WHY THE CONCERN WITH WAYS OF LIFE?

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1. **Introduction**: The Malaise of the 1970s in Rich Countries

At the end of the 1960s a large-scale comparative 10-nation study was undertaken under the auspices of the European Coordination Center for Research and Documentation and Social Sciences in Vienna: *Images of the World in the Year 2000*.(1) Close to 9000 people were asked close to 2000 questions giving a total of 1,800,000 answers - these were people from 8 European countries, North and South, East and West and in addition from India and Japan. One set of findings that emerged relatively clearly from this study of the younger generation, people 15 to 40 years old, was a relatively high level of pessimism, but heavily dependent on the level of technical-economic development:

"When it comes to domestic perspectives the organizing axis is the level of technical-economic development. Nations high on this dimension are pessimistic, bewildered and uncertain, probably a) because they see the negative effects of this type of development, b) because they feel they have exhausted the program of their societies and that the future is without challenging and clear goals. Nations low on that dimension do not have this vision and may even reject it. They follow in the same footsteps but with the optimism stemming partly from the ignorance of the adverse effects, partly from the feeling of having a program. And this seems to be the program defined and developed by countries that are already disillusioned by it."(2)

This type of finding referred to a broad range of issues: a certain science scepticism in the more developed countries, a general development pessimism with heavy emphasis on social ills, and a feeling of development fatigue, with predictions of retrogressive development, for one's country as well as for oneself towards the end of the century".(3) Moreover,

"-- these are not data reflecting an innovating humanity exploring and facing a fascinating open-ended future. These seem rather to be data reflecting a humanity with its back to the future, looking at the past, and the present - and projecting from that experience into the future. In a sense these are the data one would expect at the end of a phase in human history, not at the beginning of a new one."(4)
It looks as if the 1970s bore out this prediction based on data from the late 1960s. These public opinion data indicate a mood, but it is quite clear that this mood later crystallized into very concrete issues. Suffice it only to mention such words as nuclear power, energy, resources in general, ecology, lifestyles, local autonomy, urban problems, and some issues are already indicated.

A more systematic list of problems or issues, ills or pathologies as they are referred to here might look as follows: (5)

TABLE 1: A Tentative List of Pathologies in rich countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human pathologies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Body: cardiovascular diseases, tumors, occupational diseases, accidents including internal/external war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mind: mental disorders (schizophrenia, psychoses, neuroses) addiction to drugs, alcohol, tobacco, suicide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit: a sense of meaninglessness, alienation.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social pathologies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural: passive - withdrawal, observerism active - crime, violence, homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributional: injustice, inequality, inequality of opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural: inequity, dependency, unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental: depletion, pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural: overacceptance of exogenous culture overrejection of endogenous culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The point about a list of this type would be that in the 1970s there seemed to be increased consciousness about these phenomena, not only their extent but also theories about their causes. More and more they seem to be seen as having social origins, and even avoidable origins - thereby giving rise to a number of social movements, crystallized around the issues singly or combined. An image of a sick society developed, easily spelt out using the chart above: a society with a
high level of life-expectancy but not necessarily with healthy people because they are suffering from cardiovascular diseases, tumors, growing slowly to start with, then explosively, occupational diseases and accidents, threatened by internal wars or terrorism and by large-scale wars, with high levels of mental disorders, with a population not knowing what the sense and the meaning of the whole thing would be, withdrawing into observerism except for the active ones, engaging in crimes of various types, violence increasingly threatening to the survival of others; societies that might keep the levels of social injustice and inequality (including inequality of opportunities, for instance between the two sexes) within bonds but unable to reduce it significantly, while at the same time the society provides unable to offer employment to everybody, with increasing levels of exploitation (inequity) for those who are employed and increasing dependency on central governments and outside countries at the same time as there is a degradation of the environment both in terms of depletion and pollution and a penetration of the local and the national culture by national and foreign cultures. The picture is a non-savoury one, but not necessarily overdrawn. It is not strange that movements got organised!

There are many of them and no effort would be made towards a more complete list. Suffice it only to remind the reader of ecological movements, peace-movements, women's movements, religious movements, undogmatic leftists, Bürgerinitiativen (citizens' movements), alternative ways of life movements to mention one list; or movements focusing on alternative technologies, new food habits, self-sufficiency, simple living, personal growth to mention another. At the political level one would certainly point to various types of extraparliamentary politics, and an increase in political activation in general of the grassroot level. In short, what was a mood at the end of the 1960s exploded in a scatter of relatively crystallized issues in the beginning of the 1970s and onwards, and developed into a spectrum of activist movements, all of them giving testimony to the inadequacy of the traditional political machinery. As the 1970s grew older it was also clear that governmental initiatives try to come to grips with
these issues, usually one at a time, basing themselves on the sectorial, highly segmented machinery of governmental operations in the advanced/
industrialized/high-income countries - here referred to as the OECD countries for simplicity.

