WHO ARE THE SUCCESSORS OF NAZISM?
- Some Reflections on the
  Fiftieth Anniversary -

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January 1983
1. Introduction

Of course it is unsatisfactory to conceive of Nazism as something that started fifty years ago today, 30 January 1933 with the "Machtergreifung" (looking suspiciously like a "Machtgeschenk"), then to be completed as a process 7 May 1945, twelve years later. The historical mind would always ask two questions: How much of the phenomenon studied could be found before, and how much of it survives afterwards? Natura non facit saltus, something of that adage may apply to society although quantum jumps are not unknown in either. On the other hand, there may certainly be a vested interest in studying the Nazi period as if it can be set apart, detached, wrapped up with a solid knot on top of it, a phenomenon without predecessors and successors. In conceiving of it this way it is no longer a threat: it is not carried on waves in the German society from which it sprang, waves that might still be present, at its very core.

Of course, it is also unsatisfactory to look at the predecessors only in terms of situational factors, even highly concrete events and persons. Nobody will deny the significance of situational factors in analyzing the most dreadful phenomenon of our century, perhaps (so far) of human history. But again the same objection would hold true: by increasing the specificity of the factors seen as determinants, as sufficient if not necessary conditions, the phenomenon is set aside in its specificity, made einmalig, something behind us; completely absent in the present.

Hence, the focus in what follows will be on more lasting factors, on waves seen as carriers of the phenomenon of Nazism, like the wave emitted by a radio sender before the program starts, to be modulated and given concrete communicative content by the signals it is carrying.
Of such long-lasting, more fundamental waves or "permanents" (to distinguish them from "events", with "trends" lying somewhere inbetween) there are many. In the next section six of them will be discussed. And the logic of the exercise, then, is of course to explore to what extent these waves are still penetrating the phenomena that are designated, on German soil as possible successors of Nazism, as successor candidates.

The names of the successor candidates can be revealed at once. As seen from the political right they are the German Democratic Republic (DDR), and then a range of phenomena starting with the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), digging far into the various "Maoists", Marxistische Gruppen (MG), possibly including the German Communist parties (KPD; DKP). And seen from the left they are, symmetrically and in a similar vein: the German Federal Republic (BRD), and then various political groups starting with the Neo-Nazis and then a number of right-wing groupings—some of them, such as veteran groups, now disappearing because of social or biological retirement, possibly including the Christian Social Union (CSU) with Franz Josef Strauß as a symbol figure. In other words, the candidates include the two German states, on German territory, and the extreme left and the extreme right in BRD. In a sense the point of departure is politically symmetric but territorially asymmetric as three of the candidates are in Western Germany, only one in the East; East Germany itself. That, of course, has to do with the (perceived) lack of internal differentiation in DDR.

The question to be asked is the following: With what right can it be said that any one of these is a real successor to the phenomenon of Nazism? And the answer can be given immediately: with no right at all.
At the present time none of them exhibits a sufficient number of characteristics of Nazism for that odious certificate to be issued. That all of them, supported by numerous outsiders, try to push the dysphemism of "Nazism" on each other, is a part of the political struggle among them, but not in and by itself sufficient reason to refer to them as full-blown Nazi formations.

This conclusion, however, is somehow missing the point. If anything presented itself today almost exactly like Nazism as we know it there would probably be a war, or something very similar to it, as a consequence. Hence the question is not whether any political actor can be said to have inherited it all, perhaps even updated it by fifty years. The problem is whether sufficiently strong actors can be said to have sufficiently much of the essential characteristics to instill fears and anxieties in others. And here I am of course to some extent talking as an outsider, although as a citizen of a country occupied by Nazi Germany, with my family dispersed during these years (siblings working illegally, having to escape to Sweden; my father in concentration camp, and so on). We tend to be asking just one question: Is there any chance that this might come about again, of course not exactly in the same form but in a form sufficiently similar? And we will tend to regard with utmost scepticism any effort made, particularly by German officialdom, West of East, to present the phenomenon of Nazism in such a way that this question cannot even be explored within the framework offered by official presentations. Such efforts should, hence, be met with appropriate counter-efforts.

Finally, one word limiting this exercise: it concerns Nazism, on German soil, auf deutschem Boden. There was fascism in other parts of Europe, in Japan, and other places. But the present paper is concerned with a phenomenon in Germany that to some extent has to be understood as a German phenomenon. The other phenomena have similarities with Nazism, but are not identical.
2. Nazism: An Effort At Characterization

In the following I shall make use of a particular approach to the analysis of deep culture (including macro-cultures, i.e. civilizations) referred to as **cosmology analysis**. It is a question of trying to find the hidden code, the deeper lying elements in the culture, or structure of a social phenomenon. More concretely, it is based on six aspects or dimensions of a culture that I think one has to know something about in order to characterize a culture: Space, time, knowledge, person-nature relations, person-person relations and person-transpersonal relations. The meaning of these terms will be made clear in the following.

My general thesis is the following: there is a deep German culture which is occidental civilization in **extremis**. It differs from occidental civilization in general, but not that much; it is to considerable extent continuous with it. **Homo teutonicus = homo occidentalis in extremis**. And there is a deep Nazi culture which is an extreme version of German culture: **homo nazensis = homo teutonicus in extremis**. To make this more concrete, let me make use of the six dimensions.

