{"id":155491,"date":"2020-03-02T12:00:51","date_gmt":"2020-03-02T12:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=155491"},"modified":"2020-02-28T08:11:20","modified_gmt":"2020-02-28T08:11:20","slug":"pentagons-own-map-of-u-s-bases-in-africa-contradicts-its-claim-of-light-footprint","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2020\/03\/pentagons-own-map-of-u-s-bases-in-africa-contradicts-its-claim-of-light-footprint\/","title":{"rendered":"Pentagon\u2019s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of \u201cLight\u201d Footprint"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>

Smoke rises from a U.S. military base in Lamu County, Kenya, on Jan. 5, 2020.
Photo: Xin Huashefa\/Xinhua via Getty<\/p><\/div>\n

27 Feb 2020 –<\/em><\/span><\/span>Last month, about a dozen al-Shabab fighters infiltrated the perimeter of a military base in Manda Bay, Kenya<\/a>. One of them took aim with a rocket-propelled grenade, firing at a U.S. surveillance plane and touching off an hourslong firefight. When it was all over, the two American pilots of that plane and a U.S. soldier were dead, two other U.S. military personnel were wounded, six surveillance aircraft and helicopters were destroyed, and parts of the airfield were in flames.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n

Where there are U.S. bases, there is the potential for such attacks, because bases are not just launching pads for offensive military operations, but targets for them too. Since 9\/11, the U.S. military has built a sprawling network of outposts in more than a dozen African countries. The Intercept has obtained U.S. military documents and a set of accompanying maps that provide the locations of these African bases in 2019, including the one at Manda Bay. These formerly secret documents, created by the Pentagon\u2019s Africa Command and obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, offer an exclusive window into the footprint of American military operations in Africa.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Maps of U.S. \u201cEnduring\u201d and \u201cNon-Enduring\u201d bases in Africa. The Pentagon defines \u201cenduring\u201d bases as providing \u201cstrategic access and use to support United States security interests for the foreseeable future.\u201d \u201cNon-Enduring\u201d outposts \u2014 also known as \u201ccontingency locations\u201d \u2014 are defined as supporting and sustaining \u201coperations during contingencies or other operations.\u201d Contingency locations can be categorized as initial, temporary, or semipermanent.<\/span><\/strong>
\nImages: U.S. Africa Command<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee late last month, Stephen Townsend, the commander of AFRICOM, echoed a line favored by his predecessors<\/a>\u00a0that AFRICOM maintains a \u201clight and relatively low-cost footprint\u201d on the continent. This \u201clight\u201d footprint consists of a constellation of more than two dozen outposts that stretch from one side of Africa to the other. The 2019 planning documents provide locations for 29 bases located in 15 different countries or territories, with the highest concentrations in the Sahelian states on the west side of the continent, as well as the Horn of Africa in the east. Since the plans were created, according to AFRICOM spokesperson John Manley, two bases have been shuttered, leaving the U.S. with an archipelago of 15 \u201cenduring locations\u201d and 12 less-permanent \u201ccontingency locations.\u201d The documents note, however, that AFRICOM is actively seeking to enhance its presence and is primed for expansion in the future.<\/p>\n