In short, there is a general malaise. In itself this constitutes already an answer to the question put as a title of this chapter. But we have to go beyond that. This is merely the surface of the phenomena, described here as "issues" and "movements". Of course, one is driven to ask the question: is there some kind of common denominator, something these issues and movements have in common? An answer to the question "how do we best conceive of them" is certainly not only an invitation to intellectual activity, to develop a social theory: it is also a precondition for meaningful political activity. But this immediately leads to a problem: any kind of effort to say that these phenomena are "nothing but" - and then follows the pet theory of the authors - is dangerous, partly because people in general should formulate such theories, partly because it implies a reduction of variety, possibly towards dangerous simplification; and mainly because it may give a much to simplistic basis for political action.

Hence, we want to proceed with care. Our building so far has only a ground floor, the issues and the movements, the phenomena themselves. We want to dig down below that, maybe four levels. But all of this will be tentative, as an invitation to the reader. It is merely an effort to explore what might be below, not an effort to construct a solid theoretical edifice. Moreover, there may be those who would follow us one level down, maybe two, but not to the third and fourth levels - others may have different cut-off points. So all we hope to do is to indicate ways of coming to grips with the phenomena described.
2. The Perspective of Basic Needs: Underdevelopment, Overdevelopment and Maldevelopment

Looking at the chart in Table 1 any reader would probably agree that the phenomena listed are not unrelated to each other. They all concern our way of life (WoL) at the individual level and at the social level - but the latter immediately translates into our daily life as can be seen from the list, directly or indirectly. There is an element of surprise in this: the last few decades have brought a level of material affluence unheard of in history, not only to the ruling elites of the world, but to a large segment of the ordinary people in industrialized countries. Why then are we concerned with the ways in which people live in this part of the world; why not sit down and enjoy the high living standard achieved by many of us, waiting patiently for the day when not only 70 or 80% but 100 per cent of us, have reached the hoped-for abundance?

Simply because it does not seem to work that way. And one way of describing (rather than explaining) this phenomenon could have as a point of departure the idea of basic human needs. Basic human needs are basic in the sense that they have to be satisfied for human beings to continue being human beings, and they are human in the sense that they are felt at the individual level, however much the satisfaction usually is at the social level. Thus, the need for food expresses itself as hunger which is felt at the individual level but only very few human beings would be able to satisfy it alone. In fact, societies have emerged precisely because of the necessity for collective action in the effort to satisfy such basic needs. The same obviously applies to the need for togetherness, and however much many people might feel that the need for a sense of meaning with life can be fulfilled through a sufficiently high level of consciousness, living alone, in retreat from the material world, as a hermit, in the longer run one may discover that meaning is also derived from social interaction.
However this may be, let us proceed by assuming that human needs can be classified into four groups: those for survival and for welfare (more material needs), and those for freedom and identity (more non-material needs). A certain minimum of material production is required for these needs to be satisfied. However, if we now go one step further and assume that it is the development of people that counts, not the ever increasing production of material means, then an important point emerges. At some point in time the material production level may start becoming less useful, so that any increment in consumption means progressively less for human development, and, eventually, becomes counterproductive. It is at the stage where material increases impede rather than promote human development that we experience overdevelopment (Figure 1). Thus we can think of a dividing line between development and maldevelopment, the latter consisting of both under- and overdevelopment. It is only within a certain range of consumption, at a certain sufficiency level (no doubt varying with different cultures and historical conditions), that we may identify development.

