

GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2020

**MEASURING PEACE
IN A COMPLEX WORLD**

Institute for Economics & Peace

IEP



Quantifying Peace and its Benefits

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the 14th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies.

The GPI covers 99.7 per cent of the world's population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of *Societal Safety and Security*; the extent of *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict*; and the degree of *Militarisation*.

In addition to presenting the findings from the 2020 GPI, this year's report includes an analysis of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on peace, including Positive Peace: the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that create and sustain peaceful societies. It examines how the impact of the pandemic, and in particular its economic consequences will increase the risk of severe deteriorations in Positive Peace over the next few years, and also examines which countries are best placed to recover from the shock.

The results this year show that the level of global peacefulness deteriorated, with the average country score falling by 0.34 per cent. This is the ninth deterioration in peacefulness in the last twelve years, with 81 countries improving, and 80 recording deteriorations over the past year. The 2020 GPI reveals a world in which the conflicts and crises that emerged in the past decade have begun to abate, only to be replaced with a new wave of tension and uncertainty as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the world, a position it has held since 2008. It is joined at the top of the index by New Zealand, Austria, Portugal, and Denmark.

Afghanistan is the least peaceful country in the world for the second year in a row, followed by Syria, Iraq, South Sudan and Yemen. All, except Yemen, have been ranked amongst the five least peaceful since at least 2015.

Only two of the nine regions in the world became more peaceful over the past year. The greatest improvement occurred in the Russia and Eurasia region, followed by

North America. North America was the only region to record improvements across all three domains, while Russia and Eurasia recorded improvements in *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security*, but a deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain.

South America and Central America and the Caribbean recorded the largest and second largest deterioration on the 2020 GPI. While South America's average deterioration in peacefulness was driven by deteriorations on *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security*, the fall in peacefulness in Central America and the Caribbean was driven by changes in *Ongoing Conflict*.

Peacefulness has declined 2.5 percent since 2008 with 81 GPI countries recording a deterioration, and 79 improving. Fifteen of the 23 GPI indicators are less peaceful on average in 2020 when compared to 2008.

Two of the three GPI domains deteriorated over the past decade, with *Ongoing Conflict* deteriorating by 6.8 per cent and *Safety and Security* deteriorating by 3.3 per cent. Terrorism and internal conflict have been the biggest contributors to the global deterioration in peacefulness. Ninety-seven countries recorded increased terrorist activity, while only 43 had lower levels of terrorism. However, after peaking in 2014 during the height of the Syrian civil war, total deaths from terrorism have fallen every year for the last five years.

By contrast, the *Militarisation* domain has recorded a 4.4 per cent improvement since 2008. The number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people has fallen in 113 countries, and *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP* fell in 100.

This year's report also looks at the trends in civil unrest over the past decade. It finds that there has been a sharp increase in civil unrest events since 2011, with over 96 countries experiencing at least one violent demonstration in 2019. From 2011 to 2019, the number of riots rose by 282 per cent and general strikes rose by 821 per cent.

Europe had the largest number of protests, riots and strikes over the period, totalling nearly 1,600 events from 2011 to 2018. Sixty-five per cent of the civil unrest events in Europe were nonviolent. Civil unrest in sub-Saharan Africa rose by more than 800 per cent over the period, from 32 riots and protests in 2011 to 292 in 2018.

The only GPI region not to experience an increase in civil unrest from 2011 to 2018 was the Middle East and North Africa, with total civil unrest events falling 60 per cent over that period. However, 2011 was the height of the Arab Spring in the region, with protests and demonstrations turning into open conflict and civil war in some countries, most notably in Syria.

The economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2019 was \$14.5 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This figure is equivalent to 10.6 per cent of the world's economic activity (gross world product) or \$1,909 per person. The economic impact of violence improved by 0.2 per cent from 2018 to 2019. The biggest improvement was in armed conflict, which decreased by 29 per cent to \$521 billion, owing to a fall in the intensity of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. There was also a substantial reduction in the economic impact of terrorism, which fell by 48 per cent from 2018 to 2019.

Violence continues to have a significant impact on economic performance around the globe. In the ten countries most affected by violence, the average economic impact of violence was equivalent to 41 per cent of GDP on average, compared to under four per cent in the countries least affected by violence. Syria, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Venezuela incurred the largest proportional economic cost of violence in 2019, equivalent to 60, 57, 51 and 48 per cent of GDP, respectively.

The report's Positive Peace research focuses on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Positive Peace. Positive Peace measures a country's ability to maintain peace. Falls in Positive Peace usually precede falls in peace. The impact of the pandemic, in particular its economic consequences, will likely have a severe impact on the way societies function. This impact could lead to deteriorations in Positive Peace and increase the risk of outbreaks of violence and conflict. Europe is likely to see an increase in civil unrest as the looming recession bites, while many countries in Africa will face famine conditions, creating further stress on many fragile countries.

Countries with strong Positive Peace have higher resilience to absorb, adapt and recover from shocks, such as COVID-19 and the ensuing recession. In particular, nations that perform well on the *Well-Functioning Government* and *Sound Business Environment* Pillars of the Positive Peace Index are more likely to recover relatively quickly from the crisis.

There is also some evidence to suggest that countries with higher levels of Positive Peace have been quicker to adapt and respond to the pandemic. Looking just at nations within the OECD, countries that perform better on the *Well-Functioning Government* and *High Levels of*

Human Capital Pillars have been able to test a higher proportion of their population for the COVID-19 virus.

The 2020 GPI report also has a special focus on IEP's newest research report - the Ecological Threat Register (ETR), which combines a confluence of ecological risks with Positive Peace and economic coping capacity to better understand what future potential risks and fragilities nations will face in the next three decades. It also extrapolates population projections to 2050 to better understand the areas which will be most impacted.

The ETR aims to show both exposure to risk and the ability of nations to deal with these ecological risks. The increase in the number of ecological threats can already be seen. The total number of natural disasters has tripled in the last four decades, while their economic impact has also increased, rising from US\$50 billion in the 1980s to US\$200 billion per year in the last decade. More than two billion people already live in countries experiencing high water stress. By 2050, climate change is expected to create up to 86 million additional migrants in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million in South Asia and 17 million in Latin America.

KEY FINDINGS

SECTION 1: RESULTS

- The average level of global peacefulness deteriorated 0.34 per cent on the 2020 GPI. This is the ninth time in the last 12 years that global peacefulness has deteriorated.
- In the past year 80 countries recorded deteriorations in peacefulness, while 81 recorded improvements.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful region. It is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries in the world, with no country from the region ranked higher than 27th on the GPI.
- Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world, although it recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness. The region is home to 13 of the 20 most peaceful countries, and only two

European countries are not ranked in the top half of the index.

- Peacefulness improved on average on the *Militarisation* domain, but deteriorated on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains.
- Of the 23 GPI indicators, eight recorded an improvement, 12 had a deterioration, with the remaining three indicators not registering any change over the past year.
- After years of improvements in average military spending, there was an increase in *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP for the first time in five years. Seventy-nine countries had deteriorations on this indicator.

SECTION 2: TRENDS IN PEACEFULNESS

- The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by 2.5 per cent since 2008. Over that period, 81 countries deteriorated in peacefulness, while 79 improved.
- The average level of country peacefulness has deteriorated for nine of the past 12 years.
- The gap between the least and most peaceful countries continues to grow. Since 2008, the 25 least peaceful countries declined on average by 12.9 per cent, while the 25 most peaceful countries improved by 2.1 per cent.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the world's least peaceful region for the sixth consecutive year. It is less peaceful than the global average for 19 of the 23 GPI indicators.

- There has been a sharp rise in the level of civil unrest over the last decade, with over 96 countries experiencing at least one violent demonstration in 2019.
- From 2011 to 2019, the number of riots, general strikes and anti-government demonstrations around the world increased by 244 per cent.
- Europe had the largest number of protests, riots and strikes over the period, totalling nearly 1,600 events from 2011 to 2018. Sixty-five per cent of the civil unrest events in Europe were nonviolent.
- Civil unrest in sub-Saharan Africa rose by more than 800 per cent over the period, from 32 riots and protests in 2011 to 292 in 2018.

SECTION 3: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

- The global economic impact of violence was \$14.5 trillion PPP in 2019, equivalent to 10.6 per cent of global GDP or \$1,909 per person.
- The global economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row, decreasing by 0.2 per cent or \$29 billion from 2018 to 2019. However, it is \$1.25 trillion higher than what it was in 2012.
- The improvement was largely due to the decrease in the impact of *Armed Conflict* particularly in the Middle East and North Africa region.
- The biggest improvement in the economic impact was for *Armed Conflict*, which decreased by 11 per cent or \$66 billion in 2019 to \$521 billion. This was because of improvements in deaths from

terrorism and GDP losses from conflict, which fell by 48 per cent and 21 per cent respectively.

- The major costs associated with *Armed Conflict* is refugees and displaced persons. The costs associated with supporting them amounts to 64 per cent of the total or \$333 billion.
- Syria, South Sudan and Afghanistan incurred the largest economic cost of violence in 2019 as a percentage of their GDP, equivalent to 60, 57 and 51 per cent of GDP, respectively.
- In the ten countries most economically affected by violence, the average economic cost was equivalent to 41 per cent of GDP. In the ten most peaceful countries the average economic cost was 3.9 per cent of GDP.

SECTION 4: POSITIVE PEACE

- The COVID-19 pandemic will cause substantial changes in how society operates and business is conducted in most countries.
- Positive Peace offers a framework for interpreting and describing the COVID-19 crisis.
- Nations that are more likely to recover relatively quickly from the crisis are those which combine low levels of public debt with strong performance in the *Well-Functioning Government* Pillar.

- The crisis and the social isolation response are expected to send most countries into recession in 2020. The travel and tourism industries are likely to incur severe contractions.
- Other industries affected are hospitality, retail trade, mineral resources, education, recreation, energy and shipping.
- Countries with strong Positive Peace have higher resilience to absorb, adapt and recover from shocks, such as COVID-19 and the ensuing recession.

SECTION 5: ECOLOGICAL THREAT REGISTER

- The number of natural disasters has tripled in the last four decades.
- By 2050, climate change is estimated to create up to 86 million additional migrants in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million in South Asia and 17 million in Latin America.
- Climate change induced ecological threats are strongly correlated with Positive Peace, suggesting that high peace countries have greater capacity to adapt to climate change and deal with its adverse impacts.

- 873 million people experienced severe food insecurity and hunger in 2017.
- The risk of food insecurity could increase fourfold in the world's most food insecure nations compared to those at low risk as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- More than two billion people live in countries experiencing high water stress, and about four billion people experience severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year. Water use has increased by one per cent per year for the last four decades.



RESULTS

KEY FINDINGS

- The average level of global peacefulness deteriorated 0.34 per cent on the 2020 GPI. This is the ninth time in the last 12 years that global peacefulness has deteriorated.
- In the past year 80 countries recorded deteriorations in peacefulness, while 81 recorded improvements.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful region. It is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries in the world, with no country from the region ranked higher than 27th on the GPI.
- Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world, although it recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness. The region is home to 13 of the 20 most peaceful countries, and only two European countries are not ranked in the top half of the index.
- Peacefulness improved on average in the *Militarisation* domain, but deteriorated in both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains.
- Of the 23 GPI indicators, eight recorded an improvement, 12 had a deterioration, with the remaining three indicators not registering any change over the past year.
- After years of improvements in average military spending, there was an increase in *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP for the first time in five years. 79 countries had deteriorations on this indicator.
- Despite the overall deterioration in the *safety and security* domain, there were a number of indicators which improved on average, including the *homicide rate* and *terrorism impact* indicators. Total deaths from terrorism are now at their lowest point in the last decade.

Highlights



Global peacefulness has deteriorated over the past year. This is the fourth time in the last five years that the world has seen a fall in peacefulness. The average country score deteriorated by 0.34 per cent, with 81 countries improving, and 80 recording deteriorations in peacefulness.

The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures more than just the presence or absence of war. It captures the absence of violence or the fear of violence across three domains: *Safety and Security*, *Ongoing Conflict*, and *Militarisation*. Both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains recorded deteriorations, with only the *Militarisation* domain recording an improvement. Of the 23 GPI indicators, eight recorded an improvement, 12 had a deterioration, while the remaining three indicators did not change in the past year.

The world is now considerably less peaceful than it was at the inception of the index. Since 2008 the average level of country peacefulness has deteriorated 3.76 per cent. There have been year on year deteriorations in peacefulness for nine of the last 12 years. The fall in peacefulness over the past decade was caused by a wide range of factors, including increased terrorist activity, the intensification of conflicts in the Middle East, rising regional tensions in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, and increasing numbers of refugees and heightened political tensions in Europe and the US.

However, despite the overall deterioration in peacefulness, some indicators have recorded significant improvements over the past 13 years. The largest improvements have occurred in the *Militarisation* domain, with 113 countries reducing their *armed forces rate*, 100 reducing *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP*, and 67 lowering their levels of *nuclear and heavy weapons*. The *homicide rate* has also fallen steadily in many countries, with 117 countries having a lower homicide rate now than in 2008.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful. It is home to three of the five least peaceful countries in the world, with no country from the region ranked higher than 27th on the GPI. However, despite ongoing armed conflict and instability in the region, it did record improvements on many indicators. The number of *deaths from internal conflict* continued to fall, and the *intensity of internal conflict* also improved in the region. Both *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* improved over the past year.

Europe remains the most peaceful region and is home to six of the ten most peaceful countries in the world. However,

Europe recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, owing to falls in the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains. It is now considerably less peaceful than it was in 2008. Sixteen European countries recorded an improvement in peacefulness from the 2019 to 2020 GPI, with 19 recording deteriorations. Despite its high levels of peacefulness, Europe has higher levels of *Militarisation* than many regions around the world, particularly in regards to *weapons exports* and *nuclear and heavy weapons*.

The largest regional improvement in peacefulness occurred in Russia and Eurasia, with eight of the 12 countries in the region recording improvements. This is the fourth straight year of improvement for the region. This was driven by improvements in the *Safety and Security* domain, with improvements on the *homicide rate*, *incarceration rate*, *terrorism impact* and *political instability* indicators. The biggest regional deterioration occurred in South America, also owing to changes in the *Safety and Security* domain. There were notable deteriorations in the *incarceration rate* and the *likelihood of violent demonstrations*.

Of the three GPI domains, only *Militarisation* recorded an improvement, with *UN peacekeeping funding* and both *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* having significant improvements. Although the *armed services personnel rate* deteriorated slightly on average, the majority of countries recorded improvements, with 99 countries reducing the size of their armed forces rate as a percentage of their population.

In contrast, *military expenditure* deteriorated for the first time since 2016, with 79 countries recording increases in total *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP*. However, over the longer term military expenditure has been steadily declining, with the average level of *military expenditure* falling from 2.32 to 2.2 per cent of GDP since 2008.

Both the *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* indicators improved on the 2020 GPI and are now at their lowest level since 2009. The *weapons exports* indicator continues to reflect the unequal geographic distribution of the global arms industry, with 63 per cent of countries having no *weapons exports* over the past five years. Of the 11 countries with the highest levels of per capita *weapons exports*, eight are in



The Global Peace Index measures more than just the presence or absence of war.

Europe with the remaining three countries being the US, Russia, and Israel.

The *Safety and Security* domain deteriorated on average, with 89 countries deteriorating and 70 improving. The trend towards more authoritarian government was reflected across several indicators, with the *political terror scale*, *police rate*, and *incarceration rate* all deteriorating. The number of *violent demonstrations* continued to rise around the world, reflected in outbreaks of social unrest in Chile and Hong Kong. While the level of social unrest has fallen in the first half of 2020, partly in result of government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, the possibility of future violence remains high.

Not every aspect of *Safety and Security* deteriorated. The *terrorism impact* indicator continued to improve, with total deaths from terrorism falling to 15,952, down from a peak of 33,555 five years earlier. In total, 92 countries had an improvement on the *terrorism impact* indicator. Similarly, the *homicide rate* indicator continued its decade long improvement, with 57 countries recording an improvement on this indicator, compared to 42 that deteriorated. In El Salvador, the country with the highest number of homicides per 100,000 people, the homicide rate fell by 25 per cent.

The 2020 GPI reveals a world in which the tensions, conflicts, and crises that emerged in the past decade remain

unresolved, but some progress has been made towards achieving peace. While long-running conflicts have begun to decline or at least plateau, the underlying causes of many of these conflicts have not been addressed, and the potential for violence to flare up remains very real. There have also been new tensions arising, and growing dissatisfaction with governments around the world which has led to an increasing authoritarian response in some countries.

Additionally, although the *institutions* and *structures* of Positive Peace have improved over the last decade, *attitudes* of Positive Peace have deteriorated over the last ten years. Positive Peace is a strong leading indicator of future peacefulness, with large deteriorations in Positive Peace being statistically linked to later falls in peace. High levels of Positive Peace also allow societies to respond to and recover from exogenous shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which is currently engulfing the world. If the fall in Positive Peace continues, and the *attitudes*, *institutions* and *structures* that build and sustain peaceful societies are not supported and strengthened, it seems likely that the overall deterioration in peacefulness will continue in the years to come.


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
2020 GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

A SNAPSHOT OF THE
GLOBAL STATE OF PEACE

THE STATE OF PEACE



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
1	Iceland	1.078	↔	29	Poland	1.657	↓ 1	=57	Greece	1.877	↑ 8
2	New Zealand	1.198	↔	30	Estonia	1.68	↑ 3	=57	Liberia	1.877	↓ 1
3	Portugal	1.247	↔	31	Italy	1.69	↑ 6	59	Malawi	1.885	↓ 14
4	Austria	1.275	↔	32	Costa Rica	1.691	↑ 2	=60	Equatorial Guinea	1.891	↑ 10
5	Denmark	1.283	↔	33	Botswana	1.693	↓ 2	=60	The Gambia	1.891	↔
6	Canada	1.298	↔	34	Latvia	1.7	↓ 2	62	North Macedonia	1.9	↑ 2
7	Singapore	1.321	↔	35	Uruguay	1.704	↔	63	Madagascar	1.905	↑ 8
8	Czech Republic	1.337	↓ 1	36	Lithuania	1.705	↔	=64	Cyprus	1.92	↓ 2
9	Japan	1.36	↑ 2	37	Taiwan	1.707	↔	=64	Vietnam	1.92	↓ 5
10	Switzerland	1.366	↔	38	Spain	1.712	↑ 1	66	France	1.93	↓ 3
11	Slovenia	1.369	↓ 2	=39	Kuwait	1.723	↑ 5	67	Eswatini	1.934	↑ 9
12	Ireland	1.375	↔	=39	Mongolia	1.723	↑ 7	68	Oman	1.941	↑ 1
13	Australia	1.386	↔	41	United Arab Emirates	1.752	↑ 6	69	Montenegro	1.944	↓ 2
14	Finland	1.404	↔	42	United Kingdom	1.77	↓ 2	70	Kazakhstan	1.948	↓ 4
15	Sweden	1.479	↑ 3	43	Ghana	1.776	↓ 2	71	Moldova	1.95	↓ 3
16	Germany	1.494	↑ 6	44	Zambia	1.794	↑ 5	72	Jordan	1.958	↑ 3
=17	Belgium	1.496	↑ 6	45	Chile	1.804	↓ 17	73	Nepal	1.974	↓ 1
=17	Norway	1.496	↔	46	Sierra Leone	1.82	↓ 4	74	Argentina	1.978	↑ 3
19	Bhutan	1.501	↓ 4	47	Senegal	1.824	↑ 7	75	Paraguay	1.991	↑ 11
20	Malaysia	1.525	↔	48	South Korea	1.829	↑ 9	76	Dominican Republic	1.992	↑ 6
21	Netherlands	1.528	↓ 5	49	Indonesia	1.831	↓ 6	77	Sri Lanka	2.003	↓ 4
22	Romania	1.541	↑ 3	50	Laos	1.843	↓ 2	78	Cambodia	2.011	↑ 3
23	Mauritius	1.544	↑ 1	51	Serbia	1.846	↑ 1	79	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.04	↓ 1
24	Hungary	1.559	↓ 5	52	Tanzania	1.85	↑ 6	80	Jamaica	2.041	↔
25	Slovakia	1.568	↓ 4	53	Namibia	1.861	↑ 8	81	Rwanda	2.049	↑ 4
26	Croatia	1.615	↑ 1	54	Timor-Leste	1.863	↓ 3	82	Guyana	2.05	↑ 8
27	Qatar	1.616	↑ 3	55	Albania	1.872	↓ 2	83	Morocco	2.057	↑ 1
28	Bulgaria	1.628	↓ 2	56	Panama	1.875	↓ 6				



IMPROVEMENTS

81

countries were more peaceful in 2020 than 2019

DETERIORATIONS

80

countries were less peaceful in 2020 than in 2019

OVERALL AVERAGE CHANGE (%)

+0.34

The global GPI average deteriorated by 0.34 per cent from 2019 to 2020

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
84	Peru	2.066	↑ 3	112	Djibouti	2.215	↓ 6	138	Niger	2.608	↓ 11
85	Kosovo	2.07	↓ 6	113	El Salvador	2.243	↓ 2	139	India	2.628	↑ 2
=86	Bolivia	2.074	↓ 3	114	Thailand	2.245	↓ 1	140	Colombia	2.646	↑ 3
=86	Cuba	2.074	↑ 2	115	Guatemala	2.267	↑ 1	141	Cameroon	2.65	↓ 1
88	Trinidad and Tobago	2.078	↑ 4	116	Turkmenistan	2.276	↓ 1	142	Iran	2.672	↓ 5
89	Guinea	2.082	↑ 7	=117	Algeria	2.287	↔	143	Palestine	2.699	↓ 1
90	Ecuador	2.085	↓ 17	=117	Mauritania	2.287	↑ 1	144	Mali	2.729	↔
91	Angola	2.087	↓ 2	119	Honduras	2.288	↑ 4	145	Israel	2.775	↑ 1
92	Tunisia	2.09	↓ 1	120	Azerbaijan	2.3	↑ 12	146	Lebanon	2.828	↑ 2
93	Kyrgyz Republic	2.094	↑ 2	121	United States of America	2.307	↔	147	Nigeria	2.865	↔
94	Belarus	2.111	↑ 4	122	Burkina Faso	2.316	↓ 13	148	Ukraine	2.927	↑ 1
=95	Gabon	2.116	↓ 1	123	South Africa	2.317	↑ 3	149	Venezuela	2.936	↓ 4
=95	Georgia	2.116	↑ 4	124	Republic of the Congo	2.343	↑ 1	150	Turkey	2.959	↑ 2
97	Bangladesh	2.121	↑ 7	125	Kenya	2.375	↓ 3	151	North Korea	2.962	↓ 1
98	Lesotho	2.131	↑ 5	126	Brazil	2.413	↓ 3	152	Pakistan	2.973	↑ 1
=99	Armenia	2.135	↑ 15	127	Myanmar	2.424	↑ 2	153	Sudan	3.043	↓ 2
=99	Mozambique	2.135	↑ 2	128	Saudi Arabia	2.443	↑ 3	154	Russia	3.049	↔
=101	Guinea-Bissau	2.157	↑ 9	129	Philippines	2.471	↑ 6	155	Central African Republic	3.237	↑ 3
=101	Papua New Guinea	2.157	↓ 5	130	Egypt	2.481	↓ 2	156	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.243	↔
103	Uzbekistan	2.158	↓ 1	131	Zimbabwe	2.485	↓ 1	157	Libya	3.258	↔
104	China	2.166	↓ 4	132	Burundi	2.506	↑ 6	158	Somalia	3.302	↓ 3
105	Cote d' Ivoire	2.169	↑ 7	133	Ethiopia	2.526	↑ 3	159	Yemen	3.411	↔
106	Benin	2.182	↓ 35	134	Chad	2.538	↓ 1	160	South Sudan	3.447	↑ 1
107	Tajikistan	2.188	↑ 1	135	Nicaragua	2.553	↓ 15	161	Iraq	3.487	↓ 1
108	Togo	2.201	↓ 3	136	Eritrea	2.567	↑ 3	162	Syria	3.539	↔
109	Uganda	2.202	↓ 3	137	Mexico	2.572	↓ 3	163	Afghanistan	3.644	↔
110	Bahrain	2.209	↑ 9								
111	Haiti	2.211	↓ 18								

Results



The 2020 GPI finds that the world became less peaceful for the ninth time in the last 12 years, with the average level of country peacefulness deteriorating by 0.34 per cent over the past year. Figure 1.1 shows the change in the average levels of peacefulness for the overall score and for each of the domains, as well as the percentage of countries that improved or deteriorated. In total, peacefulness improved in 81 countries and deteriorated in 80.

The deterioration in peacefulness was mainly due to a deterioration in the *Safety and Security* domain. *Political instability* deteriorated as did other associated indicators, such as *violent demonstrations*. Furthermore, the rise of authoritarianism in response to this trend has caused a deterioration on the *political terror scale*, and a rise in the *police rate* and *incarceration rate*.

There was a deterioration in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, with rises in both the total number of conflicts fought globally, and the overall *intensity of internal conflict*. However, despite the increase in the total number of conflicts the number of deaths from conflict, both internal and external, continued to fall, owing to the defeat of ISIL in Syria and Iraq, and the winding down of the civil war in Syria.

The only domain improvement in the 2020 GPI was in *Militarisation*. This was driven by an improvement in *UN peacekeeping funding*, and a fall in the level of both *weapons imports* and *weapons exports*. Both weapons indicators are now at their most peaceful level since 2009.

Twelve of the 23 GPI indicators deteriorated on average, with eight improving and four remaining unchanged. Figure 1.2 shows the average percentage change for each indicator from the 2019 to the 2020 GPI. The overall largest average deterioration was in the *refugees and IDPs* indicator, while the *weapons imports* indicator had the largest improvement.

FIGURE 1.1

Year-on-year change in GPI score by domain, 2020

The *Safety and Security* domain had the largest overall change of any GPI domain.





FIGURE 1.2

Percentage change in score by GPI indicator, 2020

The number and intensity of internal conflicts increased, but total conflict deaths fell.



Source: IEP

“

The 2020 GPI finds that the world became less peaceful for the ninth time in the last 12 years.

”

FIVE MOST & LEAST PEACEFUL COUNTRIES BY DOMAIN

TABLE 1.1

Safety and Security domain

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
1	Iceland	1.164	0.033	↔
2	Singapore	1.224	-0.009	↔
3	Japan	1.256	-0.021	↑ 1
4	Norway	1.256	0.018	↔
5	Switzerland	1.277	0.00	↓ 1

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
163	Afghanistan	4.275	0.072	↔
162	Iraq	4.15	0.103	↓ 2
161	South Sudan	4.074	-0.01	↑ 1
160	Venezuela	4.034	0.364	↓ 5
159	Congo, DRC	3.982	0.001	↔

TABLE 1.2

Ongoing Conflict domain

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
= 1	Botswana	1	0	↔
= 1	Mauritius	1	0	↔
= 1	Singapore	1	-0.001	↑ 4
= 1	Uruguay	1	0	↔
5	Bulgaria	1.001	-0.001	↑ 1

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
163	Syria	3.828	0	↔
162	Afghanistan	3.641	0	↔
161	Yemen	3.621	0.118	↔
160	Congo, DRC	3.379	0.03	↓ 1
159	Pakistan	3.35	-0.069	↑ 1

TABLE 1.3

Militarisation domain

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
1	Iceland	1.029	-0.003	↔
2	Hungary	1.151	0	↔
3	New Zealand	1.17	-0.016	↑ 1
4	Slovenia	1.17	-0.009	↔
5	Moldova	1.236	-0.005	↔

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
163	Israel	3.914	0.034	↔
162	Russia	3.241	-0.011	↔
161	North Korea	3.224	0.167	↓ 1
160	United States of America	3.06	-0.013	↑ 1
159	France	2.767	0.001	↔



Regional Overview

Only two of the nine regions in the world improved in peacefulness in 2020: North America and Russia and Eurasia. South America experienced the largest average deterioration and was the only region to record deteriorations across all three domains GPI domains: *Safety and Security*, *Militarisation* and *Ongoing Conflict*.

Europe maintained its position as the most peaceful region in the world, which it has held since the inception of the GPI. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness and remained the least peaceful region, a position it has held since 2015.

