{"id":16252,"date":"2011-12-12T12:00:02","date_gmt":"2011-12-12T12:00:02","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/?p=16252"},"modified":"2011-12-09T01:05:52","modified_gmt":"2011-12-09T01:05:52","slug":"celac-speaking-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/2011\/12\/celac-speaking-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean\/","title":{"rendered":"CELAC: Speaking for Latin America and the Caribbean"},"content":{"rendered":"

On Saturday, Dec. 3 \u2013 while most of the U.S. media was focused on the political demise of Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain and the growing financial meltdown in Europe \u2013 the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was officially launched at a summit in Caracas, Venezuela.\u00a0 The new regional organization includes every nation in the Western Hemisphere with the exception of the United States and Canada and is seen by many as a potential rival to the region\u2019s foremost multilateral organization, the Washington-based Organization of American States (OAS).\u00a0 Though it generated a great deal of media attention within Latin America and was attended by the majority of the hemisphere\u2019s heads of state, the U.S. press largely overlooked the Caracas summit with, for instance, the New York Times<\/em> limiting its coverage to a brief 100 word blurb<\/a> from the Associated Press.<\/p>\n

The minimal coverage that the summit garnered in the U.S. media was mostly limited to reports that downplayed the significance of the new regional bloc.\u00a0 It was depicted in some articles as \u201cCh\u00e1vez\u2019s baby<\/a>\u201d and \u2013 according to one U.S. pundit \u2013 \u201cwill probably last as long as Ch\u00e1vez is willing to underwrite it.\u201d\u00a0 Miami Herald<\/em> columnist Andres Oppenheimer insisted in a headline that the \u201cGroup will have no Teeth<\/a>.\u201d Based on conversations with a White House official and a representative of a right-wing Latin American government, Oppenheimer was able to determine with certainty that CELAC \u201cwill hardly make it into the history books.\u201d<\/p>\n

As is typically the case with U.S. media coverage of Latin American politics, reporters and commentators appeared incapable of recognizing yet another watershed development in a region that has undergone major political transformations over the last dozen years.\u00a0 In this, they closely resemble the U.S. administration which \u2013 under Barack Obama as much as under George W. Bush<\/a> \u2013 has failed to acknowledge these transformations and maintained the same stale policies that have been in place for decades.\u00a0 On Dec. 2, while the Caracas summit was in full swing, State Department spokesperson Mark Toner confidently stated<\/a> that the OAS remains \u201cthe pre-eminent multilateral organization speaking for the hemisphere.\u201d\u00a0 Many Latin Americans would take exception at the notion that the OAS \u201cspeaks for the hemisphere\u201d and with CELAC now steaming ahead again, following a brief hiatus, it appears increasingly likely that the aging organization will fade into irrelevance.<\/p>\n

Much preparation<\/a> went into the founding summit of CELAC and during the two days that the leaders of the 33 Latin American and Caribbean member states were convened, long and intense discussions took place.\u00a0 Originally scheduled to take place in July, the summit was postponed until December to allow time for the host country\u2019s president, Hugo Ch\u00e1vez, to recover from cancer treatment.\u00a0 By the end of the day on Dec. 3, 22 documents had been approved<\/a> by all of the governments including a \u201cCaracas Declaration\u201d establishing various principles and orientations for the new organization; a \u201cCaracas Action Plan\u201d setting a concrete work agenda on multiple issues; a \u201cStatute of Procedures\u201d defining the organization\u2019s basic structure and decision-making process; and 19 statements on issues varying from coca chewing to democracy.<\/p>\n

Although U.S. commentators have described the bloc, in its current form, to be merely a mechanism for periodic dialogue and consultation between member countries, CELAC\u2019s founding documents provide the framework for a much bolder agenda.\u00a0 The Caracas Declaration states that the member countries will promote a \u201cconcerted voice for Latin America and the Caribbean\u201d on major issues.\u00a0 The Statute of Procedures, drafted jointly by the right-wing government of Chile and the left-wing government of Venezuela[i], calls for the \u201ccoordination of common positions between member countries in multilateral forums, political spaces and spaces of international negotiation to promote the Latin American and Caribbean agenda.\u201d\u00a0 If the members of CELAC follow through on these commitments, the group could well become a significant multilateral actor presenting common positions within global institutions such as the United Nations and negotiating with other important regional blocs, for instance in Europe and Asia.<\/p>\n

