{"id":12520,"date":"2011-05-30T12:00:29","date_gmt":"2011-05-30T11:00:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=12520"},"modified":"2011-05-27T20:34:10","modified_gmt":"2011-05-27T19:34:10","slug":"the-battle-for-libya-up-in-smoke","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2011\/05\/the-battle-for-libya-up-in-smoke\/","title":{"rendered":"The Battle for Libya: Up in Smoke"},"content":{"rendered":"

If Libyans let the West completely control the war, the country risks receiving a ‘bill’ at the end that it cannot pay.<\/em><\/p>\n

It was meant to be rapid, unburdened by collateral damage or ethical liability and in support of a worthy cause: Ridding Libya of Gaddafi as a helping hand for the spectacular Arab Spring.<\/p>\n

In reality, the battle for Libya is\u00a0everything but that. It is progressing slowly and remaining inconclusive. Worse, its collateral damage has been mounting, and consequently the ethics are\u00a0beginning to look\u00a0shaky.<\/p>\n

The word muddle comes to mind.<\/p>\n

And there are five questions that urgently need answers.<\/p>\n

‘Iraq endgame’ looming?<\/strong><\/p>\n

While there are plenty of differences between Libya and Iraq, there is an ‘oil’ connection that justifies the comparison.<\/p>\n

Gaddafi and Saddam share many misdemeanours –\u00a0but there are important differences between the two: Gaddafi never invaded any\u00a0neighbouring states and\u00a0he\u00a0also\u00a0agreed to give up his nuclear ambitions. It was Saddam’s fate that\u00a0prompted Gaddafi\u00a0to give up his rudimentary Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme and engage in information-sharing about it with the West in the first place.<\/p>\n

When he did, Gaddafi\u00a0was embraced by the West\u00a0from which\u00a0he received billions of petro-dollars. It’s also worth noting the countries in which he recycled this money,\u00a0namely, in key EU states starting with France and Italy –\u00a0two countries who are at war with him\u00a0today.<\/p>\n

Italy’s embattled Berlusconi surely knew about Gaddafi’s oppression of his people when he signed a friendship treaty with the colonel in 2008. Berlusconi’s unethical free-wheeling diplomacy even pandered to Gaddafi’s whim to preach Islam to glamourous Italian ladies. The same questionable\u00a0diplomacy, inaugurated in 2004 by Tony Blair’s “hand of friendship” with Gaddafi’s oil-rich Libya, also applies to Spain and France.<\/p>\n

This is part of the whole muddle surrounding the mess in Libya.<\/p>\n

So far, all NATO has been able to produce is a stalemate in Libya, scorn over civilian deaths and questions about its real intentions.<\/p>\n

Indeed the US should be thinking about scaling down\u00a0war-making\u00a0by its Nobel Laureate president, instead of the opposite. Obama has shown that\u00a0he does not lack the imperial bona fides needed when he was called upon to act decisively\u00a0by France and Britain to protect civilians in Libya.<\/p>\n

However, in light of the stalemate, and despite Obama’s opposition to sending ground troops, is it conceivable that Libya\u00a0is secretly still being strategised by NATO as the next Iraq?<\/p>\n

NATO vs Gaddafi: What are the\u00a0options?<\/strong><\/p>\n

If Libya is to be a testing ground for western military hardware and European hard-power, the agenda of the mission would eventually be totally altered from protection of civilians to a grand scheme increasingly hinting at imperial designs. It\u00a0would move beyond\u00a0being\u00a0a UN-mandated mission for ‘protection of civilians’ with no commitment to send occupying boots to Libya. But this, of course, would require a new UN mandate.<\/p>\n

The stalemate is far from the possibly zero-sum game NATO had in mind: To dislodge Gaddafi from power swiftly and display military kudos that might serve as a veiled threat to other Arab dictators busy killing protesters in their streets.<\/p>\n