North America recorded an improvement of 1.28 per cent, with Russia and Eurasia having a slightly smaller improvement of 1.23 per cent. North America was the only region to record improvements across all three domains, while Russia and Eurasia recorded improvements in *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* but a deterioration on *Militarisation*.

South America had the biggest fall in peacefulness, with deteriorations across all three domains.

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a slight deterioration of 0.5 per cent but as a large region, changes in peacefulness varied substantially between countries.

The deterioration in Asia-Pacific's overall score was driven by indicators in the *Militarisation* and the *Ongoing Conflict* domains. There were particularly notable deteriorations on *deaths from internal conflicts*, increasing *military expenditure* and a weaker commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*.

South America and Central America and the Caribbean both recorded deteriorations on the 2020 GPI. While South America's average deterioration in peacefulness was driven by deteriorations on *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security*, the fall in peacefulness in Central America and the Caribbean was driven by changes in *Ongoing Conflict*.

ASIA-PACIFIC


Peace deteriorated slightly in the Asia-Pacific region in the 2020 GPI, with a 0.2 per cent average decrease in peacefulness. The deterioration was driven by increasing deaths from *internal conflict*, increasing *military expenditure* and a weaker commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*. However, there were improvements in the *homicide rate* and *violent crime* indicators.

Five countries in Asia-Pacific continue to rank in the top 25 of the GPI. New Zealand ranks first in the region and second overall in the 2020 GPI, despite a deterioration in its score of 2.3 per cent. This was driven by a significant deterioration in *terrorism impact* because of the white-nationalist terror attack on two mosques in Christchurch on March 15 2019. Fifty-one people were killed in the attacks.¹

FIGURE 1.3

Regional GPI results, 2019

Only two regions became more peaceful from 2019 to 2020.



Source: IEP

TABLE 1.4

Asia-Pacific

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	New Zealand	1.198	0.027	2
2	Singapore	1.321	-0.023	7
3	Japan	1.36	-0.01	9
4	Australia	1.386	-0.01	13
5	Malaysia	1.525	-0.003	20
6	Taiwan	1.707	-0.017	37
7	Mongolia	1.723	-0.062	39
8	South Korea	1.829	-0.032	48
9	Indonesia	1.831	0.061	49
10	Laos	1.843	0.047	50
11	Timor-Leste	1.863	0.058	54
12	Vietnam	1.92	0.039	64
13	Cambodia	2.011	-0.028	78
14	Papua New Guinea	2.157	0.05	101
15	China	2.166	0.019	104
16	Thailand	2.245	-0.007	114
17	Myanmar	2.424	-0.024	127
18	Philippines	2.471	-0.046	129
19	North Korea	2.962	0.041	151
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.892	0.004	

Singapore is the second most peaceful country in the region, and the seventh most peaceful country overall. It had an overall improvement in peacefulness, owing to falls in the *homicide rate*, *incarceration rate*, and *armed forces* rate.

Australia is ranked fourth in the region and 13th in the global ranking. Its score has improved by 0.7 per cent as a consequence of an improvement in its *political terror scale* score from 1.5 to one. Australia has, however, had a continuous rise in its *weapons imports* since 2017, and now has one of the highest rates of weapons imports per capita in the world.

North Korea ranked last in the region and was the only Asia-Pacific country to rank in the bottom 25 of the GPI. The deterioration in North Korea's 2020 score is driven by a substantial reduction in *UN peacekeeping funding*. The United Nations Security Council's sanctions have placed extreme pressure on the North Korean economy, and despite President Trump's historic visit to the country in June 2019, North Korea continues to test strategic missiles in violation of UN resolutions.

Indonesia and Timor-Leste have recorded the biggest deteriorations in the region. Indonesia deteriorated due to a spike in *deaths from internal conflicts* and *internal conflicts fought*, reflecting the fatal consequences of the religious conflict in Malaccas and indigenous-immigrant conflicts across the country, particularly in West Kalimantan. Indonesia has also experienced a substantial deterioration in *political instability* over the last year. Jakarta and other major cities saw several student-led protests in September and October 2019. The demonstrations aimed at persuading the president, Joko Widodo, to delay illiberal reforms to the country's criminal code and were ultimately successful.

The deterioration of peacefulness in Timor-Leste from 2019 to 2020 was driven by deteriorations in *Safety and Security*. The largest

deterioration occurred on the *police rate* indicator. Extreme poverty and high unemployment rates have led to high crime rates in Timor-Leste, increasing the demand for police. The country's *political terror scale* score has also deteriorated, increasing from 1.5 to two. Timor-Leste has, however, recorded improvements in *Militarisation* in the 2020 GPI due to greater commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*.

China recorded a 0.9 per cent deterioration in overall peacefulness, owing largely to political unrest and *violent demonstrations* across the self-governing region of Hong Kong. The protests began after the government introduced a Fugitive Offenders amendment bill. Even though the bill was withdrawn in September 2019, demonstrations continued on afterwards. These clashes between protesters and security forces over the introduction of the bill led to a deterioration in the country's *violent demonstrations* score. The *incarceration rate* also grew, with the latest estimates suggesting that as many as 1.5 million Uighurs and other ethnic minorities have been imprisoned in 're-education' camps in the Xinjiang autonomous region.

CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

Peacefulness in Central America and The Caribbean deteriorated in the 2020 GPI, with an increasing number of *deaths from external conflict* and deteriorating scores on the *political terror scale*. The region deteriorated by 1.2 per cent on average, with seven out of the 13 countries in the region experiencing deterioration in peacefulness.

The past year in the region has been characterized by civil unrest, high levels of perceived corruption and economic hardship. The closing of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in 2019 and high levels of perceived corruption in Honduras has led to violent protests and fuelled internal and international migration. In addition, violent conflict in Haiti, Nicaragua and Mexico have increased the number of refugees fleeing violence in the region. This has also exacerbated tensions between these countries and the US.

Despite a year of political and social unrest, Costa Rica remains the most peaceful country in the region. Its *homicide rate* increased from 11.9 homicides per 100,000 people to 12.3 in the last year. The

TABLE 1.5

Central America & The Caribbean

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Costa Rica	1.691	-0.015	32
2	Panama	1.875	0.071	56
3	Dominican Republic	1.992	-0.049	76
4	Jamaica	2.041	0.013	80
5	Cuba	2.074	0.001	86
6	Trinidad and Tobago	2.078	-0.016	88
7	Haiti	2.211	0.11	111
7	El Salvador	2.243	0.008	113
9	Guatemala	2.267	-0.011	115
10	Honduras	2.288	-0.073	119
11	Nicaragua	2.553	0.215	135
12	Mexico	2.572	0.058	137
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.157	0.028	

country has also experienced a surge in migration as a spill-over from the conflict in Nicaragua, with approximately 55,000 of the 70,000 Nicaraguan refugees in 2019 migrating to Costa Rica.

Panama, the second most peaceful country in the region, also experienced political and social unrest in the last year with the government attempting to roll back rights for marginalised groups in society. This is reflected in a deterioration in Panama's *political instability* score and its *intensity of conflict* score. In its first months in office, the government of Laurentino Cortizo, launched a process to reform the constitution. As the reforms moved through the legislature, deputies tacked on a series of additional and highly controversial amendments. Positional differences over constitutional reforms will present a latent risk to stability as the government moves forward with the reform process.

Mexico is once again the least peaceful country in the region. It had one of its deadliest years on record, resulting in a 2.3 per cent deterioration in peacefulness. The *homicide rate* increased by 28.7 per cent, from 19.3 homicides per 100,000 people to 28.8. More recently, there has been an increase in cartel activity near the US border, as restrictions brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic have led to fighting between the cartels.² The economic impact of violence in Mexico was 4.57 trillion pesos (US\$238 billion) in 2019, equivalent to 21.3 per cent of the country's GDP.³

Nicaragua recorded the region's biggest deterioration in peacefulness over the last year of 9.2 per cent and ranked second last in the region. Increases in *deaths from internal conflict*, the likelihood of *violent crime* and a deterioration on the *political terror* scale have contributed significantly to this deterioration in peacefulness. An estimated 70,000 people fled Nicaragua in 2019 as a consequence of the government persecution.⁴ There has been an increase in criminal activity by paramilitary groups, and allegations that the government has tortured hundreds of political prisoners in response to widespread protests in 2018.

EUROPE

Europe remains the world's most peaceful region, despite recording a very slight deterioration in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI. Sixteen countries recorded improvements in peacefulness, with 19 having deteriorations. European countries account for 17 of the top 25 countries in the 2020 GPI, with Iceland being the highest ranking country in the region and also globally. Turkey is the only European country to be ranked in the bottom 25 least peaceful countries.

Despite being the world's most peaceful region, Europe has experienced political and economic unrest over the past year. Poland has experienced public mass-gatherings and protests against the government's controversial law that allows government interference in the judicial system, while in Romania protesters took to the streets for months demonstrating against corruption.⁵ Mass-protests also erupted in Hungary after the government introduced a new labour market law, referred to by protesters as 'the slave law'. The yellow vest movement protests also continued in France.

More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has effectively put the Schengen agreement temporarily out of effect, and thrown several European countries into turmoil, particularly the UK, Italy and Spain. The full extent of the economic and political ramifications of the pandemic remains to be seen, but relations between countries in Europe have been strained by the response to the virus.

Iceland is once again the most peaceful country in the region and world, a position it has held since the inception of the index. The country did, however, record a slight deterioration in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, driven by a deterioration in the *homicide rate*, and a small increase in *military expenditure*. Despite these changes,

TABLE 1.6

Europe

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Iceland	1.078	0.014	1
2	Portugal	1.247	0	3
3	Austria	1.275	0.011	4
4	Denmark	1.283	-0.001	5
5	Czech Republic	1.337	-0.007	8
6	Switzerland	1.366	0.001	10
7	Slovenia	1.369	0.022	11
8	Ireland	1.375	-0.005	12
9	Finland	1.404	-0.044	14
10	Sweden	1.479	-0.027	15
11	Germany	1.494	-0.051	16
11	Belgium	1.496	-0.054	17
13	Norway	1.496	-0.003	17
14	Netherlands	1.528	0.037	21
15	Romania	1.541	-0.039	22
16	Hungary	1.559	0.038	24
17	Slovakia	1.568	0.026	25
18	Croatia	1.615	-0.022	26
19	Bulgaria	1.628	0.026	28
20	Poland	1.657	0.016	29
21	Estonia	1.68	-0.012	30
22	Italy	1.69	-0.034	31
23	Latvia	1.7	0.011	34
24	Lithuania	1.705	-0.008	36
25	Spain	1.712	-0.022	38
26	United Kingdom	1.77	0.011	42
27	Serbia	1.846	0.036	51
28	Albania	1.872	0.061	55
29	Greece	1.877	-0.053	57
30	North Macedonia	1.9	-0.024	62
31	Cyprus	1.92	0.006	64
31	France	1.93	0.014	66
33	Montenegro	1.944	0.003	69
34	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.04	0.037	79
35	Kosovo	2.07	0.049	85
36	Turkey	2.959	0.007	150
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.65	0.001	

Iceland's score on both these indicators remains much more peaceful than the global average.

Turkey remains the least peaceful country in Europe. It had a slight deterioration in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, falling to 150th on the overall GPI rankings. The refugee crisis in Europe continued throughout 2019, leading to increasing tensions with Greece, as Turkey's authorities refused to stop refugees reaching the EU through its territories. In addition, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to suppress domestic political dissent, which led to a deterioration on the *political instability* and *political terror scale* indicators. Turkey also had an 8.3 per cent increase in its *incarceration rate*, from 318 prisoners per 100,000 people to 344.

Greece and Belgium had the biggest improvements in the region. While Greece's improvement in peacefulness is primarily driven by a better score on the *political terror scale* and a stronger commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*, Belgium's progress stems from a lower *homicide rate* and fewer *deaths from internal conflict*.

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

The Middle East and North Africa remains the world's least peaceful region, despite improvements in peacefulness for 11 countries on the 2020 GPI. While both the *Militarisation and Ongoing Conflict* domains improved on average, there was a deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain, owing to increases in the *likelihood of violent demonstrations*, and a rise in *political instability*. Five of the ten least peaceful countries in the world are located in the MENA region, with only Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates being ranked in the top 50 most peaceful countries.

TABLE 1.7

Middle East & North Africa

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Qatar	1.616	-0.046	27
2	Kuwait	1.723	-0.048	39
3	United Arab Emirates	1.752	-0.042	41
4	Oman	1.941	-0.012	68
5	Jordan	1.958	-0.027	72
6	Morocco	2.057	0.005	83
7	Tunisia	2.09	0.009	92
8	Bahrain	2.209	-0.111	110
9	Algeria	2.287	0.002	117
10	Saudi Arabia	2.443	-0.021	128
11	Egypt	2.481	0.052	130
12	Iran	2.672	0.137	142
13	Palestine	2.699	0.052	143
14	Israel	2.775	-0.004	145
15	Lebanon	2.828	-0.054	146
16	Sudan	3.043	0.1	153
17	Libya	3.258	-0.011	157
18	Yemen	3.411	0.051	159
19	Iraq	3.487	0.119	161
20	Syria	3.539	-0.023	162
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.513	0.006	

Syria remains the least peaceful country in the region, and the second least peaceful country overall. However, the country recorded a slight improvement in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, as the conflict and turmoil from the Syrian civil war continued to abate. Following the ceasefire deal of March 2020, around 35,000 displaced civilians have returned to their homes in Syria's north-western province of Idlib.⁶ However, millions of Syrians are still either displaced internally or are refugees.

Iraq is the second least peaceful country in the region and the third least peaceful overall. *Violent demonstrations* continue to be a concern for the Iraqi government, with the country having the maximum possible score on this indicator. Since protests erupted across the country in October 2019, Iraq has had more than 700 fatalities and thousands of severe injuries as a result of clashes between anti-government protesters and security forces.⁷

Iran had the largest fall in peacefulness in the region, with its score deteriorating by 5.4 per cent. It deteriorated across all three GPI domains, with the largest deterioration occurring in *Safety and Security*. *Political instability* and the prospect of more *violent demonstrations* continue to be the key drivers of deteriorating peacefulness. Iran has also been plagued by sporadic unrest largely owing to the impact of rising inflation and poor living standards on the population, combined with anger at elite level corruption and economic mismanagement. Given that inflation has soared and the currency continues to depreciate, public anger is increasingly likely to boil over into violent protests.

2019 was a year of political unrest and transition in Sudan. Over 200 people were killed by security forces during pro-democratic protests which led to the resignation of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. Sudan has, therefore, had a deterioration in *violent demonstrations* and *political instability* in the 2020 GPI. However, in August 2019 the Sovereignty Council of Sudan was established as a collective head of state for a 39-months transitional period, which will hopefully lead to increased political stability.

Bahrain had the biggest improvement in the region and the third largest improvement of any nation overall, with a 4.8 per cent improvement in its overall score. The kingdom has experienced fewer violent demonstrations and terrorism-related criminal investigations in the past year.

NORTH AMERICA

North America was one of only two regions to improve in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, with an overall improvement in score of 1.28 per cent. Both Canada and the US had improvements in peacefulness, with the US having the larger of the two. This marks the first time since 2016 that the region had an average improvement in peacefulness. There is a considerable disparity in peacefulness between the two countries in the region, with Canada being ranked in the top ten most peaceful countries, and the US ranked 121st overall.

Peacefulness improved in the US for the first time since 2016, with the country's overall score improving by 1.54 per cent. Improvements were recorded across all three GPI domains, with the largest coming in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain. The withdrawal of troops and winding back of involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a fall in the number of *external conflict deaths* over the past few years, although the involvement of the US in a number of smaller overseas conflicts resulted in its *external conflicts fought* indicator deteriorating. Every type of violent death

TABLE 1.8

North America

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Canada	1.298	-0.009	6
2	United States of America	2.307	-0.036	121
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.803	-0.023	

measured by the GPI fell in the US, with improvements in the *homicide rate*, *terrorism impact*, and deaths from both external and internal conflict.

Despite the improvement in internal peacefulness in the US, the level of *Militarisation* has increased over the past year. Both *weapons exports* and *weapons imports* per capita increased, and the US is now the fourth largest weapons exporter on a per capita basis, behind only France, Russia, and Israel. *Military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP and the *armed services rate* also rose.

Canada's overall level of peacefulness improved slightly, thanks to improvements in scores across all three GPI domains. The single largest improvement occurred on the *terrorism impact* indicator. Canada had a spike in terrorism between 2017 and 2018, with 16 people killed from 16 confirmed terrorist attacks. However, the number of attacks and deaths dropped in 2019, leading to the improvement in score on the 2020 GPI. Canada also had improvements both its *incarceration rate* and *police rate*. However, there was a slight increase in the *homicide rate*, which rose to 1.8 per 100,000 people, and also slight increases in *military expenditure* and *weapons exports*.

RUSSIA & EURASIA

Russia and Eurasia was one of only two regions to record an improvement in peacefulness in the 2020 GPI. The region has experienced improvements on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains, with the biggest indicator improvements recorded on *neighbouring countries relations*, *deaths from external conflict* and the average *homicide rate*. Only three countries in the region had a deterioration in peacefulness in the 2020 GPI: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. This is the fourth successive year that peacefulness in the region has improved.

Kazakhstan is the most peaceful country in the Russia and Eurasia region, and the 70th most peaceful country overall on the 2020 GPI. However, it also had the largest deterioration in the region, with the most significant change occurring on the *Safety and Security* domain. Kazakhstan's *political terror scale* score fell to three, indicating that political persecution and human rights abuses had become widespread. There were also smaller deteriorations in the *homicide rate* and *police rate*, and a very small increase in the number of *refugees and IDPs* as a percentage of the population.

Despite ranking last in the region and 11th lowest globally, Russia has recorded improvements across all three GPI domains, with its score improving by 1.3 per cent. There have been substantial reductions in the *police rate* and the *homicide rate*, with the latter falling from over 20 per 100,000 to less than ten per 100,000 in the last decade. However, *political instability* continues to be an issue in Russia. In March 2020, President Vladimir Putin proposed an amendment to the constitution which will effectively reset his

TABLE 1.9

Russia & Eurasia

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Kazakhstan	1.948	0.016	70
2	Moldova	1.95	-0.001	71
3	Kyrgyz Republic	2.094	-0.01	93
4	Belarus	2.111	-0.004	94
5	Georgia	2.116	-0.005	95
6	Armenia	2.135	-0.122	99
7	Uzbekistan	2.158	-0.008	103
8	Tajikistan	2.188	0	107
9	Turkmenistan	2.276	0.011	116
10	Azerbaijan	2.3	-0.189	120
11	Ukraine	2.927	0.012	148
12	Russia	3.049	-0.04	154
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.271	-0.028	

presidential term to zero, allowing him two more terms in office. Although the outbreak of Covid-19 has led Putin to postpone the referendum, it will likely have a significant impact on Russia's political climate once the pandemic improves.

Azerbaijan and Armenia recorded the first and second largest improvements in peacefulness globally, primarily owing to an improvement in *neighbouring countries relations* between the two neighbours. The last major open conflict between the two was the 'four-day war' in April 2016, where the dispute over the geographical region of Nagorno-Karabakh led to an estimated 300-500 people killed. The success of the operational ceasefire in 2017-2019 and the so-called 'velvet revolution' in Armenia in 2018 has significantly improved relationships between the two countries.

SOUTH AMERICA

South America had the largest deterioration of any region on the 2020 GPI, with falls in peacefulness on all three GPI domains. Six countries recorded a deterioration in peacefulness, while five countries improved their score. South America is now the fifth most peaceful region in the world, falling behind the neighbouring Central America and the Caribbean region for the first time since 2016. No South American country is currently ranked higher than 35th on the index.

Venezuela is the least peaceful country in the region and is ranked amongst the 15 least peaceful countries in the world. It also had the largest fall in peacefulness in South America, with its overall score deteriorating by 7.5 per cent. Venezuela experienced another year of political and civil unrest, with security forces and riot troops blocking opposition lawmakers and journalists from entering the parliament in January 2020. Violence and resource scarcity has significantly increased the numbers of *refugees and internally displaced people* in Venezuela and as a consequence, the country has fallen 69 places in the global ranking for this indicator. It is now ranked in the bottom ten in the world, with over ten per cent of the country estimated to be either refugees or internally displaced. Venezuela's commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding* has also weakened significantly over the past year.

TABLE 1.10

South America

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Uruguay	1.704	-0.007	35
2	Chile	1.804	0.163	45
3	Argentina	1.978	-0.011	74
4	Paraguay	1.991	-0.065	75
5	Guyana	2.05	-0.025	82
6	Peru	2.066	0.007	84
7	Bolivia	2.074	0.029	86
8	Ecuador	2.085	0.112	90
9	Brazil	2.413	0.052	126
10	Colombia	2.646	-0.005	140
11	Venezuela	2.936	0.206	149
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.159	0.041	

Chile also experienced a turbulent year, which led to it having the second largest deterioration in peacefulness in the region. An increase in the price of metro tickets led to a rise in civil unrest, with mass-protests against inequality erupting in Santiago in October 2019, before spreading around the country. In many instances these protests turned violent, leaving at least 25 people dead. While the unrest has subsided to some extent since the peak in November, sporadic bouts of protests and isolated incidents of violence are likely to continue. These protests led to a deterioration on both the *violent demonstrations* and *intensity of internal conflict* indicators.

Colombia faced increasing civil and political unrest over the past year, despite a small overall increase in peacefulness of 0.2 per cent. Over a quarter of a million demonstrators took to the streets in November 2019 to protest cuts to social welfare, with one protestor being killed after being struck by a tear gas canister. Colombia also had an increase in *terrorism impact*, a rise in the *police rate* to 367 police per 100,000 people, and a small rise in the *incarceration rate*. However, the number of internally displaced people in Colombia fell by almost two percentage points, the *homicide rate* dropped, and the country's score on the *political terror scale* indicator also improved.

Ecuador recorded a deterioration in peacefulness of 5.7 per cent in the last year. Like many other countries in the region, Ecuador experienced intense, and at times violent protests. These erupted after the government's long-standing fuel subsidies were cut in October 2019. The capital city Quito recorded high levels of property damage and deliberate disruption of business operations during the demonstrations. Following pressure from indigenous leaders, the government decided to re-introduce the subsidies. As a result, Ecuador recorded a deterioration on the *violent demonstrations* and *political instability* indicators over the past year.

SOUTH ASIA

Peacefulness in South Asia deteriorated on the 2020 GPI, owing to falls in peacefulness in Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. The deterioration in peacefulness was driven by changes on the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains. Although it is the second least peaceful region overall, South Asia has one of the widest disparities between its most and least peaceful regions.

TABLE 1.11

South Asia

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Bhutan	1.501	0.014	19
2	Nepal	1.974	0.002	73
3	Sri Lanka	2.003	0.03	77
4	Bangladesh	2.121	-0.049	97
5	India	2.628	-0.005	139
6	Pakistan	2.973	-0.037	152
7	Afghanistan	3.644	0.079	163
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.408	0.005	

Bhutan, the most peaceful country in the region, is ranked 19th overall, while Afghanistan is the least peaceful country on the GPI.

Bhutan is the most peaceful country in South Asia, and is the only country outside of Europe and Asia-Pacific to be ranked in the top 20 of the GPI. However, despite its very high levels of peacefulness, Bhutan had an overall deterioration in score on the 2020 GPI. The number of *refugees and IDPs* as a percentage of the population increased to 0.92 per cent, and the *police rate* also increased, to just over 581 police officers per 100,000 people. Although it is the most peaceful country in the region, Bhutan has a significant higher *police rate* than any other South Asian country.

Afghanistan remains the least peaceful country in the region, and the least peaceful country overall on the 2020 GPI. Despite the signing of peace deal between the US and the Taliban in February 2020, violent attacks continued only days after the agreement was signed. In addition, domestic disputes remain over the results of the September 2019 election, with Ashraf Ghani inaugurated as president while rival candidate Abdullah Abdullah held his own swearing-in ceremony. Afghanistan has also experienced the biggest deterioration in the region driven by an increasing *homicide rate*, growing weapons imports, increasing numbers of *refugees and internally displaced people* and a weaker commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*.

India, the region's most populous country, is ranked fifth in peacefulness in South Asia, and 139th overall. Tensions between different political, ethnic, and religious groups remain a significant threat to peacefulness in the country. With the amendment of the Citizenship Act in December 2019, making it difficult for particularly Muslim minorities to regain citizenship, tensions between Muslims and the Hindu majority have escalated. India has had a slight increase in the *incarceration rate* of three per cent and an increase in *deaths from internal conflict* of 9.9 per cent. However, there have been some improvements in peacefulness. India's *military expenditure* as percentage of GDP fell, as did its armed services rate. Its commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding* also improved significantly.

Bangladesh recorded the region's biggest increase in peacefulness over the last year, with a 2.3 per cent improvement in its overall score. Its score improved across all three domains, with the largest improvement on *Safety and Security*. The *violent demonstrations* indicator had the largest single improvement as a result of a fall in the number of protests from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. While protests for better working conditions in the readymade garments sector continue, they have remained peaceful so far. Bangladesh also had improvements in deaths from internal conflict, the *homicide rate*, and *terrorism impact*.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a slight fall in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, with an overall score deterioration of 0.5 per cent. Twenty countries in the region improved in peacefulness while 24 deteriorated. Disputes over election results and demands for political change have led to civil unrest and *political instability* in several countries across the region, with violent protests breaking out in many countries over the past year.

Despite retaining its place as the least peaceful country in sub-Saharan Africa, South Sudan made progress toward building the political foundations for peace at the end of the GPI measurement year. In March 2020, the country's feuding leaders, Riek Machar and Salva Kiir, reached a political settlement and formed government, putting an end to more than six years of armed conflict.

The region's three largest improvers in peacefulness in the last year were South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea, all of which recorded improvements of more than six per cent. Both South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire improved across all three GPI domains, while Equatorial Guinea substantially improved on the *Militarisation* domain.

Benin experienced the biggest deterioration of any country in the world, falling 34 places in the ranking to 106th on the 2020 GPI. Sporadic clashes erupted across the country following the election in April 2019, in which the opposition party was effectively banned, leading to a deterioration in *political instability*.

Niger recorded the second largest deterioration in the region. Over the last year, cross-border armed robberies and violent crime by gangs led to a deterioration on the *violent crime* indicator. Niger ranked 16th highest for entrenched criminality in Africa in the 2019 Africa Organised Crime Index, with a criminality score considerably higher than the continental average. As a consequence, Niger recorded a deterioration in *perceptions of criminality* in the last year.

Nigeria continues to face challenges on both *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains. The conflict between government forces and Boko Haram in the northeast led to an estimated 640 civilians killed in 2019.⁸ In addition, Nigeria's problems with cross-border smuggling and imports undercutting local producers have led the government to shut down its borders, causing Nigeria's *relationship with neighbouring countries* to deteriorate. Over the last year, the country has recorded further deteriorations in *Militarisation and Ongoing Conflict* and an overall deterioration in peacefulness of 0.8 per cent.

Economic problems have left the Gambia vulnerable to further deteriorations in peacefulness. With a youth unemployment rate of over 40 per cent, public dissatisfaction and migration have been on the rise.⁹ In addition, the country has recorded a rise in police brutality, particularly in clashes with anti-government protesters.¹⁰ However, the opening of the Farafenni bridge over the Gambia River in early 2019, reconnecting the Gasamance region in Senegal with the rest of the territory, has eased tensions in the region and led to a de facto truce between the Senegal army and separatist groups. Senegal's level of *internal organised conflict* has, therefore, improved and the Gambia has had improvements in *political instability*.

