosophies in the Orient as there are contemplative philosophies in the Occident.

26. Murty, p. 220. Of course, people have the right of self-defence against the sovereign, it is only the sovereign that protects them that can command absolute obedience. "Hobbes laid the foundations for an absolutist theory of the state" (loc.cit.), no doubt of importance for the fascist formula.

27. Murty, loc.cit.

28. Murty, p. 219. Of course, the internal process of building a state, with the slow emergence of a state bureaucracy based on contract rather than the feudal and more local relationship between lord and servant had started earlier, in the sixteenth century - in the Ottoman Empire even before that.

29. Murty, p. 221.

30. From Hegel, Philosophy of Right, quoted from Murty, p. 222.


32. Murty, p. 228.

33. Murty, p. 214. It is important to see Aristotle and Plato in this perspective, it leads to a much clearer view of Western civilization. From Greek Antiquity via the Renaissance to twentieth century fascism (and it should be remembered that the latter by its creators was seen as a second Reanissance after the Italian city-states failed) there is a relatively straight line.

34. For references, see fotnot 25 above.

35. One is reminded of how socialist countries seem to explain lack of ability to solve conflicts (Soviet Union-Yugoslavia, Soviet Union-China) between them by resorting to the "explanation" that the other party is no really socialist. The explanation has to be located in the intra-social, not in the inter-societal structure - perhaps rightly so, but it is hard to escape the feeling that more creative thought and practice at the inter-societal level might also have been possible. Given the focus on intra-societal explanations the right to intervention to prevent a country from sliding back to capitalism becomes a logical, almost foregone, conclusion as peace-promoting policy.

36. For a very extensive analysis of this aspect of marxist thought see Miklós Molnár, Marx, Engels et la politique internationale Gallimard, Paris, 1975; parts IV: "Marx et Engels face a l'expansion coloniale I: Le monde asiatique", pp. 189-290.

37. One might hope for a shortening of this lag time (around 250 years): the world can hardly wait that long for some major restructuring to take place.

38. This is, of course, basic in thecosmology theory referred to in footnote 4 above. For a beautiful way of stating it, take this long quote from Murty (p. 215):

"At the Congress of Vienna Czar Alexander objected to the inclusion of Turkey in the Law of Nations on the ground that it was barbarian. Similarly, Islamic culture laid it down that all the non-Muslim
world (dar-al-harb) must be subdued and brought under control by the Muslim world (dar-al-Islam). On the contrary, the Hindu politi-
cal thinkers insisted that a Hindu emperor's domains should not 
extend beyond India, Afghanistan and Ceylon /this is from 
Mahābhārata, XXVII, 25/ Hindu thinkers conceived it was right to 
achieve a sort of unity by establishing hegemony of one state over 
others withing the same world of culture; they prohibited aggres-
sion against states belonging to other worlds of culture; as 
against this some Greek, Christian and Islamic thinkers thought it 
was right to wage wars against alien cultures."

Chinese practice throughout the millennia seems to indicate that they 
are on the same line as the Hindu tradition. Thus, the Western tradition 
is imperialist and also universalist (as it would say itself), the other tradition is geographically more restricted (although the 
land masses are large, and, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, beware!), but 
also isolationist (as their enemies or detractors would say). Murty, 
himself an India, is well aware of this doubleness and goes on to 
say (loc.cit.):

"Hindu civilization remained stagnant and decayed, because the 
militarism implicit in its political theory caused the states of 
which it was made up to collide in perpetual destructive inter-
neceine conflicts. In such a sucidal process the social fabric as 
well as the cultural unity are torn asunder and become easy prey 
to foreign inroads. The other policy serves to preserve internal 
unity so long as the concept of sovereignty of individual states 
does not raise its ugly head, and enables the aggressive culture 
to dominate over other peoples and cultures and enjoy great 
prosperity at the expense of subject peoples. The Roman Empire 
both before and after Constantine and the Ottoman Empire serve to 
illustrate this. Both fell because of their luxury, intoxication 
with victory and the poverty of masses, as well as of rift 
within."

39. Ishida, p. 134. The term does not appear at all in the Bouquet-Murty 
book.
40. Murty, pp. 176f.
41. Murty, p. 185.
42. Murty, p. 183.
43. Murty, p. 186.
44. Murty, p. 182.
45. The books in this field are so numerous that the best the reader can 
do is to read Gandhi's own words, e.g., in Non-Violence in Peace and 
War, I & II, M. Desai editor, Navajivan, many printings. For one 
analysis, see Johan Galtung and Arne Naess, Gandhi's Politiske Etikk, 
46. Thus, in the shi-nō-kō-shō of Japan the shi included the belligerent 
samurai, in the shih-nung-kung-shang of China the shih, nor any other, 
includes the military.
47. Ishida, p. 138. What follows about China and Japan is mainly based 
on his analysis.