Figure 1: Relationship between human development and production level
The shape of the curve in Figure 1 is important. It can be seen as one in a family of curves, all of them depicting possible relationships between increasing consumption and level of satisfaction (in a more general vein one might even talk about means-ends relations in general). Three such curves are depicted in Figure 2:

Figure 2: Three Images of Consumption-Satisfaction Relations

Curve A is a well-known exponential curve indicating a very high level of optimism: not only is there more satisfaction the more consumption there is, there is even much more, they are exponentially related. In curve B, the logistic curve, this optimism has yielded in favour of an image of a saturation level: after a certain level of consumption there is no longer any appreciable gain in satisfaction; a saturation point has been reached. And in curve C this level of thinking is carried still much further: not only is there decreasing utility after a certain level of consumption, after that increasing disutility will be the order of the day. One typical example would be the consumption of food: highly useful for hunger-abatement in the first phase, then decreasingly useful, then increasingly harmful,
but not in the sense that hunger starts increasing again, but in the sense that other needs become dissatisfied through increasing consumption. Thus, in Figure 1 the needs referred to on the vertical axis may not be the same as one goes up and down the curve indicated. The same also holds true for more non-material needs: take the case of a person in search of meaning of life. In the beginning of that search discussion and togetherness with others, reading books, searches for new experiences may be extremely productive, after some time decreasing so, and after some time even counter-productive. Why? Probably because an upper limit has been reached and for more of such "inputs" to yield more in terms of meaning of life some inner changes have to take place, call it maturation, growth, spiritual revival. Just as there is an upper limit to how much food a body can digest there is also an upper limit to how many impressions a mind can digest into something spiritually meaningful.

It should be noted that on the horizontal axis in Figures 1 and 2 we have put "consumption", not "production". The reason is that consumption refers to individual consumption as that is the unit within which this particular needs-dialectic takes place. Production may go on for a very long time without leading to overconsumption, provided the products (the goods and the services) are well distributed. It is even obvious what is meant by "well distributed": people get enough to get out of underconsumption, but not so much that they get into overconsumption. When we have used the terms "underdevelopment/overdevelopment" rather than "underconsumption/overconsumption" above it is because there seem to be strong social factors counteracting this type of adequate distribution of what is produced, forcing high levels of underdevelopment (patterned underconsumption) and overdevelopment (patterned overconsumption) in society.

If we now use "maldevelopment" as a more general concept, covering the two, then there are obviously many types of maldevelopment. The following is one simple typology:
TABLE 2: A Maldevelopment Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-material needs</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>under-developed</td>
<td>over-developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under-developed</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over-developed</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The typical OECD country maldevelopment type might combine over-development for the satisfaction of material needs with underdevelopment for the satisfaction of non-material needs. But there is still considerable underdevelopment where material needs are concerned in these countries, not only poverty pockets. Thus, both types A and B in Table 2 would seem to apply to the OECD countries. But might there not also be an element of type C? - people surrounded by an abundance of satisfiers of material needs, but also of all the things needed for their non-material needs - people they know, their living rooms stuffed with books, records, cassettes, video-tapes, access to travel and all kinds of experiences - - - ? And could there not also be in less rich countries an overfeeding of complex cultural inputs, culturally extremely rich surroundings even if they are not privatized into living rooms, to the point that they actually become counter-productive? Does a person become a richer person by being surrounded by incredible art treasures, villages of temples and monuments? - if this were the case, museum guards and temple wardens should be among the richest people in the world in terms of inner growth. Hence, we are indicating that type C might apply to groups in several of the less advanced/agricultural/low-income countries.

There is a process here, and it seems to be very visible if one looks at what goes on in many of the capitals of the Third world countries today:
Figure 3: Maldevelopment as a Process

Here we have concentrated only on material consumption/satisfaction and the purpose of the figure is to indicate how people can be sucked through a tunnel of material underdevelopment straight into material overdevelopment with very little in-between, no platform of development on which one could rest, declaring "j'y suis, j'y reste". Of course, by the time they come out at the other end of the tunnel they belong to the "elite" because they have all the trappings of the elite. Some of those trappings can then be seen from Table 1: at this end of the scale they would die from cardiovascular diseases and cancer rather than from malaria or bilharzia, and so on down the list of human and social pathologies, depending on the extent to which the transition from material underdevelopment to material overdevelopment is accompanied by decreasing non-material development into real underdevelopment where these dimensions are concerned.
How much of the phenomena listed in the preceding section are we capable of conceiving of in terms such as these just developed? Some of them, perhaps most, not all. The phenomena best accounted for have a certain formula in common: there is a high level of production of things, goods and services, this in turn leads to a high level of consumption and at some point or another there is too much of that consumption. In order to produce nature is made use of, consequently there are impacts on nature, some of them highly negative; leading not only to depletion and pollution, but also to movements to protect nature. The various movements to protect the human body, mind and spirit are obvious: they may focus on any of the issues mentioned under pathologies, singly or combined. But the pathologies classified as "distributional" or "structural" are not accounted for in this way of looking at the phenomena. That goods and bads are unjustly and unequally distributed, that the structure provides little work and much exploitation and dependency are phenomena that go deeper than any needs-oriented analysis alone would uncover.

