{"id":153317,"date":"2020-02-10T12:01:38","date_gmt":"2020-02-10T12:01:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=153317"},"modified":"2020-02-17T10:53:39","modified_gmt":"2020-02-17T10:53:39","slug":"deconstructing-the-deal-a-breakdown-of-trumps-plan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2020\/02\/deconstructing-the-deal-a-breakdown-of-trumps-plan\/","title":{"rendered":"Deconstructing the Deal: A Breakdown of Trump’s Plan"},"content":{"rendered":"

After more than two years, the US president finally unveiled his proposal on 28 Jan. What is proposed exactly and what remains unclear? <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

httpv:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=SrQ0S06tw50&feature=emb_logo<\/p>\n

Trump says the Palestinians will eventually come to the table once they realise it’s in their interests – but will this actually happen?<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

29 Jan 2020 – <\/em>After a two-year wait for Donald Trump\u2019s Middle East plan to address the Israel-Palestine conflict – framed by the businessman-turned-president\u00a0as a deal – we now know what it contains.<\/p>\n

Middle East Eye\u00a0deconstructs the 181-page plan here to give you a broad sense of what it proposes along with lingering questions over exactly how it plans to attain those aims. We’ll be adding to this as we scour the deal.<\/p>\n

1. Israeli Annexation<\/h3>\n

Most importantly – and controversially – Trump\u2019s plan accepts Israeli calls to annex the Jordan Valley and Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.<\/p>\n

To be clear, these areas are currently under military occupation by Israel\u00a0and the construction of settlements there is in violation of international law.<\/p>\n

In exchange, the plan seems to offer Palestinians areas of land along the western border of Israel, connected to the Gaza Strip,\u00a0as well as\u00a0current pockets of territory that the Palestinian Authority controls.<\/p>\n

The plan also outlines a four-year freeze on Israeli settlement construction in the areas outlined for Palestinians. But what it doesn’t address are the many roads, checkpoints and military outposts that Israel has set up that strangle this existing territory.<\/p>\n

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2. Jerusalem<\/h3>\n

All parts of occupied East Jerusalem that lie west of\u00a0Israel\u2019s separation barrier – which has also been deemed illegal by the International Court of Justice –\u00a0would be recognised as part of Israel\u2019s undivided capital under this plan. These include\u00a0large parts of the city where more than 300,000 Palestinians live,\u00a0the Old City and holy sites, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound.<\/p>\n

Abu Dis: The Palestinian ‘capital’ Saudi Arabia wants to force on Abbas – Read More \u00bb<\/a> <\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

What\u2019s left – the areas to the east and the north of the barrier – would become available for the capital of a future Palestinian state, according to the plan. The plan suggests that a Palestinian capital be cobbled together between the existing village\u00a0of Abu Dis, and the East Jerusalem neighbourhoods of\u00a0Shuafat and Kafr Aqab – a capital that\u00a0“could be named Al Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine”. The Arabic name for Jerusalem, Al-Quds, translates to “the Holy City” –\u00a0yet there are no significant religious sites in the areas suggested by the plan as a basis for the new capital.<\/p>\n

3. A Palestinian State?<\/h3>\n

But when would this Palestinian state be established?<\/p>\n

The plan says this can only happen when Palestinian leadership wholly accepts Israel’s new borders, disarms completely, removes Hamas from power in Gaza and agrees to Israeli security oversight on all of its territories until a point in the future\u00a0deemed ripe for withdrawal.<\/p>\n

At this point – and only at this point – the Palestinians would receive $50bn of investment promised by the US,\u00a0although even then the figure is misleading. As outlined in the economic part of the plan<\/a> released in June, only $27.8bn of that will go directly to the new Palestinian state over the span of 10 years, while the remainder will go to neighbouring states.<\/p>\n

That $27.8bn is around 27 percent less than the\u00a0$38bn\u00a0ten-year military aid deal<\/a>\u00a0that the US made with Israel in 2016.<\/p>\n