TABLE 1.12

Sub-Saharan Africa


Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Mauritius	1.544	-0.018	23
2	Botswana	1.693	0.017	33
3	Ghana	1.776	0.011	43
4	Zambia	1.794	-0.004	44
5	Sierra Leone	1.82	0.051	46
6	Senegal	1.824	-0.013	47
7	Tanzania	1.85	-0.012	52
8	Namibia	1.861	-0.031	53
9	Liberia	1.877	0.017	57
10	Malawi	1.885	0.107	59
11	Equatorial Guinea	1.891	-0.066	60
12	The Gambia	1.891	0.003	60
13	Madagascar	1.905	0.047	63
14	Eswatini	1.934	-0.052	67
14	Rwanda	2.049	-0.004	81
16	Guinea	2.082	-0.025	89
17	Angola	2.087	0.013	91
18	Gabon	2.116	0.014	95
19	Lesotho	2.131	-0.036	98
20	Mozambique	2.135	-0.026	99
21	Guinea-Bissau	2.157	-0.053	101
22	Cote d'Ivoire	2.169	-0.067	105
23	Benin	2.182	0.222	106
24	Togo	2.201	0.023	108
25	Uganda	2.202	0.023	109
26	Djibouti	2.215	0.036	112
27	Mauritania	2.287	-0.019	117
28	Burkina Faso	2.316	0.11	122
29	South Africa	2.317	-0.08	123
30	Republic of the Congo	2.343	-0.043	124
31	Kenya	2.375	0.021	125
32	Zimbabwe	2.485	0.022	131
33	Burundi	2.506	-0.033	132
34	Ethiopia	2.526	0.008	133
35	Chad	2.538	0.026	134
36	Eritrea	2.567	-0.001	136
37	Niger	2.608	0.188	138
38	Cameroon	2.65	0.057	141
39	Mali	2.729	0.045	144
40	Nigeria	2.865	0.022	147
41	Central African Republic	3.237	-0.057	155
42	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.243	-0.022	156
43	Somalia	3.302	0.067	158
44	South Sudan	3.447	0.012	160
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.264	0.011	



Improvements & Deteriorations



FIVE LARGEST IMPROVEMENTS IN PEACE



Azerbaijan recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, with its score improving by 7.6 per cent, leading to a rise of 12 places in the rankings. The most notable improvement occurred on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, which had a 17.6 per cent improvement. However, despite these changes Azerbaijan remains the third least peaceful country in the Russia and Eurasia region, and the 120th most peaceful country overall.

Azerbaijan's improvement on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain was driven by an improvement in its relationship with its neighbour Armenia. The last significant open conflict between the two countries was in 2016, when the ceasefire was broken and an estimated 300-500 people were killed in the so-called 'four-day war'. After three years of relative peace and an operational ceasefire in 2017-19, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has stabilised.

A fall in the intensity of the conflict between the two countries also resulted in improvements in the number of *internal conflict deaths*, *internal conflicts fought*, and a fall in the number of *refugees and IDPs* as a percentage of the population, which moved from 4.07 to 3.53 per cent. *Weapons imports* also fell substantially, with the indicator recording a 25 per cent improvement on the 2020 GPI.

Although the improvement in peacefulness in Azerbaijan was significant, the country still faces several significant obstacles to peace, particularly on the *Safety and Security* domain. *Perceptions of criminality* remain high, and the country also has high levels of *political instability*, and scores poorly on the *political terror scale*.




Armenia had the second largest increase in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, with only its neighbouring country Azerbaijan having a larger improvement. It rose 15 places in the rankings and is now ranked among the 100 most peaceful countries, owing to a large improvement in *relations with neighbouring countries*, as well as a substantial fall in its *incarceration rate*.

The largest improvement occurred on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, with improvements in *relations with neighbouring countries* and a fall in deaths from internal conflict. The primary driver of these changes was an improved relationship with

neighbouring Azerbaijan, helped in part by Armenia's 'velvet revolution', and a stabilisation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

On the *Safety and Security* domain, Armenia's *incarceration rate* improved significantly, falling over 35 per cent over the past three years to 76 prisoners per 100,000 people. This fall means that Armenia now has the lowest *incarceration rate* in the Russia and Eurasia region. There was also an improvement in its *homicide rate*, *political instability*, and a fall in *terrorism impact*.


Despite these improvements, Armenia did record deteriorations in some indicators. Although *political instability* improved, it came at the expense of increasing government interference, resulting in a deterioration in Armenia's *political terror scale* score. There was also a deterioration in the *Militarisation* domain. In contrast to the improvement in Azerbaijan, weapons imports rose significantly, as did *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP.



Bahrain had the third highest increase in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, with a 4.8 per cent improvement in overall score, leading to a rise in the rankings of nine places. This is the third consecutive year of increasing peacefulness in Bahrain, after almost a decade of sustained deteriorations in peacefulness. It is now the eighth most peaceful country in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The improvement in peacefulness in Bahrain was driven by changes in just a small number of indicators, most notably *access to small arms* and the *intensity of internal conflict*. Although private gun ownership is quite high in Bahrain, it has halved on a per capita basis over the past few years. Moreover, the laws on firearms possession are quite tight including licensing only for those over the age of 21 for both firearms and ammunition.


With respect to the *intensity of internal conflict*, tensions remain between the Sunni ruling minority and the Shia majority who feel under represented. However, the authorities have tightened security and the number of incidents of violent protest has fallen sharply over the past. Figures released by the Ministry of the Interior reveal an 86 per cent decline in the number of terrorism-related criminal investigations since their peak in 2014.



South Africa had the fourth highest overall improvement in peacefulness in the 2020 GPI. Its overall score improved by 3.4 per cent, which saw it rise three places to be ranked 123rd overall, with improvements in all three GPI domains. However, despite this improvement, South Africa still faces many challenges to peace, especially in the *Safety and Security* domain. In particular, it has a very high *homicide rate*, and very high levels of *violent crime*.

South Africa's biggest improvement was in the *political terror scale* indicator, where its score moved from a four to a three. This suggests that while political violence and human rights abuses in the country remain common, the scope and intensity of these abuses has been reduced. South Africa's *incarceration rate* also improved, falling from 286 to 275 prisoners per 100,000 people. South Africa has the fourth highest *incarceration rate* in sub-Saharan Africa, ahead of only Namibia, Rwanda, and Eritrea.

South Africa improved on several indicators in the *Militarisation* domain. Its commitment to timely *UN peacekeeping funding* improved, and the number of both *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* fell. However, South Africa is still the largest weapons exporter per capita in the sub-Saharan region, and is ranked 30th for per capita *weapons exports* overall.



Honduras had the fifth largest improvement in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, rising four places in the rankings with a 3.1 per cent increase in its overall score. It recorded improvements across all three GPI domains, and had particularly noticeable improvements on the *political terror scale* and *deaths from internal conflict* indicators.


Honduras has suffered from some of the highest rates of internal conflict and interpersonal violence in the world over the past decade. However, the level of conflict has steadily declined over the past five years. As the activities of criminal gangs in Honduras have begun to subside, the *homicide rate* has fallen steadily, and *deaths from internal conflict* fell to zero. The *political terror scale* indicator improved, suggesting that government repression related to internal conflict has now lessened, and there was also a fall in the number of terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism. However, both the *police rate* and *incarceration rate* have risen over the past few years.

Despite these improvements, there are still many sources of potential conflict and tension within Honduras. It has the fourth highest *homicide rate* in the world, despite a 26 per cent fall in the number of homicides in 2017. The political tensions surrounding internal conflict and migration flows threaten to sour relations with the US, and it still has very high levels of *violent crime*, with concordantly high *perceptions of criminality*.

“

Benin had the largest deterioration in peacefulness of any country on the 2020 GPI, falling 35 places in the rankings.


FIVE LARGEST DETERIORATIONS IN PEACE



Benin had the largest deterioration in peacefulness of any country on the 2020 GPI, falling 35 places in the rankings to 106th, owing to an 11.3 per cent deterioration in overall score. Benin had deteriorations across all three GPI domains, with the largest occurring on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain.

The *intensity of internal conflict* indicator had the largest overall deterioration. Sporadic clashes have continued in Benin in 2019-20 since legislative elections were held in April 2019 from which opposition parties were barred. Benin's former president, Thomas Boni Yayi, went into exile last year after being held under de-facto house arrest by Benin's current leader, Patrice Talon. The absence of the opposition in the legislative vote has provoked unrest, with violent protests breaking out across the country, including in the capital, Porto Novo, in the south, and in Tchaourou and Kilibo in the centre of the country.

Benin's *relations with neighbouring countries* also deteriorated over the past year. Nigeria has closed its border with Benin in an attempt to cut down rice smuggling from its smaller neighbour. Despite talks to resolve the situation, the border continues to be shut to trade.



Nicaragua had the second largest fall in peacefulness of any country, falling 15 places as a result of deteriorations in the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains. This fall continues the trend of deteriorating peacefulness that began two years ago. Nicaragua is now the least peaceful country in the Central America and the Caribbean region, and the 135th most peaceful country overall.

Nicaragua's deterioration in peacefulness has been driven by protests against social security reforms that begun in 2018. The fallout from the government response to the protests has led to a deterioration on the *political terror scale* indicator, with Nicaragua's score moving from 2.5 to four. Political activists have been targeted for violent harassment, with hundreds of protestors allegedly tortured by the government.

Nicaragua also recorded a significant deterioration on the *violent crime* indicator, stemming from the actions of illegal paramilitary

groups. These groups have caused major disruptions to businesses since the onset of the political crisis in 2018. According to the main agricultural producers' association, as of April 2019 3,300 hectares of agricultural land remains illegally occupied by these groups.


The crisis of the past two years has also had a flow-on effect to a number of indicators of *Safety and Security*. There was a further deterioration on the *political instability* indicator, as the US government approved the Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act (NICA), which authorises the US executive branch to impose sanctions on Nicaraguans deemed to have committed human rights abuses or acts of corruption. This development has come at the time when the Organisation of American States is preparing to ramp up diplomatic and economic pressures against Nicaragua.



Venezuela recorded the third largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, with an overall score deterioration of 7.5 per cent. This marks the eighth consecutive year that Venezuela's score has deteriorated, with the country dropping from a ranking of 125th in 2012, to 149 on the 2020 GPI. It is now the least peaceful country in South America, a position it has held since 2019.

Venezuela's deterioration in peacefulness occurred primarily on the *Safety and Security* domain, owing to an increase in the number of *refugees and IDPs* as a percentage of the population. The 2019 UNHCR mid-year trends report notes that there are over three million Venezuelans displaced abroad, even if the majority of these have not formally sought asylum in the destination country. Almost half of these displaced Venezuelans are currently residing in Colombia.

The political crisis in Venezuela over the past few years has led to its score on many of the *Safety and Security* indicators deteriorating. Venezuela now has the maximum possible score of five for *violent demonstrations*, *violent crime*, and *perceptions of criminality*. Although its *homicide rate* improved from 56 to 49 per 100,000 people, it is still the third highest in the world, behind only Jamaica and El Salvador. However, Venezuela did have a slight improvement on its *political terror scale* score, an indication that the rule of law in the country has begun to be partially restored, and that the scope of human rights abuses and political repression has somewhat narrowed.




Niger recorded the fourth largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, falling 11 places in the rankings to 138th overall. This continues a trend of falling peacefulness in Niger that began in 2014. Since then, its overall GPI score has deteriorated by over 25

per cent. While Niger experienced deteriorations across all three domains, the decline in *Safety and Security* was the key driver of its fall in peacefulness.

The *perceptions of criminality* indicator had the largest deterioration, owing to a steep rise in violence around Niger's borders regions. The decline in security has driven domestic demand for arms, as well as weakening local law enforcement efforts to tackle rampant trafficking in arms, gold, people and drugs, as security forces were preoccupied with combating the threat from terrorism.

The *violent crime* indicator also deteriorated as a result of increased criminal activity in Niger's border regions. In recent years, gangs involved in cross-border armed robbery and cattle-rustling have emerged in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Senegal and Mali. Niger also hosts both domestic criminal networks and foreign criminal actors involved in cross-border smuggling networks, particularly in its vast Agadez region, which borders unstable states where law enforcement has weakened, particularly on the border with Libya.

Despite the overall deterioration in peacefulness, Niger did have an improvement on some indicators of *Militarisation*, with *military expenditure*, the *armed forces rate*, and the number of *weapons imports* all falling over the past year.



Chile had the fifth largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2020 GPI, falling 17 places to now be ranked 45th. It now has its lowest levels of peacefulness since the inception of the GPI.

Chile's deterioration was driven by deteriorations in the *Safety and Security* domain, most notably an increase in the *intensity of internal conflict*, *violent demonstrations*, and a rise in *political instability*. Mass protests broke out in the capital, Santiago, in October over the hike in metro fares. The protest movement then spread to other parts of the country and quickly transformed into a nation-wide campaign against inequality and the high cost of living. The movement was characterised by bouts of violence, looting and unrest which resulted in the shutdown of shops and businesses, as well as disruptions to travel and activity. A state of emergency was declared in the early days of the protests and the accompanying violence had resulted in at least 25 deaths by the end of 2019.

Although Chile recorded significant deteriorations on the *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains, it did record an improvement on the militarisation domain. The armed services rate and both *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* improved. These improvements occurred alongside reforms to end off-budget funding of *military expenditure*, passed in September 2019.



TRENDS IN PEACEFULNESS

KEY FINDINGS

- The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by 2.5 per cent since 2008. Over that period, 81 countries deteriorated in peacefulness, while 79 improved.
- The average level of country peacefulness has deteriorated for nine of the past 12 years.
- The gap between the least and most peaceful countries continues to grow. Since 2008, the 25 least peaceful countries declined on average by 12.9 per cent, while the 25 most peaceful countries improved by 2.1 per cent.
- While the deterioration in peacefulness has not been limited to any one region, indicator, or country, conflict in the Middle East has been the key driver of the global deterioration in peacefulness.
- Full democracies had a small deterioration in peacefulness of 0.32 per cent. This fall in peacefulness started five years ago, and is reflective of growing political instability and social unrest in Western Europe and North America.
- Of the three GPI domains, two recorded a deterioration while one improved. *Ongoing Conflict* deteriorated by 6.8 per cent and *Safety and Security* deteriorated by 3.3 per cent. However, *Militarisation* improved by 4.4 per cent.
- The improving trend in *Militarisation* was not limited to a single region, with 109 of the 163 countries covered in the GPI improving. One hundred countries reduced their *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP*, and 113 had a reduction in their *armed forces personnel rate*.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the world's least peaceful region for the sixth consecutive year. It is less peaceful than the global average for 19 of the 23 GPI indicators.
- Almost half of the countries in Europe, the world's most peaceful region, have deteriorated in peacefulness since 2008.
- The indicator with the largest deterioration globally was the *terrorism impact* indicator. Ninety-seven countries recorded an increase in terrorist activity since 2008. However, the total number of deaths from terrorism has been falling globally since 2014, and is now lower than at any point in the last decade.
- The *homicide rate* indicator had the largest improvement, with 123 countries improving since the 2008 GPI. There was also a notable improvement on the *political terror scale* indicator, with 47 countries improving on political terror and human rights abuses, while 33 deteriorated.
- Although deaths from conflict rose 170 per cent between the 2008 and 2020 GPI, they have been declining every year since peaking in 2014. Deaths from conflict have halved since their peak of 104,555.

GPI Trends



The world is considerably less peaceful now than it was in 2008, with the average level of country peacefulness deteriorating by 2.5 per cent over the last decade. Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for nine of the last 12 years. Since 2008, 81 countries have become less peaceful, compared to 79 that have improved. Figure 2.1 highlights the overall trend in peacefulness from 2008 to 2020, as well as the year-on-year percentage change in score.

Most of the deterioration in peacefulness over the last decade occurred in the MENA region. If this region was excluded from the analysis, the average level of peace would only have deteriorated by one per cent, and if the flow-on effects from conflict in the Middle East, such as increases in terrorism and forced migration had not changed, then the world would have become more peaceful.

Even within the MENA region, the deterioration in the last decade was concentrated in a handful of countries, most notably Syria, Yemen and Libya, which all had score deteriorations of more than 40 per cent. However, although there has been relatively little variation in peacefulness outside of MENA, there are some concerning trends in the more peaceful regions of the world.


Europe, the region that has ranked as the most peaceful since the inception of the index, has seen a deterioration in the *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains since 2008. Most strikingly, just under half of the countries in Western Europe and all but one of the Nordic countries are less peaceful now than in 2008. Despite its high level of peacefulness overall, Europe has seen significant deteriorations in *terrorism impact*, *neighbouring country relations*, *violent demonstrations*, and *political instability*.

The deterioration in peacefulness around the world has been considerably larger in countries that were already less peaceful to begin with, which has led to an increase in the 'peace gap' between peaceful and conflict-ridden countries, as shown in Figure 2.2.

FIGURE 2.1

GPI overall trend and year-on-year percentage change, 2008–2020

Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for nine of the last 12 years.



Source: IEP

KEY FINDINGS

DETERIORATED & IMPROVED COUNTRIES SINCE 2008



DETERIORATIONS IN PEACE ARE LARGER THAN IMPROVEMENTS.

12.9%

2.1%

The 25 least peaceful countries deteriorated by 12.9 per cent on average over the last decade.

The 25 most peaceful improved by an average 2.1 per cent over the last decade.


While there has been some fluctuation in the level of peacefulness of the world's most peaceful countries, there was an overall improvement in peacefulness of 2.1 per cent. By contrast, the world's least peaceful countries have experienced a clear and sustained deterioration in peacefulness over the last decade, with the average level of peacefulness deteriorating by almost 13 per cent.

The changes in peacefulness also varied considerably by government type, as shown in Figure 2.3. In countries classified as authoritarian regimes, peacefulness deteriorated the most. However, there were also significant deteriorations in peacefulness amongst hybrid regimes, which have a mix of democratic and authoritarian tendencies. Amongst countries classified as democratic, those classified as flawed democracies had an average increase in peacefulness, while full democracies had a small deterioration in peacefulness. This fall in peacefulness amongst full democracies started five years ago, and is reflective of growing political instability and social unrest in Western Europe and North America.

FIGURE 2.2

Trend in peace 2008–2020, most and least peaceful countries

The 25 least peaceful countries deteriorated in peacefulness by an average of 12.9 per cent, while the most peaceful improved by 2.1 per cent.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.3


GPI overall trend by government type, 2008–2020

Authoritarian regimes deteriorated in peacefulness more than any other government type.




Source: IEP

PEACE DETERIORATION



The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by 2.5 per cent since 2008.



DETERIORATION IN MENA

63% ↑

Percentage of MENA countries that have deteriorated in peacefulness since 2008.

IMPROVEMENTS IN OVERALL PEACEFULNESS

<20% ↓

Only two countries - Georgia and Sri Lanka - are 20 per cent more peaceful in 2020 compared to 2008.

GPI Domain Trends



The GPI measures peacefulness across three domains: *Safety and Security*, *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation*. While the world has become less peaceful over the last decade, there have been some notable improvements in peace. The average country score on the *Militarisation* domain improved by 4.4 per cent, driven largely by reductions in military spending as a percentage of GDP and the size of the armed forces in many countries. The *Safety and Security* domain deteriorated by 3.3 per cent and the *Ongoing Conflict* domain also deteriorated, falling by 6.8 per cent, as shown in Figure 2.4.

The change in the three GPI domains has varied not only by region, but also by government type. Figure 2.5 shows the indexed trend for each of the three domains across the four government types identified by the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Democracy Index.

The greatest difference between government types occurs in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain. The vast majority of the increase in active armed conflict over the past decade has taken place in authoritarian regimes, located for the most part in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa. Trends across the other two domains are more stable, with all four government types having deteriorated on the *Safety and Security* domain, albeit only marginally for flawed democracies, while all four government types improved on the *Militarisation* domain.

Figure 2.6 shows the percentage change in score for each indicator from the 2008 to the 2020 GPI. Of the 23 GPI indicators, 15

recorded a deterioration with the remaining eight recording an improvement. Only two indicators had an overall change of more than 20 per cent. The *terrorism impact* indicator deteriorated by 21.2 per cent, and the *UN peacekeeping funding* indicator improved by 20.4 per cent.


“

The greatest difference between government types occurs in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain.

FIGURE 2.4

Indexed trend in peacefulness by domain, 2008 to 2020 (2008=1)

Militarisation was the only domain to record an improvement since 2008.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.5

Indexed trend in peacefulness by domain and government type, 2008 to 2020 (2008=1)

Authoritarian regimes had the worst performance for all three domains.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.6

Percentage change by indicator, 2008–2020

The terrorism impact indicator had the largest overall change from 2008 to 2020.



Source: IEP

SAFETY & SECURITY

The *Safety and Security* domain deteriorated 3.3 per cent between 2008 and 2020. Of the 11 domain indicators, nine deteriorated, with the largest number of countries deteriorating on the *terrorism impact* indicator. The *homicide rate* indicator had the largest improvement, with 123 countries recording an improvement. The *refugees and IDPs* indicator had the most significant change, with the total number of refugees and internally displaced people increasing from just under 25 million in 2008, to over 65 million in 2019. Figure 2.7 shows the trend for these three key indicators on the *Safety and Security* domain.

Figure 2.7 highlights the extent to which terrorism has increased over the past decade, with deaths from terrorism rising from 8,374 in 2008 to just under 33,555 in 2014. However, preliminary estimates for 2019 indicate that deaths from terrorism have now dropped to less than 8,000. The fall in deaths from terrorism has been mainly driven by the military defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria and the military interventions against Boko Haram in Nigeria. Terrorism has also been spreading around the globe. In the 2008 GPI, 48 countries had not experienced any terrorism in the preceding five years. By the 2020 GPI, that number had dropped to 30.

The *homicide rate* indicator had the largest improvement of any *Safety and Security* indicator over the past decade. Despite a considerable increase in the homicide rate of some Central American countries, 124 reduced their homicide rate since 2008. There are now 27 countries globally that have a homicide rate of less than one per 100,000 people, and 58 which have a rate under two per 100,000.

Despite the improvements in homicide, terrorism, and other indicators of *Safety and Security* over the past five years, the number of *refugees and IDPs* has continued to climb, and has risen almost every year since 2008. There are now over 22 million refugees from conflict situations around the world, with many millions of additional people currently seeking asylum or in refugee-like situations. This represents a 116 per cent increase since 2008.

The number of internally displaced people has risen at an even more dramatic rate, with a 204 per cent increase in the number of IDPs since 2008. Latest estimates suggest that almost 43 million people across the world are currently internally displaced. There

are ten countries in which over a million people are displaced, with the highest total number of displaced people in Colombia and Syria.

When measured as a percentage of the population, there are now 15 countries where at least five per cent of the population are either refugees or internally displaced. Somalia and the Central African Republic both have more than 20 per cent of their population displaced, while South Sudan has over 37 per cent of its population displaced. However, the extent of displacement is greatest in Syria, where the impact and aftermath of the Syrian civil war led to just under three quarters of the entire population being either internally displaced or refugees at the end of the war.

ONGOING CONFLICT

Ongoing Conflict had the largest deterioration of any domain on the GPI, deteriorating by 6.8 per cent between 2008 and 2020. Five of the six *Ongoing Conflict* indicators deteriorated, with only *deaths from external conflict* recording an improvement. In total, 80 countries recorded a deterioration on this domain, with 61 recording an improvement since 2008. Figure 2.8 shows the trend for three key conflict indicators: the total number of battle deaths, total number of conflicts, and the average score on the *intensity of internal conflict* indicator.

The indicator with the most notable variation in the past few years on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain has been the increase and then fall in the number of conflict deaths (both internal and external). Battle related deaths rose by 265 per cent between 2008 and the peak in 2014. It then subsequently halved from 2015 to 2019.


The dramatic increase was concentrated in a handful of countries, with the majority of the deaths being attributable to the war in Syria. There were also significant increases in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen.

The largest fall in deaths occurred in Syria, however, Nigeria, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Central African Republic also had significant decreases over this time. Afghanistan is one of the few countries where the number of deaths has not decreased over the past few years, with the scope and intensity of the conflict there actually increasing since 2014. Afghanistan is now the country with the highest total number of *deaths from internal conflict*.

FIGURE 2.7

Trends in key Safety and Security indicators

Deaths from terrorism are now at their lowest level in a decade.




Source: GTD, UNHCR, IDMC, UNDP, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.8

Trends in key Ongoing Conflict indicators

While battle deaths have fallen since 2014, the total number of conflicts has increased.



Source: UCDP, EIU, IEP calculations

While the number of deaths from conflict has been declining since 2015, the total number of conflicts has continued to rise, from 104 in 2008 to 160 in 2018. This includes state-based violence, non-state violence (conflict between two armed groups within a country, neither of which is a state), and one-sided violence (the organized use of armed force by the state against civilians, excluding extra-judicial killings). While the number of one-sided conflicts remained relatively constant, both state-based and non-state conflicts increased significantly. State-based conflicts rose from 38 to 52, while non-state violent conflicts increased over 100 per cent, rising from 36 in 2008 to 76 in 2018.

The average *intensity of internal conflict* has also been rising, even as the total number of *deaths from internal conflict* has been declining across the world. Although this may seem contradictory, the countries with the highest intensity conflicts, such as Syria, improved substantially, whereas the number of low intensity conflicts increased globally.

The average *intensity of internal conflict* indicator score increased from 2.29 to 2.52. A score of one on this indicator for a single country indicates that there is no conflict. A score of two indicates that there is a strong ideological conflict within that country, while a score of three indicates open conflict, with the existence of explicit threats of violence between different groups in that country. In 2008, 104 countries had a score of two or less on this

indicator, suggesting no conflict or only latent conflict. By 2020, this number had fallen to 88. The number of countries with a score of at least three or worse rose from 57 in 2008, to 74 in 2020.

MILITARISATION


The *Militarisation* domain was the only one of the three GPI domains to have an improvement. The average score on this domain improved by 4.4 per cent between 2008 and 2020, with 109 countries recording an improvement and 52 deteriorating. Five of the six indicators on the *Militarisation* domain improved. The most noticeable improvements occurred on the *military expenditure* indicator, where 100 countries improved, and the *armed forces rate* indicator, where 113 countries improved. Figure 2.9 shows the trend for the armed forces rate and military expenditure indicators, as well as the total number of *weapons imports* from 2003 to 2020.

The improvement in both the *armed forces rate* and *military expenditure* was particularly notable in some of the largest militaries in the world. Of the five countries with the largest total military expenditure - United States, China, Saudi Arabia, India, and Russia - all five had falls in their armed service personnel rates, and China, India, and the US also had a concurrent reduction in *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP.

FIGURE 2.9

Trends in key militarisation indicators

Both the armed forces rate and average military expenditure have fallen since 2008.



Source: IISS, SIPRI, IEP calculations

From 2008 to 2020, the average *armed forces rate* fell from 463 to 405 soldiers per 100,000 people.

Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP improved in 100 countries between 2008 and 2020. It improved on average for five of the nine regions globally, with the biggest average improvement occurring in the Asia-Pacific Region. The largest increase by region occurred in the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia, where average military expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose 1.07 percentage points from 2008 to 2020.

While military expenditure has fallen on average as a percentage of GDP, it has risen on an absolute and per capita basis. Total global military spending rose from 1.577 trillion in 2008 to 1.78 trillion in 2018 (measured in constant \$US 2017 dollars), an increase of 12.9 per cent.

There was a slight deterioration in both the *weapons exports* and *weapons imports* indicators, the only two *Militarisation*

indicators to show a deterioration over the past decade. The total value of weapons imports rose by 12.6 per cent between 2008 and 2019. The GPI uses a five year moving average of these values to calculate the scores for the *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* indicators.

Weapons exports remain highly concentrated, with 73 countries registering no exports at all for the period 2003 to 2019. A number of otherwise highly peaceful countries also performed poorly on this indicator, with Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands all being ranked amongst the ten highest weapons exporters per capita for every year in the last five years. Seven of the ten largest exporters on a per capita basis are western democracies. However, by total export value, just five countries account for over 75 per cent of total weapons exports: the US, Russia, Germany, France, and China, with the US alone accounting for over 32 per cent.

Civil Unrest



KEY FINDINGS

- There has been a sharp rise in the level of civil unrest over the last decade, with over 60 countries experiencing at least one violent demonstration in 2019.
- From 2011 to 2019, the number of riots, general strikes and anti-government demonstrations around the world increased by 244 per cent.
- The number of riots around the world increased 282 per cent from 2011 to 2018.
- However, civil unrest around the world declined sharply with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with demonstrations falling 90 per cent from 11 March to 11 April 2020.
- Europe had the largest number of protests, riots and strikes over the period, totalling nearly 1,600 events from 2011 to 2018. Sixty-five per cent of the civil unrest events in Europe were nonviolent.
- Civil unrest in sub-Saharan Africa rose by more than 800 per cent over the period, from 32 riots and protests in 2011 to 292 in 2018.
- MENA was the only world region to record a decline in civil unrest, with the number of demonstrations falling 60 per cent from 2011 to 2018. 2011 was the height of the Arab Spring.

