Transarmament: from offensive to defensive defense

By Johan Galtung

1. Reactions to an attack

The word-pair "offensive/defensive" is problematic, but also crucial. In an effort to have a fresh look at the whole problem of security, the following figure giving a spectrum of reactions to an attack on a country may be useful:

Figure 1 A spectrum of reactions to attack

- The spectrum is one-dimensional which means that it is simplistic, possibly too simplistic - but it may nevertheless be useful.

- There is no resistance at all in case of an attack; at the top end total destruction of oneself as well as of the attacker. In between are all other forms of reaction - the spectrum includes all "wave-lengths", so to speak.
The basic thesis of this article is simply that almost all the current debate concerning which reactions to make use of is focussed on two major cuts along this dimension, between nuclear and conventional arms on the one hand, and between violent and non-violent reactions on the other. The latter is the distinction around which not only pacifism but also large sections of the peace movement is organized: the rejection not only of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, but also of violence in general, meaning all kinds of conventional military systems. Although most people might agree that there is such a distinction, only relatively few would share the optimism of pacifists - when they point to such examples as gandhian actions in India against the British Empire - with regard to the efficacy of non-military reactions everywhere alone. Hence, as is very well known, it is the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons that dominates the political debate and action completely, and not only in the military and political establishments (including the war establishments), but also in the peace movement. The thesis, then, is that this is most unfortunate, that it means cutting the dimension at points that certainly are important but have the distinct disadvantage that one of them is located too high on the scale of destruction, and the other one too low. The cuts to the left in Figure I are simply insufficient.

Hence, the argumentation here is in favor of a third cut, that between offensive and defensive reactions to attack. In trying to define this cut, which like the other two by no means is a sharp one, it should first of all be emphasized that it refers to the objective capability of the reaction "systems" (the weapons being a part of that concept), not to the subjective motivations that may be attached to them. In other words, it is not a question of whether a reaction system is intended to be used for an attack; the whole issue is whether it is capable of being used for an attack. Hence, the best judge as to whether a weapon system is defensive or offensive is a possible target of the system, the adversary, not...
the subjective mind behind it. Thoughts and words come and go, actions depend on what is objectively possible, given by the constraints of natural laws only. The adversary is the best judge; just as we, in our self-defense, are the best judge of the adversary.

Hence, I would locate the definition of the offensive/defensive distinction in geographical space: can the weapon system be effectively used abroad, or can it only be used at home? If it can be used abroad then it is offensive, particularly if that "abroad" includes countries with which one is in conflict. If it can only be used at home then the system is defensive, being operational only when an attack has taken place.

2. The range and impact area of weapons.

Locating the definition in space makes it possible to formulate the problem in terms of two variables: the range (of the weapons carriers) and the impact area (of the weapon itself, whether it is a classical impact weapon, an incendiary weapon, a high explosive or weapons of mass destruction - chemical/toxic, biological, radiological, nuclear or geophysical). If we now divide "range" into immobile/short/long and "impact area" into local/limited/extended then we arrive at the nine combinations in Figure II, four of them defensive according to the approach taken above, five of them offensive:

**Figure II. Offensive vs. defensive systems**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact Area</th>
<th>Range</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Immobile</td>
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<td>Limited</td>
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Of course, it all depends on where the border-line between "short" and "long" on the one hand, and between "limited" and "extensive" on the other, is located. An indication is already given above: the effects of the reaction to an attack should be within one's own country. Of course, there may be countries so small that almost any weapon system would reach outside and/or have an impact area that would also include adversary territory. In general this would call for research into other types of weapon systems, for the use of highly immobile systems with only local impact along the borders (border fortifications are classical answer in this connection), leaving the "short"/"limited" combination to core areas of the country. But even if some of this should reach into some minor parts of adversary territory this does not in any major way affect the type of reasoning we are trying to develop here.

In order to discuss this more fully let us contrast the extremes in Figure II. On the one hand, in the upper right hand corner, are very long range weapon systems with extensive impact areas: intercontinental ballistic missiles, long range bombers and submarines all of them with dual capability; i.e., useable for weapons of mass destruction. They would certainly be classified as offensive by anybody.

On the other hand, in the bottom left hand corner would be such weapons systems as land, sea, or air mines with local impact only, or a pipeline buried underground that can easily be filled with an explosive, ignited and make hundreds of kilometres unpassable for tanks. As mentioned, fortifications also belong in this category, but some of them would have guns with an impact area that would no longer be "local", but "limited". Real long range guns would be alien to the logic of purely defensive defense, however.

Then there are all the in-between categories, and they are numerous. However, they are not that difficult to handle from the point of view of the present analysis. Long range weapons systems
with local impact would clearly be offensive: a Pershing II is still an offensive weapon when equipped with conventional warhead with a highly local impact; a very long range gun with nuclear warhead would be an offensive weapon even if stationed "at home".

More important is the "short"/"limited" combination since that would bring us to the border-line between offensive and defensive. The "immobile"/"extensive" combination, the nuclear mine or short range nuclear arms seem useless both for defense and offense. They are thought-errors, leading mainly to self-deterrence. "Short range" means mobile, but mobility should not be "useful" for offensive purposes. One would be thinking in terms of jeeps and similar vehicles on land, motor torpedo boats on water, small submarines, and small aircraft using roads as airstrips, possibly with vertical take-off and landing, possibly helicopters. There would be nothing against these means of transportation being very quick: the problem is not speed, but range. In speed there is protection, and the possibility of coming quickly to the rescue where defense against aggression is needed. Speed is certainly also important in aggression, but only useful when combined with sufficient range to reach outside one's country.

