![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/10\/bp_wells.jpg\" "\\"Wells\\"")
<\/a>\n24,486 permanent and 3,593 temporarily abandoned wells in the Gulf of Mexico<\/p>\n
Since BP\u2019s catastrophic Macondo Blowout in the Gulf of Mexico last year, the Obama Administration has granted nearly 300 new drilling permits [1] and shirked plans to plug 3,600 of more than 28,000 abandoned wells, which pose significant threats to the severely damaged sea.<\/p>\n
Among those granted new permits for drilling in the Gulf, on Friday Obama granted BP permission to explore for oil in the Gulf, allowing it to bid on new leases that will be sold at auction in December.<\/p>\n
Reports Dow Jones:<\/p>\n
\u201cThe upcoming lease sale, scheduled for Dec. 14 in New Orleans, involves leases in the western Gulf of Mexico. The leases cover about 21 million acres, in water depths of up to 11,000 feet. It will be the first lease auction since the Deepwater Horizon spill.\u201d [2]<\/p>\n
Massachusetts Rep. Ed Markey objected to BP\u2019s participation in the upcoming lease sale, pointing out that:<\/p>\n
\u201cComprehensive safety legislation hasn\u2019t passed Congress, and BP hasn\u2019t paid the fines they owe for their spill, yet BP is being given back the keys to drill in the Gulf.\u201d<\/p>\n
Environmental watchdog, Oceana, added its objection to the new permits, saying that none of the new rules implemented since April 2010 would have prevented the BP disaster.<\/p>\n
\u201cOur analysis shows that while the new rules may increase safety to some degree, they likely would not have prevented the last major oil spill, and similarly do not adequately protect against future ones.\u201d [3]<\/p>\n
Detailing the failure of the Dept. of Interior\u2019s safety management systems, Oceana summarizes:<\/p>\n
- \n
- Regulation exemptions (\u201cdepartures\u201d) are often granted, including one that arguably led to the BP blowout;<\/li>\n
- Economic incentives make violating rules lucrative because penalties are ridiculously small;<\/li>\n
- Blowout preventers continue to have critical deficiencies; and<\/li>\n
- Oversight and inspection levels are paltry relative to the scale of drilling operation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
Nor have any drilling permits been denied [4] since the BP catastrophe on April 20, 2010, which still spews oil today [5].<\/p>\n
28,079 Abandoned Wells in Gulf of Mexico<\/span><\/h3>\n
In an explosive report at Sky Truth, John Amos reveals from government data that \u201cthere are currently 24,486 known permanently abandoned wells in the Gulf of Mexico, and <\/em>3,593 \u2018temporarily\u2019 abandoned wells, as of October 2011.\u201d\u00a0[6]<\/p>\n
TA wells are those temporarily sealed so that future drilling can be re-started. Both TA wells and \u201cpermanently abandoned\u201d (PA) wells endure no inspections.<\/p>\n
Over a year ago, the Dept. of Interior promised to plug the \u201ctemporarily abandoned\u201d (TA) wells, and dismantle another 650 production platforms no longer in use. [7] At an estimated decommissioning cost of $1-3 billion [8], none of this work has been started, though Feds have approved 912 permanent abandonment plans and 214 temporary abandonment plans submitted since its September 2010 rule. [9]<\/p>\n
Over 600 of those abandoned wells belong to BP, reported the Associated Press last year, adding\u00a0that some of the permanently abandoned wells date back to the 1940s [10].\u00a0 Amos advises that some of the \u201ctemporarily abandoned\u201d wells date back to the 1950s.<\/p>\n
\u201cExperts say abandoned wells can repressurize, much like a dormant volcano can awaken. And years of exposure to sea water and underground pressure can cause cementing and piping to corrode and weaken,\u201d reports AP.<\/p>\n
Leaking abandoned wells pose a significant environmental and economic threat. A three-month EcoHearth investigation revealed that a minimum of 2.5 million abandoned wells in the US and 20-30 million worldwide receive no follow up inspections to ensure they are not leaking. Worse:<\/p>\n
\u201cThere is no known technology for securely sealing these tens of millions of abandoned wells. Many\u2014likely hundreds of thousands\u2014are already hemorrhaging oil, brine and greenhouse gases into the environment. Habitats are being fundamentally altered. Aquifers are being destroyed. Some of these abandoned wells are explosive, capable of building-leveling, toxin-spreading detonations. And thanks to primitive capping technologies, virtually all are leaking now\u2014or will be.\u201d [11]<\/p>\n