(1) **As to space**: There is a general occidental tendency to see itself, the West, as the center of the world and the rest as a periphery in whose interest it is to be shaped in the image of the West, even by the West. Colonialism is one clear consequence of this general perspective. The Germans wanted very much to be a part of it, but not very successfully. The Nazi or Hitlerite **Drang nach Osten** becomes an aspect of Western colonialism in general. It was the successor in German thinking to Drang nach Süden (Africa), based on a solid historical tradition. Of course it was extreme. The program was not only that of conquering everything east of Germany, the vast expanse of Poland, the rest of Eastern Europe down to South-Eastern Europe and then Soviet Union, for geo-political and socio-economic reasons. The intention was also to empty large portions of this territory of its population, possibly including the extermination of one
hundred million Russians, half by direct killing in connection with the military onslaught, half through starvation afterwards. Of course it is an extreme version of Western colonialism, but not that different from what North-Western Europeans did to the American Indians in North-America and South-Western Europeans did to the American Indians in South-America - not to mention what all of them did to Africans in the period of colonization of Africa, under the heading of "slavery". As a matter of fact, there are only two things that make Nazism stand out: it was directed against white people, themselves of occidental stock, and it came late in history, fifty to one hundred years after late predecessors, even four centuries after the more precocious ones, the Spanish, the Portuguese. For these reasons it could no longer be legitimized the same way as Western colonialism in general. Some particular legitimation had to be invented. Racism and paganism were not enough. A theory of Herrenvolk had to be invoked, seeing others as born Untertanen, even as vermin, depriving them of the right to be in the public service, then of access to public space, then of citizenship, then of their soul, then easier to kill.

(2) As to time: The general occidental time perspective is dramatic. There is the notion, found both in Christianity, in Liberalism and in Marxism of the primordial, ideal society; then there is the Fall, then the Dark Period, then the presence of the Saviour, He Who Saw; then the period of Progress, growth and expansion of correct faith, behavior and patterns in general; then the crisis, the final confrontation; and then - if everything works out as it should - Catharsis but possibly also total Damnation. It is certainly not difficult to find these figures of thinking, even of speech and action in German thought in general and in Nazism in particular. There is the vision of a Germanic past, hinged on to Nordic mythology, mixed with medieval features, Germanic sagas, Walhall, Wagnerian mystique. There is the Fall and the Dark Period, brought about by the mixing of blood, by racial impurity. There is the Saviour, He Who Saw: Adolf
Hitler, with the Holy Script, Mein Kampf. There is the expansion both in the sense of racial purification and in the territorial sense, certainly leading to a crisis. Blut und Boden, both of them together, as basic themes of German history. And there is the vision of a highly dichotomous future, very much as envisaged in the Bible, both in the Old and the New Testaments: either complete catharsis, a perfect contradiction-free existence (paradise); or total damnation, the annihilation, destruction of everything (hell). Thus Nazism stands out as a latter-day incarnation of general occidental time cosmology, including its eschatological aspects. It sprang forth from a fertile soil prepared by lutheran eschatology and germanic nostalgia.

(3) As to knowledge: There is a general tendency in the West in favor of epistemological atomism, dividing that which is to be known into small parts that are then linked together, very often two at the time. Each part is based on a dichotomy setting it apart from its "negation", with relatively sharp border lines between the parts. All these bits of knowledge are then chained together in deductive pyramids, often very steep, with a low number of axioms on the top. Deduction is a logical operation, based on abstract properties of the notions introduced, meaning a certain emphasis on essentialism - abstracting away from concrete apparitions. In the particular type of occidental thinking I have referred to as Teutonic these pyramids become so important that they are to a large extent detached from contact with empirical reality, as seen by others. Deductive reasoning from a very low number, perhaps even only one axiom, becomes the paramount task of an intellectual. Essentialism, unhindered by any reference to examples or empirical analysis in general, dominates the intellectual style.

Again, it is not difficult to recognize Nazism in this. There is a leading principle: the contradiction
between the pure and the impure, between the Aryans on the one hand and on the other hand first of all the Jews with the Ver- 
judung, then the Bolsheviks, the "Bloschwisten", then the "Plutokraten". The Germans had been made impure not only by the Jews but also by the influence the Bolsheviks had on them, in the first line the Communists, then also the Social Democrats. The con- 
triction is, to use a Maoist term, "antagonistic" - it can only be resolved through violence. Epistemologically, in the meantime, the contradiction serves considerable intellectual functions: it explains everything. Nazi theory is the theory of how all evils derive from the non-Aryans or non-Aryan elements. The Feindbild is not only a social dichotomy with fatal con- 
sequences, but also a prime intellectual principle. Hitler becomes a Teutonic intellectual, a person capable of handling the language masterfully in his essentialist way of running up and down his own thought pyramid, with that crucial contradiction on top, and the evils of present-day German society and the promises of the future at the bottom.

(4) As to person-nature relations: In general occidental cosmology puts human beings, persons firmly on top of nature. Nature is an instrumentality, a means for a profoundly anthropocentric undertaking. But there is also another strand in the pattern: nature as beautiful, as not only resource but also a resort. Perhaps one can say that Nazism picked up both of these elements and as usual in an extreme fashion. On the one hand, there was the total destruction of nature, not only through the workings of industrialism but even through warfare. But then, on the other hand, there was also the cult of nature, romanticism of the Wandervögel, the Bavarian nature mysticism that seemed to work so well together with Prussian statism in the amalgam that with many other elements became Nazism. And the skillful administration of sexuality.
(5) As to person-person relations: The general occidental cosmology can be said to be vertical and individualist, the struggle of everybody against everybody to secure a position in a vertical hierarchy, with varying numbers of layers, more or less pyramidal, more or less narrow at the bottom, and more or less permeable from one layer to the other.