Hence, one would be thinking in terms of highly mobile and small units with limited range, on land, in the water, in the air. In order to compensate for the limited range they would have to be well dispersed all over the national territory, but because of the limited range essentially with local or district (sub-national) functions alone. If the range from one end of a country to another is so long as also to reach possible adversary territory - Chile, Norway and Sweden being obvious examples - then one should renounce on weapons systems with ranges of that type, letting the non-offensive character of the system take priority over the wish to use all systems all over the national territory - and deploy systems with shorter range, dispersed. However, if they are to operate in a dispersed and essentially local manner, they also have to be relatively autonomous. This does not mean that they are not under national command, only that they are capable of operating even if that command should be seriously impaired through adversary attack. And this, in fact, means that the whole C³I system - command, communication, control and intelligence - also has to be dispersed, less centralized. And that the country does not depend on outside suppliers for armaments (4).
Having now established that they should have short range but possibly be very quickly mobile, well dispersed, small, local and autonomous, we can turn to the impact area of the weapons. It should be "limited" for the very simple reason that it is limited how much one wants to destroy of one's own territory even if a more extensive impact area would be more destructive to adversary forces. This, then, would point in the direction of very efficient, precision-guided weapons with considerable destructive power but limited impact area; an example being "smart rockets". They certainly exist today and are generally seen as very effective against tanks in the form of anti-tank weapons; against ships, but perhaps less so against aircraft particularly when they make use of the old trick of interposing themselves between defensive forces and the sun. However, there would be ways of dealing also with this problem. Let it only be added that such forces in addition would have weapons with a highly local impact such as ordinary guns, thereby completing the four cells in the defensive area of Figure II.

3. The grey zone

Of course there is a grey zone in between. There is the famous case of the anti-aircraft guns that are defensive when pointing upwards, yet can be used as highly offensive weapons when mounted with a different angle for targets on the ground on a carrier (a ship, for instance) with a long range. This, however, is no argument at all against the distinction made. What has happened in that and similar cases is that a new weapon system has been created, from something immobile with limited or even local impact area to something long range with limited impact area. That one major physical component in two weapons system could be the same, or the same with a minor modification, is trivial. A country that wants to base its security on defensive forms of defense would simply not undertake that type of transformation of the weapons systems, and try to make them so that they cannot be suspected of it either. For that purpose it should be physically impossible to convert. At the same time, however, this serves as a warning not to be naive in believing that any component of a weapon system is inherently defensive or offensive; it depends on the total system. It should
not, however, depend on the motivation. As motivations change so may the objective character of the weapons system - hence it is an engineering problem to make systems that are highly resistant, "robust", to such changes, retaining the defensive character over a vast range of transformation of the components.

Going back to Figure 1, there are still a number of clarifications to be made. More particularly, if we make use of all three cuts that have been made on this single dimension, cutting the dimension in four regions, some comments about each of the four regions might be in order to bring out the issues.

First, there are the weapons of mass destruction, with most of the public debate and action concentrated on nuclear arms. They are classified here as offensive, and that is not entirely unproblematic. The reasoning was indicated above: weapons of mass destruction are so destructive that nobody in his right mind would use them at home, at most against an adversary, and even then only against a very much hated adversary. One reason for this is that the weapons are not only destructive of the homosphere (human beings and their settlements) but also of the biosphere, lithosphere and the hydrosphere - in other words of the whole environment (the atmosphere too for that matter, but that effect will be dispersed unless there is a "nuclear winter". In other words, nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction for that matter) are simply not credible as defensive weapons which, of course, is a major reason why they are usually conceived of and discussed in connection with long range weapons carriers like those found in the US/NATO triad. A country may have short range carriers (such as 155mm howitzers, self-propelling mounted on trucks or trains) with dual capability (e.g. for ERW, "neutron grenades") - the question still remains whether they are credible for use on own territory. Admittedly the answer is not a very clear-cut one indicating that the dimension in Figure 1 is not entirely one-dimensional - but the basic thesis still remains:
that weapons of mass destruction are essentially offensive weapons in the sense made use of here. In fact, they are so aggressive that they are for destruction rather than for conquest of enemy territory. It is not surprising that short-range nuclear weapons are being withdrawn on a unilateral basis by US/NATO.

Then there is the second category which is a very important one: conventional, offensive weapon systems. When the basic distinction is made only in terms of nuclear vs. conventional then it is easily forgotten how extremely offensive conventional weapons can be. The Second World War was an example of that, so were the Korean and Indochina wars and all or most of the other local wars after 1945 for that matter, such as Lebanon and Afghanistan. Of course, a major war today would not be fought with exactly the same arms, but for instance with the missiles, bombers and submarines now at the disposal of the super-powers, but "only" with conventional war-heads. They are so destructive, and also so offensive that although reduction or elimination of nuclear arms would be advantageous, most of what has been said about the danger of war still remains valid, with conventional offensive weapon systems doing the job. And it is precisely because the third cut along the dimension in Figure I has not been made that it becomes possible for certain political and military establishments to smuggle in conventional offensive armament as a "compensation" for a possible nuclear disarmament - riding on the fear of nuclear arms, particularly in the likely war "theater" countries in Europe.