Sealed with cement, adds EcoHearth, \u201cEach abandoned well is an environmental disaster waiting to happen. The triggers include accidents, earthquakes, natural erosion, re-pressurization (either spontaneous or precipitated by fracking) and, simply, time.\u201d<\/p>\n
As far back as 1994, the Government Accountability Office warned that there was no effective strategy in place to inspect abandoned wells, nor were bonds sufficient to cover the cost of abandonment. Lease abandonment costs estimated at \u201c$4.4 billion in current dollars \u2026 were covered by only $68 million in bonds.\u201d [12]<\/p>\n
The GAO concluded that \u201cleaks can occur\u2026 causing serious damage to the environment and marine life,\u201d adding that \u201cMMS has not encouraged the development of nonexplosive structure removal technologies that would eliminate or minimize environmental damage.\u201d<\/p>\n
Not only cement, but seals, valves and gaskets can deteriorate over time. A 2000 report by C-FER Technologies to the Dept. of Interior identified several\u00a0 different points where well leaks can occur, as this image (p. 26<\/a><\/span><\/span>) reveals.\u00a0 To date, no regulations prescribe a maximum time wells may remain inactive before being permanently abandoned. [13]<\/p>\n
\u201cThe most common failure mechanisms (corrosion, deterioration, and malfunction) cause mainly small leaks [up to 49 barrels, or 2,058 gallons]. Corrosion is historically known to cause 85% to 90% of small leaks.\u201d<\/p>\n
Depending on various factors, C-FER concludes that \u201cShut-In\u201d wells reach an environmental risk threshhold in six months, TA wells in about 10-12 years, and PA wells in 25 years.\u00a0 Some of these abandoned wells are 63 years old.<\/p>\n
The AP noted that none of the 1994 GAO recommendations have been implemented. Abandoned wells remain uninspected and pose a threat which the government continues to ignore.<\/p>\n
Agency Reorganization<\/span><\/h3>\n
The Minerals Management Service (MMS) was renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) last May after MMS drew heavy fire for malfeasance, including allowing exemptions to safety rules it granted to BP. An Office of Inspector General investigation revealed that MMS employees accepted gifts from the oil and gas industry, including sex, drugs and trips, and falsified inspection reports. [14]<\/p>\n
Not only was nothing was done with the 1994 GAO recommendations to protect the environment from abandoned wells, its 2003 reorganization recommendations [15] were likewise ignored.\u00a0 In a June 2011 report on agency reorganization in the aftermath of the Gulf oil spill, the GAO reports that \u201cas of December 2010,\u201d the DOI \u201chad not implemented many recommendations we made to address numerous weaknesses and challenges.\u201d [16]<\/p>\n
Reorganization proceeded.\u00a0 Effective October 1, 2011, the Dept. of the Interior split BOEMRE into three new federal agencies: the Office of Natural Resources Revenue to collect mineral leasing fees, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) \u201cto carry out the offshore energy management and safety and environmental oversight missions.\u201d The DOI admits:<\/p>\n
\u201cThe Deepwater Horizon<\/em> blowout and resulting oil spill shed light on weaknesses in the federal offshore energy regulatory system, including the overly broad mandate and inherently conflicted missions of MMS which was charged with resource management, safety and environmental protection, and revenue collection.\u201d [17]<\/p>\n
BOEM essentially manages the development of offshore drilling, while BSEE oversees environmental protection, with some eco-protection overlap between the two agencies. [18]<\/p>\n
Early this month, BSEE Director Michael R. Bromwich spoke at the Global Offshore Safety Summit Conference in Stavanger, Norway, sponsored by the International Regulators Forum. He announced a new position, Chief Environmental Officer of the BOEM:<\/p>\n
\u201cThis person will be empowered, at the national level, to make decisions and final recommendations when leasing and environmental program heads cannot reach agreement. This individual will also be a major participant in setting the scientific agenda for the United States\u2019 oceans.\u201d [19]<\/p>\n