U.S. Africa Command\u2019s \u201cEnduring Footprint\u201d and \u201cNon-Enduring Footprint\u201d in 2019:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
ENDURING FOOTPRINT 2019<\/td>\nNON-ENDURING FOOTPRINT 2019<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Chebelley, Djibouti<\/td>\nBizerte, Tunisia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti<\/td>\nArlit, Niger<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Entebbe, Uganda<\/td>\nDirkou, Niger<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Mombassa, Kenya<\/td>\nDiffa, Niger<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Manda Bay, Kenya<\/td>\nOuallam, Niger<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Liberville, Gabon<\/td>\nBamako, Mali<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
St. Helena, Ascension Island<\/td>\nGaroua, Cameroon<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Accra, Ghana<\/td>\nMaroua, Cameroon<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso<\/td>\nMisrata, Libya<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Dakar, Senegal<\/td>\nTripoli, Libya<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Agadez, Niger<\/td>\nBaledogle, Somalia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Niamey, Niger<\/td>\nBosasso, Somalia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
N\u2019Djamena, Chad<\/td>\nGalcayo, Somalia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nKismayo, Somalia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nMogadishu, Somalia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nWajir, Kenya<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Violent extremism and insecurity on the continent has increased exponentially during the very years that the U.S. has been building up its network of bases, providing billions of dollars in security assistance<\/a> to local partners, conducting persistent counterterrorism operations that include commando raids, combat by U.S. Special Operations forces in at least 13 African countries between 2013 and 2017<\/a>, and a record number of U.S. airstrikes in Somalia<\/a> (just over one attack per week in 2019). There are now roughly 25 active militant Islamist groups<\/a> operating in Africa, up from just five in 2010<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 a jump of 400 percent \u2014 according to the Defense Department\u2019s Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Militant Islamist activity also hit record levels in 2019. There were 3,471 reported violent events<\/a> linked to these groups last year, a 1,105 percent increase since 2009<\/a>. Reported fatalities resulting from African militant Islamist group activity also increased by 7 percent over last year, to an estimated 10,460 deaths. The situation has become so grim that U.S. military aims in West Africa have recently been scaled back from a strategy of degrading the strength and reach of terror groups to nothing more than \u201ccontainment<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

The current archipelago<\/u> of U.S. outposts in Africa represents a decrease of seven sites from the 34 bases detailed in a set of briefing<\/a> documents by AFRICOM science adviser Peter Teil that were published by The Intercept in 2018. The new 2019 AFRICOM planning documents provide information on five bases slated for closure, including a longtime \u201cenduring\u201d site in Gaborone, Botswana<\/a>, and four contingency locations, or CLs, in Faya Largeau, Chad; Lakipia, Kenya; Benina, Libya; and Gao, Mali. Shuttering the CLs, according to the documents, is part of an effort to \u201cseek efficiencies by consolidating \u2026 functions at a reduced number of posture locations,\u201d while the removal of Gabrone was chalked up to \u201ca lack of DoD [Department of Defense] property or routine DoD presence\u201d and the fact that \u201cBotswana does not acknowledge or desire any formal DoD access at the international airport.\u201d<\/p>\n

Manley refused to say which two additional bases were dropped from the 2019 list. \u201cThe fluctuation in the number is not related to Misrata and Tripoli,\u201d he told The Intercept in response to a question about whether the Libyan outposts were the others closed. But it is worth noting that since the 2019 base posture document was produced, the U.S. pulled its forces out of the North African nation. \u201cDue to increased unrest in Libya<\/a>, a contingent of U.S. forces supporting U.S. Africa Command temporarily relocated from the country in response to security conditions on the ground,\u201d AFRICOM announced last April as the Libyan civil war flared up<\/a>. Those troops have never returned, according to Manley, and a recent inspector general\u2019s report states that they won\u2019t be redeployed until there is a ceasefire<\/a> in Libya\u2019s civil war<\/a>.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s also worth noting the documents state that U.S. Army Africa uses space at \u201chost nation facilities\u201d in Theis, Senegal, and Singo, Uganda, even though the bases are not listed on AFRICOM\u2019s maps. While these \u201ccooperative training locations\u201d are not officially considered outposts by the command, they raise the question of whether 29 bases is actually a more accurate count. Whatever the real number of bases, the recent alteration of AFRICOM\u2019s footprint in 2019 appears to be a strategic consolidation as the command fortifies its presence in some of the continent\u2019s hottest hotspots. Of the 6,000 or more U.S. personnel deployed in Africa, about 1,200, according to Manley, are in West Africa, with a significant percentage in Niger<\/a>, which has become the key American hub on that side of the continent. Around 500 Special Operations forces<\/a> are reportedly deployed on the other side of the continent in Somalia, the site of America\u2019s most intense and longest-running undeclared war in Africa.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