Then there is the third category: conventional military defense. It has been described in some detail above, so let us here only look at one more point. If the units carrying the burden of conventional military defense (CMD) are short range mobile, small, local, quick, dispersed, and autonomous then they are very much like guerrilla forces. The only difference between CMD and para-military defense (PMD) would be that the latter would tend to be even more local, more embedded in the local human and natural environment, and operate less in the open, although they would probably wear some kind of uniform in conformity with the regulations of the laws of war. The often used term "militia" also enters the picture here, including some of its policing functions. In this connection it should be pointed out that PMD probably has proven, after 1945,
to be the most effective form of reaction to an attack, whether that attack takes the form of direct violence of military forces or the structural violence of excessive exploitation within and/or between countries.

4. Non-military defense

Then, there is the fourth category, non-military defense (NMD). Most models of that type of defense would also operate on the assumption of small units, local and autonomous, dispersed - in other words the same structure that has already been argued for CMD and PMD. One might say that there are two reasons underlining this: never to offer the adversary any targets with such a high concentration of defense potential that it would be worthy of a nuclear attack, and at the same time being able to resist an attack in all corners of the country. For the case of non-military defense this obviously means not only territorial defense in the sense of resistance in geographically well defined units, but also social defense in the sense of all organizations and associations in a country finding their own ways of resisting attack by not producing goods or services for the adversary etc. Clearly this is defensive as it is only meaningful in one's own society. This becomes even more clear when one looks at the following short list of 12 fundamental strategies for NMD, organized in three groups with four strategies in each.

I. Antagonist-oriented defense strategies

A. "Attack should not pay"
   1. Self-inflicted sabotage on objects of value to adversary
   2. Noncooperation and civil disobedience, "empting social structure"

B. "Incapacitation of the antagonist"
   3. Creating empathy
      (a) Positive interaction before attack; helpfulness, assistance
      (b) Cooperation with the person; noncooperation with the status - friendliness at the personal level
   4. Creating sympathy through suffering inflicted by adversary

II. Defense strategies aimed at protecting oneself

5. Efficient communication inside one's own group
6. Effectively hiding selected people and objects
7. Decreased vulnerability of the population through alternative structure
8. Communication and enactment of one's own values
III. Defense strategies aimed at deterring the antagonist

9. Organization of NMD prepared in peace time
10. Communication of preparedness through maneuvers
11. Communication of commitment to NMD
12. High level of satisfaction in one's own group

Of course, it may be argued that NMD specialists can penetrate international frontiers and organize the population elsewhere in attempts to overturn their regimes, as can PMD volunteers. This is true, but in that case it is a question of transfer of know-how; the real fighting will have to be done by the local population against its own leaders. It is more like sending a book across the border, or a teacher, less like sending a nuclear-tipped missile.

Looking at the total dimension, again, the case has now been made that on the one hand there are offensive reactions to an attack, with weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons) and with conventional offensive weapons. On the other there are defensive reactions, and they are of three types: conventional military defense, paramilitary defense and non-military defense. Just like an offensive reaction today is conceived of as including both nuclear and conventional weapons (in Soviet/WTO strategy the nuclear weapons are not for first use, in US/NATO strategy nuclear weapons also, possibly, for first use), a defensive reaction could include all three types, combining CMD, PMD and NMD. The problem of whether they are combinable is an important one, just as it is for offensive strategies. That problem, however, will be taken up below.

The basic point to be discussed here is not so much the structure of offensive vs. defensive systems, as their function. The key difference is that offensive systems can be used for attack. They are potentially aggressive, and hence provocative. Whether they will be used for attack is another matter, the important point is that any possible adversary may have reasons to suspect that they can be used for attack simply because what is possible may also...
become reality. What is impossible may not, this is the whole point underlying an objectively defensive posture.

At this point some comments about the ambiguities of the two important words "defense" and "deterrence" may be in order.

The word **defense** obviously has two meanings: any reaction to an attack, in other words the use of any weapon system from any point on the dimension of Figure I (including the bottom point which may also be some kind of defense, perhaps in the longer run); and then the other meaning a limited part of the spectrum only, what here somewhat clumsily is referred to as "defensive defense". And this spills over into the double meaning given to the word "deterrence": deterring an attack through the threat of effective retaliation (German: Vergeltung), or deterring attack through the promise of effective resistance (German: Verteidigung, not including "Vergeltung"). One may say that there is a broad use of the terms defense/deterrence covering all points on the spectrum, and the narrow use limiting it to the (purely) defensive systems only.

It is probably not possible to change the semantics since word usages are so deeply ingrained at this juncture. But it is absolutely impermissible when people participating in the debate do not clarify what they mean. At any point where the words "defense" and "deterrence" are used it should be made clear whether the terms are limited to (purely) defensive systems, or also to systems operating on the territory of the adversary.

**Offensive defense is offensive**, in both senses of that term: it **can** be used to start an offensive in the sense of aggression, and it is offensive in the sense of provoking the other side. It is not the manpower, capital, research and organizational work that goes into a military system in general that provokes; it is the offensive component of all of this. Thus, **it is misleading to analyse arms races only**.
in terms of the magnitude and rate of growth of all the factors that have been put into the organization, or - better - the destructive capability of the organization (the "bads" and "disservices" that can be rendered). Only the offensive components should be counted. On the other hand, it is quite clear from what has been said above that the border-line is not a very sharp one (although sharper, it is argued here, than most people believe) - hence the easy solution is to count all military assets disregarding the offensive/defensive distinction. The distinction that is made use of, army, navy, and the air force has approximately the same level of intellectual depth as the corresponding division for the animal kingdom: animals on land, in the water and in the air. Zoology made a great step forward when the distinction between vertebrates and invertebrates was made systematic use of; it is high time that similar distinctions - actually very old in the field of military science - become much more prominent in the debate.