Nazism carries this a considerable step further. The principle of "verticality", a somewhat bland term, expresses itself fully in a number of contexts. Between individuals it takes the form of social Darwinism: the survival of the fittest, in a jungle less and less reminiscent of human civilization, becoming purely terrorist. It becomes the right of the strong to rule over the weak; Aryans over Jews, men over women, the middle-aged over the young and the old, the "normal" over the "abnormal". Between nations it takes the form of Herrenvolk versus others, of racial supremacy with not only rights but also the duty of the Herrenvolk to exercise its supremacy to the fullest, including eradication of those at the very bottom, like one does with vermin. Between states it takes the form indicated under space above, of extreme center-periphery relations with the German state as the Herrenstaat. Within states it takes the form of authoritarianism, of the single-party state, of dictatorship with all that implies; highly vertical like the party (NSDAP) with its Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, Zellenleiter, Blockleiter, and the members. And the population.

And then, finally, it takes the form of a predilection for one particular structure, capitalism, which with its processes will tend to facilitate the operation of the other four aspects just mentioned: there is the strong competition between companies in general and entrepreneurs in particular; there is the strict division between those who buy labor and those who have only their labor to sell in return for commodities; there is the structure engendered by capitalism gone abroad, imperialism, between center and periphery countries; there is the use the capitalist class can make of the state as an instrument for the friction-free operation of capitalism,
with the oppression — or at least manipulation — of the labor-
sellers and commodity-buyers. All of this can be operated
softly, like in Northern Europe, or very heavily, like in
South America; on the extreme end of that dimension the
Nazi operation of capitalism is located, with its use of
IG Farben, Krupp, Flick, Mannesmann. And this, of course, is
consonant with the key hypothesis that Nazism in particular
and Fascism in general is a phenomenon that comes into being
when capitalism is in crisis and is no longer capable of
operating (meaning giving adequate returns for investment),
smoothly or softly. It is this combination of capitalism and
dictatorship that makes fascism — as a part of the sui generis,
Nazi syndrome.

(6) As to person-transpersonal relations: In occidentalism
in general this is expressed in the three major occidental
religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam in well-known
manner.

Characteristic of this occidental religious con-
struction is a God on top, personal; tolerating no other
Gods on His (for it is a man, or at least definitely not
a woman; an adult, or at least definitely not a child) side,
universal, for all of human-kind; responding to prayers from
human beings and watchful of their actions and thoughts;
rewarding or punishing them for what they do in this life
by allocating them in the afterlife either to Heaven or
to Hell. The secularized versions of Christianity, the ideologies of
Liberalism and Marxism, pick up the non-transcendental
aspects of this, such as high level of jealousy of competing
ideologies (including the other one); universal claims to
world validity, allegiance of the adherents both in thoughts
and action, and a promise of a contradiction-free paradise
on earth for those who believe and fulfill, and eternal dam-
nation for those who do not. German lutheranism is as perfect
an expression of this as any, with its heavy emphasis on
thoughts and words, not only deeds.

Again it is easily seen how Nazism is one extreme
version of this. It spans the gulf between the sacred and
the secular. It is sacred in its relation to a mythical
and mystical past and future, and in proclaiming the Führer and the Führerprinzip as standing above ordinary humans; closer to the "Vorsehung"—an expression of generalized religiousness, a bridging figure of thought making it easier for Christians to accept an essentially non-Christian, even anti-Christian Nazism. But this means that the Führer has in his hands what no other mortal has: the control over life and death, and not only over life and death of individual humans, but of whole groups, races, nations, peoples. And not only that: he also has a power of Vernichtung, eradication of something that has been created. In the period of Nazism this applied to the homosphere, to human beings and human settlements, human societies. The Führer was not only God-like, but a real God, arrogating to himself such divine powers. He did not at that time have the technology of the atom bomb making it possible to go one step further, from punishment of humans and human things to destruction of nature, to the biblical Verwüstung, desertification. Had he had this would no doubt also have fallen under the purview of the Führer, as the embodiment of God and anti-God.

I would like to combine Vernichtung and Verwüstung under the heading of exterminism, Exterminismus. And I see it as more than simply a relation between human beings. It is a relation between the transpersonal Führer on the one hand and human persons on the other, the successor of the creator, himself a Creator and Destroyer. Mysticism is needed for this to take hold: the alleged union between the Führer and higher forces, and the possible union between ordinary humans and the Führer in extreme forms of devotion. One may even see a chain of succession here: from Judaism with Yahwe on top, then the divine prince, then Israel as the chosen people with other peoples subservient to it; via Christianity where Jesus Christ destroys
the position of Israel as a chosen people and puts himself as the Divine Prince and declares himself as the only road to God, the father; and via Islam where Mohammed destroys the position of Jesus Christ as the indispensable intermediary and establishes a direct relation between Allah and the believing Moslem with Mohammed, the prophet, as the guide. Then Nazism, with the Führer himself on top, the thought figure of the chosen people resurrected as Deutschland (Über alles) with the lesser peoples of the world subservient to Germany, except for those heading for extermination. In that sense Nazism is within the occidental family of universal religious thought, extreme but not alien to the body. It is one chosen people trying to exterminate the other.

When all these six aspects of Nazism are combined a particularly vicious combination ensues. The expansionism built into the concept of space is combined with the Feindbild, with the explanatory approach to the problems of the world in general and Germany in particular in point (3) about knowledge (or rather epistemology); with point (5) about person-person relations with their strongly vertical nature; with point (6) with the legitimation of exterminism; and with its logical conclusion in point (2): the time eschatology. Result: Götterdämmerung, heaven or hell, Tausendjähriges Reich or Vernichtung, including Vernichtung of oneself. The latter point cannot be enough stressed as a key aspect of Nazism. It is not only the right, even duty to exterminate others when the crisis comes to fulfillment, but also the duty to sacrifice oneself, or rather oneselfs, in plural, not only in singular.