BOX 2.1

Defining Civil Unrest

IEP has used the Cross National Time Series (CNTS) dataset to analyze the global trends in civil unrest. The CNTS data includes a conservative count of riots, general strikes, and anti-government demonstrations for 200 countries. CNTS gives the following definitions for the variables used in this section:

Riots: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

General strikes: Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.

Anti-government demonstrations: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.

INTRODUCTION

The number of protest movements and demonstrations has increased across the world since 2011. In most situations, these movements avoid violence, however, both violent and nonviolent demonstrations have become increasingly frequent over the last decade. Seven of the nine GPI regions had increased levels of civil unrest, with the most violence recorded in places where democratic institutions were weak.

In recent months the world's governments faced an urgent imperative to restrict movement in order to contain COVID-19. In March and April 2020, demonstrations abated significantly as stay-at-home orders were enforced around the world. However, the economic shock that will follow the lockdowns are likely to lead to increases in civil unrest.

2019: YEAR OF THE PROTEST

2019 was characterised by increases in protests across the world. France, Chile, Mexico, Hong Kong, and elsewhere had large protests, often resulting in violence. Most civil unrest around the world takes the form of nonviolent protests, but at least 58 per cent of GPI countries experienced violent protests in 2019.

The year opened with ongoing, daily demonstrations in both France and Sudan. France's *Mouvement des gilets jaunes*, or Yellow Vests Movement held near constant demonstrations, often leading to clashes with police. Sudanese demonstrators held demonstrations for at least eight months, demanding a democratic transition, which helped lead to a coup d'état against President Omar al-Bashir.

The Algerian military also deposed President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in response to the demands of protestors, ending his 20 year presidency in April of 2019. By the end of the year, both Iraq's President Barham Salih and Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi had resigned in response to mass mobilizations. Bolivia's army supported protestors in demanding the resignation of President Evo Morales after alleged fraud in the 2018 presidential election. Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri also resigned. In Egypt,

weeks of protests across the country calling for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's resignation were met with government force and mass arrests.

By January 2020, Iranians had called for the resignation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, after months of unrest sparked by a rise in fuel prices.¹ Price hikes triggered movements in many countries last year. Chileans reacted to an increase in Santiago subway fares with civil disobedience and riots, with the movement eventually growing to call for a new constitution.

COVID-19: UNREST CONTINUES IN 2020

As COVID-19 spread across the globe, governments imposed sweeping restrictions on movement in order to contain the pandemic. The pandemic and resulting government responses have reduced protests around the world. Figure 2.10 gives the trend in daily riots and protests recorded by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which covers most of the world except for the US, Canada and countries in Oceania.

There was a small spike in March of 2020 and then a sharp decline in April. Civil unrest declined nearly 90 per cent from 11 March to 11 April 2020.

Student groups and civil organizations in Chile called for a suspension of protests in late March, but citizens also set up road blockades in actions calling for regional lockdowns and improved safety protocols.³ Demonstrations also declined in Colombia and Venezuela with the imposition of lockdowns.⁴ The restrictions were announced as indefinite in seven states in Venezuela.


Russia and Eurasia also had significantly reduced activity as measures to limit the spread of coronavirus led to the cancellation of most public events. Moscow and Chechnya faced complete lockdown and protests across Russia were either reduced or cancelled.

Restrictions on movement may dampen protest activity in the short run, but political and social tensions are likely to remain through the crisis. Some will be amplified, as frustrations are compounded by the economic downturn and food shortages in the wake of the pandemic.

FIGURE 2.10

Civil unrest, 1 January 2020–11 April 2020

Civil unrest declined 90 per cent from 11 March to 11 April 2020.



Source: ACLED

TRENDS IN CIVIL UNREST


Protest movements and civil unrest had been on the rise for the previous decade, as shown in Figure 2.11. In the eight years leading up to 2018, the available comparable global data shows a 102 per cent increase in the number of riots, general strikes and anti-government demonstrations.

The number of both protests and riots roughly doubled, while the number of general strikes quadrupled, from 33 events in 2011 to 135 in 2018.

FIGURE 2.11

Global trends in civil unrest, 2011–2018

Incidents of civil unrest doubled over the last decade.



Source: Cross-National Time Series (CNTS), IEP calculations

Sixty-four per cent were nonviolent demonstrations and another six per cent were general strikes, with the remaining 30 per cent classified as riots. More than 4,700 nonviolent demonstrations were recorded, compared to nearly 2,200 riots.

The high level of civil unrest in 2011 reflects the Arab Spring, followed by a decline in the number of protests in 2012 as these movements either achieved their goals, were repressed by governments, or escalated into civil wars. However, total global civil unrest rose above 2011 levels just three years later and has remained above that level since.

Riots did not decline in the years immediately following the Arab Spring, when the number of anti-government demonstrations fell. The number of riots around the world has increased 282 per cent since 2011. The trend peaked in 2014, especially in countries with fragile democratic institutions, before plateauing. Since 2016, there have been at least 300 events every year.

Protests peaked globally in 2016, as unrest continued to escalate in many countries but violent demonstrations fell off. Teachers, parents, labourers and municipal workers protested in India, which had nearly 150 different demonstrations. Proposed changes to France's labour laws brought demonstrations and a no-confidence vote for then-President François Hollande's

government, while Brazilians protested government corruption, calling for the impeachment of then-President Dilma Rousseff. In the United States, more than 1,000 people were arrested in the nation's capitol that year in protests focusing on police violence, gun violence, and environmental issues.

TRENDS BY REGION

Every region of the world has experienced hundreds of civil unrest events over the last ten years, as shown in Figure 2.12. The two regions with the largest increases in civil unrest were sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, although the vast majority of incidences in Europe were non-violent.

The global increase was driven by rises in seven out of nine regions. Only MENA had fewer protests, riots and strikes in 2018, when compared to 2011, while levels in North America were stable. Sub-Saharan Africa had the greatest increase, followed by Europe, South Asia, South America, Central America and the Caribbean, Asia-Pacific and Russia and Eurasia.

The MENA region had the most significant decline in violent demonstrations, with total unrest falling by 60 per cent and the number of riots falling by 50 per cent from 2011 to 2018. North America had fewer riots over the period, recording a decline of 27 per cent

Sub-Saharan Africa

Civil unrest in sub-Saharan Africa rose by more than 800 per cent, from 32 riots and protests in 2011 to 292 in 2018. The increase was mostly driven by events occurring after 2015. Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest proportion of violent demonstrations, with riots making up 42.6 per cent of total events.

Nigeria accounted for the largest number of demonstrations and the largest increase. In 2018 the number of demonstrations rose from six to 79 in a single year. Perhaps the most prominent issue was the imprisonment of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN).⁶ Supporters of the IMN protested repeatedly throughout the year to call for Zakzaky's release, who had been imprisoned since 2015.

In South Africa, there was an 86 per cent increase in civil unrest from 2011 to 2018, with most of the increase occurring in 2017 and 2018. University students began protesting following proposed tuition increases in late 2015. These demonstrations led to the temporary closure of the country's top universities.


Ethiopia experienced a similar trend, as emergency restrictions to contain protests in 2015 expired in late 2017 and citizens returned to the streets. The number of riots and demonstrations rose 500 per cent from 2015 to 2018. Much of the unrest occurred in Oromiya state, which surrounds the capital Addis Ababa and reflected long-standing tensions between the province and the federal government. Demonstrations and other ongoing violence led to the resignation of then-Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in February of 2018.

In Guinea, protestors and government forces clashed frequently over the last few years, with violence reported in 65 per cent of the demonstrations. Most of the events took place in 2018, as teacher-led protests eventually secured a promised pay increase from the government.⁷ At the same time, local political parties marched to demand that the results of municipal elections be released, alleging fraud on the part of the ruling party.⁸ Protests and riots have continued since 2018, as President Alpha Conde

FIGURE 2.12

Total civil unrest by region, 2011 to 2018

Europe had the highest incidence of unrest over the period, with over 1,600 anti-government demonstrations, general strikes and riots.



Source: Cross-National Time Series (CNTS), IEP calculations

held a referendum on 22 March 2020 to change the constitution and allow himself a third term in office, sparking further protests that resulted in at least 30 deaths.⁹

Europe

Europe had the largest number of protests, riots and strikes, with nearly 1,600 events from 2011 to 2018. Sixty-five per cent of incidents of civil unrest in Europe were nonviolent anti-government demonstrations, while 28 per cent were classed as riots and 7.5 per cent were general strikes. Greece, the UK, France, Spain and Turkey each had more than 100 incidents.

Greece had the highest level of unrest, with over 200 events over the period. The country averaged 26 protests, riots or strikes each year. However, civil unrest as a whole declined 23 per cent from 2011 to 2018 as the country started to recover from the Global Financial Crisis.

The UK had 175 civil unrest events from 2011 to 2018. Civil unrest in the country peaked in 2015, following a rise in violent

demonstrations. Total unrest has declined since then, but the UK had more than 30 protests each year from 2015 to 2017.

In France, riots peaked in 2014, but protests surged again two years later in 2016. The country had moderate levels of unrest from 2016 to 2018, which increased again with the Yellow Vests Movement, which began its public demonstrations on 17 November 2018. The protests were still ongoing in France at the time of writing. The widespread movement follows a decade of political and economic unrest in the country.

In Spain, civil unrest spiked in 2012 and again in 2018. The province of Catalonia declared independence in October 2017, following demonstrations, a general strike, and a political stand-off with Madrid. The declaration was followed by protests and counter-protests for and against the movement. Unrest has continued into 2020, following the arrest and conviction of Catalan independence leaders charged with sedition and other crimes.¹⁰

Unrest in Turkey peaked in 2014, a year following the Gezi Park occupation. Beyond demonstrations in Istanbul, riots broke out as demonstrators in Kurdish cities called on the Turkish government to intervene on behalf of Kurdish Syrians besieged by ISIS on Turkey's border.¹¹ Turkey views Syrian Kurds as aligned with Kurdish separatists in Turkey.¹² Riots declined afterwards, but nonviolent demonstrations peaked in 2016, in the same year a coup attempt against President Tayyip Recep Erdogan led to protests, at first in support of the government, and then against Erdogan's emergency security measures.¹³

South Asia

South Asia also experienced high levels of civil unrest over the period, with events peaking in 2016. South Asia had the third highest number of demonstrations over the period. However, Bhutan was the only country in South Asia and one of just eight globally that recorded no incidents of civil unrest from 2011 to 2018.

India had the largest number of events over the decade, with more than 800 protests, riots and strikes recorded from 2011 to 2018. Civil unrest in India peaked in 2017, but every year from 2015 to 2018 had upwards of 100 events. India had the largest number of general strikes in the world, totalling 90. Over the entire period, only 21 per cent of all events were violent, but the country did see 50 riots in 2017.

Pakistan had the second highest number of incidents, at 165. Seventy-five per cent of these were nonviolent. More than 50 anti-government demonstrations took place in 2016, but civil unrest has fallen 64 per cent since then.

South America

Civil unrest in South America increased from a handful of events in 2011 to over 100 across the continent in 2018. Unrest in the region peaked in 2014, driven by the high number of events in Venezuela that year. South America had the second highest rate of violent demonstrations, at 34.6 per cent of total events.

Venezuela recorded the most civil unrest in South America over the period, with 126 riots, protests or general strikes. The country's economic and political crisis has led to protests over elections, shortages, violence in the country, and in support for and against President Nicolas Maduro's government.

Brazil, which had upward of 100 events over the period, also saw significant unrest in 2014, but the highest number of events was recorded in 2016, at 32. Millions of Brazilians demonstrated against corruption in the country over the course of the decade. In response to the demands of demonstrators in 2013, President Dilma Rousseff introduced anti-corruption and legal reforms that made it possible for prosecutors to investigate corruption.¹⁴ Three years later the money laundering investigation Operation Car Wash exposed over \$5 billion in illegal payments to company executives and political parties.¹⁵ The sweeping investigation caused a political crisis, against a backdrop of economic downturn, and provoked demonstrations from March 2015 to July 2016.

Chile recorded 90 civil unrest events over the period. This unrest continued in to 2019. Mass protests broke out in the capital, Santiago, in October over the hike in metro fares. The protest movement then spread to other parts of the country and quickly transformed into a nation-wide campaign against inequality. The movement was characterised by bouts of violence, looting and

unrest which resulted in the shutdown of shops and businesses, as well as disruptions to travel and activity. A state of emergency was declared in the early days of the protests and the accompanying violence had resulted in at least 25 deaths by end of 2019.

Central America and the Caribbean

Central America and the Caribbean had relatively low levels of civil unrest, with only the Russia and Eurasia region reporting fewer events. However, the number of incidents did rise over the past decade. In 2011, Haiti was the only country to record an incident of civil unrest, as demonstrators protested election inconsistencies in April of that year.¹⁶ By 2018, nine out of 12 countries were facing civil unrest, amounting to nearly 100 events in the region that year.

Nicaragua recorded the largest increase over the total period, rising from zero events in 2011 to 27 in 2018. Protests against social security reforms resulted in clashes with the police in April of 2018, and conflict between the government and opposition escalated over the following year. At least 325 people were killed and more than 700 people were imprisoned.¹⁷ The protest movement expanded into broader demonstrations against Daniel Ortega's presidency, demanding political reforms and the holding of early elections.

Mexico had the largest number of incidents over the period, with 85. A third of these took place in 2014, the year that 43 teaching students went missing in the state of Guerrero. The local mayor was implicated in collusion with organized crime, but despite the efforts of international teams of forensic investigators, the mass disappearance remains unsolved.

Asia-Pacific

Asia-Pacific recorded a 50 per cent rise in unrest from 2011 to 2018, but levels at the end of the period were down from the peak in 2016. China faced the most civil unrest in the region, accounting for 37.6 per cent of the 619 events. Outside of China, Asia-Pacific countries averaged about 21 demonstrations each from 2011 to 2018. No other country had more than 50 over the period.

As of 2018, events in China were down 50 per cent compared to 2011, with most of the drop off occurring in the last two years of the data. This is likely due to the strict controls introduced in Xinjiang Province since 2017, including the mass internment of Uighur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in the region. Unrest erupted in Xinjiang as early as 2014 – the same year that the Umbrella Revolution emerged in Hong Kong.

Russia and Eurasia

The Russia and Eurasia region had the least unrest over the period, recording just under 300 events from 2011 to 2018. A third of these, or 93 demonstrations and one strike, took place in Russia. A further 25 per cent were in Ukraine, with about half of Ukraine's 74 events occurring in 2014.

Moldova had the next highest total number, at 29, with all of them occurring since 2015. Roughly 10,000 demonstrators in May of that year called on the government to advance reforms that would bring the country closer to the EU, including investigating \$1 billion in missing funds.¹⁸

North America

The number of incidents in North America remained steady between 2008 and 2018 with the region averaging 64 incidences per year. North America consists of the US and Canada, which had 469 and 45 events respectively.

Unrest in Canada occurred mostly in 2017 and 2018. Indigenous Canadians staged demonstrations on the country's 150th anniversary, while protestors in Ottawa protested for months when plans for a Salvation Army shelter brought the country's homelessness problem to the fore. Environmental issues were the main theme in 2018, when protestors in Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver stood against the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline.

In the US, the number of civil unrest incidents rose slightly in 2015, but the single largest demonstration was the 2017 women's march. Demonstrations against police violence, particularly against African-Americans led to the rise of the *Black Lives Matter* movement, with incidences peaking in 2015.

Middle East & North Africa

MENA had the second highest number of events, after Europe, with the majority of the riots and protests occurring during the Arab Spring in 2011. MENA was the only world region to record a decline in civil unrest, with the number of demonstrations falling 60 per cent from 2011 to 2018. Nonviolent anti-government demonstrations declined by 68.9 per cent, while riots fell by half. Most of the decline occurred in 2012.

In 2011, 17 countries out of 20 had some level of civil unrest, with Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain and Tunisia recording the largest number of riots, protests or general strikes. Only Qatar, Palestine,

and the UAE were without major events, although authorities in Palestine and the UAE detained activists and dispersed demonstrations.¹⁹

Despite the crises and civil wars that followed many movements, the majority of civil unrest in MENA during 2011 was nonviolent. Violent demonstrations were highest in Egypt in 2011, with 36 per cent of events in Egypt that year involving violence.

Events continued throughout the region in 2012. However, by 2013, civil unrest had fallen 70 per cent. The largest decline was in Syria, which had 81 events in 2011, 33 in 2012 and just one in 2013 as the Syrian Revolution gave way to the Syrian Civil War.

The decline in demonstrations in MENA reflects the so-called Arab Winter. Leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were deposed or forced to step down by 2012, but only Tunisia avoided civil war, and all four countries were affected by the various conflicts in the region, including the war against ISIL. While the same volume of demonstrations was no longer possible, the region continued to average roughly 129 events per year through 2018.

Demonstrations in Egypt took many years to subside, while civil unrest rose and fell in Lebanon, and has hit Tunisia sporadically throughout the decade. Qatar remained relatively unaffected, and the UAE continued to record no major events.

TRENDS BY GOVERNMENT TYPE

BOX 2.2

Government Types

IEP uses the government type definitions provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), based on country scores from its annual Democracy Index.

The four types of regimes are defined as:

Full democracies: Countries in which basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected by the government, the people and the culture. Elections are free and fair. The government is generally well-functioning and mostly free from bias and corruption due to systems of checks and balances.

Flawed democracies: Countries in which elections are free and fair and basic civil liberties are respected. There may be significant weaknesses in other areas of

democracy, such as problems in governance, minimal political participation or infringement on media freedom.


Hybrid regimes: States that hold elections that are not necessarily free and fair. There may be widespread corruption and weak rule of law, with problems regarding government functioning, political culture and political participation. The media and the judiciary are likely to be under government influence.

Authoritarian regimes: Countries in which political pluralism is absent or severely limited, many of which can be characterised as dictatorships. Corruption, infringement of civil liberties, repression and censorship are common. The media and the judiciary are not independent of the ruling regime.

FIGURE 2.13

Civil unrest by government type, 2011 to 2018

The rate of civil unrest events per country increased tenfold in flawed democracies.



Source: Cross-National Time Series (CNTS), EIU, IEP calculations

Authoritarian regimes were the only type of government to register a fall in civil unrest. The largest number of incidences occurred in flawed democracies and hybrid regimes over the period 2011 to 2018. They also had the highest rates of violence, with riots making up 37 per cent of all incidents of unrest in hybrid regime countries.

Civil unrest also increased the most in flawed democracies, followed by hybrid regimes. Figure 2.13 gives the trends in total civil unrest by regime type. Events include riots, general strikes, and nonviolent anti-government demonstrations.

The rate of civil unrest in authoritarian regimes declined 30 per cent from 2011 to 2018, with the sharpest fall occurring during the 2012 Arab Winter. However, the trend rose substantially for the other three government types. The largest increase occurred in flawed democracies, where the rate of demonstrations increased tenfold. Levels nearly quadrupled in hybrid regime countries and nearly doubled in full democracies.

Coinciding with the increase in protests around the world, the strength of democratic institutions continued to fall, as shown in Figure 2.14. The average country score on the democracy index is now at its lowest point in 14 years.


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From 2011 to 2019, the number of riots, general strikes and anti-government demonstrations around the world increased by 244 per cent.

FIGURE 2.14

EIU democracy index average score, 2010–2019

As civil unrest has been increasing, democracy has been decreasing.




Source: EIU democracy index

Full democracies had moderate levels of unrest throughout the last decade, averaging 6.5 demonstrations per country per year. Although demonstrations in full democracies are common, they are less likely to be violent and much less likely to lead to major political instability or regime change. Peaceful protests made up 73.6 per cent of events in democracies, while riots and general strikes accounted for 22.3 and 4.1 per cent respectively. Figure 2.15 gives the distribution of events by government type.

FIGURE 2.15

Distribution of civil unrest by government type, 2011–2018

Hybrid regimes have the greatest relative prevalence of violent civil unrest.



Source: CNTS, IEP calculations

3 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

HIGHLIGHTS

- The global economic impact of violence was \$14.5 trillion PPP in 2019, equivalent to 10.6 per cent of global GDP or \$1,909 per person.
- The global economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row, decreasing by 0.2 per cent or \$29 billion from 2018 to 2019. However, it is \$1.25 trillion higher than what it was in 2012.
- The improvement was largely due to the decrease in the impact of *Armed Conflict* particularly in the Middle East and North Africa region.
- Globally the economic impact of *Armed Conflict* decreased by 11 per cent or \$66 billion in 2019 to \$521 billion. This was because of improvements in deaths from terrorism and GDP losses from conflict, which fell by 48 per cent and 21 per cent respectively.
- The major costs associated with *Armed Conflict* is refugees and displaced persons equating to 64 per cent of the total or \$333 billion.
- Syria, South Sudan and Afghanistan incurred the largest economic cost of violence in 2019 as a percentage of their GDP, equivalent to 60, 57 and 51 per cent of GDP, respectively.
- In the ten countries most economically affected by violence, the average economic cost was equivalent to 41 per cent of GDP. In the ten most peaceful countries the average economic cost was 3.9 per cent of GDP.
- The economic impact of *suicide* is higher than the economic cost of *Armed Conflict*, with *suicide* amounting to \$757 billion in 2019, whereas *Armed Conflict* was \$521 billion.
- On average, authoritarian regimes spend 3.7 per cent of GDP on military expenditure. This is 2.3 percentage points more than the average military expenditure of full democracies, which spend 1.4 per cent of GDP on average.

The Economic Value of Peace 2019



The economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2019 amounted to \$14.5 trillion in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This is equivalent to 10.6 per cent of the global GDP or \$1,909 per person. In 2019, the economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row, decreasing by 0.2 per cent or \$29 billion.

The economic model contains 16 dimensions, with some of these dimensions containing multiple components, such as internal security expenditure, which consists of police services, law courts, prisons, and other national public safety expenditures.

Violence and the fear of violence create significant economic disruptions. Violent incidents generate costs in the form of property damage, physical injury or psychological trauma. Fear of violence also alters economic behaviour, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns. Expenditure on preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence divert public and private resources away from productive activities and towards protective measures.

Combined, they generate significant economic losses in the form of productivity shortfalls, foregone earnings and distorted expenditure. Measuring the scale and cost of violence and violence containment, therefore, has important implications for assessing the effects violence has on economic activity.

TABLE 3.1

Composition of the global economic impact of violence, billions PPP, 2019

Military Expenditure accounts for the highest percentage of the economic impact of violence.

INDICATOR	DIRECT COSTS	INDIRECT COSTS	THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT	TOTAL
Conflict deaths	5.4		5.4	10.9
Fear		70.3		70.3
GDP losses		98.3		98.3
Homicide	96.9	927.4	96.9	1,121.2
Incarceration	72.3		72.3	144.6
Internal security expenditure	2,401.5		2,401.5	4,803.0
Military expenditure	2,942.3		2,942.3	5,884.6
Peacebuilding	25.7		25.7	51.5
Peacekeeping	6.3		6.3	12.6
Private security	403.9		403.9	807.9
Refugees and IDPs	3.8	325.1	3.8	332.7
Small arms	4.6		4.6	9.2
Suicide	1.0	755.2	1.0	757.3
Terrorism	1.3	12.3	1.3	14.9
Violent crime	31.2	347.5	31.2	410.0
Total	5,996.4	2,536.2	5,996.4	14,528.9

Source: IEP

The total economic impact is broken down into three categories: direct costs, indirect costs, and a multiplier effect.

The direct costs associated with violence include the immediate consequences on the victims, perpetrators, and public systems including health, judicial and public safety. The indirect cost of violence refers to longer-term costs such as lost productivity, psychological effects and the impact of violence on the perception of safety and security in society.

The multiplier effect represents the economic benefits that would be generated by the diversion of expenditure away from sunk costs, such as incarceration spending, into more productive alternatives that would better improve the economy. For more details on the peace multiplier refer to Box 3.1 on page 51.

A summary of the methodology is provided at the end of this section and a comprehensive explanation of how the economic impact of violence is calculated is provided in Appendix B.

Table 3.1 presents a full breakdown of the costs included in the 2019 economic impact estimate.

In 2019, reductions in armed conflict underpinned the 0.2 per cent year-on-year decrease in the economic impact of violence. The fall in *Armed Conflict* in the Middle East and North Africa resulted in positive flow-on effects not only for conflict deaths, but also for the costs associated with *refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)* and *terrorism*, all of which fell in 2019.

This is the second year in a row recording a decrease in the economic impact of violence, after five straight years of rising costs. Between 2012 and 2017, the economic impact of violence rose by 10.2 per cent, increasing each year. Consequently, in 2019, the economic impact of violence is \$1.25 trillion higher than in 2012. This increase coincided with the start of the Syrian war and rising violence in Libya, Yemen and other parts of the MENA region. The decreases coincided with the defeat of ISIL in both Iraq and Syria, which led to an improvement in the security situation in both countries in the past two years.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the trend in the global economic impact of violence from 2007 to 2019. Table 3.2 presents the trend from 2015 to 2019 for each indicator.


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The global economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row, decreasing by 0.2 per cent or \$29 billion from 2018 to 2019.

FIGURE 3.1

Trend in the global economic impact of violence, 2007–2019

The de-escalation of conflicts, particularly in the MENA region, contributed to the 1.8 per cent decline in the global economic impact of violence from 2017.



GLOBAL ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

10.2%

From 2012 until 2017, the economic impact of violence rose by 10.2 per cent and is now \$1.25 trillion higher than what it was in 2012.

Source: IEP

TABLE 3.2

Change in the economic impact of violence, billions PPP, 2015–2019

The economic impact of terrorism decreased by 48 per cent over the last year.

INDICATOR	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	CHANGE (BILLIONS) 2018-2019	CHANGE (%) 2018-2019
Conflict deaths	25.6	22.6	19.8	16.2	10.9	-5.4	-33%
Fear	77.6	74.9	75.5	75.3	70.3	-5.0	-7%
GDP losses	113.8	160.9	167.2	124.5	98.3	-26.2	-21%
Homicide	1,112.1	1,101.1	1,115.3	1,126.4	1,121.2	-5.2	-0.5%
Incarceration	140.7	142.1	142.1	151.6	144.6	-7.1	-5%
Internal security expenditure	4,095.0	4,495.5	4,790.4	4,780.7	4,803.0	22.2	0.5%
Military expenditure	5,700.4	6,003.5	5,914.2	5,835.0	5,884.6	49.6	1%
Peacebuilding	46.5	45.9	46.6	49.4	51.5	2.1	4%
Peacekeeping	19.2	18.1	26.8	25.6	12.6	-13.0	-51%
Private security	768.9	869.0	881.4	829.8	807.9	-21.9	-3%
Refugees and IDPs	400.5	411.7	395.2	342.1	332.7	-9.4	-3%
Small arms	9.5	10.2	10.0	9.5	9.2	-0.3	-3%
Suicide	720.5	730.5	745.4	753.2	757.3	4.1	0.5%
Terrorism	61.8	52.8	55.2	28.8	14.9	-13.9	-48%
Violent crime	396.1	404.9	410.9	409.4	410.0	0.6	0.1%
TOTAL	13,688.4	14,543.6	14,796.0	14,557.6	14,528.9	-28.7	-0.2%

Source: IEP

COMPOSITION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE


Figure 3.2 shows the breakdown of the total economic impact of violence by category. The single largest component was global *military expenditure* at \$5.9 trillion PPP, or 40.5 per cent of the total in 2019. Globally, *military expenditure* increased by one per cent in 2019, the equivalent of \$49.6 billion, however, this increase was primarily driven by increases from the United States, China, and India. In 2019 more countries increased their military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, with 81 countries increasing, while 55 countries reduced spending. The \$49.6 billion increase in the economic impact of *military expenditure* was the largest increase of all the indicators.

Internal security expenditure was the second largest component, comprising 34.1 per cent of the global economic impact of violence, at \$4.8 trillion. *Internal security expenditure* includes spending on the police and judicial systems as well as the costs associated with incarceration. The data for internal security spending is obtained from the International Monetary Fund government finance statistics database.

FIGURE 3.2

Breakdown of the global economic impact of violence, 2019

Government spending on the military and internal security comprises almost three-quarters of the global economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP

Homicide is the third largest component in the model, at 7.7 per cent and fell by 0.5 per cent in 2019. The fall in the economic impact of *homicide* has been driven by improvements in many national homicide rates. Russia and the United States both had significant reductions, each recording a \$13 billion decline from 2018. However, the improvements in many of the countries were offset by the deterioration in Mexico's impact from homicide which increased by \$30 billion, the highest increase of any country.