Recently they have been surfacing. Let me compare the points made to some major statements, starting with the Swiss official doctrine:

Zentralstelle für Gesamtverteidigung, 1973, makes a number of important statements (the only point missing is non-military defense):

"This entails the prohibition of any recourse to indiscriminate conduct of war against the population of the opponent, even though in the atomic age, only the threat of the destruction of the opponent's population seems to be an effective deterrent" [p. 23]

"Should the large units of the army cease to exist as effective fighting formations, then there will be recourse to guerrilla warfare in order to prevent the opponent from gaining complete control over the occupied territory and to prepare for the liberation" [p. 30].

"Military cooperation with other states is inadmissible for Switzerland in peace-time because of its status as a permanently neutral state. Should Switzerland become involved in a war, then such a cooperation can be considered with the opponent of the aggressor"[p. 29].

The reader is also referred to the quotes given in footnotes [3] and [4] to appreciate better the Swiss doctrine, and Fisher, 1982. Fischer, 1982, points out how not everything is well with the Swiss case: conscientious objection is not admitted; a heavy military hierarchy paralleling and partly doubling the civilian one; arms export; gross cost overruns by the military; no preparation for non-military defence; little or no peace and conflict research.
The Swedish doctrine is somewhat weaker, based on the idea that "Defense should not by anybody be perceived as a threat, and it should be elaborated in such a way that the exclusively defensive purpose - to defend one's own country - becomes absolutely clear", see Totalförsvarets upplysningsämt, p. 8. What is missing here is a discussion of doctrine and of objective capability, not of the subjective perception, with Swedish recommendations as to what perception is legitimate and which ones not.

Svenska Freds- och Skiljedomsförbungen, 1982, goes in for non-military defense only, in a very well argued case against military defense as "building on an improbale war scenario, based on a dubious balance of power theory, preventing us from taking concrete initiatives for disarmament, eroding our non-alignment, forcing us to contribute to world militarization". However, I am afraid their view will remain that of a small minority for a long time to come, at least in democratic countries - which does not mean the case should not be made.

PenHansen, in Galtung and Hansen, 1981, has the following eight points in his plan for defence of Norway: make full use of our terrain; dynamiting of roads to impede enemy progress; fortifications and coastal artillery to stop the enemy; mobile forces to stop the enemy if he passes fortifications; anti-aircraft guns to protect important areas and mobile forces; supply security in the form of well stocked and decentralized depots; preparation for guerrilla in occupied territory in order to tie the enemy and maintain Norwegian jurisdiction; civilian resistance to prevent the enemy from making use of Norwegian social resources (pp. 19-20). As can be seen, again a case of convergence; all three elements are present.

In Spannocchi, 1975, "the Austrian answer" is given as Raumverteidigung: defense in depth, in the Austrian space itself, as opposed to Vorneverteidigung, defense at the border itself. One might note the psychological problem in the Raumverteidigung: the population close to the border is so to speak given up in the first run, possibly to occupying forces while defense goes on elsewhere. The question is, of course, what is worse: to be occupied or to be the main battlefield because it is close to the border, under the age-old doctrine of preserving every inch of one's own territory? Löser, 1981, is in the same tradition.

Alternative Defence Commission, 1983 is the proposal that comes closest to what is proposed here. One very positive point about the book is the concreteness of the policy proposals for Britain, obviously for a Labour government. When are all countries in Europe going to have such books/explorations published, and when are they going to become major elements in the public debate? When, to put it differently, is the peace movement going to take its task so seriously that concrete alternatives are discussed, not only concrete criticism?
particularly important in the debate about defensive defense is Afheldt, 1983 - with a number of technical explorations by his cousin, Brigadegeneral Eckart Afheldt.

In another important book in the German debate, Komité für Grundrechte und Demokratie, 1981, five options for alternatives to the present NATO policy are discussed: disengagement, neutralism, strictly defensive defense, civilian defense, unilateral and complete disarmament. What I miss in the book would be a more clear way of looking at these options as building blocks that can be combined in many ways, eg by combining nos. 3 and 4 (and also include guerrilla) in a more total defense concept that does not provoke.

Sozialdemokratischer Informationsdienst, 1982, presents a number of alternatives, under alternative defense policies, arguing that such defensive defense concepts as Raumverteidigung and small, mobile units could and should be combined, but does not argue the combination of this with social (ie nonmilitary defense, although the concept also includes guerrilla defense) defense. However, some years ago such concepts were totally unmentionable in such party documents - this type of debate is now moving, and very rapidly.

Röbling, 1978, makes the point that "such a strategy of "inoffensive deterrence" is the only strategy open to small states surrounded by mightier neighbors. Yugoslavia, with special respect to the Soviet Union, adopted after the events in 1968 a policy of people's resistance against any invasion, Next to its ordinary army, "the people" were organized to participate in the resistance as a partisan-force which is forbidden to recognize any capitulation, and which has to continue fighting after the defeat of the regular Yugoslav forces. The prospect of continued fighting is supposed to have a great deterrence effect" (p. 344). Röbling also mentions (p. 347) "that the Romanian law of 1972 is based on the same principle: territorial defense by the whole population".