4. No Right of Return for Refugees<\/h3>\n

Right of return for Palestinians expelled from their homes during the establishment of\u00a0Israel\u00a0is something that Palestinians have long held as a precondition to peace talks. Under Trump’s plan, however, they would not be allowed to return to any Israeli areas.<\/p>\n

The millions of Palestinian refugees living outside Israel and the occupied territories,\u00a0for example in Syria, Lebanon or Jordan,\u00a0may be allowed to move to the future Palestinian state. Or, the plan suggests, the countries they currently reside in could give them citizenship. Another mooted scheme would see 50,000 people relocated to\u00a0member states\u00a0of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.<\/p>\n

The refugees who wish to move to the presumptive Palestinian state – particularly those currently in Syria and Lebanon, countries the plan calls “extremely hostile” to Israel –\u00a0will, however, need to be approved by a committee of Israelis and Palestinians that\u00a0will also restrict the influx of new citizens.<\/p>\n

5.\u00a0Gaza, a \u2018Problem\u2019<\/h3>\n

The section of the plan addressing the fate of the besieged Gaza Strip is tellingly titled \u201cThe problem of Gaza\u201d. The 13-year Israeli-led blockade of the coastal Palestinian enclave is described as \u201ctightened security\u201d. Like \u201coccupation\u201d, the term \u201csiege\u201d or \u201cblockade\u201d is nowhere to be found in the plan.<\/p>\n

The Hamas movement is directly blamed for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and Palestinian statehood is conditioned on the Palestinian Authority regaining full control of Gaza without Hamas.<\/p>\n

The Trump administration set forward a plan for a \u201chigh-tech manufactory industrial\u201d area and a \u201cresidential and agricultural\u201d zone just south of Gaza in the Negev desert.<\/p>\n

The Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt – the only direct border area the presumptive state of Palestine will have with a state other than Israel – will be subjected to as-yet-undetermined \u201cspecific arrangements\u201d to be agreed upon between Egypt and Israel.<\/p>\n

6. The Status of Al-Aqsa<\/h3>\n

The proposal suggests that the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in occupied East Jerusalem should remain under the same \u201cgovernance regimes that exist today\u201d while remaining under Israel\u2019s full control of Jerusalem.<\/p>\n

However, the civil affairs of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, among other religious sites, are currently administered by Jordan – which is the official custodian of Jerusalem\u2019s holy sites.<\/p>\n

Currently, Jews are not allowed to pray within the Al-Aqsa compound, which sits atop where the First and Second Jewish Temple are believed to have once stood. While the plan calls for the maintenance of the \u201creligious status quo\u201d, it then calls for \u201cpeople of every faith\u201d to be permitted to pray there – raising questions about whether incursions by Israeli settlers at the site would be normalised.<\/p>\n

As for Muslims who wish to visit and pray in Al-Aqsa, the plan states that only worshipers \u201cwho come in peace\u201d will be welcome. The Palestinian state will be allowed a \u201cspecial tourism zone\u201d in Atarot – a few kilometres north of Jerusalem\u201d, which will serve as a transportation hub for tourists to gain access to the holy sites in Jerusalem.<\/p>\n

7. Israeli Security and Palestinian Demilitarisation<\/h3>\n

Under the plan, Israel will maintain military control and security coordination between Palestinian authorities, Israel, Egypt and Jordan, solidifying the existing security apparatus governing Palestinians\u2019 lives in the occupied territories.<\/p>\n

Throughout the document, Israel\u2019s security is highlighted as a necessity that cannot be compromised. The same isn\u2019t said for Palestinians, whose new state must be fully demilitarised as part of the plan. In fact, Palestinian security considerations are not mentioned anywhere in the plan.<\/p>\n

As is already the case, Israel would \u201cmaintain overriding security responsibility\u201d, while the new Palestinian state would deal with internal policing. But the plan reserves the right for Israel to intervene as it sees fit \u201cto ensure that the State of Palestine remains demilitarized and non-threatening to the State of Israel, including from terrorist threats\u201d.<\/p>\n

Already the Israeli army carries out regular incursions into Area A of the West Bank, despite it being under full Palestinian control, so there would be little change.<\/p>\n