The Caracas Declaration also commits member countries to advancing the \u201cpolitical, economic, social and cultural integration\u201d of the region.\u00a0 With this objective, CELAC members are called on to develop \u201cprograms, projects and initiatives on integration, cooperation, complementarity and development\u201d within the region, and develop mechanisms for coordination with \u201csub-regional integration mechanisms\u201d, which include the Southern Cone trade bloc Mercosur and the South American intergovernmental union UNASUR.\u00a0 Rodrigo Baena, a spokesperson for the Brazilian presidency characterized CELAC as a \u201cthird ring<\/a>\u201d of Latin American integration with Mercosur and UNASUR being the first and second rings.<\/p>\n

The Caracas Action Plan outlines a dense work agenda touching on various areas of collaboration that have been developed between Latin American and Caribbean governments in ministerial meetings over the last two years.\u00a0 These include energy cooperation, addressing hunger and illiteracy, boosting intra-regional trade, and cooperation around humanitarian and environmental challenges.\u00a0\u00a0 At the top of the agenda are plans for addressing the impact of the international financial crisis and designing a \u201cnew international financial architecture.\u201d\u00a0 Most of Latin America \u2013 in particular South America \u2013 has managed to maintain fairly strong economic growth in the midst of the global financial and economic crisis, but there are clearly concerns about the possible fallout from a full-blown financial collapse in the Eurozone.\u00a0 The way forward, as outlined in the Action Plan, is for CELAC to develop mechanisms to \u201cstrengthen and deepen the integration of our economies.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Action Plan also commits the group to developing a \u201cstrategy to design a new regional financial architecture \u2026 based in the principles of justice, solidarity and transparency\u201d and to working to \u201credesign international financial institutions\u201d such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.\u00a0 The Plan states that decision-making within these institutions should be democratized and conditionalities attached to loans should be \u201celiminated and\/or rendered more flexible.\u201d<\/p>\n

The current framework for CELAC involves no permanent institutions; only a rotating pro tempore<\/em> presidency, national representatives, working groups and regular meetings of foreign ministers and heads of state. This has led some U.S. commentators to triumphantly predict that the bloc will be ineffective and toothless.\u00a0\u00a0 It is, however, much too early to say whether the bloc will remain without an institutional framework.\u00a0 The group\u2019s statutes are likely to evolve over time and one need look no further than the recent South American group UNASUR to find an example of a regional organization that had no permanent organs and then progressively acquired institutions like a secretariat and a parliament.<\/p>\n

Like CELAC, UNASUR \u2013 made up of every independent South American government \u2013 was either ignored or dismissed by the U.S. administration and most of the U.S. media when it was created.\u00a0 Like the groups that preceded CELAC (the Latin American and Caribbean Summits (CALC) and the Rio Group) the forum that gave birth to UNASUR \u2013 the biennual \u201cMeeting of South American Presidents\u201d \u2013 was nothing more than a multilateral consulting mechanism.<\/p>\n

At the third President\u2019s Meeting, in 2004, the Cuzco Declaration announced the foundation of the South American Community of Nations, but it wasn\u2019t until May 2008 that UNASUR was officially established through a constitutive treaty<\/a> signed in Brasilia.\u00a0 Since then, UNASUR has developed the position of Secretary General \u2013 first occupied by the late Argentinean President Nestor Kirchner \u2013 and established various institutions and regional cooperation mechanisms such as a Secretariat (based in Quito, Ecuador), a soon-to-be inaugurated South American Parliament, a Center for Strategic Defense Studies and a series of ministerial councils that consult regularly on issues such as Social Development, Economy and Finance, Energy, Defense and Infrastructure.\u00a0 UNASUR is now a major regional player<\/a>.\u00a0 Over the last few years, it has been particularly effective at defusing potentially explosive regional crises such as the September 2008 political crisis in Bolivia and the 2010 diplomatic showdown<\/a> between Columbia and Venezuela<\/p>\n

CELAC appears to be progressing along a track very similar to UNASUR.\u00a0 But, aside from the obvious parallels that can be drawn between the two groups, why is there any reason to believe that CELAC will fulfill the ambitious set of objectives set forth in the Caracas Declaration?<\/p>\n

One transparent reason — though apparently not transparent enough for some inside-the-Beltway Latin America \u201cexperts\u201d — is the fact that there is a new geopolitical reality south of the Rio Grande that has created a fertile terrain for deep and effective Latin American and Caribbean integration.<\/p>\n