Hollins, 1982, points out that "a world in which the capacity for aggressive warfare had been eliminated - and this could be accomplished by 1990 - would by no means resolve all the world's critical problems. But it would be a very different world from the one we have now"[p.65]. I would share that view, both parts of it.

Roberts, 1982 makes the point that the whole debate about security has been too much dominated by armament/disarmament issues: "The creation of a rational non-nuclear defense, and the various attempts to set limits to international conflicts, deserve more place in the discussion that they get. "Uni" versus "multi" is by no means the only issue worth debating"[p. 177]. A statement with which it is hard to disagree.
5. Defense and common security

Let us now have a look at this type of defense, a triad consisting of conventional, paramilitary and non-military defense. The major arguments in favor are obvious: a defense of this kind is not provocative since it cannot be used for an attack, hence should not lead to any arms race. Within this type of defense doctrine it would be entirely possible for both parties both to have a high level of security and a relatively equal level of security. In addition it is possible for them to cooperate: it would be in the interest of either party to make the other party feel secure, which would mean that there could even be an exchange between adversaries of techniques of defensive defense (not necessarily of their exact location, however). This means that a setting is given for common security, and that is already something.

With this approach there would still be arms and even armament as a process but with the distinct possibility that a stable plateau can be achieved, in other words not only common security but a stable and common security. Of course, in world history this mutually defensive posture has probably been a normal state of affairs for most pairs of neighboring countries; the accumulation of offensive arms and offensive arms races being an exception. But in addition to this a strong defensive defense should have a high deterrent value, "deterrence" then taken not in the sense of retaliation, but in the sense of being able to stave off an attack. Nevertheless, should the attack come, and that would be the third line of argument, then the level of destruction would be lower since there would be no incentive (except for pure terrorism) to use nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. Not only the defense system but also the social system itself would be organized in such a way that no immediate target would present itself as being worthy of a nuclear attack.
5. Some critical issues of defensive defense

This, however, does not mean that the type of defense advocated here is unproblematic. The following is a short list of some basic and critical considerations, for a debate that now should take place not only within the peace movement but in our societies in general.

First, defensive defense presupposes a high level of national self-reliance in defense matters. If weapon systems are not supposed to be quickly, long range, mobile, then they cannot be transported from one country to another in order to help that other country (rather than attacking it) either. Under a doctrine of defensive defense military alliances based on high levels of mobility are severely curtailed. This, of course, does not mean that there cannot be all kinds of diplomatic, otherwise political, and economic support in case of an attack. World public opinion would still function, and even more so than before because a country with purely defensive defense cannot possibly be accused of having provoked an attacker. This may look like a severe reduction of defensive capability, but could also be seen in exactly the opposite manner. Clearly, a country which is used to relying on allies, and particularly on a superpower ally, will not mobilize all its defense resources. This is true in times of peace and even more so in times of war. Military forces in a client country in an alliance, given the idea that "I have to fight for 24 hours till help comes from the superpower, possibly even with superweapons," will certainly not exercise their defense potential to the maximum. Rather, the strategy would be to put up a decent show but trying to do so in such a way that national and personal honors are preserved, yet one manages to survive till the major burden of the battle is taken over by the superpower. A policy of national self-reliance would rule this out. If one really means what one says, that freedom is worth a fight, then that fight has to be done by nobody else than oneself. The triad advocated above (CMD, PMD, and MND) is so diverse, and on the other hand so dispersed throughout the country that it should serve exactly as a network capable of mobilizing all kinds of defense potentials. Not only is it capable of mobilizing women, but also all or most of those who are dismissed from military service for health reasons. Military "defense" in today's offensive form is simply incapable of mobilizing the population.
Second, a policy of defensive defense presupposes a high level of local defense self-reliance. If the units are to be small, dispersed, and locally supported, very often also locally based, there has to be a high local capacity to keep a fight going even if the national center has been rendered incapable of doing so. Again the same reasoning applies: in a highly hierarchical national defense system, itself possibly a replication of highly hierarchical international defense systems, the local units might tend to wait for support from the center and thus yield much less resistance than they otherwise could do. If no such support is forthcoming they might give up, capitulate. But if everything has been prepared in advance they might not only continue the struggle, but also, knowing that they have only themselves to rely upon, do more than otherwise could have been expected of them. Hence, it is obvious that a policy of defensive defense presupposes not only a higher level of national self-reliance, but also of local self-reliance. This type of military doctrine, hence, is structurally compatible with a social structure much more based on national and local self-reliance in general, just like the vertical alliance pattern with hierarchical organisation inside a country are compatible with the social structure one finds, for instance, in transnational organizations. Obviously the economic structure does not completely determine the military structure but there is a relation between the two. A complete change in defense structure would presuppose at least some change in economic, political and social structure in general. It may be argued that this is to ask for too much. It may also be argued that this type of change probably will have to take place anyhow as a reaction to the general world crisis, and that the change is not that fundamental.