Opferbereitschaft becomes an essential aspect of the total ideology: if the goals are not obtained, the enemy not eradicated, expansionism not effectuated then the sacrifice of oneselfs follows not only as a result of the logic of warfare. It is not only that those heading for extermination, or at least subjection as Untertanen for eternity were less than happy about these ideas they somehow pulled themselves even though - they were told - there was nothing personal about it. Extermination was a god-like act, a question of getting the universe straight.
They somehow pulled themselves together, and hit back. It is more than that. If victory is not achieved, then it is not deserved either, and sacrifice, self-immolation of human beings, society and settlements, follows as nothing less than a duty. The Volk has betrayed the Führer. The Führer is entirely justified in departing from such an undeserving Volk even through an act of suicide that from the point of view of less subtle peoples looks very similar to cowardice. And the real duty of those who remain is not to save themselves as they best can but to go down in flames, in latter day versions of the appropriate Wagnerian opera. It really takes das Land der Dichter und Denker to convert and pervert its Kultur via das Land der Richter und Henker to such a perfect incarnation of --- antihuman nonsense.
Table 1. Homo nazensis = homo teutonicus in extremis; homo teutonicus = homo occidentalis in extremis.

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<th>Homo occidentalis:</th>
<th>Homo teutonicus:</th>
<th>Homo nazensis:</th>
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<tr>
<td>SPACE</td>
<td>Occidental cosmology</td>
<td>Germans as auserwählt; Lebensraum; Germany on the Periphery of the Center</td>
<td>Germany to the Center of the Center; Drang nach Osten, right to be Herrenstaat</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>The West as Center; expansion/exploitation</td>
<td>Wagnerian drama</td>
<td>Tausendjahrreich, contradiction-free for Germans and Aryans; no class, less nation, race or else: Apokalypse</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNOWLEDGE</td>
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<td>Teutonic Intellectual Style: Steep pyramids, deductive data-free, reliable as guides for action. Marxism, freudianism</td>
<td>Aryan-nonaryan contradiction; Feindbilder: all non-aryans, Bolsche-wisten, Plutokraten; Hitler as teutonic intellectual</td>
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<td>PERSON-NATURE</td>
<td>Man-over-Nature</td>
<td>Nature cult; romanticism yet industrialism</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSON-PERSON</td>
<td>verticality; individualism; Man-over-Man; Man-over-Woman</td>
<td>authoritarian Beamtenstaat Kapitalismus</td>
<td>individual terrorism; strong over weak; KZ national terrorism, Herrenvolk; Endlösung dictatorship capitalism fascism</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSON-TRANSPERSONAL</td>
<td>God as universal and singular; love and vengeance; creation and anti-creation</td>
<td>Lutheran God, awesome; punishing wrong thoughts, not only words and deeds Vernichtung Verwüstung</td>
<td>Führer and Vorsehung; Führerprinzip; Ein Führer, Ein Volk total obedience; the right and duty of Vernichtung; also of collective and individual self.</td>
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3. What happened to Nazism afterwards?

This is the real topic of this paper and can now be dispensed with relatively quickly given the groundwork done in the preceding section, and the list of four successor candidates.

Thus, what could one say the DDR has picked up of all of this - not in the sense of examining the ruins of Nazism to find what can be used, but in the sense of being carried by the same basic waves of occidental in general, and German in particular, culture, modulating the waves in their own way? Proceeding systematically one might say that there is some element of spatial expansionism, but relatively weak ones. They take the geopolitical form of siding with Soviet expansionism or at least"protection"of its sphere of interest, even to the point of participating, in 1968, in the intervention and invasion of Cechoslovakia. It takes the socio-economic form of spinning webs of dependency on DDR as an advanced industrial economy, perhaps particularly by using the Soviet Union itself as a periphery-delivering raw materials and importing highly processed goods from the DDR - after the first tough period of depriving DDR of much of her industrial capacity. (a highly understandable act of revenge, or reparation to use a milder term, after the ravages of Nazi expansionism).

Then, there is the Marxist mystique. Marxism itself has the Teutonic figure of thought built into it with a contradiction between work and capital, or more concretely between workers and capitalists, between labor-sellers and labor-buyers, at the very top of a deductive pyramid. The time cosmology is also similar, only that it is less ambiguous at the end: after the crisis there will be a catharsis, ushering in a contradiction-free Communist society all over the
world. This also leads to a one-party state governed by
the party of the proletariat, the Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat.
As state form it can be characterized as a dictatorship,
including control over trade unions, key instruments of the working class.
It is authoritarian, and with a pattern of bureaucratic
socialism that in itself is vertical and replete with
struggle for survival, particularly with the use of the
party hierarchy as the battle field. There is a mysticism
in this, also with clear Christian predecessors, as expressed
in a slogan found in the DDR: Marx lebt in uns und unseren
Taten.

But all of this is soft and very bland relative to
the horrors of Nazism. There are acts of terrorism, for
instance against those who try to escape, but not to be remotely
compared with what one associates with Nazism. There is
no implicit or explicit ideology of exterminism but rather
of patient and long-lasting educational work, high handed
and rough handed as it becomes in the setting of a one-party
state. In addition there is an explicit, and honest anti-Nazi ideology.

What about the second candidate, referred to here
simply as RAF? If DDR has picked up dictatorship then
RAF has picked up terrorism, individually targeted,
cruelly performed. It is also guided by some kind of
Marxist mystique of a relatively extreme nature. On the
top is the contradiction between work and capital. If
capital can be hit at a key point, in its very essence,
then a latent crisis may become more manifest. A manifest
crisis of capitalism will catapult the system into some
type of fascism, not necessarily of the type that was
found fifty years ago, Nazism. But now the situation is
different. The chances of the working class are seen as
better, they may rise as one man against fascism and
through all of this History might be telescoped, and a
revolution away from capitalist society might be ushered
in much sooner than would otherwise be the case, even tomorrow.