While the five U.S. outposts in Somalia rank second only to the six in Niger when it comes to America\u2019s footprint on the continent, AFRICOM is actively seeking to expand its presence in the Horn of Africa. \u201cAdditional posture and\/or capacity is required in East Africa to more efficiently employ limited aviation resources in support of U.S. activities in southern Somalia,\u201d according to the formerly secret files, which also mention the \u201cpotential establishment of one or more [contingency locations] in Somalia to support Somali National Security Force development.\u201d The 2019 planning documents also state that five \u201ccontingency locations\u201d were recommended to be upgraded to \u201csemi-permanent\u201d status: Baledogle, Kismayo, and Mogadishu in Somalia, and Arlit and Diffa in Niger.<\/p>\n

What are the forces at these bases doing there? In Diffa, according to a recent inspector general\u2019s report<\/a>, a small unit of U.S. Special Forces has been providing advice and assistance to Niger\u2019s 51st Special Intervention Battalion, which conducts operations in the Lake Chad region. Another Special Forces detachment has been engaged in train, advise, and assist activities with a local counterterrorism force in Arlit, Niger.<\/p>\n

The presence of U.S. commandos at Diffa and Arlit<\/a> first came to widespread notice in the wake of the October 2017 ambush by Islamic State militants in Tongo Tongo, Niger, that killed four U.S. soldiers<\/a>. The U.S. base at Baledogle received attention last September when it was attacked by the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabab<\/a>. Manda Bay, Kenya, where al-Shabab killed the American soldier and U.S. pilots, is still another \u201cenduring\u201d location from AFRICOM\u2019s 2019 list. In the wake of the attack last month, its defenses were also hardened and its troop strength markedly increased<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u201cI think it\u2019s self-obvious we were not as prepared there in Manda Bay as we needed to be,\u201d AFRICOM\u2019s Townsend told the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 30. \u201cAl-Shabab managed to penetrate onto that airfield. A lot of people don\u2019t know, but the base where our troops live is not where the airfield is. But they were able to get access to that airfield, kill three Americans and destroy six aircraft there. \u2026 There\u2019s about 120 infantrymen there on the ground now who are securing that place, and they\u2019ve been working hard since 6 January to put in the appropriate level of defenses. So I am confident that by the time they are done, Manda Bay will be much more properly defended.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper speaks during a news conference at the Pentagon in Washington on Jan. 27, 2020. The Army, for the first time, will send soldiers from one of its new training brigades to Africa to expand the use of the new specialized units as the Pentagon looks at possible troop cuts on the continent. Photo: Jose Luis Magana\/AP<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The attack in Kenya came at a time when Defense Secretary Mark Esper was already considering proposals for a major drawdown of U.S. forces on the other side of the continent, in West Africa<\/a>, including the possible abandonment of a recently built $110 million drone base in Agadez, Niger<\/a>. According to Manley, the Pentagon\u2019s so-called Blank Slate Review process is still ongoing, and there has been no change to U.S. \u201cforce posture\u201d in Africa as of yet. \u201cI haven\u2019t made any decisions yet on West Africa or East Africa<\/a>,\u201d Esper said recently, while at the same time calling on European nations to \u201cstep up in Africa.\u201d<\/p>\n

Talk of scaling back U.S. posture and presence in Africa has prompted fierce pushback in Congress. \u201cThese personnel and installations are critical in combatting the ever-increasing number of violent extremist groups throughout the region that pose an immediate threat to our partners and allies,\u201d wrote U.S. Sens. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., and Chris Coons, D-Del.,\u00a0in a January 15 letter to Esper. The senators argued that \u201cany withdrawal or reduction would likely result in a surge in violent extremist attacks on the continent and beyond as well as increase the geopolitical influence of competitors like Russia and China.\u201d James Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee echoed these concerns. \u201cToday, more than a dozen terrorist groups with ties to Al Qaida and ISIS are operating across Africa,\u201d he said late last month. \u201cMany of these groups have ambition to attack Americans and our partners. Without sustained pressure, the threat posed by these groups will.\u201d<\/p>\n

But in the face of deteriorating security and gloomy Pentagon assessments, some experts question this rationale. \u201cThe current, overly militarized approach to fighting terrorism in Africa is not working,\u201d said William Hartung, the director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy, or CIP. \u201cAs the U.S. military footprint and military activities have increased, terrorist violence has grown and terrorist groups have proliferated.\u201d<\/p>\n