Third, a defensive defense is vulnerable to an enemy who attacks the system with offensive arms from his own country. As a matter of fact, all the adversary would have to do would be to set up a long range gun on his own territory, capable of hitting targets in a systematic manner, and destroy them from one end of the country to another. Aircraft would have to operate over the territory; a long range gun (or battery of
missiles) not. Hence, it stands to reason that a defensive defense would have to be supplemented by some element of interdiction capability. These are counterforce weapons, for instance aircraft capable of hitting the gun just mentioned. And then we are, of course, back to the problem: any interdiction capability would also be an offensive capability, and hence possibly be provocative. Consequently it is a question of having as little as possible, making them very counterforce and not countervalue, building them into the military doctrine down to the letter and verse of the instruction manuals, at all levels of the military organisation, as interdiction weapons only. How much is necessary and how much is sufficient would be difficult to say; military experts close to the peace movements would be the ideal persons to advise on this. Clearly, very soon it becomes too much, too provocative.

Fourth, a policy of defensive defense is not offensive against an outside adversary, but could be highly offensive against an inside adversary. The types of weapons that are described above as being defensive are defensive because they cannot reach outside national borders in any significant manner. But they can certainly hit inside those borders, otherwise they would not have any capability at all. And they would not necessarily distinguish between external and internal foes of the regime. As a matter of fact, they are exactly the type of weapons that a repressive government might use against insurgent forces, whether their claims are justifiable or not. They are more adequate than offensive weapons: the case of the Iranian revolution showed rather convincingly how helpless the Shah was with his "modern" weaponry designed for long range operations against a levée en masse of the population. Clearly this is an important problem, and a typical example of how a policy designed to solve one problem may not only not solve another one but also aggravate it. The only solution I can imagine would be to make the country less vulnerable, simply by reducing or even eliminating major contradictions within the country. That would permit distributing the control over these means of destruction, the weapons, in a more equitable manner in the population, not regarding it as a total monopoly of the government. This does not necessarily mean going so far as one does in Switzerland in the sense of people having arms at home. That would be too similar
to the US situation where a countrywide dispersion of firearms has proc ed to increase the level of insecurity considerably. What may not work in the US seems to work in Switzerland and Norway where militia arms are not used for private violence either.

Fifth, a defensive defense policy presupposes a higher level of readiness for defense in the population. It clearly supposes a higher level of mobilization; self-reliance at the national and local levels, and consensus. But this does not necessarily mean militarization. I do not think that it can be said a highly mobilized Norwegian population against nazi and quisling rule was militarized because it wanted to defend itself. Militarization would have much more to do with excessive MBCI-complexes, over-armament, offensive armament and such things. Nor is it necessarily the case that this type of defense presupposes a constant Feindbild. In times of peace a policy of non-alignment and even neutrality would serve to build down such Feindbild. In times of war it would come about anyhow, only that the non-military component of defense would try to see to it that it would be directed against the enemy as a soldier and not the enemy as a person. But what is absolutely clear is that a defensive policy, because it relies much more on popular participation, would presuppose a high level of consensus. That, of course, has the major advantage that mobilization of the military potential cannot happen against the popular will, as when forces are used offensively in total disregard, contempt of what a population might feel, relying on professional soldiery and a general decoupling of military society from civilian society. International adventrurism would be impossible.

Sixth, a defensive defense with three different components presupposes that the three components do not work at cross purposes. This is the famous problem of the Mix between military and non-military types of defense. Suffice it here only to say that the problem may be more important in theory than in practice. In practice there are several possibilities. There is the Mix in space: conventional defense along the borders and in thinly populated areas; PMD and NMD elsewhere. There is the Mix in time: conventional defense first, then PMD and NMD as fall-back possibilities. There is the Mix in what one might call functional space: conventional defense for geographic and precise targets,
PMD and NMD for more diffused and dispersed targets such as the population as a whole, society as a whole, nature; then CMD and PMD for more offensive purposes inside one's own territory, NMD for more defensive purposes. There is the Mix of all these mixes - the question of course being whether it becomes mixed-up? War time experience seems to indicate that it does not, that the population is able to entertain different types of defense at the same time, and that the adversary also makes a distinction between the three, perhaps behaving in the most aggressive way against PMD, less so against CMD and much less so against NMD. Perhaps; it could also be the other way round under certain circumstances. In any case, the task remains that of making the country indigestible, like a hedgehog, not appetizing to a wolf, and highly inoffensive to each other. That, however, is a discussion that would lead far beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it here only to say that the strength of this type of defense is precisely its versatility, and that the enemy of it would be those whose thinking has become so one-dimensional that they can only think in terms of one foot of the tripod, not in terms of all three. In fact, the argument against it is probably not so much that it is ineffective as a deterrent and as a defense. The argument might rather be the opposite: it is so effective that it could also be successfully turned against the country's own governments. In other words, the opposite of the argument above where the emphasis was on conventional military defense as an instrument which in the hands of the government could be used to crush a rebellion. Paramilitary defense and non-military defense, meaningless unless they are in the hands of the population itself, could also be used to topple a government. One might say that this already constitutes a balance of power, that one type of defensive defense may be the answer to the other in internal power struggles. But the much better answer, of course, would be to say that a condition for a purely defensive form of defense is that the country has come so far in ridding itself of basic internal contradictions that neither a government, nor the population, would use force in order to provoke some basic discontinuity in the history of the country.
In conclusion let us put this aspect of alternative security policies in perspective. Evidently, it is filled with contradictions, reflecting the fact that we live in a perilous world, partly of our own making. Some of these contradictions can only be softened, possibly overcome, if other aspects of alternative security policies are also enacted, very often referred to as "political" - in the present book in terms of "non-alignment","inner strength" and "outer usefulness", to be dealt with in the following three sections.