Suicide, classified as self-inflicted violence resulting in death by the World Health Organisation, is included in the model. The economic impact of suicide amounted to \$757.3 billion in 2019 and represents 5.2 per cent of the global total. The economic cost of suicide is higher than that of all of the *Armed Conflict* indicators combined.

The largest improvement in monetary terms was for the impact of *Armed Conflict*, which decreased by 11 per cent or \$66 billion. The impact of *Armed Conflict* consists of five categories:

- *Internal and external conflict deaths.*
- *GDP losses from conflict.*
- *Country contributions to peacebuilding and peacekeeping.*
- *Refugees and IDPs.*
- *Deaths and injuries from terrorism.*

All five categories improved from 2018, with the economic impact of *terrorism* recording the largest percentage improvement, falling by 48 per cent or \$14.9 billion. *GDP losses* and the economic impact of *conflict deaths*, decreased by 21 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. The economic impact from *refugees and IDPs* also recorded a decline falling by 5.6 per cent from 2018, the equivalent of \$19.4 billion.

The economic impact of *violent crime* slightly deteriorated in 2019, increasing by 0.1 per cent to \$410 billion. *Violent crime* consists of violent assault and sexual assault, and makes up 2.8 per cent of the total economic impact of violence. The countries that recorded the biggest increases in 2019 were Lesotho, Djibouti and Eritrea, these countries are all located in sub-Saharan Africa and increased by 11 per cent, six per cent and five per cent respectively.

Expenditure on *private security* is the fourth largest category in the model and comprises 5.8 per cent of the total.

The purchases of small arms and the economic impact from the *fear of violence and insecurity* are categorised as 'Other' in Figure 3.2. In 2019 these indicators accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the total.


THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, SUICIDE AND ARMED CONFLICT

IEP's model includes domains of both *Interpersonal Violence and Self-inflicted Violence*, and *Armed Conflict*. Interpersonal Violence, such as violent assault and *homicide* are violence committed by individuals or organised criminal activities. Interpersonal and self-inflicted violence is the aggregate of *homicide*, violent and sexual assault and *suicide*. The indicators of *Armed Conflict* are listed above.

FIGURE 3.3

Composition of the economic impact of Interpersonal Violence and Self-inflicted Violence, 2019

Homicide comprises almost half of the global economic impact of *Interpersonal Violence and Self-inflicted Violence*.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.4

Breakdown of the global economic impact of Armed Conflict, 2019

Forced displacement accounts for nearly two thirds of the global economic impact of *Armed Conflict*.



Source: IEP

In 2019, *Interpersonal Violence and Self-inflicted Violence* amounted to \$2.33 trillion. Figure 3.3 provides a detailed breakdown of the economic impact of *Interpersonal Violence and Self-inflicted Violence* while Figure 3.4 details the breakdown of *Armed Conflict*.

THE TEN COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST ECONOMIC IMPACT

The economic cost of violence for the ten most affected countries ranges from 24 to 60 per cent of their GDP. These countries have high levels of armed conflict, large numbers of internally displaced persons, high levels of interpersonal violence or large militaries. Table 3.3 lists the ten most affected countries as a percentage of GDP.

TABLE 3.3

The ten countries with the highest economic cost of violence, percentage of GDP, 2019

In Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan, the economic cost of violence was equivalent to more than 50 per cent of GDP.

COUNTRY	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Syria	60%
South Sudan	57%
Afghanistan	51%
Venezuela	48%
Somalia	38%
Central African Republic	38%
North Korea	34%
Cyprus	31%
Iraq	26%
Sudan	24%

Source: IEP

High-intensity conflict-affected countries, such as Syria, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and the Central African Republic, suffer from higher costs from *conflict deaths*, *terrorism*, *losses from refugees and IDPs* and *GDP losses from conflict*. Additionally, Iraq and Sudan – countries affected by medium-intensity conflict – suffer similar conflict costs, in particular, *losses from refugees and IDPs*. Venezuela is affected by high institutional and social fragility and in terms of GDP suffered the largest percentage cost from *homicide* globally, equal to 32 per cent of its GDP.

THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Regionally, Asia-Pacific recorded the highest economic impact at \$3,399 billion in 2019. Asia-Pacific's high economic impact was due to the high levels of expenditure on *internal security* and *the military*, which in 2019 made up 82 per cent of the region's total economic impact. Asia-Pacific also has the largest population of all regions. Table 3.4 displays the military expenditure in the Asia-Pacific by country.

Similarly, in North America, *internal security* and *military expenditure* comprise 80 per cent of the region's economic impact.

Figure 3.5 displays the total 2019 economic impact by region and the percentage change in the economic impact from 2018. In 2019, four regions improved – MENA, Middle East and North Africa in the listed regions recorded the largest improvement from 2018, declining by 6.5 per cent. The improvement in MENA was driven by the reduction in *Armed Conflict* which fell by 25.6 per cent.

In 2019, the economic impact deteriorated in five regions. Central America and the Caribbean suffered the largest increase, however, it is also the region with the lowest economic impact, equal to \$456 billion. Central America and the Caribbean's increase was driven by the deterioration in its economic impact of homicide, which increased by 18.5 per cent from 2018.

TABLE 3.4

Military expenditure in the Asia-Pacific, 2019

The military expenditure of China is higher than all the other countries in Asia-Pacific combined.

Country	Military Expenditure (Total, \$US Billions)	Military Expenditure (Per Capita, \$US)	Military Expenditure (% of GDP)
China	\$250.0	\$176.7	1.8%
Japan	\$46.6	\$366.5	0.9%
South Korea	\$43.1	\$841.8	2.6%
Australia	\$26.7	\$1,078.3	1.9%
Singapore	\$10.8	\$1,871.8	3.0%
Taiwan	\$10.7	\$452.2	1.8%
Indonesia	\$7.4	\$27.9	0.7%
Thailand	\$6.8	\$98.7	1.3%
Vietnam	\$5.5	\$57.0	2.1%
North Korea	\$4.2	\$165.8	24.0%
Philippines	\$3.8	\$35.4	1.1%
Malaysia	\$3.5	\$108.3	0.9%
New Zealand	\$2.3	\$476.4	1.1%
Myanmar (Burma)	\$2.0	\$37.7	3.1%
Cambodia	\$0.5	\$33.4	2.0%
Mongolia	\$0.1	\$30.8	0.7%
Papua New Guinea	\$0.1	\$7.2	0.3%
Laos	\$0.0	\$3.3	0.1%
Timor-Leste	\$0.0	\$15.6	0.7%


Source: IEP

KEY FINDINGS

GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

The global economic impact of violence was \$14.5 trillion PPP in 2019, equivalent to 10.6 per cent of global GDP, or \$1,909 per person.

 **\$1,909** OR
PER PERSON



TEN MOST VS LEAST AFFECTED COUNTRIES

41% vs **3.9%**
AVG GDP vs AVG GDP

In the ten countries most economically affected by violence, the average economic cost was equivalent to 41 per cent of GDP. In the ten most peaceful countries the average economic cost was 3.9 per cent of GDP.


GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT

Globally the economic impact of armed conflict decreased by 11 per cent or \$66 billion in 2019 to \$521 billion.

FIGURE 3.5

Total economic impact and percentage change by region, 2019

Five of the nine GPI regions suffered an increase in their economic impact of violence from 2018.



Source: IEP

The composition of violence varies substantially by region, as shown in Figure 3.6. The greatest variation between regions is the relative impact of military expenditure. This represents 57 per cent of the economic impact for the MENA region and only eight per cent in the Central America and Caribbean region, a difference of 49 percentage points.

The next largest variation is in the violent crime, homicide and


suicide category, which varied from 40 per cent of the regional composition in Central America and the Caribbean to four per cent in the MENA region.

Internal security expenditure also varies significantly by region. Europe and Asia-Pacific have the highest percentage, at 48 and 45 per cent respectively. At 28 per cent, South America has the lowest proportion of all regions derived from *internal security*.

FIGURE 3.6

Composition of regional economic cost of violence, 2019

At the regional level, military expenditure accounts for between eight and 57 per cent of the economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP

SPENDING ON MILITARY AND INTERNAL SECURITY

The per person *military expenditure* and *internal security* are highest in MENA and North America, while Central America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa spend the least as shown in Figure 3.7. On average, countries in sub-Saharan Africa spend 15 times less on violence containment than MENA and North America. It should be noted that higher expenditure, especially for *internal security*, would be expected in higher-income countries given the higher wages and better-equipped security and judicial systems.

Table 3.5 highlights the ten countries with the highest *military expenditure* for 2019 as a total, per capita, and as a percentage of GDP. The United States spends the most of any country annually on its military, however, from a per person perspective, the United States is only the third-largest spender, spending \$1,986 per person, the equivalent of two per cent of its GDP. The countries

with the highest per person spending are the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia which both spend over \$2,000 per citizen on their militaries, the most of any country.


There is considerable variation in military expenditure by government type. Figure 3.8 displays the trend in the average *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP by government types. Since 2000, fully democratic countries spend the least on military as a percentage of GDP, equivalent to 1.4 per cent of GDP. Countries under authoritarian regimes on average spend the most on their military, averaging 3.7 per cent of GDP.

Since 2000, the average *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP has fallen across all four government types. Both authoritarian regimes and flawed democracies have reduced their average expenditure by 0.5 percentage points since 2000. This is followed by full democracies at 0.3 percentage points and hybrid regimes by 0.2 percentage points.

FIGURE 3.7

Per capita containment spending (military and internal security) by region, 2019

Per capita violence containment spending is 15 times higher in MENA than sub-Saharan Africa.



Source: IEP

TABLE 3.5

Military expenditure: Total, per capita and percentage of GDP, 2019

Country	Military Expenditure (Total, \$US Billions)	Country	Military Expenditure (Per Capita, \$US)	Country	Military Expenditure (% of GDP)
United States	\$649.1	United Arab Emirates	\$2,384.83	North Korea*	24.0%
China	\$250.0	Saudi Arabia	\$2,013.29	Libya	11.4%
Saudi Arabia	\$67.6	United States	\$1,986.33	Syria	11.1%
India	\$66.5	Israel	\$1,886.56	Afghanistan	10.2%
France	\$63.8	Singapore	\$1,871.75	Iraq	9.1%
Russia	\$61.4	Kuwait	\$1,738.40	Oman	8.8%
United Kingdom	\$50.0	Oman	\$1,389.25	Saudi Arabia	8.7%
Germany	\$49.5	Norway	\$1,320.12	Palestinian Territories	8.2%
Japan	\$46.6	Australia	\$1,078.30	Yemen	5.7%
South Korea	\$43.1	France	\$978.02	United Arab Emirates	5.6%


Source: IEP

Note: *estimated

FIGURE 3.8

Average military expenditure by government type, 2000–2019

As a percentage of GDP, full democracies on average spend 2.3 percentage points less than authoritarian regimes on their military.



Source: SIPRI, EIU, IEP Calculations

“

On average, authoritarian regimes spend 3.7 per cent of GDP on military expenditure. This is 2.3 percentage points more than the average military expenditure of full democracies, which spend 1.4 per cent of GDP on average.

”



Methodology at a glance

The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effects related to “containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence.” The estimate includes the direct and indirect costs of violence, as well as an economic multiplier. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided.

Expenditure on containing violence is economically efficient when it prevents violence for the least amount of spending. However, spending beyond an optimal level has the potential to constrain a nation’s economic growth. Therefore, achieving the right levels of spending on public services such as the military, judicial and security is important for the most productive use of capital.

This study includes two types of costs: direct and indirect. Examples of direct costs include medical costs for victims of violent crime, capital destruction from violence and costs associated with security and judicial systems. Indirect costs include lost wages or productivity due to physical and emotional trauma. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behaviour.¹

An important aspect of IEP’s estimation is the international comparability of the country estimates, thereby allowing cost/benefit analysis of country interventions. The methodology uses constant purchasing power parity international dollars which allows for the costs of various countries to be compared with one another.

IEP estimates the economic impact of violence by comprehensively aggregating the costs related to violence, armed conflict and spending on military and internal security services. The GPI is the initial point of reference for developing the estimates.

The 2019 version of the economic impact of violence includes 18 variables in three groups.

The analysis presents conservative estimates of the global economic impact of violence. The estimation only includes variables of violence for which reliable data could be obtained. The following are examples of some of the items not counted in the economic impact of violence:

- the cost of crime to business
- judicial system expenditure
- domestic violence
- household out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
- spillover effects from conflict and violence.

The total economic impact of violence includes the following components:

- 1. Direct costs** are the cost of violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government. These include direct expenditures, such as the cost of policing, military and medical expenses.
- 2. Indirect costs** accrue after the violent event and include indirect economic losses, physical and psychological trauma to the victim and lost productivity.
- 3. The multiplier effect** represents the flow-on effects of direct costs, such as the additional economic benefits that would come from investment in business development or education, instead of the less productive costs of containing or dealing with violence. Box 3.1 provides a detailed explanation of the peace multiplier used.

TABLE 3.6

Variables included in the economic impact of violence, 2019

SECURITY SERVICES AND PREVENTION ORIENTED COSTS	ARMED CONFLICT RELATED COSTS	INTERPERSONAL AND SELF-INFLICTED VIOLENCE
1. Military expenditure	1. Direct costs of deaths from internal violent conflict	1. Homicide
2. Internal security expenditure	2. Direct costs of deaths from external violent conflict	2. Violent assault
3. Security agency	3. Indirect costs of violent conflict (GDP losses due to conflict)	3. Sexual assault
4. Private security	4. Losses from status as refugees and IDPs	4. Fear of crime
5. UN peacekeeping	5. Small arms imports	5. Indirect costs of incarceration
6. ODA peacebuilding expenditure	6. Terrorism	6. Suicide



The term **economic impact of violence** covers the combined effect of direct and indirect costs and the multiplier effect, while the **economic cost of violence** represents the direct and indirect cost of violence. When a country avoids the economic impact of violence, it realises a **peace dividend**.

BOX 3.1

The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, describing the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy lead to more spending which, in turn, creates employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the “multiplier effect” and is the reason that a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence. This decrease in violence has substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as money spent on medical treatments or funerals, could be

spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits by preserving the lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits from greater peace can therefore be significant. This was also noted by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009), who argued that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. More



A dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for establishing and running businesses. Consequently, with greater levels of violence it is likely that we might expect lower levels of employment and economic productivity over the long-term, as the incentives faced discourage new employment creation and longer-term investment.

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every dollar saved on violence containment, there will be an additional dollar of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with academic studies.

4 POSITIVE PEACE



KEY FINDINGS

- The COVID-19 pandemic will cause substantial changes in how society operates and business is conducted in most countries.
- Positive Peace offers a framework for interpreting and describing the COVID-19 crisis.
- OCED countries with greater development in the *Well-Functioning Government* and *High Levels of Human Capital* Pillars have been able to test a higher proportion of their population for the COVID-19 virus.
- The crisis and the social isolation response are expected to send a large number of countries into recession in 2020. The travel and tourism industries are likely to incur severe contractions.
- Other industries affected are hospitality, retail trade, mineral resources, education, recreation, energy and shipping.
- Countries with strong Positive Peace have higher resilience to absorb, adapt and recover from shocks, such as COVID-19 and the ensuing recession.
- Nations that are more likely to recover relatively quickly from the crisis are those which combine low levels of public debt with strong performance in the *Well-Functioning Government* Pillar.

Overview



Humanity is currently facing one of the most serious crises in recent history. The tragic loss of life and abrupt economic disruption engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic will cause lasting changes in how society operates and business is conducted. Responsiveness and adaptability will determine which countries perform best through this period.

Positive Peace offers a framework for interpreting this pandemic and assessing the interconnectedness between events, responses, perceptions and beliefs. Positive Peace can not only help us understand what is happening now, but can also shine a light on how to best prepare society for future shocks.

The impact of COVID-19 will only be fully known many years from now. However, anecdotal evidence combined with some leading indicators and early forecasts suggest that the pandemic has caused a humanitarian and economic crisis not seen since the mid twentieth century. No other pandemic has created the same level of social disruption globally. No other economic crisis since the Great Depression has been more acute.

Positive Peace is a comprehensive and logical frame of reference to assess this crisis. It helps authorities and stakeholders identify weaknesses and bottlenecks relating to the pandemic and the post-pandemic recovery plans. The dynamic relationships between the Pillars of Positive Peace offers insights into how best to revive economies and prepare for other future shocks.

This section also discusses how countries with high levels of Positive Peace were better prepared to respond to the crisis. The follow on effects from the pandemic will have a significant impact on global peace. Countries that are higher in Positive Peace will be better prepared to manage these effects.

What is Positive Peace?



Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies*. The same factors also lead to many other desirable socio-economic outcomes. Higher levels of Positive Peace are statistically linked to greater income growth, better environmental outcomes, higher levels of wellbeing, better developmental outcomes and stronger resilience.

IEP has empirically derived the Positive Peace Index (PPI) through the analysis of almost 25,000 economic and social progress indicators to determine which ones have statistically significant relationships with peace as measured by the Global Peace Index (GPI).

FIGURE 4.1

What is Positive Peace?

Positive Peace is a complementary concept to negative peace.



THE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PEACE

Positive Peace is predicated on eight key factors, or Pillars, that describe the workings of the socio-economic system:

WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT

A well-functioning government delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law.

SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

The strength of economic conditions as well as the formal institutions that support the operation of the private sector. Business competitiveness and economic productivity are both associated with the most peaceful countries.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

Peaceful countries often have formal laws that guarantee basic human rights and freedoms, and the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviours of citizens.

GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

Peaceful relations with other countries are as important as good relations between groups within a country. Countries with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend to be more politically stable, have better functioning governments, are regionally integrated and have lower levels of organised internal conflict.

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

Free and independent media disseminates information in a way that leads to greater knowledge and helps individuals, businesses and civil society make better decisions. This leads to better outcomes and more rational responses in times of crisis.

HIGH LEVELS OF HUMAN CAPITAL

A skilled human capital base reflects the extent to which societies educate citizens and promote the development of knowledge, thereby improving economic productivity, care for the young, political participation and social capital.

LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION

In societies with high levels of corruption, resources are inefficiently allocated, often leading to a lack of funding for essential services and civil unrest. Low corruption can enhance confidence and trust in institutions.


EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources such as education, health, and to a lesser extent, equity in income distribution.

FIGURE 4.2

The Pillars of Positive Peace

All eight Pillars are highly interconnected and interact in complex ways.



The Pillars of Positive Peace interact systemically to support a society's *attitudes, institutions and structures* that underpin development and peacebuilding. High levels of Positive Peace occur where attitudes make violence less tolerated, institutions are resilient and more responsive to society's needs and structures create the environment for the nonviolent resolution of grievances.

The Pillars also offer a practical framework for the implementation of small-scale Positive Peace projects. In cooperation with its global partners, IEP implements and supports a number of projects in local communities around the world using the Pillars of Positive Peace as the main framework to plan action and design measurement.



Positive Peace and the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic is a ‘once in a hundred years’ event and its full socio-economic impact may not be known for many months or even years.¹ Positive Peace is a useful framework to start this analysis, as it helps interpret and describe the systemic nature of nation states.

While comprehensive data covering the period of the crisis is still being collected and processed, the Pillars of Peace offer an initial qualitative assessment of how well-prepared societies are to deal

with the impact of COVID-19. This includes potential risks to global peacefulness and how Positive Peace can help countries recover from the shock.

The crisis is still in development, but many of the positive attributes of Positive Peace are important to facilitating countries’ responses to COVID-19. Table 4.1 shows a generalisation of how the Pillars of Peace have been affected and responded to COVID-19.

TABLE 4.1

The Pillars of peace and COVID-19

The Pillars of Positive Peace have been affected in different ways by the pandemic and measures to contain it.

PILLARS	ACTION
High Levels of Human Capital	COVID-19 spreads among populations and threatens to increase stress on the health system.
Well-Functioning Government	Flights are gradually banned.
Free Flow of Information	Public announcements are communicated on the disease and preventative measures.
Well-Functioning Government and High Levels of Human Capital	Governments shut down schools.
Sound Business Environment	Businesses are placed under pressure as more people stay indoors.
Well-Functioning Government	Produces stimulus packages to support Sound Business Environment and maintain High Levels of Human Capital.
Acceptance of the Rights of Others	Individuals accept the rights of others in communal areas through social distancing and avoiding stockpiling.
Equitable Distribution of Resources	The private health care system prepares Intensive Care Units for the public and government boosts social service expenditure.
Sound Business Environment	Employers allow employees to work from home where possible, but many workers are furloughed or laid off. Unemployment rates surpass 10% in some countries.
Good Relations With Neighbours	Images are projected across the world of balcony communities forming in Italy during enforced lockdowns. Communities adopt new ways to remain connected through online platforms and social media.
Well-Functioning Government	Starts locking down non-essential activity to flatten the curve.
Well-Functioning Government	Starts redirecting industry to manufacture essential medical equipment.
Low Levels of Corruption	Low Levels of Corruption provides the trust between citizen and state required for societal stresses not to escalate.
Low Levels of Corruption	State and Federal governments flow information to citizens to remain accountable and transparent.

Source: IEP

COVID-19 IN CONTEXT

The number of deaths caused by COVID-19 rose sharply early in 2020 and the pandemic surpassed H1N1/09 (swine flu) as the most lethal outbreak of the 21st century, as shown in Table 4.2.

Although COVID-19 it is not the first global pandemic of the 21st century, it is unusual given its high speed of propagation and deadliness. Epidemics and pandemics tend to more heavily affect countries with low to medium socio-economic development. However, COVID-19 is similar to HIV/AIDS, SARS and H1N1/09 in that it is also seriously affecting developed countries.

TABLE 4.2

Largest epidemics of the 21st century

Eleven out of the 18 most severe epidemics of the century took place exclusively in regions with low to medium Positive Peace.

EPIDEMIC	START	COUNTRY OR REGIONS AFFECTED	NUMBER OF DEATHS	COUNTRY OR REGION'S POSITIVE PEACE LEVEL
COVID-19	2019	Worldwide	>300,000*	All
H1N1/09 (swine flu)	2009	North America, parts of Asia and Africa	>18,000	All
Ebola	2013	West Africa	>11,300	Low to medium
Cholera	2010	Haiti	>10,000	Low
Measles	2019	D.R. Congo	>5,000	Low
Measles	2011	D. R. Congo	>4,500	Low
Cholera	2008	Zimbabwe	4,293	Low
Cholera	2016	Yemen	>3,800	Low
Ebola	2018	D.R. Congo, Uganda	2,253	Low, medium
Dengue	2019	Asia-Pacific, Latin America	>2,000	Low to high
Meningitis	2009	West Africa	931	Low to medium
MERS-CoV	2012	MENA	862	Low to high
SARS	2002	East Asia and Canada	774	High to very high
Cholera	2001	Nigeria, South Africa	>400	Low, high
Yellow Fever	2016	Angola, D.R. Congo	393	Low
Dengue	2011	Pakistan	>350	Low
Chikungunya	2013	Latin America	183	Low to high
Yellow Fever	2012	Sudan	>171	Low
Selected 20th Century Pandemics				
HIV/AIDS	1980s	Worldwide	32 million ²	All
Spanish Flu	1918	Worldwide	50 million ³	All

Source: Sen Nag (2018)⁴; Gholipour (2013)⁵; World Health Organization Country Profiles and Situation Reports; Worldometer; Pan-American Health Organization; Press Trust of India; Center for Disease Control and Prevention; BBC News; IEP.

Notes: *Data as at mid May 2020.

Among OECD countries, there is some relationship between the fatality rates of COVID-19 and the age profile of the populations as seen in Figure 4.3. Countries with greater proportions of older citizens tend to record higher fatality rates. This corroborates epidemiological findings that the elderly are more vulnerable to this particular infection.^{8,7} Outside the OECD, other factors may influence COVID-19 lethality, such as levels of poverty, access to health care, the quality of the health system and the ability of authorities to implement social distancing. Additional traits of this pandemic are that it affects men more pronouncedly than women and the rate of infection appears to be higher in colder climates (around +4°C and humidity between 20 per cent and 80 per cent).^{8,9,10,11}

RESPONDING TO A PANDEMIC


The *Epidemiological Curve* is a visual representation of the total number of cases during an epidemic over time, as per Figure 4.4. The greater the contagion power of an epidemic, the more cases will be contracted in its onset and the steeper will be the initial upswing in the curve. The red line represents the capacity of the health system to treat patients who contract the disease.

If no attempt is made to tackle the pandemic, the speed at which total cases increase will mean that there will quickly be more patients than the health system can handle, leading to an increase in the number of patients who don't receive treatment, and a subsequent increase in the death rate.

FIGURE 4.3

Covid-19 fatalities and population age, OECD countries

There is some relationship between the age profile of populations and fatality rates of COVID-19.



COVID-19 IN CONTEXT


Among OECD countries, there is some relationship between the fatality rates of COVID-19 and the age profile of the population.

Source: OECD; Worldometer
Note: *Aggregate data as at 10 April 2020

FIGURE 4.4

The impact of Positive Peace on a pandemic response

Positive Peace can both help 'flatten the curve' and increase health system capacity over time.



Positive Peace helps to flatten the epidemiological curve as Positive Peace is a measure of a society's ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Two Pillars, *Well-Functioning Government* and *High Levels of Human Capital* serve as an example, although all eight Pillars are important.

Firstly, The *Well-Functioning Government* Pillar allows authorities to act quickly to enforce border lockdowns, quarantine regimes, isolation schemes, banning certain gatherings and other measures to curtail the rate of infections. This has the effect of 'flattening' the epidemiological curve. It is also associated with having a more robust health system.

Secondly, a combination of *Well-Functioning Government* and *High Levels of Human Capital* means that authorities can increase the testing and treatment capacity by diverting public and private resources to the treatment of the pandemic.¹² This has the effect of increasing health-system capacity. The combined effect of both interventions is a reduction in the severity of the pandemic.

The other Pillars are also important as they underpin trust in authorities and promote social cohesion. For example, *Equitable Distribution of Resources* and *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*

guarantee that all citizens regardless of social status or ethnicity have access to health services. *Sound Business Environment* and *Low Levels of Corruption* make sure that the economy has enough resources to support the health system and that isolation regimes are equitable and adhered to. In general, all Pillars support the capacity of the socio-economic system to mitigate the impact of a shock such as this pandemic.

Highlighting the importance of Positive Peace, its *Well-Functioning Government* and *High Levels of Human Capital* Pillars are associated with more robust responses to the pandemic. OECD countries with greater development in these Pillars have been able to test a higher proportion of their population for the COVID-19 virus, as shown in Figure 4.5.

However, high levels of Positive Peace alone will not provide every solution for reducing the severity of a pandemic. For example, one


dilemma epidemiologists face is that by imposing strict quarantine and lock-down regimes, they slow down the upswing in cases but also reduce the rate at which the population develops immunity through contact with the virus, thus slowing or preventing herd immunity. This means that under intense social isolation, the epidemiological curve would have a low peak but a long right-side tail, or even secondary outbreaks.

On the other hand, by relaxing isolation regimes and allowing greater exposure to the virus, herd immunity may be achieved more quickly. In this situation, the epidemiological curve is high but narrow. However, this strategy does not take into account the human consequences of high death rates and the fear and emotional trauma emanating from these actions.

FIGURE 4.5

Government effectiveness and human capital

Greater development in *Well-Functioning Government* and *High Levels of Human Capital* allowed authorities to test larger proportions of their populations.



Source: IEP; Worldometer
Note: *Aggregate data as at 10 April 2020

THE EXPECTED IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON POSITIVE PEACE

While it is too soon to know the full extent of the long-term effects of COVID-19 on the world, some developments had an almost immediate impact on countries' levels of Positive Peace. The high number of fatalities is a tragedy in itself, but the measures taken to confront and contain the pandemic are also having an extremely severe economic impact.

With lockdown schemes widely adopted, there have been marked declines in urban movement by March 2020, compared with the end-2019 reference level, as shown in Figure 4.6. If urban movement can be taken as a proxy for commercial activity, it is clear that business activity and economic output will contract substantially in the first half of 2020 and well beyond.