It is at this important point that the needs approach shows its limitations. The approach rightly brings the individual into focus, but it is weak on distributional and structural aspects of social life. As our focus here is on the type of maldevelopment found in rich countries we would tend to overemphasize material oversufficiency and not the undersufficiency, hence to underemphasize the types of maldevelopment found in materially poor groups, classes and countries. Here there would also be those who try to escape from the malaise of material poverty into alternative ways of life as opposed to those who try to escape from the malaise of the spiritual poverty despite or because of excessive (material) progress. To catch these phenomena class analysis, both distributional/liberal and structural/ Marxist would be indispensable, and the corresponding social movements would be socialist/workers' parties, trade unions, demonstrations, strikes. But they belong to the classical patterns, of the rich countries; our concern is with the new phenomena clustering around ways of life.
3. The Roots of Maldevelopment: The Bourgeois Way of Life (BWL); The Exploitative Style of Development (ESD).

Above we have tried to characterize maldevelopment, seeing it as a convenient label grouping together a number of phenomena. At this level of analysis let us try to point to some characteristics of our society that certainly are related to maldevelopment. In doing so we shall try to see social life more from the inside, from the point of view of what people in general try to obtain and from the point of view of what elites of various kinds try to do. Thus, we are less concerned with general social philosophy, more with individual patterns of behaviour, be they at the people or elite levels.

We assume, by definition, that the way of life most people are steered towards is what one might called the dominant way of life, DWL. But there are several of them. Simplistically one might talk about an upper-class way of life; a middle-class way of life and a working-class way of life. However, in OECD societies most of the population seem now to identify themselves with the middle-classes, trying to deny both upper-class and working-class rootedness. And one factor behind this, again, might be a certain sharing of the ideal way of life, the way of life the overwhelming majority of the population would like to lead. In a sense it is a kind of a mixture of all three, but definitely developing out of the urban/industrial sector of these societies. It is the lifestyle of the bourguer, the bourgeois, for which reason it will be referred to here as the "bourgeois way of life", BWL. In using this term no particular theoretical perspective is implied beyond what has been said. It is simply a way of living evolving out of a certain pattern of production and a certain class in society.
We assume the bourgeois way of life to have the following four major characteristics **together** defining BWL: (27)

1. non-manual work (avoidance of heavy and dirty work)
2. material comfort (with increasing material consumption)
3. privatism/familism
4. predictability/security

Thus, the bourgeois is materially non-productive, at least when this is taken in a direct, concrete sense: touching nature with one's hands in order to work it. Material comfort points in the same direction: it is a way of creating distance between nature and human beings, by controlling the environment, keeping it constant, within an agreeable range where temperature, humidity, movements, smells, noise, etc. are concerned. Privatism defines the nuclear family, and more particularly the home/house which supposedly is its castle (Purg), as the primary unit of consumption and also of reproduction. And predictability/security adds the time-dimension to all of this: it is a quest for a predictable future at a high level of security, meaning by the latter the probability that the first three conditions will obtain for oneself, throughout one's lifespan, and also for one's offspring (the time-perspective does not go further as indicated by point 3 - familism stands for nuclear family; mother, father and offspring).

There is no doubt that this is a distinct way of life, it has coherence and inner logic; it is recognizable in contemporary life. Much more can be said about this, but we have tried to keep the description to a minimum. The form BWL takes in Northern European societies is relatively modest, but involves the majority of the population: the one-two-three-four syndrome: one spouse, 2 children, a 3-room apartment and a four-wheel vehicle (the private car) - or a multiple over the same theme with each divorce bringing new wives, husbands and children into the picture, together with a division of accumulated assets and a consequent rebuilding of the collection of material aspects. There are also extreme versions of BWL: the one plane, 2 boats, 3 cars, 4 television-set family - but it should also be noted that there are norms building up against affluence spilling over into too...
much opulence. In short, BWL is not only a goal for the working classes, but also possibly has a levelling-down function for the upper classes.

For this type of way of life to become the dominant way of life, obtainable and indeed obtained for the majority of the society, a certain style of development is needed. It is already evident from the first two points: on the one hand much is wanted in terms of material goods, on the other hand the ideal is not to participate in this material production directly. How does one solve this contradiction? Reasoning from the bourgeois way of life the answer is obvious: by means of a pattern of production that gets a maximum of material output from a minimum input of manual working hours (in other words, by high labour productivity); by expropriating as much as possible of the material goods produced from those who manually produce them (in other words, through exploitation - providing the producers with so low salaries that they can only repossess a small fraction of what they have produced, whether the producers are found in the "internal proletariat" - the working-classes - or the "external proletariat" - the Third world countries); and by squeezing nature as hard as possible to get the material products (in other words, through un-ecological practices).