What should be emphasized here is only one point: the focus here is on transarmament, not on disarmament. I have argued elsewhere that disarmament of offensive forces is absolutely indispensable, to avoid major wars, and that the route via disarmament negotiations as practised so far is a blind alley. The policy advocated here is a combination of disarmament and transarmament, not the obviously fallacious policy of trying to obtain disarmament in offensive weapons through armament in offensive weapons, but an effort to obtain disarmament in offensive weapons through transarmament to defensive weapons. Some of the latter are undoubtedly still highly violent. But within the defensive defense concept argued here there are three different types of defense: conventional, para-military and non-military. Over time this might develop, if one should try some optimism in these troubled years, towards non-military defense which is more or less the way in which we handle conflicts in civilized societies, with strikes, some civil disobedience, non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms and so on. Many would feel impatient, why not go straight to non-military defense, why not general and complete disarmament and not this approach via conventional military defense! And my answer would be along two lines: first, because the overwhelming majority of the population does not believe in non-military defense, only a part of those who are conscientious objectors, or pacifists in some other way, do. Second, because a glance at world history in general and European history in particular should convince anybody that we live in a dangerous world. Security does not come automatically, there is a need for some kind of defense.

And there is a need for a new consensus in defense matters. Offensive deterrence is only credible if the population in democratic countries believe in it; they do not. Non-defense is not believed in either. Defensive defense, with the human right for everybody to choose the branch (conventional military, para-military or non-military) which s/he believes in might be an answer...
The ideas developed in this article should be seen in a broader context of alternative security policies. My book on that topic, There Are Alternatives!, from which the present article is taken and references to current literature are added, is an effort to develop a more comprehensive approach. This is important lest one is led to believe that the road out of the present highly dangerous situation is a question of new types of military hardware only. I am indebted to Nils Petter Gleditsch and Jan Øberg for helpful editorial comments.

[1] The experience in Norway during the 1940-45 occupation can be summarized as follows: civilian, nonviolent resistance was very effective against nazification of civilian society by the Quisling regime, but ineffective against the German occupation - as was also the military resistance. Military liberation from the outside was both necessary and sufficient.

Of course, the idea of defensive defence is not at all new, and played a considerable role in the debates and commissions of the League of Nations in the 1930s. See, for instance, Griffin, 1936.

[3] Zentralstelle für Gesamtverteidigung, 1973, is very clear on this point:

"The army as a whole has defensive mission and its preparations are made with a view towards fighting only within its own territory" (p.28)

[4] Again, the Swiss make the point - in Zentralstelle, 1973:

"...we have to guarantee a minimal degree of self-sufficiency with regard to armaments. Sufficient supplies must be kept in order to maintain the combat-effectiveness of our army in case of war" (p.29)

[5] For a general review of the effects of nuclear war, see Galtung, particularly 2.4, 3.4 and 4.4. For the effects of nuclear war on the climate, see Sagan, 1983/84; also New Scientist, 3 November 1983.


[10] Øberg, 1983, p. 167, points out how "nonviolence as well as the philosophy of defensive defence has its origin in the Orient, not in our culture". I agree, but one should not underestimate the importance of defensive defence as the defence of the weaker parties, and the parties with less aggressive inclinations even if there is no trace of Oriental thinking - like in the case of the Swiss.
SUMMARY

The article argues that the most important cut in the range of possible reactions to an attack is not between nuclear means of destruction and conventional defense, nor between military and nonmilitary defense, but between offensive and defensive means of defense. Defensive weapons systems are defined as those that have a limited range and destruction area and for this reason can (essentially) only be used on one's own territory; offensive weapons systems are all the rest. The distinction is based on their objective properties, not on subjective declarations or perceptions.

Three types of defensive defense are then described: conventional military defense, para-military defense and nonmilitary defense. A good non-provocative or inoffensive defense should then be based on all three. The concept is explored further and some objections are discussed, the most important being that a minimum interdiction capability is indispensable, it would be offensive by the criterion used, and the conclusion is that the defensive character will have to be with the overall posture.

The concept developed is then related to similar concepts in the rapidly emerging literature in this field in Eastern Europe.
LITERATURE


Rüling, 1976, makes the point that "such a strategy of "inoffensive deterrence" is the only strategy open to small states surrounded by mightier neighbors. Yugoslavia, with special respect to the Soviet Union, adopted after the events in 1968 a policy of people's resistance against any invasion. Next to its ordinary army, "the people" were organized to participate in the resistance as a partisan-force which is forbidden to recognize any capitulation, and which has to continue fighting after the defeat of the regular Yugoslav forces. The prospect of continued fighting is supposed to have a great deterrence effect" (p. 344). Rüling also mentions (p. 347) "that the Romanian law of 1972 is based on the same principle: territorial defense by the whole population".

The Swedish doctrine is somewhat weaker, based on the idea that "Defense should not by anybody be perceived as a threat, and it should be elaborated in such a way that the exclusively defensive purpose - to defend one's own country - becomes absolutely clear", see Totalförsvarets upplysningsnämnd, p. 8. What is missing here is a discussion of doctrine and of objective capability, not of the subjective perception, with Swedish recommendations as to what perception is legitimate and which ones not.