His colleague, Temi Ibirogba, a program and research associate with the Africa Program at CIP, noted that the rise of violent extremism in Africa in the face of persistent U.S. military engagement since 9\/11 should be cause for skepticism of the \u201cmore is better\u201d strategy. \u201cThe U.S. military should be considering alternative approaches like better coordination with African regional and continental organizations and encouraging African governments to consider negotiations in certain cases,\u201d she told The Intercept.<\/p>\n

In recent years, the U.S. military has carried out no fewer than 36 named operations and activities<\/a> in Africa, including at least eight \u201c127-echo\u201d programs, which are named for the budgetary authority that allows U.S. Special Operations forces to use host-nation military units as proxies in missions aimed at violent extremist organizations, or VEOs. Run by Joint Special Operations Command<\/a>, the secretive organization that controls the Navy\u2019s SEAL Team 6 and the Army\u2019s Delta Force, or by theater special operations forces, these 80- to 120-person units, operating with the assistance of U.S. commandos, are primarily engaged in counterterrorism operations, especially ones aimed at high-value targets.<\/p>\n

The 2019 AFRICOM planning document notes that U.S. forces will \u201ccontinue to conduct counter-VEO-focused activities\u201d from 16 separate bases. Even discounting the two counter-VEO bases in Libya that appear to have been closed since the map was created by AFRICOM, this leaves one each in Kenya, Mali, and Tunisia, as well as five in Somalia, four in Niger, and two in Cameroon at Garoua and Maroua. The site in Garoua is a drone base that was profiled<\/a> by The Intercept in 2016. In 2017, the Intercept revealed that while the U.S. military fortified its base in Maroua, known as Camp Salak, the outpost also served as a scene of illegal imprisonment, torture, and even killings<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Facing a potential drawdown of forces, AFRICOM has been making the case that its bases and the missions run from them are integral to U.S. interests. \u201cStrategic access to Africa, its airspace, and its surrounding waters is vital to U.S. national security,\u201d Townsend told the Senate Armed Services Committee late last month. He and others have argued for what they contend is AFRICOM\u2019s supposed bang for the buck. \u201cWhat U.S. Africa Command accomplishes with relatively few people and few dollars, on a continent three-and-a-half times the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the American taxpayer,\u201d Manley told The Intercept.<\/p>\n

But a recent inspector general\u2019s report, examining U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa, raises serious questions about the utility of billions of tax dollars spent on U.S. bases, operations, and assistance to local partners. Even after a decade-plus spent fighting militants in Somalia, \u201cthe threat posed by al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia in East Africa remains \u2018high,\u2019 despite continued U.S. airstrikes and training of Somali security forces,\u201d the Defense Intelligence Agency told the Defense Department\u2019s Inspector General. The DoDIG further noted that al-Shabab not only \u201cremains a potent threat\u201d due to its \u201cability to conduct high-profile attacks, recruit fighters, and finance ongoing operations,\u201d but that the group \u201cappears to be a growing threat to U.S. personnel and interests in the region.\u201d<\/p>\n

The DoDIG\u2019s assessment of West Africa was even more dire. \u201cVEO violence in West Africa grew rapidly over the past 2 years; in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Western Niger, VEO violence increased by 250 percent since 2018,\u201d according to the report. AFRICOM told the DoDIG that security in West Africa continued to deteriorate during the final quarter of 2019 as terrorist groups \u201claunched a growing number of offensive attacks against military facilities and troops \u2026 often resulting in large numbers of casualties\u201d to U.S.-allied armed forces. \u201cVEOs in West Africa are not degraded nor contained to the Sahel and Lake Chad region<\/a>,\u201d the command admitted.<\/p>\n

Given the current state of affairs, the Center for International Policy\u2019s Hartung believes that the United States needs to reevaluate its approach. \u201cIt\u2019s time for an honest reassessment of U.S. anti-terror strategy in Africa, including greater transparency about the size and scope of U.S. military operations there,\u201d he told The Intercept. \u201cThe underlying drivers of terrorism, including poverty, corruption, and repression, do not have military solutions.\u201d<\/p>\n

_____________________________________________<\/p>\n

\n
\n

Related:<\/em><\/p>\n

\n