One might single this out as the four pillars on which this particular style of development is based, as a package:

1. high productivity (exploitation of self)
2. exploitation of internal proletariat
3. exploitation of external proletariat
4. exploitation of nature

And the connection between the bourgeois way of life and the style of development is more visible. It should be noted that this is a two-way connection: just as certain patterns of exploitation are needed in order to implement the BWL program for a high proportion of the population, once put into motion this style of development produces an enormous amount of material goods in search of consumers and does not produce a corresponding amount of manual jobs. Conceivably it might still produce enough jobs for everybody if the
non-manual sector expands as quickly as the manual sector contracts. But the term "non-manual" conceals a rather important distinction: between alienated and non-alienated jobs with the former being programmed by others, the latter being programmed by oneself. Since the former will be routine jobs ever higher productivity can be worked into the routines, thereby eliminating more and more jobs. Whether taking the form of unemployment, ever higher productivity, or even the form of being pushed into non-alienated work, (never permitted a chance to relax in routine activities) one might talk about exploitation of self. In short, the bourgeois way of life and the exploitative style of development go hand in hand.

How does this relate to what has been said in the preceding sections? It sheds some light on the maldevelopment phenomena referred to above: the quest for material growth at the expense of non-material factors is built into the combination of the quest for a bourgeois way of life, using an exploitative style of development as the instrument. The gradual erosion of human beings, somatically, mentally, spiritually, particularly the working classes, not given a chance to enjoy some of the positive sides of the bourgeois way of life (escape from unnecessarily heavy and dirty work, escape from the hazards of nature), as well as the erosion of nature, emerge clearly from this picture. One can also sense the monotony of the bourgeois way of life, a monotony sometimes apparently alleviated through CWL (chemical, circus way of life): the use of drugs, tobacco, alcohol; the use of spectator entertainment, passively watching sports-games, watching television, watching sports-games on television. Class perspectives emerge, not only the malaise derived from too much CWL.

But in addition to this something more emerges from the picture above. Exploitation is a social relation that sooner or later will lead to reactions, to struggles against exploitation. This is true whether one sees exploitation in terms of injustice in exchange relations, or in terms of exploiting too much, beyond the carrying capacity that permits regeneration (the German ausbeuten as opposed to merely ausnutzen): And a remarkable point about the
1970s was that reactions against all types of exploitation became very crystallized. Through trade-union formation and workers' parties a relatively high level of wages had been established for manual workers in many of the high-income countries and they were not willing to give that up, meaning that exploitation had to take new forms — such as importation of foreign workers, relocation of industries, utilization of new groups of labour, particularly women. The designation of these countries as high labour-cost countries became the official way of labelling the "crisis". But in addition, the "external proletariat", the Third world countries, protested very effectively against delivering so much of what was needed for material production, resources, including energy resources, without getting in return a much higher level of acquisitive power for material goods — the whole terms of trade approach promoted within the New International Economic Order, out of which the OPEC action 1973/74 stands out as a historical landmark. And then there was the clear understanding that nature also had her limits, giving rise to the ecologism, at national and international levels, of the 1970s. The only thing that still is to come is the linkage between increasingly higher levels of productivity, above defined as self-exploitation, and the various signs of fatigue in the human body, mind and spirit.

But then there is a reason why that linkage has not (yet) been made. Looking at the four "pillars" used to define ESD above, that last one (the first one on the list) is the only remaining one, the other three cannot be squeezed further. If it also has to be given up not only will ESD crumble, but with it BWL since BWL is based on it, materially speaking. In other words, to challenge increasing productivity is today to challenge the very basis of the social formation in the OECD countries, with ever increasing production, ever increasing consumption, and the possible overshooting in terms of too much BWL. And this is precisely what makes the 1980s so important: will the political struggle come to the point that the doctrine of high productivity becomes an issue with movements organized to fight against it — thereby making for more jobs at constant levels of production, possibly also for richer job content?
4. The Structural Argument: The Underlying Social Formation

Again, this leads to a new question: why do we have this bourgeois way of life, why do we have this exploitative style of development? As it is presented in the preceding section BWL becomes close to a pattern of values/attitudes, translated into behaviour, and the exploitative style of development becomes something chosen in order to fit BWL. There is certainly scope for trying to proceed one step below this, asking whether there is not something more solid, more permanent that generates both BWL and ESD. If this were not the case one could simply change the way of life and change the style of development - assuming that there would be nothing deeper, more solid that would constrain our choices. And indeed there is such a thing, an entire social formation, sometimes known as "modern", sometimes as "capitalist" (private and/or State), sometimes just seen as societies are. There are many ways of describing this social formation, the following is one of them.