Unless the Libyan Transitional National Council, NATO and the Arab League consider new options –\u00a0for instance,\u00a0cutting their\u00a0losses by offering the Gaddafis a deal they cannot refuse,\u00a0safe passage out of the country\u00a0and immunity from prosecution in return for surrender – Gaddafi is not going to be easily defeated, and definitely not by the imposition of a no-fly zone or even\u00a0by thousands of additional\u00a0sorties against his military hardware and fighting units. Nor will\u00a0his defeat\u00a0be hastened by Arab provision of logistical support and weapons.<\/p>\n

Gaddafi knows he cannot win the conflict. But he also knows NATO cannot defeat him without sending in ground troops.<\/p>\n

Afghanistan-isation of Libya?<\/strong><\/p>\n

If NATO wants to get more involved in Libya it could probably operationalise a quasi Bosnia-Kosovo strategy. Its content resonates with ‘humanitarianism’ by performing combat missions to protect civilians while at the same time fighting Gaddafi specifically.<\/p>\n

One\u00a0of the likely problems with this plan is\u00a0that once the boots are\u00a0on the ground,\u00a0the strategy could take on the character of the conflict\u00a0in Afghanistan. If NATO draws up such a plan for Libya, chances are\u00a0that it will find itself drawn\u00a0deeper into the quicksands of the Libyan battlefield.<\/p>\n

NATO would be drawn into Libya\u00a0by none other than al-Qaeda’s Organisation in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM). In the event of\u00a0an intervention by ground troops, AQIM’s Salafi lineage would\u00a0most likely judge\u00a0Libya to be\u00a0ripe terrain for its twin agenda of preaching and combatting\u00a0‘infidels’ (NATO forces).<\/p>\n

Plus, in its post-bin Laden phase, AQIM and al-Qaeda\u00a0in general\u00a0would welcome a battlefield to regroup, re-sharpen its fangs, and recruit foot soldiers against Western ‘infidels’ and neo-imperialism.<\/p>\n

This is a group that\u00a0has proven itself to\u00a0be lethal, and one that\u00a0owes its own identity partially\u00a0to the Afghan war against the former Soviets and partially, of course, against the junta that ruled after the\u00a0cancellation of the second round of elections in Algeria in 1992.<\/p>\n

Of course, this is only a hypothesis –\u00a0but one that Gaddafi would cherish. It would give him a badly needed reprieve and validate his political rhetoric that it is\u00a0al-Qaeda,\u00a0not freedom-hungry citizens,\u00a0that is attempting\u00a0to topple his regime.<\/p>\n

When it comes to\u00a0al-Qaeda and authoritarianism, the second has featured as the lesser of the two evils in the eyes of\u00a0Western governments who have\u00a0invested so much in fighting.\u00a0The West\u00a0may be able to\u00a0control and co-opt the latter –\u00a0but not so successfully the former (despite attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan).<\/p>\n

Historically, Western military intervention, in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, had either to be justified or re-calibrated and prolonged to fight al-Qaeda. This is also true in\u00a0Kosovo where intervention initially was calculated to be short. But that situation proved strategists wrong – NATO and US troops had to stay on for years after the guns fell silent.<\/p>\n

If there\u00a0is a\u00a0lesson to be learned from Iraq, it is that nothing helps groups like AQIM thrive more\u00a0than ground occupation.<\/p>\n

Whatever rationale may be used to justify sending ground troops into Libya, post-Gaddafi reconstruction or peace-keeping, the outcome will be the same – and\u00a0AQIM would be there too. Foreign troops will\u00a0create resentment and will most likely be dragged into an unwinnable fight they never wanted –\u00a0as the results of the West’s direct intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq amply shows.<\/p>\n

Similarly, the presence of al-Qaeda in Libya\u00a0may be one development that\u00a0would please some NATO commanders and states. The reason for this is that it would\u00a0prompt a much more active and enthusiastic US intervention in Libya.<\/p>\n

Were AQIM to gain ground in Libya, the implications could potentially be very\u00a0serious for the two Arab states that have been able to\u00a0topple their dictators and seem to be on the way to adopting democratic systems. Plus, the Salafi current is more prominent in Tunisia now\u00a0than it was before Bin Ali’s advent in power and commands a substantial following in Egypt.<\/p>\n