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OECD countries with greater development in the Well-Functioning Government and High Levels of Human Capital Pillars have been able to test a higher proportion of their population for the COVID-19 virus.

FIGURE 4.6

Changes in urban movements by city, March and April 2020

Movement in some European capitals virtually stopped altogether.



Note: Citymapper


The *Good Relations With Neighbours* Pillar has also been affected by the crisis. Figure 4.7 shows that there has been a widespread decline in air travel in 2020, with the global scheduled capacity – the number of available seats on scheduled flights – falling by 60 per cent over the year to April. This figure likely underestimates the true contraction in air travel because many planes are taking off with large numbers of empty seats. In China, scheduled

capacity had fallen by almost 70 per cent by mid-February, but it has since started to recover. The contraction in Italy and Spain came around one month later but stopped virtually all air travel in those countries. It is unlikely that the travel and tourism industry will recover until a vaccine is found for COVID-19 and the looming recession has passed.

FIGURE 4.7

Changes in scheduled air travel capacity, 2020

Global scheduled air travel capacity had fallen 60 per cent by April 2020.



Source: Official Aviation Guide

Other developments clearly indicate further adverse impacts on the indicators of Positive Peace:

International Tourism

The level of international tourism has collapsed in the first half of 2020. The cessation of tourism will have a negative impact on the global economy in 2020. The OECD estimates that tourism makes up 4.4 per cent of member countries' GDP and 21.5 per cent of their service exports, as shown in Table 4.3.

Hypothetically, if tourism were to stop completely for four months in 2020, this disruption would detract 1.5 percentage points from annual GDP growth and 7.2 percentage points from service export growth. Adding these two negative contributions (and accounting for service exports comprising 6.8 per cent of OECD GDP), the shutting down of tourism activity would detract two percentage points from annual GDP growth in the OECD. This means that if OECD GDP were to grow in 2020 by 2.3 per cent, as it did in 2018, the collapse of tourism alone could cut this number down to 0.3 per cent. This suggests that the disruption of the tourism industry alone could wipe out all the potential for economic growth in the OECD for 2020. This estimation does not take into account the decline in overall employment due to tourism workers losing their jobs, which could further drain consumption.

Hostility to foreigners/private property

The barring of foreign entry as a result of COVID-19 was an act of epidemiological control, rather than social hostility. However, these acts in addition to populations' fear of the pandemic have triggered spikes in cases of xenophobia and racial profiling.^{15,16}

The extent of regional integration

Regional trade will be reduced as a consequence of lower consumption and the interruption of international travel. The Dry Baltic Index – which gauges the cost of and demand for international maritime shipping of dry goods – has fallen by almost 80 per cent from its late 2019 peak to March 2020. Participation in regional trade alliances may not decline substantially, as countries hope to resume activity post pandemic.

GDP per capita

Global GDP growth for 2020 has been revised down from 2.9 per cent to negative three per cent, with the IMF forecasting that only two countries will have positive GDP growth for 2020. JP Morgan forecast that US GDP could decline by two per cent in the March quarter 2020 and three per cent in the June quarter. Forecast declines for the Eurozone are 1.3 per cent and 3.3 per cent in the same periods.¹⁷ These forecasts almost certainly imply negative annual GDP growth in the US and Europe for 2020 and are probably conservative. China is one of the two countries expected to grow, but with substantially reduced growth rates.

Business environment

This is likely to be one of the indicators most adversely impacted by COVID-19. However, the impact of the pandemic will not be homogeneous across all business sectors. The sectors that are most likely to be negatively affected by the disruptions are aviation, banking and finance, hospitality, recreation, tourism, travel, retail, energy, mineral resources, shipping and education. Business sectors that may avoid serious disruptions are telecommunications, information technology and food production.¹⁸ Some professional services – such as marketing, accounting, legal and human resources may also navigate the crisis relatively well if they concentrate on client profiles not severely disrupted by the pandemic. Once the pandemics abate, governments will attempt to kick-start economic activity possibly with large, 'shovel-ready' infrastructure projects which could buoy the construction and industrial machinery sectors.

Share of youth not in employment, education or training (NEET)

The Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis forecast that the US unemployment rate could rise to 32 per cent as a consequence of COVID-19.¹⁹ This compares with around four per cent in 2019. Unemployment is also expected to rise sharply in other countries affected by the pandemic. Traditionally, youth unemployment rates are much higher than for the population average. In addition, youth tend to be over-represented in areas such as hospitality and retail trade – areas severely impacted by the economic disruption.

TABLE 4.3

Hypothetical impact of shutting down tourism in the OECD in 2020

A four-month complete shut down of the tourism industry could wipe out almost all economic growth expected for the OECD in 2020.

ECONOMIC AGGREGATE	TOURISM'S SHARE OF ECONOMIC AGGREGATE	DETRACTION FROM AGGREGATE IF TOURISM SHUTS DOWN FOR FOUR MONTHS	DETRACTION FROM ANNUAL GDP GROWTH IF TOURISM SHUTS DOWN FOR FOUR MONTHS
GDP	4.40%	1.5 percentage points (pcp)	1.5 pcp
Services Exports	21.50%	7.2 pcp	0.5 pcp
Total detraction from annual GDP growth in 2020:			2.0 pcp
Memo item			
Employment	6.90%	2.3 pcp	

Source: OECD; IEP calculations

Poverty headcount ratio at \$5.50 a day

The global economic downturn and the disruption of global trade can increase poverty rates in developed and emerging economies. In developed countries that had a relatively benign fiscal position before the crisis, governments will borrow in order to increase welfare payments and support to businesses. This will mitigate some of the impact of the pandemic on poverty rates. However, in countries that were already heavily indebted prior to the pandemic, the ability to support economic activity will be less. In addition, developing countries will also be more limited in their ability to apply fiscal largesse because their tax revenue is already constrained and their tax base often too narrow. The result may be a sharp increase in food insecurity and the proportion of the global population living below the poverty line.

Freedom of the Press

There have been cases of press freedoms being suppressed as a result of administrative measures to combat the COVID-19 outbreak in some countries.^{20,21,22,23,24} In addition, many governments have acted with considerable speed in implementing contagion reduction measures. While this was welcome during the rapid onset of the crisis, it reduced the transparency around administrative decision making.

Countries with robust press freedoms and higher trust in the media are better able to broadcast more accurate information on the pandemic and the actions necessary to face it, as well as be believed by the general population.

POSITIVE PEACE AS A BLUEPRINT FOR THE POST-PANDEMIC RECOVERY

Countries that are most likely to recover quickly from the pandemic are those with strong performances in *Well-Functioning Government*, *Sound Business Environment*, *High Levels of Human Capital* and *Good Relations with Neighbours* before the crisis. These were the Pillars most directly affected by COVID-19 and countries that perform well in these areas will find it easier to return to pre-crisis states of systemic development. However, sustainable, long-term socio-economic improvement can only be achieved with balanced growth in all Pillars. This is a principle to which nations can turn their attention after the worst of the crisis has been overcome.


Many countries implemented stimulus packages to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on their economies and set the stage for a post-pandemic recovery. Some of these packages have been large and require substantial funding through the issuance of government debt. This can be problematic, especially if the current stock of liabilities is largely short to medium term and in foreign currency. Countries that had relatively small amounts of debt outstanding before the crisis will be better placed to fund stimulus and recovery programs without much deterioration to credit ratings and the cost of debt.

Among OECD nations, those that had strong scores on *Well-Functioning Government*, combined with low debt before the pandemic will be well placed to implement robust recovery programs, which can be seen in Figure 4.8. Outside the OECD, effective governments and low debt will also be important, with many lower-income countries requiring direct external assistance and debt forgiveness.

FIGURE 4.8

Government debt and effectiveness in OECD countries, 2018

Countries with high government effectiveness and low public debt are best placed to manage the economic impact of COVID-19.



Source: OECD; IEP

The first wave of the pandemic has led to an increased focus on the balance between globalisation and economic sovereignty. Countries with lower dependency on international trade – that is, higher economic sovereignty – may be less affected by global disruptions such as COVID-19. In light of this, governments have started to include economic sovereignty considerations in post-pandemic recovery plans. For example, Japan launched a program to help Japanese companies shift some manufacturing activity from foreign countries back into the domestic fold.²⁵ India is adopting similar measures. In the US, the federal government and companies are discussing how to bring some manufacturing back inside national borders.²⁶

One way to measure economic sovereignty is by comparing a country's total imports and exports as a proportion of GDP. Countries with a lower ratio of trade to GDP tend to be more self-reliant. In addition, a country's *import content of exports* shows how much a nation's ability to export would be compromised if it could not secure goods and services from abroad.

Countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain operate with relatively high economic sovereignty, as seen in Figure 4.9, but have high government debt and lower development in *Well-Functioning Government*. This suggests that their key economic challenges will be mostly domestic, as they seek to fund and coordinate a revival in internal activity. On the other hand, Ireland, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Belgium and others hold less debt and have more effective administrations. However, their economic recovery will depend on the speed with which regional and global trade resumes.


Nations that had high unemployment rates prior to the pandemic will be hit more severely by COVID-19. This is because the pandemic will affect their economies at a time when they are already fragile. The OECD has a widespread range of unemployment rates, as illustrated in Figure 4.10. Of particular concern is the rate of long-term unemployment – those unemployed for 27 weeks or more as a proportion of the labour force. Countries with high long-term unemployment may have excessively rigid labour markets or low levels of worker education and re-skilling. In contrast, countries with low levels of long- and short-term unemployment may find it easier to absorb the impact of the pandemic and re-allocate workers to critical sectors in its aftermath.

A robust and agile business sector – including research and development activity – will be critical for the recovery efforts. A well-developed *Sound Business Environment* and *High Levels of Human Capital* will allow businesses to adapt to new post-pandemic consumer demands, rapid technological disruption, a labour market in turmoil and shifting governmental priorities. Nations with good performance in these two Pillars are likely to experience more robust recoveries post pandemic, as seen in Figure 4.11

Some OECD countries will do well in most of the abovementioned criteria. They have lower debt, effective governments, high economic sovereignty, agile business sectors and robust investment in technological and scientific research. Others will have weaknesses in specific areas that should be addressed to facilitate the post pandemic recovery efforts.

FIGURE 4.9
Economic sovereignty in selected countries

Trade – exports plus imports – expressed as a proportion of GDP and the import content of exports are inverse proxies for economic sovereignty.




Source: OECD

FIGURE 4.10

Unemployment in OECD countries, 2018

Countries with low unemployment pre-pandemic may find it easier to re-skill and re-allocate workers.




Note: OECD

FIGURE 4.11

Business environment and human capital in OECD countries, 2018

High Levels of Human Capital and Sound Business Environment are strongly correlated.



Source: IEP

FAMINES AND FOOD SECURITY

Outside the OECD, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) warned that some vulnerable societies are facing a 'crisis within a crisis,' as the threat of famine is added to the risk of infection. Around 113 million people around the world were unable to feed themselves properly even before the pandemic disrupted the global economy in 2020.²⁷ FAO is particularly concerned with food deprivation in the Sahel region, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti, Syria and Myanmar. In addition to the economic downturn damaging livelihoods, the pandemic also

increases the probability of famine through the lockdowns and travel bans preventing aid from reaching vulnerable communities.

The *Food Security Index* ranks countries according to the availability, affordability and quality of food accessible to the population. It shows that many countries in Africa and Latin America were already facing food insecurity before COVID-19, as illustrated in Table 4.4. The pandemic is expected to worsen the situation, especially if Africa and Latin America start recording larger proportions of infected persons towards mid-2020 and implement lockdowns in order to halt the spread of the virus.

TABLE 4.4

Food Security Index – top and bottom ranks, 2019

Many African countries already faced food insecurity before the COVID-19 crisis.

TOP 15 FOOD SECURITY RANKS			BOTTOM 15 FOOD SECURITY RANKS		
RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE (OUT OF 100)	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE (OUT OF 100)
1	Singapore	87.4	99	Sudan	45.7
2	Ireland	84.0	100	Angola	45.5
3	United States	83.7	101	Zambia	44.4
4	Switzerland	83.1	102	Togo	44.0
5	Finland	82.9	103	Haiti	43.3
6	Norway	82.9	104	Malawi	42.5
7	Sweden	82.7	105	Mozambique	41.4
8	Canada	82.4	106	Sierra Leone	39.0
9	Netherlands	82.0	107	Syria	38.4
10	Austria	81.7	108	Madagascar	37.9
11	Germany	81.5	109	Chad	36.9
12	Australia	81.4	110	Congo (Dem. Rep.)	35.7
13	Qatar	81.2	111	Yemen	35.6
14	Denmark	81.0	112	Burundi	34.3
15	Belgium	80.7	113	Venezuela	31.2

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit and Corteva Agriscience



Trends in Positive Peace

The potential impact of Positive Peace on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic can be better understood by looking at the trends in Positive Peace over the last decade. Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies*. Each of the 24 indicators across the eight Pillars of the Positive Peace Index can be categorized using that three-part typology:

- *Attitudes* if they measure social views, tensions or perceptions;
- *Institutions* if they directly measure institutional operations; and
- *Structures* if they are embedded in the framework of society, such as poverty and equality, or are the result of aggregate activity, such as GDP.


Using this classification process, Figure 4.12 shows that the improvement in the PPI since 2009 is largely driven by structural improvements, with the *Structures* indicator improving by seven per cent on average since 2009. While *Structures* has been improving each year and has improved by seven per cent since 2009, *Attitudes* has deteriorated each year to be 3.9 per cent worse than a decade ago.

GDP per capita, gender equality and poverty have generally improved over time. Globally, institutional functioning has remained largely constant over the same period, except for some fluctuations during the international financial crises. However, the attitudinal indicators have been deteriorating over the period. The indicators to show the biggest deteriorations are *quality of information*, *factionalized elites* and *hostility to foreigners*.

FIGURE 4.12

Changes in the attitudes, institutions and structures of Positive Peace, 2009–2018

The improvement in the PPI since 2009 was largely driven by structural improvements globally.



Source: IEP

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The improvement in Positive Peace was largely driven by structural improvements - factors that are embedded in the framework of society, such as poverty & equality, or are the result of aggregate activity, such as GDP.

CHANGES IN THE POSITIVE PEACE PILLARS

Figure 4.13 shows the percentage change from 2009 to 2018 for all eight Pillars of Positive Peace. These scores reflect gradual changes within complex social systems and typically do not fluctuate drastically year-to-year. As such, since 2009, the average Pillar score has changed by just 2.6 per cent, and no Pillar score has changed by more than eight per cent. The slow-moving nature of Positive Peace calls for long-term planning and sustained investment in improving the Pillars.


The individual indicators change more quickly, as highlighted in Figure 4.14. Because Positive Peace works as a system where each factor affects the others, it is important to be aware of which indicators tend to change quickly or slowly. For example, the average score for *access to internet* has improved by 27 per cent since 2009, indicating a rapid increase in access to information. At the other end of the spectrum, the use of disinformation by governments – *quality of information* – has deteriorated with the access to technology and as such the PPI score for this indicator has shown a deterioration of 10.4 per cent over the period.

The *factionalized elites* indicator with is a measure in the *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillar, measures “the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines,”²⁸ it deteriorated by 7.8 per cent.

FIGURE 4.13

Changes in the Pillars of Positive Peace, 2009–2018

Seven of the eight Pillars have improved since 2009, with *Low Levels of Corruption* showing a 1.9 per cent deterioration over the period.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 4.14

Percentage change in PPI indicators, 2009–2018

The individuals using the Internet indicator recorded the largest improvement, while factionalized elites and quality of information recorded the largest deteriorations.



Source: IEP


The only region in the world to deteriorate in the ten years to 2018 was North America which fell by 4.9 per cent. This region consists of only two countries Canada and the US. All the other eight regions improved. The deterioration in North America was mainly driven by the US, although Canada did also deteriorate.

The largest improvements occurred in Russia and Eurasia, Asia-Pacific, and South Asia, at 6.7 per cent, 4.3 per cent and 3.8 per cent respectively.

FIGURE 4.15

Percentage change in average regional scores, 2009–2018

North America is the only region that did not improve in Positive Peace between 2009 and 2018, driven by a deterioration in Positive Peace in the United States.



Source: IEP

5 ECOLOGICAL THREAT REGISTER

HIGHLIGHTS

- The number of natural disasters has tripled in the last four decades.
- By 2050, climate change is estimated to create up to 86 million additional migrants in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million in South Asia and 17 million in Latin America.
- The Ecological Threat Register (ETR) indicates that 27 per cent of countries will face catastrophic water stress and 22 per cent catastrophic food stress by 2050.
- Climate change induced ecological threats are strongly correlated with Positive Peace, suggesting that high peace countries have greater capacity to adapt to climate change and deal with its adverse impacts.
- 873 million people experienced severe food insecurity and hunger in 2017.
- The risk of food insecurity could increase fourfold in the world's most food insecure nations compared to those at low risk as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- More than two billion people live in countries experiencing high water stress, and about four billion people experience severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year. Water use has increased by one per cent per year for the last four decades.
- Scarce water resources as a catalyst for conflict has increased. In 2007, 71 per cent of the total 462 water-related disputes were addressed positively and cooperatively. By 2009, this figure had fallen to 58 per cent.
- An estimated 2.26 billion people live in areas with high or very high exposure to climate hazards, of which, 1.24 billion reside in 40 countries with already low levels of peacefulness.
- A 2.1-metre rise in sea levels would permanently cover land that is currently home to 200 million people around the world.

Introduction



IEP has developed an Ecological Threat Register (ETR), which combines a set of ecological risks with Positive Peace and economic coping capacity, to better understand where future potential risks and fragilities may occur. Trends will be estimated through to 2050. This body of work will be a first release in a series which will be further developed and enhanced in the coming years.

The ETR aims to show both exposure to risk and the ability of nations to deal with these ecological risks. The measures and metrics developed here provide new tools for assessing peace-ecological-climate risks and associated opportunities for intervention.

The relationship between ecological risks, such as food insecurity and water scarcity, and peacefulness is complex. It does not always take the same form, but the research is clear that changes in the natural environment impose stresses on human societies. Emerging ecological threats will serve as a risk multiplier for ongoing political and socioeconomic tensions. The ability for nations to mitigate and adapt to new ecological threats will be crucial in ensuring the survival of existing political institutions and to avoid future social unrest and violence. The key to future success will be the levels of resilience that nations have developed. Countries with low or declining peacefulness will be the ones most at risk.

The increase in the number of ecological threats can already be seen. Figure 5.1 illustrates the total number of natural disasters from 1980 to 2019. This number has tripled in the last four

decades, while the cost has far exceeded their natural inflationary impact, rising from US\$50 billion in the 1980s to US\$200 billion per year in the last decade. Hydrological events that result in ‘sharp and harmful changes either in the quality of the earth’s water, or its distribution’, either in aquifers, rivers, cyclones or floods, have seen the largest increase since 1980.

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
There is a strong relationship between extreme weather events and displacement. For instance, in Ethiopia, droughts in the mid-1970s and 1980s and subsequent famines led to waves of voluntary and government-forced displacement from drought-stressed areas. In this case, both climatic and political factors impacted displacement and international migration. The effects of such mass population displacement were not limited to Ethiopia, but affected other countries in the region, causing increases in instability, violence and insecurity in neighbouring countries.

Global data on population displacement shows that nearly 19 million people were displaced by natural disasters in 2017. The displacement due to natural disasters is substantially larger than that due to conflict. Figure 5.2 shows new and cumulative

FIGURE 5.1

Natural disasters, 1980–2018

The number of natural disasters has quadrupled in the last four decades.



Source: NatCatSERVICE¹

displacement for both natural disasters and violent conflict. It is estimated that by 2050 climate change will create up to 86 million additional migrants in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million in South Asia and 17 million in Latin America as agricultural conditions and water availability deteriorate across these regions. Empirical evidence suggests that people living in less developed countries without the ability to mitigate these problems are those most likely to migrate and that this migration may cause increased societal strife in destination countries and regions.

In the absence of other adaptation mechanisms, migration is the most probable and effective strategy for individuals to adopt.


Positive Peace can be used as the basis for empirically measuring a country's resilience to shocks, including ecological threats. It

also provides a framework to assess the capability of nation states to respond and adapt to climate change. Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. Institutions at a local, regional and global level can mitigate climate-related conflict by creating resilience related programs and managing climate related disputes. Countries with high levels of Positive Peace will be better able to mitigate, absorb, and respond to emerging ecological threats. Such countries are strong in all eight of the Pillars of Positive Peace, which allows them to mobilise and if necessary, adapt to new challenges.

FIGURE 5.2

Population displacement from conflict and natural disasters, 2008–2017

Population displacement from natural disasters was greater than displacement from armed conflict.



Source: IDMC

THE ECOLOGICAL THREAT REGISTER

IEP has developed an Ecological Threat Register (ETR), which combines a confluence of ecological risks with Positive Peace and economic coping capacity to illustrate the intersection between ecological risk and societal risk, which can impact on economic performance and peace. The ETR aims to show both exposure to risk and also the ability of nations to deal with ecological risks. Box 5.1 provides a brief methodology of the ETR.

The ETR correlates positively with Positive Peace. This indicates that countries with higher risk have not developed the coping capacities to address these risks. These same countries generally also have lower levels of peace. Ecological risks included in the measure are water stress, food insecurity, droughts, floods, sea level rise and population growth. Figure 5.3 shows the correlation between the ecological threat register and Positive Peace.

BOX 5.1

Ecological Threat Register methodology at a glance

The Ecological Threat Register (ETR) is a quantitative measure of ecological risks combined with economic coping capacities, population growth and Positive Peace. The ecological risks included are water stress, food insecurity, droughts, floods and sea level rise. The ETR counts the total number of risks in country that are above a certain threshold.

The risks are first normalised to a score of one to five, with one being the lowest risk. Each country included is assigned a count of all the risks that are higher than three. Countries are then ranked based on their exposure to the total number of risks and weakness in the coping capacity measures.

Based on the relationship between ecological risks and Positive Peace, countries can be divided into three distinct groups: low peace and high exposure to risks, medium peace with high exposure to risks, and high peace with low exposure to risks.

The first group of countries, which have low peace and high exposure, include countries like Afghanistan, Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Mali, all of which suffer from ongoing armed conflicts. Examples of the second group - medium peace and high exposure - include India, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya and Burkina Faso. The high peace and low risk exposure group include countries such as Iceland, Uruguay, New Zealand, Panama and Sweden.

This classification aims to identify countries where a significant deficit in peacefulness and societal resistance coincides with high


level of climate change induced ecological threats. It assesses key patterns and country-specific risks to assess how the dynamics of climate change related ecological risks may combine to foster instability, strain state capacity and undermine human security. It needs to be noted that regardless of how resilient or how high Positive Peace may be, if the shock is of sufficient strength, then the societal system will collapse.

The Pillars of Positive Peace highlight the social, institutional and economic capacity of a society. When low levels of Positive Peace compound with ecological risks, this indicates a greater level of vulnerability to governance failures.

FIGURE 5.3

Ecological threat register vs Positive Peace

Countries with low Positive Peace are exposed to a larger number of environmental threats.



Source: IEP calculations

The Types of Ecological Threat



FOOD SECURITY

Trends in food security started to deteriorate in 2017 after decades of improvement. Globally, 873 million people experienced hunger and food insecurity in 2017. This number increases to two billion people when moderate levels of food insecurity are factored in.

Food security requires availability, access and utilisation of sufficient food to meet dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. Food security is affected by numerous factors, such as climate change, depletion of water tables, economic development, technology, social and political stability and the overall resilience of a society in the face of shocks. Many countries might not be able to ensure food security due to inappropriate agricultural


technologies or practice, lack of natural resources or productive land, or emergency situations like natural disasters.

Food security is strongly correlated with Positive Peace, highlighting that less peaceful countries experience a greater degree of hunger and undernourishment. Lack of peacefulness and food security creates a vicious cycle, in which political instability and social unrest leads to negative impacts on food security, which in turn fuels higher levels of political instability. The Pillars of Peace provide a framework for analysis of causes and dimensions of food security.

FIGURE 5.4

Food security vs Positive Peace

Countries with low levels of Positive Peace have higher levels of food insecurity.



Source: IEP, FAO

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The risk of food insecurity could increase fourfold in the world's most food insecure nations as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

For instance, countries that have a *Sound Business Environment* that include indicators of strong economic stability and performance, will better address food supply shocks. The *Equitable Distribution of Resources* Pillar provides guidance on the ability of a society to address inequality in access to food. Figure 5.4 shows the correlation between food security and Positive Peace.

Figure 5.5 highlights the number of people experiencing severe hunger and food insecurity by level of peace. Over 750 million people in the world's 80 least peaceful countries experience food insecurity, compared to slightly over 100 million in the high peace countries. Recent projections of food security by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisations (FAO) show that almost all scenarios highlight an increase in the number of people that will face hunger and undernourishment in the coming decades to 2050.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic consequences will accelerate adverse impacts on food security. This will be seen in broken supply chains, reduction and reallocation of aid and disruption in domestic agricultural productions. In addition, when economic activity halts due to lockdown and social distancing measures, poorer households, who are dependent on their daily wages, will lose the income to purchase food. For many people, the wage they earn that day is used to feed them and their families that night. Panic buying also feeds into price increases through heightening demand.

In response to COVID-19, some food exporting countries have adopted protectionist policies to secure their own food supply. This may create shortages in countries that strongly depend on imports. For instance, Kazakhstan and Vietnam have temporarily suspended wheat flour and rice exports, of which both are respectively among the largest exporters globally.²


This will be particularly concerning in countries where a large proportion of the population already experience hunger and undernourishment. Unlike the Ebola outbreak of 2016, multilateral arrangements such as foreign aid, global trade and international organisations will find it difficult to mount effective responses in a time of extreme travel restrictions.

A recent analysis by Care International shows that the risk of socioeconomic vulnerabilities will be nine times higher and the risk of severe food insecurity will be four times higher among countries who are already fragile compared to those with low initial risk.³ Care International identified Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Chad, Niger and Haiti as having very high risk of food shortages from the COVID-19 pandemic. These 15 countries are among the least peaceful on the Global Peace Index and have low levels of Positive Peace.

FIGURE 5.5

Total population facing severe food insecurity by level of peacefulness, 2018

A significantly higher number of people face food insecurity in less peaceful countries.



Source: IEP, FAO

WATER SECURITY

A significant impact of climate change on the global food system is through increased water scarcity. Water use or demand has increased by one per cent per year for the last four decades since 1980.⁴ This increasing demand is driven by population growth, increased economic activity and changing consumption patterns. The water demand has increased across all types of uses including domestic, industrial and agriculture.

World Resource Institute projections show that water stress will increase across some regions and countries more than others over the coming decades to 2040.

In addition, climate change is poised to drastically change water supplies by changing precipitation patterns leading to droughts and floods. Underground water tables have also shown signs of depletion, particularly in semi-arid and arid environments, including in regions in China, India and the US, but also in humid environments like Brazil and Bangladesh.⁵ Projections of the water tables in some regions are indicating further depletion of the underground water resource over the coming decades. In addition, new dams are also restricting the water flows in areas that have traditionally been major food producers. The damming of the Mekong River in China has led to a trickle of water during droughts and the end of the dry season in countries further downstream.

The United Nations World Water Development Report 2019 highlights that more than two billion people live in countries

which already experience high water stress, and about four billion people experience severe water scarcity during at least one month of the year. The natural increase for water demand, population increases and the effects of climate change will accelerate the stress on water supplies in the coming decades.

Estimates of areas exposed to high or very high levels of water scarcity show that the least peaceful countries have more areas affected, as shown in Figure 5.6.


Agriculture consumes the largest share of the water supply in most countries, followed by industrial and then domestic consumption.

The MENA region is currently the most water-scarce region and at highest risk of increased stress. MENA has the highest percentage of medium to extremely high-risk catchments, at 92 per cent of total catchments. South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa follow, with 83 and 54 per cent of their catchments ranked between medium and extremely high risk, as identified in Figure 5.7.

In the future, more extreme changes in rainfall patterns are likely for the African continent. Warming of the African continent has increased by 0.5 degrees Celsius or more in the last century, and the mean annual temperature is expected to increase by 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the 21st century. The United Nations Environmental Programme projects that almost all sub-Saharan African countries will be water scarce by 2025.

FIGURE 5.6
Areas of exposure to high and extremely high water scarcity risks by level of peacefulness

Water related risks are the highest in the least peaceful countries.