The key point in all of this becomes the location of the nucleus of capitalism. Is it the head of the German association of labor-buyers? Or, could it be the stock exchange in Frankfurt? Is it some key top civil servant in the German administration, itself an instrument of the capitalist social formation? The possibilities are many. If all such hypotheses should be tested many bombs, some of them against persons and some of them against material objects and structures, would have to be used in a chain of n-1 disconfirmations ending with number N, the final confirmation. For those who, like the present author, see this whole line of thought as sublime nonsense successful confiscation of all those bombs comes as a positive achievement. But one notes in passing that if this presentation is anything close to reality then the eschatological, even apocalyptic elements bear some similarity to Nazism, probably not because they are intrinsically related but rather because they are weeds growing out of the same cultural subsoil.

What, then, about the Neo-Nazis? It is difficult to say since one is dealing here with a variety of phenomena. As far as I can understand the principle of the German _Herrenvolk_ has been left behind, but the principle of _racial purity_ remains. However, it is interpreted in a more symmetric manner: to each nation its own state, even if it is to be achieved by terrorist means. The Germans have just as much right to get rid of the Turks as the Turks in Turkey have to get rid of Germans and others that might be overstaying in their country. There is the mystique of _Blut und Boden_, but in a horizontal rather than vertical manner. It is Herder rather than Hitler.

However, it is also Hitler in the sense of the cult
of the Führer, as one who saw the basic light although he made mistakes. In terms of concrete symbolism the Neo-
Nazis are certainly those who score highest as candidates for successorship. But precisely because of this concreteness they may also be the most innocent, the most innocuous because they are so easily discovered. They may and will engage in some acts of individual terrorism, and may also confuse issues considerably by being more nature conscious than Germans in general, picking up the nature mysticism of the Nazi movement, combining it with environmentalist issues and values that in some particular cases even may make them look like die Grünen. But all considered this phenomenon is hardly worth paying much attention to, except as a nuisance to foreigners, and minorities, mainly controllable by ordinary police techniques. What would be much more serious would be if right-wing parties in BRD should capitalize and make it a deliberate part of their policies - meaning in clear language the policies of CDU/CSU, and from there also flowing into other parties. However, by and large the focus on all these right wing forces has been a fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

And that leaves us with the BRD, Western Germany itself. In terms of space there is no doubt about socio-
economic expansionism, to some extent as a part of Western capitalism in general and European Community, state-coordinated capitalism in particular. Does it also have a geo-political connotation? So far certainly less than for DDR. There has been no participation of BRD troops in US actions abroad, for instance; even if such actions (like the Indochina wars) may have been supported openly and economically. On the other hand, latent revanchism should not be scoffed at: for a country proclaiming itself as Nachfolgerstaat a collapse of regimes to the East of the Elbe, particularly of the DDR if that should ever come about, might make latent revanchism into a manifest and even golden opportunity. Of course, such unfolding of historical
potentials would be highly situationally conditioned; but the potential is even audibly and visibly present, in rightist declarations.

If we now make a jump on the list to person-nature relations one comes to the interesting conclusion that today it is the environmentalists, generally seen as being in opposition to the BRD establishment that are riding on the type of waves that Nazism was modulating to its advantage. On the other hand it may be said that they are the representatives of a scientized rather than mystified nature, protecting nature against pollution and depletion and reduction of maturity, by means of technocracy or other types of rationality, less through any kind of mystical bonds with higher or deeper forces in nature. But there is some connection here—the romantic and anti-urban did not prevent Nazism.

If we move from there to the person-person aspects it is also clearly seen that BRD is far away from Nazism. There are acts of state-engendered terrorism, but relatively few. One cannot say that West Germans today conceive of themselves as a Herrenvolk. The state, construction is not that of a dictatorship by a one-party state, although one may as usual discuss how democratic it is. I myself find it one of the most lively and participatory countries in Europe at the local and non-governmental level, and considerably less than democratic at the establishment level, where it is parliamentary more than democratic. Hitler's Machtergreifung brought about a political revolution, but no socio-economic revolution: it did not challenge capitalism. The Neuordnung was capitalist. But did it have to be private capitalist for nazism to operate? State capitalism, shading into state socialism might also have served as a supporting structure. Capitalism was an instrument, not a goal.

Anyhow, the BRD is a capitalist country, a part of the Western capitalist social formation and as such a party to its highly celebrated growth, but also to its less applauded decline, its crisis. That, of course, brings in the type of conditions so clearly visible in their embryonic
form already today (early 1983) of impending possible breakdown of the system, with so many of the indicators moving in the same direction as they did before the "Machtergreifung" in 1933 (the unemployment level, for instance, being in 1983 where it was in 1929-30). However, such factors are more situational than permanent. They are trends rather than the type of factors we are looking for, however important they may be in releasing fascism and related phenomena.

If I should pinpoint the way in which the Bundesrepublik to my mind is a successor of Nazism, although a very incomplete one, it would be by emphasizing the perspectives on time, knowledge and the relations between the personal and transpersonal levels. I could start with the basic figure of thought: the dichotomous division of the world in good and evil, with us on the good side, of course, and with a rich and well-described Feindbild on the other. It goes without saying that a Germany defeated by the allied powers after it had committed so many holocausts, not only the one against Jews, was hardly a Germany that—united or divided—could see itself as on top of, or in the center of, the "good"part of the world. The only way it could still be in the good part, a country for which the future is nevertheless promising, would be by subjugating itself to the victors, and more particularly to the leaders among the victors, the superpowers. Only by direct submission to the superpowers could the Germanies (for this obviously goes for both of them) get a position at least not at the very bottom of the world hierarchy, and even not too far from the top, by being particularly subservient, unterwürfig.