Security coordination with Israel has long been controversial for Palestinians. But here, the plan reassures them that they \u201cwill not be burdened\u201d with the costs of financially maintaining this external military power, as these will be \u201cshouldered\u201d graciously by Israel.<\/p>\n

8. Land Transfers to Palestine<\/h3>\n

Another controversial element of Trump\u2019s plan is the transfer of land now within Israel to a future Palestinian state.<\/p>\n

The scheme envisions ceding arid areas of the Negev desert near the Egyptian border and the Northern Triangle, an area encompassing Kafr Qara, Arara, Baha al-Gharbiyye, Umm al-Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira, Kafr Bara and Jaljulia.<\/p>\n

Around a third of Palestinian citizens of Israel can be found in the Triangle: as many as 350,000 in total. The population in the area is also largely Muslim, and Umm al-Fahm is an Islamic Movement stronghold.<\/p>\n

The plan says these communities \u201clargely self-identify as Palestinian\u201d, but that is no rarity for those whom Israel – and the plan – usually call \u201cArabs\u201d.<\/p>\n

The transfer of the Triangle has been brought up before, but several legal issues that violate Israel\u2019s Basic Laws have stood in the way, in addition to cultural and logistical problems. Palestinians in the Triangle have strong ties with Palestinian communities elsewhere in Israel. This plan makes no attempt at addressing that severance.<\/p>\n

9. The Fate of Prisoners<\/h3>\n

Deeper into the plan, a section discusses a deeply sensitive issue for both Israelis and Palestinians: the fate of prisoners.<\/p>\n

According to Palestinian prisoners\u2019 rights group Addameer, some 5,000 Palestinians are currently detained by Israel. The Trump administration lays out conditions for a possible release of Palestinian prisoners as part of a swap – so long as they were not convicted of murder, attempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder.<\/p>\n

All releases, however, will be predicated on the condition that prisoners sign a pledge \u201cto promote within their community the benefits of coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians\u201d.<\/p>\n

Trump’s ‘deal of the century’: 17 things we learned – Read More \u00bb<\/a> <\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The plan also states that no Palestinian prisoners will be released so long as any Israeli citizen held captive by Palestinian groups – including the remains of soldiers – is\u00a0not returned to Israel. Hamas is believed to be holding an Israeli citizen and the bodies of two Israeli soldiers in Gaza.<\/p>\n

The plan made no mention of the fate of hundreds of Palestinian bodies<\/a> held by Israel for years, in a policy that has been denounced as collective punishment<\/a>.<\/p>\n

10. No Word on Hebron<\/h3>\n

Trump vowed that his plan would be incredibly detailed, but some of the highlights of the \u201cdeal of the century\u201d are in fact the glaring silences on key issues.<\/p>\n

The city of Hebron is one of them. Almost 800 Israeli settlers currently live in the centre of Hebron under heavy military guard among a Palestinian population of 200,000 people. It is the only Palestinian city in the West Bank that has Israeli settlers living in its heart. Meanwhile, the Ibrahimi Mosque – also known to Israelis as the Tomb of the Patriarchs – is a highly contested religious site.<\/p>\n

Any proper proposal seeking to create a two-state solution would have to address Hebron\u2019s unique situation. Yet the map released as part of the plan<\/a> is vague: A symbol indicating a land route looms over Hebron\u2019s location, obscuring whether the city would fall within the new Palestinian state or Israel.<\/p>\n

The written plan, meanwhile, brings no further clarity. The only mention of Hebron is in a spreadsheet listing possible infrastructure projects, allocating $600m for a gas-fired power plant in the city.<\/p>\n

11. The Role of Jordan<\/h3>\n

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is expected to play a significant role in Trump\u2019s plan. Acknowledging the \u201cproximity, cultural affinity and family ties\u201d between Jordan and Palestine, the scheme suggests the kingdom provides \u201cassistance in fields such as law, medicine, education, municipal services, historic preservation and institution building\u201d as the new Palestinian state is set up.<\/p>\n

Other than state-building, Jordan is to offer it Red Sea port of Aqaba for Palestinian use. Palestinians will collect all tax revenues, but pay Amman a rental fee. Only cargo ships are permitted to use the facilities.<\/p>\n