Note that this scenario,\u00a0characterised by more involvement by al-Qaeda, worries not only the Transitional National Council but also the other civic bodies who will be re-shaping politics in post-Gaddafi Libya.<\/p>\n

Libya: Whose battle is it anyway?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The battle for Libya increasingly tempts one to ask who is pulling the trigger. Leaders of the Transitional National Council undoubtedly do a great deal of lip-shooting, and obviously the weak rebel forces do a bit more.<\/p>\n

The Libyan agency\u00a0in charge of\u00a0deciding the conduct of the war and its overall strategic aims seems to be quickly falling under the\u00a0influence of powers who provided the\u00a0expensive, state of the art weaponry\u00a0that is being used to\u00a0execute the bulk of the\u00a0fighting.<\/p>\n

Already the conflict has changed. It has no relation to any pretences of an Arab Spring or a democratising agenda.<\/p>\n

Libyans\u00a0who oppose\u00a0Gaddafi have to ask themselves an important\u00a0question:\u00a0Who is running the battle and\u00a0why?<\/p>\n

Even more importantly, what\u00a0is the price\u00a0of delegating the war against Gaddafi to the West? In international politics there is no such thing as a\u00a0free lunch, so to speak.<\/p>\n

The stalemate, possible protraction or even\u00a0more direct intervention are all dynamics\u00a0that would\u00a0augment the internationalisation of the battle for Libya. Increased internationalisation naturally chips into the Libyan side’s share in the struggle –\u00a0in which the stakes are high for all Libyans, not\u00a0just the rebels.<\/p>\n

Plus, there is the moral responsibility that\u00a0comes with the territory of delegating war to foreign powers, especially when the conflict is in a protracted stalemate.<\/p>\n

Hence,\u00a0it is crucial that\u00a0the rebels\u00a0and\u00a0the Transitional National Council avoid sole reliance on the West as well as making it a priority to develop alternative back-up plans. This should\u00a0include negotiating an exit policy for Gaddafi if that is likely to spare Libya the trauma of all-out war, humanitarian crisis, loss of human rights, and dependence on the West.<\/p>\n

Gaddafi in Charge?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Gaddafi’s ‘Houdini’ instinct has a great deal to do with the stalemate. He realises NATO cannot defeat him without ground troops and at\u00a0the same time\u00a0that he cannot win. He cannot even so much as\u00a0recover Misurata –\u00a0much less Benghazi.<\/p>\n

With his back to the wall and nowhere to retire from politics safely, luxuriously\u00a0and with\u00a0impunity; Gaddafi may be the one deciding the outcome of this war. It is conceivable that his strategy right now is to dig in for a no-win-no-lose war.<\/p>\n

His troops are\u00a0trying desperately\u00a0to give the impression of strong attacks in order to camouflage their complete\u00a0defensiveness and weakness.<\/p>\n

The reality on the ground, within a prolonged stalemate, might actually be what Gaddafi really desires – entrenching the East-West division, and\u00a0returning to the pre-1963 divisions. That means\u00a0Tripolitania for the Gaddafis and Cyrenaica for those who have rejected his revolution and sought to author their own.<\/p>\n

For now, the battle for Libya, Operation Odyssey Dawn,\u00a0lacks the strength of character and right development of Odysseus. It is\u00a0obscured by\u00a0smoke screens, a far cry from the symbolism of fulfilment contained in the metaphor of dawn.<\/p>\n

________________________<\/p>\n

Dr Larbi Sadiki is a Senior Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter, and author of Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009) and The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (Columbia University Press, 2004).<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 aljazeera.net<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

It was meant to be rapid, unburdened by collateral damage or ethical liability and in support of a worthy cause: Ridding Libya of Gaddafi as a helping hand for the spectacular Arab Spring. In reality, the battle for Libya is everything but that. It is progressing slowly and remaining inconclusive. Worse, its collateral damage has been mounting, and consequently the ethics are beginning to look shaky. The word muddle comes to mind.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[57],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12520","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-militarism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12520","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12520"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12520\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12520"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12520"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12520"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}