In saying so it is implicitly said that it was much easier for the Germans to define themselves as subservient than as equal to others. The distance from being on the
top to being lower down in a vertical system is much smaller than the conceptual, psychological and social distance from being at the top of a hierarchy to being one among equals. The superpowers were willing to accept them as servants, even very willing provided they offered themselves as carriers of their particular mystique, their vision of past, present and future: economic growth and capital accumulation in one; economic planning and state growth in the other. Both of them trying, through technocratic and other means, to achieve a contradiction-free, surprise-free, social order.

And here the Germans, and once more it goes for both of them, could serve some important function by putting at their disposal their mastery of dichotomous, pyramidal, deductive thought figures. Obviously, one could no longer talk about Aryans and Jews - those terms were out. But disregarding them is one thing, to disregard a thought figure it has taken generations, centuries to construct is quite another, not easy embedded in the deep structure of epistemology as it is. For what was the meaning of Lutheranism, to take only one example, if not as a thought system with the contradiction between good and evil on top, and a rigidly organized semiductive system underneath, filled with prescriptions for thought and action, even with the prescription that he or she who did not believe in the prescription was condemned? Hence it becomes a question of appointing successors for the Aryans and the Jews, using the thought figure handed down through generations.

As mentioned the successors to the Aryans could not simply be "Germans". It had to be something broader than that where the Germans were no longer necessarily central or on the top. For the DDR, in official terms, it became Marxism-Leninism; with the socialist states of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, and progressive forces all over the world seen as one big family - soon to be victorious already from the Elbe to the China Sea - unstoppable because right Die Lehre von Marx ist allmächtig weil sie wahr ist. For the BRD it became, of course, the "free world". Membership certificates were issued to either Germany, integration was ascertained,
the Principle of Good had found, for both, a new interpretation. They rapidly became the best pupils in their respective classes. But what about the Principle of Evil?

For the Marxist East Germany another teutonic scheme of thinking dictated the Feindbild: Capital; capitalism and its manifestations all over the world, the capitalist countries headed by the United States, with imperialism in general and US imperialism in particular, more or less fascist. The scheme became considerably more than a figure of thought. It attained explanatory power by being very far from the worst guide to world events in a world where the United States are defending her illegitimate interests so many places, in the post-World-War period. However, the assumption here is that the thought figure would have been adhered to even if it had not been a good map of the world. A Nachfolgerfeind had to be found, and was found.

In the liberal/conservative West, to find the successors to the non-Aryans was a much simpler task: they were the same as before, only with the Jews officially eliminated from the list. The Bolsheviks still remained as basic parts of the Principle of Evil, supported by local and subversive Communists, shading from the deep red into the more pinkish regions of the political spectrum populated by the Social Democrats. Willy Brandt became a live bridge, always a Social Democrat, but extra suspect because he had been in uniform (as a member of Norwegian police forces, with perfect command of the language) "fighting against his own country". The Cold War helped organizing the world image along familiar lines as an irreconcilable fight between the forces of the Free World and those of "totalitarian communism", in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

If Nazism had been totally rejected, and Nazism even were an enemy, how could then the sworn enemy of
the enemy, the Soviet Union and Communists in general, still remain the enemy? Why should they not by customary logic become friends, thereby destroying the reconstruction of the thought-figure? One answer is simply that the thought-figure is more important than such logic, the social forces come and go, the thought-figure remains. But another explanation, highly compatible with the one just mentioned, will run as follows: Because Nazism was only partly an enemy. Few of the Nazishad actually been persecuted not to mention punished for their hideous crimes against humanity in general and highly concrete human beings in particular. Many of them had even been given high positions in the Nachfolgerstaat. They were in the position to define what was good and what was evil, and of course chose definitions not too far away from what they had always believed.

And thus it came that the lines of division in the Bundesrepublik only a short time after the war became surprisingly similar to the ones found before the war: on the one hand the conservatives, on the other hand, and in deep and genuine opposition to them the communists, and then in-between a vast spectrum of social democrats, some here and some there, sometimes here and sometimes there; very often just in-between. It suffices to compare the map of allegiance inside what today is West Berlin in connection with the Nazi takeover with the struggle against nuclearism fifty years later: Kreuzberg firmly against either, Schöneberg perhaps somewhat less so, Charlottenburg, Grunewald, Dahlem very much on the establishment side. Patterns survive, even in mins! Not strange that so many in Germany accepted the idea of collective guilt, that made all look equally bad, the Nazis as well as those, fought against Nazism and even paid with their lives - Schicksalsgemeinschaft!

But there is more to it than that. There is also the basic mystique, exterminism and Opferbereitschaft, readiness for sacrifice. On the place where the Führer and the Führerprinzip had been came the United States and Washington for West Germany, and Soviet Union and Moscow for East Germany. Their word was law. Obedience was and is, of course particularly among the conservatives in West and East,
absolute; subservience to Washington and Moscow takes the place of subservience to the Führer. Unterwürfig bleibt unterwürfig. They were forced, but also accepted the new obligation with ease.