A free trade zone between Jordan and the Palestinian state should be established, the plan says, \u201cto expediate economic cooperation between the two countries\u201d.<\/p>\n

Finally, the kingdom is urged to set up two security bodies with Arab countries in the region, Israel and the US – something resembling the Arab NATO that has been floated by the Trump administration. Israel doesn\u2019t have a security concern with Jordan per se, the plan says. But there are fears that \u201cMiddle Eastern powers\u201d could forcibly use the kingdom to stage attacks on Israel. Who these powers may be and how they could invade a country laden with US and UK military bases is not explained.<\/p>\n

12. Regional Normalisation with Israel<\/h3>\n

A section of the plan reveals another desired gain for Israel: the normalisation of relations with Arab states.<\/p>\n

In the past several years, Israel has experienced warming ties with states in the Middle East, particularly Gulf Arab states. But the vast majority of countries in the Middle East and North Africa do not officially recognise Israel.<\/p>\n

The Trump plan states its goal is to \u201chave the Arab states fully cooperate with the State of Israel\u201d on economic and security issues. That includes fighting \u201cterrorist groups\u201d such as Hezbollah, the Islamic State and Hamas, should the latter maintain its opposition to Israel.<\/p>\n

The plan, however, identifies one main \u201cexistential threat\u201d that unites Israel and Arab states: Iran.<\/p>\n

13. What Palestinian Sovereignty?<\/h3>\n

The proposed State of Palestine fails to answer many basic Palestinian demands – but is it even achieving basic tenets of sovereignty?<\/p>\n

In the name of Israeli security, the plan states that all border crossings connecting the new Palestinian state to neighbouring countries must be \u201cmonitored by the State of Israel\u201d. Same fate for Palestinian airspace, which will be under \u201cIsraeli security responsibility and Israeli control\u201d.<\/p>\n

If these stipulations might strike observers as undermining whatever self-determination the Palestinian state might have, the plan suggests that critics shed their preconceived notions of what sovereignty should look like.<\/p>\n

“Sovereignty is an amorphous concept that has evolved over time. With growing interdependence, each nation chooses to interact with other nations by entering into agreements that set parameters essential to each nation,\u201d the plan reads. \u201cThe notion that sovereignty is a static and consistently defined term has been an unnecessary stumbling block in past negotiations.<\/p>\n

\u201cPragmatic and operational concerns that effect [sic]\u00a0security and prosperity are what is most important.\u201d<\/p>\n

14. US Compromises at the Negotiating Table<\/h3>\n

Despite presenting a plan that was preemptively and categorically rejected by Palestinian leadership, the Trump administration has still expressed hope that the proposal would lead to negotiations.<\/p>\n

Should such negotiations take place, the United States commits to implementing a certain number of moves \u201cto the extent permitted by law\u201d as a gesture of goodwill towards the Palestinians.<\/p>\n

Those moves include the reopening of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) office in Washington; the opening of a US liaison mission to the PA; the resumption of US aid to the occupied Palestinian territories; and efforts to support international infrastructure projects.<\/p>\n

\u2018The deal that can\u2019t be made\u2019: A timeline of the Trump administration\u2019s Israel-Palestine policy – Read More \u00bb<\/a> <\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The PLO office was closed by the US in September 2018; US funding for UNRWA, the United Nations agency for Palestinian refugees, was cut off completely in August that same year; and USAID funding to projects in the occupied territories suffered a similar fate in February 2019.<\/p>\n

In effect, the moves would not so much bring new benefits to Palestinians, as simply roll back decisions that were taken since Trump came to power.<\/p>\n

15. What Is Israel Conceding?<\/h3>\n

Trump has said it over and over again: a good deal requires compromises. The \u201cdeal of the century\u201d has already been slammed for demanding that Palestinians give up East Jerusalem, large swathes of the West Bank, the right of return and compensation for refugees, justice through international bodies, to name a few.<\/p>\n

After reading the full plan, <\/em>Middle East Eye can provide a complete list of what Israel has agreed to concede to Palestinians in exchange:<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n