Out of the Middle-Ages, in the "modern period", built on the waning feudal system came the "modern system", a concordat between State and capital, bureaucracy and corporation, increasingly supported by a growing intelligentsia producing general formulas of understanding and control for State and for Capital. Bureaucrats, capitalists and intelligentsia constituted and still constitute the elites of the social formation, certainly engaged in non-manual labour. The technologies they developed or accepted for material and other forms of production would tend to be bureaucracy-, Capital- and intelligentsia-intensive, thereby reinforcing their own position in society by making themselves indispensable and also providing similar elite positions for their male offspring, the females being relegated to reproductive functions in the privacy of the family. Capital provided and provides financial support for the State in the form of direct and indirect taxes, the State provides a unified market for capital, possibly expansions abroad, infrastructures support and so on.
The rest of the population becomes clients of bureaucracy and consumers for the corporations, paying for what they receive as clients with conformity and for what they receive as consumers with labour.

At this point a peculiar characteristic of the social formation known in the OECD area should be pointed to: all "civilized" societies have elites that combine non-manual work with material comfort; not all of them have such rapidly expanding elites with a relatively high level of willingness to share the essential characteristics of their way of life with if not everybody at least many in the rest of society. As mentioned above, BWL is not monopolized by a small group, it is becoming the dominant way of life. This, of course, gives rise to the important hypothesis that the elites are preserving something else as a monopoly while letting people in general enjoy BWL, much as the upper classes went flying when railroads became relatively classless, went to the Caribbean when people in general were able to have vacations in the Mediterranean area, went to small islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans when people started "flooding" the Caribbean and so on.

One possibility hinted at above would be to monopolize the access to non-alienated work, letting the jobs of bureaucrats, capitalists and intelligentsia become the only non-programmed and non-programmable jobs in society as these are the jobs held by the programmers themselves. But there is also another possibility which opens for one way of looking at the alternative ways of life (AWL) phenomena: AWL as an outlet for the elites just as CWL becomes the medication for elites and other people when the meaninglessness and emptiness of BWL become too oppressive. But for this to serve the function of maintaining elite-exclusiveness AWL has to be patterned in an exclusive way. If AWL is to be the negation of BWL then its four leading characteristics are easily seen: more manual work which the elites have always been able to include in the form of gardening and hobby activities; less comfort which the elites have always been able to include in the form of hazardous styles of vacationing as seen particularly in British aristocratic pursuits; efforts to extend
beyond the confines of the nuclear family by extra-marital activities and exclusive elite clubs; and a lower level of predictability and security accessible to the elites through political, economic and intellectual risk-taking, all the time knowing that there will be a material base on which to land after the risks have been indulged in. (39)

Although there is no doubt that this touches the AWL phenomenon and possibly also has set a model for it it is not identical with AWL as experienced in the OECD societies, particularly in North America and Northern Europe today. This should rather be seen as a way in which the elites may become detachable from the structure being served by them and serving them well in return. AWL as a social phenomenon goes much deeper, age-wise, sex-wise and class-wise, and above all content-wise. There is in AWL also the idea of becoming much more independent of the elites in the present social formation, substituting for the bureaucrat-intensive nature of the present social formation, self-management, a to gestion; for the corporate-intensive aspect, economic self-sufficiency, more emphasis on the informal economic sector; and for the intelligentsia-intensive aspect the drive to become self-defining, to come to grips with one's own existence, with one's own means. To the extent that this is implemented there is no comfort for the elites: they become redundant, superfluous - and that is precisely the intention.