But then the symmetry stops... I see BRD as going one very important step further in developing positions homologous to Nazism. Both of them are woven into nuclear strategy, but BRD much more explicitly so than DDR. And here the point is not only the willingness by the government to engage in genocidal practice by seeing nuclear war not only as thinkable, conceivable; but even to plan for it through a myriad of small strategic and technical preparatory steps. There is willingness to engage in exterminism, in genocide, in Vernichtung and Verwüstung, of others. But in addition to that there is also a willingness to engage in Selbstvernichtung, in total elimination of one's own country and oneself as a nation in case one should not succeed. The saturation of Germany with nuclear war targets leading to the Raketen sind Magneten logic, not to mention the alleged self-invitation for destruction by the German government in inviting the stationing of nuclear weapon systems so dangerous that they will have to be eliminated even before one contemplates firing them (Cruise and Pershing II, particularly the latter) are cases in mind. Suffice it only to bring in as a final point the Endlösung: for Nazi Germany it took place in the Bunker not too far from the Reichstag; in the Bundesrepublik it may take place in an often Bunker, not too far from the Bundestag, if the time cosmology should unfold itself not in the direction of the Vernichtung of the enemy, but also Vernichtung of oneself, not heaven or hell, but hell and hell, like last time, only more so because "Verwüstung" has been added with nuclear technology.
I do not find all of this so clearly expressed in the DDR. On the contrary, I find a lot of resistance against it, the current domestic militarization of DDR society notwithstanding. And one may now ask the key question: What is more important as a successor to Nazism, is it the dictatorship of the one-party state, or Exterminismus, in the double sense alluded to above? Even if the latter goes together with democracy, and even if it should be the case that the democratic majority of the citizens of BRD are in favor of the logical consequence of the lieber tot als rot doctrine, which is exactly the official nuclear strategy? The outsider, from a small Nordic country, would not easily be surprised by this. For the outsider Nazism, as well as its successor on the Western part of German soil, exterminism in the sense of nuclearism, are too close to general German thinking with its emphasis on heroism and sacrifice, with Germans being dedicated to the irreconcilable fight between good and evil, at all times, but fortunately not at all places. Nazism could not have been accepted the way it was, meeting no resistance to speak of, if it had not been for the fact that it fitted, not quite like the hand in the glove because the hand was too big and too strangely shaped, and had to expand the glove and make it burst at some points. But some kind of fit there was. And the same goes for exterminism in the form of nuclearism: it fits. Except for the peace movement, fortunately.

But BRD is not the only country that is a part of US nuclear strategy! This is true, but it is the only central country so saturated with targets and with a government that willing to play the game the way the US seems to want it with Italy as a good number two. It should be mentioned that Japan also has found her role in the world as subservient to the United States, also unable to conceive of herself as just one among equals. However, Japan does not engage in scenarios for extermination, neither of others,
nor of themselves. And it could perhaps be said, at least up till the stationing of Cruise missiles in Comiso that the Italians, somewhat less aware of what is happening in the world and somewhat more susceptible to the power of mafia and money are engaging in scenarios mainly for self-extermination, not even with the chance of getting a good hit at the enemy.

And that makes me conclude with the BRD as a dangerous country. The trappings of democracy are there. They are important, but they are less important than riding on the much deeper and much stronger waves that not only brought Nazism into power but also are an expression of something found in the "deeper recesses of the German collective soul" if one may be pardoned for this expression. The country becomes particularly dangerous when steeped into the agonies of a capitalist system in crisis. True, the vocal opposition to Exterminism is possibly bigger today than was the vocal opposition to Nazism before the Machtergreifung. It is possibly also deeper, because it may be that some Germans have looked not only at the superficial levels of German political thought, but also at the deeper aspects-although recent efforts to try to come to grips with what happened those days fifty years ago are not very promising in that connection. Hence, it may turn out better the next time, but it may also not: it may also be that what protects Germany from a reversal to more explicitly fascist forms is that so far the capitalist crisis has been far away, far enough away to be compatible with a democracy that has made it possible for Germans to turn against themselves, in BRD. In the other Germany dictatorship makes that impossible; opposition takes the form of apathy, non-participation, migration "nach Innen", and (efforts to) escape. But it may also be less necessary, anti-fascism having deeper roots. In neither Germany is there much effort to come to grips with the German aspects of Nazism and Machtergreifung. What to the East is a universal problem of capitalism in crisis is in the West a universal problem of fragmented parliamentarism; both serving as protective shields against deeper insights. A deplorable situation, and not reassuring at all to the neighbors of Germany.

In conclusion it might perhaps be pointed out that these four that are sharing the heritage from the Nazi period are deeply divided among themselves, as are most siblings with an inheritance to take care of. I repeat: none of them is a full-scale personification of Nazism, if they had been, it would mean a *casus belli*, externally or internally. Among the four there are six possible relations, all six of them today, relations of enmity, even hatred. From the outsider point of view this may be good: If they had all been aligned, so that the four could join forces, if Germany had not been divided and polarized into a conflict, and if there had not been deep, open, divisions in the stranger of the two Germanies, there might have been more reasons for neighbors to be afraid.

But one never knows how lasting such divisions are, and more particularly one does not know what could happen to them in times of crisis. This being the case one would be frightened by any effort to make use of the popular concern with nuclear weapons to step up conventional armament, well knowing that this is the material out of which revanchism could very well one day take on very concrete forms. And one would be much more satisfied if one heard more talk about defensive weaponry, if there is to be weaponry at all - and considerably more talk about efforts to understand the deeper aspects of Nazism, embedded as they are not only in German culture in particular, but Western civilization in general.
However, I do not personally think that there is much reason to fear that the Germans will start marching again, East or West, North or South, or all four as they did last time. What one might be afraid of would not be the German inclination to sacrifice others so much as the inclination to sacrifice themselves, the Opferbereitschaft so often referred to above. It is as if the Germans feel that they have been born under an ambiguous sign. On the one hand they are selected, somewhat more gifted than others, carriers of a transcendent civilization, produced by the Germans, but for human-kind as a whole. It is a heavy responsibility: whatever happens: there have to be Germans around to interpret Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche; Goethe and Schiller - or Marx and Engels. The responsibility becomes particular clear in das Teutonenjahr 1983, celebrating Luther, Wagner, Marx and Hitler, in one year. There is a message, a mission - the duty to undertake this mission of bringing the message around the world easily becomes a right to do so.