Bromwich failed to mention anything about the abandoned wells under his purview. Out of sight, out of mind.<\/p>\n
Cost of the Macondo Blowout<\/span><\/h3>\n
On Monday, the GAO published its final report of a three-part series on the Gulf oil disaster. [20]\u00a0 Focused on federal financial exposure to oil spill claims, the accountants nevertheless point out that, as of May 2011, BP paid $700 million toward those spill claims out of its $20 billion Trust established to cover that deadly accident. BP and Oxford Economics estimate the total cost for eco-cleanup and compensatory economic damages will run to the \u201ctens of billions of dollars.\u201d [21]<\/p>\n
On the taxpayer side, the GAO estimates the federal government\u2019s costs will exceed the billion dollar incident cap set by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (as amended). As of May 2011, agency costs reached past $626 million.<\/p>\n
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund\u2019s income is generated from an oil barrel tax that is set to expire in 2017, notes GAO.<\/p>\n
With Monday\u2019s District Court decision in Louisiana, BP also faces punitive damages on \u201cthousands of thousands of thousands of claims.\u201d U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier denied BP\u2019s appeal that might have killed several hundred thousand claims, among them that clean up workers have still not been fully paid by BP. [22]<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, destroying the planet for profit continues unabated. It\u2019s time to Occupy the Gulf of Mexico: No more oil drilling in our food source.<\/p>\n
Notes:<\/strong><\/p>\n
[1] U.S. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, \u201cStatus of Gulf of Mexico Well Permits,\u201d n.d. http:\/\/www.bsee.gov\/Regulations-and-Guidance\/Permits\/Status-of-Gulf-of-Mexico-Well-Permits.aspx<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[2] Tennille Tracy, \u201cUS Govt Approves First BP Deepwater Exploration Plan in US Gulf Under New Rules,\u201d Dow Jones News Wire, 24 Oct. 2011. Reproduced at http:\/\/www.firstenercastfinancial.com\/news\/story\/45441-us-govt-approves-first-bp-deepwater-exploration-plan-us-gulf-under-new-rules<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[3] Michael Craig and Jacqueline Savitz, \u201cFalse Sense of Safety: Safety Measures Will Not Make Offshore Drilling Safe,\u201d Oceana, 20 Oct. 2011 http:\/\/na.oceana.org\/sites\/default\/files\/reports\/OffshoreSafetyReport_Oceana_10-18-11.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
Also see Oceana\u2019s online appendix showing an analysis of each new safety measure\u2019s effect on safety. http:\/\/na.oceana.org\/sites\/default\/files\/OnlineAppendix_SafetyReport_Oceana_10-19-11.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[4] U.S. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, \u201cApplication for Permit to Drill (APD) Approval Process and Definitions,\u201d n.d. http:\/\/www.bsee.gov\/uploadedFiles\/APD_Facts_and_Definitions_BSEE.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[5] See, e.g.:<\/p>\n
David Edwards, \u201cNew evidence of a massive oil slick near Deepwater Horizon site,\u201d Raw Story, 1 Sept. 2011. http:\/\/www.rawstory.com\/rawreplay\/2011\/09\/new-evidence-of-a-massive-oil-slick-near-deepwater-horizon-site\/<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
Frank Whalen, \u201cOil Still Gushing from Bp Well in Gulf,\u201d American Free Press, 2 Sept. 2011. http:\/\/americanfreepress.net\/?p=341<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
Dahr Jamail, \u201cEnvironmental Disaster in the Gulf of Mexico: The Escalation of BP\u2019s Liability,\u201d Global Research, 5 Oct. 2011. http:\/\/www.globalresearch.ca\/index.php?context=va&aid=26947<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