Source: IEP, WRI


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More than two billion people live in countries experiencing high water stress, and about four billion people experience severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year. Water use has increased by one per cent per year for the last four decades.

FIGURE 5.7

Water-related risk by region, 2014

Water-related risks are highest in the Middle East and North Africa, where almost a third of catchments were rated to be extremely high risk.



Source: WRI; IEP calculations

Note: Data collected from WRI Aqueduct Project

Water has caused conflicts and disputes within countries and between nations. With increasing water demand and pressure from climate change, acceleration in economic activity and population growth, competition for water will intensify. Competition for water resources will test societal resilience within countries, as well as the capacity of the global multilateral system in mediating hostilities and managing the flow on effects, such as mass population displacement.


As shown in Figure 5.8, tensions over scarce water resources resulted in increasing numbers of water related disputes in 32 countries across Europe, MENA and sub-Saharan Africa.

Fortunately, most of these disputes are resolved cooperatively, indicating that changes in climate and resources do not inevitably lead to conflict. Comparing events over time, cooperative events consistently outweighed conflict events for the period measured, from 1997 to 2009, as shown in Figure 5.8. However, from 2007 to

FIGURE 5.8

Water-related disputes in Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, 1997–2009

Water-related cooperative events reached a high point in 2002, with 360 recorded events.



WATER SECURITY

In 2007, 71 per cent of the total 462 water-related disputes were addressed positively and cooperatively. By 2009, this figure had fallen to 58 per cent.

Source: WARICC Dataset 2012; IEP calculations

2009 a greater share of events led to conflict, with some of them leading to violence. In 2007, 71 per cent of the total 462 water-related disputes were addressed positively and cooperatively. By 2009, this figure had fallen to 58 per cent.

The Syrian conflict illustrates the impact ecological risks can have on intensifying existing social and political grievances. It also highlights that adverse effects of climate change related ecological risk, such as population displacement, play a critical role in igniting extreme level of mass violence and armed conflict.

From 1999 to 2011, approximately 60 per cent of Syrian land underwent two long-term droughts. About 75 per cent of farmers had total crop failure, and in the northeast, farmers lost 80 per cent of their livestock. This forced a substantial proportion of the population to relocate to urban centres, with an estimated 1.3 to 1.5 million people migrating by 2011. The World Bank estimated in a 2011 survey of Syrian migrants that over 85 per cent of the respondents used migration as an “adaptation strategy.”

CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate change has caused warming of the atmosphere and ocean, the amount of snow and ice to diminish and sea levels to rise. The effects of these trends pose a major challenge to peacefulness in the coming decades by increasing resource scarcity and the effects this will have on livelihoods.

The impacts of different climate change hazards on food security and water scarcity have already emerged in many regions and countries. The World Economic Forum believes that by 2050, climate change induced environmental risks will have a greater negative impact than any other economic, geopolitical, societal, or technological changes. Countries that fail to adapt will be facing the biggest risks.

The severity and impacts of environmental risks vary across geographic regions. Some regions face multiple ecological threats. However, other areas might face a single climate related hazard,

which could simply exceed the capabilities of the state and society to mitigate and address its impacts.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fifth assessment report estimates with high confidence that there will be a further 1.5-degree Celsius increase in Earth's surface temperature between 2030 and 2052. Further deterioration in the climate will risk severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts with the following potential effects:

- rising land and sea temperatures in most of the world
- extremely high temperatures in most of the places where people live, with extreme lows at night
- extreme rainfall with flash flooding in some places and droughts in others
- continued sea level rises and coastal erosion


As shown in Figure 5.9, temperatures have increased over the past 30 years. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have confirmed that the global temperatures of the past five years are the hottest on record, reflecting an ongoing trend of warming. Recent estimations place 2018 at approximately one degree Celsius warmer than the 1850-1900 pre-industrial average, with greenhouse gas concentrations such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrogen oxide reaching record highs of 146, 257 and 122 per cent of pre-industrial levels, respectively. The mean global sea level rose 3.7 millimetres in 2018 when compared to the prior year.

Recent estimates from Climate Central, an independent climate research organisation, projects a rise in sea levels of up to 2.1-meters by 2100, which could potentially permanently drown land that is currently home to 200 million people around the world. Coastal flooding resulting from sea level rise will impact the lives of 300 million people who live in low-lying coastal areas in China, Bangladesh, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand over the next three decades.⁶

FIGURE 5.9

Mean global temperature, 1901–2015

From 1901 to 2015, the global temperature increased by 1.21 degrees Celsius. The increase during the 15-year period from 2000 to 2015 accounted for 38 per cent of the total rise.




Source: Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures

FIGURE 5.10

Climate hazard and exposure risk score vs Positive Peace

There is a strong correlation between hazard and exposure to natural disasters and Positive Peace.



Source: IEP, FAO

Climate change hazard correlates strongly with Positive Peace, which suggests that countries with lower levels of Positive Peace are exposed to higher hazards from climate change. Figure 5.10 shows the correlation between peacefulness and climate hazard and exposure risk score.


It will be difficult for the least peaceful countries to mitigate the effects of climate change or address its adverse impacts. This also means that the combination of lower resilience and higher risk could tip some of these countries into cycles of instability and violence. This latter effect is particularly important in countries where socio-political drivers of conflict and unrest are present.

The impact of climate change is further highlighted by the number of people exposed to high or very high climate change risks. A larger number of people in the world's least peaceful countries are

FIGURE 5.11

Population exposed to high or very high climate change risks by level of peacefulness

An estimated 2.26 billion people live in areas with high or very high exposure to climate hazards.



Source: IEP, WRI


facing climate risks. The risks included in the analyses are cyclones, floods, wildfires, rainfall anomalies, chronic aridity, and low-elevation coastal zones susceptible to storm surges and future sea level rise. Figure 5.11 shows the proportion and number of population at high or very high risk of climate change by level of peacefulness.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the most exposed region globally, with 45 per cent of its population exposed to climate hazards, followed by Central America and the Caribbean and South Asia. However, there are large differences between countries, even within the same region. For instance, countries in the Sahel region are facing more climate change hazards than other sub-Saharan African countries. Figure 5.12 shows the proportion of population exposed to high or very high risk of climate hazards by region.

FIGURE 5.12

Population in high risk climate zones, 2016

Over 45 per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa is exposed to climate change related hazards.



Source: IEP

CATASTROPHIC ECOLOGICAL THREATS

The severity of ecological threats varies across geographic regions and time. In some cases, the impacts of the environmental disruption are well beyond a country's capacity to address.

Catastrophic risks are particularly important from the perspective of social stability and resilience. An example is the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. This catastrophic natural disaster caused widespread destruction, leading to social chaos and the breakdown of law and order. Conversely, Japan fared much better after the 2011 tsunami, which led to a nuclear power plant meltdown, resulting in deaths and destruction. However, the incident did not create any social or political instability and the Japanese government was able to address both the destruction from the tsunami and contain the damage from the meltdown of the nuclear power plant. Japan scores highly in Positive Peace.

Defining and understanding the threshold at which a risk could become catastrophic differs across countries and context. Nevertheless, this research does set a threshold for each of the levels of risk. The thresholds, along with the results, are explained in Table 5.1.

Water stress compares available water to the amount withdrawn for agriculture, domestic and industrial needs. The indicator used in the ETR compares supply to demand and ranks countries on their ability to balance these two. When a country scores three on this indicator in the ETR, it is considered a catastrophic level of water scarcity. Water stress measures the shortfall of water supply to meet the demand in a particular country.⁷ Once this criterion is applied, 44 of 164 countries are at high risk of water stress. These countries are located in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan and Central Asia regions. The five countries with the highest water stress are Qatar, Israel, Lebanon, Iran and Jordan.

Food insecurity is defined as catastrophic if the prevalence of regular hunger and undernourishment is greater than 25 per cent of the population. Sierra Leone, Liberia and Niger were among the most affected with over 80 per cent of the population experiencing severe food insecurity in 2017. More recent estimates from the Global Hunger Index suggest that Central African Republic, Yemen and Chad are the countries currently most at risk of hunger and food insecurity.⁹

Similarly, populations at risk of rising sea levels are considered to be at catastrophic levels if it affects more than ten per cent of a country's population over the coming decades. Estimates for this criteria puts 19 of the 91 countries for which data was available at the catastrophic level for this risk. This includes many smaller countries such as Suriname as well as cities with large populations such as Alexandria in Egypt, the Hague in the Netherlands and Osaka in Japan.¹⁰ Table 5.1 summarises the scale of catastrophic risk across the world.

COPING CAPACITIES

The strength of a society — its resilience, adaptability and its governance — will be crucial in dealing with ecological threats and climate change. Societies that are strong in all eight Pillars of Peace are going to be better able to weather the impacts. This has been highlighted by the correlations between the Ecological Threat Register, climate hazard and exposure to risk and Positive Peace in Figures 5.10 and 5.13.

IEP's research finds that a greater number of countries with low levels of Positive Peace suffer from both fiscal and current account deficits. This limits the capacity of these governments in addressing economic and climatic shocks. In addition, the relationship indicates that countries with higher levels of Positive Peace have better price stability, thereby reducing uncertainty and inefficiency in the market, which in turn facilitates more business investment.

The relationship between Positive Peace and strong economic fundamentals shows that less peaceful countries are more likely to suffer from macroeconomic weakness. Less peaceful countries experience more frequent boom and bust cycles leading to higher volatility and lower economic growth rates. On average, economic growth is nearly three times higher in the very high Positive Peace countries compared to the least peaceful. Per capita economic growth is among the leading determinants of food security, employment and reduction in poverty and vulnerabilities. Figure 5.14 shows long-term per capita GDP growth by level of peace.

TABLE 5.1

Catastrophic ecological risks

Water risks, food insecurity and sea level rising are threatening catastrophic levels of impact across 44, 30 and 19 countries, for each of the risks respectively.


INDICATOR	CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERING CATASTROPHIC	COUNTRIES
Water stress	Score of 3 on scale of 1 to 5. This is a measure of the severity of the unmet demand for water.	In 2016: 44 of 164 (27 per cent)
Food insecurity	>=25% pop food deficient	In 2017: 30 of 137 (21 per cent)
Population at risk due to rising sea level	>10% of pop at risk of rising sea level	Projected for 2100: 19 of 91 (20 per cent)

Source: IEP

FIGURE 5.13

Economic coping capacity vs Positive Peace

Less peaceful countries that are at greater risk of exposure to climate change related ecological threats have lower economic coping capacity to address the fallouts from these risks.




Source: IEP, WEF

FIGURE 5.14

Average long term GDP per capita growth (1960–2016) by level of peacefulness

Countries with high levels of peace have much higher economic growth historically.



Source: IEP, WDI

“

An estimated 2.26 billion people live in areas with high or very high exposure to climate hazards, of which, 1.24 billion reside in 40 countries with already low levels of peacefulness.

”

6 APPENDICES



APPENDIX A

GPI methodology

Peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of the harmony achieved by the absence of violence or the fear of violence, which has been described as Negative Peace. Negative Peace is a complement to Positive Peace which is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.

The GPI was founded by Steve Killelea, an Australian technology entrepreneur and philanthropist. It is produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, a global think tank dedicated to developing metrics to analyse peace and to quantify its economic benefits.

The GPI measures a country's level of Negative Peace using three domains of peacefulness. The first domain, *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict*, investigates the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as their role and duration of involvement in conflicts.

The second domain evaluates the level of harmony or discord within a nation; ten indicators broadly assess what might be described as *Societal Safety and Security*. The assertion is that low crime rates, minimal terrorist activity and violent demonstrations, harmonious relations with neighbouring countries, a stable political scene and a small proportion of the population being internally displaced or made refugees can be equated with peacefulness.

Seven further indicators are related to a country's *Militarisation*—reflecting the link between a country's level of military build-up and access to weapons and its level of peacefulness, both domestically and internationally. Comparable data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the number of armed service officers per head are gauged, as are financial contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

The expert panel

An international panel of independent experts played a key role in establishing the GPI in 2007—in selecting the indicators that best assess a nation's level of peace and in assigning their weightings. The panel has overseen each edition of the GPI; this year, it included:

Professor Kevin P. Clements, chairperson

Foundation Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand

Dr Sabina Alkire

Director, Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI), University of Oxford, United Kingdom

Dr Ian Anthony

Research Coordinator and Director of the Programme on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden

Dr Manuela Mesa

Director, Centre for Education and Peace Research (CEIPAZ) and President, Spanish Association for Peace Research (AIPAZ), Madrid, Spain

Dr Ekaterina Stepanova

Head, Unit on Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

THE INDICATORS

The GPI comprises 23 indicators of the absence of violence or fear of violence. The indicators were originally selected with the assistance of the expert panel in 2007 and have been reviewed by the expert panel on an annual basis. All scores for each indicator are normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones are scored from 1 to 5, to the third decimal point.

ONGOING DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT



- ▶ **Number and duration of internal conflicts**
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)

- ▶ **Number of deaths from external organised conflict**
UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset

- ▶ **Number of deaths from internal organised conflict**
UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset

- ▶ **Number, duration and role in external conflicts**
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; IEP

- ▶ **Intensity of organised internal conflict**
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

- ▶ **Relations with neighbouring countries**
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

SOCIETAL SAFETY & SECURITY



- ▶ **Level of perceived criminality in society**
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

- ▶ **Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population**
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)

- ▶ **Political instability**
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

- ▶ **Political Terror Scale**
Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisanò. 2019. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018. Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <http://www.politicalterroryscale.org>.

- ▶ **Impact of terrorism**
IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)

- ▶ **Number of homicides per 100,000 people**
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates

- ▶ **Level of violent crime**
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

- ▶ **Likelihood of violent demonstrations**
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

- ▶ **Number of jailed population per 100,000 people**
World Prison Brief, Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London

- ▶ **Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people**
UNODC CTS; EIU estimates

MILITARISATION



- ▶ **Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP**
The Military Balance, IISS, EIU Estimates

- ▶ **Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people**
The Military Balance, IISS

- ▶ **Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people**
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database

- ▶ **Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people**
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

- ▶ **Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions**
United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP

- ▶ **Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities**
The Military Balance, IISS; SIPRI; UN Register of Conventional Arms; IEP

- ▶ **Ease of access to small arms and light weapons**
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

WEIGHTING THE INDEX

When the GPI was launched in 2007 the advisory panel of independent experts apportioned scores based on the relative importance of each of the indicators on a scale of 1-5. Two sub-component weighted indices were then calculated from the GPI group of indicators:

1. A measure of how at peace internally a country is;
2. A measure of how at peace externally a country is (its state of peace beyond its borders).

The overall composite score and index was then formulated by applying a weight of 60 per cent to the measure of internal peace and 40 per cent to external peace. The heavier weight applied to internal peace was agreed upon by the advisory panel, following robust debate. The decision was based on the notion that a greater level of internal peace is likely to lead to, or at least correlate with, lower external conflict. The weights have been reviewed by the advisory panel prior to the compilation of each edition of the GPI.

MEASURING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE INDEX

- ▶ Robustness is an important concept in composite index analysis. It is a measure of how often rank comparisons from a composite index are still true if the index is calculated using different weightings. For example, if the GPI is recalculated using a large number of different weighting schemes and Country A ranks higher than Country B in 60 per cent of these recalculations, the statement “Country A is more peaceful than Country B” is considered to be 60 per cent robust.
- ▶ IEP finds that the Global Peace Index (GPI) is at the same level of absolute robustness as the Human Development Index (HDI), a leading measure of development since it was first constructed by the United Nations Development Programme in 1990.
- ▶ Technically, the robustness of the GPI is measured by the fact that 70 per cent of pairwise country comparisons are independent of the weighting scheme chosen. In other words, regardless of the weights attributed to each component of the index, 70 per cent of the time the pairwise comparisons between countries are the same.

TABLE A.1

Indicator weights in the GPI

Internal Peace 60% / External Peace 40%

INTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)		EXTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)	
Perceptions of criminality	3	Military expenditure (% GDP)	2
Security officers and police rate	3	Armed services personnel rate	2
Homicide rate	4	UN peacekeeping funding	2
Incarceration rate	3	Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities	3
Access to small arms	3	Weapons exports	3
Intensity of internal conflict	5	Refugees and IDPs	4
Violent demonstrations	3	Neighbouring countries relations	5
Violent crime	4	External conflicts fought	2.28
Political instability	4	Deaths from external conflict	5
Political terror	4		
Weapons imports	2		
Terrorism impact	2		
Deaths from internal conflict	5		
Internal conflicts fought	2.56		

The GPI is a composite index of 23 indicators weighted and combined into one overall score. The weighting scheme within any composite index represents the relative importance of each indicator to the overall aim of the measure, in the GPI's case, global peace. To fully understand the representative nature or accuracy of any measure it is necessary to understand how sensitive the results of the index are to the specific weighting scheme used. If the analysis holds true for a large subset of all possible weighting schemes then the results can be called robust. While it is expected that ranks will be sensitive to changes in the weights of any composite index, what is more important in a practical sense is the robustness of country comparisons. One of the core aims of the GPI is to allow for Country A to be compared to Country B. This raises the question that for any two countries, how often is the first ranked more peaceful than the second across the spectrum of weights. The more times that the first country is ranked more peaceful than the second, the more confidence can be invested in the statement "Country A is more peaceful than Country B".

To avoid the computational issue of evaluating every possible combination of 23 indicators, the robustness of pairwise country comparisons has been estimated using the three GPI domains *militarisation, societal safety and security and ongoing conflict*. Implementing an accepted methodology for robustness, the GPI is calculated for every weighting combination of three weights from 0 to 1 at 0.01 intervals. For computational expedience only weighting schemes that sum to one are selected, resulting in over 5100 recalculated GPI's. Applying this it is found that around 70 per cent of all pairwise country comparisons in the GPI are independent of the weighting scheme, i.e. 100 per cent robust. This is a similar level of absolute robustness as the Human Development Index.

QUALITATIVE SCORING: THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT APPROACH

The EIU's Country Analysis team plays an important role in producing the GPI by scoring seven qualitative indicators and

filling in data gaps on quantitative indicators when official data is missing. The EIU employs more than 100 full-time country experts and economists, supported by 650 in-country contributors. Analysts generally focus on two or three countries and, in conjunction with local contributors, develop a deep knowledge of a nation's political scene, the performance of its economy and the society in general. Scoring follows a strict process to ensure reliability, consistency and comparability:

1. Individual country analysts score qualitative indicators based on a scoring methodology and using a digital platform;
2. Regional directors use the digital platform to check scores across the region; through the platform they can see how individual countries fare against each other and evaluate qualitative assessments behind proposed score revisions;
3. Indicator scores are checked by the EIU's Custom Research team (which has responsibility for the GPI) to ensure global comparability;
4. If an indicator score is found to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a judgment on the score;
5. Scores are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalising the GPI;
6. If the expert panel finds an indicator score to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a final judgment on the score, which is then discussed in turn with the advisory panel.

Because of the large scope of the GPI, occasionally data for quantitative indicators do not extend to all nations. In this case, country analysts are asked to suggest an alternative data source or provide an estimate to fill any gap. This score is checked by Regional Directors to ensure reliability and consistency within the region, and by the Custom Research team to ensure global comparability. Again, indicators are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalisation.

APPENDIX B

GPI indicator sources, definitions & scoring criteria

The information below details the sources, definitions, and scoring criteria of the 23 indicators that form the Global Peace Index. All scores for each indicator are banded or normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones scored continuously from 1 to 5 at the third decimal place. The Economist Intelligence Unit has provided imputed estimates in the rare event there are gaps in the quantitative data.

INTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

Level of Perceived Criminality in Society

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2019 to 15 March 2020

Definition: Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Very low:** The majority of other citizens can be trusted; very low levels of domestic insecurity.
- 2 = Low:** An overall positive climate of trust with other citizens.
- 3 = Moderate:** Reasonable degree of trust in other citizens.
- 4 = High:** High levels of distrust in other citizens; high levels of domestic security.
- 5 = Very high:** Very high levels of distrust in other citizens; people are extremely cautious in their dealings with others; large number of gated communities, high prevalence of security guards.

Number of Internal Security Officers and Police per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
Measurement period	2015

Alternative Source: EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU's analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

Definition: This indicator is sourced from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and refers to the civil police force. Police refers to personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. It is distinct from national guards or local militia.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-199.8	199.9-399.8	399.9-599.8	599.9-799.8	> 799.9

Number of Homicides per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
Measurement period	2016

Alternative Source: EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU's analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

Definition: This indicator comes from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. Intentional homicide refers to death deliberately inflicted on a person by another person, including infanticide. The figures refer to the total number of penal code offences or their equivalent, but exclude minor road traffic and other petty offences, brought to the attention of the police or other law enforcement agencies and recorded by one of those agencies.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-1.99	2-5.99	6-9.99	10-19.99	> 20

Number of Jailed Population per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London, World Prison Brief
Measurement period	2018

Definition: Figures are from the Institute for Criminal Policy Research and are compiled from a variety of sources. In almost all cases the original source is the national prison administration of the country concerned, or else the Ministry responsible for the prison administration. Prison population rates per 100,000 people are based on estimates of the national population. In order to compare prison population rates, and to estimate the number of persons held in prison in the countries for which information is not available, median rates have been used by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research to minimise the effect of countries with rates that are untypically high or low. Indeed, comparability can be compromised by different practice in different countries, for example with regard to pre-trial detainees and juveniles, but also psychiatrically ill offenders and offenders being detained for treatment for alcoholism and drug addiction.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-126.405	126.406-252.811	252.812-379.217	379.218-505.624	>505.625

Additional Notes: The data provided by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research are not annual averages but indicate the number of jailed population per 100,000 inhabitants in a particular month during the year. The year and month may differ from country to country.

Ease of Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2019 to 15 March 2020

Definition: Assessment of the accessibility of small arms and light weapons (SALW), ranked from 1-5 (very limited access to very easy access) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period from March to March.

Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Very limited access:** The country has developed policy instruments and best practices, such as firearm licences, strengthening of export controls, codes of conduct, firearms or ammunition marking.
- 2 = Limited access:** The regulation implies that it is difficult, time-consuming and costly to obtain firearms; domestic firearms regulation also reduces the ease with which legal arms are diverted to illicit markets.
- 3 = Moderate access:** There are regulations and commitment to ensure controls on civilian possession of firearms, although inadequate controls are not sufficient to stem the flow of illegal weapons.
- 4 = Easy access:** There are basic regulations, but they are not effectively enforced; obtaining firearms is straightforward.
- 5 = Very easy access:** There is no regulation of civilian possession, ownership, storage, carriage and use of firearms.

Intensity of Organised Internal Conflict

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	6.3%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2019 to 15 March 2020

Definition: Assessment of the intensity of conflicts within the country, ranked from 1-5 (no conflict to severe crisis) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = No conflict.**
- 2 = Latent conflict:** Positional differences over definable values of national importance.
- 3 = Manifest conflict:** Explicit threats of violence; imposition of economic sanctions by other countries.
- 4 = Crisis:** A tense situation across most of the country; at least one group uses violent force in sporadic incidents.
- 5 = Severe crisis:** Civil war; violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organised and systematic way throughout the country.

Likelihood of Violent Demonstrations

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2019 to 15 March 2020

Definition: Assessment of the likelihood of violent demonstrations ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on the question, "Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labour unrest likely to pose a threat to property or the conduct of business over the next two years?" Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for 16 March 2018 to 15 March 2019 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

Scoring Criteria

"Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labour unrest likely to pose a threat to property or the conduct of business over the next two years?"

1/5	Strongly no
2/5	No
3/5	Somewhat of a problem
4/5	Yes
5/5	Strongly yes

Level of Violent Crime

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2019 to 15 March 2020

Definition: Assessment of the likelihood of violent crime ranked from 1 to 5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team based on the question, "Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?" Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for 16 March 2018 to 15 March 2019 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

Scoring Criteria

"Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?"

1/5	Strongly no
2/5	No
3/5	Somewhat of a problem
4/5	Yes
5/5	Strongly yes

Political Instability

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2019 to 15 March 2020

Definition: Assessment of political instability ranked from 0 to 100 (very low to very high instability) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on five questions. This indicator aggregates five other questions on social unrest, orderly transfers, opposition stance, excessive executive authority and an international tension sub-index. Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for 16 March 2018 to 15 March 2019 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

Specific Questions:

- What is the risk of significant social unrest during the next two years?
- How clear, established and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?
- How likely is it that an opposition party or group will come to power and cause a significant deterioration in business operating conditions?
- Is excessive power concentrated or likely to be concentrated in the executive so that executive authority lacks accountability and possesses excessive discretion?
- Is there a risk that international disputes/tensions will negatively affect the economy and/or polity?

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-20.4	20.5-40.4	40.5-60.4	60.5-80.4	80.5-100

Political Terror Scale

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisanò. 2018. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018. Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org .
Measurement period	2018

Definition: The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a given year based on a 5-level "terror scale" originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The average of the two scores is taken.

Scoring Criteria

- 1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
- 2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
- 3 = There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
- 4 = Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
- 5 = Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons, as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.5%
Data source	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Measurement period	2015-2019

Definition: Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons imported by a country between 2014 and 2018, divided by the average population in this time period at the 100,000 people level (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for their production. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships, engines.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-7.233	7.234-14.468	14.469-21.702	21.703-28.936	>28.937

Impact of Terrorism

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.5%
Data source	IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
Measurement period	1 Jan 2015 to 20 March 2020

Definition: Terrorist incidents are defined as “intentional acts of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.” This means an

incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

- A The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- B The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence, including property violence as well as violence against people.
- C The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

For all incidents listed, at least two of the following three criteria must be present:

1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

Methodology: Using the comprehensive, event-based Global Terrorism Database, the GTI combines four variables to develop a composite score: the number of terrorist incidents in a given year, the total number of fatalities in a given year, the total number of injuries caused in a given year and the approximate level of property damage in a given year. The composite score captures the direct effects of terrorist-related violence, in terms of its physical effect, but also attempts to reflect the residual effects of terrorism in terms of emotional wounds and fear by attributing a weighted average to the damage inflicted in previous years. As of the date of publication, the Global Terrorism Database only logs events up to 31 December 2018. To assess the impact of terrorism between this date and 20 March 2020 cutoff, IEP uses data from publicly available third party sources to impute terrorist activity in that period.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-13.479	13.48-181.699	181.7-2,449.309	2,449.31-33,015.949	>33,015.95

Number Of Deaths From Organised Internal Conflict

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	6.3%
Data source	UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset
Measurement period	2017-2018

Definition: This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict. UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.”

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–23 deaths	24–998 deaths	999–4,998 deaths	4,999–9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths

Number and Duration of Internal Conflicts

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2.56
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.2%
Data sources	IEP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset
Measurement period	2014–2018

Definition: This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country's legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding the scores for all individual conflicts which have occurred within that country's legal boundaries over the last five years.

Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:

Number:

- The number of interstate armed conflicts, internal armed conflict (civil conflicts), internationalised internal armed conflicts, one-sided conflict and non-state conflict located within a country's legal boundaries.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25–999 battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

Duration:

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

The cumulative conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country's score. This indicator is two years lagging due to when the UCDP data is released.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
No internal conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 4.75	Combined conflict score of up to 9.5	Combined conflict score of up to 14.25	A combined conflict score of 19 or above. This shows very high levels of internal conflict.

EXTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020
Measurement period	2019

Alternative Source: When no data was provided, several alternative sources were used: National Public Expenditure Accounts, SIPRI information and the Military Balance 2019. Alternative data are from 2008 to 2017, depending upon data availability.

Definition: Cash outlays of central or federal government to meet the costs of national armed forces—including strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces as well as paramilitary forces, customs forces and border guards if these are trained and equipped as a military force. Published EIU data on nominal GDP (or the World Bank when unavailable) was used to arrive at the value of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

Scoring Criteria: This indicator is scored using a min-max normalisation. Applying this method, a country's score is based on the distance of its military expenditure as a share of GDP from the benchmarks of 0% (for a score of 1) and 8.37% or above (for a score of 5). The bands, while linear, approximately conform as follows:

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–2.092	2.093–4.184	4.185–6.277	6.278–8.37	>8.371

Number of Armed Services Personnel per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020
Measurement period	2020

Alternative Source: World Bank population data used if unavailable from the EIU.