Only a decade ago, nearly all of the governments of the region embraced the Washington Consensus dogma of free markets, deregulation, privatization and the downsizing of the state and its role in the economy.\u00a0 By the early 2000s, however, the tide turned as the peoples of the region went to the ballot boxes and overwhelmingly rejected policies that had led to stagnant economic growth, increased inequalities, and decreased access to education, health care and other public services.<\/p>\n

Following the election of left-of-center governments throughout most of the region by the late 2000s, Latin American countries have shunned the International Monetary Fund \u2013 purveyor of neoliberal structural adjustments \u2013 and rejected the U.S.\u2013sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas.\u00a0 They have focused increasing attention on addressing the symptoms and root causes of poverty and social disparities.\u00a0 Contrary to the gloomy predictions of U.S. Latin America \u201cexperts\u201d, the region\u2019s left-leaning governments have in many cases succeeded in spurring rates of economic growth not seen since the 1970s and have brought down poverty levels significantly as data from the IMF and World Bank has confirmed.\u00a0 This paradigm shift has transformed policy-making in nearly every country of the region, with even right-leaning governments adopting \u201csocial agendas\u201d that address the needs of the poor.<\/p>\n

The region, now dominated by left-of-center political leadership, has grown increasingly independent from the U.S. With this independence, the collective will to create a common front so as to gain leverage internationally vis-\u00e0-vis the U.S., Europe, and other global powers has grown.\u00a0 At the same time, the countries of the region increasingly see the OAS as an historical anachronism, harkening back to a time when the U.S. exercised much more direct influence in the region\u2019s affairs.<\/p>\n

The idea of CELAC, it should be remembered, was first hatched in the wake of the U.S.\u2019 unilateral decision to support elections held under a de facto government in Honduras despite the opposition of nearly every other country in the hemisphere.\u00a0 Prior to these elections, attempts were made to pass resolutions within the OAS rejecting elections under the coup regime, but the U.S. thwarted these attempts at every turn.\u00a0 For many Latin American governments, the Honduras experience confirmed that the OAS was not a space in which sensitive political crises could be resolved.\u00a0 An OAS electoral \u201cexpert\u201d mission\u2019s decision to arbitrarily change the results of the first round of Haiti\u2019s presidential elections has provided additional evidence<\/a> of the organization\u2019s bias.<\/p>\n

Reading the various documents approved at the Caracas summit it is impossible not to note the numerous statements that either directly target U.S. policy, or would be opposed by the U.S. government.\u00a0 One document is dedicated to rejecting the U.S. embargo against Cuba and the Helms-Burton Law, while another calls for the \u201cinternational community\u201d, i.e., the U.S. to \u201crespect\u201d the custom of coca-chewing in Bolivia and Peru (the U.S. has been a major opponent<\/a> of plans to amend the U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to allow for this traditional indigenous practice).\u00a0 Throughout the CELAC documents, one encounters phrases that reflect shared Latin American values but that would encounter systematic opposition from the U.S. should any attempt be made to include them in an OAS document: calls for a \u201cpluripolar world\u201d, \u201cSouth-South cooperation\u201d, \u201cpolitical integration\u201d and \u201cstripping the world of military occupation.\u201d<\/p>\n

These documents and the many high-level discussions that preceded the creation of CELAC reflect an inescapable reality that neither the U.S. nor the Beltway \u201cexperts\u201d want to acknowledge:\u00a0 Latin America has undergone profound and lasting political transformations and is progressively breaking out of the U.S. sphere of influence. \u00a0\u00a0CELAC is the logical consequence of these transformations and appears to be destined to become the pre-eminent multilateral organization speaking for Latin America and the Caribbean.<\/p>\n

NOTE:<\/p>\n

[i] At the time of the Caracas summit, Chile and Venezuela held the Pro Tempore presidencies of the Rio Group and CALC (the Latin America and Caribbean Summit group) respectively.\u00a0 As these two groups merged and were subsequently dissolved following the creation of CELAC, both Chile and Venezuela were tasked with drafting the statutes of CELAC together.<\/p>\n

This post also appeared on Truthout<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

Go to Original \u2013 cepr.net<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The new regional organization includes every nation in the Western Hemisphere with the exception of the United States and Canada and is seen by many as a potential rival to the Washington-based Organization of American States (OAS). Though it generated a great deal of media attention within Latin America and was attended by the majority [33] of the hemisphere\u2019s heads of state, the U.S. press largely overlooked the Caracas summit with, for instance, the New York Times limiting its coverage to a brief 100 word blurb from the Associated Press.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[53],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-16252","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-latin-america-and-the-caribbean"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16252","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16252"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16252\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16252"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16252"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.transcend.org\/tms\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16252"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}