Hollins, 1982, points out that "a world in which the capacity for aggressive warfare had been eliminated - and this could be accomplished by 1990 - would by no means resolve all the world's critical problems. But it would be a very different world from the one we have now" (p.65). I would share that view, both parts of it.

Roberts, 1982 makes the point that the whole debate about security has been too much dominated by armament/disarmament issues: "The creation of a rational non-nuclear defence, and the various attempts to set limits to international conflicts, deserve more place in the discussion that they get. "Uni" versus "multi" is by no means the only issue worth debating" (p. 177).

Sozialdemokratischer Informationsdienst, 1982 presents a number of alternatives, under alternative defense policies, arguing that such defensive defense concepts as Raumverteidigung and small, mobile units could and should be combined, but does not argue the combination of this with social (ie nonmilitary defense, although the concept also includes guerrilla defense) defense. However, some years ago such concepts were totally unmentionable in such party documents - this type of debate is now moving, and very rapidly.
For a general review of the effects of nuclear war, see Galtung, particularly 2.4, 3.4 and 4.4. For the effects of nuclear war on the climate, see Sagan, 1983/84; also New Scientist, 3 November 1983.

In a very important book in the German debate, Komité für Grundrechte und Demokratie, 1981, five options for alternatives to the present NATO policy are discussed: disengagement, neutralism, strictly defensive defense, civilian defense, unilateral and complete disarmament. What I miss in the book would be a more clear way of looking at these options as building blocks that can be combined in many ways, eg by combining nos. 3 and 4 (and also include guerrilla) in a more total defense concept that does not provoke.

In Spannocchi, 1975, "the Austrian answer" is given as Raumverteidigung, defense in depth, in the Austrian space itself, as opposed to Vorderverteidigung, defense at the border itself. One might note the psychological problem in the Raumverteidigung: the population close to the border is so to speak given up in the first run, possibly to occupying forces while defense goes on elsewhere. The question is, of course, what is worse: to be occupied or to be the main battlefield because it is close to the border, under the age-old doctrine of preserving every inch of one's own territory? Löser, 1981, is in the same tradition.

Öberg, 1983, p. 167, points out how "nonviolence as well as the philosophy of defensive defence has its origin in the Orient, not in our culture". I agree, but one should not underestimate the importance of defensive defence as the defence of the weaker parties, and the parties with less aggressive inclinations even if there is no trace of Oriental thinking - like in the case of the Swiss.

Alternative Defence Commission, 1983 is the proposal that comes closest to what is proposed here. One very positive point about the book is the concreteness of the policy proposals for Britain, obviously for a Labour government. When are all countries in Europe going to have such books/explorations published, and when are they going to become major elements in the public debate? When, to put it differently, is the peace movement going to take its task so seriously that concrete alternatives are discussed, not only concrete criticism?

Zentralstelle für Gesamtverteidigung, 1973, makes a number of important statements [the only point missing is nonmilitary defense]:

"This entails the prohibition of any recourse to indiscriminate conduct of war against the population of the opponent, even though in the atomic age, only the threat of the destruction of the opponent's population seems to be an effective deterrent" [p. 23]
"The army as a whole has defensive mission and its preparations are made with a view towards fighting only within its own territory."[p.28]

"Military cooperation with other states is inadmissible for Switzerland in peace-time because of its status as a permanently neutral state. Should Switzerland become involved in a war, then such a cooperation can be considered with the opponent of the aggressor"[p.29].

" -- we have to guarantee a minimal degree of self-sufficiency with regard to armaments. Sufficient supplies must be kept in order to maintain the combat-effectiveness of our army in case of war"[p.29]

"Should the large units of the army cease to exist as effective fighting formations, then there will be recourse to guerrilla warfare in order to prevent the opponent from gaining complete control over the occupied territory and to prepare for the liberation" [p. 30].

Of course, the idea of defensive defence is not at all new, and played a considerable role in the debates and commissions of the League of Nations in the 1930s. See, for instance, Griffin, 1935.

Particularly important in the debate about defensive defense is Affeldt, 1983 - with a number of technical explorations by his cousin, Brigadegeneral Eckart Affeldt.

PerHansen, in Galtung and Hansen, 1981, has the following eight points in his plan for defence of Norway: make full use of our terrain; dynamiting of roads to impede enemy progress; fortifications and coastal artillery to stop the enemy; mobile forces to stop the enemy if he passes fortifications; anti-aircraft guns to protect important areas and mobile forces; supply security in the form of well stocked and decentralized depots; preparation for guerrilla in occupied territory in order to tie the enemy and maintain Norwegian jurisdiction; civilian resistance to prevent the enemy from making use of Norwegian social resources[pp. 19-20]. As can be seen, again a case of convergence; all three elements are present.

Fischer, 1982 points out how not everything is well with the Swiss case: conscientious objection is not admitted; a heavy military hierarchy paralleling and partly doubling the civilian one; arms export; gross cost overruns by the military; no preparation for non-military defence; little or no peace and conflict research.

Svenska Freds- och Skiljedomsföreningen, 1982 . goes in for non-military defense only, in a very well argued case against military defense as "building on an improbable war scenario, based on a dubious balance of power theory, preventing us from taking concrete initiatives for disarmament, eroding our non-alignment, forcing us to contribute to world militarization". However, I am afraid their view will remain that of a small minority for a long time to come, at least in democratic countries - which does not mean the case should not be made.