Moreover, AWL more properly conceived of points in the direction of another development style, more artisanal and not so productively-oriented, cooperative domestically rather than being exploitative of the internal proletariat, cooperative globally rather than being exploitative of the external proletariat and with efforts to live in partnership with nature, to be integrative rather than exploitative also in this regard. Needless to say what has been said above is at the level of slogans and indications, but there is no difficulty today finding substantiation for the notion that it is in this direction AWL seeks to develop and is developing by those who engage actively in it. (41)
There are those who in the efforts to understand all these phenomena would pick up one corner of the bureaucrat-capitalist-intelligentsia triangle referred to above rather than the triangle as such. Some would base the analysis on the State element and develop a more anarchist type of ideology, other on the capitalist element and develop a socialist type of ideology, still others on the intelligentsia element and develop a more populist type of ideology. The present analysis tries to combine these movements and these three trends of argumentation since they seem to blend in social reality, as patterns of the dominant social formation, as factors generating the issues, and as ideologies inspiring the concrete activity of the movements. Of course, the relative weight of these three factors will differ from issue to issue, from movement to movement, from country to country and concretely over historical time. What is suggested here is merely a form of understanding rich enough to accommodate much of what seems to be underlying the general malaise with which we are concerned.

In this there is also a challenge to the ideologies of the last century. Liberalism promised happiness with continued economic growth, was blind to the problems of inequality and inequity, and also to the problems of too much affluence. Socialism introduced class analysis to come to grips with problems of inequality and inequity, through distribution and revolution, but was equally blind to the problems of too much affluence. Socialism, when practised as the right to bourgeois way of life for everybody, seems to lead to some of the same problems, only more slowly (1) because the countries involved are materially less developed, (2) because they are taking problems of underdevelopment more seriously. And anarchism and populism do not seem to have been good at asking the crucial question suggested by Figure 1 either: what are the upper limits to the type of remedies suggested? Small is beautiful, but to what point? To do without experts is fine, but to what point? How can one combine small and big, red and expert? The key problems in China today, maybe of the rich countries tomorrow.
5. The Cultural Argument: The Underlying Cosmology

Again, then, the question may be asked: why do we have such a social formation? And again we are doing nothing but inviting the reader to accompany us one more level down, this time to what is here seen as the real rock-bottom foundation, the deep culture, the cosmology of the Western civilization within which these social formations have taken root. In doing so we would of course immediately add that these social formations in turn reinforce the cosmology, become sedimented into it as a part of the deep culture. The cosmology is not a cause with a structure as one of its effects; rather, the structure is a manifestation of that deep cosmology, a way in which the cosmology unfolds itself. (43)

More concretely, there are a certain low number of aspects of the Western cosmology in the present phase that seem to be important in this connection. First, there is the general idea of a dichotomy between the spiritual and the material, between god and the world, with human beings somewhere in-between, being partly of god, partly of the world, but endowed with a capacity to choose. (44) Suspended between the two but with no doubt as to which is better the superiority of the non-manual over the manual and the non-natural over the natural become easily arrived at logical satellites. The empirical counterpart of this, in turn reinforcing the logical distinction, would be precisely the quest for the first two components of the bourgeois way of life: non-manual work and material comfort. (45)

Then, there is another aspect of Western cosmology of equal importance in this connection: the idea of progress. If the non-manual is better than the manual and material comfort is better than discomfort - both of them special manifestations of the principle of man-nature distance - then an increasing proportion of people engaged in increasingly non-manual work, not to mention increasing
manul comfort should be important elements of progress. Nowhere can this be seen so clearly, and so intelligently expressed, as in the promise held out for posterity by Lord Keynes in his famous "Economic Possibilities For Our Grandchildren". What this means, essentially, is that the BWL as a major goal for the majority of the members of Western civilization (or of people anywhere where Westernization has taken roots) is entirely in agreement with fundamental principles of that civilization.

But what about ESI? The exploitation of nature is totally in line with the man-nature distance principle, and the same applies to increased productivity in so far as it is based on a technology which in turn is based on a science that objectivises and looks at nature from the outside as our natural sciences do (and to some extent also our social and human sciences). But what about the internal and external exploitation? The internal exploitation can also be seen as one more implementation of the spirit-world/man-nature/manual-non-manual distances: those who work with their hands, close to nature should be of a lower kind if this dichotomy is valid, hence not only exploitable, but legitimately exploited. But that takes care only of the internal exploitation. For the external exploitation a third aspect of the deep culture of Western civilization has been drawn upon: the conceptualization of socio-geographical space with the West in the center and the non-West as a periphery, waiting to receive the touch of westernization (but by and large as secondary members). There is the idea of the waiting-room, of seniority as Westerners with the most recent arrivals accorded the more menial tasks from which they may graduate through "development". External exploitation, hence, is not only natural/normal according to this cosmology: it is also an invitation for the periphery to join, even some kind of an honour bestowed upon them. Not to be exploited means not to be of any interest to the centre, not to be in, to be totally marginalized.