But then there is the darker side of the birth mark. There are dark forces hidden in the German tribe, collectively and individually. Das Tier is not far away. When it appears in Nazi form as die blonde Bestie then this also means that nature has run her, sometimes cruel, course with the Germans. There are atavisms, deep forces that may come up again, who knows. Durch Leiden zu Licht, durch Licht zu Leiden. Drama is given onto the Germans, himmelhoch jauchzend und zu Tode betrübt, not bliss, happiness, enlightenment and peace, for instance in the buddhist sense, or Er lösung. Of course, other people - such as Anglo-Saxons, Nordic people, US people, may be most Latins not to mention non-Europeans may not understand this. They are even so naive as to think that one can change it. Those to the East, however, they understand - their destiny has been to be invaded.

I interpret the German Angst as an Angst the Germans have for themselves. By believing in these darker forces and a destiny with which one cannot argue, Germans may run into the vicious circle of self-fulfilling predictions.
If it comes, if a total war should once again be on the horizon, my Angst would be that the German Angst would make them nod with recognition, here it is, rather than really fight it. Should it come, and I am of course thinking of a nuclear holocaust, then I am in no doubt that the Germans would not only sacrifice, but also be heroes in the holocaust. Like the incredible German women who during the spring of 1945, in a society ravaged by war, with the men either dead or away on the fronts in the East and the West in the North and in the South carried the burden of somehow keeping society going. They would probably do it once more, if called upon, as a part of destiny. And here the Germans under Nazism differed from the Italians under fascism. The Germans went on to the bitter end; the Italians saw the hand-writing on the wall.

It is for this very reason that what I find most important and encouraging in German youth today in general, and the green wave in particular, is not necessarily the political stands (with which I by and large agree) but the underlying attitude. May be it can be put as simply as this: I do not believe that they are to any important extent victims of this general German mystique I have attempted to explain above. I do not think they are willing to sacrifice themselves and others for the sake of abstract principles. Rather, I feel that they are so filled with love of life, and love of love, that the self-hatred which always is a condition for self-immolation and extreme acts of sacrifice simply is not present. And this, needless to say, has much to do with their alternative way of life, particularly when they are able to build their own institutions, less vertical, certainly filled with rivalries and competition, but not with that hatred coming out of repression. I would also tend to think that the older German tendency to develop sharp Feindbilder replete with Angst and hatred at the world level is a projection of experiences at the micro level, in the high number of vertical, collective and exclusive organisations that
together constitute Germany.

To this one may then add an important question: why should the green generation be different? Why should they be a discontinuity at this point in history, if it is correct as stated above that a certain German cosmology is very deeply embedded in the collective and individual German minds? To this I would try three answers, all of them tentative.

First, the true German reaction, on German soil, against Nazism certainly did not start 1945, nor in 1955. A number of people had to retire biologically or at least socially for any such reaction really to come; a number of young people had to be born and grow up and achieve sufficient maturity to understand what had happened, yet not feel that they had to be defensive about it. May be the first clearly anti-fascist generation came at the end of the 1960s, and for various reasons in a marxist form. May be the second came towards the end of the 1970s, and then in a green form—certainly also inspired by the TV series Holocaust—like the film on Gandhi filled with shortcomings, yet of tremendous pedagogical value. The third, the fourth, the fifth and so on waves of anti-Nazism and deeper understanding will still have to come. They will come. In other words, a steady progress in understanding of what Nazism was about may lead to more clear tendencies of dissociation, of creating distance between oneself and anything Nazi.

Second, the first wave of anti-Nazism was marxist and was anti-Nazi in content but certainly not anti-teutonic in form. It was of short duration among other reasons because its structure was out of touch with the tendency towards horizontal, individualist and more inclusive
forms of social organization; at the same time its model of future society was not only unclear but also partly repulsive. Whatever the reason, consciously or unconsciously the 1968 wave may have lead to a deeper rejection of authoritarianism, refusing to be party to a struggle whereby one authoritarian system is supposed to replace another.

Third, adding to the negative experience of the Nazi wave and the Marxist wave came the green wave itself. One of its characteristics is that it is a loose federation of single issue movements; the peace movement, the feminist movement, the alternative way of life movement, the Bürgerinitiativen of any kind, the ecological movement, and so on. Somehow they seem all to agree that one of them should not be the important one and the others secondary in significance. They should all be on an equal footing, on an "I-shall-support-you-if-you-support-me" basis. The movement is pluralistic and has managed to remain so even after the green party was founded, serving as a setting for this loose federation, bringing its issues into one of the citadels of the classical Germanic traditions, the Bundestag in Bonn.

This horizontal, pluralistic structure is reflected in the field of political theory. Each issue brings in a lot of theory-formation in addition to data, criticism and constructive ideas. But so far nobody has come up with a generally acceptable teutonically shaped ideological pyramid where everything is neatly deduced from first principles, complete with Feindbild, crisis and catharsis. There have been efforts in this direction, and there will probably be more. If they should succeed, and one of the issues is seen as the fundamental one then there is always the danger that the corresponding movement will be seen as the leading movement, using the theory to gain ascendency over the others.
In that case it will be likely to insist that "our issue has to be attended to first, then the time will come for the other issues", substituting for a circular model of many small steps a linear model of one big step that will - on paper - bring the solution of all other problems in its wake. And in practice probably end with catastrophe.

Should this happen I would feel somewhat more frightened again. But I would feel even more frightened if the very same people who did this should also develop that combination of self-hatred and other-hatred that seems to be so rampant in the older generation, deeply anchored in vertical, collective and exclusive organizations all over Germany, and highly compatible with sentimentality, "Gemütlichkeit".

So, let us wait and see. But not passively. And not with a spirit of self-righteousness or vengeance. For we are all in it, more or less, as a part of that expansive, exploitative Occident.