Luis R. Miranda, \u201cGulf of Mexico Sea Floor Unstable, Fractured, Spilling Hydrocarbons,\u201d The Real Agenda, 10 Oct. 2011. http:\/\/real-agenda.com\/2011\/10\/10\/gulf-of-mexico-sea-floor-unstable-fractured-spilling-hydrocarbons\/<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[6] John Amos, \u201cOver 28,000 Abandoned Wells in the Gulf of Mexico,\u201d 18 Oct. 2011. http:\/\/blog.skytruth.org\/2011\/10\/abandoned-wells-in-gulf-of-mexico.html<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[7] U.S. Dept. of the Interior, \u201cInterior Department Issues \u2018Idle Iron\u2019 Guidance,\u201d 15 Sept. 2010. http:\/\/www.doi.gov\/news\/pressreleases\/Interior-Department-Issues-Idle-Iron-Guidance.cfm<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[8] Siobhan Hughes, \u201cPlugs Ordered on Idle Wells: Move to Permanently Seal Sites in Gulf Could Cost Billions but Create New Work,\u201d Wall Street Journal, 16 Sept. 2010. http:\/\/online.wsj.com\/article\/SB10001424052748703743504575493782591743858.html<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[9] U.S. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, \u201cIdle Iron Update,\u201d n.d. (pp. 9-16) https:\/\/www.noia.org\/website\/download.asp?id=47290<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[10] Jeff Donn and Mitch Weiss, \u201cGulf of Mexico hides 27,000 abandoned wells,\u201d Associated Press, 7 July 2010. http:\/\/www.dallasnews.com\/news\/state\/headlines\/20100707-Gulf-of-Mexico-hides-27-000-1068.ece<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[11] Steven Kotler, \u201cPlanet Sludge: Millions of Abandoned, Leaking Oil Wells and Natural-Gas Wells Destined to Foul Our Future,\u201d EcoHearth, 17 Aug. 2011. http:\/\/ecohearth.com\/eco-zine\/green-issues\/1609-abandoned-leaking-oil-wells-natural-gas-well-leaks-disaster.html<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[12] U.S. Government Accounting Office, \u201cOffshore Oil and Gas Resources: Interior Can Improve its Management of Lease Abandonment,\u201d (GAO\/RCED-94-82) May 1994. http:\/\/archive.gao.gov\/t2pbat3\/151878.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[13] J.R. Nichols and S.N. Kariyawasam, \u201cRisk Assessment of Temporarily Abandoned or Shut-in Wells,\u201d C-FER Technologies, Oct. 2000. http:\/\/www.boemre.gov\/tarprojects\/329\/329AA.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[14] U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, \u201cInvestigative Report \u2013 Island Operating Company, et al.,\u201d 31 March 2010. http:\/\/www.govexec.com\/pdfs\/052510ts1.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[15] U.S. Government Accounting Office, \u201cResults-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations,\u201d (GAO-03-669) 2 July 2003. http:\/\/www.gao.gov\/products\/GAO-03-669<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[16] U.S. Government Accountability Office, \u201cOil and Gas: Interior\u2019s Restructuring Challenges in the Aftermath of the Gulf Oil Spill,\u201d (GAO-11-734T) 2 June 2011. http:\/\/www.gao.gov\/new.items\/d11734t.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[17] U.S. Dept. of the Interior, \u201cInterior Department Completes Reorganization of the Former MMS,\u201d 30 Sept. 2011. http:\/\/www.doi.gov\/news\/pressreleases\/Interior-Department-Completes-Reorganization-of-the-Former-MMS.cfm#<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[18] U.S. Dept. of the Interior, untitled document distinguishing the areas of responsibility between the BOEM and the BSEE. n.d. http:\/\/www.bsee.gov\/uploadedFiles\/A%20to%20Z%20Guide%20web%20version%281%29.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[19] U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, \u201cBSEE Director Delivers Remarks at the International Regulators Forum 2011 Global Offshore Safety Summit Conference,\u201d 4 Oct. 2011. http:\/\/www.boemre.gov\/ooc\/press\/2011\/press1004.htm<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[20] U.S. Government Accountability Office, \u201cDeepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Actions Needed to Reduce Evolving but Uncertain Federal Financial Risks,\u201d (GAO-12-86), 24 Oct. 2011. http:\/\/www.gao.gov\/new.items\/d1286.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[21] U.S. Government Accountability Office, \u201cDeepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Preliminary Assessment of Federal Financial Risks and Cost Reimbursement and Notification Policies and Procedures,\u201d 9 Nov. 2010. http:\/\/www.gao.gov\/new.items\/d1190r.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
[22] Sabrina Canfield, \u201cJudge Denies BP Appeal That Might Have Killed Thousands of Claims,\u201d Courthouse News Service, 24 Oct. 2011. http:\/\/www.courthousenews.com\/2011\/10\/24\/40864.htm<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n