Given a cosmology of this type the implementation in the social structure will have an elite not only engaged in non-manual
work, but in programming others at the centre; an elite continuing
the work of god the creator. Efforts to change social structure men-
tioned above, making it less exploitative, will therefore have a
tendency to regenerate this particular characteristic, perhaps also
the centre-periphery formation when seen on a world scale. It should
also be noted that the AWL phenomena referred to in the preceding
section try to go beyond this precisely in their efforts to establish
partnership not only with nature but also with the Third world and
with the internal proletariat (which would then no longer be an
internal proletariat), and independent of the elite through self-
management, self-sufficiency and self-definition. In so far as this
is true the movements (because AWL should probably be seen as a family
of movements) are not only directed against a particular social struc-
ture as we know it, but also against the cosmology of which this
structure might be said to be a manifestation. In short, what is con-
tested is Western civilization itself.
6. Conclusion: Why The Concern With Ways Of Life?

What we have tried to say in this chapter is that there are many answers to this important question, and that the answers are located at several levels.

At the first level, the level of issues and movements, there are a number of highly concrete and very nagging issues, the raw material for mass media reports, the content of countless books and articles, and so on. The basic point here is that these issues are now parts of our way of life. They can no longer be seen as "unfortunate consequences" of our dominant way of life, however analysed, they are simply descriptions of our social environment. The many material things we have do not lead to an unmitigated happiness and satisfaction, and the many social pathologies mentioned seem more and more to dominate people's lives, making life on earth increasingly unattractive for all but a small minority having somehow managed to escape the structural and cultural bounds to needs-satisfaction. Some of these people able to escape are elites with the means to do so, others are non-elites engaging in alternative ways of life. These AWL groups are often fragmented and poorly linked, reacting in different ways to environmental problems, domestic and global poverty and hunger, to alienating structures in their own society and so on. Engaging themselves for different reasons, the various AWL nevertheless constitute a movement, a force which is threatening the DWL in industrialized societies. As we see it these movements have the potential of becoming the new DWL, a way of life possibly more harmonious, less exploitative, more in line with environmental and social constraints now known to exist. In short, the movement for an alternative ways of life can be seen as a family of movements addressing themselves to a family of issues, highly complex, highly diversified, certainly not so clear in the empirical reality as we have tried to portray them in this essay.
At the second level, the level of needs analysis, one may see the concern with ways of life as a question of individuals reaching out to each other to protect themselves, as a problem of self-defence. They live in societies that have saved many of them from the terrible pains of underconsumption, hunger and starvation, malnutrition and nature-inflicted diseases and other hazards of nature, but they have been thrown into societies that expose them to society-inflicted diseases and non-material malnourishment of various kinds. In their acts of self-defence they try to constitute social niches, islands, even gethmos, more or less effectively protected from the social pathologies dominating the outside. In short, they try to generate development rather than various types of maldevelopment.

At the third level the concern with the ways of life can be seen more concretely as a reaction against a bourgeois way of life that is becoming/has become the dominant way of life in industrialized societies, and as a reaction against the underpinnings of that way of life, the exploitative practices engaged in. At this point the struggle over ways of life becomes very political because it affects power and privilege, potentially undermining some of the basis on which the elitist power structure in the world of today, both domestically and globally, are founded.

At the fourth level this becomes a challenge not only of concrete policies, but of the entire social structure, with visions of a society much more decentralized, small self-regulating units tied together in ways not yet specified by the AWL movement, neither in theory nor in practice. And at the fifth level the concern with ways of life becomes a challenge to the underlying cultural assumptions, the cosmology of the Western civilization as a whole. That this is so can be seen most clearly from the tendency of AWL movements to invoke non-western cultural perspectives and symbols, indicating that it is not in the Western culture as such they find sufficient building blocks for the ethos always needed by a movement challenging the status quo.

Why the concern with ways of life? - above are 5 different sets of answers deriving from 5 different levels of analysis; weakly woven together in some kind of theoretical framework, very much in progress, like all theories to be challenged. But one point should be added to this.
It is naive today to believe that this concern should be limited to the industrially advanced countries. As indicated in Figure 2 contemporary development practices, with economists and other "development specialists" as tunnel-diggers, not only allows for but produces a maldevelopment of the special type we have been analyzing here; consequently, in all probability, the AWL phenomenon will soon be as widespread as the maldevelopment phenomenon, all around the world - with more or less the same issues and movements.