Definition: Active armed services personnel comprise all service men and women on full-time duty in the army, navy, air force and joint forces (including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves). Population data provided by the EIU.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–657.744	657.745–1,315.489	1,315.49–1,973.234	1,973.235–2,630.98	>2,630.981

Additional Notes: The Israeli reservist force is used to calculate Israel's number of armed services personnel.

Financial Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	IEP; United Nations Committee on Contributions
Measurement period	2016–2018

Methodology: The UNFU indicator measures whether UN member countries meet their UN peacekeeping funding commitments. Although countries may fund other programs in development or peacebuilding, the records on peacekeeping are easy to obtain and understand and provide an instructive measure of a country's commitment to peace. The indicator calculates the percentage of countries' "outstanding payments versus their annual assessment to the budget of the current peacekeeping missions" over an average of three years. This ratio is derived from data provided by the United Nations Committee on Contributions Status reports. The indicator is compiled as follows:

1. The status of contributions by UN member states is obtained.
2. For the relevant peacekeeping missions, the assessments (for that year only) and the collections (for that year only) are recorded. From this, the outstanding amount is calculated for that year.
3. The ratio of outstanding payments to assessments is calculated. By doing so a score between 0 and 1 is obtained. Zero indicates no money is owed; a country has met their funding commitments. A score of 1 indicates that a country has not paid any of their assessed contributions. Given that the scores already fall between 0 and 1, they are easily banded into a score between 1 and 5. The final banded score is a weighted sum of the current year and the previous two years. The weightings are 0.5 for the current year, 0.3 for the previous year and 0.2 for two years prior. Hence it is a three-year weighted average.
4. Outstanding payments from previous years and credits are not included. The scoring is linear to one decimal place.

Scoring Criteria

1/5	0–25% of stated contributions owed
2/5	26–50% of stated contributions owed
3/5	51–75% of stated contributions owed
4/5	75–99% of stated contributions owed
5/5	100% of stated contributions owed (no contributions made in past three years)

Additional Notes: All United Nations member states share the costs of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of member states, with the

permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	4.2%
Data source	IEP; SIPRI; IISS The Military Balance; United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
Measurement period	2018

Methodology: This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

There are five categories of weapons, each of which receive a certain number of weighted points. The five weapons categories are weighted as follows:

1. Armoured vehicle and artillery pieces = 1 point
2. Tank = 5 points
3. Combat aircraft and combat helicopter = 20 points
4. Warship = 100 points
5. Aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine = 1000 points

Countries with nuclear capabilities automatically receive the maximum score of five. Other scores are expressed to the second decimal point, adopting a min-max normalisation that sets the max at two standard deviations above the average raw score.

1/5	Nil–18,185
2/5	18,185–36,368
3/5	36,368–54,553
4/5	54,553–72,737
5/5	States with nuclear capability receive a 5, or states with heavy weapons capability of 72,738 or in the top 2% of heavy weapons receive a 5.

Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons as Supplier (Exports) per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	4.2%
Data source	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Measurement period	2015–2019

Definition: Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons exported by a country between 2015 and 2019 divided by the average population during this time period (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for the production of them. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships and engines.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-3.681	3.682-7.364	7.365-11.046	11.047-14.729	>14.73

Number of Refugees and Internally Displaced People as a Percentage of the Population

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5.7%
Data source	UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2019; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2018
Measurement period	2018-2019

Definition: Refugee population by country or territory of origin plus the number of a country's internally displaced people (IDPs), as a percentage of the country's total population.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-3.034	3.035-6.069	6.07-9.104	9.105-12.139	>12.14

Relations with Neighbouring Countries

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	7.1%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2019 to 15 March 2020

Definition: Assessment of the intensity of contentiousness of neighbours, ranked from 1-5 (peaceful to very aggressive) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Peaceful:** None of the neighbours has attacked the country since 1950.
- 2 = Low:** The relationship with neighbours is generally good, but aggressiveness is manifest in politicians' speeches or in protectionist measures.
- 3 = Moderate:** There are serious tensions and consequent economic and diplomatic restrictions from other countries.
- 4 = Aggressive:** Open conflicts with violence and protests.
- 5 = Very aggressive:** Frequent invasions by neighbouring countries.

Number, duration and role in external conflicts

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2.28
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.2%
Data source	IEP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset
Measurement period	2014-2018

Definition: This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts a country is involved in. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted against that country in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:

Number:

- Number of internationalised internal armed conflicts and interstate armed conflicts.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25-999 battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

Duration:

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

Role:

- If the country is a primary party to the conflict, that conflict receives a score of one; if it is a secondary party (supporting the primary party), that conflict receives a score of 0.25.
- If a country is a party to a force covered by a relevant United Nations Security Council Resolution, then the entire conflict score is multiplied by a quarter; if not, it receives a full score.

The different conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country's score.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
No external conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 1.5	Combined conflict score of up to 3	Combined conflict score of up to 4.5	A combined conflict score of 6 or above. This shows very high levels of external conflict.

Number Of Deaths From Organised External Conflict

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	7.1%
Data source	UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset
Measurement period	2017-2018

Alternate Source: Where applicable, IEP also uses several other open-source datasets to construct this indicator.

Definition: This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as *"a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year"*.

Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-24 deaths	25-998 deaths	999-4,998 deaths	4,999-9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths

APPENDIX C

GPI Domain Scores

TABLE C.1

Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict domain, most peaceful to least

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Botswana	1.000	Hungary	1.408	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.812
Mauritius	1.000	Lithuania	1.408	Republic of the Congo	1.823
Singapore	1.000	Bhutan	1.409	Rwanda	1.840
Uruguay	1.000	Latvia	1.409	Morocco	1.865
Bulgaria	1.001	The Gambia	1.409	Bahrain	1.868
Iceland	1.001	Cambodia	1.410	Mozambique	1.881
New Zealand	1.003	El Salvador	1.410	Armenia	1.887
Switzerland	1.005	Liberia	1.410	Djibouti	1.895
Canada	1.006	Nepal	1.410	Burkina Faso	1.936
Austria	1.008	Estonia	1.411	Thailand	1.945
Czech Republic	1.008	Ghana	1.415	Kyrgyz Republic	2.006
Italy	1.008	Sierra Leone	1.415	Benin	2.014
Portugal	1.008	Madagascar	1.416	Zimbabwe	2.041
Romania	1.008	Senegal	1.419	Tajikistan	2.058
The Netherlands	1.011	Tanzania	1.435	Azerbaijan	2.080
Germany	1.024	Guinea	1.436	Bangladesh	2.100
Malaysia	1.025	Qatar	1.447	Colombia	2.100
Australia	1.053	Kuwait	1.448	Algeria	2.116
Belgium	1.107	Peru	1.464	Venezuela	2.209
Argentina	1.201	Jordan	1.491	Nicaragua	2.225
Costa Rica	1.201	Cyprus	1.604	Burundi	2.338
Jamaica	1.201	Ecuador	1.604	Kenya	2.377
Namibia	1.201	Gabon	1.604	Chad	2.395
Trinidad and Tobago	1.201	Kazakhstan	1.604	Niger	2.416
Zambia	1.201	Malawi	1.604	Israel	2.426
Ireland	1.202	Serbia	1.604	Saudi Arabia	2.426
Mongolia	1.202	South Africa	1.604	Egypt	2.474
Finland	1.210	Taiwan	1.604	Mexico	2.475
Norway	1.210	North Macedonia	1.605	Philippines	2.539
United Kingdom	1.211	Guatemala	1.606	Myanmar	2.599
Denmark	1.212	Guinea-Bissau	1.609	North Korea	2.610
France	1.248	Mauritania	1.611	Iran	2.642
Sweden	1.267	Brazil	1.613	Mali	2.677
Spain	1.359	Sri Lanka	1.614	Ethiopia	2.714
Albania	1.403	Eritrea	1.619	Palestine	2.823
Bolivia	1.403	Angola	1.625	Cameroon	2.829
Chile	1.403	Indonesia	1.628	Lebanon	2.864
Croatia	1.403	Cote d'Ivoire	1.642	Russia	2.952
Dominican Republic	1.403	United Arab Emirates	1.667	Ukraine	3.077
Equatorial Guinea	1.403	Tunisia	1.759	Sudan	3.083
Guyana	1.403	United States of America	1.759	Central African Republic	3.092
Honduras	1.403	China	1.780	India	3.099
Japan	1.403	Uganda	1.783	Nigeria	3.120
Laos	1.403	Haiti	1.796	Turkey	3.178
Montenegro	1.403	Belarus	1.805	Libya	3.262
Oman	1.403	Cuba	1.805	Somalia	3.292
Panama	1.403	Kosovo	1.805	South Sudan	3.310
Papua New Guinea	1.403	Lesotho	1.805	Iraq	3.347
Paraguay	1.403	Moldova	1.805	Pakistan	3.350
Poland	1.403	Turkmenistan	1.805	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.379
Slovakia	1.403	Uzbekistan	1.805	Yemen	3.621
Slovenia	1.403	Georgia	1.806	Afghanistan	3.641
Eswatini	1.403	Greece	1.806	Syria	3.828
Timor-Leste	1.403	South Korea	1.806		
Vietnam	1.403	Togo	1.811		

TABLE C.2

Societal Safety and Security domain, most to least peaceful

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Iceland	1.164	United States of America	2.309	Dominican Republic	2.716
Singapore	1.224	Cyprus	2.316	Uganda	2.717
Japan	1.256	The Gambia	2.319	Guinea	2.723
Norway	1.256	Mongolia	2.320	Haiti	2.735
Switzerland	1.277	Uruguay	2.323	Argentina	2.780
Denmark	1.316	Kazakhstan	2.328	Bahrain	2.785
New Zealand	1.367	Armenia	2.347	Myanmar	2.804
Finland	1.383	Saudi Arabia	2.371	Trinidad and Tobago	2.808
Portugal	1.415	India	2.385	Burkina Faso	2.816
Canada	1.425	Albania	2.392	Guyana	2.834
Australia	1.433	Morocco	2.398	Cote d'Ivoire	2.886
Slovenia	1.452	Tanzania	2.398	Ethiopia	2.904
Austria	1.463	Sri Lanka	2.408	Thailand	2.905
Sweden	1.473	Timor-Leste	2.414	Papua New Guinea	2.928
South Korea	1.496	Uzbekistan	2.427	Chad	2.929
Qatar	1.549	Kyrgyz Republic	2.437	Jamaica	2.932
Czech Republic	1.582	Zambia	2.437	Republic of the Congo	2.933
Ireland	1.586	Israel	2.441	Philippines	2.951
The Netherlands	1.609	Liberia	2.444	Pakistan	2.966
Germany	1.633	Nepal	2.449	Palestine	2.985
Bhutan	1.664	Equatorial Guinea	2.450	Iran	3.006
Taiwan	1.766	Belarus	2.452	Russia	3.022
United Arab Emirates	1.771	Bangladesh	2.453	Cameroon	3.068
Slovakia	1.786	Moldova	2.468	North Korea	3.100
Greece	1.795	Namibia	2.475	Guatemala	3.107
Croatia	1.800	Panama	2.479	Zimbabwe	3.107
Belgium	1.803	Paraguay	2.489	Lebanon	3.120
United Kingdom	1.816	Rwanda	2.491	Mauritania	3.126
Romania	1.858	Algeria	2.502	Nigeria	3.186
Kuwait	1.879	Benin	2.510	South Africa	3.193
Hungary	1.902	Cambodia	2.515	Burundi	3.221
Spain	1.910	Georgia	2.522	Mexico	3.225
Poland	1.927	Tunisia	2.523	Niger	3.228
Estonia	1.945	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.526	El Salvador	3.229
Lithuania	1.962	Djibouti	2.552	Honduras	3.230
Oman	1.988	China	2.554	Brazil	3.292
France	2.005	Cuba	2.560	Ukraine	3.307
Bulgaria	2.038	Tajikistan	2.560	Turkey	3.318
Mauritius	2.056	Eswatini	2.566	Colombia	3.366
Malaysia	2.057	Kosovo	2.575	Nicaragua	3.366
Latvia	2.062	Azerbaijan	2.578	Mali	3.374
Italy	2.079	Lesotho	2.584	Sudan	3.484
Ghana	2.102	Ecuador	2.585	Eritrea	3.514
Costa Rica	2.146	Madagascar	2.585	Libya	3.652
Serbia	2.160	Egypt	2.589	Syria	3.835
Laos	2.179	Mozambique	2.591	Somalia	3.916
Sierra Leone	2.192	Bolivia	2.602	Yemen	3.922
Senegal	2.229	Montenegro	2.611	Central African Republic	3.942
Chile	2.235	Angola	2.620	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.982
Indonesia	2.239	Gabon	2.640	Venezuela	4.034
Vietnam	2.240	Peru	2.647	South Sudan	4.074
Botswana	2.250	Turkmenistan	2.647	Iraq	4.150
North Macedonia	2.276	Guinea-Bissau	2.659	Afghanistan	4.275
Jordan	2.305	Kenya	2.664		
Malawi	2.306	Togo	2.667		

TABLE C.3

Militarisation domain, most peaceful to least

COUNTRY	SCORE
Iceland	1.029
Hungary	1.151
New Zealand	1.170
Slovenia	1.170
Moldova	1.236
Malaysia	1.269
Ireland	1.273
Portugal	1.279
Denmark	1.315
Austria	1.328
Bhutan	1.346
Czech Republic	1.351
Mongolia	1.381
Madagascar	1.399
Mauritius	1.404
Indonesia	1.414
Slovakia	1.423
Latvia	1.446
Japan	1.455
Panama	1.482
Tanzania	1.482
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.488
Burundi	1.499
Canada	1.500
Zambia	1.516
Belgium	1.527
Montenegro	1.538
Thailand	1.539
Poland	1.545
Timor-Leste	1.546
Dominican Republic	1.548
Cyprus	1.552
Liberia	1.561
Rwanda	1.561
Eswatini	1.570
Kosovo	1.574
Guyana	1.577
Croatia	1.578
Estonia	1.578
Myanmar	1.588
Cuba	1.591
Malawi	1.592
Costa Rica	1.594
Equatorial Guinea	1.600
Uruguay	1.606
Bangladesh	1.609
Serbia	1.635
Nicaragua	1.639
Albania	1.641
Lithuania	1.646
Chile	1.655
Philippines	1.656
Argentina	1.668
Kyrgyz Republic	1.668
Mexico	1.671

COUNTRY	SCORE
El Salvador	1.673
Bahrain	1.675
Cote d'Ivoire	1.675
Jamaica	1.681
Ethiopia	1.690
Botswana	1.692
Senegal	1.694
North Macedonia	1.702
Morocco	1.727
Namibia	1.728
Finland	1.732
Guatemala	1.736
Ghana	1.744
Cameroon	1.747
Romania	1.747
Sierra Leone	1.749
Taiwan	1.753
Mozambique	1.762
Tajikistan	1.773
Mali	1.782
Mauritania	1.782
Sweden	1.791
Bulgaria	1.797
South Africa	1.805
Georgia	1.807
Australia	1.814
The Gambia	1.819
Lesotho	1.822
Kazakhstan	1.825
Angola	1.827
United Arab Emirates	1.827
Tunisia	1.840
Honduras	1.862
Uganda	1.868
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.871
Kuwait	1.871
Papua New Guinea	1.872
Niger	1.875
Sri Lanka	1.879
Spain	1.892
Benin	1.893
Guinea	1.898
Peru	1.899
Ecuador	1.904
Laos	1.907
Germany	1.910
Haiti	1.925
Nepal	1.934
Gabon	1.937
Kenya	1.945
Togo	1.955
Venezuela	1.968
Belarus	1.970
Italy	1.978
Singapore	1.986

COUNTRY	SCORE
Cambodia	1.990
Palestine	1.991
Paraguay	1.998
Qatar	2.000
Jordan	2.014
China	2.017
Burkina Faso	2.037
Switzerland	2.042
Turkey	2.047
Brazil	2.049
Zimbabwe	2.054
Eritrea	2.061
Trinidad and Tobago	2.064
Republic of the Congo	2.067
Vietnam	2.067
Nigeria	2.070
Guinea-Bissau	2.098
Ukraine	2.099
Bolivia	2.109
Djibouti	2.116
Armenia	2.119
The Netherlands	2.120
Colombia	2.122
Azerbaijan	2.139
Chad	2.154
Iran	2.154
Greece	2.176
Uzbekistan	2.216
Algeria	2.222
Central African Republic	2.238
Yemen	2.263
Somalia	2.264
Sudan	2.268
Lebanon	2.325
Turkmenistan	2.335
Norway	2.369
Egypt	2.385
South Korea	2.435
India	2.491
United Kingdom	2.495
Pakistan	2.553
South Sudan	2.560
Afghanistan	2.593
Iraq	2.622
Libya	2.664
Syria	2.667
Saudi Arabia	2.690
Oman	2.704
France	2.767
United States of America	3.060
North Korea	3.224
Russia	3.241
Israel	3.914

APPENDIX D

Economic Cost of Violence

The economic impact of violence includes the direct and indirect costs of violence as well as an economic multiplier applied to the direct costs. The economic cost of violence includes only the direct and indirect costs. Per capita and percentage of GDP results are calculated using the economic cost of violence.

TABLE D.1

Economic cost of violence

ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2019 PPP)	PER CAPITA IMPACT (2019, PPP)	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2019 PPP)
1	Syria	13,460.0	913.6	60%	16,705.4
2	South Sudan	3,026.9	264.5	57%	3,416.7
3	Afghanistan	35,601.1	1,552.1	51%	56,453.0
4	Venezuela	38,174.8	1,289.7	48%	41,760.9
5	Somalia	1,865.5	156.6	38%	2,377.0
6	Central African Republic	1,574.5	401.3	38%	1,901.2
7	North Korea	5,991.3	439.9	34%	11,266.1
8	Cyprus	10,027.9	9,499.3	31%	11,295.5
9	Iraq	177,522.9	7,255.5	26%	285,430.5
10	Sudan	36,354.2	1,375.7	24%	57,107.6
11	Colombia	169,517.8	4,355.7	23%	215,451.2
12	Yemen	17,756.7	870.0	22%	25,155.9
13	Libya	20,615.0	5,396.4	22%	34,920.0
14	Palestinian Territories	2,765.5	859.8	19%	4,344.5
15	Eritrea	978.0	248.7	18%	1,290.0
16	El Salvador	9,850.7	2,066.5	18%	13,249.6
17	Mali	6,575.5	551.3	14%	10,533.5
18	Georgia	5,830.7	2,011.7	14%	7,859.8
19	Jamaica	3,853.7	1,740.3	14%	5,044.6
20	Lesotho	954.7	549.9	14%	1,244.5
21	Zimbabwe	2,364.1	210.8	13%	3,565.1
22	South Africa	99,977.0	2,533.0	13%	145,387.8
23	Honduras	6,506.4	897.7	13%	8,453.5
24	Mauritania	2,315.6	905.9	12%	4,113.0
25	Oman	22,846.7	9,314.5	12%	44,988.4
26	Saudi Arabia	212,186.9	12,415.0	11%	416,578.6
27	Ukraine	50,420.6	1,870.1	11%	82,303.7
28	Russia	419,851.3	4,971.3	10%	715,694.1
29	Trinidad & Tobago	4,370.0	4,520.8	10%	6,205.2
30	Botswana	4,355.5	2,871.8	10%	6,700.5
31	Mexico	270,011.9	2,749.9	10%	359,571.1
32	United Arab Emirates	71,907.6	14,890.8	10%	142,081.9
33	Algeria	63,861.0	2,936.0	10%	123,337.6
34	Brazil	327,020.1	2,143.0	10%	451,891.6
35	Azerbaijan	17,524.9	2,806.7	10%	27,853.7
36	Bahrain	7,162.5	8,717.3	10%	13,659.9
37	Kosovo	757.0	673.0	9%	1,292.2
38	Bosnia & Herzegovina	4,477.8	1,944.1	9%	6,811.1
39	Congo - Brazzaville	2,797.9	774.6	9%	4,182.5
40	Namibia	2,426.8	1,504.9	9%	3,894.3
41	Burundi	879.1	116.8	9%	1,310.1
42	Serbia	10,945.0	2,148.9	9%	18,829.0
43	Swaziland	1,030.9	1,105.4	9%	1,538.0
44	Myanmar (Burma)	19,409.1	538.8	8%	29,019.9
45	Cuba	8,419.1	1,099.1	8%	12,627.1

TABLE D.1

Economic cost of violence (continued)

ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2019 PPP)	PER CAPITA IMPACT (2019, PPP)	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2019 PPP)
46	Kuwait	24,802.7	11,424.9	8%	47,951.6
47	Turkey	186,936.8	3,802.1	8%	311,457.6
48	Niger	1,961.7	157.5	8%	3,513.2
49	United States	1,675,322.8	9,017.3	8%	2,946,557.7
50	Montenegro	983.9	2,911.7	8%	1,832.1
51	Armenia	2,556.5	1,628.6	8%	4,778.6
52	Pakistan	82,500.0	760.9	8%	152,804.5
53	Uzbekistan	26,001.1	1,557.5	8%	50,409.4
54	Guyana	549.7	1,018.5	8%	796.7
55	Guatemala	11,556.1	838.3	8%	14,457.2
56	Bhutan	680.6	1,459.5	8%	1,192.5
57	Lebanon	7,039.5	2,134.9	8%	13,008.8
58	Argentina	59,640.5	2,248.4	8%	100,478.4
59	Nigeria	99,068.9	664.5	8%	130,166.1
60	Israel	27,466.1	5,894.2	7%	49,822.3
61	Chad	2,174.0	230.7	7%	3,542.6
62	Congo - Kinshasa	5,858.9	87.5	7%	7,347.7
63	Lithuania	7,095.4	4,127.2	7%	11,871.7
64	Latvia	4,214.2	3,815.8	7%	7,364.2
65	Liberia	427.8	162.2	7%	787.1
66	United Kingdom	196,934.1	4,807.3	7%	320,039.6
67	Uruguay	5,440.8	2,552.6	7%	8,856.2
68	Bulgaria	10,419.6	2,754.8	7%	19,385.3
69	Burkina Faso	2,654.2	248.6	7%	4,911.2
70	France	188,952.1	4,952.8	6%	323,087.9
71	Côte d'Ivoire	6,928.2	385.5	6%	9,600.9
72	Costa Rica	5,651.1	1,699.7	6%	8,418.7
73	Taiwan	36,813.9	2,446.4	6%	57,965.6
74	Gambia	406.2	308.6	6%	667.8
75	Sri Lanka	17,442.6	1,417.0	6%	29,685.2
76	Estonia	2,858.2	3,885.7	6%	5,077.8
77	Greece	18,244.3	3,141.8	6%	35,006.8
78	Poland	67,049.7	3,202.0	6%	122,011.3
79	Vietnam	44,122.6	833.0	6%	80,377.0
80	Belgium	32,485.8	4,423.4	6%	50,863.0
81	Macedonia	1,968.4	1,771.8	6%	3,694.4
82	Albania	2,257.3	1,370.7	6%	4,022.1
83	Cameroon	5,478.3	281.5	6%	6,945.8
84	Belarus	11,429.2	2,035.7	6%	19,241.5
85	Australia	71,196.8	4,917.4	6%	121,815.7
86	Djibouti	343.4	607.9	6%	590.5
87	Guinea-Bissau	184.6	155.7	6%	296.9
88	Hungary	18,715.8	3,355.3	6%	32,509.0
89	Morocco	17,921.4	894.3	6%	32,365.0
90	Gabon	2,135.1	1,745.3	6%	3,608.6
91	Tunisia	7,870.3	1,255.3	6%	14,636.2
92	Bolivia	5,268.0	782.0	6%	8,771.2
93	Ecuador	11,060.7	1,135.6	6%	19,150.3
94	Peru	26,335.9	1,335.9	6%	43,486.5
95	Jordan	5,458.7	1,060.4	6%	10,502.1
96	Turkmenistan	7,132.3	2,239.0	6%	13,101.2
97	Haiti	1,044.7	139.2	6%	1,546.9
98	Dominican Republic	10,774.4	1,544.0	5%	16,803.8
99	South Korea	112,679.3	3,706.6	5%	189,648.0
100	Romania	30,166.4	2,851.3	5%	55,830.0
101	Togo	773.9	156.4	5%	1,249.5
102	Angola	8,902.3	504.6	5%	15,528.9
103	Portugal	17,353.7	3,081.6	5%	31,713.7
104	Kyrgyzstan	1,286.4	371.9	5%	2,281.0
105	Iran	87,807.2	1,967.0	5%	161,318.3
106	Moldova	1,345.0	561.0	5%	2,266.9
107	Senegal	3,034.5	305.4	5%	4,976.7
108	Uganda	4,958.6	171.6	5%	7,598.3
109	Slovakia	9,387.0	3,108.4	5%	16,940.1
110	Chile	23,415.8	2,152.8	5%	39,175.3
111	Mongolia	2,292.6	1,216.7	5%	3,798.2

TABLE D.1

Economic cost of violence (continued)

ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2019 PPP)	PER CAPITA IMPACT (2019, PPP)	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2019 PPP)
112	India	568,464.6	728.1	5%	985,945.8
113	Nicaragua	1,711.5	398.8	5%	2,506.3
114	New Zealand	9,977.5	3,426.3	5%	16,273.7
115	Italy	119,968.2	3,737.6	5%	221,604.6
116	Singapore	28,182.0	9,115.1	5%	52,793.7
117	Croatia	5,521.6	2,209.9	5%	9,203.6
118	Ethiopia	11,560.2	141.6	5%	15,229.7
119	Rwanda	1,433.2	166.2	5%	2,078.0
120	Sierra Leone	604.6	134.5	5%	1,038.7
121	Tajikistan	1,616.7	336.0	5%	3,060.3
122	Nepal	4,172.8	253.6	5%	7,512.6
123	Paraguay	4,381.1	963.6	5%	6,645.9
124	Germany	194,454.3	4,069.4	5%	334,882.8
125	Spain	81,759.7	3,254.6	4%	151,003.5
126	Panama	4,977.7	1,806.0	4%	7,517.9
127	Netherlands	42,196.1	4,407.4	4%	75,297.9
128	Czechia	18,591.2	3,186.8	4%	33,860.4
129	China	1,149,022.9	1,500.3	4%	2,123,019.7
130	Sweden	22,431.6	3,654.1	4%	36,477.9
131	Slovenia	3,415.6	2,855.8	4%	5,943.7
132	Kazakhstan	20,281.5	1,660.4	4%	30,557.6
133	Norway	13,985.8	4,551.2	4%	24,364.4
134	Guinea	1,573.5	191.0	4%	2,492.5
135	Finland	10,611.3	3,262.3	4%	18,081.2
136	Philippines	41,648.7	611.7	4%	65,152.6
137	Thailand	55,622.3	1,350.1	4%	93,406.2
138	Benin	1,545.7	228.5	4%	2,624.9
139	Mozambique	1,757.9	100.5	4%	3,068.0
140	Zambia	2,612.2	243.1	4%	4,280.0
141	Papua New Guinea	1,404.5	254.0	4%	2,138.0
142	Egypt	55,173.9	1,017.6	4%	101,121.6
143	Laos	2,043.4	453.2	4%	3,154.8
144	Malaysia	37,099.7	2,069.0	4%	66,294.4
145	Timor-Leste	394.4	518.0	4%	685.8
146	Switzerland	20,735.0	4,168.8	4%	35,618.5
147	Tanzania	6,647.0	182.9	3%	10,810.3
148	Japan	193,426.4	2,607.3	3%	331,611.5
149	Cambodia	2,657.7	292.5	3%	4,751.2
150	Mauritius	1,044.6	1,433.5	3%	1,818.2
151	Denmark	10,814.3	3,210.7	3%	18,475.2
152	Madagascar	1,531.7	86.9	3%	2,281.7
153	Austria	16,384.1	3,185.4	3%	27,878.1
154	Equatorial Guinea	889.4	1,069.1	3%	1,404.7
155	Kenya	6,606.3	207.9	3%	10,594.8
156	Canada	59,215.2	2,491.7	3%	92,076.5
157	Iceland	529.8	2,439.0	3%	823.8
158	Ireland	10,918.2	3,712.4	3%	17,833.2
159	Bangladesh	21,225.3	211.5	3%	35,190.3
160	Ghana	3,505.4	202.5	2%	5,967.4
161	Qatar	8,425.3	5,746.1	2%	15,484.8
162	Malawi	534.8	48.3	2%	925.0
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
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